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Home , Alexei Navalny, City Duma, Dmitry Gudkov, Meduza, State Duma, Vladimir Putin

NO. 40 JUNE 2021 Introduction

Repression and Autocracy as Heads into State Elections Sabine Fischer

Russia is experiencing a wave of state repression ahead of parliamentary elections on 19 September 2021. The crackdown is unusually harsh and broad, extending into pre- viously unaffected areas and increasingly penetrating the private sphere of Russian citizens. For years the Russian state had largely relied on the so-called “power verti- cal” and on controlling the information space through propaganda and marginalisa- tion of independent media. The political leadership, so it would appear, no longer regards such measures as sufficient to secure its power and is increasingly resorting to repression. The upshot is a further hardening of autocracy. Even German NGOs are experiencing growing pressure from the Russian state. This trend cannot be expected to slow, still less reverse in the foreseeable future.

Repression – wherever it occurs – involves of repression – restrictions and violence – restrictions (of civil rights and liberties) and have increased noticeably in recent months. physical violence. Russia has seen a string The state continues to rely primarily on the of political and former but has also expanded its use of the attempts over the past decades. The poison- latter. ing of is only the most recent case, following on the spectacular murder of in February 2015 What Is New? and numerous other attacks at home and abroad. In Russia’s Chechen Republic, Three aspects are new. The measures are, has entrenched violence firstly, much larger-scale. During the against opponents and civil society as the nationwide demonstrations in late January foundation of his power. and early February 2021 alone more than Few of these crimes have been properly 11,500 individuals were detained. Protestors investigated, and the Russian state denies were subjected to violence and detainees’ any involvement or responsibility. Security rights were violated. The security forces also forces crush . is common- cracked down on journalists. place in Russian prisons. Civil rights and Since January several thousand adminis- liberties are heavily curtailed. Both forms trative penalties have been issued in con-

nection with the protests. The proportion . In mid-April the state of “administrative detentions” (compared to prosecutor applied to have the FBK and fines) has jumped in comparison to earlier other organisations associated with Navalny years. More than 130 criminal investiga- designated as “extremist organisations”. In tions have been initiated and a number of parallel the amended the law long prison sentences already imposed. on “extremist organisations” which now The “offences” included participation in prevents their members from standing in unauthorised demonstrations, violation of elections (even if their membership ended administrative and Covid prevention rules, before designation). On 9 June the FBK, and inciting minors to join protests. Action Navalny’s regional offices and his Citizens’ against social media likes and reposts about Rights Protection Foundation were – as the protests has also been stepped up. The expected – classified as “extremist”, with human rights organisation OVD-Info, which far-reaching political and legal consequenc- documents abuses and provides legal sup- es not only for activists but potentially also port, states that: “The scale of detentions, for hundreds of thousands of private donors. administrative and criminal prosecution in Anticipating this outcome, FBK had already connection with the protests in January- dissolved its nationwide structures on 29 February 2021 is undoubtedly the largest April to shield its staff. in the entire history of modern Russia.” Independent media have also come under The protests were triggered by the deten- pressure. Three editors of the student news- tion of opposition politician Alexei Navalny paper DOXA were charged in mid-April with after he returned to Moscow on 17 January inciting minors to participate in the pro- 2021. On 2 February a Moscow court sen- Navalny protests and have been under tenced him to two years and eight months house arrest since then. In May two promi- imprisonment for violating parole from nent independent Russian-language media an earlier sentence – which the European outlets, and V-Times, were declared Court of Human Rights had already declared “foreign agents”. politically motivated and called on the Rus- More than ninety organisations are cur- sian government to rescind. rently classified as “foreign agents” and State institutions and Navalny’s nation- existential challenges. They are required to wide teams published widely diverging display the designation prominently in all estimates of the size of the demonstrations public statements, with the intention of between January and April. Photographs discrediting them. They are also subject to prove that thousands of people took to the heightened bureaucratic scrutiny, which streets on 23 and 31 January in more than ties up time and resources and is especially 120 Russian cities. These were thus the burdensome for smaller organisations and biggest demonstrations since the mass pro- natural persons. The label deters Russian tests against election fraud in 2011/12. donors and targeted entities quickly find themselves in existential financial difficul- Secondly, repression has expanded to tar- ties. Meduza responded with get organisations and groups that were pre- a crowdfunding campaign that attracted viously largely untouched. The arrest of 80,000 donors within the space of just a few the well-known on accu- days. Other media, organisations and sations of disclosing confidential informa- individuals lack such capacities. V-Times tion caused consternation, for example. announced on 3 June that it was closing Pavlov is the head of Team 29, a group of down. The state campaign lawyers working to uphold civil rights that against Meduza, V-Times and DOXA repre- also represented Navalny’s Anti-Corruption sents a bitter setback for Russia’s inde- Foundation (Fond Borby s Korruptsii, FBK). pendent media landscape. His arrest was understood as signalling an expansion of state repression to include

