Final Fire and Aviation Safety Team Report

for the

Kettle Complex, North Star, Tunk Block, Okanagon Complex, Chelan Complex, Wolverine/Blankenship/First Creek, Carpenter Road, Kaniksu Complex, and Grizzly Bear Complex

Prepared for PNWCG MAC

October 1, 2015

Table of Contents

Executive Summary ...... 3 Introduction ...... 4 Methods and Procedures ...... 4 Purpose and Objectives ...... 6 Findings, Common Themes ...... 7 – 8 Findings, Recommendations and Action Items...... 8 – 10 Findings, Specific Incident Reports ...... 10 – 25 Selected Quotes from Interviews...... 25 – 26

Appendices A - Daily FAST Summaries (September 5 through September 9, 2015) B - FAST Delegation of Authority, September 5, 2015

Fire and Aviation Safety Team Members

Doug Frederick, Fire Management Officer, USFWS, Inland Northwest Refuge Complex, FAST Operations Jim Heuring, Forest Practices District Manager, Washington DNR, FAST Safety Ian Reid, District Ranger, USFS, Umatilla National Forest, FAST Leader/Point of Contact, [email protected] Ryan Stailey, Training Specialist, DOI Office Aviation Safety, FAST Aviation

FAST Logistical Support

John Szulc, BIA Fire Operations, FAST Liaison Shelby Gales, Fire Operations Safety Manager, Pacific Northwest Region, Forest Service/BLM Rachel Smith, Assistant Director Fire and Aviation, Southern Region, Forest Service Steve Holdsambeck, Assistant Director Fire and Aviation, Southern Region, Forest Service

This report is dedicated to Daniel Lyon and to the lives of Andrew Zajac, Richard Wheeler, and Tom Zbyszewski who died while fighting these fires.

Executive Summary

Near-record drought, dry lightning, and high winds combined in mid-August 2015 to create a conflagration of large wildfires in central and eastern Washington. The Pacific Northwest Geographic Area (GA) was at Preparedness Level (PL) 5, the highest level possible. A PL 5 in two other GAs, and the national level, led to extreme resource shortage. Incident Management Teams (IMTs) and Agency Administrators (AAs) were faced with challenging decisions regarding risk management, firefighter exposure, and cumulative fatigue. One of these fires killed three firefighters and seriously injured another. A Fire and Aviation Safety Team (FAST) was convened on September 5, 2015 to assess operational and managerial activities on fires throughout Washington by reviewing safety and risk management issues, nontraditional fire resources (e.g. military), contractor use, and fatigue management on large fires managed by 7 different type 1, 2, and 3 IMTs. The FAST found:  IMTs and AAs used creativity, innovation, and deliberate risk assessment to prioritize and protect values at risk while working with the limited resources they received  Fire burned into several communities and IMTs and local resources took heroic action to save many towns including Chelan, Omak, Okanogan, Holden Village, and Troy from being destroyed  Safety records overall were excellent given the number of exposure hours, with some tragic exceptions and several other important near misses that could have been fatal  Initial attack resources, IMTs, and line supervisors generally did not engage fires or chose to disengage when conditions became unfavorable. Multiple fires were not staffed due to line supervisors’ inability to provide for LCES  The independent action of private citizens under Washington law often resulted in natural resource damage and put firefighters at increased risk of serious injury  The nontraditional wildland resources of Australians, New Zealanders, Military, National Guard, and State Mobilization and Conflagration resources performed exceptionally and were an important asset to the 2015 fire season  The support from agency administrators resulted in positive relations with the IMTs but local agency administrators with community trust, relationships, and knowledge of their management area were preferred  A critical shortage of line supervision resources (strike team and task force leaders and equipment bosses) was observed with future shortage of non-operational IMT positions  Field communication systems were stretched beyond their limits due to large fire size  Land management history played a significant role in fire behavior and firefighter risk management with treatment of activity slash greatly reducing firefighter hazard

Introduction

The PNWCG MAC (MAC) requested the Fire and Aviation Safety Team (FAST) to conduct an independent safety assessment and evaluation of operations and managerial activities on large fires using type 1, 2, and 3 Incident Management Teams (IMTs) in Washington. The FAST was specifically tasked to engage individual firefighters, incident commanders, agency administrators, and emergency responders in grasping the current and potential safety and risk management issues. The FAST was directed to be service oriented, interagency in focus, and to provide early warning to the MAC where accident-prone conditions existed.

