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Home , Alexander Bastrykin, Alexander Bortnikov, Alexei Navalny, Sergei Magnitsky

BRIEFING PAPER Number CBP 9137, 16 March 2021

The imprisonment of By Ben Smith

Alexei Navalny

Contents: 1. 2. Background of discontent 3. Reaction 4. Sanctions 5. The “Magnitsky” legal frameworks 6. Further reading

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2 The imprisonment of Alexei Navalny

Contents

Summary 3 1. Alexei Navalny 4 Crackdown halts protests 4 2. Background of discontent 5 Dangerous moment 5 3. Reaction 6 UK 6 EU 6 Council of Europe 7 G7 7 4. Sanctions 8 Sanctions 15 October 8 US and EU co-ordinated announcement, 2 March 8 4.1 Co-ordination? 9 5. The “Magnitsky” legal frameworks 10 6. Further reading 11

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3 Commons Library Briefing, 16 March 2021

Summary

Russian Opposition Leader Alexei Navalny returned to in January 2021, after recovering in Germany from Novichok poisoning. He was immediately arrested and imprisoned over a conviction that the European Court of Human Rights had previously declared violated his human rights. That brought thousands of onto the streets, in some of the biggest demonstrations against the Government. At least a thousand were arrested. The demonstrations were widely ascribed to growing discontent with the Government over corruption and declining living standards,. The events have propelled Navalny to a new level of prominence and shown the Government increasingly resorting to repression. EU criticisms of Navalny’s treatment caused relations between the EU and Russia to nosedive, with the Kremlin announcing the expulsion of European diplomats, a move seen as a calculated humiliation. The EU remains divided, however, over how to respond. Some countries would like to see the Nord Stream 2 pipeline between Russia and Germany cancelled, but Germany argues against mixing business and politics. The Council of Europe, the body that oversees human rights in Europe and of which Russia is a member, has also condemned Russia’s treatment of Navalny. The UK has used the fact that it is chairing the G7 and the UN Security Council to encourage a strong international response. Short of cancelling the Nord Stream 2 or imposing other large-scale , sanctions targeted against individuals for corruption and human rights abuses are the most likely international reaction. The US, the UK and the EU all have legal frameworks specially designed for this kind of sanction – often known as Magnitsky sanctions, after the Russian auditor who died in a Russian jail after uncovering massive fraud. Sanctions over Navalny will be an early test of transatlantic and cross-Channel collaboration after the US presidential transition and Brexit.

1. Alexei Navalny

Anti-corruption campaigner Alexei Navalny has long been a leading figure opposing the present Russian Government. In August 2020 he was poisoned with a nerve agent from the Novichok group and was urgently transferred to a hospital in , where he recovered. On 17 January 2021 he returned to Russia and was immediately arrested. A few days later he released a video describing what he said was President Putin’s “palace” on the Black Sea coast, and it soon clocked up 100 million views. President Putin denied that either he or his family owned any such property, while critics said that the residence had been built for Putin by billionaire businessmen who support him. More than a quarter of Russians watched the video. A court sentenced him on 2 February to two years and eight months’ imprisonment. That brought thousands onto the streets in more than 100 cities to call for his release. In Moscow some 40,000 came out. More than 2.500 people were arrested on the day of his sentencing. Crackdown halts protests An independent monitor estimated that some 10,000 people had been arrested over the two main weekends of protest in January, and more than 1,000 were sentenced to jail terms in Moscow and St Petersburg alone. The response from the security agencies seemed to be having the desired effect. On 14 February Navalny’s chief of staff called off the street protests, asking people to make light displays instead.

www.parliament.uk/commons-library | intranet.parliament.uk/commons-library | [email protected] | @commonslibrary 5 Commons Library Briefing, 16 March 2021

2. Background of discontent

The Russian economy has managed only slow growth in the last few years, recovering slowly after shrinking in 2016. Forecasts suggest a contraction of 4 per cent in 2020, leaving average real incomes falling by 11 per cent since 2013; increasing numbers of Russians live in poverty. In spite of the economic damage inflicted by the Covid pandemic, the Government scrapped a big investment plan in 2020, in order to protect its national wealth fund. From being largely happy with the country’s direction in early 2018, Russians became far more dissatisfied following the announcement in June of that year of a sharp increase in the pension age. That did not stop about 78 per cent of the electorate voting Yes in the referendum held at the end of June 2020 on reforms allowing to serve another two terms as President after the 2024 election (if he stands). President Putin’s approval ratings fell to 60 per cent in summer 2020. That might seem like solid support, but it was the lowest approval since 2014, before the annexation of Crimea. Worse, his approval among voters aged 18-24 fell to 20 per cent; about 36 per cent of this age group had voted for Putin in 2019. Meanwhile, Alexei Navalny’s approval increased from 9 per cent to 20 per cent after he’d been poisoned. The poisoning, the daring return to Russia, the Putin’s palace video and the prison sentence have raised Navalny’s profile as leader of the Russian opposition. One observer put it like this: “Navalny is the most revolutionary figure Russia has seen since independence in 1991”. Dangerous moment The Russian Government’s policy towards Navalny used to be to ignore him. The assassination attempt having failed, his presence in a Moscow jail presents a risk to the Kremlin as he may be considered a martyr. The fall? in living standards is coming at a time when the popularity boost from exploits like Crimea may be fading. A parliamentary election is due for September 2021. Analysts say Navalny may remain in prison until the next presidential election, scheduled for 2024, as there is another case against him pending. One Moscow-based observer argues that the present moment is a watershed for the Putin Kremlin, whose enforcers can keep on arresting protesters and imprisoning critics and no longer care about presenting a positive vision for the country. She goes on: “The drama surrounding Navalny’s poisoning was the fuse, but the fire it lit is being fed by the public’s fatigue and frustration with the Putin regime and its inability to change”.1

