DOCSLIB.ORG

Opposition in Putin's Russia: Resisting Propaganda

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Opposition in Putin's Russia: Resisting Propaganda Opposition in Putin’s Russia: Resisting Propaganda By Aleksandra Urman Submitted to Central European University Department of Political Science In partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Supervisor: Visiting Professor Oana Lup CEU eTD Collection Budapest, Hungary 2017 Abstract Misinformation campaigns and propaganda are among the important pillars of contemporary authoritarian regimes which allow the incumbents to stay in power even without resorting to large- scale repressions. Still, under every authoritarian regime a certain share of citizens maintains oppositional attitudes towards the incumbent and his/her government and demonstrates resistance to the state’s propagandistic campaigns. Present study explores the reasons behind the opposition’s resistance to misinformation in Putin’s Russia. Main methods of Russian propaganda and ideas which it propagates are identified. The study builds up on the existing body of literature on information processing and selective exposure. The hypotheses that Russian opposition assesses new information based not on informed decisions, but on the existing attitudes and values, is confirmed through two online experiments. Big data analysis of media consumption of the supporters of oppositional leader Alexei Navalny and Russian prime-minister Dmitry Medvedev on major Russian social network Vkontakte suggests that at least a considerable proportion of Russian opposition consciously engages in selective exposure, seeking out the media sources that present points of view consistent with the users’ pre-existing oppositional attitudes. CEU eTD Collection i Acknowledgements I would like to express my sincerest gratitude to my supervisor Oana Lup for her dedication and time spent in discussions about this thesis. Her advice helped me a lot to find the right direction for this work and without her frequent and detailed feedback this thesis would never be possible. I would also like to thank professor Levente Littvay for our discussions and his continuous guidance and support. Without his classes and his advice I would never come up with an idea for this thesis in the first place. Special thanks goes to Anastasia Skripkina, Kostiantyn Riabkov and Yuliia Kazmina for their advice on the data analysis and the interpretation of the results, to Anton Mudrak for his comments on the Ukraine-related sections of this thesis, to Egor Sennikov for his help with the recruitment of participants for the experimental part of the present study. I am infinitely grateful to my family for their unconditional support and love as well as to my friends back home. To Andrew for the 10 years of our friendship and the late night calls. To Vladimir and Alexey for being present in my life every day in spite of the distance. To Yaroslav for his advice and our discussions. My sincerest thanks goes to my CEU family without who this year would have been much more difficult and boring. To Rustam for being the person I could rely on since my first day at CEU. To Anton for so many Friday nights. To Yan for his pirogi and making the dormitory feel like home. To Kostya for his sense of humour and our lengthy kitchen discussions. To Yulya for her sincerest care. To Nastya for her endless patience. To Olya for her timely advice and singing. To Egor for CEU eTD Collection so many stories. To Lev for his songs and thoughtfulness. And, of course, to Tanya, for one year of our Boston marriage-like life. ii Table of contents Abstract ............................................................................................................................................ i Acknowledgements ......................................................................................................................... ii Table of contents ............................................................................................................................ iii List of Figures and Tables............................................................................................................... v Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1 Chapter 1. Russian Propaganda: What is it Like and How to Avoid It .......................................... 5 1.1 The role of propaganda in contemporary authoritarian regimes ...................................... 5 1.2 Russian propaganda: main features .................................................................................. 8 1.3 Selective exposure – a means of “inner emigration”? ........................................................ 12 Chapter 2: “The mentioned citizen” and “banderovtsy”: how Russian propaganda treats opposition and Ukrainians ............................................................................................................ 14 2.1 Sweeping aside the opposition ............................................................................................ 14 2.2 Russian misinformation and the Ukrainian crisis: from bad to worse ................................ 19 Chapter 3. Resistance to Russian propaganda: evidence from an experimental study ................. 29 3.1 Research methodology ........................................................................................................ 29 3.2 Research method ................................................................................................................. 31 3.3 Results: the experiments ..................................................................................................... 39 3.4 Regression analysis: data and design .................................................................................. 45 3.5 Results: regression analysis ................................................................................................ 48 Chapter 4. Testing for the presence of selective exposure effect using big data analysis ............ 51 4.1 Research methodology ........................................................................................................ 51 CEU eTD Collection 4.2 Background and case selection ........................................................................................... 54 4.3 Data ..................................................................................................................................... 57 4.4 Research method ................................................................................................................. 59 4.5 Results ................................................................................................................................. 