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Prospects of the Russian Protest Movement Ksenia Kirillova and Olga Khvostunova Prospects of the Russian Protest Movement

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Prospects of the Russian Protest Movement Ksenia Kirillova and Olga Khvostunova Prospects of the Russian Protest Movement Prospects of the Russian Protest Movement Ksenia Kirillova and Olga Khvostunova Prospects of the Russian Protest Movement ISBN-13: 978-1-61977-090-4 Cover: People attend a rally to demand authorities allow opposition candidates to run in the upcoming local election in Moscow, Russia August 10, 2019. REUTERS/Maxim Shemetov Atlantic Council 1030 15th Street, NW 12th Floor Washington, DC 20005 Website: www.atlanticcouncil.org II ATLANTIC COUNCIL Prospects of the Russian Protest Movement Prospects of the Russian Protest Movement Ksenia Kirillova and Olga Khvostunova This piece is written and published in accordance with the Atlantic Council Policy on Intellectual Independence. The author is solely responsible for its analysis and recommendations. The Atlantic Council and its donors do not determine, nor do they necessarily endorse or advocate for, any of this report’s conclusions. ATLANTIC COUNCIL III Prospects of the Russian Protest Movement The Atlantic Council is a nonpartisan organization that promotes constructive US leadership and engagement in international affairs based on the central role of the Atlantic community in meeting today’s global challenges. The Institute of Modern Russia (IMR) is a public policy think-tank that strives to establish an intellectual framework for building a democratic Russia governed by rule of law. IMR promotes social, economic, and institutional development in Russia through research, analysis, advocacy and outreach. IMR’s goal is to advance Russia’s integration into the community of democracies and to improve its cooperation on the global stage. IV ATLANTIC COUNCIL Prospects of the Russian Protest Movement CONTENTS Prospects of the Moscow Protest Movement 2 Putin’s Declining Popularity and Its Causes in Russia 2 Challenges Facing Russia’s Protest Movement 5 Russian Youth in the Moscow Protests 12 What Comes Next? 17 About the Authors 18 ATLANTIC COUNCIL 1 Prospects of the Russian Protest Movement PROSPECTS OF THE MOSCOW PROTEST MOVEMENT Ksenia Kirillova he eruption of protests on the streets of As these kinds of protests in Russia become increasingly Moscow in early August was the culmination common, polls tell us that Russians have been losing of demonstrations the previous month confidence in President Vladimir Putin. But those Tafter election officials barred opposition candidates two trends do not add up to a popular movement from running for City Council, citing irregularities in for change. They may be frustrated, but Russians are the signatures collected to put them on the ballot.1 also too divided and anxious to coalesce around a Hundreds were arrested as the protests repeated for revolutionary vision or action. several weekends in a row amid police crackdowns against demonstrators and opposition figures.2 PUTIN’S DECLINING POPULARITY The results of the 2019 Russian municipal and regional AND ITS CAUSES IN RUSSIA polls were foreseeable, but did contain a few surprises. In the regional elections, all sixteen pro-Kremlin governors The last year has seen a shift in the mood of the Russian were re-elected, including Alexander Beglov in Saint public that, in combination several other trends, could Petersburg, whose victory was preceded by numerous spell trouble for Putin, were it not for the opposition’s violations.3 Although United Russia dominated in the inability to unify Russians and counter the government’s regional elections, the ruling party suffered significant shopworn narrative. losses in Moscow: they were able to get only twenty- five out of forty-five seats while the opposition parties Most significantly, public confidence in Putin is waning. received twenty seats, thirteen of which were taken by In a January 2019 poll by the Russian Center for Public the Communist party—quite an unusual outcome for the Opinion Research (VCIOM), the level of confidence in city, where the Communists have been rarely supported Vladimir Putin had reached its lowest point in thirteen by voters. Many explain this victory as a result of a years. At that time, only 33 percent of respondents “smart voting” strategy, launched by Alexei Navalny and expressed confidence in the president.5 By late May designed to rally support for the registered candidates 2019, the number had fallen to 31.7 percent,6 which, in Moscow’s election with the best chance of defeating according to Radio Liberty,7 is the lowest rating since a pro-Kremlin candidate. But whether the “smart voting” the center began asking the question. This indicator strategy played a crucial role in the results or not, the started to slide in the summer of 2018,8 as Putin signed outcome of Moscow’s election has confirmed both the into law hikes in the retirement age and the country’s growth of protest moods among the population and the value-added tax rate, even as people’s real incomes opposition’s ability to mobilize joint actions.4 continued to decline. 