Sabato Highlights✰✰✰ 5 ✰ The 2001General Election ✰✰ ✰Democrats Recapture Governorship after Eight Years Out

Overall ☑ Aft er eight years out of power, the Democrats reclaimed the governorship with Mark Warner and also secured the lieutenant governor’s post with Tim Kaine. Both won narrow victories, 52.2 percent for Warner and 50.3 percent for Kaine. ☑ The Republicans triumphed in down-ballot races, however. Jerry Kilgore cap- tured the offi ce of attorney general with the largest statewide percentage of the winners, 60 percent. And the GOP collected a startling 64 seats out of 100 in the House of Delegates (66, counting two conservative Independents who usu- ally vote with the Republicans). It was only in 1999 that Republicans elected their fi rst House of Delegates majority, a “mere” 53 seats. Redistricting earlier in 2001 produced most of the electoral gains, of course.

Statewide Offi ces ☑ Over 1.9 million Virginians cast ballots in 2001, an eight percent gain from the last governor’s election in 1997 but only 46 percent of registered voters and 36 percent of those aged 18 and older. ☑ Warner and Kaine won over six in ten votes in the more liberal central cities, but McEachin secured a surprisingly low 54 percent in the cities. Warner nar- rowly won suburban Virginia and also scored a breakthrough in the rural areas, with over 51 percent of their votes. Kilgore swamped McEachin in both the rural areas and the suburbs. Katzen garnered small margins in both rural and suburban areas, but it could not overcome Kaine’s large central-city majority. ☑ All three Democrats exceeded 90 percent in black- majority precincts across Virginia. Mark Earley had won 16 percent in his successful contest for attorney general in 1997, but that proportion declined to seven percent in 2001. ☑ One Election Day “exit poll” showed a substantial gender gap, as usual. Warner won women, 53 percent to 39 percent, with men favoring Earley by a smaller 49 percent to 44 percent. Earley won the votes of whites by just 50 percent to

121 44 percent; a Democrat in Virginia needs only about 40 percent of the white vote to win statewide. ☑ A tiny four percent of Democrats defected to Mark Earley, but 11 percent of Republicans voted for the Democrat Warner. Warner also carried Independents by 56 percent to 34 percent.

House of Delegates ☑ An amazing 278 collective years of seniority was lost to the House of Delegates in a single election. Of the 100 incumbents, just 78 were returned to offi ce (17 had voluntarily retired, and another 6 were defeated at the polls—5 of the 6 in the general election). ☑ For the fi ft h consecutive legislative election, Republicans secured an absolute majority of the statewide vote and their largest proportion ever (55.5 percent). Democrats recorded their lowest percentage in modern times (39.1 percent).

Campaign Finance ☑ The six statewide candidates on the November ballot spent a massive $39 mil- lion—a 59 percent increase over 1997. ☑ Warner outspent Earley by $19.9 million to $11.5 million, and once all Warner campaign committees are added to the mix, his money edge grew to $22.5 mil- lion to $11.5 million (approaching a two-to- one ratio). ☑ Nearly $13.4 million was spent on all campaigns for the House of Delegates in 2001; when added to the statewide candidates’ war chests, the year’s total reached a staggering $53 million, easily an all-time record. ☑ Republican House of Delegates candidates outspent the Democrats by 56 per- cent to 39 percent—a proportion very close to the percentage of votes received by each legislative party.

122 Virginia Votes ✰ 1999–2002 ✰✰✰ 5 ✰ The 2001General Election ✰✰ ✰Democrats Recapture Governorship after Eight Years Out

ver the course of the last decade, the Virginia Republican party won just about ev- Oerything: all presidential contests; the governorship, lieutenant governorship, and attorney general’s post; both U.S. Senate seats; eight of eleven U.S. House seats; and both houses of the General Assembly. Democrats had begun to despair that Virginia had moved so strongly into the GOP column that its nominees were no longer com- petitive. The 2001 elections proved those fears exaggerated. Mark Warner rescued his party from a dismal fate and carried in a Democratic lieutenant governor with him. Still, Republicans had reason to be pleased, or less displeased than they would otherwise have been. The race for governor was closer than many polls had predicted, and the lieutenant governor’s election was a squeaker. The Republican candidate for attorney general captured the only landslide of Election Day, and Warner’s coattails proved completely insuffi cient to do anything about a Republican near- sweep of close House of Delegates contests; the GOP captured a massive 64 seats, a gain of 12—a greater total than their own party leaders had dreamed possible. Both parties could be partly satisfi ed with the 2001 results, then, and so could the citizenry, since vigorous two- party competition is one major key to long- term good government. For Democrats, though, the victories were especially sweet. Written off as a spent force only a year earlier, they proved fully capable of capturing the state’s highest offi ce against the odds in conservative Virginia. The Virginia Democratic breakthrough had regional and national implica- tions, too. Combined with Democrat James McGreevey’s landslide victory in the nation’s only other gubernatorial contest in New Jersey, Warner’s triumph suggested that Democrats could win under the most hostile of conditions—in a time of war, with the Republican president at stratospheric popularity levels, and (in Warner’s case) in a conservative, Republican-leaning state. Regionally, there was also good news for Democrats. The 2001 result in Virginia meant that for the fi rst time since 1994, Democrats would control a majority of the Southern governors. Just since 1998, moderate- conservative Democrats wrested state- houses from Republicans in Alabama (1998), South Carolina (1998), Mississippi (1999), and Virginia (2001), while losing only one Southern governorship to the Republicans, Florida in 1998. This substantial comeback for the Democrats was espe- cially noteworthy since the South is clearly the most Republican of all American geo- graphic regions in modern times. Yet that nature reasserted itself in 2002 and 2003, when the GOP reclaimed the governorships in Alabama, South Carolina, and Mississippi.1

1. The successful Democrats, other than Warner, were Don Seigelman (Alabama), Jim Hodges (South Carolina), and Ronnie Musgrove (Mississippi). Jeb Bush is the GOP exception in Florida. But

123 General Election Campaign

Even before September 11 irrevocably changed the political climate, and most ev- erything else in America, the 2001 campaign for governor in Virginia was unusually quiet, even dull. Partly, this was by Democratic design. Simply by virtue of being a Democrat, Mark Warner was presumed to be on the wrong side of many social and economic issues in conservative Virginia. “Quiet” meant that Warner was steadily reassuring voters that he would not raise broad-based taxes, would not spend money recklessly, would preserve Second Amendment rights, would uphold the traditional family, and generally would govern as a classically cautious Virginia businessman: no tumult, no upheaval, and “bipartisan administration.” Even on abortion, his one truly liberal position, Warner pointed to the Republican legislature and suggested he would not change the status quo and might merely veto further restrictions on abortion. Except on economic development, education, and transportation, Warner seemed to be saying, “You won’t even know that I’m there.” His well- funded and or- ganized campaign methodically reached out to every identifi able Democratic, inde- pendent, moderate Republican, and nonpartisan constituency. He started substantial television and radio advertising in August, and save for the period immediately aft er September 11, never went “dark” (off - air) until November 6. Particularly memorable was Warner’s outreach to rural Virginia, where Democrats had been electorally hammered statewide since 1989. In his Senate run in 1996, Mark Warner had done better than expected, winning 50.8 percent of the rural vote. However, an angry Oliver North constituency was somewhat responsible; the 1994 North vot- ers, concentrated in downstate rural areas, were determined to seek revenge against U.S. Senator John Warner, who abandoned Republican Senate nominee North in order to back Independent Marshall Coleman.2 In 2001, Warner reconnected with rural citi- zens through extensive campaigning in Southside and Southwest localities. He focused on their economic plight and relatively high unemployment rates. He became the most pro-gun rights Democratic candidate for governor since Gerald Baliles in 1985, know- ing that hunting and fi shing is a way of rural life. He organized an active “Sportsmen for Warner” group, and their blaze orange signs seemed to be everywhere. His colorful Roanoke supporter, Dave “Mudcat” Saunders, wrote a bluegrass song that was omni- present on appropriate TV and radio media markets. The lyrics, sung to “Dooley,” hailed Warner as a “good ol’ boy from up in Nova- ville,” and went in part: Mark Warner is ready to lead our Commonwealth, He’ll work for mountain people and economic health. Get ready to shout it, fr om the coalmines to the stills, “Here comes Mark Warner—the hero of the hills!” Warner . . . for public education, Warner . . . what a reputation, Warner . . . vote in this election, To keep our children home. As the election results would show, all the eff ort worked well enough. It added a few percentage points in most rural cities and counties, substantially cutting the usual GOP margins there.

in 2002 Seigelman lost to Bob Riley (R) and Hodges was denied a second term by Mark Sanford (R). In 2003 Musgrove lost a re-election bid to Haley Barbour (R). 2. See: Chapter 4 of Larry J. Sabato’s Virginia Votes 1991–1994 (Weldon Cooper Center for Public Service: 1995), pp. 91–132.

124 Virginia Votes ✰ 1999–2002 Meanwhile, Mark Earley was much less visible. He was broke early on from the contested nomination battle—and also from his lack of attention to serious fund- raising during his fi rst years as attorney general. His party was divided both because of the budget impasse and his battle with John Hager. Earley made both situations worse for himself along the way. First, he refused to take much of a public stand on the budget, other than (without fanfare) urging the factions to settle. Arguably, Earley would have been better off either, siding fully with Governor Gilmore and making the car tax cut battle his own, or more likely, by insisting that Gilmore agree to perhaps a 60 percent car tax cut—halfway between the GOP Senate’s preferred 50 percent and Gilmore’s 70 percent. If he had followed Gilmore, Earley could have more credibly campaigned as Gilmore’s natural successor, the populist fi ghter for the “working people of Virginia.” If he had forged a compromise, then Earley would have been viewed as courageous, willing to turn up his nose at the substantial campaign cash from Gilmore’s Republican National Committee in order to do the sensible thing in the face of economic uncertainty. (It is questionable whether Gilmore could have denied him the RNC money anyway, especially if Earley’s poll ratings had im- proved as a result of his stand.) Even more inexplicably, Earley refused to intercede to strengthen his own ticket. Once John Hager accepted the likelihood of his defeat for the gubernato- rial slot, he privately made clear to Earley and others that he was willing to run for re- election as lieutenant governor. A quirk in the party rules permitted him to do so,3 and the combined strengths of the Earley and Hager delegates—even with sub- stantial defections—could have engineered this ticket. Virtually everyone outside of a few holdouts in the Earley camp, including a concerned Warner campaign, un- derstood that Hager’s re- nomination would dramatically strengthen and reunite the GOP ticket. This was especially true given that the only other candidate for the sec- ond slot was a weak candidate, Jay Katzen, whose constituency in the Republican right- wing heavily overlapped Earley’s own. Once again, Earley’s innate cautiousness (and perhaps his dislike for Hager) prevented him from acting in his own self-interest. Earley said nothing, Hager persisted in a divisive battle, a second- rate candidate was nominated for lieutenant governor, and many of Hager’s business backers proceeded to give money and support to Warner in the general election. Boldness is required to win a diffi cult election, and in the cases of the budget impasse and the nomination for lieutenant governor, Earley proved himself completely bereft of that crucial quality. The fl oundering Earley eff ort made a critical mid- summer decision that fur- ther weakened his cause. Instead of telling Earley’s remarkable personal story and selecting one or more policy issues as the positive centerpiece of the campaign, the Earley high command decided to go heavily negative. Their goal was simple: to de- fi ne Warner and his running mates as “the most liberal ticket in Virginia history.” A detailed mailer replete with dozens of newspaper citations that enforced this mes- sage was widely circulated to the press and activists. But there were several problems. While Warner’s primary ticket nominees were quite liberal on issues such as the death penalty, gay rights, and gun control, Warner had taken great pains—literally from primary election night—to separate himself from their views. They were on their

3. The Republican Party of Virginia scrapped rules that had required Republican candidates to formally fi le for the offi ces of governor, lieutenant governor, and attorney general by February 1, 2001. A lawyer for the party determined that GOP offi cials had violated the rules by failing to publish a legal notice at least seven days before the fi ling deadline. The committee decided to open the nominating process to other candidates, giving Hager the maneuvering room he needed to run again for lieutenant governor. For more information, see: Michael Sluss, “Hager Still in Race for Governor Nomination; Rules Fumble Allowed Bid for Re-election as Lieutenant Governor,” Roanoke Times, May 8, 2001, B1.

CHAPTER 5 ✰ The 2001General Election 125 own, said Warner, and they’ll have to defend their views by themselves. The move may have been unpleasant for Kaine and McEachin, but it was eff ective for Warner. Secondly Warner had worked for years to build up rural credibility on guns and other conservative lightning rods, and his credibility seemed to hold. Thirdly the GOP booklet crudely exaggerated the views of the Democrats in some cases, using ellipses to leave out qualifying phrases in quotations.4 Roundly condemned by newspapers of all stripes, the Earley gambit failed miserably, and gave Warner the justifi cation to attack Earley throughout the fall as a “negative campaigner” with no positive vi- sion for Virginia. Warner had claimed the high ground and weathered the inevitable broadside against his newfound conservatism. On Labor Day, Warner had a lead in the polls and was on the off ensive. And then came September 11. Naturally, as the nation reeled from the shock and horror of a modern Pearl Harbor, all conventional politics ceased. In Virginia, as in New York City and New Jersey, the candidates withdrew their advertisements and themselves, entering into a “Twilight Zone” of seclusion. (Eerily, the three locales with the highest profi le elections in 2001 were the ones most aff ected by 9-11.) Both Virginia “Marks” cautiously avoided crass com- mentary, quietly assessed the implications for their candidacies, and privately sought expert opinions on when to resume their electoral ventures. Views were sharply di- vided. Some believed that Warner would benefi t since he was ahead and the cam- paign had been frozen in place, preventing any Earley attempts to make up ground quickly by means of hard- hitting negative attacks. Others saw an opening for Earley. As President Bush’s and Governor Gilmore’s ratings soared, fellow Republican Earley could possibly get a lift . Also, as citizens rallied around tested leaders, especially in- cumbents, the nominee of the incumbent party might fi nally be able to capitalize on the contrast between his fourteen years in public offi ce and Warner’s absence of elective experience. Similarly, pundits disagreed on the electorate’s taste for politics in a post 9-11 world. Some said the campaign was eff ectively over, as voters would tune out everything but the war on terrorism, resulting in a dramatically lower turnout. Others insisted a wave of patriotism would encourage voters to pay closer attention and turn out to vote in record numbers. As it happened, not much happened. Just 7 days aft er 9-11, the candidates ten- tatively reappeared on the campaign trail, speaking at forums and airing mild, posi- tive, unity-oriented television ads. Within two weeks, negative ads were popping up again on both sides. The issues barely changed, and both candidates seemed to agree on backing President Bush, supporting the war, and developing security plans for the state. Moreover, as we shall see, turnout was fairly stable compared with the past three gubernatorial elections, neither expanding nor withering much. In essence, the voters apparently indicated that the work of democracy must continue, and they were able to separate the overriding federal security issue from the separate state issues of education, transportation, taxes, and the like. Two debates helped to re- start the conventional campaign. The fi rst, held October 3 in Richmond, was moderated by the always- colorful former Governor L. Douglas Wilder. According to the Warner campaign, the Democratic nominee (who served as Wilder’s nominal 1989 campaign manager) had already received private assurances of Wilder’s endorsement once the debate was

4. For example, Mark Warner is quoted as saying in an October 2, 1996 issue of The Virginian-Pilot: “We’ve got to put off tax relief …” Those little ellipses turn out to be crucial. What Warner actually said was: “We’ve got to put off tax relief until we’ve got our fi scal house in order.” See the Virginian -Pilot edi- torial from September 1, 2001 entitled “Abortion, Gay Rights Aren’t What This Election Is About,” p. B8. See also: Michael Sluss, “Democrats Decry Republican Ad Campaign; Warner Cites Brochure With Out-of-Context Quotes, Unexplained Excerpts,” Roanoke Times, September 8, 2001, p. A1.

126 Virginia Votes ✰ 1999–2002 over. To Warner’s surprise, though, Wilder pummeled Warner during the debate, inter- rupting him repeatedly and demanding that he clarify his somewhat murky positions on taxes and guns, among other things. Wilder barely laid a glove on Earley, a much smoother debater who was the consensus winner in this two-against- one match-up. The last debate, and the only one scheduled for statewide television and C- SPAN broadcast, was to occur on October 7, an unusually early fi nale preferred by the Warner team. The start of the war in Afghanistan caused a last-minute cancellation, however, and the debate sponsors, the Virginia Capitol Correspondents Association and the University of Virginia Center for Politics, were forced into round-the- clock renegotiations for a make- up date. Mark Warner attempted to use the cancellation as an excuse to duck a prime-time, statewide television encounter, but almost universal press condemnation forced him to capitulate. The debate was held in Roanoke at host station WDBJ7 (CBS) on October 10. This time, ironically—given his reluc- tance to come—Warner improved his performance and fought to a draw with Earley. The draw stopped dead any momentum Earley may have generated in the Wilder debate. The next day, in a press conference announced just before the second debate, Wilder endorsed Warner to be his successor as governor.5 The fi nal month of the campaign lacked real drama and seemed to be on au- topilot, much to the advantage of Mark Warner. His massive spending, with a two- to- one lead over Earley, enabled the Democrat to dominate the airwaves. (Financing will be discussed later on.) The editorial press was substantially on the Democrat’s side, especially the Washington Post. The 800- pound gorilla of journalism in Virginia was even more emphatically Democratic than usual; the Earley campaign insisted that the editorial spin was fully matched by a bias that resonated in the news pages throughout the election.6 Joining the Post in endorsing the Democrat were two other large-circulation downstate papers, the Norfolk Virginian- Pilot and the Roanoke Times. (Earley was favored by the more conservative Richmond Times- Dispatch and the Washington Times.) The newspaper polls were also unanimous in showing a Warner lead, with the Post and the Times-Dispatch showing a massive Warner margin that did not materialize on Election Day. (Polling is dissected in a subsequent sec- tion.) Finally, manifestations of the GOP split were everywhere in the fi nal weeks. Moderate- to- liberal Republican politicians, such as Senator Warren Barry of Fairfax, Delegate Panny Rhodes of Richmond, and former Governor Linwood Holton, pub- licly endorsed the Democrat. (Holton’s son-in- law was Tim Kaine, and Holton had backed Democrats before; nonetheless, his TV ad for Warner was widely cited as eff ective and persuasive with the old “mountain- valley” Republicans whence Holton came.) Many of John Hager’s business supporters not only defected to Warner, they contributed money to him. A large committee of Republicans and Independents called “Virginians for Warner,” headed by former GOP National Committeewoman Judy Peachee Ford—who had once played a major role in electing Governor Mills Godwin in 1973, U.S. Senator John Warner in 1978, and U.S. Senator Paul Trible in

5. The Warner campaign shrewdly scheduled the Wilder endorsement at this time in order to blunt any advantage gained by Earley in the second debate, had the latter won it. Wilder’s unqualifi ed backing of Warner generated even larger headlines than usual because of his roughing up of Warner in the fi rst debate. It may also be true that Wilder, who had publicly asked to host the last debate but was rebuff ed by Warner, may have been evening up the score in his debate—as Wilder has been wont to do over the years. Machiavellian politics are alive and well in Virginia, as everywhere else. 6. This is hardly the fi rst time serious charges of news bias have been leveled at the Washington Post in a Virginia campaign. See for example the analysis of the Post’s own ombudsman, Richard Harwood, concerning the paper’s pro-Wilder spin in the 1989 gubernatorial election: Richard Harwood, “Tilt! Tilt! Tilt!” Washington Post, November 19, 1989, p. D6.

CHAPTER 5 ✰ The 2001General Election 127 1982—had a high media profi le. There was no comparable “Democrats for Earley,” though a group of 16 African American ministers did support his candidacy.7 Of great importance, President Bush declined to campaign for his party’s can- didates in Virginia—a stunning abandonment that left many senior Republicans grumbling privately. While Bush, hovering from 80 to 90 percent in job approval aft er September 11, did send out a letter to activists and record a get-out- the- vote telephone message, his failure even to cut a TV or radio spot for Earley was a clear sig- nal of the White House’s lack of confi dence in the nominee’s ability to win. The Bush staff cited the president’s busy schedule—though he went to a World Series game and continued to exercise one to two hours per day. They also pointed to Bush’s desire to stay above the partisan fray in wartime; however, Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, Richard Nixon, and George H.W. Bush had campaigned extensively for their party’s candidates during foreign confl icts, with no ill eff ects. True, Bush never appeared for the GOP candidates in New York or New Jersey either, but Bush had far more pull in GOP- leaning Virginia than in the heavily Democratic Northeast. More likely, one suspects that Bush simply did not want to be associated with a loser. Republican National Committee polls, helpfully leaked directly to a receptive Washington Post reporter by a close Gilmore associate at the RNC, showed Earley behind Warner by 10-12 percentage points as the campaign drew to a close. Whether Bush could have elected Earley with a one-day downstate stump- ing tour of Hampton Roads, Richmond, and Roanoke is unknowable but tantaliz- ing. Chances are that the president would at least have made the contest closer, and possibly given a tight race to GOP lieutenant governor candidate Katzen. Instead, Earley was reduced to airing on the fi nal weekend an unconvincing endorsement spot from New York Mayor Rudy Giuliani. It was obvious that Giuliani barely knew Earley. The Yankee mayor of the New York—while a national hero—could barely swing an election for mayor in his own city, much less Virginia. Virginians might give money to Rudy for his city, but they were unlikely to give his candidate their votes in a state they knew far better than he possibly could.

Bellwether Localities

Prior to Election Day, many reporters, analysts, and political junkies were busy handi- capping the race for governor. Polling, of course, is one way to predict the outcome. But polling changes with the wind and more oft en than not misses the mark. Another way to try to fi gure out what is likely to happen is by looking at history. There are “bellwether” cities and counties that always or almost always have voted with the winner of the Governor’s Mansion in Virginia’s modern two- party era, which began in 1969 with the election of the state’s fi rst Republican governor since the 1880s, Linwood Holton. Out of the 95 counties and 39 independent cit- ies that currently exist in the Commonwealth, exactly TWO localities had gotten it right every single time.8 Surprisingly, these localities are not found in the Old Dominion’s heartland, but in the region considered—at least by down-staters—to be the most liberal and

7. Tyler Whitley, “Black Pastors’ Group Backs Earley,” Richmond Times-Dispatch, October 5, 2001, p. B4. 8. Excerpts of this article were originally published in the Richmond Times-Dispatch: “Look To Bellwethers For Trends,” September 23, 2001, p. E1. For more information, see the UVa Center for Politics’ website, http: // www.centerforpolitics.org under “Featured Publications.”