Methods and Procedures

The FAST was mobilized in Colville, Washington on September 5, 2015, inbriefed virtually with the MAC, then visited the Kettle Complex. On September 6, the FAST visited the North Star/Tunk Block Incidents. On September 7, the FAST visited the Okanagon and Chelan Complexes and the Wolverine/Blankenship/First Creek fires. On September 8, the FAST visited the Carpenter Road Incident. On September 9, we visited the Kaniksu Complex. On September 10, the FAST visited the Grizzly Bear Complex. The FAST closed out with the MAC virtually on September 11, 2015 from Pendleton, Oregon, and provided the MAC with a draft of this report on September 14, 2015. In summary, the FAST visited 7 separate incidents in 6 days, which collectively burned over 900,000 acres in Washington and northeastern Oregon (Table 1).

At each incident, the FAST reported to the Incident Command Post (ICP) and met with the Incident Commander (IC) and members of their Command and General Staff (IMT), Agency Administrators (AA) and Agency Administrator Representatives, local fire management officers (FMOs), in addition to various cooperators, stakeholders, and firefighters. Incident engagements lasted approximately 4 to 6 hours.

Each FAST member took detailed notes of IMT/AA interactions during incident site visits. Through consensus, which included the IC and often the AA, the FAST identified key health and safety issues associated with each incident. A review of the daily FAST summaries (Appendix A) provides a comprehensive overview of the circumstances and conditions at each incident.

Table 1. Incidents visited during the FAST deployment, September 2015.

Fire Name Date Date Team Type Incident Communities Acres1 Started Visited (1-3) Commander Immediately Threatened1 Kettle 8/11/15 9/5/15 1 Chris Schulte** Curlew, Malo, 76,509 Complex Orient, Boydd, Barstow North Star/ 8/13/15 9/6/15 1 Ed Lewis Nespelum, 210,115 Tunk Block 8/14/15 Republic, 162,600 Riverside*, Tonaskat, Okanagon 8/14/15 9/7/15 1 Mike Minton Conconully*, 132,634 Complex/ 8/14/15 Chris Schulte** Tonasket, 88,684 Chelan Riverside*, Complex Omak*, Okanagon*, Synarep*, Stehekin, Chelan*, Chelan Falls*, Pateros, Methow Wolverine 6/29/15 9/7/15 1 Clay Templin Holden*, 65,355 Carpenter 8/14/15 9/8/15 2 Doug Johnson Hunters, 65,068 Road Fruitland Kaniksu 8/11/15 9/9/15 2 Tom Kurth 26,000 Complex Grizzly Bear 8/13/15 9/10/15 3 Kim Soper Troy*, 75,268 Complex Eden Bench*, Grouse Flats* *Fire burned into the community **IC interview concerning both fires 1As described by InciWeb on 9/10/15

Purpose and Objectives

The overall purpose and objective of the FAST, as established by the September 5, 2015 Delegation of Authority, were to serve as a field presence for the PNWCG MAC and assist firefighters, fire managers, AAs, and IMTs. The FAST focused on the following elements: a) safety and risk issues arising from IMTs, AAs, local unit line officers, FMOs or any resources involved in fire suppression, b) entities such as military and international resources who do not traditionally engage in wildland fire under normal conditions and their span of control, c) how safety and risk topics are being relayed and implemented among our contract resources and our contractors being inspected properly, d) recognition by managers and incident staff of the unusual fire condition faced throughout the geographic area this year and any positive or negative safety implications of response actions for initial attack, extended attack, and large fire incidents, e) immediate and cumulative fatigue management, including contractors. The FAST was also directed to assess instances of independent action as it relates to the new Washington Law HB 2093. Most incidents visited by the FAST had a military or National Guard presence and examples of independent action taken (Table 2).

The FAST focused on both the immediate and long-term implications of managing multiple large fires over an extended timeframe. The FAST identified common themes that emerged among all or most incidents, while recognizing each incident had its own specific local concerns, objectives, hazards, and issues.

Table 2. Incidents visited during the FAST deployment, September 2015.

