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Home , Alexei Navalny, Boris Nemtsov, Mayor of Moscow

Alexei Navalny: How he defined opposition success in Putin’s

by Olivia Loftin

A THESIS

submitted to

Oregon State University

Honors College

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Honors Baccalaureate of Arts in Political Science (Honors Scholar)

Presented June 1, 2018 Commencement June 2018

AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF

Olivia Loftin for the degree of Honors Baccalaureate of Arts in Political Science presented on June 1, 2018. Title: : How he defined opposition success in Putin’s Russia.

Abstract approved:______Sarah Henderson

Not many people in Russia have been able to successfully create an opposition movement under the presidency of . Opposition is already hard in any country, but things are especially difficult in Russia. Putin has made protest regulations, stifled the independent media, and excessively utilized selective rule by law. Navalny, however, has had surprising success considering the circumstances, making people wonder how he has been more successful than other opposition leaders. His use of selective rule by law, his framing of the media, and his international image have all played a role in his path to success. If he can keep the opposition movement alive without getting killed or jailed, Navalny will be one of the first to have a shot at making positive change in the Russian government.

Key Words: opposition, leadership, Russia, Putin, Navalny

Corresponding e-mail address: [email protected]

©Copyright by Olivia Loftin June 1, 2018 All Rights Reserved

Alexei Navalny: How he defined opposition success in Putin’s Russia

by Olivia Loftin

A THESIS

submitted to

Oregon State University

Honors College

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Honors Baccalaureate of Arts in Political Science (Honors Scholar)

Presented June 1, 2018 Commencement June 2018

Honors Baccalaureate of Arts in Political Science project of Olivia Loftin presented on June 1, 2018.

APPROVED:

______Sarah Henderson, Mentor, representing Political Science

______Christopher Stout, Committee Member, representing Political Science

______Trina Hogg, Committee Member, representing History

______Toni Doolen, Dean, Oregon State University Honors College

I understand that my project will become part of the permanent collection of Oregon State University, Honors College. My signature below authorizes release of my project to any reader upon request.

______Olivia Loftin, Author

Introduction

Since Vladimir Putin became Russia’s president in 2000, he has both gained immense popularity and overseen a dramatic decline in the quality of the country’s democracy. Compared to 2000, there are fewer checks on the president’s power, the legislature readily implements his agenda, and it is hard for opposition to mobilize. In addition, because of the lack of independent media, citizens have a hard time finding out about alterative candidates. While the economy has grown, the Kremlin has become extremely corrupt. Throughout the years, many people have attempted to lead opposition in Russia, though many of them fail due to the institutions put in place by the president and his oligarchy. Putin’s presidency has made room for opposition harder to find, and most people who try end up dead or in jail.

In addition, it is very hard for an opposition to form. Opposition is small to nonexistent, but opposition in Russia has always been small. However,

Putin has implemented several policies to make it dangerous to protest. In fact, opposition leaders such as have faced jail, while leaders such as have even faced even death. To make things worse, recently passed legislation increases punishments for unauthorized protests. Many would argue that the Russian state has the upper hand over opposition movements (Zakharova, 2016).

Alexei Navalny, someone who has been working in the Russian opposition for the past decade, has made an impact where many have failed.

Unlike the opposition leaders before him, Navalny has attracted thousands of protesters; not just in the big cities but throughout all of Russia. Through his that he developed in 2006, he has been able to reach many young

Russian citizens with his anti-corruption campaign. Since he started protesting in 2011, the Kremlin has tried to shut him down using familiar strategies. These strategies include arresting him at key times in his anti- corruption movement, including both times he decided to run for public office.