128 Virginia Votes ✰ 1999–2002 least representative, Northern Virginia. The small city of Fairfax and the gargantuan county of Fairfax have picked every governor in the eight elections between 1969 and 1997. In addition to the twin Fairfaxes, there were 18 near- bellwethers going into the 2001 election. Five cities and thirteen counties had chosen the winner in seven of eight elections: the cities of Franklin, Galax, Lexington, Newport News, and Salem, and the counties of Bedford, Bland, Fluvanna, Gloucester, Lunenberg, Madison, Middlesex, Montgomery, Orange, Prince Edward, Prince William, Southampton, and Wythe. In most cases, these localities have a closely split political personality. They are com- petitive with a substantial base of support for both Democrats and Republicans, yet neither party claims a solid majority of residents. Swing Independents, moving from side to side with regularity, determine the identity of successful candidates there. Also, with the exceptions of the city of Newport News and Montgomery County, the near- bellwethers are not heavily populated, and they are geographically scattered. At the other end of the spectrum were the eight anti-bellwethers: Charles City, Greensville, New Kent, Norfolk, Petersburg, Portsmouth, Prince George, and Surry. These three cities and fi ve counties had the state’s worst record for picking winners— just three of the last eight governors between 1969 and 1997. With the exceptions of New Kent and Prince George counties, the anti- bellwethers were heavily Democratic with a large African American constituency; they voted only for the three successful Democratic governors in the 1980s.9 The odds were substantial that, as a group, the bellwethers and near-bellwethers would probably be right again. Thus, the press and academics were justifi ed in sending reporters and researchers into these localities to test sentiments before the November vote. However, consider this: before the 1997 election, there were four, not two, perfect bellwethers. Even though Governor Jim Gilmore carried the vast majority of all the state’s localities (106 of the then-135), he lost the small cities of Franklin and Lexington, which since 1969 had been totally on the money. Great confi dence in any single bellwether, then, is misplaced. Even in the most accurate localities, the propor- tion of the votes given to the winning candidates has oft en not closely mirrored the statewide vote. For instance, Galax was 13.4 percent under the statewide average for Doug Wilder in 1989; Fairfax County voted 6.7 percent under the statewide average for George Allen in 1993; and Prince William was 7.2 percent over the average for Jim Gilmore in 1997. Still, the crown heading into 2001 belonged to “Fairfax squared,” and it is an impressive and highly selective title in Virginia. Our neighbor to the south, North Carolina, has many more bellwethers. Twenty- six counties there have picked the presidential winner consistently from 1968 to 2000.10 (There are 100 counties in North Carolina, only a slightly larger number than in Virginia.) How did the bellwethers perform in 2001? Once again, both Fairfax city and county correctly picked the winning candidate, retaining their perfect record. Of the 18 near-bellwethers, nine improved on their record to 8 of 9: Galax, Prince Edward, Salem, Montgomery, Newport News, Lunenberg, Southampton, Franklin city and Lexington. Buoyed by a Democratic victory, 6 of the 9 localities on the other end of the scale (Greensville, Surry, Norfolk, Portsmouth, Petersburg, and Charles City)

9. See the UVa Center for Politics’ website, http: // www.centerforpolitics.org, for a more ac- curate listing of the localities, in the order of most bellwether-like (Fairfax County) to least (Charles City County). 10. See: Eric Johnson, “North Carolina’s Presidential Bellwethers,” N.C. Data Net (June 2001): 1–3.

CHAPTER 5 ✰ The 2001General Election 129 picked up a win in 2001 and shed their “anti-bellwether” label. The Virginia localities that have the worst record since 1969 in gubernatorial elections are the counties of New Kent and Prince George, and the city of Poquoson.11

The Ten Keys to the Governor’s Mansion

The fundamentals of the fall campaign are summarized in the “Ten Keys to the Governor’s Mansion,” a predictive tool that made its debut in the 1993 Virginia Votes analysis. Since 1969, the party with a net advantage among the ten keys has invariably captured the governorship (see Table 5.01).12 The keys once again pointed the way to victory, though it took longer than usual for all these indicators to become clear, in part because the race was exceptionally slow to jell and also due to the tragic events of September 11. Prior to 9- 11 the economy was unquestionably weakening—never a good omen for a party in power—but aft er the terrorist attacks the state and national economy took a quick slide into full- blown recession. Whatever their cause, bad times breed a desire for change in the electorate. Democrat Warner also had signifi cant advantages in party unity, campaign money, and perhaps most of all, one of the election’s dominant circumstances: the GOP- induced budget impasse which was an embarrassing, indelible scarlet letter for Earley from start to fi nish. Also notable were two normally Republican keys which Warner turned neutral for the ’01 campaign. The Democrat’s overfl owing war chest helped his party compensate for its usual lack of a fi rst-rate canvassing and get-out- the- vote eff ort to match the time-tested GOP machinery. Also Governor Jim Gilmore, despite soaring popularity in the wake of 9- 11, was unable to transfer any of it to his party’s chosen successor. Wisely or unwisely, Earley consistently kept his distance from the budget-scarred executive, and Gilmore himself demonstrated something of a paradox in public and private opinion polls: a large majority approved of his job performance, but a plurality also thought the state was on the wrong track and wanted a change at the top. (Much the same mix- and- match views were observed in the 2000 presiden- tial election, with the electorate simultaneously satisfi ed with President Clinton’s job performance but weary of the scandalous aspects of his tenure.) In any event, Gilmore—who was deeply frustrated at Earley’s obvious reluc- tance to bring him into the battle—could do little more than shovel RNC money in Earley’s direction during fall 2001. The campaign featured no “scandals” lasting more than a news cycle or two, and neither of the candidates had a special edge in personality appeal. Earley’s governmental experience and articulate delivery were off set by Warner’s stress on his business background and his high- energy search to be “hired” for the job. The Republican was not without his keys, foremost among them his long apprenticeship in elective offi ce. Virginians are an orderly, hierarchical people who normally prefer their governors well trained. In the whole of the 20th century, only three times did men without a public offi ce background capture the governorship: Henry Carter Stuart (D) in 1913,13 Westmoreland Davis (D) in 1917

11. Poquoson was not incorporated as a city until 1975, and therefore can be measured as win- ning only 3 of the last 7 gubernatorial elections 12. See Virginia Votes 1991–1994, pp. 74–78. Footnote 26 on page 75 discusses one published antecedent for the phrase, “Keys to the Governor’s Mansion.” 13. Stuart was elected a delegate to the 1901–1902 Constitutional Convention, but did not serve in any other elected offi ce prior to his term as governor.

130 Virginia Votes ✰ 1999–2002 TABLE 5.01 The Ten Keys to the Governor’s Mansion, 2001 YEAR 1969 1973 1977 1981 1985 1989 1993 1997 2001 Gubernatorial Winner Linwood Holton Mills Godwin John Dalton Charles Robb Gerald Baliles Douglas Wilder George Allen Jim Gilmore Mark Warner (Party) (R) (R) (R) (D) (D) (D) (R) (R) (D) [Winning %] [52.5%] [50.7%] [55.9%] [53.5%] [55.2%] [50.1%] [58.3%] [55.8%] [52.2%] PREVAILING CONDITIONS—GENERAL ELECTION FOR GOVERNOR Which party had the advantage? (D) = Democrat (R) = Republican (N) = No strong advantage to one side ECONOMY1 DRRNDDRRD

PARTY UNITY RRRDDDRND

SCANDAL NDNNNNRNN

CAMPAIGN ORGANIZATION AND TECHNOLOGY NRRDDNNRN

CAMPAIGN MONEY NNRNNNDRD

CANDIDATE PERSONALITY AND APPEAL R NRD N D RDN

PRIOR OFFICE EXPERIENCE OF CANDIDATES2 NRNNDNDRN

RETROSPECTIVE JUDGMENT ON PREVIOUS GOVERNOR D RRR D D RRN

PRESIDENTIAL POPULARITY3 RDRRRRRNR

SPECIAL ISSUES AND DOMINANT CIRCUMSTANCES RDRDDNRRD Time for change Watergate Democrats Democrats Diverse Abortion issue Crime issue and Gilmore’s GOP budget im- mood plus extreme helped Henry divisive primary moderated Democratic helped Wilder in a yearning for car tax cut passe hurt Earley factionalism Howell reach his & campaign while GOP ticket attracted campaign, but change from easily trumped badly; Sept. among Democrats high watermark, errors took their factionalism new Virginia race hurt him on the Robb/ Beyer’s 11 dominated propelled Holton. but it was not toll. emerged suburban Election Day. Wilder/ Clinton emphasis on fall, keeping enough. support Democrats aided education, campaign on Allen. environment back burner. and abortion.

NET ADVANTAGE R (+2) R (+2) R (+8) D (+2) D (+5) D (+3) R (+5) R (+4) D (+2) 1 As measured by changes in per capita income and the unemployment rate in the twelve months prior to Election Day. 2 Prior statewide elective offi ce is given more weight than a district or local offi ce. 3 As measured by public opinion poll ratings for the six months prior to election day. and A. Linwood Holton (R) in 1969. Mark Earley also had an exceptionally valuable card in President George W. Bush’s popularity. But as we discussed previously, it was never played. Thus did the 2001 election continue an extreme oddity in Virginia politics: in every gubernatorial election beginning in 1977, Virginians have chosen as governor the candidate representing the party opposite to that of the President. This occurs whether state voters like the president (Reagan, Bush Sr., Bush Jr.) or dislike him (Carter, Clinton). The “Ten Keys to the Governorship” is a parlor game, of course, but aft er all, politics is a vital form of entertainment. And once again, the keys have helped explain how the out- of- power party picked the lock of the Executive Mansion in Virginia.

CHAPTER 5 ✰ The 2001General Election 131 FIGURE 5.01 The 2001 Gubernatorial Election, by Counties

FIGURE 5.02 The 2001 Gubernatorial Election, by Cities

SOURCE: Offi cial Election Results provided by the State Board of Elections.

General Election Results

Election night brought both joy and unhappiness to both parties in diff erent mea- sures. The Democrats won the top two prizes, though in closer than expected con- tests. Mark Warner captured the governorship with 52.2 percent to Mark Earley’s 47.0 percent, with less than one percent for Libertarian William Redpath. Tim Kaine edged Jay Katzen for lieutenant governor, 50.3 percent to 48.1 percent, with

132 Virginia Votes ✰ 1999–2002 FIGURE 5.03 The 2001 Lieutenant Gubernatorial Election, by Counties

FIGURE 5.04 The 2001 Lieutenant Gubernatorial Election, by Cities

SOURCE: Offi cial Election Results provided by the State Board of Elections.

1.6 percent for Libertarian Gary Reams. In Virginia, it is fair to say that a majority of any size for Democrats is a triumph, and party activists were cheered by their double- barreled victory. Republicans found the other returns more palatable. Jerry Kilgore won the attorney general’s post in a landslide, 60 percent to 39.9 percent—an un- expected blowout. Democrats had hoped that coattails would give them the sweep enjoyed by the GOP four years earlier, but Warner apparently was not even wearing a coat. Kilgore captured 123,000 more votes than Warner, and he was the only 2001

CHAPTER 5 ✰ The 2001General Election 133 FIGURE 5.05 The 2001 Attorney General Election, by Counties

FIGURE 5.06 The 2001 Attorney General Election, by Cities

SOURCE: Offi cial Election Results provided by the State Board of Elections.

candidate to secure more than one million ballots. Of course, Kilgore’s highly pro- fessional campaign deserved most of the credit, but McEachin ran a campaign even worse than Mark Earley. The Democrat also never recovered from the badly split Democratic primary vote, nor did he receive much help, fi nancial or otherwise, from Mark Warner and other major Democrats—save Doug Wilder. But Wilder’s assis- tance was a double- edged sword, reminding Virginians of the controversial career of the only other successful statewide African American candidate and re-emphasizing

134 Virginia Votes ✰ 1999–2002 TABLE 5.02 Election Results for Statewide Offi ce, 2001 Candidate (Party) Total Number of Votes Percent GOVERNOR Mark R. Warner (D) 984,177 52.2 Mark L. Earley (R) 887,234 47.0 William B. Redpath (Libertarian) 14,497 0.8 Write-ins 813 0.0 TOTAL 1,886,721 100.0

LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR Timothy M. Kaine (D) 925,974 50.3 Jay K. Katzen (R) 883,886 48.1 Gary A. Reams (Libertarian) 28,783 1.6 Write-ins 490 0.0 TOTAL 1,839,133 100.0

ATTORNEY GENERAL Jerry W. Kilgore (R) 1,107,068 60.0 A. Donald McEachin (D) 736,431 39.9 Write-ins 1,282 0.1 TOTAL 1,844,781 100.0 SOURCE: Offi cial Election results provided by the State Board of Elections

TABLE 5.03 Virginia Governors’ Percentage of Vote, 1961–2001 Year Winning Candidate Percent of Vote 1961 Albertis S. Harrison 63.8 1965 Mills E. Godwin (D) 47.9 1969 Linwood Holton (R) 52.5 1973 Mills E. Godwin (R) 50.7 1977 John N. Dalton (R) 55.9 1981 Charles S. Robb (D) 53.5 1985 Gerald Baliles (D) 55.2 1989 L. Douglas Wilder (D) 50.1 1993 George Allen (R) 58.3 1997 Jim Gilmore (R) 55.8 2001 Mark Warner (D) 52.2

(subliminally) the always- present issue of race. Aft er all, under ideal conditions, Wilder had barely won his 1985 and 1989 contests.14 Returning to Warner’s top- of- the- ticket win, his vote proportion was by no means lackluster when compared to four recent predecessors, as Table 5.03 shows. Mills Godwin in both 1965 and 1973, as well as Doug Wilder in 1989, attained a lower percentage of the vote than Warner. Appropriately enough, Warner’s 52.2 was closest to Linwood Holton’s 52.5 percent in 1969; Holton (a Republican in 1969) backed Warner, as noted earlier. In addition, Warner’s statewide vote plurality of 97,000 was close to Democrat Chuck Robb’s 1981 margin of 101,000 votes, though Robb’s 53.5 percent victory was larger. Five other modern governors exceeded Warner’s showing by four to twelve

14. It should be noted that judging McEachin through the lens of Wilder’s record is as “just” as measuring any white candidate’s potential by the record of any other Caucasian politician. But life isn’t fair, and politics is arguably the least fair part of life.

CHAPTER 5 ✰ The 2001General Election 135 TABLE 5.04 General Election Results for Statewide Offi ces, by Congressional District, 2001 Governor* Lieutenant Governor Attorney General Congressional District Total Vote Percent of Registered Voting Warner (D) Earley (R) Kaine (D) Katzen (R) Kilgore (R) McEachin (D) 1 189,318 45.5 48.6 50.7 45.8 52.5 65.7 34.2 2 123,060 40.0 49.6 49.8 47.2 51.6 64.3 35.6 3 128,474 44.4 71.3 28.0 72.6 26.1 36.8 63.0 4 173,233 46.9 53.5 45.9 53.5 45.4 57.0 42.9 5 178,856 50.3 52.4 46.2 47.3 49.7 62.2 37.7 6 172,622 50.6 48.7 50.5 44.5 53.8 66.8 33.1 7 229,704 51.7 44.0 55.1 46.6 52.1 70.4 29.6 8 176,952 45.8 62.0 37.3 60.8 38.0 43.3 56.6 9 154,232 45.8 52.3 46.8 48.8 49.1 68.6 31.4 10 213,841 43.9 44.9 54.4 41.5 57.1 64.9 35.1 11 165,219 44.1 55.5 43.7 53.6 45.0 51.3 48.6 SOURCE: Offi cial election results provided by the State Board of Elections. *Percentages do not total 100 since Libertarian Party and write-in votes are not listed in the table.

TABLE 5.05 Change in Democrat Percentage for Governor, by Congressional District, 1997–2001 District Beyer ’97 Warner ‘01 Percentage Change 1 38.2 48.6 10.4 2 41.6 49.6 8.0 3 66.6 71.2 4.7 4 40.9 53.5 12.6 5 39.6 52.4 12.8 6 38.0 48.7 10.7 7 34.1 44.0 9.9 8 54.7 62.0 7.3 9 40.9 52.3 11.4 10 36.7 44.9 8.2 11 46.9 55.5 8.6 Statewide 42.6 52.2 9.6

percentage points: Albertis Harrison (D), John Dalton (R), Gerald Baliles (D), George Allen (R), and Jim Gilmore (R). As usual, the Democrats in 2001 ran more strongly in the cities than the coun- ties. As Figures 5.01 through 5.06 illustrate, Warner carried 45 of 95 counties and 29 of 39 cities; Kaine won only 36 counties but 26 cities; and McEachin could muster majorities in a mere 6 counties and 9 cities. Kilgore’s 89 counties and 30 cities well refl ected his landslide. Table 5.04 breaks the 2001 vote down by congressional district. Warner captured six districts, two by landslides—the African American 3rd and the lib- eral Northern Virginia 8th. Healthy Warner majorities were also recorded in the Tidewater 4th (Earley’s home district), the Southside 5th, the Southwest 9th, and the Northern Virginia “swing” 11th district. The 5th and 9th have usually backed Republicans, so Warner’s triumph in them was considerable. Earley won healthy margins in just two districts, the heavily Republican Piedmont 7th and Shenandoah- Northwestern 10th. Slim GOP pluralities were amassed in the Hampton-Newport News- Northern Neck 1st, the Norfolk- Virginia Beach 2nd, and the Roanoke 6th, all

136 Virginia Votes ✰ 1999–2002 TABLE 5.06 Voter Participation in Gubernatorial Elections in Virginia, 1953–2001 Total Potential Total Registered Total Votes Total Vote Change From Votes Cast as Percentage Votes Cast as Percentage Year Voting Population Population Cast Preceding Election of Potential Vote Registered Population 1953 2,107,600 — 414,025 — 19.6 — 1957 2,222,700 944,627 517,655 25 23.9 54.8 1961 2,356,700 1,052,255 394,490 –23.8 16.7 37.5 1965 2,540,600 1,363,849 562,789 42.7 22.2 41.3 1969 2,738,800 1,732,822 915,764 62.7 33.4 52.8 1973 3,234,000 2,035,375 1,035,495 13.1 32.0 50.9 1977 3,590,000 2,022,619 1,250,940 20.8 34.8 61.9 1981 3,857,000 2,215,081 1,437,382 14.9 37.3 64.9 1985 4,276,000 2,597,904 1,377,966 –4.1 32.2 53.0 1989 4,586,800 2,737,340 1,821,242 32.2 39.7 66.5 1993 4,924,000 2,975,777 1,817,777 –0.2 36.9 61.1 1997 5,126,000 3,565,139 1,764,476 –2.9 34.4 49.5 2001 5,263,000 4,109,127 1,905,511 7.9 36.2 46.4 SOURCES: Total potential voting population for all years was based on population estimates provided by either the Taylor Murphy Institute, University of Virginia, or the U.S. Bureau of the Census; fi gures for total registered popula- tion and total votes cast for all years were provided by the State Board of Elections. NOTES: Total potential voting age from 1953–1969 includes all persons aged 21 and over, while fi gures after 1969 include all those aged 18 and above. Total registered population fi gures from 1957–1969 are offi cial estimates provided by the State Board of Elections; after 1970 the State Board collected exact tabulations of registered voters by locality. For gubernatorial elections prior to 1957, reasonably accurate estimates of registered voters by city and county do not exist. Also, the total registered population from 1973 to 1977 declined because of purges of the electoral polls.

of which have regularly yielded substantial Republican majorities until 2001. Warner demonstrated major gains over 1997 Democratic nominee Don Beyer in the 5th, 4th, 9th, 6th, 1st, and 7th (see Table 5.05). Kaine carried only four congressional districts; the 3rd, 4th, 8th, and 11th. Katzen was able to snatch two Warner-majority districts, the 5th and the 9th. Kilgore won all but the heavily Democratic 3rd and 8th, though the 11th was also close. Voter turnout in the congressional districts was reasonably similar to other re- cent elections, with the 5th, 6th, and 7th (in ascending order) producing the highest participation rates, and the lowest rates recorded in the 2nd, 10th, 11th, and 3rd.15 Overall, 2001’s turnout in Virginia displayed a glass half- full, glass half- empty quality. Aft er declines in the absolute turnout in 1993 and 1997 from 1989’s high watermark of 1,821,000, the state fi nally topped 1.9 million in a gubernatorial elec- tion in 2001 (see Table 5.06). Over 141,000 more Virginians cast a ballot in 2001 than four years earlier (an 8 percent gain), possibly because of a patriotic response to the September 11 terrorist attacks, or maybe due to the intensifi ed get-out- the- vote (GOTV) eff orts of the Democratic Party. Still, this improved participation rate for governor—36 percent of those citizens aged 18 and over—was far below the 53 percent of Virginians who showed up to vote in the 2000 presidential election. About 46.4 percent of registered voters cast a 2001 ballot, but this represented a decline from 1997’s 49.5 percent. This drop, however, may simply refl ect the broader registered voter pool generated by the so-called “motor-voter” law of 1993, which in recent years has added hundreds of thousands of “casual citizens” to the rolls. These citizens may register to vote incidentally at the Division of Motor Vehicles and else- where, but they may actually have little resolve to show up at the polls.

15. For more information, see: Larry J. Sabato, Virginia Votes 1995–1998 (Weldon Cooper Center for Public Service, 1999), pp. 151–152.

