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http://www.jstor.org PACIFISM: A PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS

JAN NARVESON SEVERAL different doctrines have first place, there is the question: How been called "pacifism," and it is much violence should not be resisted, impossible to say anything cogent and what degree of force is one not about it without saying which of them entitled to use in resisting, punishing, one has in mind. I must begin by mak- or preventing it? Answers to this ques- ing it clear, then, that I am limiting the tion will make a lot of difference. For discussion of pacifism to a rather nar- example, everyone would agree that row band of doctrines, further distinc- there are limits to the kind and degree tions among which will be brought out of force with which a particular degree below. By "pacifism," I do not mean of violence is to be met: we do not the theory that violence is evil. With have a right to kill someone for rap- appropriate restrictions, this is a view ping us on the ribs, for example, and that every person with any pretensions yet there is no tendency toward paci- to morality doubtless holds: Nobody fism in this. We might go further and thinks that we have a right to inflict maintain, for example, that capital pain wantonly on other people. The punishment, even for the crime of pacifist goes a very long step further. murder, is unjustified without doing so His belief is not only that violence is on pacifist grounds. Again, the pacifist evil but also that it is morally wrong to should say just what sort of a reaction use force to resist, punish, or prevent constitutes a forcible or violent one. violence. This further step makes If somebody attacks me with his fists pacifism a radical moral doctrine. What and I pin his arms to his body with I shall try to establish below is that it wrestling holds which restrict him but is in fact, more than merely radical- cause him no pain, is that all right in it is actually incoherent because self- the pacifist's book? And again, many contradictory in its fundamental in- non-pacifists could consistently main- tent. I shall also suggest that several tain that we should avoid, to the ex- moral attitudes and psychological views tent that it is possible, inflicting a like which have tended to be associated with pain on those who attempt to inflict pacifism as I have defined it do not pain on us. It is unnecessary to be a have any necessary connection with pacifist merely in order to deny the that doctrine. Most proponents of moral soundness of the principle, "an pacifism, I shall argue, have tended to eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth." confuse these different doctrines, and We need a clarification, then, from the that confusion is probably what ac- pacifist as to just how far he is and is counts for such popularity as pacifism not willing to go. But this need should has had. already make us pause, for surely the It is next in order to point out that pacifist cannot draw these lines in a the pacifistic attitude is a matter of merely arbitrary manner. It is his rea- degree, and this in two respects. In the sons for drawing the ones he does that 259 260 ETHICS count, and these are what I propose might simply shrug their shoulders and to discuss below. say, "Well, it takes all kinds, doesn't The second matter of degree in re- it?" But they would not say that a spect of which the pacifist must specify man who did that ought to be punished his doctrine concerns the question: in some way; they would not even say Who ought not to resist violence with that he had done anything wrong. In force? For example, there are pacifists fact, as I have mentioned, they would who would only claim that they them- more likely than not find something selves ought not to. Others would say admirable about it. The point, then, that only pacifists ought not to, or that is this: The non-pacifist does not say all persons of a certain type, where that it is your duty to resist violence the type is not specified in terms of with force. The non-pacifist is merely belief or non-belief in pacifism, ought saying that there's nothing wrong with not to resist violence with force. And, doing so, that one has every right to finally, there are those who hold that do so if he is so inclined. Whether we everyone ought not to do so. We shall wish to add that a person would be see that considerations about this sec- foolish or silly to do so is quite another ond variable doom some forms of paci- question, one on which the non-pacifist fism to contradiction. does not need to take any particular My general program will be to show position. that (1) only the doctrine that every- Consequently, a genuine pacifist one ought not to resist violence with cannot merely say that we may, if we force is of philosophical interest among wish, prefer not to resist violence with those doctrines known as "pacifism"; force. Nor can he merely say that there (2) that doctrine, if advanced as a is something admirable or saintly moral doctrine, is logically untenable; about not doing so, for, as pointed out and (3) the reasons for the popularity above, the non-pacifist could perfectly of pacifism rest on failure to see exactly well agree with that. He must say, in- what the doctrine