What explains Navalny’s success compared to other opposition leaders? In this context, success means the ability to mobilize thousands and stay alive and out of jail. Analyzing his methods and tactics to consolidate

Russian opposition will shed light on how he has been more successful than the people before him. This thesis will use social movement theory to highlight three key factors in opposition movements: state interactions, media framing, and methods of opposition leadership. Navalny has been able to use three tactics to his advantage. This first includes his ability to exploit the

Kremlin’s use of rule by law, subsequently using the Kremlin’s weapon against them. Secondly, he has been able to leverage the media surrounding elections, effectively gaining him a wider following. Third, he has garnered international support and attention, making it difficult for the Kremlin to attack him too strongly. Not only is it important to look at where he differs in his strategies, but it is important to look at his personal characteristics. To secure his non-partisan anti-corruption campaign, Navalny has made his political views unclear and ambiguous, making it easy to rally support. Finally, the

assumption surrounding his convictions is that they are trumped up, and he is not-guilty in the eyes of most of his followers. These five factors explain how he is still running a successful opposition after almost 8 years, where many others have failed. It’s important to understand his success, because it helps strengthen the understanding of how others can create successful oppositions under repressive regimes.

Nuts and Bolts of Opposition Leadership

Scholars have been studying political movements and opposition for decades. Social movements and oppositions are different wherever they take place, yet there are still key similarities that help to analyze them (McAdam,

McCarthy, & Zald, 1996, pp 1-20). Throughout different studies, it is demonstrated that there are certain aspects of opposition movements that are the most important to recognize. These include the interactions social movements have with the state, the use of media framing, and understanding the approach of the opposition leader.

Social movements are difficult to implement in any governmental structure, but especially difficult in non-democracies. Opposition is easier in democracies, as they are usually given the right to protest and the freedom of speech. In non-democracies, these civil liberties are not always granted.

Consequently, it is more difficult for an opposition to gain a following because there are higher risks associated with protesting when that isn’t a right given to people under the government. In Western democracies, there is usually a mediator to help buffer the opposition from the government. An example of

this is an opposition aligning itself with a political party. Doing this gives the opposition a base following of members of that political party, as well as a buffer between the opposition and the state. In a non-democracy however, opposition movements are usually about anti-corruption. Because anti- corruption is a non-partisan movement, the opposition cannot align with a partisan group. They must directly interact with the state with no mediator to help with the movement. When an opposition movement is in place to alter state institutions, it is eminent that they will eventually have to come in to contact with the state and its governing structures, shaping the rest of the opposition’s success (Jenkins, 2004, pp. 3-13).

Along with state interaction, media framing is also key to an opposition movement’s success. Media framing is a term used to describe how an opposition positions itself within the public eye. It is how the opposition is broadcasted to the country, and can be done intentionally. Having an opposition with a presence in the media will help make it more successful, as it will increase its visibility (McCarthy, Smith, & Zald, 1996, pp. 292-311). The struggle with mass media is the length of attention events receive. An opposition movement might get an initial boost in the news when it starts, but it could lose speed when the press needs to cover another pressing issue.

Consistent media attention is needed to gain broader support and to have a broader recognition of the movement. If the movement is being brought up over the course of years, rather than just a few weeks, it shows that the

movement has been holding its ground, how long it has been around, and the success they have had since they have been active.

Not only is it important to have consistent media attention, but it is also important to garner attention in the political and electoral arenas, so that the opposition is broadcasted to more citizens across the country (McCarthy,

Smith, & Zald, 1996, pp. 292-311). Political and electoral media attention would be gained by members or leaders of the opposition running for public office. The opposition is then legitimized by having an electoral system presence and by being recognized by the government. Running for office gives the opposition a place to hold the opposition’s agenda and policies in the public eye. Citizens that might not usually pay attention to the media could pay close attention to elections, helping the opposition reach a wider audience. Spreading the ideals of the opposition, through both consistent media attention and having an electoral presence, can help an opposition be successful as it reaches a broad group of people (McCarthy, Smith, & Zald,

1996, pp. 292-311).

Not only are media framing and connection to the state important to understanding opposition movements, but so is the approach and motivation of the opposition leader himself (Gel’man, 2014). Though there are more strategies to running a movement, populism and ideology are two popular methods an opposition leader could use. The ideology method would help a movement cater to specific groups in the country based on their political beliefs. The ideals of the opposition would be connected to ideals of one of

the parties in the country, helping gain support from people who are already a follower of that party. However, this can deter people who are not members of that party from following the movement. This does not usually work with anti- corruption efforts, because corruption is usually best seen as non-partisan.

