British 20Th-Century Imperialism and Anti-Imperialism in South Asia

Home , Romesh Chunder Dutt

1 British 20th-century a member of the UK parliament from 1892 2 to 1895, had begun to voice key points of 3 Imperialism and a nationalist indictment of the economic 4 Anti-Imperialism in effects of imperial rule. By the time selec- 5 tions from Naoroji’s speeches and writings 6 South Asia were prominently collected in his Poverty and 7 Un-British Rule in India in 1901, he was joined 8 The ‘short’ half-century from 1905 to 1947 in in this effort by figures like the Maharashtrian 9 South Asia was framed by two partitions that nationalist and Bombay Supreme Court Judge 10 say much about the contours of imperialism Mahadev Govind Ranade (1842–1901) and, 11 and anti-imperialism during this final phase especially, the Bengali intellectual and Indian 12 of British rule in the Indian subcontinent. Civil Service member Romesh Chunder Dutt 13 With the decision to partition the colonial (1848–1909). Together such figures articu- 14 province of Bengal along its east–west (and lated ideas about the drain of wealth from 15 Hindu–Muslim) axis in 1905, mass agitation India to Britain, the de-industrialization of 16 in India was given its most visible platform the subcontinent’s economy through the sti- 17 since the so-called ‘sepoy’ mutiny or Indian fling of handicraft production and the atten- 18 rebellion of 1857. By once more dividing a dant consequence of de-urbanization, and the 19 Bengal that nationalist fervour had success- beginnings of a thesis about distorted agri- 20 fully reunited by 1911, while splitting the cultural commercialization. The latter, in par- 21 Punjab in two as well, the end of British impe- ticular, highlighted the Raj’s privileging of the 22 rialism in the subcontinent in 1947 brought production of export commodities and their 23 not only independence but also the carnage movement by rail to coastal cities over grains 24 and tragedy that yielded the two new states of for domestic consumption, the creation of a 25 India and Pakistan. robust internal market, and the prevention of 26 the spate of famines that haunted the Indian 27 countryside throughout the late 19th century 28 Swaraj, the partition of Bengal, (Habib 1985;ONLY Roy 2000). 29 and the growth of All-India Party By the 1890s Congress nationalism was 30 nationalism showing new and more vigorously agita- 31 While the origin of official party national- tional tendencies as well as signs of the ten- 32 ism in India dates to the middle of the 1880s, sions around religious communitarianism 33 the English-educated ‘middle classes’ who that would continue to complicate the politics 34 launched the organisations that became of anti-imperialism in India throughout the 35 the Indian National Congress (INC) were first half of the 20th century. The early 1890s 36 reformist more than anti-imperialist in bent. marked the high point of the popular move- 37 The demands articulated by the most visible ment for cow protection that had been gain- 38 among these early nationalists thus focused ing momentum across much of north-west 39 on increased opportunities for participation India for some two decades, especially with 40 in the Government of India. These included the support of the Gujarati religious lumi- 41 calls for easing access to posts in the Indian nary Swami Dayananda Saraswati (1824–83) 42 Civil Service and for increased representation and his orthodox Hindu reformist organi- 43 within the ranks of the limited institutions of zation the Arya Samaj. This was a budding 44 quasi-parliamentary government that the Raj sore point between increasingly mobilised 45 first established after the rebellion of 1857 members of the Hindu community and seg- 46 and until the Indian Councils Act of 1861. ments of Indian Muslim society – for whom 47 While the INC can scarcely be described as the cow could be a more ready option than 48 heading a mass-based people’s movement in the goat for performing the rite of sacrificial 49 its early years, events like the so-called Ilbert slaughter associated with certain festival days 50 bill controversy of the 1880s did mean that in the Islamic calendar – and rioting around 51 PROOFeven the politics of reformism harboured the the issue broke out in 1893 in various parts 52 seeds of more significant oppositional ten- of north India. Clearly symbolising growing 53 dencies. Already prior to the INC’s formation, inter-religious tension, such turbulence was 54 moreover, figures like the Parsi intellectual also indicative of a new phase in the expres- 55 Dadabhai Naoroji (1825–1917), the renowned sion of nationalist discontent with the colo- 56 forefather of party nationalism in India and nial government, whose registration scheme

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1 for licensing cow slaughter was taken both as the famous Bengali poet Rabindranath 2 an unfulfilled prohibition of the practice by Tagore – had been calling for Indians to 3 the protection movement’s advocates and as ready themselves for a more confrontational 4 express sanction for it by Indian Muslims. stance against the Raj through a process of 5 One of the more prominent exponents of self-strengthening (atmashakti). Finally, at 6 the majoritarian brand of nationalism that the most militant end of the spectrum were 7 emerged from this mix of anti-imperialist individuals, both male and female, who used 8 agitation and communitarian strife was tactics of revolutionary terror, including 9 the Maharashtrian social reformer, lawyer, bombings and political assassinations (Bose 10 and early Congress ‘extremist’ Balwantrao and Jalal 2004: 96; Sarkar 1988). 11 Gangadhar Tilak (1856–1920), who along While the highpoint of swadeshi agita- 12 with Lala Lajpat Rai (1865–1928) in the Punjab tion had passed by 1908, in the previous 13 and Bipin Chandra Pal (1858–1932) made up three years notable achievements had been 14 the famous triumvirate of ‘Lal, Bal, and Pal’, made, with cotton imports declining by up 15 usually portrayed as moving the Congress to a quarter in the first year of boycott and a 16 away from its reformist origins and towards concerted effort to avoid other imported con- 17 a more militant stance. Especially with par- sumer goods as well as major institutions 18 tition of Bengal in 1905 by the notoriously of the colonial state such as courts and edu- 19 high-handed Viceroy George Nathanial cational facilities. At the same time, events 20 Curzon (in office 1899–1905), a more extrem- in Bengal provided a rallying point for anti- 21 ist ‘hot faction’ emerged within the Congress. imperial nationalist sentiment to deepen in 22 This so-called garam dal faction was counter- other parts of the subcontinent as well. They 23 poised against the more moderate naram dal also provided a basis for Congress to increase 24 or ‘soft’ faction headed by figures like Tilak’s its visibility and press its claim to the status 25 rival, the Congress leader Gopal Krishna of ostensible spoke for the nationalist cause 26 Gokhale (1866–1915), a fellow Maharashtrian outside Bengal, primarily in parts of Madras, 27 from the Ratnagiri district who was ten years the Punjab, and Bombay. As the historian 28 his junior. Burton SteinONLY notes, for example, in the south 29 While the ‘moderate’–‘extremist’ split cer- of India the swadeshi movement and the