THE UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA YOLo 58, NO.6

THE 1981 GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION IN VIRGINIA

By Larry Sabato

The author, an assistant professor ofgovernment at the 49.0 percent (682,410 votes to 656,284 nearly identical percentages ofthe black vote University of Virginia, is on leave until July 1982 to serve votes). I (97.4 percent and 96.4 percent, as the Thomas Jefferson Visiting Professor at Downing Robb's victory was a comfortable and respectively)-setting modern records in College, Cambridge University, England. This article is based on a more detailed chapter of the forthcoming broad one. The Democrat carried sixty-two that area for presidential and gubernatorial volume, Virginia Votes 1979-1982, to be publishedby the of ninety-five counties and thirty-three of contenders. Institute in 1983. forty-one cities, and won nine of the ten congressional districts. Losing only the In the contest for lieutenant governor, The longest losing streak in the nation for Seventh Congressional District (in the Richard Davis eroded normally Republican a state Democratic party was finally broken Valley-Piedmont area), and that very nar­ margins practically everywhere. The Demo­ in ovember 1981 with the election to the rowly, Robb built sizeable majorities in both cratic nominee swept sixty-six of ninety-five state's three top positions of a moderate­ the Tidewater-area Fourth District and the counties and thirty-two of forty-one cities, conservative slate of Virginia Democrats. Norfolk-Virginia Beach Second District­ while also carrying eight often congressional For the first time since 1966, Democrats in and, to a lesser extent, in the far Southwest districts. His massive majorities in Tidewa­ the Old Dominion were able to garner a Ninth and the Hampton Roads-Northern ter's Second and Fourth districts (the latter victory for their candidates for high office Neck First districts. Robb's identical majori­ his home area) were the largest won by any (governor, U.S. senator, or president). ties of53.7 percent in the Northern Virginia's statewide candidate, and the former Ports­ The returns of the 1981 gubernatorial Eighth and Tenth districts approximated his mouth mayor also easily overcame minim­ election offered Virginia Democrats a statewide plurality and represented some­ mal Miller pluralities in the Southside Fifth needed opportunity not only to govern the thing of a hometown endorsement for the District and Miller's native Valley-Piedmont state but also to restore vibrancy and first Northern Virginia resident to capture Seventh District. Davis was the only momentum to their beleaguered party. But the governorship since Westmoreland Davis Democrat to carry the Richmond-area Third the strains of"Happy Days Are Here Again" in 1917. Winning margins in the usually District by a substantial margin, and he did not signal a return to the old order of Republican Richmond-area Third, South­ exceeded Robb's majorities in all districts one-party Democratic rule. Virginia is still side Fifth, and Roanoke Sixth districts (very except the Southside Fifth and Southwest strongly two-party competitive; and while slim pluralities, but remarkable nonethe­ Ninth districts. the state GOP suffered a setback in 1981, the less) rounded out Robb's strong statewide Republicans, with nine ofthe state's ten U.S. performance. Only in the attorney general's race did a representatives and one of two U.S. senators Interestingly, Robb's Virginia victory Republican candidate come close to recreat­ still in their corner, will survive to fight again closely resembles that of his famous father­ ing the electoral pattern that had kept another day. in-law, former President Lyndon B. John­ Republicans in the winner's circle for a GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS son. No other Democratic presidential dozen years. Wyatt Durrette's geographic nominee has carried Virginia since 1948; showing was much broader than that of his On November 3, 1981, Democrat Charles Johnson received 53.5 percent of the state's Republican ticketmates, particularly in Robb was elected governor with 760,357 vote in the 1964 presidential election­ Northern Virginia and the Piedmont, and he votes (53.5 percent) to Republican J. exactly the same percentage as Robb was the only Republican to run reasonably Marshall Coleman's 659,398 votes (46.4 received in 1981. The regional pattern of well in parts of Tidewater. Durrette's major percent). Democrat Richard Davis easily victory for both candidates was similar, as electoral weakness was in Southwest Virgin­ defeated Republican Nathan Miller for the Iwell as the proportion of Virginia's counties ia, where he was unable to stem the lieutenant governorship, with 750,743 votes and cities carried by the two candidates. In Democratic tide and actually did slightly (55.4 percent) to 602,714 votes (44.5 per­ addition, Johnson and Robb garnered worse than his running mates. Despite his cent). The attorney general's race was much Southwestern failure, however, Durrette did 1 Write-in votes accounted for a tenth ofa percent or less in all three forty~one closer, with Democrat Gerald Baliles edging contests. Total write-ins cast for governor were 856; for lieutenant manage to carry of ninety-five Republican Wyatt Durette by just 51.0 to governor, 621; and for attorney general, 520. counties and seventeen of forty-one cities

INSTITUTE OF GOVERNNIENT / UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA CHARLOTTESVILLE / FEBRUARY 1982 24

statewide, and to win decisively in his home TABLE 1. The Urban Vote in the 1981 Virginia General Election area of Northern Virginia even while Coleman and Miller were being swamped there. Percent of Votes Cast for Percent of Governor Lieutenant Governor Attorney General Democratic candidate Gerald Baliles was Total Vote Robb (D) Coleman (R) Davis (D) Miller (R) Ralites (D) Durrette (R) able to secure the attorney general's post by Urban Corridor a 56.9 54.4 45.6 57.3 42.7 50.3 49.7 overcoming Durrette's lead in the two Standard Metropolitan Northern Virginia districts and a similar Statistical Areas b 64.3 53.6 46.4 56.4 43.6 50.1 49.9 edge in the Valley-Piedmont Seventh Dis­ Central Cities 17.8 64.5 35.5 67.2 32.8 62.7 37.3 trict with majorities in all of the seven other Suburbs 46.5 49.5 50.5 52.3 47.7 45.4 54.6 Rural Areas c 32.3 congressional districts. While Baliles ran 53.4 46.5 53.9 46.1 53.0 46.9 several percentage points behind his ticket­ mates in most localities, thereby lending SOURCE: Compiled from official election results provided by the State Board of Elections. credence to theories that he was helped to victory by a "coattail" effect, he bettered Note: Percentages occasionally do not sum to 100 percent because write-in candidates received a fraction Robb's showing in the Richmond-area Third of a percent of the vote. District (Baliles's home district) and narrow­ Includes eighteen cities and eighteen counties located in a geographic area that stretches from Northern ly exceeded both Robb's and Davis's Virginia through Richmond to Tidewater. margins in the Southside Fifth and South­ b The nine Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs) for Virginia, as designate~ ~Y .tile l.J.'S~_ west Ninth districts. Census Bureau, are Lynchburg, Washington, D.C., Newport News:"Haiiip-~on, Norfolk-Ports.mo~th, Petersburg-Colonial Heights, Richmond, Roanoke, Charlottesville, and Danvl1le.-the last two ~elng fIrst Baliles's narrow victory completed the designated after the 1980 census. "Central cities" and "surburbs" are included In the SMSA fIgures. Democratic statewide sweep of offices and c All Virginia localities not included in either an SMSA or the Urban Corridor. produced the first "ticket election" since 1965. This fact was clearly reflected in the voting returns, as those localities that split latter a modern record, exceeding even to that of the central cities. In 1981 the their tickets by giving a plurality of votes to Robb's vote in the 1977 lieutenant gover­ suburban vote was two and one-half times candidates of different parties were unusual­ nor's contest). larger than the central city vote, about the ly rare in 1981. Just 22.8 percent of all Robb, Davis, and Baliles all carried the ,same ratio as in the 1980 presidential localities (twenty-three counties and eight Urban Corridor (an area stretching from election. This historical and demographic cities) had split tickets, compared with 55.9 Northern Virginia through Richmond to trend will almost certainly continue, at least percent in the 1977 gubernatorial electi?n Tidewater), the state's nine Standard Metro­ in the short run, suggesting again that both and 85.1 percent in the 1973 gubernatonal politan Statistical Areas, and the rural areas parties will need in the future to be even more election. of Virginia, but there are differences among electorally attentive to the suburbs. the voting patterns. Davis was the only The 1981 election also drew proportion­ Democrat to win a majority in the suburbs THE BLACK VOTE ately more voters to the polls. A total of64.9 (52.3 percent), with a margin even larger An estimated 200,000 black voters cast percent of the state's re¥istered ~oters than Robb's 51.1 percent in the 1977 ballots in one or more of the 1981 statewide participated in this electIon, setting a lieutenant governor's election. Moreover, 2 modern record. Voting participation lagged contests. These black voters were clearly a Davis led his ticketmates in the central cities, decisive factor in the outcome of all three behind only in Northern Virginia, where in rural Virginia, and in the Urban Corridor. about .S9 percent of the registered voters statewide races since blacks voted over­ By contrast, Baliles lost the suburbs substan­ whelmingly Democratic in all three contests went to the polls. This difference in partici­ tially, even though he carried the central and since the black vote total exceeded the, pation between Northern Virginia and the cities and rural areas. The fact that Baliles plurality amassed by each victorious Demo­ remainder of the state is an enduring one, was still able to forge a winning coalition crat. attributable in good measure to the fact that makes the attorney general's race the most A survey of selected black precincts Northern Virginians concentrate their inter­ demographically interesting of. the three around the state indicates that Charles Robb est on government in Washington~ D.C. contests. In the 1976 presidential race and secured about 96.4 percent of the black vote, rather than in Richmond. Even when some the 1978 election for U.S. Senate, the with Marshall Coleman receiving 3.6 per­ of the statewide candidates reside in North­ Democratic candidates had won both the cent.3 In recent years only two candidates ern Virginia, as was the case in 1981, this central cities and the rural areas but still lost have garnered lower percentages ofthe black turnout differential does not disappear. statewide because of the large GOP margin vote: U.S. Senator Harry F. Byrd in his 1970 in the suburbs. (In fact, Republican election, with 3.0 percent; and GOP presi­ Durrette's 1981 proportion of the suburban THE URBAN VOTE dential nominee Ronald Reagan in 1980, vote-54.6 percent-was even larger than with 3.4 percent. (Only four years earlier, One of the keys to Robb's victory was the that of Republicans who has won in several Coleman had won almost a third ofthe black Democrats' ability to reduce the usual previous statewide races.) Yet Baliles still vote in his race for attorney general.) The Republican majority in the suburbs, as Table won in 1981, succeeding where others had total black vote was nearly twice that of 1 indicates. Republican Coleman won the failed in fashioning a majority coalition of Robb's statewide victory margin, a fact that suburbs by the wafer-thin margin of 50.5 the central cities and the rural areas, 'underscores the importance ofthe black vote percent, compared to an average GOP primarily because his victory margin in the in an election where Robb, Davis, and majority in the suburbs over the last decade central cities was considerably larger than Baliles all lost the white vote by varying of 56.5 percent. Because the Democrats we~e that achieved by Democrats in earlier close able to neutralize the GOP's demographIC races. 2 This general estimate was arrived at by using pre-election survey base of support, the central cities and rural The ability ofRobb and Davis to blunt the data and actual turnout data for selected black precincts around the areas played a decisive role in the election, GOP's suburban strength and Baliles's state. Obviously, no precise figure can be cited. and Robb secured majorities in both. The increased margin in the central cities were 3 This survey used the same standard set of black precincts Democratic candidate carried rural Virginia essential for their victories in 1981 simply contained in the author's Virginia Votes series; for identification of these precincts, see L. Sabato, Virginia Votes 1975-/978 with 53.4 percent of the vote and the central because of the size of the suburban vote as a (Charlottesville: Institute of Government, University of Virginia, cities by almost a two-to-one margin (the proportion of the total vote, when compared 1979), p. 19. 25

