THE CITY THAT COULD HAVE BEEN—THE METRO RED LINE AND LOS ANGELES’ STRUGGLE FOR A PROPER PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM ______

A Thesis

Presented to the

Faculty of

California State University, Fullerton ______

In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree

Master of Arts

in

Public History ______

By

Johnathan Lozano

Thesis Committee Approval:

Volker Janssen, Department of History, Chair Margie Brown-Coronel, Department of History Allison Varzally, Department of History

Fall Semester, 2016

ABSTRACT

This thesis looks at the city of Los Angeles from the early 1900s to late 1980s in analyzing how its public transportation system was created, and the various plans at expanding it. A history of Los Angeles is described by highlighting how various streetcar lines formed, and why they disappeared during the 1950s. The impact they had on the growth of the city is discussed, as well as the origin of certain neighborhoods and communities. Emphasis is placed on relations between city inhabitants, and city officials in the way they treated minorities in different spaces and neighborhoods. Issues of proper infrastructure and transportation are discussed, and how they interlink and connect the large metropolitan areas with various stakeholders and interests’ groups. Various city plans and proposals are discussed in relation to how they would impact the growing city and its inhabitants in terms of street layout meshed with highways and public transportation. Special emphasis is placed on the Metro Red Line, and how the original plan was meant for it to travel underneath Wilshire Boulevard. This changed to accommodate biased concerns of elected officials and neighborhoods along the mid-

Wilshire corridor and adjacent neighborhoods. By highlighting Los Angeles’ bias towards minorities, a connection is made in how the city viewed them, and the treatment they received.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ...... ii

LIST OF FIGURES ...... iv

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ...... v

SECTIONS

Introduction ...... 1 Henry Huntington—Let Us Sell Property ...... 2 The Big Merger—Los Angeles Public Transit Readjusted ...... 4 The Fall of the Private Empire ...... 6 The City That Could Have Been—Plans and Highways ...... 9 The Union Station Controversy—Minorities and Space in Los Angeles ...... 13 Back to the Future, Or Past. Failed Attempts at Bringing Back Trolleys...... 20 The Fed, Politics, and Big Money ...... 25 Proposition A—Hail Mary’s Pass...... 28 The Metro Red Line ...... 33 Methane, Fires, and the Death of the Red Line ...... 39 Conclusion—The Future of Rail in Los Angeles ...... 50

REFERENCES ...... 53

iii

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure Page

1. A wide area that city leaders proposed needed public transit. (Courtesy of the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority Research Library and Archive. Reprinted with permission.) ...... 26

2. The 1980 Proposition A plan touted an extensive system across Los Angeles County. (Courtesy of the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority Research Library and Archive. Reprinted with permission.) ...... 29

3. The original proposed route of the Metro Red line. (Courtesy of the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority Research Library and Archive. Reprinted with permission.) ...... 32

4. Traffic along the Regional Core. (Courtesy of the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority Research Library and Archive. Reprinted with permission.) ...... 35

5. The first minimum operable segment would service Wilshire Blvd. (Courtesy of the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority Research Library and Archive. Reprinted with permission.) ...... 37

6. The alternative proposal for the Red line. (Courtesy of the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority Research Library and Archive. Reprinted with permission.) ...... 48

iv

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

To my mother, who taught me how to ride the Metro when I was a kid.

v

1

Introduction

Los Angeles is a city of many qualities. To many, it is home to celebrities, movie studios, and Hollywood. To others, it is a city surrounded by sunny beaches, mountains, and amusement parks. However, Los Angeles is much more than points of attraction that ring in the minds of individuals who dream of coming here—it is a vibrant diverse city, constantly changing and evolving. From its roots as a small pueblo to becoming a major urban financial hub in the United States, Los Angeles is more than a major metropolis that spans an entire region. As a diverse city, it offers various neighborhoods or spaces, and all of these are connected by transportation that help make the identity of Los

Angeles. Transit projects, highways and public transit have changed the space of the city throughout the years. Los Angeles’ policies towards public transportation have shaped the way neighborhoods form, and thus have defined how the city views and interacts with minorities in the region. Fortunately, scholarly research exists that highlights how the city handles these spaces when they relate to underserved and impoverished communities.

Scholars such as Richard Longstreth, Mike Davis, and Eric Avila have written works on how communities bring cities to life, as well as the individuals and infrastructure that bind them together. At the same time, various city guidelines and plans have produced infrastructure projects that destroy certain neighborhoods in the name of progress with no regards to the residents who called those areas home. Public transportation plans have been proposed, and instead of carrying out bold visions of uniting densely populated

2 communities are changed due to public outcry concerning poor people and those of color.

Although the city of Los Angeles has a unique history based on prominent boosters promoting the Mediterranean climate of Southern California, the city itself has a dark history of ignoring certain communities through the lens of racism, fear, and social inequality. Every block, building, and neighborhood gives a historic view of its past. This paper will analyze how Los Angeles through its public transportation, infrastructure and city works initiatives changed the aspect of how the city would interact with its communities, and shape the future that we currently live in today.

Henry Huntington—Let Us Sell Property

Los Angeles is currently known as the automobile city. There are various highways, roads, interstates and freeways that traverse, cross, and divide the concrete of

Southern California. Before the automobile became affordable for Angelinos they relied on the public transportation system offered by local, private enterprises. In 1873 the Los

Angeles City Council gave the first decree that would fulfill the promise “to lay down and maintain iron railroad tracks and to run cars thereon, propelled by horses or mules, and to carry passengers thereon . . . ”1 City council realized that although it had commercial rail lines moving from its harbor to downtown, it needed a transportation system geared towards its residents to make sure that they could move around the city.2

Unlike New York and its urban transit rail, Los Angeles began with a few lines of

1 Thomas Shanks, From Horse Car to Red Car to Mass Rapid Transit a Century of Progress (Virginia Beach: The Donning Company/Publishers, 1991), 15.

2 It is of vital importance to know that the rise of urban transportation grew in hand with the aforementioned commercial Southern Pacific rail lines that began bisecting the Los Angeles terrain during the mid-1870s. Many of the lines that traveled across the terrain would form small adjunct cities that would create the outlying of Los Angeles County.

3 privately owned rail that sought to capitalize the untapped market of public transportation. Various rich businessmen built different lines throughout downtown, servicing streets such as Spring and Alameda.3 They believed if they built such lines to service business locations and residences, they would profit from the homeowners in the area.4 The lines proved difficult to maintain and operate; some went bankrupt, others sold.5 Since these lines originally serviced downtown, investors sought to expand outward to profit from growing ridership in cities like Santa Monica and San Pedro.

One such investor who realized the potential of using public transportation in order to entice people to buy property was Henry Huntington. Henry was the nephew of

Collis P. Huntington, railroad tycoon who owned the Central Pacific Railroad (CP), and helped create the transcontinental railroad.6 Huntington came to California in the early

1890s, and immediately fell in love with the climate, aura, and atmosphere.7 A key member of the Central Pacific who managed various subdivisions of its vast railroad network, he took it upon himself to look after the Pacific Electric (PE) and the Los

Angeles Railway (LARY), two of Los Angeles’ major public transportation systems.

3 Shanks, 15.

4 Robert M. Fogelson, The Fragmented Metropolis Los Angeles, 1850-1930 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), 86.

5 Robert C. Post, Street Railways and the Growth of Los Angeles (San Marino: Golden West Books, 1989), 29.

6 Fogelson, 30.

7 James Thorpe, Henry Edwards Huntington—A Biography (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 178.

4

Huntington acquired the Los Angeles Railway because of his role in the CP. His uncle trusted him to manage the majority of operations in Southern California. When

Huntington decided to purchase LARY, articles came out in the Los Angeles Express praising the success that he had in “transform[ing] the Southern Pacific from a very wild, woolly and western road into . . . the best managed Eastern lines . . . ”8 In 1898 he bought

LARY, and implement railroad track standards that allowed the unification of its various small urban lines into one—the Huntington standard.

While Huntington purchased the LARY to improve it, he continued the successful operation of the PE. The PE differed from the LARY in various ways. We can think of the PE as the current Metrolink currently servicing Southern California cities like

Riverside and Oceanside while LARY is like Metro, providing patrons mobility throughout the county and city of Los Angeles. People used them to travel around the area but neither encroached on the others territory, as LARY serviced downtown, and adjacent neighborhoods like Boyle Heights, and East Los Angeles. The PE serviced longer commutes such as those from Pasadena, Long Beach and Hawthorne. As no overlap existed in the concentration of their service, no issue was present.

The Big Merger—Los Angeles Public Transit Readjusted

In 1900 Collis Huntington passed away. Everyone believed that Henry

Huntington would become the next President of SP, given how closely he worked with his uncle in establishing CP/SP dominance in the western United States. Instead, E. H.

Harriman became president, and Huntington resigned from the company. He sold the

8 Ibid., 136.

5 majority of his shares and only asked to keep control of the Pacific Electric.9 Harriman became aware that Huntington wanted to expand his trolley lines even further, something that could impact the profits of the CP/SP. He believed that, “Together with

[Huntington’s] personal drive, [the PE] could produce an electric railroad system with a threat to steam railroads . . . ”10 Not wanting to see this occur, he discretely purchased over 45% of the PE shares along with two competing rail lines in the area.11 An agreement was reached between the two men in 1903, in which they would both own parts of the company in a shared setting. Henry would retain 55% of the shares in LARY, and Harriman would control 45% in the PE. With this compromise reached, the CP/SP could rest easy knowing that Henry would not compete directly with their expanding freight service operations throughout Southern California, and Los Angeles.