61 Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 70 iii Bibliography ................................................................................................................................. 74 Appendix 1 .................................................................................................................................... 78 Appendix 2 .................................................................................................................................... 81 Appendix 3 .................................................................................................................................... 83 CEU eTD Collection iv List of Figures and Tables Figure 1. Approval rating of Vladimir Putin and the Russian government 2000-2016 ................ 19 Figure 2. Google Trends, Russian searches about Navalny and Medvedev, May 2012-April 2017 ....................................................................................................................................................... 56 Figure 3. Single decision tree....................................................................................................... 63 Figure 4. ROC curve, single decision tree. ................................................................................... 63 Figure 5. ROC curve, 2000 trees random forest. .......................................................................... 64 Figure 6. ROC curve, logistic regression model. .......................................................................... 65 Table 1 .......................................................................................................................................... 40 Table 2 .......................................................................................................................................... 41 Table 3 .......................................................................................................................................... 42 Table 4 .......................................................................................................................................... 48 Table 5 .......................................................................................................................................... 83 CEU eTD Collection v Introduction Information is one of the most important resources in the 21st century. Long before the humanity entered the post-industrial era, information was crucial to politicians as it is the key to influencing public opinion, thus gaining or cementing one’s popular support. The dictators of the 20th century, such as Stalin or Hitler, would not have been able to stay in power and do what they were doing without propaganda and massive misinformation
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Minsk II a Fragile Ceasefire
    Briefing 16 July 2015 Ukraine: Follow-up of Minsk II A fragile ceasefire SUMMARY Four months after leaders from France, Germany, Ukraine and Russia reached a 13-point 'Package of measures for the implementation of the Minsk agreements' ('Minsk II') on 12 February 2015, the ceasefire is crumbling. The pressure on Kyiv to contribute to a de-escalation and comply with Minsk II continues to grow. While Moscow still denies accusations that there are Russian soldiers in eastern Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin publicly admitted in March 2015 to having invaded Crimea. There is mounting evidence that Moscow continues to play an active military role in eastern Ukraine. The multidimensional conflict is eroding the country's stability on all fronts. While the situation on both the military and the economic front is acute, the country is under pressure to conduct wide-reaching reforms to meet its international obligations. In addition, Russia is challenging Ukraine's identity as a sovereign nation state with a wide range of disinformation tools. Against this backdrop, the international community and the EU are under increasing pressure to react. In the following pages, the current status of the Minsk II agreement is assessed and other recent key developments in Ukraine and beyond examined. This briefing brings up to date that of 16 March 2015, 'Ukraine after Minsk II: the next level – Hybrid responses to hybrid threats?'. In this briefing: • Minsk II – still standing on the ground? • Security-related implications of the crisis • Russian disinformation
    [Show full text]
  • The Palgrave Handbook of Digital Russia Studies
    The Palgrave Handbook of Digital Russia Studies Edited by Daria Gritsenko Mariëlle Wijermars · Mikhail Kopotev The Palgrave Handbook of Digital Russia Studies Daria Gritsenko Mariëlle Wijermars • Mikhail Kopotev Editors The Palgrave Handbook of Digital Russia Studies Editors Daria Gritsenko Mariëlle Wijermars University of Helsinki Maastricht University Helsinki, Finland Maastricht, The Netherlands Mikhail Kopotev Higher School of Economics (HSE University) Saint Petersburg, Russia ISBN 978-3-030-42854-9 ISBN 978-3-030-42855-6 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42855-6 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2021. This book is an open access publication. Open Access This book is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this book are included in the book’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the book’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specifc statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
    [Show full text]
  • The Media As a Mirror of Putin's Evolving Strategy in Ukraine
    Tomila Lankina and Kohei Watanabe ‘Russian Spring’ or ‘Spring betrayal’? The media as a mirror of Putin’s evolving strategy in Ukraine Article (Accepted version) (Refereed) Original citation: Lankina, Tomila V. and Watanabe, Kohei (2017) ‘Russian Spring’ or ‘Spring betrayal’? The media as a mirror of Putin’s evolving strategy in Ukraine. Europe-Asia Studies. pp. 1526- 1556. ISSN 0966-8136 DOI: 10.1080/09668136.2017.1397603 © 2017 University of Glasgow This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/68226/ Available in LSE Research Online: January 2018 LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE Research Online website. This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be differences between this version and the published version. You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. 1 Tomila Lankina* and Kohei Watanabe** ‘Russian Spring’ or ‘Spring Betrayal’? The Media as a Mirror of Putin’s Evolving Strategy in Ukraine Abstract We develop a novel Russian-language electronic content analysis dictionary and method to analyse Russian state media’s framing of the Euromaidan protests.
