DOCSLIB.ORG

Alexei Navalny: How He Defined Opposition Success in Putin's

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Alexei Navalny: How He Defined Opposition Success in Putin's Alexei Navalny: How he defined opposition success in Putin’s Russia by Olivia Loftin A THESIS submitted to Oregon State University Honors College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Honors Baccalaureate of Arts in Political Science (Honors Scholar) Presented June 1, 2018 Commencement June 2018 AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF Olivia Loftin for the degree of Honors Baccalaureate of Arts in Political Science presented on June 1, 2018. Title: Alexei Navalny: How he defined opposition success in Putin’s Russia. Abstract approved:_____________________________________________________ Sarah Henderson Not many people in Russia have been able to successfully create an opposition movement under the presidency of Vladimir Putin. Opposition is already hard in any country, but things are especially difficult in Russia. Putin has made protest regulations, stifled the independent media, and excessively utilized selective rule by law. Navalny, however, has had surprising success considering the circumstances, making people wonder how he has been more successful than other opposition leaders. His use of selective rule by law, his framing of the media, and his international image have all played a role in his path to success. If he can keep the opposition movement alive without getting killed or jailed, Navalny will be one of the first to have a shot at making positive change in the Russian government. Key Words: opposition, leadership, Russia, Putin, Navalny Corresponding e-mail address: [email protected] ©Copyright by Olivia Loftin June 1, 2018 All Rights Reserved Alexei Navalny: How he defined opposition success in Putin’s Russia by Olivia Loftin A THESIS submitted to Oregon State University Honors College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Honors Baccalaureate of Arts in Political Science (Honors Scholar) Presented June 1, 2018 Commencement June 2018 Honors Baccalaureate of Arts in Political Science project of Olivia Loftin presented on June 1, 2018. APPROVED: _____________________________________________________________________ Sarah Henderson, Mentor, representing Political Science _____________________________________________________________________ Christopher Stout, Committee Member, representing Political Science _____________________________________________________________________ Trina Hogg, Committee Member, representing History _____________________________________________________________________ Toni Doolen, Dean, Oregon State University Honors College I understand that my project will become part of the permanent collection of Oregon State University, Honors College. My signature below authorizes release of my project to any reader upon request. _____________________________________________________________________ Olivia Loftin, Author Introduction Since Vladimir Putin became Russia’s president in 2000, he has both gained immense popularity and overseen a dramatic decline in the quality of the country’s democracy. Compared to 2000, there are fewer checks on the president’s power, the legislature readily implements his agenda, and it is hard for opposition to mobilize. In addition, because of the lack of independent media, citizens have a hard time finding out about alterative candidates. While the economy has grown, the Kremlin has become extremely corrupt. Throughout the years, many people have attempted to lead opposition in Russia, though many of them fail due to the institutions put in place by the president and his oligarchy. Putin’s presidency has made room for opposition harder to find, and most people who try end up dead or in jail. In addition, it is very hard for an opposition to form. Opposition is small to nonexistent, but opposition in Russia has always been small. However, Putin has implemented several policies to make it dangerous to protest. In fact, opposition leaders such as Mikhail Khodorkovsky have faced jail, while leaders such as Boris Nemtsov have even faced even death. To make things worse, recently passed legislation increases punishments for unauthorized protests. Many would argue that the Russian state has the upper hand over opposition movements (Zakharova, 2016). Alexei Navalny, someone who has been working in the Russian opposition for the past decade, has made an impact where many have failed. Unlike the opposition leaders before him, Navalny has attracted thousands of protesters; not just in the big cities but throughout all of Russia. Through his blog that he developed in 2006, he has been able to reach many young Russian citizens with his anti-corruption campaign. Since he started protesting in 2011, the Kremlin has tried to shut him down using familiar strategies. These strategies include arresting him at key times in his anti- corruption movement, including both times he decided to run for public office. What explains Navalny’s success compared to other opposition leaders? In this context, success means the ability to mobilize thousands and stay alive and out of jail. Analyzing his methods and tactics to consolidate Russian opposition will shed light on how he has been more successful than the people before him. This thesis will use social movement theory to highlight three key factors in opposition movements: state interactions, media framing, and methods of opposition leadership. Navalny has been able to use three tactics to his advantage. This first includes his ability to exploit the Kremlin’s use of rule by law, subsequently using the Kremlin’s weapon against them. Secondly, he has been able to leverage the media surrounding elections, effectively gaining him a wider following. Third, he has garnered