Fire Name Independent Action State Mob Used Military/National International Taken (Y/N) Guard Resources Kettle Complex No Yes National Guard Canadian, Australian, NZ North Star/ Yes Yes National Guard Australian/NZ Tunk Block Okanagon Yes Yes National Guard Australian/NZ Complex and Chelan Complex Wolverine Yes Yes Active Military and Australian/NZ Natl. Guard Carpenter Road Yes Yes National Guard Australian Kaniksu Complex No No Active Military and Australian Natl. Guard Grizzly Bear Yes Yes National Guard Australian/NZ Complex

Findings

Common themes

 IMTs and AAs used creativity, innovation, and deliberate risk assessment to prioritize and protect values at risk while working with the limited resources they received  Fire burned into several communities and IMTs and local resources took heroic action to save many towns, including Omak, Chelan, Okanogan, Chelan Falls, Holden Village, Riverside, Troy, Eden Bench, and Grouse Flats, from being destroyed  Safety records overall were excellent given the number of exposure hours, with some tragic exceptions and several other important near misses that could have been fatal. The near misses revolved around heavy equipment and vehicle incidents, snags, and near burn-overs  Initial attack resources such as rapellers, IMTs, and line supervisors generally did not engage fires or chose to disengage when conditions became unfavorable. Multiple fires were not staffed due to line supervisors’ inability to provide for LCES  The firefighter fatalities on the Okanogan-Wenatchee National Forest resulted in acute emotional impacts that will be long lasting in that area  The independent action of private citizens under Washington law often resulted in natural resource damage and put firefighters at increased risk of serious injury  The nontraditional wildland resources of Australians, New Zealanders, military, National Guard, and state mobilization and conflagration resources performed exceptionally and were an important asset to the 2015 fire season  The support from agency administrators resulted in positive relations with the IMTs and local agency administrators with community trust, relationships, and knowledge of their management area were preferred  A critical shortage of line supervision resources (strike team and task force leaders and equipment bosses) was observed  Field communication systems were stretched beyond their limits due to large fire size, and frequencies were limited  Land management history played a significant role in fire behavior and firefighter risk management with treatment of activity slash greatly reducing firefighter hazard. Areas that had not previously burned slash after logging were compared to structures that lacked defensible space  Air attack platforms were also limited which impacted operations  The ROSS ordering system has significant issues, but name requests were used as work-arounds

 Travel time in and around fires were all long but were generally mitigated by spike camps  Lack of logistical support affected firefighter morale and added to cumulative fatigue  Contractors were not willing to report injuries to risk demobilization

Recommendations and Action Items

1. Many have adapted the PACE model for planning and operations, transferring that to NIFC communications, hardware, and the frequencies would be useful in the future. Many incidents reported not enough repeaters, links, or frequencies for command, air to ground or tactical channels. Developing a contingency list that already is licensed and works with current systems would be useful. An example is Radio Frequency agreements are conducted with DOI every 5 years in which agencies exchange information and permission to use/share frequencies. We recommend developing a list of less used frequencies that could be tapped into on these sorts of PL6 seasons. The MOU’s already exist for DOI. Purchasing/renting additional repeaters and links would be cheaper than risking poor or no communications and those safety implications. Regarding NIFC support there is a possible need to increase support staff to keep up with maintenance and support needs. We recommend looking at faster delivery methods – direct contract air services as opposed to FedEx when necessary or requested. We recommend having more repeaters and frequencies available to accommodate the increased need. Acknowledge the use of older radios by contractors on fires and the need to use frequencies in the 164 – 174 range so everyone can communicate. Take a broader look at the fact that fires are getting much larger and have possibly outgrown the radio and repeater system capacity.

2. Take a hard look at the resource ordering system. Qualified people were available, yet ROSS was not effective in getting them ordered and out to where they needed to be. a. We recommend increased use of prepositioning for quicker mobilization. b. We recommend looking at creative ways to fill those Single Resource Boss needs, like creating training opportunities for long term fire crew members. c. We recommend locating and identifying search and rescue modules that are available and willing to help the fire suppression effort. Some were available, but there was no way of effectively ordering them to get them where they were needed.

3. The new law in Washington that allows fire suppression action to be taken by citizens needs to be tightened up to require them to coordinate their actions with the fire organization. There was too much independent action that was not coordinated with anyone that seriously endangered firefighters. One recommendation that could have

some potential is to add the LOFR position if they don’t currently exist to all the teams’ rosters. This person could help work with the County Emergency Services and Sheriff’s offices to educate and enforce closures and minimize intrusions into the fire areas.