    [Show full text]
  • Nord Stream 2
    Updated August 24, 2021 Russia’s Nord Stream 2 Natural Gas Pipeline to Germany Nord Stream 2, a natural gas pipeline nearing completion, is which accounted for about 48% of EU natural gas imports expected to increase the volume of Russia’s natural gas in 2020. Russian gas exports to the EU were up 18% year- export capacity directly to Germany, bypassing Ukraine, on-year in the first quarter of 2021. Factors behind reliance Poland, and other transit states (Figure 1). Successive U.S. on Russian supply include diminishing European gas Administrations and Congresses have opposed Nord Stream supplies, commitments to reduce coal use, Russian 2, reflecting concerns about European dependence on investments in European infrastructure, Russian export Russian energy and the threat of increased Russian prices, and the perception of many Europeans that Russia aggression in Ukraine. The German government is a key remains a reliable supplier. proponent of the pipeline, which it says will be a reliable Figure 1. Nord Stream Gas Pipeline System source of natural gas as Germany is ending nuclear energy production and reducing coal use. Despite the Biden Administration’s stated opposition to Nord Stream 2, the Administration appears to have shifted its focus away from working to prevent the pipeline’s completion to mitigating the potential negative impacts of an operational pipeline. Some critics of this approach, including some Members of Congress and the Ukrainian and Polish governments, sharply criticized a U.S.-German joint statement on energy security, issued on July 21, 2021, which they perceived as indirectly affirming the pipeline’s completion.
    [Show full text]
  • On Geopolitics, Trolling and the Mistranslation of Race in a Twitter Controversy
    #Russianrapisracist vs #RussianNaziPurgeParty: On Geopolitics, Trolling and the Mistranslation of Race in a Twitter Controversy Dinara Yangeldina Introduction I am currently being trolled by Russian rap fans in droves posting straight up Nazi propaganda. The Russian hip hop scene is extremely racist. It’s being led by racists like @sdthaking and i1official (@Talib Kweli 2020)1 The above tweet was posted at the end of February 2020 in the middle of a heated Twitter controversy between famous us rapper Talib Kweli and the Russian hip-hop community, in which he described the en- tire Russian rap scene as racist, Nazi and state sponsored.2 Thе scandal quickly spread to other social media platforms and got extensive cover- age online and even on the official Russian tv channels. But what exactly 1 In the wake of a harassment-related scandal Talib Kweli was permanently banned from Twitter on 4 July 2020. It is for this reason that none of his original Tweets are available anymore. The retypes of tweets are based on screenshots circulated in sec- ondary sources or collected by me during the initial stage of research for this chapter (the same applies to Twitter screenshots used here but not available in the original to reference). 2 Talib Kweli is a rapper known for his outspoken activist stance against police bru- tality and racial oppression in the usa. His early recognition is linked to the criti- cally acclaimed band Black Star, which he formed together with Mos Def in 1997 in Brooklyn, New York. This style of hip-hop, known as conscious hip-hop, is usually juxtaposed with gangsta rap.
    [Show full text]
  • Russian Media Organisations Banned for Three Years in Ukraine Ukraine
    Russian Media Organisations Banned for Three Years in Ukraine Ukraine abides by all commitments and international standards of ensuring freedom of speech in spite of the continued Russian aggression, the occupation of Ukraine’s sovereign territory in violation of all international rules, the use by the aggressor State of some media of various forms of ownership with a view to carrying out special information operations in the information field of Ukraine and other States by its security services. This is confirmed by Ukraine’s performance in Press Freedom Index 2018, compiled by the international organization Reporters Without Borders. According to the rating, Ukraine has moved one position up and is now ranked 101st. With regard to the concern expressed in the alert published on the Council of Europe Platform on the alleged prohibition of Russian media in Ukraine, the following information shall be taken into account. It is common knowledge that since 2014 Ukraine has been subjected to hybrid aggression of the Russian Federation. This aggression manifested not only in the illegal occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and military aggression in Donetsk and Luhansk regions but also in an unprecedented disinformation and propagandistic campaign against Ukraine. With a view to establishing a legal framework to counter the aggression, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted the Law of Ukraine “On Sanctions” (hereinafter referred to as the Law) on 14 August 2014. Article 1 of the Law states that, with a view to protecting national interests, national security, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, countering terrorist activities, as well as preventing infringement of rights and restoring infringed rights, freedoms and lawful interests of citizens of Ukraine, society and the state special economic and other restrictive measures (hereinafter referred to as ‘sanctions’) may be taken.