international support and attention, making it difficult for the Kremlin to attack him too strongly. Not only is it important to look at where he differs in his strategies, but it is important to look at his personal characteristics. To secure his non-partisan anti-corruption campaign, Navalny has made his political views unclear and ambiguous, making it easy to rally support. Finally, the assumption surrounding his convictions is that they are trumped up, and he is not-guilty in the eyes of most of his followers. These five factors explain how he is still running a successful opposition after almost 8 years, where many others have failed. It’s important to understand his success, because it helps strengthen the understanding of how others can create successful oppositions under repressive regimes. Nuts and Bolts of Opposition Leadership Scholars have been studying political movements and opposition for decades. Social movements and oppositions are different wherever they take place, yet there are still key similarities that help to analyze them (McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996, pp 1-20). Throughout different studies, it is demonstrated that there are certain aspects of opposition movements that are the most important to recognize. These include the interactions social movements have with the state, the use of media framing, and understanding the approach of the opposition leader. Social movements are difficult to implement in any governmental structure, but especially difficult in non-democracies. Opposition is easier in democracies, as they are usually given the right to protest and the freedom of speech. In non-democracies, these civil liberties are not always granted. Consequently, it is more difficult for an opposition to gain a following because there are higher risks associated with protesting when that isn’t a right given to people under the government. In Western democracies, there is usually a mediator to help buffer the opposition from the government. An example of this is an opposition aligning itself with a political party. Doing this gives the opposition a base following of members of that political party, as well as a buffer between the opposition and the state. In a non-democracy however, opposition movements are usually about anti-corruption. Because anti- corruption is a non-partisan movement, the opposition cannot align with a partisan group. They must directly interact with the state with no mediator to help with the movement. When an opposition movement is in place to alter state institutions, it is eminent that they will eventually have to come in to contact with the state and its governing structures, shaping the rest of the opposition’s success (Jenkins, 2004, pp. 3-13). Along with state interaction, media framing is also key to an opposition movement’s success. Media framing is a term used to describe how an opposition positions itself within the public eye. It is how the opposition is broadcasted to the country, and can be done intentionally. Having an opposition with a presence in the media will help make it more successful, as it will increase its visibility (McCarthy, Smith, & Zald, 1996, pp. 292-311). The struggle with mass media is the length of attention events receive. An opposition movement might get an initial boost in the news when it starts, but it could lose speed when the press needs to cover another pressing issue. Consistent media attention is needed to gain broader support and to have a broader recognition of the movement. If the movement is being brought up over the course of years, rather than just a few weeks, it shows that the movement has been holding its ground, how long it has been around, and the success they have had since they have been active. Not only is it important to have consistent media attention, but it is also important to garner attention in the political and electoral arenas,
Load more

Recommended publications
  • OPERATION NEMTSOV”: 307 Disinformation, Confusion MARCH and Some Worrying Hypotheses 2015
    Centro de Estudios y Documentación InternacionalesCentro de Barcelona E-ISSN 2014-0843 D.L.: B-8438-2012 opiniónEuropa “OPERATION NEMTSOV”: 307 Disinformation, confusion MARCH and some worrying hypotheses 2015 Nicolás de Pedro, Research Fellow, CIDOB Marta Ter, Head of the North Caucasus department at the Lliga dels Drets dels Pobles he investigation into the assassination of Boris Nemtsov reminds previ- ous ones on high-profile political killings, although the uncertainties grow with every new revelation. The verified, documented connec- Ttion between the main suspect, Zaur Dadayev, and Ramzan Kadyrov, Chechen strongman and close ally of Putin strengthens the theory linking the crime to the Kremlin and suggests possible internal fighting within the state security apparatus. Nemtsov joins a long list of critics and opponents who have been assassinated in the last fifteen years. Among the most prominent are:Sergey Yushenkov, member of parliament for the Liberal Russia party (assassinated on April 17th, 2003); Yuri Shchekochikhin, journalist on the Novaya Gazeta (July 3rd, 2003); Paul Klebnikov, US journalist of Russian origin and editor of the Russian edition of Forbes (July 9th, 2004); Anna Politkovskaya, journalist for Novaya Gazeta (October 7th, 2006); Alexander Litvinenko, former KGB/FSB agent (November 23rd, 2006); and Na- talya Estemirova, human rights activist for the Chechen branch of the NGO Me- morial (July 15th, 2009). Each of these assassinations has its own particularities, but none has been properly explained and all of the victims were people who dis- comfited the Kremlin. Despite this, political motivations and possible connections with state apparatus are the only lines of investigation that have been systemati- cally ignored or explicitly denied in all of these cases.