1 “Moscow protests: Opposition rally ‘largest since 2011,’” BBC, August 10, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-49305129. 2 “Moscow: Thousands protest local election,” Deutsche Welle, August 10, 2019, https://www.dw.com/en/moscow-thousands-protest- local-election/a-49979411. 3 “Единый день голосования в России. Главное,” Meduza, September 8, 2019, https://meduza.io/feature/2019/09/09/proval-edinoy- rossii-v-habarovske-beglov-v-peterburge-sistemnaya-oppozitsiya-v-moskve. 4 “Поражение в Москве, победа в регионах: итоги выборов 8 сентября,” The Bell, September 9, 2019, https://thebell.io/porazhenie-v- moskve-pobeda-v-regionah-itogi-vyborov-8-sentyabrya/. 5 “Опрос: доверие россиян к Путину сократилось до 13-летнего минимума,” BBC, January 25, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/russian/ news-47008309. 6 “Рейтинги доверия политикам, одобрения работы государственных институтов, рейтинги партий,” VCIOM, May 24, 2019, https:// wciom.ru/index.php?id=236&uid=9707. 7 “Рейтинг доверия россиян Владимиру Путину обновил исторический минимум,” Radio Svoboda, May 25, 2019, https://www.svoboda.org/a/29962455.html. 8 “Рейтинги доверия политикам, оценки работы президента и правительства, поддержка политических партий,” VCIOM, May 31, 2019, https://wciom.ru/index.php?id=236&uid=9728. 2 ATLANTIC COUNCIL Prospects of the Russian Protest Movement Anton Sergienko (RFE/RL) Following the barring of opposition candidates in Moscow city elections, protests on the streets of Moscow continued throughout August 2019, with over 2,000 protestors detained. Photo credit: Anton Sergienko (RFE/RL) Ironically, VCIOM also reported in late May 2019 an Also, notably, the number of Russians who support increase from January 2019 in Putin’s job approval,9 from Putin’s foreign policy, usually a solid indicator for the 61.7 percent to 64.5 percent. The agency explained the president, decreased in 2018.11 discrepancy between the confidence and job approval numbers by saying it had adopted a new, more accurate Another ominous trend for Putin and his government method of conducting surveys soon after releasing the is the recent growth of protest activity in Russia. bruising results of the public-confidence question. Anastasia Nikolskaya, a researcher at Kosygin Russian State University who has for years studied the attitudes That explanation, though, raises a few questions. First, of the Russian public, told this year’s meeting of the in March 2019, VCIOM had put Putin’s job approval Free Russia Forum in Vilnius: at its highest level since the beginning of 2019,10 65 percent, even as his confidence rating hit 33 percent. A year ago, Russia’s domestic policy was What can account for that discrepancy? Second, May’s condemned by many, but the majority approved 64.5 percent cannot be called “growth” from the March of the country’s foreign policy and emphasized figure of 65 percent, by anyone’s reckoning. For all of the importance of the idea that other countries VCIOM’s claims about new methodology, Putin’s ratings fear Russia. However, in October the request for continue to decline. a peaceful foreign policy was clearly made. There 9 Рейтинги доверия политикам, оценки работы президента и правительства, поддержка политических партий, VCIOM, May 31, 2019, https://wciom.ru/index.php?id=236&uid=9728. 10 Алексей Дегтярев, “Рейтинг одобрения деятельности Путина достиг максимума за полгода,” Взгляд, March 22, 2019, https://vz.ru/news/2019/3/22/969654.html. 11 “Опрос социологов: уровень поддержки внешней политики Путина снижается,” Radio Svoboda, August 9, 2018, https://www.svoboda.org/a/29421583.html. ATLANTIC COUNCIL 3 Prospects of the Russian Protest Movement The Kremlin utilizes bureaucracy to restrict assembly. To protest the arrest of journalist Ivan Golunov, Russians organized shifts of single-person pickets to circumvent a law requiring permits for gatherings of more than one person. Photo Source: Wikimedia Commons is also a growing tendency of [Russians] fighting within the framework of the economic logic that has for their rights by constitutional means. Respect dominated since 2012 among the Russian elites,” is among the most important Russian values, so Vladislav Inozemtsev, economist and director of the the arrogant statements of low-level local officials Center for Post-Industrial Society Studies, wrote in make people feel even more offended. It’s fair to June. This stagnation, Inozemtsev wrote, is wearing say that people have changed.12 people out: In a May interview with Russian independent news The situation is aggravated by the fact that the agency Znak.com, Nikolskaya said there is a “revolution authorities consciously create in people’s minds a in the mass consciousness of Russians” and that “people sense of life in a ‘besieged fortress’ and thus send a want autonomy for their regions.”13 signal that we should not expect our lives to improve in the near future. Under the circumstances, the These demands for respect and self-government, authorities should not be surprised by the decline along with rising skepticism of Putin, are being made in their own popularity.
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