CHAPTER 5 ✰ The 2001General Election 137 TABLE 5.07 Voter Turnout in Virginia, 1976–2001 Year Chief Contest % of All Adults % of Registered 1976 President/Senator 48.6 80.8 1977 Governor 34.8 61.9 1978 Senator 32.7 60.3 1980 President 48.9 81.4 1981 Governor 37.3 64.9 1982 Senator 34.7 63.4 1984 President/Senator 51.9 81.5 1985 Governor 32.2 53.0 1988 President/Senator 50.0 77.6 1989 Governor 39.7 66.5 1990 Senator 26.4 45.8 1992 President 54.5 84.5 1993 Governor 36.9 61.1 1994 Senator 41.8 69.3 1996 President/Senator 47.6 74.3 1997 Governor 34.4 49.5 2000 President/Senator 52.8 68.5 2001 Governor 36.2 46.4

Political Map of Virginia

People vote, not trees, or rocks, or territory.16 This is the theory behind the “Political Map of Virginia,” which was updated in the spring of 2001 to refl ect the 2000 census. A similar map was produced in 1988 to show the eff ects of growth particularly in Northern Virginia, but also in the Richmond and Tidewater areas. The regular map of Virginia displays the territorial boundaries of the 39 cities and 95 counties that comprise the Commonwealth of Virginia. Each of these cities and counties has been expanded or contracted to demonstrate its real proportion of the statewide electorate in the political map. Thus, the giant county of Fairfax, Virginia’s largest jurisdiction with a population of over 1 million people, is the most prominent feature (see Figure 5.07). Northern Virginia as a whole is a substantial portion of the map, accounting for nearly 30 percent of the potential votes to be cast in any statewide election. Also of great importance is the growth of the Richmond and Tidewater areas. While the central cities of Richmond, Norfolk, and Portsmouth have either declined in popula- tion or grown only slightly, the surrounding suburbs have exploded in growth. The big political losers are of course Virginia’s rural areas, which take up far less space on the political map of Virginia than they do on the territorial map. This decline has been observed since the 1960’s and it is proceeding apace, though a few rural localities are gaining population and becoming new suburbs—from Northern Virginia’s Spotsylvania and Staff ord counties to the Charlottesville area’s Greene and Madison counties, and the city of Suff olk in Tidewater. From the look of the political map, it would appear that the urban / suburban areas would always dominate Virginia politics. But the reality is that even within a geographic area, the more liberal central cities (including Alexandria, Norfolk, Charlottesville, and Richmond) have confl icting interests with their suburban

16. Excerpts of this article were originally published in the Richmond Times-Dispatch: “Notes on the State of Virginia in the 21st Century,” April 29, 2001, p. F7. For more information, see the UVa Center for Politics website, http: // www.centerforpolitics.org under “Featured Publications.”

138 Virginia Votes ✰ 1999–2002 FIGURE 5.07 The Political Map of Virginia: All Counties and Cities of Virginia Scaled in Proportion to Population

neighbors, including Fairfax, Henrico, Chesterfi eld, Virginia Beach, and Albemarle, to name a few. Similarly, rural areas are so scattered around Virginia that even though they may have lifestyle issues in common, regional diff erences make it diffi cult for them to unite. If somehow they could unite, rural Virginia would not be as minor a force on Election Day as it oft en appears to be. Such a joining of forces would be one way for Southside and Southwest Virginia to reverse their shrinking infl uence. Figure 5.08 shows the localities won by Warner and Earley on the political map of Virginia. The political map of Virginia, since it is based on population, more ac- curately displays Warner’s win and the overall closeness of the race than a geographi- cal map. Warner carried the notable heavyweights of Fairfax, Arlington, Alexandria, Richmond, Henrico, Newport News, and Norfolk, while Earley posted wins in the suburban giants Prince William, Chesterfi eld, Chesapeake, and Virginia Beach. It is impossible to predict future trends for certain, but it is likely that subur- ban growth will continue, especially in Northern Virginia. To denizens of the “real Virginia” south of the Occoquan River, Fairfax’s domination of the “Political Map of Virginia” may be a bitter pill to swallow. Nonetheless, when the next political map is drawn in 2011, it is likely that Fairfax will have extended its reach again.

The Urban and Rural Vote

As long ago as the 1960’s, Virginia’s voting majority shift ed from its once-dominant rural areas to its metropolitan cities and suburbs. Urban Virginia now heavily domi- nates the state’s politics, as Table 5.08 suggests. Six out of every ten votes in November 2001 came from the Urban Corridor, comprised of Northern Virginia- Richmond- Tidewater area, and nearly eight in ten originated in the Metropolitan Statistical

CHAPTER 5 ✰ The 2001General Election 139 FIGURE 5.08 The Political Map of Virginia, 2001 Gubernatorial Election

TABLE 5.08 The Urban and Rural Vote, Virginia General Elections, 2001 Governor Lieutenant Governor Attorney General Percent of Urban Measure Total Votes Warner (D) Earley (R) Kaine (D) Katzen (R) McEachin (D) Kilgore (R) Urban Corridora 61.2 53.2 44.7 52.7 46.1 13.1 56.8 Metropolitan Statistical Areasb 78.0 52.4 45.7 51.2 47.4 41.3 58.7 Central Cities 16.2 64.6 34.6 63.8 34.6 53.9 46.0 Suburbs 61.8 49.2 48.6 48.0 50.7 38.0 62.0 Rural Areasc 21.7 51.3 47.7 47.0 51.2 34.9 65.1 SOURCE: Compiled from offi cial election results from the State Board of Elections. N O T E S : a I n c l u d e s c i t i e s o f A l e x a n d r i a , C h e s a p e a k e , C o l o n i a l H e i g h t s , Fa i r f a x , Fa l l s C h u r c h , F r e d e r i c k s b u r g , H a m p t o n , H o p e w e l l , M a n a s s a s , M a n a s s a s P a r k , N e w p o r t News, Norfolk, Petersburg, Poquoson, Portsmouth, Richmond, Virginia Beach, and Williamsburg; and the counties of Arlington, Caroline, Charles City, Chesterfi eld, C l a r k e , D i n w i d d i e , Fa i r f a x , Fa u q u i e r, H a n o v e r, H e n r i c o , J a m e s C i t y, L o u d o u n , N e w K e n t , P r i n c e G e o r g e , P r i n c e W i l l i a m , S p o t s y l v a n i a , S t a ff o r d , a n d Yo rk. b The eight current Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) for Virginia, as established by the U.S. Census Bureau, are Charlottesville, Danville, Johnson City- Kingsport-Bristol, Lynchburg, Washington, D.C., Norfolk-Virginia Beach-Newport News, Richmond-Petersburg, and Roanoke. “Central Cities” and “Suburbs” are included in the MSA fi gures. The Charlottesville and Danville MSAs were fi rst designated after the 1980 census. Various other MSAs have been expanded each decade, with new cities and counties added to them. Therefore, this grouping of MSAs in substantially, but not entirely the same as that listed in previous editions of Virginia Votes. c All Virginia localities not included in either an MSA or the Urban Corridor.

Areas designated by the U.S. Census Bureau. Not surprisingly, all three winners car- ried both the Urban Corridor and the MSAs. In 16 percent of the statewide vote generated by the central cities, Warner and Kaine garnered over six in ten votes, while McEachin won just 53.9 percent. The ever-growing suburbs comprised 61 percent of the 2001 statewide vote, and both Warner and Katzen edged their foes here. Nonetheless, a tie or near- tie for Democrats in the usually GOP suburbs is a major achievement. Kilgore swamped McEachin in suburbia, 62 percent to 38 percent. The rural areas still produce over a fi ft h of the statewide vote, and Warner’s breakthrough in this demographic division secured

140 Virginia Votes ✰ 1999–2002 TABLE 5.09 Metropolitan Proportions of Statewide Vote in Virginia, 1969–2001 Percent of Statewide Vote Election Central Cities Suburbs GENERAL ELECTIONS 1969 Governor 21.5 35.0 1970 U.S. Senator 22.6 35.4 1971 Lieutenant Governor 18.6 28.4 1972 President 21.7 41.2 1973 Governor 22.0 37.6 1976 President 20.1 41.5 1977 Governor 20.6 39.0 1978 U.S. Senator 19.8 39.1 1980 President 17.0 44.3 1981 Governor 17.8 46.5 1982 U.S. Senator 18.0 46.9 1984 President 16.8 49.3 1985 Governor 17.1 47.5 1987 Lottery Referendum 15.1 48.5 1988 President 15.0 52.6 1989 Governor 22.5 48.6 1990 U.S. Senator 13.5 61.0 1992 President 13.7 60.0 1993 Governor 18.1 58.2 1994 U.S. Senator 17.9 59.6 1996 President 17.2 60.6 1997 Governor 17.2 58.6 2000 President 15.7 62.1 2001 Governor 16.2 61.8 DEMOCRATIC PRIMARIES 1969 Governor (fi rst primary) 28.1 26.3 1969 Governor (runoff ) 27.3 28.8 1977 Governor 26.9 37.8 1988 President 25.4 45.5 1994 U.S. Senator 24.4 48.2 2001 Lieutenant Governor 38.6 45.3 2001 Attorney General 38.3 44.9 REPUBLICAN PRIMARIES 1988 President 13.6 59.7 1989 Governor 15.0 55.6 1996 U.S. Senator 19.1 64.5 1997 Attorney General 17.1 64.6 2000 President 14.3 69.6 him a narrow majority (51.3 percent) in small- town and agricultural Virginia. No Democratic gubernatorial candidate since Gerald Baliles had carried the rural vote. Katzen maintained a GOP rural edge, with a four percent victory, while Kilgore overwhelmed McEachin, 65.1 percent to 34.9 percent. Note that Warner exceeded the recent Democratic performance in all demographic sectors of Virginia.

Predominantly African American Precincts

The 44 predominantly black precincts in Table 5.10 show a strong Democratic per- formance across the board. All three Democrats gained 92-93 percent of the almost 24,000 votes cast in these precincts. That is an impressive proportion, of course,

CHAPTER 5 ✰ The 2001General Election 141 TABLE 5.10 Voting in Selected Predominantly Black Precincts in Virginia Cities, General Election for Statewide Offi ces, 2001 Governor Lieutenant Governor Attorney General City Number of Precincts Total Votes Cast Percent of Registered Voting Warner (D) Earley (R) Kaine (D) Katzen (R) McEachin (D) Kilgore (R) BLACK PRECINCTS Charlottesvillea 1 530 32.7% 86.0% 12.6% 84.7% 12.2% 82.7% 16.4% Chesapeakeb 1 410 40.0% 92.6% 7.1% 93.8% 6.2% 93.9% 6.1% Emporiac 1 123 36.0% 87.5% 12.5% 88.7% 10.4% 87.2% 12.8% Hamptond 2 2,561 41.3% 87.5% 12.1% 87.8% 10.9% 84.0% 15.7% Newport Newse 8 3,083 34.0% 92.1% 4.6% 95.7% 3.3% 94.9% 4.8% Norfolkf 10 6,071 33.4% 92.1% 7.0% 94.7% 4.5% 93.2% 6.2% Petersburgg 4 1,911 44.9% 93.7% 5.8% 92.7% 6.7% 97.2% 5.8% Portsmouthh 2 2,184 52.8% 94.9% 5.0% 96.3% 2.8% 96.5% 3.4% Richmondi 15 7,701 44.1% 91.4% 7.9% 91.7% 7.1% 90.2% 10.5% Total or Average 44 23,865 39.5% 92.0% 7.4% 92.9% 6.1% 91.9% 8.4% SOURCE: Offi cial election results provided by the State Board of Elections. a Charlottesville: Tonsler precinct b Chesapeake: South Norfolk Fire Station precinct c Emporia: Precinct 2 d Hampton: Pembroke and Phenix precincts e Newport News: Chestnut, Dunbar, Hutington, Jeff erson, Magruder, Marshall, Newsome Park, and Washington f Norfolk: Berkley, Bowling Park, Brambleton, Campostella, Chesterfi eld, Monroe, Park Place, Rosemont, Union Chapel, and Young Park Precincts g Petersburg: 5th Ward-1st Precinct, 5th Ward-2nd Precinct, 6th Ward-1st Precinct, and 6th Ward-2nd Precinct h Portsmouth: Precincts 26 and 27 i Richmond: Precincts 301, 303, 304, 306, 602, 604, 606, 608, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 707, and 802

though hardly a record. For example, in 1989 Doug Wilder garnered 96 percent in a very similar set of precincts (see Table 5.11). Notable was Mark Earley’s decline from nearly 16 percent in these precincts (when he was elected attorney general in 1997) to less than half that, 7 percent, in 2001. A lifetime member of the NAACP, Earley had been proud of his outreach to the black community during his career, but his inept campaign never managed to communicate his history to African Americans (or much of anyone else). Turnout in the black precincts was low, as usual—about 7 percent below the overall turnout. (The last time black turnout exceeded overall turnout was for Wilder’s 1989 gubernatorial election—see Table 5.12.) At the same time, the black precinct turnout in 2001 was closer to the statewide average than any year since 1994 (the Robb-North U.S. Senate contest). This is additional evidence that Warner’s Democratic GOTV had at least a marginal eff ect.

Ballot Fall-Off

The remarkable aspect about ballot fall-off in 2001 was that there was so little of it. As readers of this series know, ballot fall-off (or drop-off ) is the tendency of a few percent of voters to cast a ballot for the top offi ce (usually) but not to complete the ballot. (see Tables 5.13 and 5.14). In 2001, 99 percent of voters cast a ballot for governor, 96.5 percent for lieutenant governor, and a slightly larger 96.8 percent for attorney general. There was not much variance among the congressional districts, except that fall-off was somewhat higher in the Southside 5th. The most fascinating ballot fall-off numbers come from the African American

142 Virginia Votes ✰ 1999–2002 TABLE 5.11 Major Statewide Elections in Virginia By Demographic and Black Voting Patterns, 1969–2001 Percent for Winner Election Central Cities Suburbs Black Vote GENERAL ELECTIONS 1969 Governor, Linwood Holton (R) 50.9 56.5 37.2 1970 U.S. Senator, Harry Byrd, Jr. (I) 52.2 55.9 3.0 1971 Lt. Governor, Henry Howell (I) 50.6 39.8 91.7 1972 President, Richard Nixon (R) 60.3 70.1 8.8 1972 U.S. Senate, William Scott (R) 42.5 52.7 6.7 1973 Governor, Mills Godwin (R) 43.2 54.6 5.7 1976 President, Gerald Ford (R) 43.6 53.9 5.0 1976 U.S. Senate, Harry Byrd, Jr. (I) 51.4 55.9 4.4 1977 Governor, John Dalton (R) 47.9 59.9 5.0 1977 Lt. Governor, Charles Robb (D) 61.2 51.1 94.9 1977 Attorney General, Marshall Coleman (R) 47.7 56.6 32.7 1978 U.S. Senate, John Warner (R) 45.4 53.7 7.1 1980 President, Ronald Reagan (R) 41.3 58.4 3.4 1981 Governor, Charles Robb (D) 64.5 49.5 96.4 1981 Lt. Governor, Dick Davis (D) 67.2 52.3 95.5 1981 Attorney General, Gerald Baliles (D) 62.7 45.4 95.9 1982 U.S. Senate, Paul Trible (R) 39.6 55.1 5.7 1984 President Ronald Reagan (R) 47.9 66.8 8.2 1984 U.S. Senate, John Warner (R) 57.6 72.9 21.2 1985 Governor, Gerald Baliles (D) 66.2 51.5 94.1 1985 Lt. Governor, Douglas Wilder (D) 64.4 48.8 96.6 1985 Attorney General, Mary Sue Terry, (D) 71.3 58.6 95.6 1988 President, George Bush, (R) 45.2 63.4 8.6 1988 U.S. Senate, Charles Robb (D) 76.1 70.3 83.7 1989 Governor, Douglas Wilder (D) 68.5 47.0 96.2 1989 Lt. Governor, Donald Beyer (D) 64.9 53.4 87.8 1989 Attorney General, Mary Sue Terry (D) 72.7 61.6 94.7 1990 U.S. Senate, John Warner (R) 78.0 80.9 64.2 1992 President, George Bush (R) 33.1 47.1 7.0 1993 Governor, George Allen (R) 46.5 59.9 11.4 1993 Lt. Governor, Donald Beyer (D) 64.6 54.2 90.9 1993 Attorney General, James Gilmore (R) 46.1 57.7 10.6 1994 U.S. Senate, Charles Robb (D) 59.2 43.5 93.4 1996 President, Robert Dole (R) 46.6 51.1 4.8 1996 U.S. Senate, John Warner (R) 45.0 56.0 11.6 1997 Governor, James Gilmore (R) 43.7 58.3 11.2 1997 Lt. Governor, John Hager (R) 38.8 53.3 9.1 1997 Attorney General, Mark Earley (R) 48.0 59.9 15.6 2000 President, George W. Bush (R) 38.8 54.4 5.5 2000 Senate, George Allen (R) 38.5 53.8 8.1 2001 Governor, Mark Warner (D) 64.6 49.2 92.0 2001 Lt. Governor, Timothy Kaine (D) 62.1 47.1 92.9 2001 Attorney General, Jerry Kilgore (R) 41.2 61.0 8.4 (continued) precincts. Normally, these precincts exhibit a high degree of fall- off . But in 2001, just as in 1985 and 1989, an African American candidate on the ballot made a clear diff erence. Black voters in 2001 were almost as likely to vote for attorney general as for governor. The highest rate of fall- off in the black precincts was recorded for the lieutenant governor contest—and even here, only about 8 percent failed to vote.

CHAPTER 5 ✰ The 2001General Election 143 TABLE 5.11 Major Statewide Elections in Virginia By Demographic and Black Voting Patterns, 1969–2001 (continued) Percent for Winner Election Central Cities Suburbs Black Vote DEMOCRATIC PRIMARY ELECTIONS 1969 Governor, William Battle (fi rst primary) 31.8 40.6 11.8 1969 Governor, William Battle (runoff ) 40.7 51.2 4.8 1977 Governor, Henry Howell 59.6 50.6 86.1 1977 Lt. Governor, Charles Robb 35.0 39.1 26.6 1977 Attorney General, Edward E. Lane 37.8 32.0 15.8 1988 President, Jesse Jackson 64.1 38.2 93.8 1994 U.S. Senator, Charles Robb 68.5 61.3 82.9 2001 Lt. Governor, Tim Kaine 32.9 42.6 22.9 2001 Attorney General, Donald McEachin 38.1 32.5 77.3 REPUBLICAN PRIMARY ELECTIONS 1988 President, George Bush 54.5 52.5 37.7 1989 Governor, Marshall Coleman 34.6 35.9 42.8 1996 U.S. Senator, John Warner 75.1 64.7 84.6 1997 Attorney General, Mark Earley 36.9 38.0 38.5 2000 President, George W. Bush 49.6 51.4 31.4

TABLE 5.12 Voter Turnout in Selected Black Precincts vs. Statewide Turnout in Virginia, 1976–2001 Overall Turnout Selected Black Precincts % Black Turnout Exceeds (+) or Year Election (% of Registered) (% of Registered) Underachieves (–) Overall Turnout 1976 President 80.8 76.4 –4.4 1977 Governor 61.9 62.8 0.9 1978 U.S. Senator 60.3 56.4 –3.9 1980 President 81.3 75.4 –5.9 1981 Governor 64.9 67.5 2.6 1982 U.S. Senator 65.1 68.9 3.8 1984 President 81.5 72.6 –8.9 1985 Governor 53.0 53.9 0.9 1987 Lottery/Gen. Assembly 59.1 49.6 –9.5 1988 President 77.6 64.4 –13.2 1989 Governor 66.5 72.6 6.1 1990 U.S. Senator 45.8 31.7 –14.1 1992 President 84.5 72.0 –12.5 1993 Governor 61.1 50.5 –10.6 1994 U.S. Senator 69.3 64.0 –5.3 1996 President 74.3 64.0 –10.3 1997 Governor 49.5 41.1 –8.4 2000 President 68.5 56.4 –12.1 2001 Governor 46.4 39.5 –6.9

Election Day Polls and Demographic Breakdowns

For the fi rst time since 1981 in a Virginia gubernatorial election, no Election Day exit poll was conducted at the polling places throughout the state. These surveys have been under a dark cloud aft er their Florida errors in the 2000 presidential race,17 but they are actually the most accurate polls of all since they sample only those who turn

17. See chapters by Larry J. Sabato and Diana Owen in Overtime! The Election 2000 Thriller, (Longman: 2001).

144 Virginia Votes ✰ 1999–2002 TABLE 5.13 Ballot Fall-off , Virginia General Election (All Voters), 2001 Percent of Votes Cast for Offi ce of Total Persons Voting Congressional District Governor Lieutenant Governor Attorney General 1 98.6% 96.4% 96.4% 2 99.1% 97.0% 98.0% 3 98.3% 96.3% 96.6% 4 98.8% 95.9% 96.7% 5 98.9% 93.2% 93.5% 6 99.2% 96.2% 96.5% 7 99.4% 98.0% 97.9% 8 99.0% 98.2% 97.9% 9 99.1% 94.1% 96.0% 10 99.2% 97.6% 97.4% 11 99.3% 98.1% 97.9% Statewide 99.0% 96.5% 96.8% SOURCE: Offi cial election results provided by the State Board of Elections.