    [Show full text]
  • The Media As a Mirror of Putin's Evolving Strategy in Ukraine
    Tomila Lankina and Kohei Watanabe ‘Russian Spring’ or ‘Spring betrayal’? The media as a mirror of Putin’s evolving strategy in Ukraine Article (Accepted version) (Refereed) Original citation: Lankina, Tomila V. and Watanabe, Kohei (2017) ‘Russian Spring’ or ‘Spring betrayal’? The media as a mirror of Putin’s evolving strategy in Ukraine. Europe-Asia Studies. pp. 1526- 1556. ISSN 0966-8136 DOI: 10.1080/09668136.2017.1397603 © 2017 University of Glasgow This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/68226/ Available in LSE Research Online: January 2018 LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE Research Online website. This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be differences between this version and the published version. You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. 1 Tomila Lankina* and Kohei Watanabe** ‘Russian Spring’ or ‘Spring Betrayal’? The Media as a Mirror of Putin’s Evolving Strategy in Ukraine Abstract We develop a novel Russian-language electronic content analysis dictionary and method to analyse Russian state media’s framing of the Euromaidan protests.
    [Show full text]
  • Boris Nemtsov 27 February 2015 Moscow, Russia
    Boris Nemtsov 27 February 2015 Moscow, Russia the fight against corruption, embezzlement and fraud, claiming that the whole system built by Putin was akin to a mafia. In 2009, he discovered that one of Putin’s allies, Mayor of Moscow City Yury Luzhkov, BORIS and his wife, Yelena Baturina, were engaged in fraudulent business practices. According to the results of his investigation, Baturina had become a billionaire with the help of her husband’s connections. Her real-estate devel- opment company, Inteco, had invested in the construction of dozens of housing complexes in Moscow. Other investors were keen to part- ner with Baturina because she was able to use NEMTSOV her networks to secure permission from the Moscow government to build apartment build- ings, which were the most problematic and It was nearing midnight on 27 February 2015, and the expensive construction projects for developers. stars atop the Kremlin towers shone with their charac- Nemtsov’s report revealed the success of teristic bright-red light. Boris Nemtsov and his partner, Baturina’s business empire to be related to the Anna Duritskaya, were walking along Bolshoy Moskovo- tax benefits she received directly from Moscow retsky Bridge. It was a cold night, and the view from the City government and from lucrative govern- bridge would have been breathtaking. ment tenders won by Inteco. A snowplough passed slowly by the couple, obscuring the scene and probably muffling the sound of the gunshots fired from a side stairway to the bridge. The 55-year-old Nemtsov, a well-known Russian politician, anti-corrup- tion activist and a fierce critic of Vladimir Putin, fell to the ground with four bullets in his back.
    [Show full text]
  • Nord Stream 2
    Updated August 24, 2021 Russia’s Nord Stream 2 Natural Gas Pipeline to Germany Nord Stream 2, a natural gas pipeline nearing completion, is which accounted for about 48% of EU natural gas imports expected to increase the volume of Russia’s natural gas in 2020. Russian gas exports to the EU were up 18% year- export capacity directly to Germany, bypassing Ukraine, on-year in the first quarter of 2021. Factors behind reliance Poland, and other transit states (Figure 1). Successive U.S. on Russian supply include diminishing European gas Administrations and Congresses have opposed Nord Stream supplies, commitments to reduce coal use, Russian 2, reflecting concerns about European dependence on investments in European infrastructure, Russian export Russian energy and the threat of increased Russian prices, and the perception of many Europeans that Russia aggression in Ukraine. The German government is a key remains a reliable supplier. proponent of the pipeline, which it says will be a reliable Figure 1. Nord Stream Gas Pipeline System source of natural gas as Germany is ending nuclear energy production and reducing coal use. Despite the Biden Administration’s stated opposition to Nord Stream 2, the Administration appears to have shifted its focus away from working to prevent the pipeline’s completion to mitigating the potential negative impacts of an operational pipeline. Some critics of this approach, including some Members of Congress and the Ukrainian and Polish governments, sharply criticized a U.S.-German joint statement on energy security, issued on July 21, 2021, which they perceived as indirectly affirming the pipeline’s completion.
