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Home , Alexei Navalny, Moscow City Duma

UCL SSEES Press Briefing

The Return of

Expert briefing 28 January 2021

BACKGROUND coast. The video on YouTube has so far been watched nearly 100 million times. Alexei Navalny – a leading Russian opposition figure – was detained on his Navalny called for mass street protests on return to on Sunday 17 January 2021, Saturday 23 January, which resulted in following treatment in for poisoning. demonstrations across the country. Senior An investigation by provided Russian politicians have framed the 23 evidence that Navalny was poisoned by the January protests as an attempt by Western (FSB) in , powers to destabilise Russia through Russia, in August 2020 with a nerve agent of Navalny. Information collected from the Novichok group. participants at the protests suggests that many protestors came out in response to The day after Navalny returned to Russia in factors beyond – and, in some cases, in spite January this year, a ordered that he be of – Navalny personally. detained on remand until 15 February, given the Federal Penitentiary Service's claim that A panel discussion was held by UCL’s School he violated parole conditions while in of Slavonic and East European Studies Germany, following a suspended sentence (SSEES) online on 27 January 2021 to handed down to him in 2014. A court hearing discuss these developments. This briefing is scheduled for 2 February that should make documents summarises the main points clear whether he will be sent to prison, with made by the panellists. his suspended sentence turned into a custodial sentence. He also faces the possibility of an additional 10 years in prison WHY NOW? for a separate case initiated in December Professor Mark Galeotti – UCL SSEES; Royal United Services Institute 2020. KEY POINT The ‘Siloviki’ – Russian law On 19 January, Navalny released a video enforcement actors – are evidently taking a linking to the construction of a more aggressive stance towards Navalny. $1.35 billion dollar palace on the Black Sea

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1. There are certain limitations to the the protest mood surrounding national level of repression the state can elections in 2011 and the City Duma impose on Navalny. It is important for elections of 2019. Putin to uphold a veneer of democracy for legitimacy’s sake. 1. The ‘Crimean consensus’ – political However, the regime is becoming unity seen following Russia’s progressively less interested in annexation of Crimea in 2014 – started allowing the opposition to have a to break down in 2016. voice. The August poisoning of has not gained in popularity since the Navalny suggests that it might be 2016 parliamentary elections. Since shifting towards a more authoritarian then, public trust in the president as a stance. However, it is too early to tell if politician and as a political institution the Kremlin is shifting away from a has steadily but irreversibly declined. ‘hybrid’ system to pure authoritarianism. 2. We can compare the current political climate in Russia with that of 2011 2. The narrative that Navalny acts as an when mass protests broke out. In the agent of the West is a convenient way 2011 parliamentary elections, there of delegitimising him, and actors was a high voter turnout and a high within Putin’s inner circle have helped level of protest voting that benefited to exacerbate this rhetoric of Navalny the systemic opposition. The being an enemy of the state. Some of widespread suspicion of major them even believe it. electoral falsification provoked protests across the country. United 3. United Russia – the Kremlin-backed Russia managed to preserve its ‘party of power’, currently with a majority in the State Duma – the lower super-majority in the national chamber of the national legislature – legislature – is in the electoral but it only won 49% of the vote, as doldrums. In this situation, it relies on compared to 64% in the previous fragmentation of the opposition to elections in 2007. maintain dominance. Navalny’s encouragement of ‘’ 3. Another useful comparison is with the (encouraging people to vote for any elections in 2019. party but United Russia) in past Navalny’s supporters and other non- elections is, therefore, very systemic opposition politicians were problematic for the regime and may unable to register as candidates, have tipped the balance towards which provoked numerous and eliminating him, as otherwise he can massive protest demonstrations. cohere a ‘coalition of the fed-up' ‘Systemic’ candidates that became against the regime. city parliamentarians with the support of Navalny’s ‘smart voting’ project behave like genuine opposition in UPCOMING ELECTIONS making the City Duma more vocal, Dr Ekaterina Schulmann – Moscow School politically combative, and publicly of Social and Economic Sciences; visible, although the Moscow Chatham House government has managed to preserve the loyal majority it needs in order, for KEY POINT With parliamentary elections example, to pass the city budget. approaching, we can draw parallels between Russia’s current political context and that of

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4. The 2011 elections demonstrated the combination of high voter turnout and 2. The protest is broad. The protesters protest voting. The Moscow City did not primarily consist of young Duma elections of 2019 showed how people, or of intelligentsia. It was a far the loss of mandates by the ruling wider range, and across the country. party together with the protest Again, it makes it harder for the movement opened up the scope for Kremlin to know how to pitch its political discussion. Both are possible response. scenarios for 2021. ‘Smart voting’ has channelled the generalised protest 3. The protest is happening outside the mood into a political instrument that usual arenas in which the state has the potential to influence election operates. Unlike China, the Kremlin outcomes. United Russia will need a has failed to place effective limitations majority in the September elections to on the Internet early on and, therefore, maintain any degree of legitimacy, but struggles to grapple with social media. public dissatisfaction threatens this It has no monopoly on this space and prospect. lacks the vocabulary. The sense of community that social media has facilitated means it is easier for people PROTEST IN COMPARATIVE to organise themselves and sustain PERSPECTIVE the conversation about grievances, including Navalny’s imprisonment. Clara Ferreira Marques – Bloomberg This can encourage more people to Opinion get involved as the movement KEY POINT To understand the Kremlin’s continues. Social media has already response, it helps to think of the nature of effectively broadcast marches, this protest. Hong Kong is one helpful point allowing vicarious participants to join of comparison. in.

1. The protest is cumulative. The current 4. The Kremlin has shown itself unable to demonstrations are the result of comprehend and inflexible in its political and economic grievances that reactions. Little compromise and more have accumulated over the last few repression. We saw a large presence years and that have been exacerbated from heavily armed OMON (riot police) by the pandemic. It’s the continuation at the 23 January protests. They of past demonstrations. Navalny is arrested children. seen as the one trigger by the regime, while the general public has been 5. A ratcheting up of violence, even if brought out by many more aspects. It that includes protesters fighting back, makes it harder for the government to will not necessarily play in the respond in a targeted way. Kremlin’s favour.

FURTHER Dr Ben Noble | Lecturer in Russian Politics | UCL School of Slavonic & East European Studies INFORMATION Email: [email protected]

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