TABLE 5.14 Ballot Fall-off in Virginia Gubernatorial Elections, 1977–2001 Percent Votes Cast for Offi ce to Total Persons Voting Governor Lieutenant Governor Attorney General Year All Voters Black Precincts All Voters Black Precincts All Voters Black Precincts 1977 98.5 97.6 94.7 88.5 90.8 82.3 1981 98.8 97.0 94.2 86.5 93.2 82.3 1985 97.5 91.6 95.9 94.2 96.3 89.5 1989 98.2 97.9 94.8 83.0 95.2 88.4 1993 98.7 95.3 95.7 86.6 94.0 82.2 1997 98.4 95.8 94.9 88.7 94.0 89.3 2001 99.0 97.0 96.5 91.5 96.8 94.7 SOURCE: Offi cial election results provided by the State Board of Elections. up to cast a ballot; all pre- election polls must guess which respondents will truly vote in the end. Nonetheless, no media organizations decided to undertake an exit poll in 2001—citing the cost, the risk, and the supposed lack of public interest in the con- test. For some of the same reasons, almost all Virginia television stations abandoned the standard wall-to- wall election night coverage of the gubernatorial election on November 6. Instead of continuous 7:00–11:30 p.m. coverage, news of the results was generally restricted to trailers at the bottom of TV screens and a brief “news at 11 p.m.” wrap-up, even on stations in the state capital. Fortunately, a somewhat less- accurate substitute is available for our purposes of analysis: an Election Day telephone survey of 500 self-reported “actual” voters (with a margin of error of plus or minus 4.4 percent) conducted for the National Republican Congressional Committee by Public Opinion Strategies, a well-known national GOP fi rm. The Democrats did not conduct an Election Day poll, but their internal polling throughout the campaign will be discussed later. The Republican survey suggests underlying conditions that should have favored Mark Earley (see Table 5.15). Fully 61 percent of the respondents thought Virginia was “on the right track,” while only 25 percent believed the state had “gotten seriously off on the wrong track.” President Bush had an approval rating of 88 percent and Governor Gilmore had a substantially lower, but still positive, favorability rating of 56 percent. Party identifi cation among the voters leaned strongly to the Republicans, with 45 percent picking the GOP label with various degrees of enthusiasm to just

CHAPTER 5 ✰ The 2001General Election 145 TABLE 5.15 Election Day Poll from the National Republican Congressional Committee Candidate Warner (D) Earley (R) AGE 18–34 (14) 46 46 35–54 (49) 51 44 55+ (34) 49 44 GENDER Male (48) 44 49 Female (52) 53 39 RACE White (76) 44 50 Black (15) 73 18 PARTY Republican (45) 11 86 Democrat (34) 94 4 Independent (17) 56 34 IDEOLOGY Conservative (42) 23 71 Moderate (39) 66 29 Liberal (13) 82 8 CURRENTLY MARRIED? Yes (67) 44 50 No (29) 61 32 EDUCATION High school graduate or less (27) 50 45 Some college (20) 47 44 College graduate or more (51) 49 44 VOTE FOR PRESIDENT IN 2000 Bush (54) 21 75 Gore (36) 95 3 RIGHT DIRECTION Right Direction (61) 38 57 Wrong Track (25) 73 21

34 percent for the Democrats. (About 17 percent were Independent or third- party, with 4 percent declining to say.) Moreover, 42 percent were conservative in ideology, compared to 39 percent moderate and just 13 percent liberal. Yet despite all this good news for Mark Earley, Mark Warner was able to cobble together a majority, and the poll results suggest some of the reasons. First, Earley’s central campaign theme—that Warner’s support for a possible Northern Virginia referendum to raise the local sales tax for roads and schools made him a “big- taxer”— was simply rejected by a sizeable majority. Just 34 percent agreed with Earley that “Warner was supporting a nine hundred million dollar tax increase,” while 56 percent believed that “all [Warner] was doing was supporting the right of people to choose to tax themselves in a vote . . .” There was also a clear indication that the strong Democratic canvass and GOTV operations had an eff ect. Marginally more voters reported that they had been contacted by telephone and mail originating in the Warner campaign than Earley’s organization. The demographics of the electorate on November 6, 2001 also worked to Warner’s advantage. Women were 52 percent of the Election Day turnout, and they favored Warner by 53 percent to 39 percent for Earley. Men were in Earley’s corner, by a relatively narrow 49 percent to 44 percent. This ten- point “gender gap” is a relatively standard one in politics across the country; in this particular case,

146 Virginia Votes ✰ 1999–2002 TABLE 5.15 Election Day Poll from the National Republican Congressional Committee (continued) Candidate Warner (D) Earley (R) FOR WHOM DID YOU VOTE IN THE RACE FOR GOVERNOR? Mark Earley 49 44 Mark Warner FOR WHOM DID YOU VOTE FOR IN THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES IN THIS DISTRICT? Republican candidate (48) 19 77 Democratic candidate (36) 92 5 DID MARK EARLEY’S CAMPAIGN CONTACT YOU BY . . . Telephone (27) 48 47 In person or by staff ers/volunteers (19) 39 56 Mail (55) 44 49 DID A VOLUNTEER FROM MARK EARLEY’S CAMPAIGN KNOCK ON YOUR DOOR OR LEAVE LITERATURE AT YOUR DOOR THIS WEEKEND? Yes (11) 56 38 DID MARK WARNER’S CAMPAIGN CONTACT YOU BY . . . Telephone (31) 66 28 In person or by staff ers/volunteers 67 26 Mail (58) 54 41 DID A VOLUNTEER FROM MARK WARNER’S CAMPAIGN KNOCK ON YOUR DOOR OR LEAVE LITERATURE AT YOUR DOOR THIS WEEKEND? Yes 62 32 WHAT STATEMENT COMES CLOSER TO YOUR POINT OF VIEW? Mark Earley said by supporting the initiatives, Mark Warner was supporting a $900 21 66 million tax increase. (34) Mark Warner said that all he was doing was supporting the right of the people to 88 7 choose to tax themselves for more roads and schools. (56) SYMPATHETIC TO THE NRA Yes (48) 31 65 No (43) 70 24 women’s strong preference for the Democrat won out over a male predisposition for the Republican. African Americans were also 15 percent of Election Day turnout, a proportion that argues success in that portion of Warner’s GOTV eff ort. The GOP survey shows Warner winning blacks 73 percent to 18 percent for Earley, but the margin of error for this small subsample is in double- digits; the sample black precincts presented elsewhere in this chapter would suggest that Warner was closer to 90 percent of the black vote, with Earley’s backing just over 10 percent. Among whites, with a large, reliable subsample, Earley edged Warner by only 50 percent to 44 percent. Normally, a Democrat needs just over 40 percent of the white vote to win statewide, assuming a solid black turnout, and that is precisely what Warner achieved. The Gilmore factor is especially interesting in this survey. Just as with Bill Clinton in 2000, the electorate appeared to be saying about the incumbent governor: We approve of the job you have been doing, overall, but we are ready for a change. Not only did a third of Warner’s vote come from voters who had a favorable opin- ion of Gilmore, but in a head- to- head election match- up of Mark Warner and Jim Gilmore, Warner prevailed over the incumbent by 47 percent to 45 percent, with the remainder unsure or refusing to answer. (That is, had Gilmore been seeking a second term, this GOP survey suggests he would have LOST to the Democrat by about 51 percent to 49 percent.) Also worth noting is the Bush factor, or rather, non-factor. Thanks to the presi- dent’s decision to leave his party’s candidate to his own devices, Warner was able to win over a fi ft h of the 2000 Bush voters, as well as 95 percent of the Gore voters.

CHAPTER 5 ✰ The 2001General Election 147 Among those who approved of Bush’s performance as president, Earley won just a narrow 50 percent to 44 percent edge. How might these numbers have changed had Bush campaigned for the Republican gubernatorial nominee? Warner succeeded not only with his own partisans to a greater degree than Earley, but he won Independents overwhelmingly. Just 4 percent of Democrats de- fected to Earley, while 11 percent of Republicans cast a ballot for Warner. Warner captured Independents by 56 percent to 34 percent. Similarly, a quarter of conser- vatives defected to Warner, while Earley—a lifetime member of the NAACP and someone who was on reasonably good terms with organized labor—won only 8 percent of liberals. Moderates cast ballots for Warner by better than a two-to- one margin (66 percent to 29 percent). One of the most tortured campaign sub-plots was the National Rifle Association’s hemming and hawing about their endorsement. Warner and his “Sportsmen” subgroup undertook to secure a detente with the NRA. It worked well enough so that, despite heavy GOP pressure, the NRA delayed any action until the campaign’s fi nal weeks, and then managed only a non-endorsement “recommenda- tion” of Earley in a letter to members.18 This had an impact, apparently. Almost a third of NRA- sympathizers in the Virginia electorate voted for Warner. Some poll fi ndings are unsurprising but worth noting. Warner emphasized education and the economy, and sure enough, he won close to two- thirds of voters who said those issues were their top concerns. Earley concentrated on taxes, and he garnered almost three- quarters of the voters who were worried on that score. The incumbent party usually wins a majority of those who believe the state is on the right track: Earley captured 57 percent of them. Warner won fully 73 percent of the voters who thought Virginia had gone off on the wrong track. Tracking the voters’ minds is also fascinating. Perhaps indicative of the under- lying Republican leanings of Virginians, Earley won most voters who had fi rmly and “fi nally ma[d]e up” their minds about the election before October. But October was all Warner’s: he got about 56 percent of October deciders. Earley caught up a bit among those who chose a candidate on the last weekend or on Election Day itself: the two candidates essentially split those voters. Overall, about 4 in 10 voters decided be- fore October; another 4 in 10 decided during October; and the fi nal 2 in 10 decided right at the campaign’s end.

Pre- Election Public Polls

Far less useful, indeed sometimes very misleading, were the pre-election public polls taken mainly by news media organizations. With one main exception, these polls tended to infl ate Mark Warner’s lead (or at least his eventual margin of victory). The polls were not among Mark Earley’s primary problems, but they did make it more dif- fi cult for him to stage an upset, raise money, and attract President Bush to the state. Naturally, reporters tended to frame their coverage around the apparent Warner lead, with frequent and prominent notations of Earley’s “lagging campaign, behind in the polls.” Speculative stories were even written about Warner’s presumed ability to carry Republican suburbs in Northern Virginia (such as Loudoun and Prince William counties, both of which Warner lost on November 6). Most damaging to Earley was a late August poll published on the front page by

18. See: Jeff Schapiro and Tyler Whitley, “Earley Gains NRA Support; Ratings: Earley, A-Minus; Warner, C,” Richmond Times-Dispatch, October 26, 2001, p. B4.

148 Virginia Votes ✰ 1999–2002 the Republican Party’s frequent nemesis, The Washington Post—unquestionably, the newspaper most supportive of Warner and hostile to Earley in 2001. This survey was the fi rst public poll to show Earley well behind Warner, and by the stunning margin of 14 percentage points, with Warner having already reached an absolute majority among registered voters (51 percent to 37 percent).19 The GOP stronghold of the Shenandoah Valley was actually shown to be com- fortably in the Warner camp, by 52 percent to 38 percent. Even the Warner staff never believed their candidate to be ahead there, and on Election Day, Earley won the region by a very large margin. In the same poll, Warner led in every region by at least 8 percentage points, and the Democrat was given an eye- popping 29 percent lead in the Southwest—which he eventually won by a mere fi ve points. Any knowledgeable student of Virginia politics knew instantly that such regional margins in any vaguely competitive race were preposterous, whether in an August poll or on Election Day. Until the Post poll, the accepted view in the political community was that Warner was ahead but not by a crushing margin and not with majority support. That is precisely what a June Mason-Dixon survey had shown, with 45 percent for Warner and 40 percent for Earley. With a long and arguably the most accurate polling record in Virginia—as previous editions of Virginia Votes have indicated—Mason-Dixon was remarkably stable from March through October, and Warner’s lead varied be- tween three and seven points consistently (and always below 50 percent). So domi- nant is the Post, however, that Mason-Dixon’s better overall record could not com- pete with the D.C. press giant’s numbers. A Richmond Times-Dispatch / Channel 12 survey in mid- September, giving Warner only a three- point edge, seemed to do little to change the hardening consensus that Warner was far ahead. Also ignored were several WJLA- TV (Channel 7 in D.C.) polls that had the race very close. (One of them, taken October 6- 7, had the contest tied at 48 percent each). Two late surveys, one by the Post giving Warner a 10-point lead with majority sup- port and the other from the Times-Dispatch / Channel 12 showing Warner up 13 percent (46 percent to 33 percent), made the idea of an Earley upset seem almost comical. Oddly, the Post published no polling at all in the races for lieutenant governor and attorney general, so it is impossible to say if its infl ated Democratic lead was spe- cifi c to the governorship or applied to the sample generally. All the other polls listed in Table 5.16 did include the other statewide elections, and here their track record was better. Tim Kaine always led Jay Katzen for lieutenant governor, though by very small margins in the general election period—precisely the fi nal result. And Jerry Kilgore had at least a ten-point lead in every single poll taken aft er Labor Day, though no poll forecast his twenty-point blowout. Incidentally, every public poll except for the Washington Post’s had a relatively small sample (379 to 633) and a margin of error ranging from 4 percent to 5.1 per- cent. The Post polls had by far the largest samples (1,312 and 1,010) and the smallest margin of error (3 percent), presumably making it most likely to be on target.

Mark Warner’s Horserace Polling

Public news media surveys are intermittent, oft en small- sample polls that may or may not reveal the underlying trend in an election contest. The candidates themselves

19. The “likely voter” lead was at 11 percent, 53 percent for Warner to 42 percent for Earley—a total which was reported second, aft er the larger registered voter lead in the story. See R.H. Melton and Claudia Deane, “Warner Has Wide Lead, Poll Shows,” Washington Post, August 26, 2001, p. A1.

CHAPTER 5 ✰ The 2001General Election 149 TABLE 5.16 Public Opinion Polls, Virginia Statewide Elections, 2001 Richmond Times-Dispatch/ Mason Dixon NBC 12 Poll Washington Post Candidates March 26–27 June 13–15 Sept. 10, 14–15 Oct. 15–17 Oct. 29–30 Sept. 10, 13–19 Oct. 26–Nov. 1 Aug. 19–23 Oct. 22–25 Warner 44 45 46 45 48 39 46 51 51 Earley 37 40 40 42 42 36 33 37 41 Other/Undecided 19 15 14 13 10 17 21 12 8 Kaine NA 38 37 38 42 35 35 NA NA Katzen NA 27 32 36 40 33 30 NA NA Other/Undecided NA 35 31 26 18 20 35 NA NA Kilgore NA 34 39 41 46 42 45 NA NA McEachin NA 30 29 31 35 30 32 NA NA Undecided NA 36 32 28 19 17 23 NA NA Margin of Error (plus or minues) 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 5.1 4.6 3.0 3.0 Sample Size 625 625 625 625 633 379 481 1,312 1,010

have a much greater incentive to spend generously on thorough, large- sample surveys, assuming they have the war chest to do so. Mark Warner had both the incentive and the fi nancing, and his campaign has shared with us the head-to- head poll results of its private surveys from February to November 2001 (see Table 5.17). While Warner always had at least a slight lead in his polling, the contest started out essentially tied in February, 40 percent for Warner to 37 percent for Earley, with a margin or error of 3.5 percent. By June, aft er the budget impasse and as more people began to see, hear, and read about the two gubernatorial candidates, Warner built a sizeable twelve percentage point lead, 45 percent to 33 percent. By July, though, Virginia’s underlying Republicanism—and perhaps fading memories of the budget impasse—had enabled Earley to close the gap considerably, with Warner ahead by just four points, 43 percent to 39 percent. Within a month, Warner began to launch a major wave of television advertising, which Earley did not or could not match, and by the end of August, as the traditional Labor Day launch approached, Warner had jumped back up to a twelve-point lead, 49 percent to 37 percent. Then came September 11. As noted in an earlier section, most observers be- lieved that the horrible events of that day gave Earley two chances to rebound: fi rst, because the terrorist attacks shook up the race, potentially erasing memories of what had come before and diminishing in importance all other factors (such as the budget impasse), and second, since the public’s new insecurity and shock might encour- age people to rally around symbols of security (incumbent offi ceholders) and put a premium on public offi ce experience, which Earley had and Warner did not. Sure enough, the fi rst private survey taken a week aft er September 11 showed Warner’s lead shrinking considerably, to seven points (43 percent to 36 percent), with the un- decided proportion mushrooming from 14 percent to 21 percent. For whatever combination of reasons, Earley failed to take advantage of the op- portunity. Yes, Earley did begin to stress his experience somewhat more, but Warner was quick to emphasize on television and the stump that he “backed President Bush” and that Virginia’s pressing agenda was diff erent than the federal government’s. By late September, the number of undecideds declined again, and Warner’s lead gradually grew to eight points in early October and a fairly steady ten points for much of the remaining time before the general election. Keep in mind, though, that Warner never crossed the 50 percent- majority threshold at any point. Virginia does not easily embrace a Democrat. Warner’s surveys, like all but the Mason-Dixon poll, over-estimated his eventual

150 Virginia Votes ✰ 1999–2002 TABLE 5.17 Mark Warner’s Private Campaign Polling, The Horserace for Governor, February 2001—November 2001 Candidate Feb ’01 June ’01 July ’01 Aug 9 ’01 Aug 30 ’01 Sep 18 ’01 Sep 26 ’01 Oct 4 ’01 Oct 11 ’01 Oct 18 ’01 Oct 19 ’01 Oct 25 ’01 Nov 1 ’01 Mark Earley 37 33 39 38 37 36 40 38 37 37 37 38 38 Mark Warner 40 45 43 45 49 43 47 47 47 47 48 46 48 Undecided/Other 23 21 18 17 14 21 13 15 16 16 15 16 14 Margin of Error (+ or –) 3.5 3.5 3.7 4.0 3.5 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 Sample Size 800 800 705 600 803 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 victory margin. It may be that the 14 percent “undecided” close to Election Day broke heavily for Earley, and indeed Warner’s pollsters found these lingering undecideds to be heavily Republican-leaning. It may be that the polls did not eff ectively screen for non-voters who claimed they would cast a ballot (and this category may have been disproportionately Democratic). It may be that the underlying Republicanism of many voters reasserted itself on Election Day, especially with party labels on the gubernatorial ballot for the fi rst time and a very strong GOP down-ticket that might have created a “coattail updraft ” that benefi ted Earley (and Katzen). Or it may be none of these factors. The substantial error opportunities built into the sampling, interviewing, and polling analysis process may be all the explanation we need—and yet more warning for us in future campaigns before we take more polls as holy writ.

2001 House of Delegates Elections: A Republican Landside

One of the biggest surprises of election night was the Republican House tide that swept the GOP to its largest majority ever in the House of Delegates. Having only won ma- jority control of the House two years earlier, with a slim 52-seat margin (53 counting GOP- leaning Independent Lacey Putney of Bedford), Republicans were jubilant as they watched their slate capture 64 House berths on November 6. In addition, the two in- dependent winners, Putney and former Democrat Watkins Abbitt, Jr. of Appomattox, were also viewed as belonging to the GOP conservative camp. This nearly two-thirds majority was considerably more than House Republican leaders (or anyone else) pre- dicted on election eve. Since the GOP exceeded 55 seats, the “power- sharing” agree- ment negotiated in 1998 by the two parties was voided, giving the Republicans com- plete House power for the fi rst time in history.20 It was a stunning reversal of fortune. As late as 1967, Democrats held 85 of the 100 House seats, and twenty years later, in 1987, they still held 64. Fourteen years aft erwards, the Republicans had fl ipped that total. The main explanation of course was redistricting, carried out solely by the GOP in the legislature for the fi rst time in 2001 (backed up by a Republican governor). The artfully drawn districts encouraged many senior and junior Democrats to retire, as discussed in the primary chapter earlier. But there was more to the story than the GOP’s revenge for past Democratic line- drawing bludgeoning. Under Speaker Vance Wilkins, the Republicans had long focused on intense, supportive recruitment of strong candidates. By contrast, Democrats had let their “feeder system” atrophy, leav- ing many younger Democrats around the state disillusioned and unenthused about seeking offi ce. This clearly showed in the party slates in 2001. Moreover, Wilkins

20. The GOP never enjoyed a majority of the House of Delegates, even during the Reconstruction era. For more information on the power sharing agreement of 1998, see: Tyler Whitley, “House Majority Likely for GOP; Power-Sharing Arrangement in Eff ect Since 1998 Could End,” Richmond Times- Dispatch, October 14, 2001, p. A1.

CHAPTER 5 ✰ The 2001General Election 151 and GOP operatives had used their majority control skillfully to raise money from most groups and individuals with legislative interests—all of whom knew that, what- ever the margin, they would still be dealing with a GOP House come January 2002. Finally, the underlying conservatism of Virginia voters outside Northern Virginia and the central cities was on display in the 2001 House results. Mark Warner’s fi ve- point victory had no coattails at all for Democratic House candidates, even in sub- urban and rural locales where he did well. Perhaps GOP attorney general candidate Jerry Kilgore acted as a kind of “circuit breaker” for coattails as he swept to victory with a margin far larger than Warner’s. Forty 2001 House races were not races at all, with 25 Republicans, 14 Democrats, and independent Putney unopposed. (Thirty- eight of these lucky delegates were incumbents, while two Republicans, Bill Janis of Goochland and Thomas Gear of Hampton, had a free November ride aft er winning intra- party contests.) But among the sixty opposed House elections, there were four signifi cant incumbent upsets: Delegate William P. “Billy” Robinson (D-Norfolk), who succeeded his father and had served twenty years as a leading African American member of the House, was defeated by Republican Winsome Sears. A conservative Christian and ex- Marine, Sears had a couple of fi rsts: the fi rst Republican African American woman ever elected to the Virginia General Assembly and the fi rst black Republican in modern times to win in a majority- black district. In addition, Sears is one of the few and possibly only current black Republican woman to represent a black-majority state legislative dis- trict in the country.21 Robinson nearly lost to Republican Michael Ball in 1999, and in recent years he had been weakened by legal ethics charges and other controversies, even spending a night in jail just a few days before the 2001 election.22 Delegate James M. Shuler (D-Blacksburg), fi rst elected in 1993, lost to Republican David Nutter, the public spokesman for Virginia Tech in the newly- drawn 7th district. (Republican redistricting had forced Shuler to change residency and run in the new district.) In an odd twist of fate, however, Shuler stayed in the House of Delegates. The death of Senator Emily Couric (D- Charlottesville) on October 18, 2001 left an opening in the 25th Senatorial district. A special election to fi ll the seat was held on December 18, 2001, and Delegate Creigh Deeds (D- Bath), a ten-year veteran of the House, won in a landslide over Republican Jane Maddux in the new district. On January 8, 2002, the day before the General Assembly ses- sion opened, Shuler defeated Republican Larry Linkous for the House seat vacated by Deeds with a whopping 71 percent of the votes. Shuler in eff ect reclaimed the seat he had held for 8 years. Delegate John H. Tate (D- Tazewell), who had served 3 terms, became the second Democratic casualty in Southwest Virginia, defeated by Republican C.W. “Bill” Carrico, a former state trooper. Delegate John H. Rust (R- Fairfax) became the GOP’s only loss of the night. The infl uential 4-term delegate succumbed to the combined eff ects of a moderate- liberal constituency and a deter- mined young foe, Democratic attorney J. Chapman Petersen. These and other notable House races are listed in Table 5.18. The Republicans squeezed out plurality victories in two hotly- contested, multi- candidate contests. In the 96th district, incumbent Republican Melanie Rapp of Yorktown overcame

21. The National Conference of State Legislatures, The Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies, and the National Black Caucus of State Legislators were contacted regarding Sears’ status as the only African American female Republican representing a majority African American district in the country. The groups were not sure, but knew that this was a very rare if not unprecedented event. 22. Marc Davis, “Veteran Sees Challenge from Newcomer in 90th,” The Virginian-Pilot, October 29, 2001, p. B1.