larger 30 tainly speaks to the terms on which majori- moderate–extremist split within Congress 31 tarian party nationalism negotiated its own that it precipitated by 1907 was used by differ- 32 evolving temperament, as contemporary ent elements of Madras’s Brahmin commu- 33 historians observe, it does a disservice to the nity to jockey for leadership over the regional 34 diversity of elements that underpinned the Congress. While the Mylapore Brahmins of 35 first truly mass and geographically expan- Tamil Nadu had dominated Congress activ- 36 sive episode of anti-imperialist nationalist ity in Madras until 1905, their upstart north- 37 agitation that developed around the call for ern Telugu-speaking Brahmin adversaries 38 swadeshi (‘self-sufficiency’) in Bengal from opted to side with the more radical stance of 39 1905 to 1908 or 1911. Along with the old mod- figures like Tilak and Aurobindo. Supporting 40 erates who favoured constitutional methods the singing of the banned Bengali anthem 41 while being ‘deeply offended at Curzon’s ‘Bande Mataram’ (‘Hail Mother India’) and 42 aggressive measures’ (Bose and Jalal 2004: pledging to unite the Madras and Calcutta 43 95) in Bengal, such as Gokhale and the fore- division of the Congress, it was this same fac- 44 father of Bengali nationalism Surendranath tion of Telugu-speaking Brahmins who would 45 Banerji (1848–1925), the historian Sumit form the Andhra Mahasabha in 1910. A half- 46 Sarkar distinguishes three other orienta- century later, the same body would succeed in 47 tions. While the ‘extremist’ politics favoured its call for a separate Telugu-speaking prov- 48 by Lal, Bal, and Pal, as well as figures like ince to be carved out from the old colonial 49 the Calcutta-born poet and yogi Aurobindo province of Madras (Stein 2010: 282–283). 50 Ghose (1872–1950), clearly did leave room In the Punjab swadeshi activism in Bengal 51 PROOFfor tactical violence if necessary, more gener- ended up resonating with unrest or discontent 52 ally such figures called for passive resistance that had its own independent cause. The main 53 through the boycott of British goods and point of anger in this crucial wheat-growing 54 institutions. At the same time, already prior bread-basket of the subcontinent was the 55 to 1905 other more diffuse strands – such as colonial state’s decision to raise rates for canal 56 those emanating from the Nobel laureate, waters. Some 30 years after irrigation in the

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1 province started to be transformed through sight of Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. 2 large-scale canal construction – which, along Though it is difficult to quantify the effect 3 with the railways, ended up being one of the that such exposure had on the views of those 4 only forms of heavy capital investment that the who returned to a home society ruled by 5 late colonial state would sponsor – the years Britain, the numbers underlying other aspects 6 1906–07 saw the outbreak of significant peas- of the war’s impact are less difficult to cap- 7 ant unrest in the Punjab. At the same time, ture. Used widely to protect Britain’s broader 8 the province was another site that proved only imperial interests in Asia and Africa through- 9 too well equipped for anti-imperialist social out the late 19th century, on the eve of the 10 unrest to blend into inter-communitarian war the British Indian Army was already 11 tension, owing to its mixed population of among the largest volunteer forces in the 12 Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs. Therefore, so world, if not the largest. In the four years 13 too were the Arya Samaj’s efforts at consoli- after 1914 its ranks had swelled enormously, 14 dating support among the lower middle-class totalling some 1.2 million by 1918 with some 15 Punjabi Hindus just past their third decade 350,000 absorbed just from the Punjab (Bose 16 (Fox 1985). and Jalal 2004: 102; Bose 2006: 125). Not sur- 17 By the end of the first decade of the new prisingly, such a vast increase in manpower 18 century, much of the more militant leader- together with the need to support the wider 19 ship that had assembled around swadeshi – military endeavour that Britain was fighting 20 including Lajpat Rai and Tilak – would see entailed a large-scale expansion of India’s 21 their campaigning result in imprisonment war-related production, as well as of prices 22 or exile. By this time, moreover, the spirit of and the money supply. 23 boycott had already been largely broken – in This combination produced decidedly 24 no small part because of the opportunistic polarising effects at the different ends of 25 decision of Bombay’s textile industrialists the class spectrum. With the free coinage 26 to ramp up prices and profits amid dimin- of silver rupees suspended since the early 27 ished competition, which sapped the Bengali 1890s, Indian currency policy was controlled 28 peasant’s ability to persist in support of the by the SecretaryONLY of State for India sitting 29 boycott. Nonetheless, by 1911 they also saw in London, on the basis of a so-called gold 30 victory, as the new viceroy Hardinge (who exchange standard. With both a gold reserve 31 replaced Curzon’s own successor, the Earl of and a paper currency reserve at his disposal, 32 Minto, in 1910) opted to annul the partition the Secretary of State’s policy throughout 33 decision. In the process, the colonial state’s the 1890s was to stabilise the exchange rate 34 about-turn also served to discredit the class of the rupee at 1 shilling 4 pence. If the gen- 35 of landed Muslim interests in East Bengal eral tendency towards deflationary policy 36 who had been the only group to support par- became too much of a bottleneck, as was 37 tition, thus further opening the way for the becoming the case during the first dec- 38 All India Muslim League, which it played a ade of the 20th century as economic activ- 39 significant role in founding in 1906, to be ity expanded, the mints could be selectively 40 seized by a new style of leaser by the time of reopened to coin more silver rupees. With 41 the First World War. the enormous expansion in the price of sil- 42 ver during the war, however, the relationship 43 between the nominal and intrinsic values of 44 The First World War, the shifting the rupee suddenly reversed. Whereas for the 45 economics of colonial rule, and previous 20 years actual value was well below 46 political leftism nominal value, when the opposite became 47 It is telling that among the myriad effects the case after 1914 there was no choice but 48 of the First World War on the context of to allow the rupee to appreciate. The latter 49 early 20th-century imperialism and anti- effect was exacerbated by the growing 50 imperialism in India the movement of some demand for silver fostered by the ramping up 51 PROOFone million Indian troops to foreign theatres of wartime production, which necessitated 52 of operation rarely ranks high on the list. increased coinage given what was then a still 53 While well over 60,000 would perish in for- limited paper currency. The supply of silver 54 eign battlefields, those who returned proved rupees thus expanded from 1.8 billion to 2.9 55 greatly transformed by the traumas of battle billion during the war years (Rothermund 56 as well as by what was, for most, their first 1993: 72–73).