is. The things which stead, that, for whatever class of people pacifism wishes to accomplish, insofar he thinks it applies to, there is some- as they are worth accomplishing, can thing positively wrong about meeting be managed on the basis of quite ordi- violence with force. He must say that, nary and conservative moral principles. insofar as the people to whom his prin- Let us begin by being precise about ciple applies resort to force, they are the kind of moral force the principle committing a breach of moral duty- of pacifism is intended to have. One a very serious thing to say. Just how good way to do this is to consider what serious, we shall ere long see. it is intended to deny. What would non- Next, we must understand what the pacifists, which I suppose includes most implications of holding pacifism as a people, say of a man who followed moral principle are, and the first such Christ's suggestion and, when unac- implication requiring our attention con- countably slapped, simply turned the cerns the matter of the size of the class other cheek? They might say that such of people to which it is supposed to a man is either a fool or a saint. Or they apply. It will be of interest to discuss might say, "It's all very well for him two of the four possibilities previously to do that, but it's not for me"; or they listed, I think. The first is that in which PACIFISM: A PHILOSOPHICALANALYSIS 261 the pacifist says that only pacifists have something definite, and we are then in the duty of pacifism. Let us see what a position to ask why. this amounts to. Incidentally, it is worth mentioning If we say that the principle of paci- that when people say things such as fism is the principle that all and only "Only pacifists have the duty of paci- pacifists have a duty of not opposing fism," "Only Catholics have the duties violence with force, we get into a very of Catholicism," and, in general, "Only odd situation. For suppose we ask our- X-ists have the duties of X-ism" they selves, "Very well, which people are the probably are falling into a trap which pacifists then?" The answer will have catches a good many people. It is, to be "All those people who believe that namely, the mistake of supposing that pacifists have the duty not to meet vio- what it is to have a certain duty is to lence with force." But surely one could believe that you have a certain duty. believe that a certain class of people, The untenability of this is parallel to whom we shall call "pacifists,"have the the untenability of the previously men- duty not to meet violence with force tioned attempt to say what pacifism is. without believing that one ought not, For, if having a duty is believing that oneself, to meet violence with force. you have a certain duty, the question That is to say, the "principle" that arises, "What does such a person be- pacifists ought to avoid meeting vio- lieve?" The answer that must be given lence with force, is circular: It presup- if we follow this analysis would then poses that one already knows who the be, "He believes that he believes that pacifists are. Yet this is precisely what he has a certain duty"; and so on, ad that statement of the principle is sup- infinitum. posed to answer! We are supposed to On the other hand, one might be- be able to say that anybody who be- lieve that having a duty does not con- lieves that principle is a pacifist; yet, sist in believing that one has and yet as we have seen, a person could very believe that only those people really well believe that a certain class of have the duty who believe that they people called "pacifists" ought not to have it. But in that case, we would, meet violence with force without be- being conscientious, perhaps want to lieving that he himself ought not to ask the question, "Well, ought I to be- meet violence with force. Thus every- lieve that I have that duty, or oughtn't one could be a "pacifist" in -the sense I?" If you say that the answer is "Yes," the reason cannot be that you already of believing that statement and yet no do believe it, for you are asking whether one believe that he himself (or anyone you should. On the other hand, the in particular) ought to avoid meeting answer "No" or "It doesn't make any violence with force. Consequently,paci- difference-it's up to you," implies that fism cannot be specified in that way. there is really no reason for doing the A pacifist must be a person who be- thing in question at all. In short, asking lieves either that he himself (at least) whether I ought to believe that I have ought not to meet force with force or a duty to do x, is equivalent to asking that some larger class of persons, per- whether I should do x. A person might haps everyone, ought not to meet force very well believe that he ought to do with force. He would then be believing x but be wrong. It might be the case 2 62 ETHICS that he really ought not to do x; in that would do. Nevertheless, he is now hold- case the fact that he believes he ought ing a general principle. to do x, far from being a reason why Suppose, however, he holds that no he ought to do it, is a reason for us to one else has this duty of pacifism, that point out his error. It also, of course, only he himself ought not to meet force presupposes that he has some reason with force, although it is quite