margins.4 Of significance, too, is the fact that election campaign, although Coleman was demeanor-and instead began unrelentingly the proportion of registered black voters perceived as making gains in the campaign's to link Coleman to other GOP luminaries, turning out at the polls-67.5 percent­ final weeks. A number of circumstances especially President Reagan. IIi contrast, exceeded the proportion of registered white conspired to prevent Coleman from win­ Robb's media consultant, Robert Squier, voters that turned out (about 63 percent) for ning, however. took pains to introduce the electorate to the first time since 1977, and by a greater "Robb the man," allowing voters to accus­ First, and most significantly, was a split in margin than in that year. Blacks obviously tom themselves to elements of his personali­ Republican ranks and the unified posture of considered the 1981 gubernatorial election ty rarely communicated in newspapers or on state Democrats. Conservative Herbert an important one, for reasons that will be the television news. Bateman's defeat for the lieutenant gover­ discussed shortly. nor's nomination at the Republican conven­ Events in the last week ofa campaign can tion by the more moderate Nathan Miller as always be crucial to the outcome, and INTERPRETING THE RESULTS well as lingering doubts about Coleman's especially in a campaign where candidates conservatism fractured the GOP's coalition are not clearly differentiated, as in the 1981 As in any election, many superficial gubernatorial race. In this case, last-minute reasons can be identified for the Democratic with the state's independent conservative establishment, and Coleman was never able events not only affected the outcome but also victory in 1981. The races for lieutenant almost certainly expanded Robb's winning governor and attorney general are the easiest to repair the damage. By contrast, the margin. Just a week before the election, to interpret. Richard Davis's landslide usually contentious Democrats were imbued President Reagan made an appearance for victory over Nathan Miller as lieutenant with a missionary zeal, fully realizing that Coleman in Richmond, and survey data governor was tied closely to serious conflict­ another statewide defeat might turn their indicated that Reagan's strong personal of-interest charges levelled against the desperate posture into a hopeless one for the endorsement did indeed give Coleman a Republican nominee. Already in a weak near term. The party positions, then, were temporary, though short-lived, boost.5 position after a divisive convention nomina­ oddly reversed. For years Democrats had However, the Reagan visit also generated an tion over a conservative favorite, state suffered from a "majority mentality"; they unanticipated electoral movement that Senator Herbert Bateman, Miller was never had continued to act just as they had done gained momentum as the week wore on: the able to gain the offensive or successfully ride during the years of one-party Democratic galvanizing of the black vote for Coleman's out the charges during the autumn cam­ rule in the state, allowing themselves the opponent. While black leadership earlier has paign. The voting patterns suggest that even luxury of factionalism as though the Demo­ made its peace with Robb, the black in heavily Republican localities, Miller cratic nomination were still tantamount to community appeared to have little enthusi­ suffered from large numbers of abstentions election. Similarly, the Republicans had asm for the conservatively leaning Demo­ or outright defections by GOP partisans. continued to operate under a "minority mentality," submerging their differences and crat. In fact, a black write-in slate for the As for the attorney general's race, its result presenting a united front just as though they three statewide posts had emerged as a could be ascribed primarily to a coattail were still a distinctly minor force in a hostile potentially serious drain on black Demo­ effect. Robb's winning margin was suffi­ political environment. However, by 1981, cratic support in the Southside area. But ciently large to provide Gerald Baliles with years of unbroken success for Republicans Reagan's appearance for Coleman helped to an unexpected victory over his favored and of unrelieved disaster for Democrats change that. Never a favorite ofblack voters opponent, Wyatt Durrette. The attorney apparently had reversed the philosophical Reagan and his budget-cutting policies had general's race had been the most subdued of poles, producing a role reversal that pre­ become increasingly unpopular among the three statewide contests, overshadowed saged the final election results. blacks during 1981. Coupled with Reagan's by the boisterous gubernatorial election and visit was a strong endorsement of Coleman the scandal-charged lieutenant governor's Coleman faced other major problems as by former govenor Mills E. Godwin, Jr., race. Both Baliles and Durrette were well. His opponent had no extensive public another highly unpopular figure in the black regarded as serious, competent, and expe­ record; and since