    [Show full text]
  • Russian Aggression Against Ukraine and the West’S Policy Response
    The Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on Europe and Regional Security Cooperation Statement for the Record Russian Aggression against Ukraine and the West’s Policy Response Steven Pifer Senior Fellow, Center on the United States and Europe The Brookings Institution March 4, 2015 1 Russian Aggression against Ukraine and the West’s Policy Response Introduction Mr. Chairman, Senator Shaheen, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, and the U.S. and West’s policy response. What began as an internal Ukrainian political dispute became a Ukraine-Russia crisis in early 2014. Since then, Moscow has used military force to seize Crimea, supported armed separatists and ultimately sent regular Russian army units into eastern Ukraine. A ceasefire agreement was reached in Minsk last September, but the separatists and Russians failed to implement its terms. The Minsk II ceasefire agreed on February 12 may now be taking effect but seems fragile at best. Implementing other terms of the agreement will prove difficult. Driving Russia’s aggression has been a mix of geopolitical and domestic political considerations. The Kremlin’s goal over the past year appears to have been to destabilize and distract the Ukrainian government, in order keep that government from addressing its pressing economic, financial and other challenges as well as from drawing closer to the European Union through implementation of the EU-Ukraine association agreement. Beyond Ukraine, the United States and Europe face a broader Russia problem. Moscow has operated its military forces in a more provocative manner near NATO members and has asserted a right to “protect” ethnic Russians and Russian speakers wherever they are located and whatever their citizenship.
    [Show full text]
  • Human Rights Impact Assessment of the Covid-19 Response in Russia
    HUMAN RIGHTS IMPACT ASSESSMENT OF THE COVID-19 RESPONSE IN RUSSIA August 2020 Cover photo: © Анна Иларионова/Pixabay IPHR - International Partnership for Human Rights (Belgium) W IPHRonline.org @IPHR E [email protected] @IPHRonline Public Verdict Foundation W http://en.publicverdict.org/ @fondov Table of Contents I. Executive summary 4 II. Methodology 5 III. Brief country information 6 IV. Incidence of COVID-19 in Russia 7 V. The Russian Authorities’ Response to Covid-19 and its Impact on Human Rights 8 VI. Summary of Key Findings 42 VII. Recommendations 45 I. Executive summary What are the impacts on human rights of the restrictive measures imposed by the Government of Russia in response to the COVID-19 pandemic? How have the Russian authorities complied with international human rights standards while implementing measures to combat the spread of Covid-19? These questions lie at the heart of this study by International Partnership for Human Rights (IPHR) and Public Verdict Foundation. This study examines these measures through a human rights lens of international, regional human rights treaties of core and soft law (non-binding) standards. Through our monitoring, we have identified the following key points on how the COVID-19 pandemic was handled in Russia from mid-March until mid-July 2020: In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Russian authorities implemented strict quarantine measures at an early stage, restricting the movements and freedoms of the citizens of the country. The first case of COVID-19 in Russia was officially registered on 2 March 2020, in the vicinity of Moscow.1 The virus began spreading across the country a few weeks later but Moscow has remained the epicentre of the outbreak in Russia.