A couple of years later in 1908, rumors emerged that Henry would retire and sell his beloved “Big Red Cars.” Indeed, in 1910 he relinquished control of the PE to

Harriman, in exchange for complete and full ownership of the LARY. No real reason surfaced as to why Henry sold his beloved system. Historians believe that he gave it up in part to the constant verbal and written abuse of the Los Angeles Examiner. The Examiner reported multiple accidental deaths that were blamed on the PE and fights with local union leaders concerning wages.12 Henry gradually became less “active . . . businessman

9 Spencer Crump, Ride the Big Red Cars (Corona del Mar: Trans-Anglo Books, 1977), 43.

10 Ibid., 46.

11 Fogelson, 91.

12 Thorpe, 190-196.

6 in electric street railways, land development, and utilities . . . ”13 The shift in ownership in the PE suggested that the city would no longer have one individual owning the public transportation infrastructure, but rather two. The Great Merger created a monopoly in the city.

The Fall of the Private Empire

The end of the massive private transportation system serviced by Henry and

LARY trolleys came during the mid-1950s. With the mass production of the automobile, individuals gained independence and freedom from having to plan their lives according to service schedules. The very rail lines that created suburbs around the city would ultimately cause the end of the PE and LARY throughout the region.

The fall of the trolley was a double-edged sword brought forth by private companies that initially conceived of a public transportation system. The trolley was created in order to service people who lived in communities created by wealthy real estate developers and rail companies.14 This in turn created short-term gains and long- term losses for those that owned these private transit systems. Rail lines were initially built and then homes constructed around them, without the input of urban planners to correctly plan and zone to maximize the usage of the land. With the foundation of the private trolley system built on the idea to sell land “rather [than] develop efficient, rational transportation systems . . . ” the future of the system would be grim unless

13 Ibid., 238.

14 Scott L. Bottles, Los Angeles and the Automobile (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 38.

7 adjustments and zoning laws were implemented on where lines would go.15 The idea of selling real estate with the enticement of a cheap transportation system to bring them to the core of the city to conduct business would build a community that did not look, or feel like any other throughout the United States. In fact, this uniquely established Los

Angeles as having many proxy cities around it, as everyone would come to the core for work or business purposes, but leave later to return home.16

The PE and LARY suffered monetary losses in response to the increase of car culture in Southern California. Individuals were able to easily obtain credit to finance automobiles, and a new form of taxis called jitneys siphoned off thousands of potential paying trolley customers.17 This in turn cut into revenues for LARY and the PE, making it harder for improvements on the actual infrastructure of the lines. It became so difficult for LARY to operate that they asked the Huntington Estate to supply funding, only to hear that “[the estate would not] issue any more long term bonds” that would help the company.18 Due to this nonchalant approach, and much like SP in managing the PE, the trolleys were forced to increase fares. The fare increase hurt the company’s image, as the public lamented and vilified these actions. Traffic along heavily congested areas in

15 Ibid.

16 It’s important to note that currently Los Angeles has four downtowns in the nearby vicinity – DTLA, Wilshire, Culver City and Santa Monica. Mike Davis explains how each “downtown” was created to satisfy the needs of the constituents of the given community. This in turn is a direct result of the various land plots that were sold when trolley lines were created, and thus outlines how Los Angeles is different from other cities around the U.S. Please see: Mike Davis, City of Quartz: Excavating the Future in Los Angeles (London: Verso, 1990).

17 Fogelson, 167.

18 Thorpe, 469.

8 downtown further worsened the situation, as “street cars accumulate[d] from time to time at such a rate that they often present an unbroken line for over two blocks along

Broadway and west of Seventh Street.”19 At the same time, new companies introduced buses that would service the areas that the PE and LARY either had consistently late service or packed trolleys. The Los Angeles public transportation system was falling apart due to a lack of maintenance and investment, rider apathy, and the rise of the automobile. In the mid-1950s, both the LARY and PE shut down their trolleys, and were replaced by buses.

In essence, the private ownership of Los Angeles’ public transportation during this time was defined by the competition of two corporations. No public agency had a direct effect on the lines other than the licensing of the rights to build rail on public property and the approval of city wide fare increases. In a sense, the era of public transportation of the early to mid-20th century highlights what private entrepreneurship and capital could accomplish. However, it also showed that operating a mass public transportation system financed by private capital would end in a loss. The revenue loss of these systems proved unsustainable, and a new approach had to occur. Angelinos needed a new method of public transportation, but one that would rely on tax dollars, rather than private funds. It is incorrect to assume that the automobile was the sole reason Los

Angeles’ first public transportation system went away, but rather a combination of revenue-loss and competition that ultimately caused the Red Cars and LARY to ride into the sunset.

19 Bottles, 56.

9

The City That Could Have Been—Plans and Highways

The automobile changed the dynamic of the city in a way that elected officials did not foresee. Highways and throughways were created specifically for the vice that swept the city in which “dedicated concrete and asphalt strips . . . cut straight through the old neighborhoods, barrios, and ghettoes of the city.”20 The railroad system that bisected Los

Angeles created spaces and neighborhoods for individuals and in the fanaticism of making more roads for the automobile, these spaces were either destroyed, altered, or modified. It is important to understand why this resonates in the history of Los Angeles and in the makings of the culture that surrounds the city. Early plans made by engineers and planners for the city called for various zoning and specific improvements to be met.

Instead, city council members and the public opted to ignore such drastic policies.

Unfortunately, ignoring city planners would haunt the way the city would grow, as city streets and throughways became increasingly dysfunctional compared to larger cities in the East Coast.

In 1922, the city ordered a new plan to be drafted to address vehicular traffic and public transportation. It called forth city planners to come together and draft a proposal that would shape the future of the city, taking into account the anticipated growth. From the beginning, these commissioners knew that they were in over their heads, as the city consisted of too many neighborhoods and roads that they could completely tackle and provide suggestions for improvements. They believed that the “importance of the subject warranted the employment of experts of national reputation to review existing plans . . .

20 Jeremiah B.C. Axelrod, Inventing Autopia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009), 19.

10 knitting all into one compact and related whole.”21 These experts immediately recognized that the automobile was an important component of transportation in Los Angeles, but that it would cause hindrances and headaches in the future.22 Vehicular traffic increased from 43,099 registered vehicles in Los Angeles County in 1914 to 172,313 in 1922.23

The 1924 plan came about in support of infrastructure improvements in terms of wider boulevards, linking outside regions through thoroughfares and redistributing vehicular traffic amongst city streets. Unfortunately, this plan offered no streetcar reform to help the public transportation system become integrated with the growing needs of the city.24

However, city officials disliked the plans that urban planning experts proposed.

Leaders objected to the idea of making new streets that would cut and bisect the city. In essence, they were against transforming the city from a decentralized regional autonomy to a concentric structure that traditional cities were made of that included an inherent structural hierarchy of social organizations.25 City leaders did not want their city to resemble that of Boston or New York. This plan also proposed radical changes to

Wilshire Blvd. The street would be widened to accommodate a higher flux of vehicles

21 Ibid., 100.

22 Frederick Law Olmstead, A Major Traffic Street Plan, MTA Archives: Los Angeles, 1924, 16.

23 Matthew W. Roth, “The Public Relations of Urban Form: The Major Traffic Street Plan of 1924 and the Origins of Los Angeles Car Culture”, in Where Minds and Matters Meet: Technology in California and the West, ed. Volker Janssen (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012), 109.

24 Axelrod, 104.

25 Ibid., 102.

11 and the eastward terminus would be relocated near Boyle Heights.26 This would cause

Wilshire Blvd to become a major conduit for street traffic coming from the suburbs in the

West and leading them to downtown. Leaders adamantly opposed the proposition and plans proposed by the Traffic Commission, and hardly any of the recommendations were implemented. Curiously, the Automobile Club of Southern California (AAA) directly influenced the outcome and recommendations of this report. In the acknowledgments of

A Major Traffic Street Plan, the planners directly state how “many of the recommendations contained in these reports have been incorporated in whole or in part in the present plan . . . ” from the discussions that AAA had regarding city streets.27 The fact that the planning committee and the Traffic Commission essentially borrowed verbatim the recommendations and plans made by a private company highlights the influence and power that local private business held over key leadership positions in the city.

The idea that private leadership could influence and help shape the direction Los

Angeles would take in terms of streets, avenues, and highways also directly affected the space within the city. Street placement is important as it allows individuals to come and go from their neighborhood, business’, and places of enjoyment. Zoning laws can help streets become neighborhoods or mixed business’, industrial complexes, etc. What planners Bartholomew and Olmstead created with the 1924 plan was the ability for an outside entity, AAA, along with the interests of private planners to influence and enact their own auto-centric views on the city. By the mid-1920s, the automobile was

26 Ibid., 38.

27 Ibid., 7.

12 influencing the future of small communities as smaller cities as the people lived in South

Gate or Montebello traveled longer distances for work.28 Advertisements targeted future homeowners shopping around for a new community by highlighting the advantages of living near major streets. Citing how “Montebello Park is located on the principle traffic arteries . . . Whittier Boulevard . . . The American Way . . . Garfield Boulevard . . .” They specifically touted how those neighborhoods would be close to major thoroughfares—a clear advantage in owning an automobile.29

The automobile did not start this trend, but rather the trolley system. As mentioned earlier, the PE and LARY were conceived and expanded to sell real estate, and by extension, homes. The process of suburbanization began as a submission of ideas to create major thoroughfares to alleviate the automobile traffic jams that plagued the city.