all right other than his belief for thinking it is for others to do so. Now if this is what his duty to do x. our man feels, we may continue to call Having cleared this red herring out him a "pacifist," in a somewhat at- of the way, we must consider the view tenuated sense, but he is then no longer of those who believe that they them- holding pacifism as a moral principle selves have a duty of pacifism and ask or, indeed, as a principle at all.' For ourselves the question: What general now his disinclination for violence is kind of reason must a person have for essentially just a matter of taste. I supposing a certain type of act to be like pistachio ice cream, but I wouldn't his duty, in a moral sense? Now, one dream of saying that other people have answer he might give is that pacifism a duty to eat it; similarly, this man just as such is a duty, that is, that meeting doesn't like to meet force with force, violence with force is, as such, wrong. although he wouldn't dream of insist- In that case, however, what he thinks ing that others act as he does. And this is not merely that he has this duty, but is a secondary sense of "pacifism," that everyone has this duty. first, because pacifism has always been Now he might object, "Well, but no; advocated on moral grounds and, I don't mean that everyone has it. For second, because non-pacifists can easi- instance, if a man is defending, not him- ly have this same feeling. A person self, but other people, such as his wife might very well feel squeamish, for ex- and children, then he has a right to ample, about using force, even in self- meet violence with force." Now this, of defense, or he might not be able to course, would be a very important bring himself to use it even if he wants qualification to his principle and one of to. But none of these has anything to a kind which we will be discussing in a do with asserting pacifism to be a duty. moment. Meanwhile, however, we may Moreover, a mere attitude could hardly point out that he evidently still thinks license a man to refuse military service that, if it weren't for certain more im- if it were required of him, or to join portant duties, everyone would have a ban-the-bomb crusades, and so forth. (I fear, however, that such attitudes duty to avoid meeting violence with have sometimes caused people to do force. In other words, he then believes those things.) that, other things being equal, one And, in turn, it is similarly impos- with force. ought not to meet violence sible to claim that your support of He believes, to put it yet another way, pacifism is a moral one if your position that if one does meet violence with is that a certain selection of people, but force, one must have a special excuse no one else, ought not to meet force or justification of a moral kind; then with force, even though you are unpre- he may want to give some account of pared to offer any reason whatever for just which excuses and justifications this selection. Suppose, for example, PACIFISM: A PHILOSOPHICALANALYSIS 263 that you hold that only the Arapahoes, the argument, is due to the fact that or only the Chinese, or only people peace is desirable, a moral position more than six feet high have this which anybody can take, pacifist or no, "duty." If such were the case, and no plus the purely contingent fact that reasons offered at all, we could only this policy causes the other side to dis- conclude that you had a very peculiar arm, that is, it brings about peace. attitude toward the Arapahoes, or And, of course, that's the catch. If whatever, but we would hardly want to one attempts to support pacifism be- say that you had a moral principle. cause of its probable effects, then one's Your "principle" amounts to saying position depends on what the effects that these particular individuals hap- are. Determining what they are is a pen to have the duty of pacifism just purely empirical matter, and, conse- because they are the individuals they quently, one could not possibly be a are, and this, as Bentham would say, pacifist as a matter of pure principle is the "negation of all principles." Of if his reasons for supporting pacifism course, if you meant that somehow the are merely tactical. One must, in this property of being over six feet tall case, submit one's opinions to the makes it your duty not to use violence, governance of fact. then you have a principle, all right, but It is not part of my intention to dis- a very queer one indeed unless you can cuss matters of fact, as such, but it is give some further reasons. Again, it worthwhile to point out that the general would not be possible to distinguish history of the human race certainly this from a sheer attitude. offers no support for the supposition Pacifism, then, must be the principle that turning the other cheek always that the use of force to meet force is produces good effects on the aggressor. wrong as such, that is, that nobody may Some aggressors,such as the Nazis, were do so unless he has a special justifica- apparently just "egged on" by the tion. "pacifist" attitude of their victims. There is another way in which one Some of the S.S. men apparently be- might advocate a sort of "pacifism," came curious to see just how much however, which we must also dispose torture the victim would put up with of before