4. Use of military was successful, the system has improved in many areas. Two areas could still be improved: a. Line-certified fire boots are still an issue. This creates a safety, medical and morale issue. High quality firefighting boots need to be issued early on with the expectation that the troops will have time to break them in ahead of time and can keep them for future assignments. Sore, damaged feet is a real impediment on their ability to function. b. MCAD organization that is assigned to a unit for fire dispatch should do the training. Spending this extra time up from goes a long way to develop crew cohesion and ability to identify strengths and weaknesses that translate to greater safety on the fireline.

5. The use of Australians and New Zealanders proved to be a great asset. A better crosswalk of qualifications would maximize utilization of these resources. Better equipping these firefighters, not only with vehicles, but also with cell phones and credit cards would ensure they have better communication and increase their flexibility. Another concern in understanding roles and responsibilities was the crosswalk of positions from AUS/NEZ to US ICS. Some international firefighters felt underutilized and confused because the US ICS the terminology was not understood. We recommend a crosswalk table for international positions is developed before the next deployment so this confusion and potential feeling of inadequacy is resolved in future assignments.

6. VIPR has a couple of issues that need fixing before next fire season. The recommendations are: add a clause to the contract about leaving camp to seek lodging in town. That travel time and long distances to the motel added as we saw in one incident this year, an extra 3 hours of travel time per day to resources working 12-16 hours then driving into a motel. From a safety perspective, fire resources should be required to camp in fire camp once they are off shift or not travel more than 10 miles to town. The other issue was resources being mobilized through VIPR showing up and not meeting the terms of the contract upon inspection. The front end of the process should have 100% inspection rate. Of the 7 teams visited 6 had ICPIs assigned to them or could get them. That should be tracked through the MAC group as a critical need to move ICPIs around to incidents that don’t have them for inspection purposes. Our final recommendation is to look at making VIPR more user friendly as some contractors

reported they didn’t sign up because it was too much paperwork. It was undetermined what that would entail but perhaps the Finance side could look at the process.

7. Illness and Injuries. This issue arose from several interviews revealing heat related issues where the person came to the fire not feeling well and didn’t want to miss out on the pay and aggravated their illness or injury. We recommend educating firefighters on the dangers of working while injured or ill and send the message that it is acceptable to stay in camp for a day instead of reporting to the line not feeling well. Crew bosses and contractors’ supervisors all need to do a better job of observing that fire line personnel are fit for duty. The other issue was not reporting accidents or injuries. This came up in several incidents. For a contractor not reporting injuries or incidents should be in the terms of the contract that will penalize the contractor for not reporting it.

Individual Incident Reports

Kettle Complex

All photos InciWeb file unless otherwise noted

FAST members met with IC, Deputy IC, field ops, safety, air ops, FS Agency Rep Terry Baker and FS Agency Administrator Rodney Smoldon (Acting Forest Supervisor) for the Kettle Complex (WA-COF-1111, 1202, 1222,and 001196) near Kettle Falls, WA and close to the Canadian border. FAST attended the 1900 planning meeting that evening (5 September) and the 0600 operational period briefing the following day. Afterwards, we closed out with Incident Commander Chris Shulte.

Safety and risk issues from the aviation standpoint included air operations occurring in close proximity on two separate incidents between Canadian and American air resources on the

Stickpin Fire. A helicopter bucket hit a power line during water drop operations. This occurred without serious damage or consequences, and a Lessons Learned was conducted.

As far as incident accidents and injuries, there were 2 minor vehicle backing accidents, no time loss injuries and 16 hospital visits that included a chainsaw cut, bee stings and camp crud. When the IMT arrived, the camp was infested with Black Widow spiders. There was at least 1 serious bite. An exterminator was hired and they sprayed. This helped thin the spider population in camp. Communications were an issue early on because of lack of repeaters and frequencies early on, this had smoothed out by the time this team arrived, other than the typical limitations associated with steep, broken terrain and large distances.