This would define what the space of Los Angeles would look like.30 R. D. McKenzie’s essay titled “The Ecological Approach to the Study of Human Community” describes how the expansion of a city can relocate individuals and groups according to their residence and occupation. He argues that as you leave the center of a city, different quadrants that either house “slums . . . overflowing immigrant colonies . . . factory and shop workers . . . and the ghetto family” are shown, thus highlighting how the space of a city is constructed.31 This sociological scholarship helps us understand the way that Los

28 Richard Longstreth, City Center to Regional Mall: Architecture, the Automobile, and Retailing in Los Angeles, 1920-1950 (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997), 11.

29 Ibid., 11

30 Axelrod, 111.

31 Robert E. Park, Ernest W. Burgess, Roderick D. McKenzie, The City (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1925), 56.

13

Angeles grew towards suburbanization during the 1920s. Although the city did not grow outward in a radial circle like Washington D.C. or Atlanta, it did hold pockets of neighborhoods that would associate with certain class and social statures. As the suburbs of the city grew, segregation patterns emerged. In his seminal City of Quartz Mike Davis describes how “Homeowners’ associations first appeared on the political scene in the

1920s as instruments of white mobilization against attempts by blacks to buy homes outside the ghetto.”32

The Union Station Controversy—Minorities and Space in Los Angeles

In 1925, a new report came out that was more detailed and focused on urban transportation. The Report and Recommendation on a Comprehensive Rapid Transit Plan highlighted various aspects of possible improvements that could accommodate and help the exponential growth of Los Angeles. The report outlined various solutions all centered on a public rail system that could help with traffic, trolleys running late and overall rider satisfaction. Within the 219 pages, planners called for the city to invest in three types of rail systems that would all work seamlessly together in providing a proper public transportation system to Angelinos. Rapid transit lines would provide high-speed service between business districts; interurban lines would service different cities in the region and join them in a major hub in downtown, while street railway lines would act as feeders for both the interurban and high-speed rail lines.33 The current Metro Rail system follows this basic structure of a three-way approach in providing a public transportation system

32 Mike Davis, City of Quartz: Excavating the Future in Los Angeles (London: Verso, 1990), 161.

33 Kelker-De Leuw, Report and Recommendations on a Comprehensive Rapid Transit Plan For the City and County of Los Angeles, MTA Archives: Los Angeles, 1925.

14 through current light/heavy rail lines, Metrolink service, and the fleet of busses that crisscross the city. But citizens expressed disdain and resistance towards the proposed plan. The plans called for elevated right-of-ways for trolleys and interurban lines, and citizens were outraged at the prospect of having raised trolley lines without “put[ting] the question up to the people who are to help pay the bill.”34

At the same time the city council discussed this plan, the big three transcontinental railroads, the SP, CP, and Santa Fe Railroads all proposed their own separate depot stations to service each company. City council balked at the request, and countered that the city needed a single unified station to serve constituents and tourists.35

A war of words proceeded between the Los Angeles Times and businessmen who supported the consortium of railway operators eager to have their separate stations. The

Los Angeles Times often in printed ads depicted darkness on city streets if citizens voted in favor of the 1926 referendum.36 The rail companies argued that if their proposal was approved, they would be able to eliminate majority of all at-grade (when trains run at street level with automobile traffic) crossings in downtown Los Angeles, thus saving motorists time. They were supported by downtown businesses and organizations that also backed the Kelker Comprehensive Rapid Transit Plan.37 At the same time, PE argued that if Measure L was successful, they could eliminate majority of their at-grade

34 Bottles, 134

35 Ibid., 136.

36 Axelrod, 190

37 Jonathan Richmond, Transport of Delight: The Mythical Conception of Rail Transit in Los Angeles (Akron: The University of Akron Press, 2005), 157.

15 crossings as well throughout the downtown area, thus allowing for faster service for

Angelinos using the interurban to get from the suburbs to work in Los Angeles.38

The significance of the battle over a unified station and separate depots that would eliminate the issue with at-grade crossings was much more than just about rail operations, but about how Los Angeles regarded minorities and their space within the city. A large minority of Chinese and Mexican communities lived in the area that planners proposed for Union Station. When Measure L was defeated at the polls by a minor margin, business elites and the Los Angeles Times celebrated because they were able to stop the perceived encroachment that the railways and minorities had in downtown LA. In essence, the issue became not whether Los Angeles would adopt the style of elevated trains twenty-five feet in the air over major streets of the city, but rather if the citizens wanted such large populations of minorities close to downtown and shown to visiting tourists. Would LA present a clean image of race and class, or would they allow tourists to see minorities in their shanty homes?

Currently, Union Station stands in former Chinatown and a small community of

Mexican homes that existed before the construction of the depot. The city was so concerned with the public appearance near downtown that the construction of Union

Station would solve the issue. It would eradicate and destroy these ethnic communities, and in turn hold the banner of progress as the city created new buildings to service the public. When Measure L failed at the polls, the city proceeded to build the new depot near Olvera Street in order to begin the modernization of downtown. Ten years later the downtown Chinese community was dislocated in the name of civic progress, which

38 Bottles, 137.

16

Axelrod described as a “brutal process of modernization . . . ”39 As city officials bulldozed the entire area, business elites used the excuse that civic progress needed to occur, and that racial relocation was an unfortunate byproduct. The homes of Chinese and

Mexican families needed removal in order to build new civic buildings and a rail depot to serve the public.

Essentially, the city would justify the forceful removal of minorities from their homes in favor of progress for the city. They argued that it would be uncivil, un-

American, and un-patriotic to question the construction of a civic center that would house governmental offices and services. With this hollow excuse, Los Angeles finished construction of its Union Station in 1939. Historians view the 1926 voter campaign to build Union Station as the turning point for public transportation in the city. Angelinos opted for reshaping the social class surrounding downtown by “ethnic realignment of entire districts of the city” rather than investing in the infrastructure that plagued the PE and LARY.40 It also highlighted the political weight that the Los Angeles Times had in changing the focus of the subject from urban transportation and efficient crossings to that of urbanism and race in the city. The end of the PE and LARY began in 1926 with the failure of Measure L, as “the city’s denizens did little to save mass transit in Los

Angeles . . .” instead opting for new civic buildings instead of infrastructure improvement.41

39 Axelrod, 190.

40 Ibid., 193.

41 Bottles, 157.

17

Throughout the middle and latter half of the twentieth-century, Los Angeles expanded the way automobiles would travel around the city without making way to help enhance the service of streetcars. City officials already went down the path of increasing roads, relenting to automobile pressure. For example, in April of 1920, downtown officials erected a parking ban along major streets in order to keep traffic and streetcars moving. Infuriated by such actions, protestors gathered and staged a “sit-in” with their cars.42 The parking ban was immediately reversed, and traffic continued. Automobile drivers won. Likewise, in 1938 the Los Angeles Times published more AAA research that called for an elevated freeway to cure traffic woes.43 The report only mentioned that by clearing up streets of traffic, the streetcar could better maintain its schedule and service patrons.44

This same principle of putting the automobile first rather than public transportation came to forefront during the 1950s as federal legislation, the Federal-Aid

Highway Act of 1956 created the Eisenhower Interstate Highway System. This system provided federal monies for new highway construction around the nation, but Los

Angeles would benefit the most from it.45 It is important to note that throughout these expansions, the space of the city constantly changed as homes and neighborhoods became victims. Just like Chinatown was demolished for the construction in the name of

42 Axelrod, 65.

43 Ed Ainsworth, “Motorways Plan Detailed: System of Elevated Roads Designed to Cure Traffic Ills,” Los Angeles Times, June 15, 1938.

44 Ibid.

45 Jeremy Smith. “The Interstate Highway System,” World Trade 17, no. 5 (2004): 74.

18 progress and civic duty in order to build Union Station, so would predominantly ethnic minority communities be sacrificed for the needs of predominantly white affluent motorists.

Eric Avila’s essay, The Folklore of the Freeway discusses how the freeway system wreaked “havoc upon the inner-city communities of East and South Central Los

Angeles.”46 The construction of new highways funded by federal dollars proceeded the same way that the Arroyo Seco Parkway came into existence in 1940—the first highway in the city. For example, freeway construction in the city of Boyle Heights displaced over a tenth of the population.47 The population of Boyle Heights consisted primarily of different demographics, such as Jews, Mexicans, African, and Japanese Americans.48 In this simple example, the creation of multiple freeways within a two-mile span of this neighborhood caused the dislocation of such various groups. Much like the current site of

Dodger Stadium, individuals in the Chavez Ravine were disenfranchised and evicted from their homes in the 1950s after they had been found “blighted” and in need of dire

“rehabilitation.”49 Little did this community know that their homes would be demolished for a brand-new baseball stadium, and the promises of the city finding alternative housing

46 Eric Avila, “The Folklore of the Freeway: Space, Culture and Identity in Postwar Los Angeles,” Aztlán 23, no. 1 (1998): 17.