getting to the main point. before he began to resist. Furthermore, One might argue that pacifism is de- there is the possibility that, while paci- sirable as a tactic: that, as a matter of fism might work against some people fact, some good end, such as the re- (one might cite the British, against duction of violence itself, is to be whom pacifism in India was apparently achieved by "turning the other cheek." rather successful-but the British are For example, if it were the case that comparatively nice people), it might turning the other cheek caused the of- fail against others (e.g., the Nazis). fender to break down and repent, then A further point about holding paci- that would be a very good reason for fism to be desirable as a tactic is that behaving "pacifistically." If unilateral this could not easily support the posi- disarmament causes the other side to tion that pacifism is a duty. The ques- disarm, then certainly unilateral dis- tion whether we have no right to fight armament would be a desirable policy. back can hardly be settled by noting But note that its desirability, if this is that not to fight back might cause the 264 ETHICS aggressorto stop fighting. To prove that else, and if such a consideration could a policy is a desirable one because it ever of itself justify anything at all it works is not to prove that it is oblig- could also justify anything whatever. atory to follow it. We surely need That mere difference of person, as considerations a good deal less tenuous such, is of no moral importance, is a than this to prove such a momentous presupposition of anything that can contention as that we have no right to possibly pretend to be a moral theory. resist. Instead of such idle nonsense, then, It appears, then, that to hold the the pacifist would have to mention pacifist position as a genuine, full- some specific characteristic which every blooded moral principle is to hold that other person has which we lack and nobody has a right to fight back when which justifies us in defending them. attacked, that fighting back is inher- But this, alas, is impossible, for, while ently evil, as such. It means that we there may be some interesting differ- are all mistaken in supposing that we ence between me, on the one hand, and have a right of self-protection. And, of everyone else, on the other, the pacifist course, this is an extreme and extraor- is not merely addressing himself to me. dinary position in any case. It appears On the contrary, as we have seen, he to mean, for instance, that we have no has to address himself to everyone. He right to punish criminals, that all of is claiming that each person has no our machinery of criminal justice is, right to defend himself, although he in fact, unjust. Robbers, murderers, does have a right to defend other rapists, and miscellaneous delinquents people. And, therefore, what is needed ought, on this 'theory,to be let loose. is a characteristic which distinguishes Now, the pacifist's first move, upon each person from everyone else, and hearing this, will be to claim that he not just me from everyone else- has been misrepresented.He might say which is plainly self-contradictory. that it is only one's self that one has If the reader does not yet see why the no right to defend, and that one may "characteristic"of being identical with legitimately fight in order to defend oneself cannot be used to support a other people. This qualification cannot moral theory, let him reflect that the be made by those pacifists who qualify proposition "Everyone is identical with as conscientious objectors, however, for himself" is a trivial truth-as clear an the latter are refusing to defend their example of an analytic proposition as fellow citizens and not merely them- there could possibly be. But a statement selves. But this is comparatively trivial of moral principle is not a trivial truth; when we contemplate the next objec- it is a substantive moral assertion. But tion to this amended version of the non-tautologous statements, as every- theory. Let us now ask ourselves what one knows, cannot logically be derived it is about attacks on other people from tautologies, and, consequently, which could possibly justify us in de- the fact that everyone is identical with fending them, while we are not justified himself cannot possibly be used to in defending ourselves? It cannot be prove a moral position. the mere fact that they are other people Again, then, the pacifist must retreat than ourselves, for, of course, everyone in order to avoid talking idle nonsense. is a different person from everyone His next move, now, might be to say PACIFISM: A PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS 265 that we have a right to defend all those fending oneself) which he wishes to who are not able to defend themselves. encourage in others as a reason for Big, grown-up men who are able to de- denying it in the case of those who al- fend themselves ought not to do so, but ready have it (namely, the defenseless). they ought to defend mere helpless This is indeed self-contradictory. children who are unable to defend them- To attempt to be consistent, at least, selves. the pacifist is forced to accept the char- This last, very queer theory could acterization of him at which we tenta- give rise to some amusing