As for non-traditional partners, Canadians staffed the Northern divisions with overhead, crews, dozers and air assets. They integrated well with both this team and the previous team. They were professional and skilled and were a great asset, and the closest thing the fire had to a Type 1 handcrew. The same was said for the Australians and New Zealanders, “a great asset”. It was interesting that the Canadians do not wear fire shelters, they disengage when fire behavior changes. The National Guard had only spent 1 day on the line, so they hard to evaluate, but appeared to be better trained and the thought was that they would be a good addition. There were no volunteers on this fire and no independent action by private citizens was observed. Two Strike Teams of MOB engines and leaders were on the fire during the tenure of both IMTs. Both noted that State MOB worked very well. They were initially used to locate and rate structures on the west side of the fire, then moved to the line where they performed well and were a great asset holding line so the structures didn’t become an issue. Contract crews were few, inspected and no issues were reported. Some had to be demobilized because they received bad information before the season and didn’t take the refresher. Lack of resources was a major concern, the team had enough resources to staff 2 divisions appropriately but they spread out over 8-9 divisions.

By the time this team took over, the extreme fire behavior seen the first 2 weeks had abated due to the weather change. Fatigue was managed by cutting back hours. Because it is late in a long season and many had prolonged smoke exposure during extended day of inversions and so many acres burning, this is manifesting itself mostly with camp crud. The IMT is trying to mitigate with many hand wash stations and having camp and kitchen help wipe surfaces down with anti-bacterial soap regularly. The IMT was managing its own fatigue (they had been extended at Chelan Complex) by asking for additional days off and a hotel room before travelling.

Another issue observed was that Area Command was very hard to work with. The IMT felt that they were hoarding air assets and they were just another layer to go through to get resources. Some members of the IMT suggested that Area Command is an outdated model not needed with modern communications. The AA had a safety officer from the Boise NF come out before fires hit and programmatically review the forest fire safety program and risk management issues. This was good timing and served the forest well. The forest created a list of rotating agency reps, duty officers, and IBAs from out of the area to increase capacity.

Issues and concerns the IC wanted elevated were clarification on the TFRs and being able to grant waivers to the TFRs. IMT members felt this authority is delegated down to IMTs and clarified in the CFRs. They wanted the MAC group to acknowledge this. The IMT also said something that has worked well for them is to embed a standing lead resource advisor to be the liaison between the local unit and operations. This person works for the IC as a LOFR and is rostered with the IMT. They also said that printing information updates in Spanish was very valuable when they were managing the Chelan complex. The IMT conducted an emergency simulation of an incident within an incident medical extraction and it went very well.

Tunk Block/North Star

FAST members met with IC, Deputy IC, field ops, safety, ICPI, communication, air ops, tribal employment officer, plans chief, Colville FS Agency Rep Roy Bergstrom and Colville FS Agency Administrator Rob MacWhorter for the Tunk Block and North Star Fires (WA-COA-000157, WA- NES-001219) in Omak, WA. We also attended an Agency Administrator meeting with reps from different agencies associated with both the Chelan/Okanogan and Tunk Block/North Star Fires. That evening FAST attended the 1900 planning meeting. Afterwards, we closed out with Incident Commander Ed Lewis and deputy IC Noel Livingston.

Agency Administrators felt the IMT was doing a good job with safety and managing risk. They did a deliberate risk assessment for a PSD operation and were using the PACE model to

communicate strategy and tactics. Communication between the 2 fires seemed to work well, especially at critical times. The IMT was able to go direct in some areas with IHCs that had been prescouted and was safe to enter. The MAP points for evacuation were thoughtful and communicated well with cooperators and the public. The fires were not complexed because the IMT did not want to confuse the public by changing the names of the fires that they were used to hearing. The IMT made a conscious risk decision by keeping aircraft assigned to the fire available for IA near Republic so as not to bring in out of area aircraft that weren’t familiar with the situations.

The foremost safety and risk issue from these fires was lack of adequate field communications. Current radio systems were designed for 4,000 acre fires, but the size of the fires recently is really taxing the system. The IMT felt there was a lack of radio support from NIFC on these fires. The IMT also experienced delays in ordering radios Span-of-control issues associated to the lack of those middle management positions was also a definite safety concern.

There were 2 minor vehicle accidents, 1 very close call with a falling snag near a dozer operator on night shift, this was mitigated by changing to swing shift and using 2 people to scout dozer lines. 1 person was hospitalized for smoke inhalation, they were found to have a high amount of CO. This was mitigated by moving camp.