47 Ibid., 17.

48 Eric Avila, Popular Culture in the Age of White Flight (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), 26.

49 Gyan Prakash and Kevin M. Kruse, The Spaces of the Modern City (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 280.

19 turned out for naught. Minorities were seen as expendable, and the city cancelled its plans of providing alternative housing a few years later.50

Already in Southern California, rapid transit was beginning to symbolize not middle-class transport but the conveyance of the poor. A slow shift in popular imagining was recasting the once universal streetcar as not only a hindrance to traffic but a symbol of the poor and implicitly a threat to clear segregation in the city. Quite simply, mass transit gave the urban poor cheap mobility about town, and this potentially uncontrolled movement was disorientating for many middle- class Angelenos.51

Given that the freeway is associated with the post-war construction of Los

Angeles, the space of the city drastically changed for those living in the path of these new projects. Unfortunately, Los Angeles’ new creation of freeways created a “geography of ethnic invisibility as commuters drove over neighborhoods like Compton, Watts and East

LA without ever seeing the segregated consequences of Southern California suburban growth.”52 The space in Los Angeles was originally altered by the interurban lines of the

Pacific Electric and LARY creating distant suburbs that overtime would overflow with residents and communities. The automobile and the freeway exasperated this further, by modifying, replacing, and removing communities (specifically minorities and those of color) in the name of progress. While the changing of space in Los Angeles came from

50 Avila, Popular Culture, 156. It’s important to note that the new mayor of Los Angeles opted not to follow through on the pledge of the city to find the displaced community individuals new homes because of the current Cold War McCarthyism Red Scare that was sweeping the nation. Because of this any attempts at trying to promote public housing were viewed as communistic. In an effort to stem controversies from forming at the city level, the new mayor opted to remove any public housing commitments and/or promises from being fulfilled. Please see: Don Parson. “The Decline of Public Housing and the Politics of the Red Scare: The significance of the Los Angeles public Housing War,” Journal of Urban History 33, no. 3 (2007).

51 Axelrod, 195.

52 Prakash, 281.

20 the automobile and the creation of the highway system, the initial public transportation system played a vital role in the subsequent changes that would come during the century.

Back to the Future, Or Past. Failed Attempts at Bringing Back Trolleys

In the latter half of the 20th century, city legislators made multiple attempts to bring back some fashion of mass-public transportation that did not solely revolve around buses. In 1968, the Southern California Rapid Transit District (SCRTD) studied the feasibility, and costs of bringing back rail to the city. At a price tag of $2.5 billion, the city could have over “89 miles of an ultimately 300-mile, high-speed Rapid Transit

Network . . . [the] inauguration of 250 miles of fast, express feeder bus service . . . [and] the addition of 850 new, air-conditioned buses.”53 The proposed creation of various railways, much like the 1924 plan called for widening of highly used streets. These included routes along Long Beach, South Central, UCLA/Westwood and the San Gabriel

Valley. It would allow for travel from these cities to the core of downtown, relieving freeways of traffic congestion. Planners cited principles that “the economy and flexibility of bus Rapid Transit can be effectively utilized, complementing local bus service and taking advantage of the expanding freeway network.”54 Although this transit plan offered lofty goals, it specifically mentioned the need of an inclusion and extension of rail that would service the highly used Wilshire Corridor from Fairfax Ave and Barrington Ave, closer to West LA The fact that Wilshire Blvd. was specifically mentioned in this report suggests the importance of this corridor early on in rapid transit’s revival in Los Angeles.

53 Southern California Rapid Transit District, Final Report Fact Kit, MTA Archives: Los Angeles, 1968.

54 Final Report Fact Kit, 6.

21

Voters vehemently rejected the SCRTD proposal due to the high cost of over $2.5 billion dollars. And yet, throughout the course of vetting the plan, public concerns were addressed in the final proposal.55 Instead, what was not described in the community discussions and memorandum is the fact that various constituents who lived outside the scope of the project were mostly apathetic, or against it.56 The community discussions highlighted that a lot of constituents did want rapid transit, but middle-class voters did not. Looking back, SCRTD research ignored the middle-class and did not include them in the community plans or discussions.57 The middle-class voters stopped the possibility of an expansion of mass transit because it did not conform to what they wanted. By doing so, they kept the space of Los Angeles the same, and denied the opportunity to give minorities more access to public transit.58

In 1974, the SCRTD presented a new plan, A Public Transportation Improvement

Program or what would become known as Proposition A. More audacious than the last, this plan called forth a 116-mile-long rail system at a cost of $6.6 billion dollars. This plan was triple the price of the failed 1968 plan, so how could the SCRTD possibly hope to believe that voters would approve such a lofty project? They believed that “[they had] close working relationship[s] with local agencies [that] has been maintained throughout

55 Jack R. Gilstrap, Remarks of Jack R. Gilstrap (Los Angeles, 1968), 3.

56 Brian Stipak, “An analysis of the 1968 Rapid Transit Vote in Los Angeles,” Transportation, no. 2 (1973): 76.

57 Ibid., 84.

58 Ibid.

22 the current studies.”59 Essentially, the SCRTD was expecting to get this new proposal passed with an increase in community outreach and public meetings held throughout the city. In fact, over eighteen formal meetings took place throughout Los Angeles with over

900 feedback responses. At the same time, the 1974 plans also reiterated the importance of mass transit through the Wilshire Corridor along the Miracle Mile due to the population concentrated in that area. It presented the most viable way of developing a right-of-way transit line that would not be susceptible to the issues of automobile traffic.60

In 1973, Los Angeles elected its first African American Mayor, Thomas Bradley.

Bradley brought major changes to the 1974 proposal as he had personal investment in the project, given that he promised construction of a mass transit system during his first

“eighteen months of the day he took office.”61 He campaigned vigorously throughout the city for the new plan, making constituents believe that the 1974 proposal had merit and could pass the ballot vote in the November elections. Unlike previous proposals, this one had a familiar face attached to it. However, it was no secret that the true cost of the plan would be roughly $10 billion even after federal aid came through in the form of grants.

Los Angeles Times reporter Ray Hebert notes that the one-cent sales tax would only provide, “205 million in the first year and probably more in succeeding years.” Instead, the city would have to apply for grants from the Urban Mass Transportation Authority

59 Alan M. Voorhees & Associates, A Public Transportation Improvement Program (Los Angeles: 1974), MTA Archives: Los Angeles, 1.

60 Ibid., 20.

61 Ethan N. Elkind, Railtown (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014), 13.

23

(UMTA) to supply the rest of the funds. Even cheerleader Mayor Bradley understood that

“no construction will be started without a guarantee of at least a 2-for-1 federal support . . . the RTD is also looking for as much as 80% federal funding.”62 There was no guarantee that the mass transit plan presented to the public could be achieved without the funds from the federal government.

While voters learned the true cost of the project through reporting by various newspaper outlets, a bus strike occurred within the SCRTD ranks. This 68-day strike left a horrible impression with Angelinos. How could an agency ask for almost $6 billion in funds, yet leave the city paralyzed without public transportation for over two months?

Supporters of the plan lost their confidence and soon faced a doubtful public. The situation had gone from hopeful in the passing of the 1974 plan, to grim within a matter of weeks.63 On the State Capitol steps, Mayor Bradly acknowledged that the SCRTD was woefully underequipped to force the workers back to work. Employees, after all, have

“the right to collective bargaining—the right to strike.”64 This did not placate the public.

Although the strike ended shortly before the crucial November vote, the damage was done. The Transportation Improvement Program/Proposition A failed by a margin of

53.7% against, with only 46.3% in favor.65

62 Ray Herbert, “Prop. A: Climax of Long Effort to Cut L.A.-Area Auto Traffic: Ballot . . . ” Los Angeles Times, October 28, 1974.

63 Ray Herbert, “Future of Southland Transit Uncertain in Wake of Strike,” Los Angeles Times, October 24, 1974.

64 Thomas Bradley, Mayor Bradley’s Address on RTD Strike MTA Archives: Los Angeles, 1974.

65 Ray Herbert, “Opposition to Tax Blamed for Prop A. loss: Tax Blamed for Defeat of Mass Transit Plan,” Los Angeles Times, November 7, 1974.

24

The loss forced the SCRTD to reflect on the narrow defeat of the proposal.