logical gym- tively arrived. He must indeed say that nastics. For instance, what about no one ought ever to be defended groups of people? If a group of people against attack. The right of self- who cannot defend themselves singly defense can be denied coherently only can defend themselves together, then if the right of defense, in general, is when it has grown to that size ought denied. This in itself is an important it to stop defending itself? If so, then conclusion. every time a person can defend some- It must be borne in mind, by the way, one else, he would form with the per- that I have not said anything to take son being defended a "defensive unit" exception to the man who simply does which was able to defend itself, and not wish to defend himself. So long as thus would by his very presence debar he does not attempt to make his paci- himself from making the defense. At fism into a principle, one cannot accuse this rate, no one will ever get defended, him of any inconsistency, however it seems: The defenseless people by much one might wish to say that he is definition cannot defend themselves, foolish or eccentric. It is solely with while those who can defend them moral principles that I am concerned would enable the group consisting of here. the defenders and the defended to de- We now come to the last and most fend themselves, and hence they would fundamental problem of all. If we ask be obliged not to do so. ourselves what the point of pacifism is, Such reflections, however, are merely what gets it going, so to speak, the curious shadows of a much more funda- answer is, of course, obvious enough: mental and serious logical problem. opposition to violence. The pacifist is This arises when we begin to ask: But generally thought of as the man who is why should even defenseless people be so much opposed to violence that he defended? If resisting violence is in- will not even use it to defend himself herently evil, then how can it suddenly or anyone else. And it is precisely this become permissible when we use it on characterization which I wish to show behalf of other people? The fact that is far from being plausible, morally in- they are defenseless cannot possibly ac- consistent. count for this, for it follows from the To begin with, we may note some- theory in question, that everyone ought thing which at first glance may seem to put himself in the position of people merely to be a matter of fact, albeit who are defenseless by refusing to de- one which should worry the pacifist, in fend himself. This type of pacifist, in our latest characterization of him. I short, is using the very characteristic refer to the commonplace observation (namely, being in a state of not de- that, generally speaking, we measure 266 ETHICS a man's degree of opposition to some- consist in, if not a right at least to de- thing by the amount of effort he is fend themselves from whatever violence willing to put forth against it. A man might be offered them? But lest the could hardly be said to be dead set reader think that this is a gratuitous against something if he is not willing assumption, note carefully the reason to lift a finger to keep it from going why having a right involves having a on. A person who claims to be com- right to be defended from breaches of pletely opposed to something yet does that right. It is because the prevention nothing to prevent it would ordinarily of infractions of that right is precisely be said to be a hypocrite. what one has a right to when one has a As facts, however, we cannot make right at all. A right just is a status too much of these. The pacifist could justifying preventive action. To say claim to be willing to go to any length, that you have a right to X but that no short of violence, to prevent violence. one has any justification whatever for He might, for instance, stand out in preventing people from depriving you the cold all day long handing out leaf- of it, is self-contradictory. If you claim lets (as I have known some to do), a right to X, then to describe some and this would surely argue for the action as an act of depriving you of X, sincerity of his beliefs. is logically to imply that its absence is But would it really? one of the things that you have a right Let us ask ourselves, one final time, to. what we are claiming when we claim Thus far it does not follow logically that violence is morally wrong and un- that we have a right to use force in our just. We are, in the first place, claiming own or anyone's defense. What does that a person has no right to indulge follow logically is that one has a right in it, as such (meaning that he has no to whatever may be necessary to pre- right to indulge in it, unless he has an vent infringements of his right. One overriding justification). But what do might at first suppose that the universe we mean when we say that he has no could be so constructed that it is never right to indulge in it? Violence, of the necessary to use force to prevent people type we are considering,is a two-termed who are bent on getting something from affair: one does violence to somebody, getting it. one cannot simply "do violence." It Yet even this is not so, for when we might be oneself, of course, but we are speak of "force" in the sense in which not primarily interested in those