152 Virginia Votes ✰ 1999–2002 TABLE 5.18 Selected Results, General Election, Virginia House of Delegates, 2001 Area (District No.) Candidates Expenditures No. of Votes % of Votes Tazewell (5) C. William Carrico (R)+ $85,444 11,561 59% John H. Tate, Jr. (D)* $172,151 8,072 41% Write-Ins 5 0% Totals $257,595 19,633 100%

Roanoke (7) David A. Nutter (R)+ $94,256 8,603 52% James M. Shuler (D)* $189,308 7,821 48% Write-Ins 0 0% Totals $283,564 16,424 100%

Fairfax (37) John H. Rust, Jr. (R)* $284,203 9,959 48% J. Chapman Peterson (D)+ $166,740 10,899 52% Write-Ins 13 0% Totals $450,943 20,871 100%

Fairfax (49) Edgar L. Gonzalez (R) $102,879 3,429 31% L. Karen Darner (D)*+ $49,919 7,529 69% Write-Ins 13 0% Totals $152,798 10,971 100%

Petersburg (63) Fenton L. Bland, Jr. (D)+ $61,321 8,774 52% Rosalyn R Dance (I) $54,487 7,926 47% Write-Ins 20 0% Totals $115,808 16,720 100%

Richmond (68) Edward B. Barber (D) $183,753 9,038 34% John Conrad (I) $158,632 6,406 24% Bradley Marrs (R)+ $217,832 10,788 41% Write-Ins 5 0% Totals $560,217 26,237 100%

Charles City (74) Floyd H. Miles, Sr. (D)+ $55,526 10,451 61% Terone B. Green (I) $84,004 5,016 29% Victor A. Motley, Sr. (I) $1,555 1,611 9% Write-Ins 21 0% Totals $560,217 26,237 100%

Norfolk (90) Winsome E. Sears (R)+ $73,946 6,696 53% William P. Robinson, Jr. (D)* $149,194 6,017 47% Write-Ins 4 0% Totals $223,140 12,717 100%

York (96) Patrick Pettitt (D) $94,440 8,175 38% Melanie Rapp (R)*+ $139,440 9,888 46% Dick Ashe (I) $29,664 3,144 15% Robert L. Stermer III (L) $2,134 208 1% Write-Ins 16 0% Totals $265,678 21,431 100% SOURCE: Offi cial election results provided by the State Board of Elections. Expenditures information provided by Virginia Public Access Project. * indicates incumbent, + indicates winner

CHAPTER 5 ✰ The 2001General Election 153 TABLE 5.19 Candidates by Party, Virginia General Assembly Elections, 1967–1999 DEMOCRATS REPUBLICANS INDEPENDENTS Year Senate House Total %a Senate House Total %a Senate House Total %a 1967 38 98 136 (58.4) 21 57 78 (33.5) 6 13 19 (8.1) 1969 — 96 96 (60.0) — 55 55 (34.4) — 9 9 (5.6) 1971 39 96 135 (51.5) 26 72 98 (37.4 7 22 29 (11.1) 1973 — 86 86 (46.7) — 60 60 (32.6) — 38 38 (20.7) 1975 40 95 135 (60.3) 20 48 68 (30.4) 9 12 21 (9.3) 1977 — 92 92 (57.5) — 53 53 (33.1) — 15 15 (9.4) 1979 39 91 130 (57.0) 26 63 89 (39.0) 3 6 9 (3.9) 1981 — 90 90 (54.2) — 58 58 (34.9) — 18 18 (10.8) 1982 — 85 85 (53.5) — 66 66 (41.5) — 8 8 (5.0) 1983 38 81 119 (56.4) 23 55 78 (37.0) 3 11 14 (6.6) 1985 — 79 79 (55.2) — 59 59 (41.3) — 5 5 (3.5) 1987 36 77 113 (55.4) 23 53 76 (37.2) 6 9 15 (7.4) 1989 — 78 78 (52.3) — 61 61 (40.9) — 10 10 (6.8) 1991 38 83 121 (51.7) 30 64 94 (40.2) 8 11 19 (8.1) 1993 — 78 78 (42.2) — 77 77 (41.6) — 30 30 (16.2) 1995 28 80 108 (43.5) 35 85 120 (48.4) 6 14 20 (8.1) 1997 — 70 70 (43.5) — 68 68 (42.2) — 23 23 (14.3) 1999 24 66 90 (39.6) 33 72 105 (46.3) 7 25 32 (14.1) 2001 — 69 69 (40.1) — 81 81 (47.1) — 22 22 (12.8) SOURCE: Compiled from offi cial election results provided by the State Board of Elections. NOTE: Senate elections are held every four years; thus, no Senate elections occurred in 1969, 1973, 1977, 1981, 1982, 1985, 1989, 1993, 1997, 2001. a Percent of total number of candidates for each election year.

Democrat Patrick Pettitt (whom she had defeated by 2 percentage points in a December 2000 special election to replace now-Congresswoman Jo Ann Davis), Libertarian Robert Stermer, and H.R. “Dick” Ashe, an Independent who described himself throughout the campaign as a Republican. The feud between Ashe and Rapp was more than political. Rapp publicly questioned the moral integrity of a man who was not married to the woman with whom he was living. Ashe, in turn, publicly pointed out that Rapp is a single adult woman living with her parents, and said that raised questions about whether she had the experience to play an eff ective role in the Assembly.23 Although Ashe won the editorial endorsement from the Daily Press, Rapp retained her seat by posting 46 percent of the vote. TABLE 5.20 The retirement of maverick Republican Panny Rhodes (a moderate who Re-election Rates, Virginia General Assembly Elections 1979–2001 had butted heads with Gilmore throughout her terms in the House and openly supported Warner in 2001) created an open-seat race in the Richmond-area 68th Election House of State district. Republican lawyer Bradley Marrs, Democrat Edward Barber, and Rhodes- Year Delegates Senate supported former Richmond Vice- Mayor John Conrad (a Republican who ran as 1979 96.6 91.9 1981 86.4 — an Independent) created one of the most widely watched House races of the year. 1982 88.0 — Endorsed by Gilmore, Marrs ran on a conservative social platform and triumphed 1983 95.9 97.2 over his more moderate opponents. 1985 95.8 — Additionally, the GOP almost won a second seat for a Republican-backed 1987 93.6 89.5 African American woman, Independent Rosalyn Dance of Petersburg. She lost nar- — 1989 93.5 rowly to Democrat Fenton Bland in a black- majority district. Bland thus succeeded 1991 91.8 78.1 1993 96.7 — white Democrat Jay DeBoer, increasing the Legislative Black Caucus in the House 1995 96.7 81.6 by one new seat. Another African American Democrat, Floyd Miles of Charles City 1997 97.8 — 1999 97.9 94.9 23. Andrew Petkofsky, “96th House Race Off ers a Plethora of Candidates,” Richmond Times- 2001 94.0 — Dispatch, October 29, 2001, p. B4.

154 Virginia Votes ✰ 1999–2002 TABLE 5.21 Election Results in Open Seats, Virginia House of Delegates, 2001 District Defending Party Winner (Party) Loser (Party) Change 14 D Danny W. Marshall III (R) Joyce E. Glaise (D) R 16 New Robert Hurt (R) Randy W. Collins (D) R 18 D C.L. Athey Jr. (R) Peter B. Schwartz (D) R 20 D Chris B. Saxman (R) Tracy C. Pyles Jr. (D) R 31 R L. Scott Lingamfelter (R) Michele D. Krause (D) NC 58 R Rob B. Bell III (R) Charles S. Martin (D) NC 60 D Clarke N. Hogan (R) Brad J. Wike (D) R 63 D Fenton L. Bland (D) Rosalyn R. Dance (I) NC 67 R Gary A. Reese (R) Gayla G. Schoenborn (D) NC 68 R Bradley Marrs (R) Edward B. Barber (D) NC 74 D Floyd H. Miles Sr. (D) Terone B. Green (I) NC 78 R John A. Cosgrove Jr. (R) JoAnn H. Huskey (D) NC 86 D Thomas Davis Rust (R) James G. Kelly (D) R 88 D Mark L. Cole (R) Wililam L. Jones (D) R 94 D G. Glenn Oder (R) John C. Miller (D) R 97 D Ryan T. McDougle (R) John W. Montgomery Jr. (D) R

County, easily held the seat of Delelgate Donald McEachin, the party’s losing candi- date for state attorney general. Lastly, the Republicans’ attempt to elect a Hispanic candidate in a new Hispanic-minority “infl uence district” failed in Northern Virginia. Incumbent white Democrat Karen Darner of Alexandria easily maintained her post against Republican Edgar Gonzalez. Redistricting years usually produce a high number of retirements, and such was the case in 2001, with 17 delegates voluntarily deciding not to run again. Fully 12 of these 17 were Democrats, with 208 years of seniority lost in one fell swoop; the re- maining 5 were Republicans, with just 36 years of seniority. Of the 83 delegates who ran for re- election, fi ve were defeated in either the primary or general elections (three Democrats, two Republicans). This added another 26 years of seniority lost for the Democrats, and 8 years for the Republicans.24 The total years of seniority drained from the House of Delegates and its institutional memory in 2001 was 278. With 78 of the 83 delegates successfully seeking another term at the polls in 2001, the re- election rate was a healthy 94 percent. As Table 5.20 indicates, this rate is actually lower than most election years but higher than the three previous redistrict- ing years of 1981, 1982, and 1991. Most of the change in the House of Delegates in 2001 came not from incum- bent defeats but from “open seats” where no incumbent was running. As Table 5.21 indicates, the sixteen open seats were fertile ground for the Republicans, who won nine of them. The other seven seats did not change party hands (with Republicans winning fi ve of those, too). Table 5.23 demonstrates that the House membership turnover in 2001 (22) was almost the same as in two previous redistricting years (1991—21, and 1981— 23). But the turnover was far less than in the tumultuous redistricting years of 1965 (35) and 1971 (38). As usual, the more populous urban areas, with far more seats, lost more delegates in turnover than the rural areas; in 2001, sixteen new urban delegates were elected, compared with just six new rural delegates. Hampton Roads, Southside,

24. Delegate Jim Shuler, an eight-year veteran of the House, was defeated in the November elec- tion for the 7th district, but won a special election on January 8, 2002 and returned to the House, representing the 12th district. His service is not included in the number of years seniority lost to defeat and retirement.

CHAPTER 5 ✰ The 2001General Election 155 TABLE 5.22 Party Representation, Virginia General Assembly, 1967–2001 Democrats Republicans Independents Year Senate No. House No. Senate No. House No. House No. 1967 34 85 6 14 1 1969 33 75 7 24 1 1971 33 73 7 24 3 1973 34 65 6 20 15 1975 35 78 5 17 5 1977 34 76 6 21 3 1979 31 74 9 25 1 1981 31 66 9 33 1 1982 31 65 9 34 1 1983 32 65 8 34 1 1985 32 65 8 33 2 1987 30 64 10 35 1 1989 30 59 10 39 2 1991 22 58 18 34 1 1993 22 52 18 47 1 1995 20 52 20 47 1 1997 20 51 20 48 1 1999 19 47 21 52 1 2001 18 34 22 64 2

TABLE 5.23 Membership Turnover, Virginia General Assembly, 1965–2001 Number of New Members in the General Assembly SENATE HOUSE ENTIRE ASSEMBLY Year Urban Rural Total Urban Rural Total Urban Rural Total 1965 1 9 10 14 21 35 15 30 45 1967 5 4 9 5 6 11 20 10 30 1969 — — — 17 9 26 17 9 26 1971 9 8 17 20 18 68 29 26 55 1973 — — — 16 7 23 16 7 23 1975 5 5 10 12 3 15 17 8 25 1977 — — — 14 4 18 14 4 18 1979 3 3 6 11 4 15 14 7 21 1981 — — — 15 8 23 15 8 23 1982 — — — 12 7 19 12 7 19 1983 3 2 5 6 0 6 9 2 11 1985 — — — 5 3 8 5 3 8 1987 5 1 6 6 6 12 11 7 18 1989 — — — 6 14 8 6 14 1991 10 5 15 16 5 21 26 10 36 1993 — — — 6 7 13 6 7 13 1995 7 2 9 5 3 8 12 5 17 1997 — — — 7 2 9 7 2 9 1999 3 0 3 4 4 8 7 4 11 2001 — — — 16 6 22 16 6 22

and the Richmond area accounted for fi ft een of the new delegates, with Northern Virginia and the Southwest adding three each. Most observers can only marvel at the remarkable performance of the GOP in the House races. In the mid-1970s the Republicans were kept to 28 percent to 29 percent of the statewide vote (considering all 100 House races together). By contrast,

156 Virginia Votes ✰ 1999–2002 in every one of the fi ve consecutive General Assembly elections beginning in 1993, the Republicans have achieved an absolute majority of the statewide legislative vote, with their largest proportion in history (55.5 percent) recorded in 2001. Again for the fi rst time ever, Democrats were pushed below the 40 percent mark in 2001 (39.1 percent). Independents secured 5 percent of the total vote. Considering only the fi ft y-one party-contested districts in 2001, the Republicans also hit a new high in the proportion of total votes cast (52.9 percent) and the Democrats sunk to a new low (45.6 percent).

Women and Minorities

The 2001 election saw the number of female legislators in the House remain the same (15), with all 14 incumbent women running for re- election holding their seats. The only change in membership was the retirement of moderate Republican Panny Rhodes of Richmond, and the addition of African American Republican Winsome Sears in the Norfolk- area 90th. Of the 15 female delegates, seven are Democrats, and eight belong to the GOP. With the seven women who serve in the Senate of Virginia (all Democrats), the 22 total female legislators comprise 15.7 percent of the General Assembly.25 The number of African American delegates increased by one in 2001, raising the total to ten. Two prominent black legislators left the General Assembly, each for diff erent reasons—Delegate Donald McEachin, a six- year veteran of the House, retired from his seat to pursue (unsuccessfully) the position of Attorney General, and Delegate Billy Robinson of Norfolk (as discussed in the previous section) was defeated soundly in his bid for an eleventh term. Both delegates were replaced by African Americans: Democrat Floyd Miles of Charles City won in the 74th (where

25. The 15 women serving in the Virginia House of Delegates following in the 2002 session were: Name Party District Kristin Amundson D Mount Vernon—44 Viola Baskerville D Richmond—71 Kathy Byron R Lynchburg—22 Mary Christian D Hampton—92 Flora Davis Crittenden D Newport News—95 Karen Darner D Arlington—49 Jeannemarie Devolites R Vienna—35 Thelma Drake R Norfolk—87 Michèle McQuigg R Woodbridge—51 Melanie Rapp R Yorktown—96 Winsome Sears R Norfolk—90 Beverly Sherwood R Winchester—29 Terrie Suit R Virginia Beach—81 Marian Van Landingham D Alexandria—45 Vivian Watts D Annandale—39 The 7 women serving in the Senate of Virginia in the 2002 session were: Name Party District Leslie Byrne D Falls Church—34 Janet Howell D Reston—32 Louise Lucas D Portsmouth—18 Yvonne Miller D Norfolk—5 Linda Puller D Mount Vernon—36 Patsy Ticer D Alexandria—30 Mary Margaret Whipple D Arlington—31

CHAPTER 5 ✰ The 2001General Election 157 TABLE 5.24 Membership Turnover by Regional Areas, Virginia General Assembly, 1965–2001 Election Year Regional Area 1965* 1967* 1969 1971* 1973 1975* 1977 1979* 1981 1982 1983* 1985 1987* 1989 1991* 1993 1995* 1997 1999* 2001 Northern Virginia 4 3 11 9 4 7 7 7 8 2 3 2 3 2 10 2 4 2 4 3 Piedmont 1 2 1 3 2 0 3 0 2 2 1 0 1 1302111 Northern Neck & Eastern Shore 3 1 0 0 2 0 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 0100110 Richmond 4 5 3 5 3 5 3 0 3 4 2 0 2 3411104 Hampton Roads 7 10 3 10 4 4 1 5 2 2 3 3 5 1723236 Tidewater (minus Hampton Roads) 2 0 2 1 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0100100 Southside 6 4 3 10 1 2 2 3 3 2 0 2 3 2422105 Southwest 10 2 3 7 1 2 0 1 2 4 0 0 3 4142013 Western 1 2052102111001310000 Shenandoah Valley 7 1 0 4 1 4 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 1 3 0 1 0 NOTE: For an exact measure of the regional areas used in this table, see the author’s Aftermath of Armageddon: An Analysis of the 1973 Virginia Gubernatorial Election (Charlottesville: Institute of Government, 1975), Figure 1. Starred (*) election years are those in which members of both the Senate and House of Delegates were elected. Unstarred election years are those in which only members of the House of Delegates were elected.

he faced two other black candidates in the open-seat race), and Republican Winsome Sears defeated Robinson in the 90th. The other new African American legislator is Democrat Fenton Bland of Petersburg, who narrowly overcame a tough challenge from Independent Rosalyn Dance (also an African American who had GOP sup- port) to replace the retiring Jay DeBoer. In addition to the ten African Americans in the House, there are fi ve African American senators, raising the total of black legisla- tors to 15, or 10.7 percent of the General Assembly.26 In an interesting note, much was made in the press during the redistricting session of the new majority-minority district drawn in Northern Virginia. The 49th House district was adjusted to include portions of Arlington, Alexandria, and Fairfax, and was approximately 41 percent Hispanic. The GOP nominated Salvadoran-American businessman Edgar Gonzalez, who was recruited by Speaker Vance Wilkins and pub- licly supported by Congressman Tom Davis and Delegates Jeannemarie Devolites

26. The 10 African Americans serving in the Virginia House of Delegates in the 2002 session were: Name Party District Viola Baskerville D Richmond—71 Fenton Bland D Petersburg—63 Mary Christian D Hampton—92 Flora Davis Crittenden D Newport News—95 Dwight Jones D Richmond—70 Jerrauld Jones D Norfolk—89 Kenneth Melvin D Portsmouth—80 Floyd Miles D Richmond—74 Winsome Sears R Norfolk—90 Lionell Spruill D Chesapeake—70 The 5 African Americans serving in the Senate of Virginia in the 2002 session were: Name Party District Benjamin Lambert D Richmond—9 Louise Lucas D Portsmouth—18 Henry Marsh D Richmond—16 Henry Maxwell D Newport News—2 Yvonne Miller D Norfolk—5

158 Virginia Votes ✰ 1999–2002 TABLE 5.25 Vote by Parties, Virginia General Assembly Elections, 1967–1999 PERCENT OF VOTE STATEWIDE 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1982 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 STATEWIDE Democratic 60.0 58.6 55.9 66.9 66.6 62.0 59.6 56.9 61.5 58.3 59.9 52.6 54.3 44.6 44.3 44.9 40.7 39.1 Republican 37.1 34.6 31.7 28.1 29.7 36.5 36.5 40.8 36.1 39.5 35.8 44.8 42.1 51.2 53.0 50.7 54.9 55.5 Independents 2.8 6.8 12.4 4.9 3.7 1.5 3.9 2.2 2.4 2.1 4.2 2.4 3.4 4.2 2.5 3.9 3.8 5.0 Write-ins 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.4 Totals 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

PARTY CONTESTS Democratic 56.9 55.3 54.6 57.3 61.8 56.3 51.9 52.6 54.4 54.0 52.8 50.3 47.6 48.5 51.4 49.0 46.7 45.6 Republican 39.9 37.1 32.6 40.0 36.2 43.4 46.6 46.8 45.0 45.9 46.3 49.3 49.6 50.0 48.1 49.7 52.1 52.9 Independents 3.2 7.6 12.8 2.7 2.0 0.3 1.5 0.5 0.6 0.1 0.9 0.3 2.7 1.8 0.4 1.2 1.2 1.5 Write-ins 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 Totals 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.1 100.1 NOTE: Totals may exceed 100 percent due to rounding error.

TABLE 5.26 Campaign Spending, Virginia House of Delegates, 2001 Elections Total Campaign Expenditures Percent of Expenditures HOUSE OF DELEGATES (PARTY-CONTESTED DISTRICTS ONLY; N = 51) Democrats $4,242,976 43.5 Republicans $5,291,701 54.3 Independents/Others $214,398 2.2 TOTAL $9,749,075 100.0

HOUSE OF DELEGATES (ALL DISTRICTS; N = 100) Democrats $5,279,739 39.5 Republicans $7,520,245 56.3 Independents/Others $563,825 4.2 TOTAL $13,363,809 100.0 SOURCE: Offi cial Election results provided by the Virginia Public Access Project. and Jack Rust.27 On Election Day, however, the overwhelmingly Democratic nature of the district prevailed, as incumbent Democrat Karen Darner won in a landslide.

Campaign Finance: Statewide Campaigns

Campaign money fl owed like mother’s milk in 2001, as the grand total for all state- wide candidates on the November ballot topped an incredible $39 million—a 59 percent increase over the $25 million spent in 1997. The Warner- Earley race ac- counted for $31.4 million of the total, a 77 percent increase over 1997 (see Table 5.26). Warner outspent Earley by close to two- to- one, $19.9 million to $11.5 mil- lion. Earley was no laggard, spending over a million dollars more than Jim Gilmore did to win the governorship four years earlier (though Earley had a contest for the nomination and Gilmore did not). But Warner essentially tripled the money spent by the Democratic nominees for governor in 1989, 1993, and 1997. Warner’s bulging

27. Ann O’Hanlon, “GOP Picks Gonzalez to Run in 49th,” Washington Post, July 22, 2001, p. C1.

CHAPTER 5 ✰ The 2001General Election 159 TABLE 5.27 Campaign Spending in Virginia Statewide Elections, 1981–2001 Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent Change Change Change Change Change 1981 1985 from 1981 1989 from 1985 1993 from 1989 1997 from 1993 2001 from 1997 GOVERNOR Democrat $2,336,000 $4,206,000 80% $6,861,000 63% $6,505,000 –5% $7,333,057 13% $19,881,944 171% Republican $2,829,000 $3,927,000 39% $9,270,000 14% $5,467,000 –41% $10,343,516 89% $11,468,273 11% Total $5,165,000 $8,133,000 58% $16,131,000 98% $11,972,000 –26% $17,676,573 48% $31,350,217 77%

LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR Democrat $339,000 $696,000 105% $2,554,000 267% $1,917,000 –25% $2,196,408 15% $2,695,350 23% Republican $341,000 $882,000 159% $1,429,000 62% $1,543,000 8% $2,177,706 41% $1,354,075 –38% Total $680,000 $1,578,000 132% $3,983,00 152% $3,460,000 –13% $4,374,114 26% $4,049,425 –7%

ATTORNEY GENERAL Democrat $380,000 $1,318,000 247% $1,359,000 3% $1,272,000 –6% $1,070,793 –16% $1,638,589 53% Republican $647,000 $938,000 45% $478,000 49% $1,161,000 143% $1,472,170 27% $2,151,966 46% Total $1,027,000 $2,256,000 120% $1,837,000 –19% $2,433,000 32% $2,542,962 5% $3,790,555 49% Grand Total $6,872,000 $11,967,000 74% $21,951,000 83% $17,865,000 –19% $24,593,649 38% $39,190,197 59%

TABLE 5.28 war chest was enhanced further once the non-overlapping expenditures for his sepa- Money Spent Per Vote, Virginia rate campaign committees, Victory 2001 ($4.8 million) and Virginians for Warner Statewide Elections, 2001 ($845,000) were added in28 (see Table 5.31). This grand total of $22.5 million is the Money Spent Per largest amount ever spent by a candidate for statewide offi ce in Virginia; the runner- Candidate Vote Received up was unsuccessful Republican U.S. Senate nominee Oliver North in 1994 ($19.8 Warner $20.20 million). Overall, Warner expended $20.20 per vote received, or if the two other Earley $12.93 major Warner committees are added in, an astounding $22.89 per vote. Earley’s more Kaine $2.91 modest, and losing, allotment per vote was $12.93. Katzen $1.53 McEachin $2.23 Warner had been a big spender once before, in his unsuccessful bid for the Kilgore $1.94 U.S. Senate in 1996, when he spent $11.5 million to incumbent U.S. Senator John Warner’s $2.7 million. However, in that campaign, Mark Warner had supplied fully 90 percent of his total from his own enormous $200 million personal fortune. In TABLE 5.29 Expenditures for Television and Radio, 2001, the Democrat played a smarter game, one made possible by the very real pros- Virginia Statewide Candidates, 2001 pect of his victory throughout the campaign as well as his determination to get large and small donors to put some skin in his game. Out of his $19.9 million total spent Percent of Amount Overall by the Warner for Governor campaign in 2001, he supplied “only” $4.7 million from Candidate Spent Spending his own bank account; fully 76.4 percent of his total was contributed by other people, Warner (D) $10,293,163 52 most of them of more modest means. This is unusual human behavior, since few give Earley (R) $6,682,802 58 willingly to multimillionaires, but Warner’s campaign ran an aggressive outreach to Kaine (D) $1,180,952 44 Democrats hungry for a victory and Independents hoping for a piece of the winner’s Katzen (R) $268,153 20 action. Warner received donations from approximately 20,172 people since January Kilgore (R) $1,145,928 53 2000. Earley, by contrast, had far fewer fi nancial supporters: 12,457 donors gave to McEachin (D) $479,754 29 the Republican nominee.29 SOURCE: Figures provided by the Virginia Public Access Project. NOTE: These are not self-reported numbers, but VPAP’s 28. Gross total spending by Warner for Governor, Virginians for Warner, and Victory 2001 was best interpretation of expenditure information provided $25,573,068. Minus transfers between the committees (Virginians for Warner donated $809,715 to by each candidate. the campaign committee, and the campaign committee donated $2.2 million to Victory 2001), the net spending on behalf of Mark Warner totaled $22,523,853. Source: David Poole of the Virginia Public Access Project. 29. Figures provided by David Poole of the Virginia Public Access Project. The numbers are probably slightly off because (1) small donors would be double-counted if they gave more than one donation, and (2) a single donor can give under various names—his individual name and any number of companies.