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1 With the colonial state also resorting to an to the agrarian export economy produced a 2 outright printing of money that was secured grave decline in earnings for the wealthier 3 by accumulating credits on India’s behalf in peasantry, as Sarkar notes, the agricultural 4 the Bank of England, in the five years from poor and the landless were confronted with 5 1914 to 1919 circulating paper notes jumped an even more dire situation; the fact that the 6 from Rs. 660 million to Rs. 1530 million price of the coarse food grains on which such 7 (Bose and Jalal 2004: 103). Given its multiple groups relied for subsistence was increas- 8 sources, war-induced inflation would persist ing faster than the price of more expensive 9 for a significant period after 1919, a fact that crops like rice and wheat became a particular 10 helped expand the windfall profits that the source of distress. For urban workers as well, 11 war had brought to India’s ascending capi- the high price of food grains meant that the 12 talists. Among the emergent industrial bour- wartime industrial boom amounted to little 13 geoisie who benefited most were west India’s in the face of the erosion of their real wages. 14 textile mill owners, concentrated in Bombay Overall, therefore, ‘the war meant misery and 15 and Ahmedabad, with the jute mill owners falling living standards for the majority of the 16 of East Bengal also seeing significant gains Indian people’ (Sarkar 1988: 171). 17 after a decline in orders at the very start of As a harbinger of great economic dislo- 18 the war (though British jute magnates were cation, the war also portended the extreme 19 dominant in the province); coal-mining capi- volatility of social forces that would underpin 20 tal also fared well. While these were among Gandhianism during the 1920s and the atten- 21 the few sectors that had already managed to dant process by which Gandhi himself would 22 establish themselves under imperial rule, the transform Congress into the head of a true 23 war marked a coming-out party for cement mass movement. Already before the 1920s, 24 and, especially, steel, with the famous con- however, both mainstream party nationalism 25 glomerate of the Tatas capitalising on the de and other anti-imperialist forces experienced 26 facto protection that the war brought with it other crucial developments that bear men- 27 (Rothermund 1993: 67–69; Sarkar 1988: 171). tioning. From 1915 to 1918, for example, the 28 Further complicating these tendencies was famous poetONLY and Hyderabad-born Bengali 29 the Government of India’s unchastened rev- activist Sarojini Naidu (1879–1949) travelled 30 enue demand, a virtual necessity in light of the breadth of the subcontinent talking about 31 its priority of reorienting Indian society and nationalist themes and the empowerment of 32 economy towards serving Britain’s war-related women. Well before sitting in jail alongside 33 needs. While the hated Indian land tax – which the men who dominated Congress national- 34 had been the principal mechanism for effecting ism in the 1930s, she had helped to launch the 35 the drain of wealth ever since the late 1700s – Women’s Indian Association in 1917 to call 36 had by the 1880s already started to decline in for female suffrage and the right to hold what 37 importance in relation to other means of sur- limited legislative offices existed for Indians 38 plus appropriation, it remained a significant within the colonial government. 39 burden all the same. Given the increasing reli- In these same years, other new varieties 40 ance on other sources of government demand of radicalism, internationalism, and left- 41 during the war years – especially through the ism were accumulating as well. It was in the 42 income tax and customs duties – it was India’s years after 1918 that trade unionism became 43 great mass of agriculturalists as well as its truly substantial, paving the way for sig- 44 much smaller, though significant, band of nificant strikes, especially in Bombay in the 45 urban workers who were hardest hit. mid- to late 1920s. It was also in 1920 – at the 46 As prices of industrial goods and imported October meeting of the Second Congress of 47 manufactures increased precipitously, the the Communist International in Tashkent – 48 war had the opposite effect on the prices that the Communist Party of India is often said 49 of agricultural commodities destined for to have been started. (The main wing of the 50 export. This made for a particularly perilous party, however, records its birth as dating from 51 PROOFcircumstance for the Indian peasant, whose a conference for Indian communists held in 52 livelihood had been definitively fastened Kanpur, the largest city in contemporary Uttar 53 to the world market ever since the reversal Pradesh, in 1925.) The spirit of internation- 54 of the long price depression that had char- alism inspired by the Bolshevik Revolution 55 acterised the East India Company’s rule in absorbed a broad range of Indian figures who 56 the years from 1820 to 1850. While the blow had already become convinced of the need

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1 to solicit foreign assistance – including that come to an end. With leaders like Tilak back 2 from Kaiser Wilhelm’s Germany – during the from imprisonment or exile (the latter having 3 war. They included the eminent socialist (and been jailed in Mandalay), by 1916 Congress 4 eventual exponent of a self-made philoso- had reached its historic Lucknow Pact with 5 phy of ‘radical humanism’) M.N. Roy. Well the Muslim League. While the pact would 6 before the Bengali revolutionary had appeared continue in the spirit of moderate reformism 7 at the Second Congress of the Communist in its demands on the British, it was more 8 International, Roy’s initial involvement in what notable for what it suggested about efforts 9 the British feared would become a vast Indo- to forge an all-India anti-imperialist politics 10 German conspiracy had brought him to Japan, capable of bringing together the subconti- 11 Korea, China, the US, and then Mexico, where nent’s extremely heterogeneous Muslim com- 12 he proved instrumental in starting that coun- munity during these years. 