cases, pacifism is concerned with it, we do for what makes it wrong to commit not mean merely physical "force." To violence is that it harms the people to call an action a use of force is not whom it is done. To say that it is wrong merely to make a reference to the laws is to say that those to whom it is done of mechanics. On the contrary, it is to have a right not to have it done to describe whatever is being done as be- them. (This must again be qualified ing a means to the infliction on some- by pointing out that this is so only if body of something (ordinarily physi- they have done nothing to merit having cal) which he does not want done to that right abridged.) him; and the same is true for "force" Yet what could that right to their own in the sense in which it applies to war, security, which people have, possibly assault and battery, and the like. PACIFISM: A PHILOSOPHICALANALYSIS 267 The proper contrary of "force" in him, we would have to face the ques- this connection is "rationalpersuasion." tion: Do we mean attempted rational Naturally, one way there might be of persuasion, or successful rational per- getting somebody not to do something suasion, that is, rational persuasion he has no right to do is to convince which really does succeed in preventing him he ought not to do it or that it is him from acting? Attempted rational not in his interest to do it. But it is persuasion might fail (if only because inconsistent, I suggest, to argue that the opponent is unreasonable), and rational persuasion is the only morally then what? To argue that we have a permissible method of preventing vio- right to use rational persuasion which lence. A pragmatic reason for this is also succeeds (i.e., we have a right to easy enough to point to: Violent people its success as well as to its use) is to are too busy being violent to be reason- imply that we have a right to prevent able. We cannot engage in rational him from performing the act. But this, persuasion unless the enemy is willing in turn, means that, if attempts at to sit down and talk; but what if he rational persuasion fail, we have a isn't? One cannot contend that every right to the use of force. Thus what human being can be persuaded to sit we have a right to, if we ever have a down and talk before he strikes, for right to anything, is not merely the use this is not something we can determine of rational persuasion to keep people just by reasoning: it is a question of from depriving you of the thing to observation, certainly. But these points which you have the right. We do indeed are not strictly relevant anyway, for our have a right to that, but we also have question is not the empirical question a right to anything else that might be of whether there is some handy way necessary (other *things being equal) which can always be used to get a to prevent the deprivation from occur- person to sit down and discuss moral ring. And it is a logical truth, not merely philosophy when he is about to murder a contingent one, that what might be you. Our question is: If force is the necessary is force. (If merely saying only way to prevent violence in a given something could miraculously deprive case, is its use justified in that case? someone of the ability to carry through This is a purely moral question which a course of action, then those speech- we can discuss without any special acts would be called a type of force, if reference to matters of fact. And, more- a very mysterious one. And we could over, it is precisely this question which properly begin to oppose their use for we should have to discuss with the precisely the same reasons as we now would-be violator. The point is that if oppose violence.) a person can be rationally persuaded What this all adds up to, then, is that that he ought not to engage in violence, if we have any rights at all, we have a then precisely what he would be ration- right to use force to prevent the depri- ally persuaded of if we were to succeed vation of the thing to which we are said would be the proposition that the use to have a right. But the pacifist, of all of force is justifiable to prevent him people, is the one most concerned to from doing so. For note that if we were insist that we do have some rights, to argue that only rational persuasion namely, the right not to have violence is permissible as a means of preventing done to us. This is logically implied in 268 ETHICS asserting it to be a duty on everyone's Would I be justified in killing him to part to avoid violence. And this is why prevent this, under any circumstances the pacifist's position is self-contradic- whatever? tory. In saying that violence is wrong, Suppose that I call the police and one is at the same time saying that they take out a warrant against him, people have a right to its prevention, by and suppose that when the police come, force if necessary. Whether and to what he puts up a struggle. He pulls a knife extent it may be necessary is a ques- or a gun, let us say, and the police shoot tion of fact, but, since it is a question him in the ensuing battle. Has my of fact only, the moral right to use right to the prevention of his annoying force on some possible occasions is me extended to killing him? Well, not established. exactly, since the immediate threat in We now have an answer to