SWP Comment 40 June 2021

2 Thirdly, in a departure from previous prac- Why Now? tice, the state is increasingly encroaching on the private sphere and turning its atten- The proximate cause of the clampdown is tion to the politically unorganised. Since the Duma election on 19 September 2021. the protests at the beginning of the year The state is bulldozing anything that could hundreds of citizens across the country be regarded as a political alternative to the have been visited by the security forces at ailing ruling party . home or work and warned, summonsed, The root cause, however, is the protracted fined or detained. Moscow’s public CCTV legitimacy crisis of the Russian political systems have been used for large-scale system. Its roots lie in the simultaneity of facial recognition for the first time. These societal modernisation and political auto- measures also affect citizens who did not cratisation that has characterised the rela- actually participate in the protests, with tionship between state and society since security forces questioning neighbours the . The contradictions were initially and family members. Numerous dismissals masked by economic growth and increasing across the country were apparently asso- prosperity. That phase ended with the eco- ciated with participation in or mobilisation nomic crisis of 2008/09 and the suppression for the protests. The most spectacular case of mass protests during the 2011/12 Duma involved about one hundred employees and presidential elections. of the Moscow metro, who lost their jobs Traditionalism, , strong in mid-May for supporting the protests. leadership and geopolitical confrontation The repression has been accompanied with the West became the central legitimis- by a wave of new legislation designed ing narrative of the Russian state after to hamper opposition and civil society Vladimir returned to the Kremlin in activities and expand the state’s scope for 2012 and annexed the in 2014. repression. At the end of 2020 it was made The wave of patriotism generated by the possible to designate natural persons as “Crimea effect” lasted only four years. The “foreign agents” if they receive financial pension reform announced in summer support from abroad. The right to demon- 2018 was widely regarded as the state ulti- strate has been further curtailed and new mately tearing up the implicit “social possibilities have been created to suppress contract” that had offered material security political speech in the internet and social in return for political passivity. Since then, media. A new law on education came into the oscillation of public and state effect at the beginning of June to control repression has grown increasingly fierce. the discussion and dissemination of politi- Notable protests occurred in summer 2019 cal issues in education, training and scien- in Moscow around the election tific contexts, as well as international and from July 2020 in after the research collaborations. The laws on “ex- sacking and detention of Sergei tremist” and “undesirable” organisations Furgal. The protests of winter and spring were also drastically toughened in June. 2021 represent the continuation and pro- All the while the pressure on opposition visional culmination of this development. politicians grows. Many have left the coun- Moreover, the sharpening legitimacy try, most recently the former Duma crisis sees the state increasingly concerned . As the expanding extent for its stability. So far it has failed to foster and changing quality of state repression in other sources of legitimacy and appears recent months demonstrates, the state is no incapable of dealing with political dissent. longer limiting itself to clamping down on But the widely postulated fear stalking prominent opponents. Russia's rulers should not be overstated. The state ultimately trusts in the proven effectiveness of its instruments. From the perspective of the political leadership, for