13 try’s Communist Party as well. As would remain the case well into the 14 Roy’s tireless intellectual production, 1940s, and much more than the Congress 15 together with his relentless and penetrat- at the same point, the Muslim League was 16 ing criticism of the mainstream of Indian a party in search of a base. What it did have 17 nationalism, including Gandhi’s ‘counter- was a new generation of leadership, with the 18 revolutionary leadership’ in calling an end Karachi-born and English-trained barris- 19 to the first campaign of civil disobedience ter and INC member Muhammed Ali Jinnah 20 in the early 1920s, is indicative of the great (1846–1948) having joined the League in 1912 21 diversity in Indian anti-imperialism that is after being elected as the Muslim representa- 22 typically obscured by the focus on better tive to the Imperial Legislative Council in 23 known-figures and organised party activity 1909. Tellingly, Jinnah’s political career thus 24 (Roy 1926: 47). In this respect, the origins of began in the wake of the so-called Morley– 25 Gandhi’s role as anti-imperialist tactician in Minto reforms legislated through the Indian 26 his struggles on behalf of the Indian commu- Councils Act of 1909. While portrayed by 27 nity of South Africa (though, as is worth not- Congress leaders as a stalling tactic in lieu 28 ing, not in any significant way the black one) of real self-government,ONLY the Morley–Minto 29 should not be regarded as unique. Already reforms increased the number of Indian rep- 30 prior to war and outside a path of intrigue as resentatives to the district, municipal, pro- 31 extensive as that which Roy would travel, for vincial, and central legislative bodies, while 32 example, an institution like the Ghadar Party expanding their selection through elections 33 had been set up among Punjabi emigrants rather than appointment. Partly in response 34 in North America. With the goal of support- to the ‘middle-class’ reformist Muslim lead- 35 ing India’s liberation, assorted Ghadarites ership, Morley–Minto also inaugurated a 36 had made their way back to the Punjab on the system of reserved seats (at a proportion tend- 37 outbreak of war in order to organise revolu- ing to exceed population levels) for Muslim 38 tionary activities by 1915, persisting in their representatives as well as separate elector- 39 oppositional activity for the next 30 years ates for those seats that were to be restricted 40 until independence was finally won. In a very to Muslim voters. Jinnah himself initially 41 different example, it was in this same period opposed such a system, given its tendency to 42 that in Malabar the beginnings of the modern ghettoise Muslim politics. After he separated 43 state of Kerala’s communist tradition began himself from any official role in Congress 44 congealing with the emerging, if often sym- by 1916, however, his ascent within the com- 45 bolically conflicted, low-caste empowerment mand structure of the League by championing 46 politics of temple entry (Menon 2007). Hindu–Muslim unity through the Lucknow 47 Pact would be premised on persuading the 48 Congress to accept separate Muslim represen- 49 Gandhianism, Islamic tation and elections. 50 universalism, and the development While it is true that by this time sepa- 51 PROOFof a mass basis for politics in the rate electorates and seats reserved on a 52 1920s ‘communal’ basis were becoming a non- 53 Before the 1920s, there was ample reason to negotiable issue for the Muslim elite, the 54 believe that the relative quiescence that char- politics of imperial divide and rule was not 55 acterised the beleaguered Congress move- confined to Muslims alone. This would be 56 ment during the first years of the war had made most dramatically evident in the rift

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1 between Gandhi and the great leader of Congress nationalism and dipping his toes 2 India’s Dalit community Bhimrao Ramji into the waters of several local agitations 3 Ambedkar (1891–1956) over the ‘communal instead. From 1917 to 1918 he thus involved 4 award’ of 1932, through which the British himself in Gujarat in an episode of agrarian 5 proposed to mandate a separate elector- protest over the colonial state’s land revenue 6 ate for untouchables as well. Yet it had been demand, followed by a second experiment in 7 cemented well before with the Government the industrial centre of Ahmedabad where he 8 of India Act of 1919, which reaffirmed elec- helped to conciliate a labour dispute in the 9 toral ‘communalisation’ by providing for city’s textile mills. His third major campaign 10 reserved seats not only for Muslims but for during these years found him in the eastern 11 various other groups as well, including Sikhs, province of Bengal, where he lent his sup- 12 non-Brahmins, and landowners. The other port to peasants against the European indigo 13 crucial feature of the 1919 Act was to for- planters who supervised the forced regime of 14 malise the so-called Montagu-Chelmsford production to which they were subject. 15 reforms of two years earlier. Setting the pat- By 1919, with mainstream party national- 16 tern for imperial strategy for the next quarter ism able to win no more than dyarchy, with 17 century, the 1919 Act thus sought to appease the hated wartime emergency powers for 18 the increasingly vociferous demands articu- detention and trial without jury (inaugurated 19 lated by the nationalist mainstream for home by the so-called Rowlatt Acts) retained, and 20 rule by offering a system of dyarchy or dual with seething discontent among the urban 21 government. By expanding the franchise and and agrarian poor, Gandhi saw fit to expand 22 devolving a variety of non-essential powers of his strategy for agitation far and wide. After 23 government to the provinces, where Indian he set up his own organisation Satyagraha 24 politicians would be dominant, the offer of Sabha, drawing on the existing infrastruc- 25 dyarchy proved effective in splitting the main- ture of home rule leagues and allying with 26 stream of party nationalism after 1917 once the leaders of ‘Pan-Islamist’ (or, perhaps less 27 more. derisively, ‘Islamic universalist’) sentiment, 28 It was against this backdrop that Mohandes the Muslim ONLYbrothers Mohamed and Shaukat 29 Karamchand Gandhi (1868–1949) would step Ali, the protests of 1919 were the most sig- 30 into the void of official leadership, with his nificant in India since the 1857 rebellion. 