Populism, on the other hand, holds the people’s interests in mind while also being able to reach a greater number of individuals. Populist leadership usually takes form in movements to end non-partisan issues such as government corruption, embezzling, and lack of protection of individual freedoms. If citizens feel they are being wronged or that the opposition can better their accessibility to rights within the country, they will be more likely to follow the opposition and stand behind it. Populism appeals to people across many political parties and multiple groups of individuals, as it is a non-partisan method (Gel’man, 2014).

These methods for creating a successful opposition are all necessary to be successful against the state. Opposition movements need to be able to positively frame themselves in the media, have a clear relationship with the state, and cater the leadership style for the movement’s success. Opposition movement strategy is different for every state, as countries all have individualized structures. Successfully utilizing opposition strategy determines the success of the opposition. In a country where opposition is more difficult to advance, however, small victories are the biggest signs of success.

Holding office, getting media attention, and gaining wide support are signs of success in repressive governments. The tactics to create an opposition

movement are very different depending on the environment of the state, but that does not mean that the oppositions are not similar in their core methods and strategies.

A Change in Civil Society Under Putin

Since Vladimir Putin gained power in 1999, the Russian government has been in a constant decline from democracy. The democracy under

Putin’s predecessor, had been the closest to democracy Russia had ever been, and Putin’s succession turned the government into a democratic facade with underlying authoritarian values. Normally, a democracy would include following a governing document, having a balance of power, giving people access to civil liberties, and free and fair elections

(, 2016). However, Russia has not done well sticking to these democratic principles. Specifically, in regard to the issue of opposition, people have not been given access to civil liberties, such as freedom to protest and freedom of speech, that would be allowed under a true democracy.

Throughout Putin’s presidency over the last 20 years, apart from the 4-year break where he was Prime Minister to , he has continuously implemented policies to impede democratic rights to the citizens. Through the considerable attacks on independent media, the implementation of protest regulations, and the selective use of rule by law, citizens all over Russia have been living under swiftly declining civic society.

The media system in Russia has increasingly become censored by the government. At this point in time, there are very few media outlets not owned or controlled by the state. This means that the media is consistently producing journalism in support of , the party of the president. Media outlets are pressured to tell stories in a certain way, making Russia look better in certain situations than it might be. This kind of media environment is not conducive to independent journalists, and those who speak against the

Russian narrative are often prosecuted or attacked. Because independent journalists feel threatened, there are a lack of them. Even if you are giving monetary or verbal support to an independent journalist, you are not safe, as many supporters have suffered threats or attacks as well (Freedom House,

2017). With a controlled and censored media system, citizens only get the side of the story the government wants them to hear. Consequently, citizens may have a higher chance of supporting the government that is harming them, because they are fed information that sheds a more positive light on the government than might be true.

Even if people were unhappy with the government, they would have a hard time actively protesting it, as Putin has also implemented multiple protest regulations. The laws that have been implemented restrict the accessibility of obtaining permission to have protests on certain days. These laws can also restrict the length of allowed times for protesting. Violating these laws can get people arrested and can also entail excessive fines. When opposition movements with potential surfaces, it gets stifled in various ways by the

Kremlin. Since Putin made the regulatory laws in 2012, people have continued to protest and subsequently been jailed and fined. When Navalny and his followers took to the streets in 2017, hundreds of people were jailed for breaking rules regarding protesting (Partlett, 2012). Not only can people get arrested for violating these protest regulations, but opposition leaders can be jailed for other crimes seemingly unrelated to their opposition practices.

This is the selective use of rule by law method used by the Kremlin to stifle the more prominent opposition leaders.

