Repression and Autocracy As Russia Heads Into State Duma Elections Sabine Fischer

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Repression and Autocracy As Russia Heads Into State Duma Elections Sabine Fischer NO. 40 JUNE 2021 Introduction Repression and Autocracy as Russia Heads into State Duma Elections Sabine Fischer Russia is experiencing a wave of state repression ahead of parliamentary elections on 19 September 2021. The crackdown is unusually harsh and broad, extending into pre- viously unaffected areas and increasingly penetrating the private sphere of Russian citizens. For years the Russian state had largely relied on the so-called “power verti- cal” and on controlling the information space through propaganda and marginalisa- tion of independent media. The political leadership, so it would appear, no longer regards such measures as sufficient to secure its power and is increasingly resorting to repression. The upshot is a further hardening of autocracy. Even German NGOs are experiencing growing pressure from the Russian state. This trend cannot be expected to slow, still less reverse in the foreseeable future. Repression – wherever it occurs – involves of repression – restrictions and violence – restrictions (of civil rights and liberties) and have increased noticeably in recent months. physical violence. Russia has seen a string The state continues to rely primarily on the of political assassinations and assassination former but has also expanded its use of the attempts over the past decades. The poison- latter. ing of Alexei Navalny is only the most recent case, following on the spectacular murder of Boris Nemtsov in February 2015 What Is New? and numerous other attacks at home and abroad. In Russia’s Chechen Republic, Three aspects are new. The measures are, Ramzan Kadyrov has entrenched violence firstly, much larger-scale. During the against opponents and civil society as the nationwide demonstrations in late January foundation of his power. and early February 2021 alone more than Few of these crimes have been properly 11,500 individuals were detained. Protestors investigated, and the Russian state denies were subjected to violence and detainees’ any involvement or responsibility. Security rights were violated. The security forces also forces crush protests. Torture is common- cracked down on journalists. place in Russian prisons. Civil rights and Since January several thousand adminis- liberties are heavily curtailed. Both forms trative penalties have been issued in con- nection with the protests. The proportion lawyers. In mid-April the Moscow state of “administrative detentions” (compared to prosecutor applied to have the FBK and fines) has jumped in comparison to earlier other organisations associated with Navalny years. More than 130 criminal investiga- designated as “extremist organisations”. In tions have been initiated and a number of parallel the State Duma amended the law long prison sentences already imposed. on “extremist organisations” which now The “offences” included participation in prevents their members from standing in unauthorised demonstrations, violation of elections (even if their membership ended administrative and Covid prevention rules, before designation). On 9 June the FBK, and inciting minors to join protests. Action Navalny’s regional offices and his Citizens’ against social media likes and reposts about Rights Protection Foundation were – as the protests has also been stepped up. The expected – classified as “extremist”, with human rights organisation OVD-Info, which far-reaching political and legal consequenc- documents abuses and provides legal sup- es not only for activists but potentially also port, states that: “The scale of detentions, for hundreds of thousands of private donors. administrative and criminal prosecution in Anticipating this outcome, FBK had already connection with the protests in January- dissolved its nationwide structures on 29 February 2021 is undoubtedly the largest April to shield its staff. in the entire history of modern Russia.” Independent media have also come under The protests were triggered by the deten- pressure. Three editors of the student news- tion of opposition politician Alexei Navalny paper DOXA were charged in mid-April with after he returned to Moscow on 17 January inciting minors to participate in the pro- 2021. On 2 February a Moscow court sen- Navalny protests and have been under tenced him to two years and eight months house arrest since then. In May two promi- imprisonment for violating parole from nent independent Russian-language media an earlier sentence – which the European outlets, Meduza and V-Times, were declared Court of Human Rights had already declared “foreign agents”. politically motivated and called on the Rus- More than ninety organisations are cur- sian government to rescind. rently classified as “foreign agents” and face State institutions and Navalny’s nation- existential challenges. They are required to wide teams published widely diverging display the designation prominently in all estimates of the size of the demonstrations public statements, with the intention of between January and April. Photographs discrediting them. They are also subject to prove that thousands of people took to the heightened bureaucratic scrutiny, which streets on 23 and 31 January in more than ties up time and resources and is especially 120 Russian cities. These were thus the burdensome for smaller organisations and biggest demonstrations since the mass pro- natural persons. The label deters Russian tests against election fraud in 2011/12. donors and targeted entities quickly find themselves in existential financial difficul- Secondly, repression has expanded to tar- ties. Meduza responded with get organisations and groups that were pre- a crowdfunding campaign that attracted viously largely untouched. The arrest of 80,000 donors within the space of just a few the well-known lawyer Ivan Pavlov on accu- days. Other media, organisations and sations of disclosing confidential informa- individuals lack such capacities. V-Times tion caused consternation, for example. announced on 3 June that it was closing Pavlov is the head of Team 29, a group of down. The state campaign lawyers working to uphold civil rights that against Meduza, V-Times and DOXA repre- also represented Navalny’s Anti-Corruption sents a bitter setback for Russia’s inde- Foundation (Fond Borby s Korruptsii, FBK). pendent media landscape. His arrest was understood as signalling an expansion of state repression to include SWP Comment 40 June 2021 2 Thirdly, in a departure from previous prac- Why Now? tice, the state is increasingly encroaching on the private sphere and turning its atten- The proximate cause of the clampdown is tion to the politically unorganised. Since the Duma election on 19 September 2021. the protests at the beginning of the year The state is bulldozing anything that could hundreds of citizens across the country be regarded as a political alternative to the have been visited by the security forces at ailing ruling party United Russia. home or work and warned, summonsed, The root cause, however, is the protracted fined or detained. Moscow’s public CCTV legitimacy crisis of the Russian political systems have been used for large-scale system. Its roots lie in the simultaneity of facial recognition for the first time. These societal modernisation and political auto- measures also affect citizens who did not cratisation that has characterised the rela- actually participate in the protests, with tionship between state and society since security forces questioning neighbours the 2000s. The contradictions were initially and family members. Numerous dismissals masked by economic growth and increasing across the country were apparently asso- prosperity. That phase ended with the eco- ciated with participation in or mobilisation nomic crisis of 2008/09 and the suppression for the protests. The most spectacular case of mass protests during the 2011/12 Duma involved about one hundred employees and presidential elections. of the Moscow metro, who lost their jobs Traditionalism, nationalism, strong in mid-May for supporting the protests. leadership and geopolitical confrontation The repression has been accompanied with the West became the central legitimis- by a wave of new legislation designed ing narrative of the Russian state after to hamper opposition and civil society Vladimir Putin returned to the Kremlin in activities and expand the state’s scope for 2012 and annexed the Crimea in 2014. repression. At the end of 2020 it was made The wave of patriotism generated by the possible to designate natural persons as “Crimea effect” lasted only four years. The “foreign agents” if they receive financial pension reform announced in summer support from abroad. The right to demon- 2018 was widely regarded as the state ulti- strate has been further curtailed and new mately tearing up the implicit “social possibilities have been created to suppress contract” that had offered material security political speech in the internet and social in return for political passivity. Since then, media. A new law on education came into the oscillation of public protest and state effect at the beginning of June to control repression has grown increasingly fierce. the discussion and dissemination of politi- Notable protests occurred in summer 2019 cal issues in education, training and scien- in Moscow around the City Duma election tific contexts, as well as international and from July 2020 in Khabarovsk after the research collaborations. The laws on “ex- sacking and detention of Governor Sergei tremist” and “undesirable” organisations Furgal. The protests of winter and spring were also drastically
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