31 charisma, invocation of traditional Hindu They also marked the inauguration of a new 32 imagery, and unique blend of cultural tra- method of hartals or work stoppages which 33 ditionalism, agrarian anti-materialism, and were designed to unfold in co-ordinated fash- 34 tactical ingenuity accelerating Congress into ion with urban marches and other forms of 35 his orbit. The symbolism to which Gandhi direct action. Alarming to the British, the new 36 appealed allowed a much-needed expan- emphasis on such tactics elicited a resort to 37 sion of populism within the mainstream martial law in various areas; the most noto- 38 of the nationalist movement. As Thomas rious consequence of this took place in the 39 and Barbara Metcalf observe, for example, Punjabi city of Amritsar, where on 13 April 40 Gandhi’s appeal to the imagery of khadi 1919 the commanding general Reginald Dyer 41 (hand-spun or hand-woven cloth) and charkha ordered his troops to open fire on peaceable 42 (the spinning wheel) ‘opened new opportu- protesters gathered at the Jalianwalla Bagh, 43 nities for India’s women’. This took place killing 379 and injuring more than 1200 (Bose 44 by shifting the emphasis of the most audi- and Jalal 2004: 111–112; Metcalf and Metcalf 45 ble stream within nationalist discourse from 2006: 168). 46 the notion of woman as guardian of an inner Now more vocally calling for the old strat- 47 ‘spiritual’ order to woman as a lead sponsor egy of ‘passive resistance’ to be supplemented 48 in actively creating the nation by her own hand by a confluence between ahimsa (non- 49 (Metcalf and Metcalf 2006: 185). violence) and his new philosophy of ‘quest- 50 Born to a Gujarati bania family, educated as ing for truth’ through satyagraha, Gandhi 51 PROOFa lawyer, and having made his way to South ascended rapidly over the next few years. Both 52 Africa by 1893, Gandhi would remain keenly on its surface and at a much deeper level for 53 aware of the goings-on in India, with his ear- the great many, especially in the north Indian 54 liest well-known tract, Hind Swaraj, appear- belt from Gujarat to the Uttar Pradesh, where 55 ing in 1908. By 1915 Gandhi had returned so many revered the Mahatma (or ‘the great 56 from Natal, initially remaining distant from soul’), it was a Gandhian nationalism that

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1 became the idiom for confronting British (Chandravarkar 1981). Likewise, during these 2 imperialism en masse. Fresh from capturing same years the subcontinent witnessed a 3 leadership, Gandhi continued his alliance dramatic expansion in the membership of 4 with Muslim political leaders attempting to the new kisan sabhas (‘peasant associations’). 5 spearhead a mass movement among Indian Marching largely to the beat of its own drum- 6 Muslims to express concern over the fate of mer, such peasant (and also ‘tribal’) resist- 7 the Ottoman Empire’s claim to the Islamic ance was more often than not feared as a 8 caliphate, the survival of which was feared source of potentially uncontainable unrest 9 to be in jeopardy after the Treaty of Versailles in the countryside, by British colonialists as 10 in 1919. Allying with these ‘pro-khilafat’ well as mainstream party nationalists. With 11 Muslims, Gandhi once again expanded his the growth of such subaltern movements, the 12 tactic of organised mass agitation through demands and ideologies of those at their fore- 13 what became the truly all-India ‘non-coop- front also proved varied and nimble. Calls for 14 eration movement’ of 1920–22. As Sarkar abolition of zamindari landlordship, threats of 15 notes, even in a relatively isolated province rent and revenue strikes against government 16 like Assam, non-cooperation would attain and private landed interests alike, and agita- 17 a strength that no later episode of nation- tion against the government’s attempts to 18 alist anti-imperialism would again rival increase its tax demand – as in the Krishna– 19 (Sarkar 1988: 217). Likewise, so was the Godavari river delta in 1927 – would become 20 ‘Malabar Rebellion’ of 1921 a chapter in non- an important feature of these years and a sign 21 cooperation. (It was also, more immediately, of things to come (Sarkar 1988: 241–242). 22 a chapter in pro-khilafat agitation among a At the same time, it was not just Gandhi 23 Mappila community of Muslim tenants in who displayed a knack for charismatic lead- 24 south-west India who had been invok- ership coupled with tactical ingenuity. By 25 ing Islamic imagery in protest against their 1927 Ambedkar had emerged as the crucial 26 largely Nair and Nambudiri landlords since figure giving voice to the demands for caste 27 the mid-19th century.) equality (and abolition), especially among 28 Again taking British imperialism by storm, his own ONLYcommunity of Mahar untouchables 29 the ferocity of non-cooperation was scarcely in Maharashtra. As his visibility increased, 30 contained. Gandhi’s decision to muster the he would also become unsparing in criticis- 31 immensity of his reputation to call for its end ing Gandhi’s paternalistic and ineffectual 32 in February of 1922 – not, as suggested earlier approach to India’s Dalits, which focused on 33 in the quotation from M.N. Roy (1926), with- conciliation rather than confrontation by call- 34 out criticism – followed from peasant unrest ing on upper castes to treat untouchability as 35 in the Uttar Pradesh district of Gorakhpur, an unwanted accretion rather than a funda- 36 which resulted in the burning of a police sta- mental feature of Brahmanical domination. 37 tion in the town of Chauri Chaura and the In Tamil Nadu, these same years witnessed 38 deaths of 22 officers trapped inside. As the Erode Venkata Ramaswami (1879–1973), 39 incident at Chauri Chaura suggests only too known to his followers under the title of 40 well, mass agitation may have found cru- Periyar, break with Congress after support- 41 cial inspiration in Gandhian nationalism ing non-cooperation in the south of India to 42 but was never exhausted by it. Throughout launch his anti-Brahmanical ‘self-respect’ 43 the 1920s, as significant episodes of satya- movement. 44 graha continued, there was also a dramatic 45 upsurge in labour and peasant unrest, both 46 through highly visible organised action and The political and economic 47 on a more spontaneous basis. The textile contexts of the 1930s 48 mills of Bombay played host to their first In terms of the high politics of British 49 widespread strike in September of 1925, with rule in India during the period from the 50 some 250,000 millhands participating and late 1920s to the end of the 1930s and before 51 PROOFcommunist trade unionists playing a signifi- the Second World War, there occurred a con- 52 cant role in its organization. This was only a tinuation of already established patterns of 53 prelude, however, to the much bigger indus- imperial retrenchment. In the face of ever 54 trial action that would be conducted among more vociferous demands for autonomy and, 55 Bombay’s millhands three years later in 1928, by December 1929, purna swaraj (‘complete 56 with worker participation roughly doubling self-rule’), London persisted in offering only