Although the argument that higher taxes scared the population in voting for the proposition was legitimate, a host of deeper issues existed for the electorate. The strike that occurred before the ballot did not help gain voter sympathy—instead it showed the pitiful state that the SCRTD leadership was in. The SCRTD was asking for an increase in sales tax to manage and construct a new mass transit system, yet they could not keep in order their current operations. The SCRTD was in such denial about their role at the loss in the polls that the President of the SCRTD, Thomas Neuson said that the reason the proposition failed was because of “voter resistance [in] further taxing themselves.”66

Mayor Bradley fully knew the real reason the proposition failed. In an Op-Ed article in the Los Angeles Times he explained how “in the face of unsettled economic conditions, and a lack of confidence in the Southern California Rapid Transit District as currently constituted” voters could not in full consensus vote for the plan, essentially blaming both poor economic conditions and the leadership of the SCRTD.67

Even though the Transportation Improvement Program/Proposition A did not pass that November, Californians as a whole voted in favor of Proposition 5 previously in

June 1974, which increased and diverted funds from fuel taxes and revenue to a contingency fund to study, research and plan mass transit. Over $200 million from this gas tax funded “Los Angeles County public transportation projects over the next six

66 Thomas G. Neuson, A Failure of Proposition A, MTA Archives: Los Angeles, 1974.

67 It is important to note that during this time the United States economy was suffering through small-like depressions caused by the 1973 OPEC oil embargo. High prices of oil caused the economy to suffer, and as a whole American’s (including Angelinos) were worried about raising taxes or paying for utilities that may not be needed at the very moment.

25 years.”68 The passage of Proposition 5 on the June ballot was important not just for the state, but for the city and county of Los Angeles. This would allow state dollars to contribute directly to any future plans that concerned mass transit. With this in mind,

Mayor Bradley and President Neuson’s reasoning made sense. Citizens did not want to double tax themselves after passing Proposition 5 a couple of months early, but the strike that crippled the SCRTD left a bad impression on how the organization would handle the funds to create a new transit system.

The Fed, Politics, and Big Money

Proponents of the failed Proposition A reform touted that they reached a wider audience than previous plans. However, the Federal government played an important role in the doomed Proposition A ballot initiative due to the fact that the city leaders and planners applied for grants and monies from the UMTA. Such grants and monies imposed more guidelines and requirements on grant recipients.69 This explains why the

1974 plan was more detailed, involved more community input and was spearheaded by

Mayor Bradley. Monies provided by the federal government meant that stakeholders no longer resided solely in Los Angeles County. Rather, the city would have to answer to the federal government over its use of the grants and monies apportioned to it for the study of transit in the area. If the reports were incomplete, public meetings not held, or if the city failed to adhere to protocol in anyway, there was a political price to pay. This also

68 “Prop. 5: Progress on Public Transit,” Los Angeles Times, June 6, 1974.

69 George M. Smerk, The Federal Role in Urban Mass Transportation (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991), 124.

26 explains why the plans failure shocked city leaders who had poured a lot of energy and money into the effort.

Figure 1. A wide area that city leaders proposed needed public transit. (Courtesy of the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority Research Library and Archive. Reprinted with permission.)

However, the monies received from the federal government could only be used for planning and survey purposes. They could not be used as operating subsidies on the current mass transit system. Legislators on Capitol Hill took notice of these issues, and a year prior in 1973 submitted revisions that would allow the government to subsidize mass transit projects if they met certain conditions. As a contingency for not just handing out

27 grants and monies with no accountability, the fed would require that applications meet three distinct requirements.

The applicant would need to show that: 1) a subsidy is necessary to provide services of mass transit in their city, 2) a complete and thorough comprehensive mass transit plan concerning their proposed city be complete and accurate highlighting, “service improvement[s] that would provide more efficient, economical and convenient transit service . . .”, and 3) that the proposed service is operated efficiently.70

This addendum to the current UMTA language was lobbied, debated and ultimately approved. President Jimmy Carter also voiced his support of expanding grant subsidy money to help cities across the nation expand, build and enhance their mass transit systems. Instead of just changing the language on current legislation, President

Carter opted for a bipartisan bill that would divert and invest $11.8 billion dollars to the

UMTA.71 As Capitol Hill signed the bipartisan agreement in 1974, the final bill reached the desk of the President. A new era dawned on the country—mass transit support was back.

In September 1975, Jack R. Gilstrap presented to the SCRTD Board of Directors a preliminary proposal for a rapid transit starter line. This starter line would essentially make it possible for the city to come up with a viable plan on which to fund, and thus begin construction on rail in the region. “the first stage priority of the start line should be that portion of the corridor from Union Station . . . to the Long Beach Harbor Area.”72

70 Smerk, 126.

71 Paul Houston, “$11.8 Billion Voted for Mass Transit: Ford Sends Word He Will Sign,” Los Angeles Times, November 22, 1974.

72 Jack R. Gilstrap, Rapid Transit Starter Line the Options (MTA Archives: Los Angeles, 1975), 7.

28

The report also concluded that there were two viable options to reach the San Fernando

Valley, one through Wilshire Blvd, the other through Burbank Blvd. Even fifty years later, the importance of Wilshire Blvd did not leave the city as planners continued to reference the street in plans while striving for improving traffic and public transportation in the region. The Rapid Transit Starter Line (Options) highlighted the pros and cons of using the Wilshire section for rail. The costs of constructing such a line were higher along the Wilshire corridor rather than going through Burbank Blvd (1.22 million compared to

1.44, respectively). The route would take longer to complete, was favored by multiple cities’ Chambers of Commerce, and had a higher potential social and economic impact than the Burbank alternative. However, in this report, planners highlight the need to have a starter line reach out from the center of Los Angeles to Long Beach, and the San

Gabriel Valley. With such a limited scope, city officials were hopeful that if they presented the information to the local ballot box, citizens would be okay with approving such plans, and raising taxes to fund it. It failed.

Proposition A—Hail Mary’s Pass

Five years later in 1980, the SCRTD again brought forth another plan in which the main subway corridor ran underneath west on Wilshire Blvd., north on Fairfax Blvd.,

East on Sunset Blvd. and north towards North Hollywood.73 In a never-ending tale of proposals and planning, along with spending taxpayer money on such measures, Los

Angeles was going to ask for another tax increase. Dubbed again Proposition A like the failed measure in 1974, the 1980 Proposition A promised to increase of a “one-half of 1%

73 Brian D. Taylor, Eugene J. Kim, John E. Gahbauer, “The Thin Red Line: A Case Study of Political Influence on Transportation Planning Practice,” Journal of Planning Education and Research, no. 29 (2009): 178.

29 of the gross receipts” sales tax in the County.74 This final proposal suggested a

“compromise between the original 1968 Wilshire Corridor proposal and the alternate

Hollywood to downtown route,” it tried to combine the strengths of previous proposals in one final package.75

Figure 2. The 1980 Proposition A plan touted an extensive system across Los Angeles County. (Courtesy of the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority Research Library and Archive. Reprinted with permission.)

Proposition A came to the voters amidst political turmoil amongst county supervisors and Mayor Bradley. County Board Supervisors discussed in August 1980 whether to include a proposal by Supervisor Kenneth Hahn regarding the amount of monies available with a one-half of 1% sales tax increase. This brought chaos and turmoil to an already divided board who did not want to jeopardize the proposal by bringing in

74 Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority Administrative Code, MTA Archives: Los Angeles, 1980. Accessed on May 11, 2016: http://libraryarchives.metro.net/DPGTL/legislation/1980_proposition_a_ordinance.pdf

75 Mark Evan Garrett, “The Struggle for Transit Justice: Race, Space, and Social Equality in Los Angeles” (Phd diss., University of California, Los Angeles, 2006), 454.

30 amendments during the final roll call. For decades, the idea of rail was on the table, and after each vote at the polls, each measure had failed. Mayor Bradley had already been defeated in 1974, and 1976. The governing board had a longer record of defeat. The state of rail in Los Angeles was non-existent, by which at this time other cities like Atlanta,

Georgia and Washington D.C. were already beginning construction on mass transit rapid systems. It was Los Angeles that could not catch up to the trend, and the board realized this. Hahn’s proposal to the board diverted attention from the main Wilshire Corridor and seemed to divert funds to other projects. More importantly, it could disrupt the valuable matching-grant component from the UMTA that the city desperately needed in order to build an adequate starter line. Hahn’s proposition seemed selfish because he wanted funds from an already established starter line to one that could be an “idealistic vision for an immediate and dramatic solution to the regional transportation problem.”76 This immediate solution was to bring more service into the region, specifically to serve the low-income community that resided in his district.

In a surprising turn of events, Hahn was able to convince enough board supervisors to vote for his proposal. Most importantly, he was able to convince Thomas

Remy, Mayor Bradley’s alternate on the board and Bob Geoghegan, supervisor Edmund

Edelman’s alternate to vote for the proposal. Remi’s reasoning was that, “‘Tom’s instructions to me were to go ahead and vote on the proposal, but don’t be the final vote against it.’ Bradley did not want to be on record supporting another losing sales tax proposal, but he did not want to be the deciding vote . . . Bradley wanted to avoid a

76 Elkind, 40.

31 possibly rail-killing vote.”77 The Los Angeles Times noticed this change of heart from

Remy, and reported how the Los Angeles County Taxpayer Assn. criticized Bradley not being enthusiastic for rail. He stated how “with all this expressed interest you would think that Mayor Bradley would have attended the important commission meeting . . .”78.