    [Show full text]
  • Journalism in the Borderland. Barents Media Freedom
    Journalism in the borderland Barents Media Freedom 2017 Published with support from Fritt Ord Authored by Atle Staalesen Atle Staalesen is journalist and Director of the Independent Barents Observer. In 2002, he founded the Barents Observer, which in the period 2005-2015 was hosted by the Norwegian Barents Secretariat. Atle was editor until 2009 and later worked as journalist and project coordinator for several European cross-border cooperation projects. He quit his job in the Barents Secretariat late 2015 following a conflict over editorial rights and subsequently re- established the Barents Observer as an independent and non-profit stock company along with the rest of the newspaper crew. Atle has a degree in Russian studies from the University of Oslo and studied journalism at the Moscow State University. Kirkenes, 2017 The Independent Barents Observer [email protected] @BarentsNews Introduction «You will not write about politics, will you?» The question comes from one of the border guards checking my passport at the Russian checkpoint of Borisoglebsk. I am on my way across the Norwegian-Russian border heading for Murmansk, the Russian Arctic city, on a work assignment. It is not uncommon that Russian border guards ask journalists about the purpose of their visit. However, this time the question is more intriguing than normal. And the timing is extraordinary. Only few weeks earlier had Thomas Nilsen, my colleague and Editor of the Barents Observer, been stopped on the very same spot and taken aside by the border guards. In a back room he was told that he was no longer wanted in Russia and that he would be rejected entry for the next five years.
    [Show full text]
  • Nord Stream 2: Background, Objections, and Possible Outcomes Steven Pifer
    NORD STREAM 2: BACKGROUND, OBJECTIONS, AND POSSIBLE OUTCOMES STEVEN PIFER APRIL 2021 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Nord Stream 2 is an almost-finished natural gas pipeline from Russia to Germany. The Biden administration opposes it and has come under congressional pressure to invoke sanctions to prevent its completion, in large part because the pipeline seems a geopolitical project targeted at Ukraine. The German government, however, regards the pipeline as a “commercial project” and appears committed to its completion, perhaps in the next few months. U.S. sanctions applied on Russian entities to date have failed to stop Nord Stream 2, raising the question of whether the U.S. government would sanction German and other European companies for servicing or certifying the pipeline. Such sanctions would provoke controversy with Germany at a time when both Berlin and the Biden administration seek to rebuild good relations. The two sides have work to do if they wish to avoid Nord Stream 2 becoming a major point of U.S.-German contention. THE PIPELINE The European Union currently imports about 40% of its natural gas from Russia, or about one-third Nord Stream 2 is actually a pair of natural gas of its total gas consumption.4 Gazprom began pipelines that, if/when completed, will run some discussions with European companies on a direct 1,200 kilometers along the bottom of the Baltic Russia-Germany gas pipeline in 2001. At that time, 1 Sea from Ust-Luga, Russia to Greifswald, Germany. it shipped gas to western Europe via pipelines that The two pipelines, collectively referred to as Nord mainly transited Ukraine, and also Belarus and Stream 2, are projected to have the capacity to Poland (the Yamal system).
    [Show full text]
  • Instrumentalizing the Sources of Attraction. How Russia Undermines Its Own Soft Power
    INSTRUMENTALIZING THE SOURCES OF ATTRACTION. HOW RUSSIA UNDERMINES ITS OWN SOFT POWER By Vasile Rotaru Abstract The 2011-2013 domestic protests and the 2013-2015 Ukraine crisis have brought to the Russian politics forefront an increasing preoccupation for the soft power. The concept started to be used in official discourses and documents and a series of measures have been taken both to avoid the ‘dangers’ of and to streamline Russia’s soft power. This dichotomous approach towards the ‘power of attraction’ have revealed the differences of perception of the soft power by Russian officials and the Western counterparts. The present paper will analyse Russia’s efforts to control and to instrumentalize the sources of soft power, trying to assess the effectiveness of such an approach. Keywords: Russian soft power, Russian foreign policy, public diplomacy, Russian mass media, Russian internet Introduction The use of term soft power is relatively new in the Russian political circles, however, it has become recently increasingly popular among the Russian analysts, policy makers and politicians. The term per se was used for the first time in Russian political discourse in February 2012 by Vladimir Putin. In the presidential election campaign, the then candidate Putin drew attention to the fact that soft power – “a set of tools and methods to achieve foreign policy goals without the use of arms but by exerting information and other levers of influence” is used frequently by “big countries, international blocks or corporations” “to develop and provoke extremist, separatist and nationalistic attitudes, to manipulate the public and to directly interfere in the domestic policy of sovereign countries” (Putin 2012).