the ques- response to which he is killed is a tion. How much force does a given threat to the lives of the policemen. threat of violence justify for preventive Yet my annoyer may never have con- purposes? The answer, in a word, is templated real violence. It is an unfor- "Enough." That the answer is this tunate case of unpremeditated escala- simple may at first sight seem implausi- tion. But this is precisely what makes ble. One might suppose that some elab- the contention that one is justified in orate equation between the aggressive using enough force to do the job, what- and the preventive force is needed: the ever amount that may be, to prevent punishment be proportionate to the action which violates a right less alarm- crime. But this is a misunderstanding. ing than at first sight it seems. For it In the first place, prevention and is difficult to envisage a reason why ex- punishment are not the same, even if treme force is needed to prevent mild punishment is thought to be directed threats from realization except by way mainly toward prevention. The punish- of escalation, and escalation automati- ment of a particular crime logically cally justifies increased use of preven- cannot prevent that instance of the tive force. crime, since it presupposes that it has The existence of laws, police, courts, already been performed; and punish- and more or less civilized modes of be- ment need not involve the use of any havior on the part of most of the popu- violence at all, although law-enforce- lace naturally affects the answer to the ment officers in some places have a question of how much force is neces- nasty tendency to assume the contrary. sary. One of the purposes of a legal But preventive force is another matter. system of justice is surely to make the If a man threatens to kill me, it is de- use of force by individuals very much sirable, of course, for me to try to pre- less necessary than it would otherwise vent this by the use of the least amount be. If we try to think back to a "state of force sufficient to do the job. But I of nature" situation, we shall have much am justified even in killing him if less difficulty envisaging the need for necessary. This much, I suppose, is large amounts of force to prevent small obvious to most people. But suppose threats of violence. Here Hobbes's his threat is much smaller: suppose that contention that in such a state every he is merely pestering me, which is a man has a right to the life of every very mild form of aggression indeed. other becomes understandable.He was, PACIFISM: A PHILOSOPHICALANALYSIS 269 I suggest, relying on the same principle protect the said rights. But this will as I have argued for here: that one has not do, I believe. For I have not main- a right to use as much force as neces- tained that having a right, or believing sary to defend one's rights, which in- that one has a right, entails a readiness clude the right of safety of person. to defend that right. One has a perfect I have said that the duty to avoid right not to resist violence to oneself violence is only a duty, other things if one is so inclined. But our question being equal. We might arrive at the has been whether self-defense is justi- same conclusion as we have above by fiable, and not whether one's belief that asking the question: Which "other violence is wrong entails a willingness things" might count as being unequal? or readiness to use it. My contention The answer to this is that whatever else has been that such a belief does entail they may be, the purpose of preventing the justifiability of using it. If one violence from being done is necessarily came upon a community in which no one of these justifying conditions. That sort of violence was ever resisted and it the use of force is never justified to was claimed in that community that prevent initial violence being done to the non-resistance was a matter of con- one logically implies that there is noth- science, we should have to conclude, I ing wrong with initial violence. We can- think, not that this was a community not characterize it as being wrong if of saints, but rather that this com- preventive violence is not simultane- munity lacked the concept of justice- ously being characterized as justifiable. or perhaps that their nervous systems We often think of pacifists as being were oddly different from ours. gentle and idealistic souls, which in its The true test of the pacifist comes, way is true enough. What I have been of course, when he is called upon to concerned to show is that they are also assist in the protection of the safety of confused. If they attempt to formulate other persons and not just of himself. their position using our standard con- For while he is, as I have said, surely cepts of rights, their position involves a entitled to be pacific about his own contradiction: Violence is wrong, and person if he is so inclined, he is not it is wrong to resist it. But the right to entitled to be so about the safety of resist is precisely what having a right others. It is here that the test of princi- of safety of person is, if it is anything at ples comes out. People have a tendency all. to brand conscientious objectors as Could the position be reformulated cowards or traitors, but this is not quite with a less "committal" concept of