Geoghegan on the other hand realized that Hahn would require his support, and although his boss had instructed him to vote no on the proposition, he realized that “‘you’ve [in reference to Ed Edelman] never been against mass transit . . . it is a program that can get through if we vote for it.’”79

Although Hahn’s proposal squeezed by in the final vote tally, some members of the council believed that it wasn’t completely honest. Barna Szabo understood the predicament that Hahn was trying to solve with his proposal. Hahn believed that if you gave an immediate tangible incentive that voters could see, they would most likely vote for the bigger project. Others believed that it was not “very pure and honest . . . if [we] provide a perceived public benefit, which is the lower bus fare, the public will be willing to accept . . . ”80 Hahn didn’t view it this way, in his mind “We’re finally going to do something about rapid transit and stop just talking about it.”81 He was right. For decades the city had proposed various times multiple plans that all failed at the ballot. In the

77 Ibid., 44.

78 Bill Boyarsky, “Bradley Criticized on Tax Hike for Transit,” Los Angeles Times, September 9, 1980.

79 Elkind, 41.

80 Richmond, 185.

81 Jean Meri, “Transit Tax Plan to Go on 1980 Ballot,” Los Angeles Times, August 21, 1980.

32 minds of many, including Hahn, if providing a tangible benefit (a fifty-cent subsidy on transit fares for the first three years) would entice Angelinos to vote for the measure, so be it.

Figure 3. The original proposed route of the Metro Red line. (Courtesy of the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority Research Library and Archive. Reprinted with Permission.)

In November 1980, Proposition A won at the polls with a 54% majority. Hahn was right, voters wanted something tangible that they could see an immediate result from—not the lengthy wait for construction of a subway that would take over five years to build. Even though the measure passed, certain cities and districts in the county voted

33 no. In particular, cities that would not have direct service by the original starter lines voted with a resounded no. This included Antelope Valley, Whittier, Bell Gardens, La

Mirada, and Downey. All had strong disapproval towards Proposition A.82

The Metro Red Line

Los Angeles was finally ready for rail, and with this tax proposal, the city in 1983 released the Final Environmental Impact Statement for Los Angeles Rail Rapid Transit

Project—Metro Rail (EIR). Published with funds from the U.S. Department of

Transportation and the UMTA, this 600-page document outlined in meticulous detail every station, gradient, and environmental impact the future Metro Red Line would have throughout the city. What seemed like a dream twenty years earlier was finally becoming a reality. Los Angeles would finally have rail again. From the beginning, the opening summary of the 1983 EIR acknowledge and touched yet again on the importance of traveling along the “intensely-developed Wilshire Corridor.”83 It stated how in “the year

2000, the most intensely developed section, known as the Regional Core, will house approximately one million persons, an increase of 25% from 1980.”84 Over seven stations would service Wilshire Blvd., with key stops at main intersections such as

Vermont, Normandie, La Brea, and Fairfax. All of these stations would help alleviate traffic and congestion on surface streets, and allow riders avoid long delays. At the same

82 Jack Birkenshaw, “Transit Tax Rode Rail Route to Victory,” Los Angeles Times, November 16, 1980.

83 Ibid.

84 Final Environmental Impact Statement Los Angeles Rail Rapid Transit Project Los Angeles, California (EIR) MTA Archives: Los Angeles, 1983, S-I.

34 time, data from the 1970s census presented in a Critical Social Factors Map highlighted how the intersection of Wilshire/Vermont and constituents of the Hollywood district depend highly on public transit. When this map is correlated with other social factors such as unemployment, certain age groups, and the non-ownership of automobiles, the

Miracle Mile/Wilshire corridor highlights the disparity of transit equality in the community.85

The 1983 EIR also mentioned the possible alternatives to a full subway transit system. An alternate with an aerial segment that would cause the Red line to come above ground from the subway was proposed which would have a cost $3.2 billion instead of

$3.3. The full-length subway approach was the logical way to build the Red Line since it would all be underground with no at-grade or aerial crossings that could impact service for riders.86 However, funding at the federal level would cause the subway to be built in multiple segments. Dubbed Minimum Operable Segment (MOS), the Metro Red Line would be split into different sections, each a piece that would be built after the next. The original MOS-1 for the line would initiate at Union Station, travel through the Wilshire district and end at Fairfax and Beverly Blvd.87 It again highlighted the significance of making sure that public transportation bisected Wilshire Blvd in order for it to service constituents and local business. At the same time, officials noted how “Bus demand in the

Wilshire Corridor under all rail alternatives . . . would be reduced substantially relative to the No Project Alternative . . . 232,000 daily auto person-trips would be diverted to

85 Critical Social Factors Map MTA Archives: Los Angeles, 1976.

86 1983 EIR, S-3.

87 Ibid., 2-73.

35 transit . . . trans ridership would increase from 1.96 million daily boarding to 2.43 million

. . . 88 Traffic would subside, as taking buses and automobiles off major streets would relieve congestion found throughout the Regional Core as noted in the Environmental

Impact Studies. However, politics would influence the funding Los Angeles received from the federal government to make this UMTA proposal a reality.

Figure 4. Traffic along the Regional Core. (Courtesy of the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority Research Library and Archive. Reprinted with permission.)

88 Ibid., 2-84

36

President Ronald Reagan, a staunch conservative believed that the federal government should not fund such extravagant costs of public rail in cities. His administration opposed transit funding, and it was up to LA lobbyists to convince congress to make sure that the city received funds. Los Angeles waited too long in cleaning up house to present a proper bid proposal to the UMTA for matching funds to begin construction on a starter line to kick-start its new public transportation system.

Other cities like Atlanta and Washington D.C. proposed their mass transit plans during the 1970s under a different administration. The Reagan administration’s “’position on anything was that we have to cut spending,’ and that lobbying directly to congress was the only way to get around this . . .”89 As early as 1967, Washington D.C. had submitted a plan to include 25 miles of rail around the nation’s capital, along with patronage estimates and costs of the system.90

The proposed system included a mixture of increased bus service to various outlying communities while completing a heavy rail system that could serve Capitol Hill.

Although the plans were later expanded to a grandiose 101-mile-long rapid transit district

(much like the various plans that Los Angeles proposed during the 1960s and 70s), funding presented an issue in making these plans a reality.91 Unique to this proposed system is the fact that Washington D.C. is located within the purview of the states of

Maryland and Virginia. This caused many different stakeholders to come together in

89 Richmond, 205

90 Alan M. Voorhees & Associates, Washington Area 1980 Rail Rapid Transit Patronage Forecast. July, 1967.

91 Jeremy F Plant., Louise G, White. “Mass Transit as A Developmental Stimulus: The Metro Example,” Southern Review of Public Administration (pre-1986) 6, no. 4 (1983), 507.

37 order to submit a unified plan that would service all their communities and citizenry. This was unlike Los Angeles which only fell under the purview of a single county and state, the system that WMATA was trying to accomplish relied on various stakeholders with different legislative bodies in the region. Congress authorized the $2.5 billion for this system in 1969, and construction began. The Washington D.C. Metro system opened in

1974, a full 15 years before Los Angeles.92

Figure 5. The first minimum operable segment would service Wilshire Blvd. (Courtesy of the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority Research Library and Archive. Reprinted with permission.)

92 Zachary M. Schrag, The Great Society Subway: A History of the Washington Metro (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2006), 171. It is important to note that the WMATA was able to receive such large funds for its Metro Rail system due to the fact that it applied early for federal funds unlike Los Angeles which formally received funds over 15 years later. In reality, during the 1980s when the Metro Red Line construction began the executive administration along with congress began to question the validity and feasibility of large public works. Due to these unfortunate circumstances, the LA Metro Rail system would be approved and funded in parts, rather than as a whole.

38

Funds were approved for the Metro Red line but with the contingency that it would be built in different minimum usable segments due to legislation provided by

UMTA administrator Ralph Stanley. Stanley believed that in order for a system to secure

UMTA funding, it needed to be built “in usable segments . . . [and] a condition of federal aid that localities sign ‘full-funding’ agreements pledging that they, not the federal government, would be responsible for cost overruns.”93 This is the reason why LACTA agreed to divide the Metro Red Line from one inclusive long project, to separate pieces— to make sure that the subway received proper funds. Much like businessmen and special interest groups in the 1920s lobbied together to stop outside influences (in this case, large railroad corporations trying to dictate where to put Union Station), they banded together in lobbying congress to make sure that the city received earmarked money towards the line. In a unique marriage of convenience, Democrats, Republicans, unions, business’, and real estate companies came together in lobbying efforts on Capitol Hill. Mike Lewis, former Chair of the RTD stated the Reagan administration made it a point to cut spending in all areas.94 Local interests were at the heart of these proponents. Every organization that banded together to lobby congress for direct earmarked money had something to gain—newly created jobs would benefit local officials running for elections, and new transit locations would allow entrepreneurs to create local business’. Los Angeles was going to receive funding for the starter line subway, and in a joint effort they made that point abundantly clear.