160 Virginia Votes ✰ 1999–2002 Wa rn er e ff ectively sanitized his campaign from the taint of labor money by TABLE 5.30 directing almost all organized labor contributions to the joint party committee, Expenditures for Direct Mail, Virginia Victory 2001. The labor donations to the Warner eff orts totaled $1.3 million, with Statewide Candidates, 2001 Warner for Governor taking in $120,595 and Victory 2001 accepting $1,208,159.30 Percent of Victory 2001 reported paying 2,740 individuals a total of $352,151 for Amount Overall GOTV-related expenses. Most of these people were “fl ushers” in majority black dis- Candidate Spent Spending tricts, a common practice used by many Democratic candidates. In addition, Victory Warner (D) $1,648,180 8 2001 paid companies another $448,676 in GOTV-related expenses, including food Earley (R) $413,721 6 Kaine (D) $290,853 11 ($8,850 worth of in- kind Election Day meals from Golden Corral in Virginia Beach) Katzen (R) $125,406 9 and phones ($400,000 to Landmark Strategies).31 Kilgore (R) $84,852 4 Interestingly, Mark Earley also had paid fl ushers, though on a much smaller McEachin (D) $131,907 8 scale: Earley reported paying 530 individuals a total of $35,465 for GOTV- related SOURCE: Figures provided by the Virginia Public Access expenses on his latest report. Table 5.32 shows a similar breakdown for Earley’s cam- Project. paign, including fl ushers in rock- solid Republican localities in Chesterfi eld, Virginia NOTE: These are not self-reported numbers, but VPAP’s best interpretation of expenditure information provided Beach, Hanover, and Chesapeake, Earley’s hometown. Earley won all four, but by each candidate. Chesapeake and Virginia Beach voted for him by disappointing margins. The spending for lieutenant governor and attorney general in 2001 was much TABLE 5.31 closer to past practice. The total for the No. 2 offi ce actually declined 7 percent from Spending by Mark Warner’s Campaign 1997, mainly because the Republican nominee, Jay Katzen, spent just $1.4 mil- and Related Committees, 2001 lion—38 percent less than John Hager had spent four years earlier. Despite his re- Committee Amount Spent peated private pleas for assistance, Katzen was unable to get much if any help from na- Warner for Governor $19,881,944 tional Republican Party committees such as the RNC, chaired by Governor Gilmore. Virginians for Warner $845,409 Within a short time aft er his narrow defeat on November 6, an unhappy Katzen Victory 2001 $4,845,715 was on the phone to some well- connected members of the RNC, informing them Gross Total Spent $25,573,068 Net Spending $22,523,853 of Gilmore’s actions and urging that he be fi red as RNC chairman. Whether this ef- SOURCE: Virginia Public Access Project fort had any real impact on Gilmore’s late- November resignation as party chairman NOTE: The diff erence between “Gross Total Spent” and “Net is unknown. Meanwhile, Democrat Kaine was raising and spending $2.7 million, a Spending” results from the fact that Virginians for Warner 23 percent gain over L.F. Payne, the Democratic nominee for lieutenant governor in donated $809,715 to the Warner for Governor campaign 1997. Kaine had a hotly contested primary, of course, while Payne (and Katzen) were committee, and the Warner for Governor campaign com- mittee transferred $2.2 million to Victory 2001. unopposed in the end for their respective party nominations. Still, Kaine undeniably outspent Katzen in the general election period. Kaine’s per- vote total was $2.91 to Katzen’s $1.53. Donald McEachin had a tough primary in 2001, too, while his GOP opponent Jerry Kilgore was unopposed for the Republican nod. Yet Kilgore outspent McEachin $2.2 million to $1.6 million. The 2001 race cost half again as much as the contest in 1997, and McEachin’s votes cost $2.23 apiece to Kilgore’s $1.94. All three statewide winners spent more than their opponents on television and radio. Warner spent $10.3 million in this fashion to Earley’s $6.7 million—though as a proportion of his campaign spending, this was just 52 percent of Warner’s budget but 58 percent of Earley’s. Kaine massively outspent Katzen for broadcast advertis- ing, $1.2 million to $268,000. Kilgore’s margin over McEachin was almost as large, $1.2 million to $480,000. Incredibly, Katzen devoted only 20 percent of his budget to TV and radio, and McEachin just 29 percent. By contrast, Kaine allocated 44 per- cent and Kilgore 53 percent of their respective budgets to electronic ads. Direct mail consumed a much smaller percentage of all six war chests, between 4 percent for Kilgore to 11 percent for Kaine. As for every major category of expen- diture, Warner spent the most absolute dollars among all the candidates, over $1.6 million.

30. Figures provided by David Poole of the Virginia Public Access Project. 31. Ibid.

CHAPTER 5 ✰ The 2001General Election 161 TABLE 5.32 Get-Out-The-Vote Expenses, Virginia Gubernatorial Candidates, 2001 Locality Number of Paid Flushers Total Spent Victory 2001 (Warner (D)) Richmond 843 $95,764 Norfolk 351 $28,597 Hampton 310 $23,260 Roanoke 295 $22,507 Portsmouth 226 $18,978 Petersburg 221 $23,000 Newport News 208 $15,350 Lynchburg 147 $7,474 Chesapeake 139 $11,445 Total 2740 $352,151

Earley (R) Virginia Beach 212 $10,285 Chesapeake 101 $5,040 Mechanicsville (Hanover Co.) 87 $4,350 Midlothian (Chesterfi eld Co.) 76 $3,375 Other 54 $12,469 Total 530 $23,050

Campaign Finance: House of Delegates Campaigns

Nearly $13.4 million was spent by all candidates running for the House of Delegates in 2001. When added to the $39.2 million spent by the six statewide candidates, the total campaign expenditure for Virginia’s general election candidates was a staggering $53 million. The House Republicans outspent the Democrats by close to the same margin of votes they secured in the 2001 elections: $7.5 million for the Republicans to $5.3 million for the Democrats, or 56.3 percent to 39.5 percent. When looking only at the 51 party-contested House contests, the GOP candidates outspent the Democrats by a slightly smaller percentage, 54.3 percent to 43.5 percent (see Table 5.25). It is important to note that as impressive as the $13.4 million in total 2001 House expenditures is, it actually represents a drop of 22 percent from the total of just two years ago. In 1999 the House candidates in all 100 districts spent $16.4 mil- lion. The retirement of so many senior incumbent Democrats and the reduction in competition that came with redistricting may account for the “missing” $3 million in 2001. Similarly, the average expenditure for a major-party candidate in a party- contested House district in 2001 was $93,474, a 44 percent decrease from the average 1999 expenditure of $167,020.

The Arrogance of Power

The late U.S. Senator J. William Fulbright (D- Arkansas) wrote a book in 1966 about the disastrous U.S. involvement in Vietnam, entitled The Arrogance of Power. In the volume, the veteran legislator who had worked closely with several presidents and dozens of Cabinet offi cials described the headiness of power, and the fateful,

162 Virginia Votes ✰ 1999–2002 self-destructive arrogance that sooner or later comes from its full exercise. Virginia’s modern political history is yet one more example of Fulbright’s axiom. In 1969, Virginia awoke from a long one- party slumber and threw out the rul- ing Democrats, electing a young Republican named Linwood Holton to the gover- norship to replace a six- decade- old oligarchy. The GOP then fl ourished for twelve years, installing two more governors, a lieutenant governor, an attorney general, a U.S. senator, and nine of ten U.S. representatives. Greater power led to GOP fac- tionalism and internal strife, not dissimilar to that which plagued the Democrats in the 1960s. So in 1981 the Democrats roared back to power in a sweep of top state offi ces led by a young, handsome ex- Marine, Charles S. Robb, son- in- law of President Lyndon B. Johnson. Two more sweeps ensued in 1985 and 1989, and Democrats began to think the old party order, with a new moderate twist, had been restored. Yet as if on cue, the arrogance of power re-emerged, and brawls among the Democrats (Robb, Wilder, and others) became headline staples. A little known and lightly re- garded former state legislator and one-year congressman, George F. Allen, became the giant- killer in 1993, easily dispatching the Democrats’ governor- in- waiting, former Attorney General Mary Sue Terry. Over the next seven years the Democrats seemed to fall apart as the Republicans secured every offi ce not absolutely nailed down by their opponents. The 1990s, like the 1970s, were a Republican “dream come true.” Just as in 1981, though, the dream turned sour for the GOP, thanks to the ar- rogance of a Republican-engineered budget impasse, intense party factionalism, and a disastrous campaign with no sense of mission or purpose other than holding power. Thus, a Democratic period of power (or power-sharing) has begun anew. Its precise duration is not yet known, but the arrogance of power will have something to do with its length. Which party will demonstrate more internal factionalism over time? Will Democratic executive power generate more excesses than Republican legislative power, or the reverse? One thing is certain: the voters will remain alert, in charge, and appropriately vengeful. One would think the parties would learn this lesson over time, but it is probably not in the nature of power or the ambitious individuals who seek and gain high offi ce. Virginia’s electorate asserts itself at regular intervals to restore balance and competition between the parties. Its recurrent message is a welcome and audible echo of the Commonwealth’s time- tested motto, Sic Semper Tyrannis (“Thus Ever to Tyrants”)—both the real kind, King George III, and the aspiring sort, namely parties that arrogantly believe they have a divine right to govern. ★

CHAPTER 5 ✰ The 2001General Election 163 APPENDIX 8 General Election for Governor, November 6, 2001 M. L. Earley (R) M. R. Warner (D) Deviation Percent of Deviation Percent of Number Percent from Choice’s Choice’s Number Percent From Choice’s Choice’s LOCALITY Total Vote of Votes of Vote State Average State Total of Votes of Vote State Average State Total STATE 1,886,721 887,234 47.0% 984,177 52.2% CITIES 557,801 234,326 42.0% –5.0% 26.4% 319,384 57.3% 5.1% 32.5% Alexandria 34,802 10,810 31.1% –16.0% 1.2% 23,739 68.2% 16.0% 2.4% Bedford (City) 1,813 747 41.2% –5.8% 0.1% 1,031 56.9% 4.7% 0.1% Bristol 4,458 2,268 50.9% 3.8% 0.3% 2,166 48.6% –3.6% 0.2% Buena Vista 1,455 572 39.3% –7.7% 0.1% 853 58.6% 6.5% 0.1% Charlottesville 9,306 2,316 24.9% –22.1% 0.3% 6,781 72.9% 20.7% 0.7% Chesapeake 52,633 28,328 53.8% 6.8% 3.2% 24,087 45.8% –6.4% 2.4% Colonial Heights 5,473 3,660 66.9% 19.8% 0.4% 1,758 32.1% –20.0% 0.2% Covington 1,709 597 34.9% –12.1% 0.1% 1,071 62.7% 10.5% 0.1% Danville 13,730 6,150 44.8% –2.2% 0.7% 7,346 53.5% 1.3% 0.7% Emporia 1,535 616 40.1% –6.9% 0.1% 912 59.4% 7.3% 0.1% Fairfax (City) 6,724 3,203 47.6% 0.6% 0.4% 3,478 51.7% –0.4% 0.4% Falls Church 3,985 1,326 33.3% –13.8% 0.1% 2,623 65.8% 13.7% 0.3% Franklin 2,222 781 35.1% –11.9% 0.1% 1,434 64.5% 12.4% 0.1% Fredericksburg 4,456 1,679 37.7% –9.3% 0.2% 2,717 61.0% 8.8% 0.3% Galax 1,605 733 45.7% –1.4% 0.1% 866 54.0% 1.8% 0.1% Hampton 32,392 11,592 35.8% –11.2% 1.3% 20,627 63.7% 11.5% 2.1% Harrisonburg 6,468 3,334 51.5% 4.5% 0.4% 3,083 47.7% –4.5% 0.3% Hopewell 4,994 2,435 48.8% 1.7% 0.3% 2,467 49.4% –2.8% 0.3% Lexington 1,629 552 33.9% –13.1% 0.1% 1,053 64.6% 12.5% 0.1% Lynchburg 17,568 8,132 46.3% –0.7% 0.9% 9,314 53.0% 0.9% 0.9% Manassas Park 1,494 790 52.9% 5.9% 0.1% 691 46.3% –5.9% 0.1% Manassas 6,543 3,520 53.8% 6.8% 0.4% 2,992 45.7% –6.4% 0.3% Martinsville 4,132 1,346 32.6% –14.5% 0.2% 2,769 67.0% 14.9% 0.3% Newport News 37,422 15,920 42.5% –4.5% 1.8% 21,318 57.0% 4.8% 2.2% Norfolk 43,293 14,741 34.0% –13.0% 1.7% 28,244 65.2% 13.1% 2.9% Norton 1,144 366 32.0% –15.0% 0.0% 773 67.6% 15.4% 0.1% Petersburg 8,559 1,509 17.6% –29.4% 0.2% 7,018 82.0% 29.8% 0.7% Poquoson 4,171 2,656 63.7% 16.7% 0.3% 1,489 35.7% –16.5% 0.2% Portsmouth 26,374 8,922 33.8% –13.2% 1.0% 17,336 65.7% 13.6% 1.8% Radford 3,183 1,280 40.2% –6.8% 0.1% 1,876 58.9% 6.8% 0.2% Richmond (City) 48,537 12,432 25.6% –21.4% 1.4% 35,558 73.3% 21.1% 3.6% Roanoke (City) 24,699 9,147 37.0% –10.0% 1.0% 15,348 62.1% 10.0% 1.6% Salem 8,175 4,042 49.4% 2.4% 0.5% 4,067 49.7% –2.4% 0.4% Staunton 6,437 3,256 50.6% 3.6% 0.4% 3,141 48.8% –3.4% 0.3% Suff olk 17,181 7,996 46.5% –0.5% 0.9% 9,124 53.1% 0.9% Va. Beach 93,890 49,800 53.0% 6.0% 5.6% 43,495 46.3% –5.8% 4.4% Waynesboro 4,911 2,777 56.5% 9.5% 0.3% 2,109 42.9% –9.2% 0.2% Williamsburg 2,566 1,067 41.6% –5.4% 0.1% 1,475 57.5% 5.3% 0.1% Winchester 6,133 2,928 47.7% 0.7% 0.3% 3,155 51.4% –0.7% 0.3% COUNTIES 1,328,920 652,910 49.1% 2.1% 73.6% 664,793 50.0% –2.1% 67.5% Accomack 7,374 3,575 48.5% 1.5% 0.4% 3,710 50.3% –1.9% 0.4% Albemarle 26,428 11,143 42.2% –4.9% 1.3% 14,891 56.3% 4.2% 1.5% Alleghany 5,118 2,044 39.9% –7.1% 0.2% 3,018 59.0% 6.8% 0.3% Amelia 3,565 1,880 52.7% 5.7% 0.2% 1,665 46.7% –5.5% 0.2% Amherst 8,266 4,031 48.8% 1.7% 0.5% 4,198 50.8% –1.4% 0.4% Appomattox 4,420 2,090 47.3% 0.3% 0.2% 2,268 51.3% –0.9% 0.2% Arlington 52,719 16,214 30.8% –16.3% 1.8% 35,990 68.3% 16.1% 3.7% Augusta 17,974 11,133 61.9% 14.9% 1.3% 6,673 37.1% –15.0% 0.7% Bath 1,553 721 46.4% –0.6% 0.1% 804 51.8% –0.4% 0.1% Bedford (Co.) 19,547 11,298 57.8% 10.8% 1.3% 8,035 41.1% –11.1% 0.8%

164 Virginia Votes ✰ 1999–2002 APPENDIX 8 General Election for Governor, November 6, 2001 (continued) M. L. Earley (R) M. R. Warner (D) Deviation Percent of Deviation Percent of Number Percent from Choice’s Choice’s Number Percent From Choice’s Choice’s LOCALITY Total Vote of Votes of Vote State Average State Total of Votes of Vote State Average State Total Bland 1,734 888 51.2% 4.2% 0.1% 835 48.2% –4.0% 0.1% Botetourt 10,602 5,872 55.4% 8.4% 0.7% 4,629 43.7% –8.5% 0.5% Brunswick 4,350 1,491 34.3% –12.7% 0.2% 2,840 65.3% 13.1% 0.3% Buchanan 5,706 1,921 33.7% –13.4% 0.2% 3,746 65.7% 13.5% 0.4% Buckingham 3,997 1,601 40.1% –7.0% 0.2% 2,364 59.1% 7.0% 0.2% Campbell 15,743 8,366 53.1% 6.1% 0.9% 7,187 45.7% –6.5% 0.7% Caroline 5,902 2,274 38.5% –8.5% 0.3% 3,590 60.8% 8.7% 0.4% Carroll 7,830 4,481 57.2% 10.2% 0.5% 3,309 42.3% –9.9% 0.3% Charles City 2,391 631 26.4% –20.6% 0.1% 1,747 73.1% 20.9% 0.2% Charlotte 4,287 2,014 47.0% –0.0% 0.2% 2,202 51.4% –0.8% 0.2% Chesterfi eld 80,598 46,160 57.3% 10.2% 5.2% 33,810 41.9% –10.2% 3.4% Clarke 3,727 1,851 49.7% 2.6% 0.2% 1,839 49.3% –2.8% 0.2% Craig 1,825 887 48.6% 1.6% 0.1% 918 50.3% –1.9% 0.1% Culpeper 8,849 5,054 57.1% 10.1% 0.6% 3,721 42.0% –10.1% 0.4% Cumberland 2,632 1,255 47.7% 0.7% 0.1% 1,315 50.0% –2.2% 0.1% Dickenson 4,763 1,837 38.6% –8.5% 0.2% 2,907 61.0% 8.9% 0.3% Dinwiddie 6,836 3,202 46.8% –0.2% 0.4% 3,578 52.3% 0.2% 0.4% Essex 2,651 1,203 45.4% –1.6% 0.1% 1,436 54.2% 2.0% 0.1% Fairfax (Co.) 269,014 120,799 44.9% –2.1% 13.6% 146,537 54.5% 2.3% 14.9% Fauquier 16,472 9,420 57.2% 10.2% 1.1% 6,952 42.2% –10.0% 0.7% Floyd 4,493 2,331 51.9% 4.9% 0.3% 2,093 46.6% –5.6% 0.2% Fluvanna 6,630 3,425 51.7% 4.6% 0.4% 3,118 47.0% –5.1% 0.3% Franklin 13,996 6,703 47.9% 0.9% 0.8% 7,182 51.3% –0.8% 0.7% Frederick 16,499 9,947 60.3% 13.3% 1.1% 6,433 39.0% –13.2% 0.7% Giles 5,432 2,276 41.9% –5.1% 0.3% 3,071 56.5% 4.4% 0.3% Gloucester 9,196 5,010 54.5% 7.5% 0.6% 4,116 44.8% –7.4% 0.4% Goochland 6,537 3,394 51.9% 4.9% 0.4% 3,091 47.3% –4.9% 0.3% Grayson 5,371 2,824 52.6% 5.6% 0.3% 2,507 46.7% –5.5% 0.3% Greene 3,944 2,244 56.9% 9.9% 0.3% 1,644 41.7% –10.5% 0.2% Greensville 2,709 841 31.0% –16.0% 0.1% 1,859 68.6% 16.5% 0.2% Halifax 10,051 4,366 43.4% –3.6% 0.5% 5,506 54.8% 2.6% 0.6% Hanover 30,691 18,757 61.1% 14.1% 2.1% 11,713 38.2% –14.0% 1.2% Henrico 81,903 39,215 47.9% 0.9% 4.4% 42,089 51.4% –0.8% 4.3% Henry 16,085 5,942 36.9% –10.1% 0.7% 9,872 61.4% 9.2% 1.0% Highland 1,110 568 51.2% 4.1% 0.1% 533 48.0% –4.1% 0.1% Isle of Wright 9,471 4,708 49.7% 2.7% 0.5% 4,727 49.9% –2.3% 0.5% James City 17,251 8,654 50.2% 3.1% 1.0% 8,505 49.3% –2.9% 0.9% King and Queen 2,074 872 42.0% –5.0% 0.1% 1,188 57.3% 5.1% 0.1% King George 4,291 2,151 50.1% 3.1% 0.2% 2,110 49.2% –3.0% 0.2% King William 3,929 1,960 49.9% 2.9% 0.2% 1,942 49.4% –2.7% 0.2% Lancaster 4,432 2,373 53.5% 6.5% 0.3% 2,025 45.7% –6.5% 0.2% Lee 5,484 2,536 46.2% –0.8% 0.3% 2,923 53.3% 1.1% 0.3% Loudon 45,609 24,372 53.4% 6.4% 2.7% 20,907 45.8% –6.3% 2.1% Louisa 7,902 3,568 45.2% –1.9% 0.4% 4,244 53.7% 1.5% 0.4% Lunenberg 3,652 1,634 44.7% –2.3% 0.2% 1,996 54.7% 2.5% 0.2% Madison 3,992 2,121 53.1% 6.1% 0.2% 1,794 44.9% –7.2% 0.2% Mathews 3,265 1,712 52.4% 5.4% 0.2% 1,516 46.4% –5.7% 0.2% Mecklenburg 7,541 3,898 51.7% 4.7% 0.4% 3,519 46.7% –5.5% 0.4% Middlesex 3,692 1,861 50.4% 3.4% 0.2% 1,757 47.6% –4.6% 0.2% Montgomery 20,034 8,639 43.1% –3.9% 1.0% 11,154 55.7% 3.5% 1.1% (continued)