Robb's only public office, community, who emphasized Robb's "pro­ rienced contenders who had conducted that of lieutenant governor, is a showcase ?lack" positions on several racially tinged generally positive campaigns. Durrette, position where few substantive decisions Issues (postcard voter registration, congres­ however, was regarded as the likely winner need to be made, proving Robb's "liberal­ sional representation for the District of because he was the undisputed choice of the ism" and tying him to unpopular Democrats Columbia, and minority hiring quotas). In "conservative coalition," the only one ofthe became a very difficult task for Coleman. retrospect, Godwin's emotionally charged three Republican nominees to have pre­ Moreover, Robb was a man whose very speech backfired, accomplishing little for served the GOP's winning formula. (Indeed, temperament and essence were conservative establish~ Coleman in the overwhelmingly white even Roy Smith, leader of the independent a fact clearly sensed by the state's suburbs while providing a spark to Robb's "Virginians for Robb" forces, was in the ment, who saw in Robb no threat to the elite. get-out-the-vote efforts in minority neigh­ Durrette Camp.) But the electorate never Robb's stolid manner and handsome visage borhoods. In addition, the Reagan-Godwin focused on the attorney general's race; and also gave him an advantage over Coleman in combination probably kept black defections with either candidate viewed as acceptable, television appearances. to the write-in slate to an absolute min­ Robb's margin in the end proved decisive. Coleman's image was considerably less imum.6 Unlike the attorney general's contest, the reassuring, and his image-makers were governor's race was very visible and media partly at fault. A man ofconsiderable charm Two other last-minute events probably oriented, and there is reason to think that it and self-deprecating humor, Coleman was expanded Robb's victory margin. On elec­ was also closely contested until the final advised to tone down his wit and to tion eve, when undecided and independent hour.s of the campaign. Robb had led every deemphasize the elements of his personality pubhc poll conducted during the general and style that were not in keeping with the 5 The data were compiled during a Virginian-Pi/ot poll of 1,655 comprehensively conservative image he adult Virginians; the results are discussed in the Virginian-Pilot. 4 With black voter turnout estimated at 200,000, and with 97 "needed" to win. Similarly, his television Nov. I, 1981, p. A-I. percent of that number participating in the governor's contest, advertising program, after having built his Robb received an estimated 96.4 percent ofthe black vote, or about. name identification to a level approaching 6 Cora Tucker of Halifax County, the black write-in candidate for 187,000 votes. Of the remaining white vote, Robb received 46.7 Robb's, skipped the crucial middle step of governor, received just 526 votes, while her running mates, percent to Coleman's 53.3 percent. Using the same method of lieutenant governor candidate Jesse Jeffress of Lynchburg and calculation, Davis secured 49.6 percent of the white vote, while ?efining Coleman as an individual, offilling attorney general candidate James Ghee of Farmville, secured only Baliles won 44.6 percent. In the outline of Coleman's personality and 393 and 380 votes, respectively. 26

~oters traditionally are paying close atten­ CONCLUSIONS million compared to Coleman's approxi­ tion to the contest that they will decide on the mately $2.83 million. An examination of the underlying causes morrow, the Reverend Jerry Falwell broke ~he third ingredient of the Democratic of the Democratic resurgence in Virginia's his self-imposed silence and announced in a ~ecIpe for recovery was reduced factional­ 1981 election reveals that the Democrats radio interview that he would vote for the IS~. That, too, was finally achieved in 1981, returned to a fully competitive position entire Republican ticket. It was an an­ maInly because ofthe do-or-die nature ofthe be~ause they fulfilled a three-ingredient nouncement that Republican strategists had contest for the Democrats. The coalition reCIpe for recovery. feare~ because of Falwell's unpopularity, assembled by Robb in 1981 rivals the one especIally among the crucial suburban First of all, the Democrats nominated that elected Mills Godwin as a Democrat in ca~didates ~ith ~pulatio~.7 The endorsement, widely car­ moderate suburban appeal. 