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1 vague possibilities of constitutional reform Marxist Bhagat Singh (1907–31), along with 2 by increasing the franchise, expanding legis- his fellow revolutionaries Sukhdev Thapar 3 latures, and devolving non-essential powers (1907–31) and Shivaram Rajguri (1908–31), 4 to the provinces. True sovereignty through would be tried for the last time and convicted 5 control over the political centre and key issues in the famous Lahore Conspiracy case that 6 like defence and finance remained off-limits. resulted in their execution.) Ongoing calls in 7 To an observer in the 1930s it would hardly go the agrarian context to suspend the payment 8 without saying that the days of British imperi- of rent, for example, fell foul of Gandhi’s 9 alism in the subcontinent were numbered. general preference for ‘national unity’ over 10 The historic purna swaraj declaration itself arousing excessive inter-class and inter-caste 11 was meant as a direct response to the parlia- discord by too freely sanctioning a national 12 mentary ‘Simon’ Commission of 1928 and its liberation movement focused on the ineq- 13 tepid recommendations along the above lines uities of Indian society rather than just the 14 in the wake of the extreme anti-imperialist goal of independence. By March 1931 Gandhi 15 tumult of the 1920s. Gandhianism had dealt would enter into his much-reviled pact with 16 the final blow to Congress’s old moder- Viceroy Irwin in advance of the second of 17 ates long ago, and by 1930 it was a younger, the three Round Table Conferences that 18 more left-leaning, and still almost entirely would take place on constitutional reform in 19 male leadership that was taking over the London and as part of which he would call to 20 party, which had now become the premier end the first phase of the civil disobedience 21 font of majoritarian nationalist politics in campaign. Unfortunately, Gandhi banked 22 India. This included figures like Jawaharlal on obtaining more than would be in the off- 23 Nehru (1889–1964) and Subhas Chandra Bose ing at the second conference, which took 24 (1897–1945), both of whom would play ever place at the end of 1931. He would miss the 25 more important roles in the years to come. third conference at the end of 1932 alto- 26 After the failure of the Simon Commission, gether, although from his jail in Pune his 27 it was with Gandhi’s historic ‘salt march’ in vow to fast to the death in the name of 28 March 1930 that the next great wave of all- opposing theONLY fractionalization of Hindu 29 India anti-imperialist agitation would be unity did succeed in persuading Ambedkar 30 unleashed. This took shape through the civil to sign the so-called Poona Pact. (It was 31 disobedience campaigns of the early 1930s. by the terms of the latter that Ambedkar 32 While the salt tax was deemed an obscure tar- withdrew his support for Prime Minister 33 get to inaugurate this new phase of struggle, Ramsay MacDonald’s communal award, 34 the symbolic richness of the choice was made which would have created separate elector- 35 manifest as Indians of all stripes supported ates for India’s untouchables. In exchange, 36 the Mahatma’s procession to the coastal city Ambedkar won Gandhi’s support for an 37 of Dandi. The insistence of a figure like Naidu increased number of seats for the ‘depressed 38 on participating alongside the largely male classes’ instead.) 39 group that Gandhi had assembled portended While the first inkling that Britain might 40 what would also become of the thousands of one day leave India would emerge with the 41 largely rural women (along with some urban- Government of India Act of 1935, that piece 42 based elite women) who would consciously of legislation was roundly condemned by 43 break the law, openly selling and buying salt anti-imperialist forces across the political 44 in countless market towns. It was the sub- spectrum. Although it would do away with the 45 continent’s women, above all, in other words, system of dyarchy and bring all government 46 who would vindicate Gandhi’s tactic. offices under the control of elected Indian 47 While civil disobedience would be renewed officials, the Act’s arrangements for power at 48 several times over the next four years, amid the federal centre were deemed too little, too 49 large-scale arrest and repression, the first late. Among the condemnations were those 50 phase of the campaign reached a limit in that came from Jinnah, now the leader of 51 PROOFMarch 1931. At this point Gandhi once more the Muslim League, who used the Act’s defi- 52 found himself with cold feet when faced cient though explicit proposals for the future 53 with the possibility of uncontained peas- structure of a federal centre as an occasion to 54 ant radicalism and the possibility of revolu- return to politics after the League had been 55 tionary violence. (It was during this period largely sidelined from the mid-1920s. (The 56 that the young Punjabi revolutionary and ‘Pan-Islamist’ politics of the Gandhi-allied

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1 khilafat movement proved to be little to Yet it was not simply cash crop production 2 Jinnah’s staunchly secularist liking.) that was hit by the Depression. With British 3 Despite their outrage at the 1935 Act, main- imperialism’s dominant mode of surplus 4 stream party nationalists opted not to boycott extraction having already shifted since the 5 the proposed elections for provincial min- 1870s and 1880s to appropriation via credit 6 istries in 1937, with Congress’s sweeping rather than tax-based mechanisms, by 1929 7 success proving nearly unqualified and the the Indian peasant had grown deeply depend- 8 Muslim League’s dismal performance a sign of ent on borrowing. Therefore, even if the path 9 how little support Jinnah still had as the ‘sole of credit terminated in the person of the 10 spokesman’ for India’s Muslims. Winning reviled moneylender, it clearly commenced 11 a total of only 4 per cent of the Muslim vote, in the esteemed high streets of London. The 12 as the historian Ayesha Jalal has been most larger collapse in liquidity was thus anath- 13 important in demonstrating, Jinnah’s League ema to the subsistence agriculturalist as well, 14 was caught in the basic contradiction that given the reliance of the peasant on usurious 15 would bedevil any brand of all-India Muslim loans to service revenue, rent, and debt pay- 16 politics for the next ten years. With the two ments. All of these burdens thus increased 17 most populous Muslim states of the Punjab when prices for agricultural commodities 18 and Bengal dominated by elites and politicians plummeted, given that both government and 19 whose interests favoured maximal provincial landed and moneyed power-holders refused 20 autonomy, there was scarcely any convergence to lower their respective demands. 