The National Guard filled medical and security needs on these fires. The medical personnel were highly skilled and well equipped, they did a great job to add that resource, and cover this very large area. The security folks performed a much needed task, but would have rather been more operational. The New Zealanders and Australians were highly skilled, a pleasure to work with and willing to perform any needed task. Local fire districts and the Forests provided much needed resources, but were on a short leash for Initial Attack (IA) purposes. MOB resources stepped up and did a fine job. The Colville Tribe was very supportive of the effort. Working with the smoke monitoring agencies was helpful in identifying the extent of those issues and passing the information along to emergency management for dissemination to the public.

As far as Contract Resources, a helibase communications trailer was demobed because it was substandard and the contractor was uncooperative. ICPIs, like all resources were difficult to acquire, so inspections were minimal especially early on. When adequately staffed, they were able to weed out deficiencies.

Extreme fire behavior was experienced on both fires with huge growth daily until the weather change. Fatigue was a direct result of this fire behavior, with limited resources working long hours in extended IA, eating MREs, double lunches, no showers and poor sleeping conditions.

The firefighters inherited by the Team were worn out. It was immediately identified and hours were cut back, good food, showers and more optimal accommodations were provided. They also changed from night shift, going to a swing shift, which improved on safety and fatigue. Three spike camps functioned to cut down on drive time. Team fatigue was also monitored and dealt with by adhering to 2 to 1 and frequent rests when possible.

Some of the other issues were that Washington’s evacuation laws lack the enforcement that it needs to be effective. The positive attribute is that it has 3 levels, which helps identify the urgency. The process to extend the tour of resources is too cumbersome, with too many signatures required.

Issues the IC wanted elevated were the NW MAC group should include a logistics conference call; this could provide the necessary information gathered by the other calls in this important aspect of fire operations. The greatest issue was a 30 minute delay in getting medical attention due to dead spots in communication caused by not getting enough repeaters and support from NIFC. If the medical situation was urgent this delay in communications could have been the difference between life and death.

Okanogan Complex and Chelan Complex

The FAST reported to Okanogan Complex (WA-NES-001203) and Chelan Complex (WA-SES- 000701) ICP in Okanogan for 0600 operational briefing. FAST met with IC Mike Minton and IC trainee Pete Duncan. We also talked with Operations, Safety, Medical, Communications, Logistics, Training Specialist, Liaison Officer. FAST also visited with FS Agency Rep and Tonasket District Ranger Matt Reidy, and Kevin Roberts and Ron Wonch, district manager and fire operations for South Okanagon WA DNR. FAST closed out with Minton, Duncan, and Reidy at 1200.

At that time of the FAST visit the IMT was transitioning the Okanogan complex to a NIMO Team, and then taking over the Tunk Block and North Star fires for a few days.

As with all of the fires, shortage of resources was a common theme. For this IMT, medical resource shortages led to less than ideal staffing both on the line and with the Team (Safety Officers and line Medics). Attempts to fill orders through ROSS proved unsuccessful. Name requesting was helpful, however the feeling was that there seemed to be an unwillingness to bring in medical personnel from out of Region. Risk was mitigated to some extent by filling gaps where possible with National Guard medical members. The IMT did a good job going over the 9-line process in the operational briefing for resources who weren’t familiar.

Bee stings were an issue early on (over 100 cases reported). Burns from stump holes and ash pits were also a safety issue due to some personnel wearing the La Sportiva and Fuego brand boots. This was mitigated through an awareness campaign with posters showing what these hazards may look like and calling out wearers of those boots to be vigilant about situational awareness.

Lack of resources caused many primary positions to be filled with trainees. At peak fire activity, they had only one SOF per Branch. Single resource Bosses were supervising 4-5 resources rather than the desired 1-2. The DNR process for resource sign up (blue card) was rough as those resources aren’t required to have radios. This put more responsibility on TFLD’s to account for them and added more communication responsibilities to them.

The IMT felt that at PL5 the NIFC system is also not up to the task and has huge shortages. Again the IMT needed repeaters, mobile radios and frequencies. Another system deficiency was the inability of ROSS to keep up with PL-5 and many very large fires. Moving resources from fire A to fire B in I-Suite is lagging 5-7 days as expanded and ROSS can’t keep up.