SWP Comment 40 June 2021

3 example, the repression of 2011/12 was a Putin’s approval by contrast is back at 67 success, with the protests ebbing rapidly percent after a pandemic-related slump to away after the showdown on Bolotnaya 59 percent in spring 2020. That trend is ex- Square in May 2012. pedited by an official narrative that the The current dynamic of repression is pandemic has been defeated, along with the largely characterised by two contextual lifting of many restrictions even during the factors that have ramped up the domestic second wave in autumn and winter 2020/21. political temperature since 2020. For a time That does nothing to change the ongoing the Covid-19 pandemic appeared to threaten legitimacy crisis, which divides Russian the constitutional reform designed to se- society into a slowly growing dissatisfied cure the existing political system and keep minority that is willing to protest and a Putin in the presidency. The virus over- declining majority who continue to support shadowed the entire year, affected the Rus- the political system – however reticently – sian economy and – although the official out of traditionalism, resignation or fear of figures are much lower – likely change. Surveys must be interpreted with cost several hundred thousand lives. the utmost caution in authoritarian con- But the real political bombshell of 2020 texts like the Russian, however. It is quite was the political crisis in neighbouring possible that respondents will play down . From the very outset its protest their criticisms for fear of repercussions, movement became a sounding board for even in anonymous surveys. If that were the hopes and fears of Russia’s rulers and the case Levada’s figures, which point to opposition alike. The Kremlin quickly about 35 percent dissatisfaction, would be backed Belarusian President Alexander an underestimate. Lukashenko and indicated that “regime The Russian state’s repression strategy change” in Minsk was a red line. The leverages this social polarisation by boost- “autocratic alliance” between Moscow and ing anti-liberal and anti-Western propaganda Minsk now appears permanent. The fall directed towards the traditionalist and/or of Lukashenko, who wages war on his own change-averse majority while increasingly population, would represent a bitter defeat vigorously suppressing and silencing the and create a fatal precedent for Moscow. critical minority willing to protest. The The two countries’ domestic politics are political leadership can even expect repres- now more closely intertwined than ever. sion of the minority to earn it new legiti- macy among sections of the majority by “protecting” them from dreaded instability. Effectiveness and Consequences of It is hard to predict where this process will the Latest Repression lead. Much depends on whether the next generation of activists choose to move ab- From the state’s perspective the repression of road or withdraw from politics – or con- the first half of 2021 is already a “success”. tinue to work to change the country from The latest surveys by Levada within despite growing risks. Willingness Centre show willingness to protest declin- to emigrate has certainly increased steadily ing significantly since January, while sup- over the past decade. port for those who took to the streets has also Phases of repression also alter the politi- fallen. Navalny’s public recognition has risen cal system. They strengthen the actors since August 2020 – but not his political of repression, in the sense of granting the support. He is in prison, many of his closest security forces greater sway within the collaborators have fled abroad, and his orga- power apparatus. In this way repression nisations are hamstrung by court verdicts creates structural realities that are difficult and new legislation. Navalny and his col- to reverse. Here again this continues a trend laborators will find it difficult to pursue of the past decade, which has seen the power their political goals under these conditions. of the security services steadily expanding.