The selective use of rule by law has been used to stifle the opposition leaders and movements that are able to get past the protesting rules and the media restrictions. Though Navalny is the focus of this study in terms of opposition success, there are many other people across Russia that have had a much less successful time opposing the Kremlin. These people can also be victims of selective use of rule by law. Mikhail Khodorkovsky is one of the victims of Putin’s civil society. Khodorkovsky had made a name for himself through investing, and had become extremely wealthy: presumably the richest man in Russia at the time. In 2003, after parties in opposition of the government were completely eradicated, Khodorkovsky was exposed. He had been investing in political parties with various political beliefs, including those that were in opposition of the Kremlin (Kara-Murza, 2017). As discussed earlier, regarding media oppression in Russia, even support of independent journalists is dangerous. He seemed to be in the clear, until he was arrested in 2003 for fraud and embezzlement. His argued that the charges

were outrageous and solely because Khodorkovsky had been voicing political ideals in opposition to the Kremlin. Even still, he was sentenced to 10 years in prison. Though he was pardoned in 2013, he was exiled, and left Russia for

London where he would attempt to build an opposition based on questioning the current state of the Kremlin.

Though Khodorkovsky had few small successes, he was never going to be as successful as Navalny is today. Khodorkovsky, clearly a fan of the liberal opposition, was viewed negatively in the media before he even started opposition work, and he has served real time in jail. Making political statements and having clear political views makes people of other ideologies less likely to follow him, as they might not agree with his beliefs. His reputation was also hurt by the fact that he was making billions of dollars in

Russia in the 1990s when poverty was at an all-time high. Because of this, he is looked at more negatively by the media and the people. Lastly, he was unsuccessful because many citizens thought there was cause to the charges against him and that he deserved the jail time (Charlton & Ebel, 2018). This does not help his following or opposition, but it was probably a good precedent for Navalny to use when creating his own opposition.

Another example of opposition was the work of Boris Nemtsov.

Nemtsov had been in power during the Yeltsin era, famous for his Western

Liberalism. He had been in opposition of the Kremlin for years, and had helped Navalny start his opposition movement. When Navalny was jailed for enough time to miss his protest in February of 2015, Nemtsov stepped up to

the plate, handing out fliers and rallying people to come speak their minds.

What did him in, however, was his decision to go on the local radio show and tell people to come protest with him for a better government. On his way home, he was shot several times and was killed on site. It does not seem coincidental that he was shot and killed on the same day that he broadcasted his opposition across the city. Many people believe, international and domestic citizens alike, that the murder was politically charged and even potentially ordered by someone in the Kremlin (Ioffe, 2015).

While Nemtsov had been relatively helpful to Navalny’s case, and had supported him through everything and helped him establish prominence in

Yabloko, their political party, Nemtsov was not popular enough to have a large following and he was killed too early in his life to know how much more he could have done for the cause. His death, if anything, demonstrated to the people that their rights are not being protected and that speaking in opposition to the government can have serious consequences. People will continue to question their freedom and the government that they live under.

What is even more pertinent, is that the murder of Nemstov is not an isolated case. There have been several cases across Russia that have been speculated as murders that the Russian government had ordered to silence dissent (Filipov, 2017). For the people of Russia to even speculate that the government is killing people to silence the opposition is important, as it will keep them aware of future occurrences where this might happen again. It

almost keeps Navalny safer, as the people would have an idea of why he was killed if the Kremlin decided to silence him in the same manner.

As demonstrated, opposition politics have become increasingly more difficult in Russia. Putin has been changing the rules of the game since he was elected president, by over regulating protesting, shutting down independent media, and using an excessive amount of selective rule by law.

People like Khodorkovsky and Nemstov have suffered the consequences of these changes. These changes in civil society have drastically changed how opposition works. This kind of system can only really produce individual leaders rather than large movements, as it is hard to get a lot of people to follow you when there are so many life changing and brutal consequences.

People get scared when they see opposition leaders be jailed, exiled, or even killed. In Russia, if you are an opposition leader and you can get people to protest with you and for you, you are on the road to opposition success. Not only are people afraid of the consequences, but Putin has gained a genuine level of popularity and support. His approval ratings are through the roof, and he has become a person that look up to and model after. Whether, all those sentiments are completely genuine from everyone that supports him, he has more popularity than one would expect from an authoritarian-like leader. This creates a difficult place for a movement, not just a leader, to arise. Finding a big enough group of people to oppose a very popular man, when there could be life-threatening consequences, is very difficult. So, when someone like Alexei Navalny has been able to get thousands of people to

protest across Russia, one wonders how this is possible in Putin’s hand- crafted civil society.