CHAPTER 5 ✰ The 2001General Election 165 APPENDIX 8 General Election for Governor, November 6, 2001 (continued) M. L. Earley (R) M. R. Warner (D) Deviation Percent of Deviation Percent of Number Percent from Choice’s Choice’s Number Percent From Choice’s Choice’s LOCALITY Total Vote of Votes of Vote State Average State Total of Votes of Vote State Average State Total Nelson 4,513 1,763 39.1% –8.0% 0.2% 2,681 59.4% 7.2% 0.3% New Kent 4,737 2,532 53.5% 6.4% 0.3% 2,161 45.6% –6.5% 0.2% Northampton 3,610 1,236 34.2% –12.8% 0.1% 2,316 64.2% 12.0% 0.2% Northumberland 4,355 2,159 49.6% 2.6% 0.2% 2,166 49.7% –2.4% 0.2% Nottoway 4,381 1,824 41.6% –5.4% 0.2% 2,513 57.4% 5.2% 0.3% Orange 7,613 3,902 51.3% 4.2% 0.4% 3,617 47.5% –4.7% 0.4% Page 5,757 3,292 57.2% 10.2% 0.4% 2,443 42.4% –9.7% 0.2% Patrick 5,483 2,775 50.6% 3.6% 0.3% 2,651 48.3% –3.8% 0.3% Pittsylvania 17,568 9,831 56.0% 8.9% 1.1% 7,462 42.5% –9.7% 0.8% Powhatan 6,957 4,338 62.4% 15.3% 0.5% 2,558 36.8% –15.4% 0.3% Prince Edward 4,905 1,967 40.1% –6.9% 0.2% 2,874 58.6% 6.4% 0.3% Prince George 7,570 4,104 54.2% 7.2% 0.5% 3,414 45.1% –7.1% 0.3% Prince William 58,342 30,543 52.4% 5.3% 3.4% 27,297 46.8% –5.4% 2.8% Pulaski 9,639 4,411 45.8% –1.3% 0.5% 5,109 53.0% 0.8% 0.5% Rappahannock 2,675 1,369 51.2% 4.2% 0.2% 1,284 48.0% –4.2% 0.1% Richmond (Co.) 2,242 1,124 50.1% 3.1% 0.1% 1,101 49.1% –3.1% 0.1% Roanoke (Co.) 31,917 16,713 52.4% 5.3% 1.9% 14,993 47.0% –5.2% 1.5% Rockbridge 5,903 2,885 48.9% 1.8% 0.3% 2,972 50.3% –1.8% 0.3% Rockingham 18,472 11,723 63.5% 16.4% 1.3% 6,642 36.0% –16.2% 0.7% Russell 7,467 2,907 38.9% –8.1% 0.3% 4,507 60.4% 8.2% 0.5% Scott 6,727 3,772 56.1% 9.0% 0.4% 2,877 42.8% –9.4% 0.3% Shenandoah 11,263 6,653 59.1% 12.0% 0.7% 4,531 40.2% –11.9% 0.5% Smyth 9,130 4,354 47.7% 0.7% 0.5% 4,691 51.4% –0.8% 0.5% Southampton 4,632 1,827 39.4% –7.6% 0.2% 2,790 60.2% 8.1% 0.3% Spotsylvania 21,283 11,447 53.8% 6.8% 1.3% 9,742 45.8% –6.4% 1.0% Staff ord 21,422 12,019 56.1% 9.1% 1.4% 9,248 43.2% –9.0% 0.9% Surry 2,365 801 33.9% –13.2% 0.1% 1,550 65.5% 13.4% 0.2% Sussex 3,124 1,134 36.3% –10.7% 0.1% 1,924 61.6% 9.4% 0.2% Tazewell 9,661 4,335 44.9% –2.2% 0.5% 5,250 54.3% 2.2% 0.5% Warren 7,959 4,311 54.2% 7.1% 0.5% 3,546 44.6% –7.6% 0.4% Washington 14,808 7,972 53.8% 6.8% 0.9% 6,703 45.3% –6.9% 0.7% Westmoreland 4,293 1,759 41.0% –6.1% 0.2% 2,471 57.6% 5.4% 0.3% Wise 9,421 3,816 40.5% –6.5% 0.4% 5,509 58.5% 6.3% 0.6% Wythe 7,869 3,991 50.7% 3.7% 0.4% 3,822 48.6% –3.6% 0.4% York 16,718 9,083 54.3% 7.3% 1.0% 7,530 45.0% –7.1% 0.8%

166 Virginia Votes ✰ 1999–2002

APPENDIX 9 General Election for Lieutenant Governor, November 6, 2001 T. M. Kaine (D) Deviation Percent of Number Percent from Choice’s Choice’s LOCALITY Total Vote of Votes of Vote State Average State Total STATE 1,839,133 925,974 50.3% CITIES 543,130 302,929 55.8% 5.4% 32.7% Alexandria 34,339 22,990 67.0% 16.6% 2.5% Bedford (City) 1,713 877 51.2% 0.8% 0.1% Bristol 4,289 2,089 48.7% –1.6% 0.2% Buena Vista 1,358 743 54.7% 4.4% 0.1% Charlottesville 9,131 6,231 68.2% 17.9% 0.7% Chesapeake 51,101 23,164 45.3% –5.0% 2.5% Colonial Heights 5,412 1,999 36.9% –13.4% 0.2% Covington 1,576 897 56.9% 6.6% 0.1% Danville 12,409 6,133 49.4% –0.9% 0.7% Emporia 1,450 843 58.1% 7.8% 0.1% Fairfax (City) 6,655 3,367 50.6% 0.2% 0.4% Falls Church 3,947 2,575 65.2% 14.9% 0.3% Franklin 2,174 1,328 61.1% 10.7% 0.1% Fredericksburg 4,385 2,611 59.5% 9.2% 0.3% Galax 1,553 762 49.1% –1.3% 0.1% Hampton 31,555 19,725 62.5% 12.2% 2.1% Harrisonburg 6,328 2,723 43.0% –7.3% 0.3% Hopewell 4,621 2,446 52.9% 2.6% 0.3% Lexington 1,563 969 62.0% 11.6% 0.1% Lynchburg 17,149 8,475 49.4% –0.9% 0.9% Manassas Park 1,422 593 41.7% –8.6% 0.1% Manassas 6,376 2,734 42.9% –7.5% 0.3% Martinsville 3,989 2,404 60.3% 9.9% 0.3% Newport News 36,645 20,189 55.1% 4.7% 2.2% Norfolk 41,862 26,841 64.1% 13.8% 2.9% Norton 1,079 731 67.7% 17.4% 0.1% Petersburg 8,317 6,893 82.9% 32.5% 0.7% Poquoson 4,112 1,265 30.8% –19.6% 0.1% Portsmouth 25,608 16,860 65.8% 15.5% 1.8% Radford 3,089 1,682 54.5% 4.1% 0.2% Richmond (City) 48,006 36,549 76.1% 25.8% 3.9% Roanoke (City) 23,865 14,328 60.0% 9.7% 1.5% Salem 7,947 3,674 46.2% –4.1% 0.4% Staunton 6,200 2,662 42.9% –7.4% 0.3% Suff olk 16,590 8,394 50.6% 0.2% 0.9% Va. Beach 92,115 40,235 43.7% –6.7% 4.3% Waynesboro 4,816 1,970 40.9% –9.4% 0.2% Williamsburg 2,473 1,372 55.5% 5.1% 0.1% Winchester 5,911 2,606 44.1% –6.3% 0.3% COUNTIES 1,296,003 623,045 48.1% –2.3% 67.3% Accomack 6,956 3,151 45.3% –5.0% 0.3% Albemarle 25,973 13,472 51.9% 1.5% 1.5% Alleghany 4,717 2,492 52.8% 2.5% 0.3% Amelia 3,470 1,572 45.3% –5.0% 0.2% Amherst 8,057 3,594 44.6% –5.7% 0.4% Appomattox 4,050 1,826 45.1% –5.3% 0.2% Arlington 52,430 35,342 67.4% 17.1% 3.8% Augusta 17,341 5,556 32.0% –18.3% 0.6% Bath 1,439 674 46.8% –3.5% 0.1% Bedford (Co.) 18,750 6,840 36.5% –13.9% 0.7%

168 Virginia Votes ✰ 1999–2002 J. K. Katzen (R) G. A. Reams ( L ) Deviation Percent of Deviation Percent of Number Percent From Choice’s Choice’s Number Percent From Choice’s Choice’s of Votes of Vote State Average State Total of Votes of Vote State Average State Total 883,886 48.1% 28,783 1.6% 232,475 42.8% –5.3% 26.3% 7,511 1.4% –0.2% 26.1% 10,944 31.9% –16.2% 1.2% 384 1.1% –0.4% 1.3% 776 45.3% –2.8% 0.1% 60 3.5% 1.9% 0.2% 2,145 50.0% 2.0% 0.2% 53 1.2% –0.3% 0.2% 573 42.2% –5.9% 0.1% 42 3.1% 1.5% 0.1% 2,330 25.5% –22.5% 0.3% 563 6.2% 4.6% 2.0% 27,494 53.8% 5.7% 3.1% 428 0.8% –0.7% 1.5% 3,359 62.1% 14.0% 0.4% 49 0.9% –0.7% 0.2% 634 40.2% –7.8% 0.1% 45 2.9% 1.3% 0.2% 5,998 48.3% 0.3% 0.7% 278 2.2% 0.7% 1.0% 594 41.0% –7.1% 0.1% 12 0.8% –0.7% 0.0% 3,192 48.0% –0.1% 0.4% 95 1.4% –0.1% 0.3% 1,312 33.2% –14.8% 0.1% 58 1.5% –0.1% 0.2% 829 38.1% –9.9% 0.1% 16 0.7% –0.8% 0.1% 1,664 37.9% –10.1% 0.2% 107 2.4% 0.9% 0.4% 773 49.8% 1.7% 0.1% 17 1.1% –0.5% 0.1% 11,363 36.0% –12.0% 1.3% 446 1.4% –0.2% 1.5% 3,495 55.2% 7.2% 0.4% 105 1.7% 0.1% 0.4% 2,055 44.5% –3.6% 0.2% 120 2.6% 1.0% 0.4% 550 35.2% –12.9% 0.1% 44 2.8% 1.3% 0.2% 8,445 49.2% 1.2% 1.0% 224 1.3% –0.3% 0.8% 786 55.3% 7.2% 0.1% 43 3.0% 1.5% 0.1% 3,552 55.7% 7.6% 0.4% 90 1.4% –0.2% 0.3% 1,533 38.4% –9.6% 0.2% 52 1.3% –0.3% 0.2% 15,979 43.6% –4.5% 1.8% 459 1.3% –0.3% 1.6% 14,386 34.4% –13.7% 1.6% 597 1.4% –0.1% 2.1% 326 30.2% –17.8% 0.0% 22 2.0% 0.5% 0.1% 1,357 16.3% –31.7% 0.2% 67 0.8% –0.8% 0.2% 2,787 67.8% 19.7% 0.3% 59 1.4% –0.1% 0.2% 8,397 32.8% –15.3% 1.0% 335 1.3% –0.3% 1.2% 1,354 43.8% –4.2% 0.2% 53 1.7% 0.2% 0.2% 10,792 22.5% –25.6% 1.2% 660 1.4% –0.2% 2.3% 9,154 38.4% –9.7% 1.0% 383 1.6% 0.0% 1.3% 4,177 52.6% 4.5% 0.5% 96 1.2% –0.4% 0.3% 3,444 55.5% 7.5% 0.4% 90 1.5% –0.1% 0.3% 8,081 48.7% 0.7% 0.9% 113 0.7% –0.9% 0.4% 50,801 55.1% 7.1% 5.7% 1,039 1.1% –0.4% 3.6% 2,785 57.8% 9.8% 0.3% 61 1.3% –0.3% 0.2% 1,058 42.8% –5.3% 0.1% 43 1.7% 0.2% 0.1% 3,201 54.2% 6.1% 0.4% 103 1.7% 0.2% 0.4% 651,411 50.3% 2.2% 73.7% 21,272 1.6% 0.1% 73.9% 3,553 51.1% 3.0% 0.4% 252 3.6% 2.1% 0.9% 11,607 44.7% –3.4% 1.3% 882 3.4% 1.8% 3.1% 2,075 44.0% –4.1% 0.2% 150 3.2% 1.6% 0.5% 1,852 53.4% 5.3% 0.2% 46 1.3% –0.2% 0.2% 4,382 54.4% 6.3% 0.5% 81 1.0% –0.6% 0.3% 2,100 51.9% 3.8% 0.2% 124 3.1% 1.5% 0.4% 16,257 31.0% –17.1% 1.8% 815 1.6% –0.0% 2.8% 11,404 65.8% 17.7% 1.3% 380 2.2% 0.6% 1.3% 707 49.1% 1.1% 0.1% 58 4.0% 2.5% 0.2% 11,484 61.2% 13.2% 1.3% 426 2.3% 0.7% 1.5% (continued)

CHAPTER 5 ✰ The 2001General Election 169 APPENDIX 9 General Election for Lieutenant Governor, November 6, 2001 (continued) T. M. Kaine (D) Deviation Percent of Number Percent from Choice’s Choice’s LOCALITY Total Vote of Votes of Vote State Average State Total Bland 1,636 661 40.4% –9.9% 0.1% Botetourt 10,163 3,971 39.1% –11.3% 0.4% Brunswick 4,310 2,831 65.7% 15.3% 0.3% Buchanan 5,323 3,368 63.3% 12.9% 0.4% Buckingham 3,869 2,167 56.0% 5.7% 0.2% Campbell 14,832 5,888 39.7% –10.7% 0.6% Caroline 5,785 3,458 59.8% 9.4% 0.4% Carroll 7,564 2,707 35.8% –14.6% 0.3% Charles City 2,304 1,695 73.6% 23.2% 0.2% Charlotte 3,988 1,820 45.6% –4.7% 0.2% Chesterfi eld 80,036 37,209 46.5% –3.9% 4.0% Clarke 3,646 1,639 45.0% –5.4% 0.2% Craig 1,777 791 44.5% –5.8% 0.1% Culpeper 8,483 3,055 36.0% –14.3% 0.3% Cumberland 2,505 1,191 47.5% –2.8% 0.1% Dickenson 4,546 2,629 57.8% 7.5% 0.3% Dinwiddie 6,595 3,510 53.2% 2.9% 0.4% Essex 2,541 1,358 53.4% 3.1% 0.1% Fairfax (Co.) 266,451 139,870 52.5% 2.1% 15.1% Fauquier 16,319 6,552 40.1% –10.2% 0.7% Floyd 4,233 1,770 41.8% –8.5% 0.2% Fluvanna 6,488 2,827 43.6% –6.8% 0.3% Franklin 13,401 6,162 46.0% –4.4% 0.7% Frederick 15,998 5,439 34.0% –16.4% 0.6% Giles 4,976 2,621 52.7% 2.3% 0.3% Gloucester 9,048 3,685 40.7% –9.6% 0.4% Goochland 6,489 3,257 50.2% –0.2% 0.4% Grayson 5,169 2,097 40.6% –9.8% 0.2% Greene 3,725 1,301 34.9% –15.4% 0.1% Greensville 2,606 1,790 68.7% 18.3% 0.2% Halifax 9,049 4,335 47.9% –2.4% 0.5% Hanover 30,495 12,720 41.7% –8.6% 1.4% Henrico 81,294 45,568 56.1% 5.7% 4.9% Henry 14,472 7,816 54.0% 3.7% 0.8% Highland 1,087 429 39.5% –10.9% 0.0% Isle of Wight 9,278 4,309 46.4% –3.9% 0.5% James City 17,043 7,757 45.5% –4.8% 0.8% King and Queen 2,002 1,115 55.7% 5.3% 0.1% King George 4,219 1,905 45.2% –5.2% 0.2% King William 3,876 2,013 51.9% 1.6% 0.2% Lancaster 4,379 2,044 46.7% –3.7% 0.2% Lee 5,242 2,660 50.7% 0.4% 0.3% Loudoun 45,058 19,638 43.6% –6.8% 2.1% Louisa 7,514 3,866 51.5% 1.1% 0.4% Lunenburg 3,576 1,965 54.9% 4.6% 0.2% Madison 3,654 1,411 38.6% –11.7% 0.2% Mathews 3,006 1,234 41.1% –9.3% 0.1% Mecklenburg 7,196 3,022 42.0% –8.4% 0.3% Middlesex 3,432 1,496 43.6% –6.8% 0.2% Montgomery 19,682 10,301 52.3% 2.0% 1.1%

170 Virginia Votes ✰ 1999–2002 J. K. Katzen (R) G. A. Reams ( L ) Deviation Percent of Deviation Percent of Number Percent From Choice’s Choice’s Number Percent From Choice’s Choice’s of Votes of Vote State Average State Total of Votes of Vote State Average State Total 927 56.7% 8.6% 0.1% 48 2.9% 1.4% 0.2% 5,957 58.6% 10.6% 0.7% 235 2.3% 0.7% 0.8% 1,447 33.6% –14.5% 0.2% 30 0.7% –0.9% 0.1% 1,819 34.2% –13.9% 0.2% 136 2.6% 1.0% 0.5% 1,629 42.1% –6.0% 0.2% 73 1.9% 0.3% 0.3% 8,560 57.7% 9.7% 1.0% 383 2.6% 1.0% 1.3% 2,272 39.3% –8.8% 0.3% 55 1.0% –0.6% 0.2% 4,751 62.8% 14.8% 0.5% 106 1.4% –0.2% 0.4% 594 25.8% –22.3% 0.1% 15 0.7% –0.9% 0.1% 2,002 50.2% 2.1% 0.2% 166 4.2% 2.6% 0.6% 42,140 52.7% 4.6% 4.8% 662 0.8% –0.7% 2.3% 1,943 53.3% 5.2% 0.2% 64 1.8% 0.2% 0.2% 952 53.6% 5.5% 0.1% 34 1.9% 0.3% 0.1% 5,117 60.3% 12.3% 0.6% 311 3.7% 2.1% 1.1% 1,225 48.9% 0.8% 0.1% 89 3.6% 2.0% 0.3% 1,882 41.4% –6.7% 0.2% 35 0.8% –0.8% 0.1% 3,003 45.5% –2.5% 0.3% 82 1.2% –0.3% 0.3% 1,153 45.4% –2.7% 0.1% 30 1.2% –0.4% 0.1% 123,454 46.3% –1.7% 14.0% 3,063 1.1% –0.4% 10.6% 9,543 58.5% 10.4% 1.1% 224 1.4% –0.2% 0.8% 2,303 54.4% 6.3% 0.3% 160 3.8% 2.2% 0.6% 3,484 53.7% 5.6% 0.4% 177 2.7% 1.2% 0.6% 7,032 52.5% 4.4% 0.8% 207 1.5% –0.0% 0.7% 10,284 64.3% 16.2% 1.2% 275 1.7% 0.2% 1.0% 2,188 44.0% –4.1% 0.2% 165 3.3% 1.8% 0.6% 5,196 57.4% 9.4% 0.6% 164 1.8% 0.2% 0.6% 3,183 49.1% 1.0% 0.4% 48 0.7% –0.8% 0.2% 2,995 57.9% 9.9% 0.3% 77 1.5% –0.1% 0.3% 2,265 60.8% 12.7% 0.3% 159 4.3% 2.7% 0.6% 790 30.3% –17.7% 0.1% 25 1.0% –0.6% 0.1% 4,407 48.7% 0.6% 0.5% 306 3.4% 1.8% 1.1% 17,535 57.5% 9.4% 2.0% 239 0.8% –0.8% 0.8% 35,040 43.1% –5.0% 4.0% 655 0.8% –0.8% 2.3% 6,095 42.1% –5.9% 0.7% 561 3.9% 2.3% 1.9% 637 58.6% 10.5% 0.1% 21 1.9% 0.4% 0.1% 4,865 52.4% 4.4% 0.6% 100 1.1% –0.5% 0.3% 9,099 53.4% 5.3% 1.0% 180 1.1% –0.5% 0.6% 867 43.3% –4.8% 0.1% 20 1.0% –0.6% 0.1% 2,235 53.0% 4.9% 0.3% 77 1.8% 0.3% 0.3% 1,829 47.2% –0.9% 0.2% 34 0.9% –0.7% 0.1% 2,290 52.3% 4.2% 0.3% 42 1.0% –0.6% 0.1% 2,522 48.1% 0.1% 0.3% 60 1.1% –0.4% 0.2% 24,826 55.1% 7.0% 2.8% 580 1.3% –0.3% 2.0% 3,507 46.7% –1.4% 0.4% 141 1.9% 0.3% 0.5% 1,583 44.3% –3.8% 0.2% 27 0.8% –0.8% 0.1% 2,096 57.4% 9.3% 0.2% 147 4.0% 2.5% 0.5% 1,675 55.7% 7.7% 0.2% 97 3.2% 1.7% 0.3% 3,864 53.7% 5.6% 0.4% 309 4.3% 2.7% 1.1% 1,823 53.1% 5.1% 0.2% 113 3.3% 1.7% 0.4% 8,962 45.5% –2.5% 1.0% 416 2.1% 0.5% 1.4% (continued)