fair. They are acting as if they were rights? I do not think so. It has been cowards or traitors, but claiming to do suggested2 that the pacifist need not so on principle. It is not surprising if a talk in terms of this "kind" of rights. community should fail to understand He can affirm, according to this sug- such "principles," for the test of ad- gestion, simply that neither the aggres- herence to a principle is willingness to sors nor the defenders "have" rights to act on it, and the appropriate action, what they do, that to affirm their not if one believes a certain thing to be having them is simply to be against the grossly wrong, is to take steps to pre- use of force, without this entailing the vent or resist it. Thus people who assess readiness to use force if necessary to conscientious objection as cowardice or 270 ETHICS worse are taking an understandable defense is obligatory and not merely step: from an intuitive feeling that the justifiable? pacifist does not really believe what he The only thing I can suggest here is saying they infer that his actions (or is that the answer requires us to specu- inaction) must be due to cowardice. late about the obligations of living in a What I am suggesting is that this is not community. If a community expects its correct: The actions are due, not to members to assist in the common de- cowardice, but to confusion. fense when necessary, it can make this I have not addressed myself specifi- clear to people and give them their cally to the question whether, for in- choice either to be prepared to meet stance, conscription is morally justifi- this obligation or to live somewhere able, given that the war effort on behalf else. But a community of pacifists would of which it is invoked is genuinely justi- also be quite conceivable, a community fiable. Now, war efforts very often in which no citizen could expect the aren't justifiable (indeed, since at least others to defend him as a part of their one of the parties to each war must be community responsibilities. One might an aggressor, a minimum of 50 per cent not care to live in such a community, of war efforts must be unjustifiable); but then, a pacifist might not care to but if they ever are, is it then justifiable live in our sort. When the community to conscript soldiers? In closing, I would is a whole nation of present-day size, it suggest an answer which may seem is much more difficult to put the issue surprising in view of my arguments a clearly to each citizen in advance. But few pages back. My answer is that it is, the upshot of it is that (1) the issue but that in the case of conscientious depends upon what sort of community objectors, the only justifiable means of we conceive ourselves to have; (2) we getting them to comply is rational per- do not have clearly formed views on suasion. this point; (3) there is no basic moral The reason is that, in showing that duty to defend others; (4) we there- self-defense is morally justifiable, one fore have no direct right to force people has not simultaneously shown that the to become soldiers in time of justified defense of other people is morally wars; (5) but we do have a right to obligatory. The kinds of arguments deny many basic community services needed to show that an act is obligatory to people who will not assist us in time are quite different from those which of need by contributing the force of merely show that it is justified. And, their arms; and so (6) the only thing since what has been shown is that self- to do is to try to argue conscientious defense is justifiable and not obligatory, objectors into assistance, pointing to all the only conclusion that can be im- of the above factors and leaving them mediately inferred from this is that their choice. defense of others is also justifiable and Too much can easily be made of the not obligatory. Would it be possible to issue of conscription versus voluntary show that the defense of others (at service in time of war. (In time of least in some circumstances) is obliga- peace, we have another issue alto- tory and not merely justifiable, without gether; my arguments here apply only at the same time showing that self- when there is clear justification for PACIFISM: A PHILOSOPHICALANALYSIS 271 defensive measures.) It must be remem- justifiable if the defense of persons is bered that there is a limit to what law considered a basic obligation of the can do in "requiring" compliance, and citizen. In contemporary communities, the pacifist is precisely the person who it seems to me that there is good reason cannot be reached by the ordinary for giving it that status. methods of the law, since he has made Many questions remain to be dis- up his mind not to be moved by force. cussed, but I hope to have exposed the The philosophical difference lies, not in most fundamental issues surrounding the question of whether compliance is this question and to have shown that ultimately voluntary, since with all laws the pacifist's central position is unten- it to some extent must be, but in the able. moral status which military service is UNIVERSITY OF WATERLOO presumed to have. The draft is morally WATERLOO,ONTARIO

NOTES 1. Compare, for example, K. Baier, The Moral 2. I owe this suggestion to my colleague, Leslie Point of View (Cornell, 1958), p. 191. Armour.