    [Show full text]
  • Nord Stream 2: Background, Objections, and Possible Outcomes Steven Pifer
    NORD STREAM 2: BACKGROUND, OBJECTIONS, AND POSSIBLE OUTCOMES STEVEN PIFER APRIL 2021 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Nord Stream 2 is an almost-finished natural gas pipeline from Russia to Germany. The Biden administration opposes it and has come under congressional pressure to invoke sanctions to prevent its completion, in large part because the pipeline seems a geopolitical project targeted at Ukraine. The German government, however, regards the pipeline as a “commercial project” and appears committed to its completion, perhaps in the next few months. U.S. sanctions applied on Russian entities to date have failed to stop Nord Stream 2, raising the question of whether the U.S. government would sanction German and other European companies for servicing or certifying the pipeline. Such sanctions would provoke controversy with Germany at a time when both Berlin and the Biden administration seek to rebuild good relations. The two sides have work to do if they wish to avoid Nord Stream 2 becoming a major point of U.S.-German contention. THE PIPELINE The European Union currently imports about 40% of its natural gas from Russia, or about one-third Nord Stream 2 is actually a pair of natural gas of its total gas consumption.4 Gazprom began pipelines that, if/when completed, will run some discussions with European companies on a direct 1,200 kilometers along the bottom of the Baltic Russia-Germany gas pipeline in 2001. At that time, 1 Sea from Ust-Luga, Russia to Greifswald, Germany. it shipped gas to western Europe via pipelines that The two pipelines, collectively referred to as Nord mainly transited Ukraine, and also Belarus and Stream 2, are projected to have the capacity to Poland (the Yamal system).
    [Show full text]
  • Gazprom's New Weakness Offers Opportunity by Anders Åslund
    CASE Network E-briefs 6/2009 June 2009 Gazprom's New Weakness Offers Opportunity By Anders Åslund Gazprom has gone from being a great commercial hope Gazprom also lacks a comparative advantage in the to an ailing giant. Gazprom's owners need to face up to transportation of gas. No other company has so many the crisis and institute reforms. explosions on major pipelines. Moreover, Gazprom is notorious for including shady intermediaries, which A year ago, Gazprom was the third‐most valuable later prompt the company to shut off its deliveries. company in the world with a market capitalization of over $350 billion. Today, it has shrunk by two‐thirds to Finally, few companies procure at more excessive about $120 billion, declining to become the world's prices. When Gazprom built Blue Stream, Hermitage 40th‐largest company, even though it still accounts for Capital Management showed that Gazprom's cost per about 20 percent of Russia's market capitalization and kilometer of pipeline was three times greater than on roughly 10 percent of its gross domestic product. the Turkish side. This seems to be a standard excess cost for Gazprom. In the first quarter, the country's gas exports plunged by 56 percent from last year, compelling Gazprom to cut its Gazprom's only comparative advantage is its control of production ever more. During the first 10 days of May, it one‐quarter of the world's gas reserves, but these plummeted by 34 percent. Even in the fourth quarter of reserves do not actually belong to the company. They 2008 ‐‐ when production, exports and prices were still are only licenses granted by the government.
    [Show full text]
  • The Long Arm of Vladimir Putin: How the Kremlin Uses Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties to Target Its Opposition Abroad
    The Long Arm of Vladimir Putin: How the Kremlin Uses Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties to Target its Opposition Abroad Russia Studies Centre Policy Paper No. 5 (2015) Dr Andrew Foxall The Henry Jackson Society June 2015 THE LONG ARM OF VLADIMIR PUTIN Summary Over the past 15 years, there has been – and continues to be – significant interchange between Western and Russian law-enforcement agencies, even in cases where Russia’s requests for legal assistance have been politicaLLy motivated. Though it is the Kremlin’s warfare that garners the West’s attention, its ‘lawfare’ poses just as significant a threat because it undermines the rule of law. One of the chief weapons in Russia’s ‘lawfare’ is the so-called ‘Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty’ (MLAT), a bilateral agreement that defines how countries co-operate on legal matters. TypicaLLy, the Kremlin will fabricate a criminaL case against an individual, and then request, through the MLAT system, the co-operation of Western countries in its attempts to persecute said person. Though Putin’s regime has been mounting, since 2012, an escalating campaign against opposition figures, the Kremlin’s use of ‘lawfare’ is nothing new. Long before then, Russia requested – and received – legal assistance from Western countries on a number of occasions, in its efforts to extradite opposition figures back to Russia. Western countries have complied with Russia’s requests for legal assistance in some of the most brazen and high-profile politicaLLy motivated cases in recent history, incLuding: individuals linked with Mikhail Khodorkovsky and the Yukos affair; Bill Browder and others connecteD to Hermitage Capital Management; and AnDrey Borodin and Bank of Moscow.
    [Show full text]
  • From the Ukraine–Russia War to the Navalny Case: How to Deal with the Kremlin?