21 with the interests of elites and politicians in It can be no surprise that Gandhi’s deci- 22 the Muslim minority provinces, whose fate sion to call off civil disobedience before the 23 would be tied to the prospect for power over Second Round Table Conference took place 24 the federal centre. According to this view, just as discontent was spreading from the 25 there was no straight line from the demands of subcontinent’s wheat-producing areas to its 26 the Muslim League to a demand for secession eastern and southern rice-growing regions 27 in order to form an Islamic homeland (Jalal (Rothermund 1993: 98–99). With the colo- 28 1985). Of course, outside the realm of high nial state’sONLY refusal to accept the national- 29 politics the notion of a Muslim state in north- ist demand for a prohibition on the export 30 west India, consisting of what would become of gold, it is equally unsurprising that from 31 the provinces of the eventual West (though not 1931 to 1936 some Rs. 3 billion worth of gold 32 East) Pakistan, had initially been articulated left India. The product of distress sales by a 33 in 1930 by the famous poet Muhammad Iqbal desperate peasantry selling off ornaments, 34 (1877–1938) and again in 1933 by Chaudhri trinkets, and, in effect, the last reserves of 35 Rahmat Ali, a student at Cambridge. As such, what little wealth they had, the outflow was 36 it was also gaining popular momentum within the direct consequence of the marked appre- 37 the broader context of mounting anti-imperial ciation of gold and the inability of anyone but 38 agitation in the years that followed. the Secretary of State in London to control 39 Setting the larger context for the high and India’s monetary policy. Once it became more 40 popular politics of India anti-imperialism lucrative for the moneylender to demand the 41 during these years was the shock of the surrender of objects made of precious metal 42 Depression, which was heard around the rather than whatever nominal debt he was 43 world and reverberated across the decade. owed, there was little choice for the peasant 44 From the standpoint of a colonial economy but to comply. In the process the enormous 45 like that of India, still dealing with the dislo- disinvestment from the Indian countryside 46 cation produced by the First World War, the that took place maintained Britain’s all- 47 Depression initially manifested itself through important imperial interest and self-image as 48 the sudden collapse of a wheat price that had creditor, including that to an India with which 49 become acclimatised to a general increase in it had long run a trade deficit but upon whose 50 agrarian prices following the First World War. exports the imperial centre’s traditional sur- 51 PROOFWhile internal supply and demand condi- plus with the rest of the world was based 52 tions in India remained the same, the release (Rothermund 1993: 102). 53 of American wheat stores took their toll on Finally, in urban areas the Depression pro- 54 world market prices. A similar fate (though duced a more varied set of effects. While 55 for very different reasons) was met by the unemployment and low wages were common 56 price of rice. in many important sectors, such as jute and

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1 cotton textiles, for industrialists in others the London would fundamentally alter its foun- 2 limited tariff protections that were allowed dational role as debtor to Britain’s creditor. 3 in these years proved significant. Sugar, pig Although the heart of the economic relation- 4 iron, and cement are three notable examples. ship on which British imperialism had come 5 Ultimately, however, ‘the 1930s were good to be premised would thus be inverted, in 6 times for urban consumption’ though much the immediate term such balances could not 7 less so for ‘urban investment’, with the Rs. be touched. Moreover, the enormous increase 8 155 million worth of alcohol imported in this in the Indian money supply on which such 9 time, rivalling the total invested in machinery expansion was based made for a grave infla- 10 for cotton textile production (Bose and Jalal tion shock. While in the ten years from 1929 11 2004: 122). to 1939 the money supply increased from 12 Rs. 3.4 to 4 billion in coins (and dropped 13 from Rs. 2.6 billion to 1.6 billion in paper 14 War, partition, and the end notes), by 1945 it had reached Rs. 22 billion. 15 of British imperialism Overall, during the war the printing presses 16 To continue with the focus on economic thus produced the equivalent of Rs. 11 billion 17 context, the last years of the British impe- in sterling balances in the Bank of England 18 rial enterprise in the subcontinent once and another Rs. 5 billion in other credits. 19 again produced a whiplash effect wrought, Herein was to be found not only the inversion 20 in major part, by the consequences of inter- by which the war would result in a national 21 national geopolitics for world capitalism. debt of Rs. 9.5 billion and credits totalling 22 Viceroy Linlithgow’s unilateral declaration of approximately Rs. 16 billion but also one 23 India’s entry into the war alongside Britain source of the extreme duress that the rural 24 on 3 September 1939 inaugurated a new poor, labour, and the urban salaried would 25 phase of anti-imperialist outrage among face. With a dramatic decline in what the 26 party nationalists, though much less within economist Amartya Sen calls ‘exchange enti- 27 the Communist Party of India. (The latter’s tlements’, it was the millions in rural Bengal 28 anti-fascist stance in support of the Allied war who would ONLYsuffer the worst of this duress, 29 and its eventual opposition to the last great with the catastrophic famine of 1943–44 tak- 30 Gandhian episode of civil disobedience that ing some 3.5 to 3.8 million lives (Bose and 31 took place through 1942s Quit India move- Jalal 2004: 129; Rothermund 1993: 116; Sen 32 ment would largely sap the goodwill it had 1999). 