93 Alan Altshuler., David Luberoff, Mega-Projects (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 2003), 201.

94 Richmond, 205

39

Methane, Fires, and the Death of the Red Line

On March 24, 1985 disaster struck along the proposed subway corridor near

Wilshire Blvd. that would change the dynamic of public transit for the next 25 years. Los

Angeles’ past came back to life, and the remnants of long forgotten oil fields that lined the city became prominent on everyone’s minds. The lack of proper safety regulations and codes from the 1930s would cause issues, as the recklessness of city boosters would bode to fruition numerous years later.95 A methane gas explosion built up on the site of a former oil well caused an explosion in the basement of the department store Ross Dress- for-Less on the corner of 3rd Street and Fairfax. An employee went to the break room that was adjacent to the basement in which methane gas accumulated in due to poor ventilation. As the worker punched-in to begin the shift, it triggered the massive explosion.96 The front page of the Los Angeles Times declared it as an “explosion . . . tied to abandoned oil field.”97 Images in the Times showed circles of fire, debris, wreckage, and rubble near the ill-fated department store—decrypt and reminiscent of a tattered war scene. Over twenty-two people were hurt, but luckily, no one was killed. Fire Department officials were not quite sure how to the cap the fire given that it was coming from underground pockets. They believed that it was easier to let them burn while digging

95 Elkind, 79

96 Eric Berkowitz, “The Subway Mayor: How a Bus-Only Politician—and a Car-Obsessed City— Are Learning to Love the Underground,” Los Angeles Weekly, August 18, 2005; available at: http://www.laweekly.com/news/the-subway-mayor-2140484.

97 George Ramos and Steve Harvey, “Blast Shatters Store; 23 Hurt,” Los Angeles Times, March 25, 1985.

40 adjacent relief wells.98 The fire continued for five days until it was extinguished.99 This caused the future of construction of the Red Line into doubt, given that the line was supposed to cut through the area where the explosion had occurred.

Officials reacted swiftly to the explosion. Less than three days after the explosion, homeowner associations questioned the validity, and safety of having a massive underground project like the Metro Red Line traverse underneath neighborhoods that could hold pockets of methane gas.100 The Los Angeles City Council added the Fairfax district as an area “whereas natural flammable gas intrusion into buildings from subsurface sources . . . ” could trigger the possibility of more explosions.101 City building codes were updated and refreshed to ease the fears of residents that other buildings in the area might explode spontaneously. The city also officially deemed a giant portion of the

Fairfax district as a “High Potential Methane Zone Boundary . . . ”102 This included a large portion of the Wilshire Miracle Mile district that was critical in the proposal pitch for building the Red line.

The scrutiny on the Red line continued as attention shifted from city officials to federal legislators. Congressman Henry Waxman whose district the explosion took place immediately stepped in to seek out answers regarding the safety of his constituents.

98 Ted Thackrey and George Ramos, “Well Started in Fairfax Sector to Burn Off Gas,” Los Angeles Times, March 26, 1985.

99 Taylor, 178.

100 Marita Hernandez, “Life in Blast Area: It Goes On in Eerily Quiet Ways,” Los Angeles Times March 28, 1985.

101 City of Los Angeles, Final Ordinance no. 161552, 1986.

102 City of Los Angeles, Final Ordinance no. 161699, 1986.

41

Representative Waxman had been a staunch supporter of LAs public transportation describing himself as a “‘strong supporter of the original Metro Rail route,’” and that he

“‘knew we [Los Angeles] needed an innovative transportation network . . . ’” but he also understood that “[he] was just a supporter, though. Transportation had not been one of my issues legislatively.’”103 This would change rather quickly, as he would take on the lead in derailing the Metro trajectory into his neighborhood.

When the explosion occurred, construction had not started. The methane gas issue lingering underneath the Fairfax district would now become center stage as to whether any funds at all would be distributed to the agency in order to begin the project. Waxman unversed in the nature of public transportation through his own admission, sought to educate himself from various experts. He repeatedly asked LACTC officials about the line, and why it was going a certain direction and not another. Replies of “well, some important state senator wanted this because of this important constituency and he wanted us to have Metro Rail go through this part . . . ” caused him to believe that the project lacked coherence and common sense.104 He asked a Los Angeles Times reporter what he believed of the proposed system given the reporting he had written. Asking the simple question if it made sense, and having a reply of a “No” Waxman became wary of continued support of a subway in his district where possible safety mishaps could occur.

Political pressure would now mount amongst supporters who opposed the subway from reaching their doorstep. Residential communities along the proposed route in neighborhoods such as Beverly Hills-Fairfax opposed the creation of a subway station

103 Elkind, 82.

104 Ibid.

42 due to concerns that “a possible loss of adequate rental housing could displace the elderly . . . and destructive to the private sector” along with the possibility of other methane gas.105 The SCRTD staunchly replied that the corridor through which the Red line would traverse is safe if implemented with proper safety protocols as mandated by

The Division of Occupational Safety and Health (CalOSHA).106 In reality, the opposition to the subway came as a combined fear of future explosions, and the gentrification that would come with public transportation.107

The Census statistical data shows that hardly any low-income neighborhoods where next to the proposed trajectory of the Metro Red line. Only in downtown Los

Angeles and certain tracts on the way to the city of Long Beach are extensively highlighted as areas of low-income neighborhoods. The only area close enough to the

Metro Red Line was in the vicinity near Wilshire Blvd, Vermont Ave, Pico Blvd and

Washington Blvd, respectively.108 Since the subway would go towards affluent high- income communities like Beverly Hills, the Fairfax District, they wound up opposing the project. In fact, the 2000 census showed that a population of 1200 people resided in an area of 1.2 miles, a small ratio of residents to square footage compared to adjacent

105 Victor Merina, “Residents Swipe at Subway Corridor Development Plan,” Los Angeles Times, August 2, 1985.

106 Bob Sector and Kevin Roderick, “Waxman Hurls New Roadblock at Metro Rail,” Los Angeles Times, August 8, 1986.

107 Engineers stated that drilling through the aforementioned area of the Fairfax district would be safe, although there could never be any assurance that another explosion would occur (much like any assurances that an earthquake would not break gas lines in a neighborhood district).

108 U.S. Department of Commerce—Social and Economic Statistics Administration—Bureau of the Census, “Supplementary Report Low-Income Neighborhoods in Large Cities: 1970 Los Angeles and Long Beach, Calif,” xii.

43 neighborhoods.109 Waxman was concerned with the views of his constituents, and by extension his possible future reelection.110

Racial tensions and the belief of poor people coming into affluent high-income neighborhoods shaped the discourse of why Waxman staunchly opposed the Metro Red line from coming into his district. New rail lines help shape the way commuters travel.

His residents believed that if a rail line is brought into their neighborhood, crime would rise as a result.111 At the same time, bringing in rail stations could “lower quality of life because of increased noise, traffic and congestion.”112 Another state representative also channeled these views. In an interview conducted years later, State Senator David Roberti expressed how building a subway through his district of Fairfax would “pretty much destroy an ethnic community that was long established in Los Angeles.”113 Given that

Senator Roberti expressed concerned in saving his “ethnic community” it is a stark reminder of how certain communities are worth treasuring—when they have the correct type of political representation. This is unlike the aforementioned Chinatown, or Chavez

Revine which were demolished in order to promote civic progress. Since they had no political representation that could save their space, political officials paid little to no attention at the results of dislocating thousands of individuals. Unlike the communities

109 Elkind, 86.

110 Richmond, 207.

111 Alan Altshuler., David Luberoff, Mega-Projects (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 2003), 202

112 Matthew E. Kahn, “Gentrification Trends in New Transit-Oriented Communities: Evidence from 14 Cities That Expanded and Built Rail Transit Systems,” Real Estate Economics, no. 35 (2007): 163.

113 Elkind, 88.

44 along the former route of the Red Line that would be more accessible to public transit riders, their needs were constantly heard due to their status and the willpower they had over their public representatives.

Senator Roberti received his start in politics through help of Waxman, and thus was loyal to his mentor in the political sphere. In a quid-pro-quo, Roberti decided to oppose the construction of a subway through his district, in support of Waxman. In essence, Roberti believed that “if your constituents don’t want thousands of commuters coming in, there’s not a politician in the world who is going to respond to that, [well] okay?”114 It is not surprising to believe that Waxman was under the same pressure from his constituents as well.

Even though the Metro Red line is beneficial to Los Angeles as it would bring a new era of rapid mass transit, a few public legislators and officials representing elite affluent high-income districts would derail the entire endeavor. The risk of being booted out of office and replaced by another representative who will enact the view of the constituents was enough of a motivational factor to go against the Metro Red line. This brings an issue of public civility and purpose of greater good into question. If State

Legislators and Federal Representatives are willing to put the needs of their district above the needs of the city in general, how does that bode for the regional greater good? In terms of the Red line, the benefits of building a new public transportation system far outweighed the negative aspects that certain neighborhoods believed. Low-income communities viewed the first MOS-1 of the Red line as a way to travel and work around the city.

114 Ibid.

45

For affluent communities the risk of public transportation in their vicinity, “Public transit was bringing in people whose income are below the average incumbents, they are more likely to oppose transit expansion.”115 Herman L Boschken describes how “the relative affluence of the UMC [Upper-Middle-Class], high and rising income not only provides the means to display independence from the “drudgery” of physical work but also helps provide access to those exclusive social venues that concentrate these

‘significant people’ . . . ”116 This explains the reasoning and somehow permissible logic that affluent individuals held towards minorities. They feared that they might trespass on their homes. Believing that they are essentially better than other people, caused them to maintain an “associational position” that reaffirmed themselves that they belonged to the current social structure and status quo.117 If you (or in this case the Metro Red line) began introducing outside factors that would challenge this social structure and status quo, it causes that system/neighborhood to fall apart. The current social structure could not be kept. Viewing their actions as acts of racial segregation, fear, or just local resentment towards low-income communities, affluent neighborhoods rejected the idea of public rail lines in their area.118 This was the case for the Metro Red line in the Fairfax-

Beverly Hills-Hancock Park District as local representatives did not want “thousands of commuters [in their neighborhood], and an office holder [an appointed representative]

115 Kahn, 164.

116 Herman L. Boschken, Social Class, Politics, and Urban Markets: The Making of Bias in Policy Outcomes (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), 59.