    From the Ukraine–Russia War to the Navalny Case: How to Deal with the Kremlin? Nona Mikhelidze No. 12. April 2021 This publication has been funded by the European Union under the Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement no. 769886. ABSTRACT April 2021 . 12 Seven years after the annexation of Crimea and amid an ongoing war in Ukraine, Russia has tried to move towards military escalation in the Donbass region making clear that the status quo emerged in 2014 as a “new normal” cannot last. The Minsk II Agreement negotiated between Ukraine, Russia, France and Germany in the framework of the Normandy Format in February 2015 remains unimplemented despite numerous rounds of mediation. Western economic sanctions against Moscow succeeded in limiting the Kremlin’s military EU-LISTCO Policy Paper Series. Paper EU-LISTCO Policy advance beyond Donbass and deterred it from making further territorial gains. However, these measures failed to impact on Russian decision-making regarding resolution of the conflict. Influencing Russia’s foreign policy is not an easy task, as the country’s conduct of international relations is shaped by domestic factors and the authoritarian nature of its governance. Still, the West needs a strategy in response to the international and domestic wrongdoings already committed by the Kremlin and as a preventative measure to deter Moscow’s future aggression. In order to face the Russian challenge, the West should first design clear rules for its own foreign-policy behaviour based on the primacy of human rights and democracy and then define how to defend universal values abroad, including in Russia.
    [Show full text]
  • 5. Shared Sovereignty Russian Style: Relations Between Moscow and the Regions
    05petrov 06-04-2000 22:09 Pagina 111 Nikolay Petrov 5. Shared Sovereignty Russian Style: Relations between Moscow and the Regions ‘Centre – region’ relations are the key to an understanding of exactly what is hap- pening in Russian politics now, what its internal machinery is, how stable the current configuration of forces is, and how fundamental and irreversible are the changes that have occurred since Soviet times: in short, what is to be expected in the immediate future and in the long term. In general these relations are described by various commentators in various ways: from triumphant federalism to variations on purely feudal relations, from the rigid diktat of Moscow to the freebooter activities of the regional barons. Without a sufficiently detailed and comprehensive account of what is happening, the reader may form an unbal- anced and therefore entirely erroneous opinion. Current Russian political reality is so dynamic and varied that arguments can be found to support the most widely differing, sometimes diametrically opposed, concepts: disintegration of the country, or conversely rapid unification and centralisation; a cult of personality, where the prosperity or poverty of enor- mous regions depends upon their leaders, geographical determinism, where each social grouping has what nature has given it, and cultural determinism, where the people have the government that they deserve. The aim of this paper is to give a general idea of the basic principles, as estab- lished in the past and as now taking shape, of internal organisation of the Russ- ian political machine as regards relations between the two principal levels: the Centre and the regions.
    [Show full text]
  • RUSSIA WATCH No.2, August 2000 Graham T
    RUSSIA WATCH No.2, August 2000 Graham T. Allison, Director Editor: Ben Dunlap Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project Production Director: Melissa C..Carr John F. Kennedy School of Government Researcher: Emily Van Buskirk Harvard University Production Assistant: Emily Goodhue SPOTLIGHT ON RUSSIA’S OLIGARCHS On July 28 Russian President Vladimir Putin met with 21 of Russia’s most influ- ential businessmen to “redefine the relationship between the state and big busi- ness.” At that meeting, Putin assured the tycoons that privatization results would remained unchallenged, but stopped far short of offering a general amnesty for crimes committed in that process. He opened the meeting by saying: “I only want to draw your attention straightaway to the fact that you have yourselves formed this very state, to a large extent through political and quasi-political structures under your control.” Putin assured the oligarchs that recent investi- The Kremlin roundtable comes at a crucial time for the oligarchs. In the last gations were not part of a policy of attacking big business, but said he would not try to restrict two months, many of them have found themselves subjects of investigations prosecutors who launch such cases. by the General Prosecutor’s Office, Tax Police, and Federal Security Serv- ice. After years of cozying up to the government, buying up the state’s most valuable resources in noncompetitive bidding, receiving state-guaranteed loans with little accountability, and flouting the country’s tax laws with imp u- nity, the heads of some of Russia’s leading financial-industrial groups have been thrust under the spotlight.
    [Show full text]