CHAPTER 5 ✰ The 2001General Election 171 APPENDIX 9 General Election for Lieutenant Governor, November 6, 2001 (continued) T. M. Kaine (D) Deviation Percent of Number Percent from Choice’s Choice’s LOCALITY Total Vote of Votes of Vote State Average State Total Nelson 4,426 2,452 55.4% 5.1% 0.3% New Kent 4,666 2,238 48.0% –2.4% 0.2% Northampton 3,379 1,928 57.1% 6.7% 0.2% Northumberland 4,258 2,061 48.4% –1.9% 0.2% Nottoway 4,207 2,366 56.2% 5.9% 0.3% Orange 7,336 3,217 43.9% –6.5% 0.3% Page 5,644 2,152 38.1% –12.2% 0.2% Patrick 4,909 1,971 40.2% –10.2% 0.2% Pittsylvania 16,426 6,196 37.7% –12.6% 0.7% Powhatan 6,893 2,665 38.7% –11.7% 0.3% Prince Edward 4,676 2,594 55.5% 5.1% 0.3% Prince George 7,513 3,609 48.0% –2.3% 0.4% Prince William 57,231 25,535 44.6% –5.7% 2.8% Pulaski 9,341 4,647 49.7% –0.6% 0.5% Rappahannock 2,659 1,174 44.2% –6.2% 0.1% Richmond (Co.) 2,140 1,005 47.0% –3.4% 0.1% Roanoke (Co.) 31,333 13,562 43.3% –7.1% 1.5% Rockbridge 5,692 2,632 46.2% –4.1% 0.3% Rockingham 18,017 5,402 30.0% –20.4% 0.6% Russell 7,017 4,042 57.6% 7.3% 0.4% Scott 6,099 2,250 36.9% –13.5% 0.2% Shenandoah 11,010 3,639 33.1% –17.3% 0.4% Smyth 8,357 4,127 49.4% –1.0% 0.4% Southampton 4,516 2,528 56.0% 5.6% 0.3% Spotsylvania 21,076 9,246 43.9% –6.5% 1.0% Staff ord 21,158 8,676 41.0% –9.3% 0.9% Surry 2,276 1,443 63.4% 13.1% 0.2% Sussex 2,860 1,674 58.5% 8.2% 0.2% Tazewell 9,232 4,524 49.0% –1.3% 0.5% Warren 7,612 2,729 35.9% –14.5% 0.3% Washington 13,724 6,014 43.8% –6.5% 0.6% Westmoreland 4,086 2,261 55.3% 5.0% 0.2% Wise 8,520 4,803 56.4% 6.0% 0.5% Wythe 7,695 3,443 44.7% –5.6% 0.4% York 16,476 6,798 41.3% –9.1% 0.7%

172 Virginia Votes ✰ 1999–2002 J. K. Katzen (R) G. A. Reams ( L ) Deviation Percent of Deviation Percent of Number Percent From Choice’s Choice’s Number Percent From Choice’s Choice’s of Votes of Vote State Average State Total of Votes of Vote State Average State Total 1,802 40.7% –7.3% 0.2% 169 3.8% 2.3% 0.6% 2,362 50.6% 2.6% 0.3% 58 1.2% –0.3% 0.2% 1,279 37.9% –10.2% 0.1% 172 5.1% 3.5% 0.6% 2,138 50.2% 2.2% 0.2% 57 1.3% –0.2% 0.2% 1,734 41.2% –6.8% 0.2% 107 2.5% 1.0% 0.4% 3,897 53.1% 5.1% 0.4% 222 3.0% 1.5% 0.8% 3,434 60.8% 12.8% 0.4% 56 1.0% –0.6% 0.2% 2,760 56.2% 8.2% 0.3% 178 3.6% 2.1% 0.6% 9,767 59.5% 11.4% 1.1% 463 2.8% 1.3% 1.6% 4,147 60.2% 12.1% 0.5% 81 1.2% –0.4% 0.3% 1,969 42.1% –6.0% 0.2% 113 2.4% 0.9% 0.4% 3,844 51.2% 3.1% 0.4% 59 0.8% –0.8% 0.2% 30,721 53.7% 5.6% 3.5% 971 1.7% 0.1% 3.4% 4,456 47.7% –0.4% 0.5% 235 2.5% 1.0% 0.8% 1,457 54.8% 6.7% 0.2% 26 1.0% –0.6% 0.1% 1,100 51.4% 3.3% 0.1% 35 1.6% 0.1% 0.1% 17,400 55.5% 7.5% 2.0% 370 1.2% –0.4% 1.3% 2,935 51.6% 3.5% 0.3% 125 2.2% 0.6% 0.4% 12,343 68.5% 20.4% 1.4% 265 1.5% –0.1% 0.9% 2,798 39.9% –8.2% 0.3% 177 2.5% 1.0% 0.6% 3,649 59.8% 11.8% 0.4% 200 3.3% 1.7% 0.7% 7,205 65.4% 17.4% 0.8% 161 1.5% –0.1% 0.6% 3,958 47.4% –0.7% 0.4% 272 3.3% 1.7% 0.9% 1,939 42.9% –5.1% 0.2% 49 1.1% –0.5% 0.2% 11,595 55.0% 7.0% 1.3% 231 1.1% –0.5% 0.8% 12,177 57.6% 9.5% 1.4% 292 1.4% –0.2% 1.0% 798 35.1% –13.0% 0.1% 35 1.5% –0.0% 0.1% 1,050 36.7% –11.3% 0.1% 136 4.8% 3.2% 0.5% 4,519 48.9% 0.9% 0.5% 188 2.0% 0.5% 0.7% 4,709 61.9% 13.8% 0.5% 171 2.2% 0.7% 0.6% 7,411 54.0% 5.9% 0.8% 298 2.2% 0.6% 1.0% 1,700 41.6% –6.5% 0.2% 125 3.1% 1.5% 0.4% 3,513 41.2% –6.8% 0.4% 203 2.4% 0.8% 0.7% 4,137 53.8% 5.7% 0.5% 107 1.4% –0.2% 0.4% 9,440 57.3% 9.2% 1.1% 228 1.4% –0.2% 0.8%

CHAPTER 5 ✰ The 2001General Election 173 APPENDIX 10 General Election for Attorney General, November 6, 2001 J. W. Kilgore (R) A. D. McEachin (D) Deviation Percent of Deviation Percent of Number Percent from Choice’s Choice’s Number Percent From Choice’s Choice’s LOCALITY Total Vote of Votes of Vote State Average State Total of Votes of Vote State Average State Total STATE 1,844,781 1,107,068 60.0% 736,431 39.9% CITIES 546,251 297,145 54.4% –5.6% 26.8% 248,497 45.5% 5.6% 33.7% Alexandria 34,193 12,582 36.8% –23.2% 1.1% 21,570 63.1% 23.2% 2.9% Bedford (City) 1,684 1,022 60.7% 0.7% 0.1% 662 39.3% –0.6% 0.1% Bristol 4,370 3,412 78.1% 18.1% 0.3% 957 21.9% –18.0% 0.1% Buena Vista 1,360 799 58.8% –1.3% 0.1% 561 41.3% 1.3% 0.1% Charlottesville 9,146 3,273 35.8% –24.2% 0.3% 5,848 63.9% 24.0% 0.8% Chesapeake 51,983 32,895 63.3% 3.3% 3.0% 19,038 36.6% –3.3% 2.6% Colonial Heights 5,397 4,533 84.0% 24.0% 0.4% 859 15.9% –24.0% 0.1% Covington 1,574 905 57.5% –2.5% 0.1% 669 42.5% 2.6% 0.1% Danville 12,735 7,384 58.0% –2.0% 0.7% 5,348 42.0% 2.1% 0.7% Emporia 1,478 801 54.2% –5.8% 0.1% 677 45.8% 5.9% 0.1% Fairfax (City) 6,646 3,757 56.5% –3.5% 0.3% 2,887 43.4% 3.5% 0.4% Falls Church 3,940 1,516 38.5% –21.5% 0.1% 2,419 61.4% 21.5% 0.3% Franklin 2,176 1,112 51.1% –8.9% 0.1% 1,053 48.4% 8.5% 0.1% Fredericksburg 4,368 2,190 50.1% –9.9% 0.2% 2,167 49.6% 9.7% 0.3% Galax 1,550 1,025 66.1% 6.1% 0.1% 525 33.9% –6.0% 0.1% Hampton 31,724 14,963 47.2% –12.8% 1.4% 16,696 52.6% 12.7% 2.3% Harrisonburg 6,335 4,095 64.6% 4.6% 0.4% 2,229 35.2% –4.7% 0.3% Hopewell 4,600 2,951 64.2% 4.1% 0.3% 1,649 35.8% –4.1% 0.2% Lexington 1,576 749 47.5% –12.5% 0.1% 827 52.5% 12.6% 0.1% Lynchburg 17,213 10,284 59.7% –0.3% 0.9% 6,899 40.1% 0.2% 0.9% Manassas Park 1,411 860 60.9% 0.9% 0.1% 551 39.1% –0.9% 0.1% Manassas 6,386 3,913 61.3% 1.3% 0.4% 2,473 38.7% –1.2% 0.3% Martinsville 3,994 2,072 51.9% –8.1% 0.2% 1,920 48.1% 8.2% 0.3% Newport News 36,742 20,342 55.4% –4.6% 1.8% 16,339 44.5% 4.5% 2.2% Norfolk 42,682 19,716 46.2% –13.8% 1.8% 22,860 53.6% 13.6% 3.1% Norton 1,130 800 70.8% 10.8% 0.1% 330 29.2% –10.7% 0.0% Petersburg 8,381 1,882 22.5% –37.6% 0.2% 6,498 77.5% 37.6% 0.9% Poquoson 4,129 3,358 81.3% 21.3% 0.3% 771 18.7% –21.2% 0.1% Portsmouth 25,778 11,493 44.6% –15.4% 1.0% 14,245 55.3% 15.3% 1.9% Radford 3,108 1,846 59.4% –0.6% 0.2% 1,262 40.6% 0.7% 0.2% Richmond (City) 47,413 17,165 36.2% –23.8% 1.6% 30,233 63.8% 23.8% 4.1% Roanoke (City) 24,005 12,673 52.8% –7.2% 1.1% 11,328 47.2% 7.3% 1.5% Salem 7,970 5,502 69.0% 9.0% 0.5% 2,468 31.0% –9.0% 0.3% Staunton 6,252 4,304 68.8% 8.8% 0.4% 1,947 31.1% –8.8% 0.3% Suff olk 16,655 9,708 58.3% –1.7% 0.9% 6,943 41.7% 1.8%0.9% Va. Beach 92,961 62,830 67.6% 7.6% 5.7% 30,020 32.3% –7.6% 4.1% Waynesboro 4,827 3,376 69.9% 9.9% 0.3% 1,448 30.0% –9.9% 0.2% Williamsburg 2,482 1,339 53.9% –6.1% 0.1% 1,143 46.1% 6.1% 0.2% Winchester 5,897 3,718 63.0% 3.0% 0.3% 2,178 36.9% –3.0% 0.3% COUNTIES 1,298,530 809,923 62.4% 2.4% 73.2% 487,934 37.6% –2.3% 66.3% Accomack 6,881 4,255 61.8% 1.8% 0.4% 2,626 38.2% –1.8% 0.4% Albemarle 25,943 14,598 56.3% –3.7% 1.3% 11,324 43.6% 3.7% 1.5% Alleghany 4,735 2,877 60.8% 0.7% 0.3% 1,858 39.2% –0.7% 0.3% Amelia 3,477 2,290 65.9% 5.9% 0.2% 1,187 34.1% –5.8% 0.2% Amherst 8,084 5,278 65.3% 5.3% 0.5% 2,806 34.7% –5.2% 0.4% Appomattox 4,097 2,692 65.7% 5.7% 0.2% 1,405 34.3% –5.6% 0.2% Arlington 52,237 18,506 35.4% –24.6% 1.7% 33,705 64.5% 24.6% 4.6% Augusta 17,483 13,552 77.5% 17.5% 1.2% 3,931 22.5% –17.4% 0.5% Bath 1,435 928 64.7% 4.7% 0.1% 507 35.3% –4.6% 0.1% Bedford (Co.) 18,401 13,436 73.0% 13.0% 1.2% 4,965 27.0% –12.9% 0.7%

174 Virginia Votes ✰ 1999–2002 APPENDIX 10 General Election for Attorney General, November 6, 2001 (continued) J. W. Kilgore (R) A. D. McEachin (D) Deviation Percent of Deviation Percent of Number Percent from Choice’s Choice’s Number Percent From Choice’s Choice’s LOCALITY Total Vote of Votes of Vote State Average State Total of Votes of Vote State Average State Total Bland 1,659 1,221 73.6% 13.6% 0.1% 438 26.4% –13.5% 0.1% Botetourt 10,138 7,305 72.1% 12.0% 0.7% 2,833 27.9% –12.0% 0.4% Brunswick 4,313 1,816 42.1% –17.9% 0.2% 2,491 57.8% 17.8% 0.3% Buchanan 5,494 3,025 55.1% –5.0% 0.3% 2,469 44.9% 5.0% 0.3% Buckingham 3,877 2,187 56.4% –3.6% 0.2% 1,690 43.6% 3.7% 0.2% Campbell 14,873 10,608 71.3% 11.3% 1.0% 4,261 28.6% –11.3% 0.6% Caroline 5,785 2,977 51.5% –8.6% 0.3% 2,808 48.5% 8.6% 0.4% Carroll 7,639 5,711 74.8% 14.8% 0.5% 1,928 25.2% –14.7% 0.3% Charles City 2,356 762 32.3% –27.7% 0.1% 1,594 67.7% 27.7% 0.2% Charlotte 3,975 2,541 63.9% 3.9% 0.2% 1,434 36.1% –3.8% 0.2% Chesterfi eld 80,127 56,413 70.4% 10.4% 5.1% 23,630 29.5% –10.4% 3.2% Clarke 3,643 2,268 62.3% 2.2% 0.2% 1,374 37.7% –2.2% 0.2% Craig 1,787 1,190 66.6% 6.6% 0.1% 597 33.4% –6.5% 0.1% Culpeper 8,402 5,866 69.8% 9.8% 0.5% 2,536 30.2% –9.7% 0.3% Cumberland 2,520 1,526 60.6% 0.5% 0.1% 994 39.4% –0.5% 0.1% Dickenson 4,603 2,817 61.2% 1.2% 0.3% 1,785 38.8% –1.1% 0.2% Dinwiddie 6,641 3,910 58.9% –1.1% 0.4% 2,731 41.1% 1.2% 0.4% Essex 2,560 1,528 59.7% –0.3% 0.1% 1,032 40.3% 0.4% 0.1% Fairfax (Co.) 266,158 140,059 52.6% –7.4% 12.7% 125,976 47.3% 7.4% 17.1% Fauquier 16,196 11,083 68.4% 8.4% 1.0% 5,101 31.5% –8.4% 0.7% Floyd 4,261 2,845 66.8% 6.8% 0.3% 1,416 33.2% –6.7% 0.2% Fluvanna 6,521 4,370 67.0% 7.0% 0.4% 2,151 33.0% –6.9% 0.3% Franklin 13,448 9,129 67.9% 7.9% 0.8% 4,319 32.1% –7.8% 0.6% Frederick 16,085 11,746 73.0% 13.0% 1.1% 4,339 27.0% –12.9% 0.6% Giles 4,998 3,112 62.3% 2.3% 0.3% 1,885 37.7% –2.2% 0.3% Gloucester 9,083 6,431 70.8% 10.8% 0.6% 2,648 29.2% –10.8% 0.4% Goochland 6,450 4,316 66.9% 6.9% 0.4% 2,134 33.1% –6.8% 0.3% Grayson 5,187 3,639 70.2% 10.1% 0.3% 1,548 29.8% –10.1% 0.2% Greene 3,760 2,762 73.5% 13.4% 0.2% 998 26.5% –13.4% 0.1% Greensville 2,630 1,091 41.5% –18.5% 0.1% 1,538 58.5% 18.6% 0.2% Halifax 9,218 5,477 59.4% –0.6% 0.5% 3,740 40.6% 0.7% 0.5% Hanover 30,381 23,515 77.4% 17.4% 2.1% 6,859 22.6% –17.3% 0.9% Henrico 81,332 50,391 62.0% 1.9% 4.6% 30,818 37.9% –2.0% 4.2% Henry 14,538 8,627 59.3% –0.7% 0.8% 5,909 40.6% 0.7% 0.8% Highland 1,082 747 69.0% 9.0% 0.1% 334 30.9% –9.1% 0.0% Isle of Wight 9,296 5,978 64.3% 4.3% 0.5% 3,309 35.6% –4.3% 0.4% James City 16,997 11,314 66.6% 6.6% 1.0% 5,668 33.3% –6.6% 0.8% King and Queen 1,994 1,130 56.7% –3.3% 0.1% 864 43.3% 3.4% 0.1% King George 4,221 2,726 64.6% 4.6% 0.2% 1,490 35.3% –4.6% 0.2% King William 3,870 2,542 65.7% 5.7% 0.2% 1,323 34.2% –5.7% 0.2% Lancaster 4,383 2,931 66.9% 6.9% 0.3% 1,447 33.0% –6.9% 0.2% Lee 5,358 3,761 70.2% 10.2% 0.3% 1,597 29.8% –10.1% 0.2% Loudoun 44,953 28,447 63.3% 3.3% 2.6% 16,459 36.6% –3.3% 2.2% Louisa 7,603 4,777 62.8% 2.8% 0.4% 2,823 37.1% –2.8% 0.4% Lunenburg 3,607 2,125 58.9% –1.1% 0.2% 1,474 40.9% 0.9% 0.2% Madison 3,655 2,518 68.9% 8.9% 0.2% 1,137 31.1% –8.8% 0.2% Mathews 3,024 2,192 72.5% 12.5% 0.2% 831 27.5% –12.4% 0.1% Mecklenburg 7,120 4,494 63.1% 3.1% 0.4% 2,625 36.9% –3.1% 0.4% Middlesex 3,402 2,384 70.1% 10.1% 0.2% 1,017 29.9% –10.0% 0.1% Montgomery 19,655 11,712 59.6% –0.4% 1.1% 7,940 40.4% 0.5% 1.1% (continued)

CHAPTER 5 ✰ The 2001General Election 175 APPENDIX 10 General Election for Attorney General, November 6, 2001 (continued) J. W. Kilgore (R) A. D. McEachin (D) Deviation Percent of Deviation Percent of Number Percent from Choice’s Choice’s Number Percent From Choice’s Choice’s LOCALITY Total Vote of Votes of Vote State Average State Total of Votes of Vote State Average State Total Nelson 4,413 2,374 53.8% –6.2% 0.2% 2,035 46.1% 6.2% 0.3% New Kent 4,706 3,238 68.8% 8.8% 0.3% 1,462 31.1% –8.9% 0.2% Northampton 3,335 1,763 52.9% –7.1% 0.2% 1,571 47.1% 7.2% 0.2% Northumberland 4,272 2,738 64.1% 4.1% 0.2% 1,529 35.8% –4.1% 0.2% Nottoway 4,188 2,328 55.6% –4.4% 0.2% 1,860 44.4% 4.5% 0.3% Orange 7,292 4,771 65.4% 5.4% 0.4% 2,519 34.5% –5.4% 0.3% Page 5,664 4,027 71.1% 11.1% 0.4% 1,626 28.7% –11.2% 0.2% Patrick 4,939 3,429 69.4% 9.4% 0.3% 1,509 30.6% –9.4% 0.2% Pittsylvania 16,656 11,800 70.8% 10.8% 1.1% 4,856 29.2% –10.8% 0.7% Powhatan 6,859 5,288 77.1% 17.1% 0.5% 1,571 22.9% –17.0% 0.2% Prince Edward 4,707 2,489 52.9% –7.1% 0.2% 2,218 47.1% 7.2% 0.3% Prince George 7,505 4,936 65.8% 5.8% 0.4% 2,554 34.0% –5.9% 0.3% Prince William 56,984 34,336 60.3% 0.2% 3.1% 22,639 39.7% –0.2% 3.1% Pulaski 9,313 6,019 64.6% 4.6% 0.5% 3,292 35.3% –4.6% 0.4% Rappahannock 2,646 1,571 59.4% –0.6% 0.1% 1,073 40.6% 0.6% 0.1% Richmond (Co.) 2,178 1,518 69.7% 9.7% 0.1% 660 30.3% –9.6% 0.1% Roanoke (Co.) 31,375 22,221 70.8% 10.8% 2.0% 9,149 29.2% –10.8% 1.2% Rockbridge 5,701 3,610 63.3% 3.3% 0.3% 2,090 36.7% –3.3% 0.3% Rockingham 18,121 14,235 78.6% 18.5% 1.3% 3,877 21.4% –18.5% 0.5% Russell 7,253 4,777 65.9% 5.9% 0.4% 2,476 34.1% –5.8% 0.3% Scott 6,594 5,315 80.6% 20.6% 0.5% 1,278 19.4% –20.5% 0.2% Shenandoah 11,029 8,277 75.0% 15.0% 0.7% 2,745 24.9% –15.0% 0.4% Smyth 8,684 6,354 73.2% 13.2% 0.6% 2,330 26.8% –13.1% 0.3% Southampton 4,522 2,518 55.7% –4.3% 0.2% 1,998 44.2% 4.3% 0.3% Spotsylvania 21,081 14,224 67.5% 7.5% 1.3% 6,844 32.5% –7.5% 0.9% Staff ord 21,157 14,603 69.0% 9.0% 1.3% 6,533 30.9% –9.0% 0.9% Surry 2,290 1,005 43.9% –16.1% 0.1% 1,284 56.1% 16.2% 0.2% Sussex 2,907 1,382 47.5% –12.5% 0.1% 1,525 52.5% 12.5% 0.2% Tazewell 9,370 6,125 65.4% 5.4% 0.6% 3,245 34.6% –5.3% 0.4% Warren 7,487 5,099 68.1% 8.1% 0.5% 2,385 31.9% –8.1% 0.3% Washington 14,263 11,093 77.8% 17.8% 1.0% 3,167 22.2% –17.7% 0.4% Westmoreland 4,098 2,178 53.1% –6.9% 0.2% 1,918 46.8% 6.9% 0.3% Wise 9,078 6,531 71.9% 11.9% 0.6% 2,547 28.1% –11.9% 0.3% Wythe 7,764 5,721 73.7% 13.7% 0.5% 2,033 26.2% –13.7% 0.3% York 16,468 11,576 70.3% 10.3% 1.0% 4,880 29.6% –10.3% 0.7%

176 Virginia Votes ✰ 1999–2002