1965, stretching as it did from the conserva­ !he~ ~Ied on radIo and television, came so late that recognIzed that In conservative Virgin­ ~ive coalition to blacks, elements of organ­ Ia, lIberal candidates normally are doomed It coUI~ not be defused or mitigated by other Ized labor, and liberals.9 The Robb "umbrel­ to general election defeats. They saw that campaIgn events; in fact, it was virtually the ~a" sheltered a diverse group of political only more moderate candidates would be last new piece of information that undecided Interests, all of which were there for different able ,to .reduce the massive Republican voters received before the election. rea~ons. Robb had. to walk a tightrope marg~ns In the politically potent suburbs­ Fi?~lly, there was Robb's thirty-minute d~nng the campaIgn to preserve this margIns that had fueled GOP victories for a televIsIon program on election eve where d~sparate coalition; governing will present to Robb, i~ a relaxed family setting,' talked dozen years, even in years when Democrats hIm much the same challenge. about hIS campaign and answered the managed to amass large majorities in the The recipe for recovery worked for state questions of a friendly audience. While central cities and rural Virginia. In the Democrats in 1981, and Democrats were lengthy political broadcasts are considered Rob?-Davi -Baliles ticket, the Democrats able to regain the vibrancy and momentum a nomInated a team that fit the recipe precise­ relatively ineffective, one exception is an p~rt~ ~eeds to ~ai.ntainitselfand to prosper. ly. electi~n-eve broadcast.8 Voters (especially ':IrgInIa now IS fIrmly two-party competi­ Second, t~e Democratic party began to undecideds) are exceptionally attentive then tive, and becoming more so. The 1981 House c.lose a yawnIng technological and organiza­ since voting is on their agenda of activitie~ of Delegates elections suggest as much with tional gap between its own capabilities and for the following day. Robb's election-eve Republican,S po ting a gain there of'eight that of the state GOP. The Robb campaign program, which did not compete with any seats despIte the statewide Democratic was able either to match or to exceed the similar Coleman broadcast, may have sweep. While the gubernatorial election Cole~~n ~ampaign's helped to solidify his partisans and attract to media and polling results were a setback to the state GOP, the sophIstication, and the Democrats came his camp some remaining undecideds strengthened two-party competition can closer to the level of the Republicans' get­ particularly in the suburbs (the program'~ only be regarded as good news for the state out-the-vote activities than ever before in the appeal seemed especially directed to that a.s a wh.o!e, because a healthy and competi­ modern e~a. The. onl~ campaign technique group). tIve polItIcal system offers the best chance of that remaIned pnmanly a GOP preserve in good government. The Old Dominion's 198.1, was direct mail; the Republican 7 In a September Virginian-Pilot poll, Falwell received an electorate, just as it had done in the GOP's overwhelmingly negative rating, the highest of any public figure maIlIngs were much better designed and gub.ernatorial breakthrough in 1969, once recorded in the poll. When asked whether they felt "positive, more effectively targeted than the Demo­ agaIn helped to preserve and extend two­ neutral, or negative" about Falwell, 54 percent of the respondents cratic variety. In good measure the Robb said "negative," while only 10 percent answered "positive" (20 party competition in 1981. That i a welcome campaign was able to accompli~h so much. percent were neutral, 10 percent didn't know Falwell, and 6 percent development for Virginians ofall ideological refused to answer). Interestingly, suburbanite and city dwellers, technologically because of its fund-raising and partisan hues. whose polit!cal views are often dramatically different from each success. For the first time since the 1973 other, felt equally negative about Falwell. gubernatorial election, Democratic cam­ 8 See the author's The Rise ofPolitical Consultants: New Ways of Winning Elections ( ew York: Basic Books, 1981), pp. 122, 189, paign expen?itures approached the Republi­ 9 While Robb was denied the AFL-CIO endorsement, he was 190, 192, and 210n. can tota.!, WIth Robb spending about $2.45 supported by many individual unions.

Entered as second-class matter EWS Charlottesville, Virginia LETTER

. (ISSN 0042-0271) Edjtor / James A.. (Dotph~ Norton AssistantEditor I Sandnr~H. Wiley Publist,ed Jn9ntbly by, the Institute of Govern­ ~ent, Urtiversity ofVirginia, Cbariotte$ville, Virgin.. 1a 22903. Theviews andopinionsexpressed herein are those of ~he au~bors, and are notto