1 Tatiana Stanovaya, ‘Vladimir Putin’s Russia is destabilising itself from within’, , 7 February 2020 6 The imprisonment of Alexei Navalny

3. Reaction UK On 27 January 2020 Foreign Office minister Wendy Morton called for Navalny’s immediate and unconditional release. Upon the news that Navalny had been sentenced, Foreign Secretary said on 2 February: Today’s perverse ruling, targeting the victim of a poisoning rather than those responsible, shows Russia is failing to meet the most basic commitments expected of any responsible member of the international community. The UK is chairing the UN Security Council at present and on 2 February tried to call an informal meeting of the Security Council. It did not go ahead, reportedly over fears of “causing tension with Russia”. EU On 5 February, while the EU’s foreign policy chief was meeting Kremlin representatives in Moscow, Russia expelled diplomats from Germany, Sweden and Poland for the alleged offence of attending anti-Putin demonstrations. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said: “The is an unreliable partner. Further degradation of ties is fraught with negative and very, very unpredictable consequences.” There were calls for Borrell’s resignation over what some saw as an unwise trip leading to a “brutal, calculated public humiliation” on the part of the Kremlin. The Navalny row will “freeze already icy relations even harder” according to many observers. Germany, Poland and Sweden each expelled a Russian diplomat in retaliation. Baltic states, Belgium, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, and Poland have called for Magnitsky- style sanctions against Russian officials involved in the imprisonment of Navalny. EU divisions But the EU is divided over Russia. In February Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the and Romania called for travel bans and asset freezes on more Russian individuals. Critics have also said that the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline, which is being built between Russia and Germany, should be halted over the Navalny case. The new US Administration may increasingly support a tougher line against the project. A bill passed during the Trump Administration had already imposed sanctions in connection with the pipeline and the Biden Administration has described the Nord Stream 2 as “a bad deal for Europe”. The German economy minister, however, said in February that Nord Stream 2 should be kept separate from politics, and joined France and Austria in defending doing business with Russia in spite of human rights violations. President Macron, particularly, has tried to engage the Russian leadership in dialogue, although the results have been “thin – non- existent really” according to a French Russia expert. A German commentator at the Brookings Institution argues that the EU should take a stronger line, including using the EU’s new Magnitsky sanctions legal framework: European governments should target the assets and estates that Putin’s henchmen and oligarch enablers have amassed in Europe. The “European ” is named after the Russian whistleblower , who died in a Moscow jail in 2009. Adopted in December, it allows the EU to freeze the assets of, ban entry to, or prohibit dealings with human rights abusers wherever they are. It’s time to use it.2

2 Constanze Stelzenmüller, EU support for Russian democracy is inadequate, Brookings Institution, 9 February 2021 7 Commons Library Briefing, 16 March 2021

Council of Europe Russia is a member of the Council of Europe (CoE) and is therefore bound by the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights. The court had already judged in October 2017 that the earlier conviction, the basis for February’s sentence, was “arbitrary and manifestly unreasonable and, as a consequence, in violation of Articles 6 and 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights”. On 4 February the CoE leadership issued a statement regretting Navalny’s imprisonment and calling upon the Russian authorities to abide by their international human rights commitments. PACE On 3 February the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) condemned police brutality and judicial abuses against journalists reporting on peaceful demonstrations.3 Russia’s relationship with the Council of Europe has been particularly strained since the annexation of Crimea. It was only in June 2019 that Russian delegates to the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assemble (PACE) regained their voting rights, after they had been removed over Crimea. Russian delegates are unlikely to be expelled again in the near future. G7 On 26 January the foreign ministers of G7 members Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK, US and the EU issued a statement, saying they were “united in condemning the politically motivated arrest and detention of Alexey Navalny” and “deeply concerned by the detention of thousands of peaceful protesters and journalists”.