117 Ibid., 60.

118 Richmond, 207.

46 responds to that. God knows I did.”119 Their representatives derailed the subway at the behest of their constituents.

Leaders in these communities formed a damning report, presenting that the construction of the subway would constitute a hazard to constituents in the vicinity due to the pockets of methane gas located throughout the area that the red line would traverse.120 They allowed Waxman to implement legislation at the federal level, stating that he “consider[ed] it irresponsible to support a Metro Rail system that would tunnel through areas of potential . . . explosion . . . ‘I'm not willing to take the risk of lives being lost . . .. I want safety to be the paramount issue.’”121 SCRTD leaders pleaded, begging for the Red line go along Wilshire towards the Fairfax district. He did not budge. John

Dyer, general manager for the SCRTD passionately wrote to Waxman, that “Metro Rail can be safely constructed and operated . . . we will not tunnel through any area where a reasonable doubt exists among experts . . . as to the safety of the Project’s construction or operation.”122 Waxman stated how “proceeding with the project as planned ‘may end up blowing up the workers and the riders.’ . . . ‘Metro Rail would be the most expensive subway system in the world.’”123 Southern California colleagues on Capitol Hill noted how Waxman was using deceptive measures to mislead and influence the votes of other

119 Elkind, 88.

120 Ibid.

121 Rich Connell, “Waxman Demands Metro Rail Avoid Methane Zone,” Los Angeles Times, August 27 1985.

122 Elkind, 88.

123 Bob Sector and Kevin Roderick, “Waxman Hurls New Roadblock at Metro Rail: Metro: Subway Hits a Roadblock,” Los Angeles Times, August 8, 1986.

47 legislators, with some of them believing that majority of the construction resided inside his district, when it did not.124 Waxman’s mind was set on making sure that no rail crossed into his district.

In order to salvage what was left of the Red line project, local congressional representatives in the area banded together to convince Waxman to allow for the MOS-1 segment. Congressman Julian Dixon and Glen Anderson came to Waxman to negotiate a compromise. Construction on the Metro Red line would continue, but would not cross into his district. Instead the line would follow an alternate route that would at “a later phase of the subway would be rerouted to avoid the Fairfax district . . . ”125 Waxman’s constituents would avoid a subway in their backyard, and the city could keep the funds.

This compromise would severely cripple the original plan to service the Wilshire corridor and the Westside, as the line would run north on Vermont Ave. The language of the bill highlighted that “no tunnel or subway stations would be allowed in the potentially risky or high-risk area that was identified by a Los Angeles city task force.” 126 This caused no subway to run west of Wilshire and Western for over twenty years.

124 Ibid.

125 “House Passes Transit Bill with Funds for Metro Rail,” Los Angeles Times, September 12, 1985.

126 Ibid.

48

Figure 6. The alternative proposal for the Red line. (Courtesy of the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority Research Library and Archive. Reprinted with permission.)

On July 14, 1988, the SCRTD moved forward with Candidate Alignment 1 as

“the New Locally Preferred Alternative [LPA].”127 The area of Wilshire, with stations at

La Brea, Wilshire/Fairfax, and Beverly would be removed from the plans. The Los

Angeles City Council and the Los Angeles City Planning Committee both unanimously recommended this new LPA in order to fulfill the promise of the compromise worded in federal legislation in order to receive funding. Daily rail boarding’s would drop with the

127 Final Environmental Impact Statement Los Angeles Rail Rapid Transit Project Los Angeles, California (EIR) MTA Archives: Los Angeles, 1989 EIR, S-1-3.

49 new LPA, as the old route would average 364,000 a day, while the new alignment would carry under 300,000.128 This compromise signified the lengths at which the City Council,

SCRTD, and local leaders would go to make sure that federal dollars were received in order to begin construction of the subway. Since the federal government tightened the amount of money given out for public transportation projects, city leaders recognized the need to abide by the Waxman regulations and play by his rules. Public opinion also questioned Waxman regulations, with residents commenting how “instead of putting the line on Wilshire, why not put it on Sixth or Seventh and run it adjacent to Wilshire?”129

Although certain residents in Waxman’s district did not want a subway close to their homes, others saw the value in providing transit to the Miracle Mile, and Wilshire

Boulevard.

The 1989 EIR, and the formation of the stations along the Metro Red line was a compromise on the original promise that was heavily fought for by Mayor Bradley and various other SCRTD and City Council leaders. Although the westward terminus of the line is located at Wilshire/Western, the northern part of the route traveled alongside

Vermont Ave. serviced the adjacent communities. educational and medical facilities. The

SCRTD would not receive its original proposed route, but at least it received something.

Los Angeles was late in implementing a viable proposal and plan to the federal government for funding, and because of this would receive only a partial public system— unlike other cities like Washington D.C., San Francisco and Atlanta.

128 Ibid., S-1-3.

129 Ibid., 7-2-5.

50

Conclusion—The Future of Rail in Los Angeles

Los Angeles has a long history with public transportation and infrastructure.

Unfortunately, this history is often filled with prejudice concerning those of color, or minorities. Throughout the years, the city has had a peculiar way of serving constituents while dealing with public works projects. This includes destroying Chinatown for Union

Station, constructing highways that bisected and destroyed poor communities to changing the trajectory of the Metro Red line to avoid affluent neighborhoods. It took many years for a mass transit project to have voter approval, and millions of federal dollars to make it a reality. Since the 1920s, planners realized that Wilshire Blvd would serve as a crucial artery in the dichotomy of Los Angeles, allowing individuals to travel from West LA to downtown. The predictions came true, and Wilshire Blvd is currently one of the busiest avenues outside of New York City. Planners realized this and proposed (through the many failed plans) that public transportation needed to serve this stretch of Los Angeles.

The proposed Metro Rail in the 1980s would have rectified this issue. Instead, the

Metro Red line would not cross into the densely populated Wilshire area because of congressional representatives who threatened to derail the project because of their constituent’s unfounded fears regarding minorities. The excuse that constituents in

Waxman’s district used citing the possibility of future methane gas explosions was incorrect, and blatantly false. SCRTD leaders acknowledged that underground methane wells existed, and promised they would adhere to the professional advice of engineers and CalOSHA while drilling. Engineers and experts who understood the subterranean terrain of Los Angeles tried to convince Waxman through letters and forms that it was

51 safe to drill. This fell on deaf ears.130 Supervisor Edelman in 2004 commented how

“Unfortunately [the subway] should have gone along Wilshire Boulevard all the way to the ocean . . . People there didn’t want folks to come out of the subway into their neighborhoods. Pathetic.”131 Former allies of Waxman recalled how methane was manageable as long as it was vented and proper precautions were taken.132 In the end,

Waxman was set on his viewpoint that the subway in general was a waste of money, and he would not have it run through his constituents’ backyard.

The ability that one representative had in controlling and derailing the original plans of Metro Rail is astonishing. Waxman had at one point come close to cutting off funding for the entire plan if it did not meet his criteria that no drilling be allowed in the area of “high methane risk,” also known as the area of the Fairfax-Beverly Hills district.

All of this occurred because his constituents did not want outsiders in their community, or the possibility of traffic occurring closer to their homes. The idea of self-entitlement and selfishness caused Wilshire Blvd lose its promised subway, and instead the 1989 EIR caused the Red line to turn north on Vermont Ave, and West on Hollywood Blvd. The second most congested area outside of New York City was ignored because constituents desire that their space be left alone, free of minorities or people of low-income.133 Others

130 Elkind, 95.

131 Ibid., 94.

132 Berkowitz.

133 Elkind, 94.

52 also believe the same thing, nothing how Waxman betrayed the people of Los Angeles in order to appease his constituents of keeping “alien invasions out of his district.”134

Fortunately for the city, the proposed alternative for the Red line would transport people from downtown LA to North Hollywood. The dreaded language that Waxman incorporated in federal law that forbad a subway line from traversing through the “high methane risk” zone was lifted two decades later. Waxman himself, informed by a new panel of experts “indicated that technologies have been developed that could make tunneling in the area safe.”135 The ban was repealed on a voice vote on the House floor, and President George W. Bush signed the law on December 26, 2007.136 Thankfully, current day Metro is working on an extension to the now Purple Line to reach Westwood through Beverly Hills. The crowded Wilshire Blvd corridor will have a proper heavy-rail subway system that can fulfill the promise of fast transit for the Miracle Mile and

Westwood district. 137 The Los Angeles community deserves a proper Metro system, and with the Waxman ban lifted, areas in desperate need of rail will finally receive the service they deserve.

134 Berkowitz.

135 “House lifts obstacle to Westside subway; Rep. Waxman persuades lawmakers to repeal a 1985 ban that blocked the line’s extension,” Los Angeles Times, February 8, 2007.

136 Elkind, 205.

137 The Red Line extension leading to Wilshire/Western was renamed the Purple line to aid transit riders differentiate between the two different terminus’ of Western and North Hollywood.

53

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