The Methods of Russia’s Most Prominent Opposition Leader

Success is a difficult word to define when discussing an opposition movement within Russian borders. In many countries, one might define opposition success as obtaining roles in the government, having a large citizen following, and making widespread change. In Russia, it is not that simple. With the government as censored and restrictive as it is towards people with thoughts of opposition, a leader is successful if they can have any sort of following, avoid being killed, and avoid long periods of time in jail.

Throughout the past year or two, students in 84 cities have organized protests under Alexei Navalny’s leadership. Hundreds of students have been jailed.

These are some of the largest protests since the early 1990s, and definitely the largest anti-corruption protests during Putin’s regime (Kara-Murza, 2017).

Navalny has stayed alive, gained a decent following, and even gained an international presence. The opposition leader has used many tactics to ensure this level of success in opposition leadership in Russia, the most prominent of these tactics including but not limited to how he uses rule by law to his advantage, the way in which he catches the eye of the media, and the extent of his international support.

The rule by law practice that has been evident in Russia for decades has put many people in prison. Mikhail Khodorkovsky is one of these people, and as earlier mentioned, rule by law in Russia has been used to suppress

opposition efforts under the guise of something else. Opposition leaders are being jailed for things such as corruption, ironically the very thing they are fighting against, and laws are being made to fine anyone who tries to protest in the wrong way (Partlett, 2012). Navalny has been no exception to these regulation and suppression tactics. In 2011, Navalny was jailed for the first time when he started a protest outside the . He was fighting the corrupt ways in which the recent election had been carried out, and spent 15 days in jail for his actions. Though the Russian government most likely did this to suppress his following, it only made it stronger. Soon after his arrest,

Navalny’s blog was translated into English and became a source of international news (Martin, 2017). He became a physical presence to people instead of just someone who was voicing their opinions online. Navalny became a symbol of hope to Russians across the country, and an even bigger threat to the Kremlin. The next year, when Putin was re-elected as president, Navalny was arrested once again, this time for alleged embezzlement. This is an ironic claim, as Navalny had been fighting corruption for years. To then be jailed for corruption in the Russian government himself is an interesting tactic on the Russian government’s part.

The sentence was supposed to be five years, but Navalny was only imprisoned for a day when he was then released, since there was no evidence to use against him (Martin, 2017). In 2016, when Navalny decided he would declare a campaign to run for , he was again convicted of the same alleged corruption charges that he was convicted of in

2012. Conveniently, the allegations were brought up right when Navalny decided he would run for president. This would then ban him from running in the election.

Through these numerous events in which Navalny was convicted of embezzlement or a protest related crime, it is demonstrated that the Russian government was using the law in Russia to eradicate or even stall the opposition. The timing of each jailing or conviction lines up with something that Navalny was doing that would maximize his opposition forces. He was convicted near his run for president when he was becoming internationally popular and every time he had a protest that was larger than normal for

Russian opposition. Considering there is no evidence to support the allegations of corruption against Navalny, and that even the European Court of Human Rights has spoken out about the fact that he has not been given fair trial, one can argue that the legal action being taken against him is a governmental tactic to halt his leadership. However, this has only been an advantage to Navalny’s opposition. Jailing him creates an uproar, as people protesting are clearly on his side and in support of his movement. Convicting him of embezzlement of which there is no evidence shows the people that

Navalny can do nothing wrong and still be punished. These actions create a fire in the opposition movement and push it forward, rather than stall it as the

Kremlin might have intended.

Aside from the use of rule by law to spur the opposition movement of

Navalny forward, the media and public image he has created also plays a

huge role in his success. In the beginning, Navalny made his presence known through his blog. The takeoff of his media presence, however, is connected to the first time in which he was jailed for doing a protest in 2011. Here, the media responses grew exponentially. Internationally, his name was in the news with an optimistic view of what he could do for Russia's future. His blog also became available in English. However, one of the most important results, was that more people started protesting following his arrest than ever before.