33 been building up since the high point of com- While by the end of the war the fate of 34 munist–socialist unity after 1936.) British imperialism was in many ways 35 While the effects of the Second World sealed, the 1940s would witness questions 36 War were not wholly different from those of independence that were increasingly con- 37 of the First, they were also much more dra- sumed by questions about the structure of 38 matic. Initially at least the war brought with the proposed federal centre. The renewed 39 it increasing prices that reversed the pat- rift within Congress after 1937, which pit- 40 tern of the Depression years, with the full ted an increasingly pronounced left wing led 41 employment of existing industrial resources, by Subhas Chandra Bose against the organi- 42 another windfall in the profits of India’s capi- zation’s more conservative right wing and 43 talist class, and significant difficulties for what was, by then, Gandhi’s often stifling 44 the agrarian and urban poor. With little new moderation, was only temporarily repaired 45 capital investment, even though wages and by the shared outrage over the declaration 46 profits should have increased purchasing of war on India’s behalf. The reinvigor- 47 power for ordinary consumption, the prior- ated spirit of unity that resulted did lead the 48 itisation of export for provisioning Britain’s rejection of Sir Stafford Cripps’s Mission to 49 war effort ended up seriously compounding India in March 1942, the gestures of which 50 what Rothermund calls the regime of ‘forced towards self-government proved insuffi- 51 PROOFsaving’ to which India was being subjected cient for party nationalists in the Congress. 52 (1993: 115). With goods from the subconti- However, this unity could not conceal the 53 nent bought by the British government on lasting difficulties that were to result from 54 credit, in the longer term the vast sterling the crisis that Congress had experienced 55 balances that India was accumulating in in its conference of early 1939 at Tripuri, a 56

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1 village in the then Central Provinces, where recrimination, and back and forth, almost 2 Gandhi up-ended Bose’s attempts to win nothing was certain with respect to how 3 re-election as president. Despite the lat- ‘nations’ and ‘states’ in the subcontinent were 4 ter’s electoral victory, Gandhi had used his to be aligned once the British were finally to 5 great personal stature to persuade both leave. 6 Congress’s right and left, Nehru included, With the Simla conference of June 1945 7 to make it effectively impossible for Bose bringing together Gandhi, the Congress, and 8 to lead. Combined with the general failure Jinnah, with the 1945–46 elections in which 9 of the Congress left to resist the anti-labour Jinnah’s Muslim League had finally won any 10 and anti-kisan policies of its party minis- semblance of right to call itself an All-India 11 tries in the provinces, the atmosphere was Party for the subcontinent’s Muslims, and 12 such that Bose was left with little choice but with the so-called Cabinet Mission Plan of 13 to withdraw his candidacy. Opting in June 1946, exactly what the Pakistan demand was 14 1939 to form a new ‘Forward Bloc’ within supposed to mean remained largely up in the 15 Congress – with communist support – air. From the standpoint of Jinnah’s brand 16 he would be altogether ousted from the INC of Muslim League anti-imperialism, the idea 17 by the end of 1939 (Sarkar 1988: 373–374). of binding together the Muslim-majority 18 In this sequence of events are to be found areas of the north-west and Bengal in the 19 the origins of Bose’s later efforts to launch north-east was meant largely as a means for 20 the last great internationalist chapter in creating a loose confederal structure. 21 Indian anti-imperialism with his Azad Hind In this latter vision – as the Cabinet 22 Fauj (‘Indian National Army’, INA), with Mission of 1946 found the British largely 23 its widespread participation of women and endorsing – the ‘Pakistan’ entity, complete 24 its famous female ‘Rani of Jhansi’ regiment with its large Hindu and Sikh minority com- 25 as well as its tilt towards the Axis powers. munities, was to function as a counterbal- 26 Escaping from India in 1943 and making his ance to a ‘Hindustan’ entity that would have 27 way towards Japan, Bose sought to recruit a its own large community of Muslim minori- 28 religiously and ethno-linguistically diverse ties. Therefore,ONLY that Jinnah’s endgame 29 range of Indian expatriates and surrendered should have eventually come apart may not 30 soldiers from the British Indian Army in East have been an entirely obvious outcome, 31 and South-East Asia. These he planned to even if it was, perhaps, naive to imagine that 32 use to lead a march back to Delhi in order Congress’s leadership – now securely in the 33 to strike at a Britain embroiled in the Allied hands of figures like Nehru and Vallabhbhai 34 war. While the INA would be halted in 1944, Patel (1875–1950) – would ever prefer a weak- 35 and Bose himself would die in a plane crash ened centre over a non-partitioned Bengal 36 in 1945, the British decision in that same year and Punjab. That the ultimate fruit of anti- 37 to try three INA officers – one Hindu, one imperialism in India was to be both inde- 38 Muslim, and one Sikh – would incite the last pendence and the enormous human tragedy 39 great episode of mass people’s protest during of partition, however, cannot be doubted. 40 the anti-imperialist struggle. With an effective population exchange across 41 In the story of Bose’s exile from Congress, religious lines of some 12 million persons 42 there can also be found evidence of the con- and widespread, gruesome, and semi-organ- 43 flicting nature of the forces that comprised ised communitarian slaughter, Britain’s sud- 44 Indian anti-imperialism at nearly every level. den insistence on quitting India as fast as it 45 While the politics of Hindu–Muslim strife could in 1947 would pave the way to a new era 46 had hardly begun in the 1940s (or even in of American neo-imperialism, complete with 47 the 20th century), whatever clear momentum its Cold War battles against the Soviet Union. 48 towards partition that had developed in these The latter itself being no stranger to neo- 49 years was not ultimately determinative of the imperialism in Asia, it would be a very differ- 50 choice of partition. Instead, the rush of events ent constellation of global forces that would 51 PROOFthat followed the end of the war derived prin- have to be met by the states that the struggle 52 cipally from the inability of mainstream party against British imperialism in the subconti- 53 nationalists to come to consensus over what nent gave rise to, India, Pakistan, and eventu- 54 the federal structure of the post-colonial ally Bangladesh as well. 55 state should look like. Amid the squabbling, Faisal Chaudhry 56

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