SWP Comment 40 June 2021

4 Social change is held back by state policies ment for Democracy. Designated organisa- designed to shore up power. Dissent is sup- tions are forced to cease all work in Russia pressed by ever harsher means: fragmented, immediately in order to avoid further atomised and neutralised. This mechanism endangering their Russian partners. This also functions at the level of the political makes the latter’s situation even more elites, whose members can regularly find precarious, as the number of foreign part- themselves in the sights of political repres- ners and funding sources declines. sion. EPDE, DRA and LibMod are participants The interlocking dynamics in Russia and in the German-Russian Petersburg Dialogue. Belarus leave little grounds for hope of Mos- By banning them, the Russian leadership is cow (or Minsk) dropping broad repression signalling that its efforts to eliminate criti- as an increasingly central instrument of cism and dissent will make no exceptions power. Given that Moscow unconditionally even for such a venerable dialogue project. supports Lukaschenko’s suppression of There are indications from the Russian the Belarusian popular movement, the big State Duma that German party-political question is whether Russia eventually might foundations could also be targeted, specifi- go down the Belarusian path. In any case cally mentioning the Green-affiliated Hein- the latest developments are associated with rich Böll Foundation. The German side of a clear hardening of Russian autocracy that the Petersburg Dialogue has suspended all makes opening and compromise – whether joint activities until further notice, making internal or external – unlikely for the in- their resumption conditional on delisting. definite future. Moscow’s action against German NGOs underlines the isolationist tendencies in Russian and demonstrates Transnational Repression – Ger- the drastic deterioration in German-Russian man Organisations also Affected relations since autumn 2020. The political crisis in Belarus and the Navalny poisoning On 26 May 2021 the Russian prosecutor have further chilled an already frosty rela- general designated three German NGOs tionship. The next German government “undesirable”: the German-Russian Ex- will have to base its Russia policy on the change (DRA), the Centre for Liberal Moder- assumption that the domestic political nity (LibMod) and the Forum of Russian- hardening will make understanding and Speaking Europeans. The -based Euro- compromise with Moscow even more pean Platform for Democratic Elections difficult. At the same time this creates an (EPDE) had already received the label in almost unsolvable conflict of goals for Ger- 2018. The 2015 law on “undesirable organi- man and policy: sations” prohibits non-Russian organisa- The EU’s five guiding principles for rela- tions that supposedly threaten the Russian tions with Russia are designed to deter state from operating within Russia. The law Russian transgressions at all levels, in the was significantly tightened to coincide with shared neighbourhood and towards the EU the listing of the three German organisa- and its member states. They also seek to tions. It allows members of designated orga- encourage and develop people to people nisations to be prevented from entering contacts with Russian society. But the nega- the country and puts Russian citizens and tive dynamic at the political level of the residents who cooperate with them under relationship severely narrows the possibili- the risk of criminal prosecution. ties, especially where Moscow is doing The Russian ministry of justice currently everything to isolate Russian society. This lists 34 foreign organisations as undesir- undercuts the EU’s fifth principle, people- able. Seventeen – or half – are American. to-people contacts and support for civil But they also include a string of European society. The banning of German NGOs and organisations such as the European Endow- suppression of the Petersburg Dialogue

SWP Comment 40 June 2021

5 demonstrate this very clearly. Germany and the EU have already had to adapt their co- operation with Russian civil society to in- creasingly restrictive conditions and operate with extreme sensitivity to the difficult con- text. The need now is to continue – how- ever cautiously – along that path and at same time to signal to the Russian people that the EU remains genuinely interested in engaging with them. © Stiftung Wissenschaft Germany and the EU will also have to und Politik, 2021 ready themselves for increasing emigration All rights reserved from Russia and Belarus. These people will need support. But they – like the Russian This Comment reflects community in general – can also be impor- the author’s views. tant interlocutors and potential communi- The online version of cators into Russian society. People-to-people this publication contains contacts with Russia were abruptly inter- functioning links to other rupted by the pandemic, and will remain SWP texts and other relevant difficult even after it is overcome. The ques- sources. tion of visa-free travel for Russian citizens SWP Comments are subject has long been a bone of contention within to internal peer review, fact- the EU. It now becomes crucial in order to checking and copy-editing. maintain at least minimal direct contact For further information on with Russian society. our quality control pro- cedures, please visit the SWP website: https://www.swp- berlin.org/en/about-swp/ quality-management-for- swp-publications/

SWP Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs

Ludwigkirchplatz 3–4 10719 Berlin Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 Fax +49 30 880 07-100 www.swp-berlin.org [email protected]

ISSN (Print) 1861-1761 ISSN (Online) 2747-5107 doi: 10.18449/2021C40

Translation by Meredith Dale

(English version of SWP-Aktuell 46/2021)

Dr. Sabine Fischer is Senior Fellow in the Eastern Europe and Eurasia Research Division.

SWP Comment 40 June 2021

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