    [Show full text]
  • From the Ukraine–Russia War to the Navalny Case: How to Deal with the Kremlin?
    From the Ukraine–Russia War to the Navalny Case: How to Deal with the Kremlin? Nona Mikhelidze No. 12. April 2021 This publication has been funded by the European Union under the Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement no. 769886. ABSTRACT April 2021 . 12 Seven years after the annexation of Crimea and amid an ongoing war in Ukraine, Russia has tried to move towards military escalation in the Donbass region making clear that the status quo emerged in 2014 as a “new normal” cannot last. The Minsk II Agreement negotiated between Ukraine, Russia, France and Germany in the framework of the Normandy Format in February 2015 remains unimplemented despite numerous rounds of mediation. Western economic sanctions against Moscow succeeded in limiting the Kremlin’s military EU-LISTCO Policy Paper Series. Paper EU-LISTCO Policy advance beyond Donbass and deterred it from making further territorial gains. However, these measures failed to impact on Russian decision-making regarding resolution of the conflict. Influencing Russia’s foreign policy is not an easy task, as the country’s conduct of international relations is shaped by domestic factors and the authoritarian nature of its governance. Still, the West needs a strategy in response to the international and domestic wrongdoings already committed by the Kremlin and as a preventative measure to deter Moscow’s future aggression. In order to face the Russian challenge, the West should first design clear rules for its own foreign-policy behaviour based on the primacy of human rights and democracy and then define how to defend universal values abroad, including in Russia.
    [Show full text]
  • Anastasia Afonina 'The Popular Culture of Criminality' VAV3, Gerrit
    Anastasia Afonina ‘The Popular Culture of Criminality’ VAV3, Gerrit Rietveld Academie As fashion evolved throughout times, we moved from long gowns into mini skirts in less than a century. At the beginning of 2000s we were hypnotized by the Paris Hilton’s glamor- ous pink and disgusted by the unsatisfactory living conditions of people labeled as a ‘lower class’. From what I see we can develop even faster. We can be even more radical. My research is about a modern popular culture and, in particular, the active exploitation of criminal aesthetics in the different forms of art, such as music, fashion, cinema, etc. My curi- osity is built around an observation that just recently people that we would call ‘upper-middle class’ were often trying to ignore the presence of some particular urban areas known as ‘ghetto’ and its unsatisfactory social conditions that meanwhile developed in its individual culture. This lifestyle, fashion, music, slang, etc, was not highly appreciated by the other so- cial classes. Yet now, what was considered as ‘bad taste’ ten years ago has a huge impact on contemporary art and media. Therefore, I am curious about the reason of a rapidly growing interest and the frequent use of the ghetto culture that became the new popular culture nowadays. Estonian rapper Tommy Cash In addition to it, I would also like to get to know more about its connection with political and social propaganda. I find it interesting, how those two different things - propaganda and a popular culture - can be so interconnected the way they affect each other.
    [Show full text]
  • Russia's Information War Propaganda Or Counter-Propaganda?
    Briefing October 2016 Russia's information war Propaganda or counter-propaganda? SUMMARY In the West, Russia is more often seen as an instigator than a target of propaganda. However, Kremlin documents and Russian media argue that Russia itself faces serious threats from external information activity. Allegedly, such threats could undermine political stability in the country, curtail its international influence, and jeopardise traditional values. Moscow therefore argues that it needs to take defensive measures. The Kremlin claims that the USA and its allies are waging an information war against Russia. ISIL/Da'esh, which produces an increasing amount of Russian-language material, is another major adversary. At home, the Kremlin has clamped down on media and civil society to exclude external influences. Internationally, it has launched media weapons such as news channel RT to compete with Western media, and bankrolled pro-Russian NGOs. Critics of the Kremlin dispute its claims of a Western-led information war against Russia, and accuse it of conducting disinformation campaigns to justify aggression in neighbouring countries such as Ukraine. In terms of meeting their declared goal of protecting Russia from information threats, Russian measures have succeeded in excluding most foreign influences from the country. The international impact is more questionable; Russia's image is still very poor, but that does not mean that the Kremlin cannot defend what it sees as the country's external interests. In this briefing: Strategy and priorities Roles and responsibilities Adversaries Main tools Insights and criticism EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service Author: Martin Russell Members' Research Service PE 589.810 EN EPRS Russia's information war: Propaganda or counter-propaganda? Definitions: 'information', 'information war', 'propaganda' Russian official texts refer to 'information' rather than to 'propaganda'.
    [Show full text]