More people were paying attention to the protests, and tens of thousands of people hit the streets following Navalny’s words of encouragement from prison (Barry, 2011). They began to believe in the now physical presence he held in Russia, as opposed to just seeing his blog. He had a tangible opposition after this week in December of 2011, and it was the beginning of a very successful opposition for Putin’s repressive regime.

After this first arrest and its aftermath, Navalny moved on to creating a public presence through running in elections. He first ran for the mayor of

Moscow. This election was held in 2013, and his campaign was solely based on anti-corruption policies. Because Navalny has not publicized his political beliefs, people do not have enough information about his agenda to feel comfortable voting him into office. Despite that, he ended up coming second in that election, with a whopping 30%. Even though he did not come in first in the election, this was still a huge feat for his opposition movement (Bennetts,

2017). This election was not entirely about actually winning the election anyways. It was more about proving that he could gain support and that he

could grab the media’s attention throughout the process. He did both of those things, meaning that even though he did not become the mayor of , he truly did get what he wanted out of it. He even raised over $3 million for his campaign, an outrageous amount of money for the type of campaign work he was doing (Ennis, 2013). It is more money than most people in his position would have gotten, and that is due entirely to the large number of people backing him at that point in time.

Losing the mayoral race, however, was not the stopping point for

Navalny trying to gain support and popularity through the media. Four years later, Navalny made the decision to run for president, putting him on broadcasting networks across the globe. The power of the presidency has been held in the hands of one person for almost 20. People running against

Putin is common, but they are not usually people with an agenda like

Navalny’s. Because of this, he got a lot of popularity by running for president, so much so that he was polled to get at least 10% of the vote. That number may seem small, but considering how he is portrayed by the state, this is impressively high (Bennetts, 2017). This was heightened even more when he was convicted of embezzlement for the second time, barring him from being able to run in the election. This did not, however, stop Navalny from continuing his campaign. People believed that it was outrageous that he was arrested immediately after he announced his candidacy, and then consequently banned from the campaign. These convictions have been viewed as purposefully barring him from being able to run for office (AP in

Moscow, 2017). Though he was unable to legitimately run for president, he asked that the country boycott the election instead. This is probably the first time in the elections that Putin has ran and been worried about the turnout, as something to this extent had not happened before (Dewan, 2018). Support for

Navalny seemed to be expanding rapidly, and that support did not stop at the

Russian border.

One of the biggest reasons Navalny has been so successful is the support he has gotten from countries outside of Russia. When Navalny made himself a physical presence after his first major set of protests, articles of support started flying out of the press in many different countries. For example, an article in , released in 2011, detailed positive connotations on the topic of Navalny. It was spattered with quotes from various Russian citizens confirming their support and how he has been a great influence on the country (Ioffe, 2011). Articles like this were released around the world, as many governments liked the idea of someone countering the hard power of Vladimir Putin’s rule. Even Germany has added their opinion, releasing an article this year that notes the opposition leader as a

“real politician” trying to help fix the “imitated democracy” that is in place in

Russia (Esch, 2018). Just as The New Yorker did in 2011, this German magazine, Spiegel Online, highlights a positive outlook on the way in which

Navalny is affecting the country with his opposition leadership. Among just the individual state’s opinions regarding Navalny, remarks have been made by

European-wide organizations such as the . The EU has

released statements regarding how criminal charges should not be related to political opinions, and that there is a connection to Navalny’s conviction and his then inability to run for president ( Staff, 2017).

International support may seem like a small advantage when talking about something on a playing field that only encompasses Russia, but it is so much bigger than one would think. With support from other countries, Russian citizens can see that Navalny is not just a positive leader inside the country.

Outsiders are viewing him in the same way: as a catalyst for change and someone who has a real shot at making a difference. When internal thoughts on an opposition are matched by outsider thoughts, it helps make the opposition seem real and meaningful. Everyone sees the possibility for change. With this international support, the media attention that Navalny has received in Russia, and the use of rule by law against him, Navalny has been able to make this opposition one of the most successful oppositions since the early 1990s.

