18. THE FOURTH MACEDONIAN WAR (199-197)

The Aitolian declaration of war was done independently, without an advance agreement with Rome. The discussions with Apustius had been no more than talks, and he had no authority to bind his city or the consul. The Aitolians were therefore fighting a separate war, at least in theory. This created all sorts of difficulties later, but it must have been a deliberate decision. It would have been quite possible to hold out longer so that clear terms of alliance and participation could be negotiated with Rome, and such a process would surely increase the value of the Aitolian contribution to the joint effort. But the Aitol• ians had gone ahead independently. Some reasons can be suggested. One is procedural. Damokritos the strategos had organised a special Assembly meeting on the subject of declaring war, and a discussion was therefore necessary. In fact, the calling of the special Assembly - apparently a constitutional inno• vation - implied a decision to declare war on Macedon; the Aitolians had got themselves trapped. The campaign of Sulpicius into highland Macedon might have seemed to be the beginning of the end for Philip, and Aitolia would not wish to avoid being on the winning side'; only participants would be likely to acquire a share of the spoils. More probably the Aitolians remembered the difficulties over the previous alliance with Rome, and did not wish to be bound by the same sort of terms again. It seems, indeed, that they assumed that the previous treaty of 211 was still in force 2• Certain events during the war tend to show this, though it is never stated outright; equally, cer• tain other events suggest the opposite, that Rome at least did not regard the alliance as still in force. After the dispute over the peace terms of 206 and 205, it was very difficult for both sides to decide. In 202 Aitolia had asked for help against Philip in the Aegean; this might have been an approach predicated on the continuing alliance. The Roman response had been a blunt refusal, with a curt reference to Aitolia's separate peace; but this was not a denial of the Aitolians'

1 This is the clear implication of Livy 31.40.9-10. 2 There is no sign of a time limit in the section of the treaty which is preserved, and no sign that it was limited to the period of the war. 364 PART FOUR: THE MACEDONIAN WARS right to ask3• Flaminius later denied the continuance of the treaty, but this may not be the last word, for he was in dispute with the Aitolians over something else at the time, and this was a useful debating point. It was not, however, his only point in the argument; if the treaty real• ly was defunct, that would have been sufficient for his reply, but he went on to make other points. So even this apparent firm statement is not conclusive4• It looks as though Flamininus was not actually sure on the issue. In all probability neither side knew one way or the other, and nei• ther wanted to put the matter to a test. It suited both to leave the issue vague and unresolved. Relations between Rome and Aitolia were never smooth and friendly, under any circumstances or at any time. Aitolia clearly wished to be regarded as a specifically indepen• dent state, capable of making its own decisions; and only a brief con• templation of Italy and Sicily would have demonstrated that allies of Rome swiftly sank to the effective status of subjects; in 199 the Aitol• ians could see the examples of Tarentum, Syracuse, with which they had proxeny relations, and of Capua and all the Latin allies; closer to home the subject status of the Illyrian cities, Apollonia and Epidau• ros, and of Kerkyra, was equally clear. Aitolia's history had included only occasional alliances, and those which had been made tended to turn out badly; further, like Rome, the league did tend to absorb new members into itself. None of these suggested reasons is perhaps wholly convincing alone, but if they are taken together, it is possible to suggest that the league deliberately did not seek a new Roman treaty partly because the old one might still be valid, and could be be appealed to when it was opportune, and partly because the status of a Roman ally could be seen to be one of subordination and dependence, a status all Aitol• ian feelings rebelled against. The Aitolians, with the arrogance which was wholly Greek, and which included, no doubt, a defensiveness as a result of Greek insults directed at them, and which made them dis• liked so much, assumed that they could fight their own war against Macedon in co-operation with Rome, and that by avoiding an alliance they would be able to insist on their right to be consulted. The Aitolian decision for war was taken in August of 199. There

:i Livy 31.29.4; App. Mac. 4.2. 4 Livy 33.13.7-12.