3 18 MPs make up the UK delegation to PACE 8 The imprisonment of Alexei Navalny

4. Sanctions

Navalny himself called for targeted sanctions, as he was recovering from the poison attack: “Sanctions against the whole country don’t work. The most important thing is to impose entry bans on profiteers of the regime and freeze their assets”. First round of Navalny sanctions The EU and the UK announced co-ordinated sanctions on 15 October 2020.4 The UK enforced asset freezes and travel bans on six individuals deemed responsible for the poisoning of Alexei Navalny, using regulations that provide for measures against those involved in proliferation and use of chemical weapons. The names were: • Aleksandr Vasilievich Bortnikov: Director of the (FSB) • Sergei Vladilenovich Kiriyenko: First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Executive Office • Aleksei Yurievich Krivoruchko: Deputy Minister of Defence • Sergei Ivanovich Menyailo: Plenipotentiary Representative of the President in • Pavel Anatolievich Popov: Deputy Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation • Andrei Veniaminovich Yarin: Chief of the Presidential Domestic Policy Directorate • State Scientific Research Institute for Organic Chemistry and Technology On 15 October the EU sanctioned the same six individuals and one entity linked to the Navalny case. On 31 December the UK sanctioned Anatoliy Vladimirovich Chepiga, but for the Salisbury incident, rather than in connection with Navalny (reasons are set out in the UK sanctions list). Response to Navalny’s imprisonment On news of the Moscow court decision to imprison Navalny, there was widespread political pressure for new sanctions against Russian officials in the US and the EU as well as the UK. In January the demanded significantly tighter EU sanctions against Russia. On 8 February there was a joint call between representatives of the EU, Britain, the , Canada and to discuss a possible joint response to the jailing. On 21 February the UK Government said it would consider more action: We are considering all options for further action. We will continue to work with the OPCW and all of our international partners to uphold the Chemical Weapons Convention and to hold Russia to account. US and EU co-ordinated announcement, 2 March On 2 March the EU and the US announced sanctions targeted at senior security and political officials, as well as companies and research institutes connected with the poisoning. Certain businessmen seen as close to Putin were not included.

4 The existing UK sanctions regime on Russia is aimed at encouraging Russia to stop destabilising Ukraine or threatening its territorial integrity, and has been in place since 2013.

9 Commons Library Briefing, 16 March 2021

The EU designated , Igor Krasnov, and Alexander Kalashnikov. This was the first use of the EU’s Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime, established on 7 December 2020. Using Executive Orders designed to counter chemical weapons, the US State Department designated: • Alexander Bortnikov • Anatoliy Chepiga • Alexander Kalashnikov • Sergei Kiriyenko • Aleksei Krivoruchko • Sergei Menyailo • Alexander Mishkin • Pavel Popov • Andrei Yarin Entities The US sanctioned several entities – research centres associated with the Novichok programme, the Federal Security Service (FSB) and the GRU military intelligence service.

4.1 Co-ordination? The incoming US Senate Foreign Relations Committee chair, Bob Menendez, wrote to the new Secretary of State Antony Blinken on 29 January, urging sanctions on Russian officials who have violated human rights. Menendez went on to say: “the strength of all these measures will depend on our ability to coordinate and amplify their effect with our European allies”. On 8 February the new US Secretary of State Antony Blinken confirmed that consultations were taking place: …what we’re doing is, first of all, consulting and working closely with other countries who are very concerned about what’s happened – not just to Mr. Navalny, but others who have stood up to exercise their rights. Apparently confirming a willingness to co-ordinate their sanctions, the UK, the US and the EU have made simultaneous announcements. The UK and the EU moved together in October to sanction top politicians associated with the alleged mistreatment of Navalny. On 2 March 2021 the US and the EU co-ordinated their announcement. There remain, however, some differences in the respective lists of individuals and entities.

10 The imprisonment of Alexei Navalny

5. The “Magnitsky” legal frameworks

The US was the first to pass a legal framework for Magnitsky sanctions – sanctions against officials guilty of corruption and human rights abuses. What is now called The Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act was first passed to sanction officials responsible for the death of Sergei Magnitsky (see box ), then broadened out to a global scope. MEPs argued that the EU should not hesitate to use its new EU Global Human Sergei Magnitsky Rights Sanctions Regime, which came into Sergei Magnitsky was a Russian who uncovered force in December 2020, to sanction those large-scale tax fraud. While working at the Moscow office of Hermitage Capital, a firm based in and responsible for Navalny’s imprisonment. run by the US-born financier , he discovered The UK also has a legal framework for that millions of dollars of Hermitage tax payments had Magnitsky sanctions, set out in the Global been syphoned off into the pockets of Russian officials. He was arrested but refused to withdraw his testimony Human Rights Sanctions Regulations 2020. and died in 2009, after mistreatment in jail. Canada passed the Justice for Victims of Bill Browder, now a UK citizen, started a campaign to Corrupt Foreign Officials Act in October have sanctions imposed on the officials involved – to get the officials banned from visiting the US and using the US 2017. financial system. A committee of the Australian Parliament A Magnitsky Act naming the Russians involved was recommended in December 2020 that the passed by the US Congress in 2012. It was later broadened to become the Global Magnitsky Act of 2016, Australian Government should pass similar applying to gross human rights abusers anywhere. Other legislation without delay. countries, including Canada, Lithuania and Estonia have introduced their own versions of the legislation. 11 Commons Library Briefing, 16 March 2021

6. Further reading

Magnitsky legislation, July 2020 Russian intelligence services and special forces, 4 December 2018 Russian foreign and security policy, 5 July 2016

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