What Makes Navalny’s Continuing Opposition and Popularity a Reality

Since Navalny has brought his opposition to the forefront of the

Russian political sphere over ten years ago, he has become increasingly known by the masses. This does not seem like something that is likely to be stopped due to his inability to be president of Russia for the March 2018 election. As the opposition grows, one might question why Navalny, out of all the opposition leaders in Russia, has been so much more successful than

other opposition leaders. It was not, however, just luck of the draw. Navalny’s political ambiguity and clear innocence in any conviction thrown his way are two very important key factors that, if continued, could keep his opposition alive and on the road to success for a very long time.

Ever since Navalny became a figure in the public eye, he has been running his campaigns and opposition with an anti-corruption platform. This platform has been key to his success as an opposition leader. When running a campaign on something such as anti-corruption, you have the potential to gain support from anyone across the political spectrum. Because of this, it is essential to recognize that having an outward political opinion might ruin those chances. People would be willing to support anti-corruption, but might be deterred if they do not align with other political values that the anti- corruption leader holds. Navalny has been extremely successful in making sure that he is only advocating for things related to anti-corruption. Most of his platforms when running for office usually only involve anti-corruption reform.

Because of this, Navalny’s personal political ideas are ambiguous to the public. This has helped gain support from a broad range of people, but has not necessarily done him any favors in terms of winning elections. People are skeptical to vote for him as president because they do not fully know what he stands for other than anti-corruption. Though they may not want him as president or mayor, this does not mean his ideas are not liked or are not heard. People can still support him without physically voting for him. Though

in this situation, it is not the result of the election that matters anyways; it is the effect it has in the media and how much attention it gives his campaign.

Another important factor of Navalny’s personal image that keeps him popular in Russian opposition, is the fact that there has been no evidence that he has committed any crimes that he has been convicted of, such as embezzlement. Because of this, he has become a figure for wrongful conviction. Other countries and international organizations have spoken out regarding the fact that it looks like Russia is using conviction to thwart political opposition. Lots of people in Russia, and obviously outside of Russia, have recognized this is what is going on in the Russian courts, and have spoken out against it. Luckily, Navalny has not been jailed for more than several days, but with the way the Russian government throws charges at Navalny, the possibility has not yet left the table.

Conclusion

Opposition movements operate in many ways across the world, with various levels of success. Opposition leaders all over the world use tactics such as media framing to make their opposition seem positive in the eyes of the people, as well as the use of interactions with the state and having an international presence. In Russia, opposition movements have failed for many years as people try to go against the Kremlin, as seen by Mikhail

Khodorkovsky’s time in jail and Boris Nemtsov’s death. Civil society has changed a lot since Putin became president in 2000. It is a lot more difficult to protest due to his regulations and policies, the consequences for protesting

are extremely high, and Putin has become very popular. This makes opposition very difficult, as people fear the consequences.

Alexei Navalny, however, has worked for almost ten years to get a cohesive opposition movement to go against Putin and the Kremlin. He has had an unbelievable amount of success doing so. His leadership style and method could pinpoint what makes political movements successful and what other opposition leaders could do to make change against their own governments. What is currently happening in Russia, and has been happening for the last 10 years, could be a catalyst for change in a country that has dealt with a static and oppressive government for a long time. For

Navalny to continue his success, he needs to stay internationally recognized, continue use the selective rule by law to his advantage, and stay politically ambiguous. If he can manage all those things without getting jailed or killed, change is possible and perhaps unprecedented in Russia.

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Barry, E. (2011). Rally Defying Putin’s Party Draws Tens of Thousands. NY Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/11/world/europe/thousands- protest-in-moscow-russia-in-defiance-of-putin.html

Bennetts, M. (2017). The Kremlin’s Kryptonite? Anti-corruption crusader Alexei Navalny has led massive protests in Moscow and beyond. But can he really challenge Vladimir Putin in 2018? News Week.

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