The IC mentioned the struggle and impact of the locals and the new state law in regards to fighting fire on private and state lands. They didn’t have many problems when they took the fire over but the earlier teams dealt with private unassigned resources and tried to roll them into the organization. The bigger effect was on the resources and the damage that is being documented even of public lands. Local landowners frequently ignored evacuation notices and this was challenging for the IMT and managing safety of assigned resources. This was a distraction but as the fire wound down so did the locals’ participation.

National Guard aviation assets integrated and worked well with helibase organization. They were integral in filling the gaps in the shortage of medical resources. Australia and New Zealand resources were fantastic and engaged right away with a diverse skill set and were used at all levels of the operation. Their skills were tested on this incident and they adapted to some unusually extreme urban fire on this complex. This team has little exposure to WA agencies and found the delegation to be vague and inconsistent as they have traveled from region to region. They suggested that NMAC or NWCG look at standardization among regions.

The fires that came into Omak and Chelan were some of the most extreme fire behavior seen by many people. All other priorities and values at risk were abandoned to protect human life which was in grave danger. The Initial Attack IC ordered an IMT even though he knew they weren’t available to be a part of the record. Resources were prepositioned to deal with the lightning event, they just didn’t have enough. They could not get air resources on the Okanogan complex when needed as they were diverted to Chelan. Resources worked in the gray and did creative things such as using a strike team leader as an equipment boss if needed.

In managing fatigue, The IMT set up two spike camps in order to reduce travel times and smoke exposure for line personnel. All personnel were given time off to attend Firefighter memorial service and/or receive counseling. IMT member said they had heard the community of Twisp wished they were part of the CISM process. The 3 fatalities impacted fire operations and morale.

Team members looked after one another and covered for each other in order to get in regular breaks and/or rest. We overheard one team member saying he consistently worked 18 hour shifts but only put down 16 on his shift ticket and FAST advised IC to address this.

Other issues occurred with the delegation letter that lagged far behind transfer of command and multiple signatories (individual fire districts) that were never present in planning meetings. The IMT also was confused why BIA issued its own delegation letter instead of a joint delegation with the other agencies. There were major issues with independent action at the onset of these fires, including unauthorized dozer line on the national forest that caused substantial resource damage. The IMT felt that multiple agency reps/administrators were problematic to the team at times. The IMT preferred local agency administrators that knew the issues, had relationships in the community, could make a decision when the IMT needed a question answered, and stick to that decision.

Other issues the IC wanted elevated were lend-lease sounds good in principle but it can create additional work for finance in tracking. Arriving type 6 engines weren’t set up as strike teams which created difficulty in trying to find a strike team leader to manage them. They had a tough time getting medical resources but used an OES rep (California) to facilitate name requests for line EMTs, REM module for paramedics and low angle extraction. The theatre of operations concept had a lot of potential but it was never really fully embraced. A model that worked well in CA was a hybrid between theater concept and area command. Area command controlled aircraft, logistics, and crews, but AAs and IMTs kept control of the fires. Also, it might have put off other agencies to see the overwhelming contingent of FS agency reps. The FS had little land affected in these fires and some of the agency reps would change decisions after the fact.

Wolverine/Blankenship/First Creek

The FAST met with IC Clay Templin and Deputy IC Jerome MacDonald at the Wolverine (WA- OWF-000287), Blankenship (000443) and First Creek (000650) ICP in Wenatchee at 1530 on 9/7/15. Templin’s team was transitioning with a Type 2 team. The FAST received a full briefing from Ops, Safety, Air Ops, Liaison Officer, and Medical. We interviewed Okanogan-Wenatchee NF Agency Administrator Mike Williams (Forest Supervisor) and Agency Rep Kari Grover-Weir (Chelan District Ranger). We attended 1800 planning meeting with both teams in attendance. We closed out with IC Templin, Grover-Weir, and acting Entiat District Ranger Randy Whitehall at 1900.

This IMT was transitioning in (with Chris Shulte’s Team – who remained embedded managing Branch A) when fatalities at Twisp River Fire occurred. Both Teams sent resources immediately. They were operating under the “Theatre of Operations” concept at the time, which was working well with the IC’s. However, Agency Administrators on those conference calls were often times having discussions / debates amongst each other during those calls. This may have been what delayed the Delegation of Authority letters being issued for many days. AAs eventually set up their own call which helped tremendously.

Computer programs (I-Suite) were unable to keep up. The pace of activity and continual combining and adding of fires and complexes taxed this system. This incident needed a separate Cost Apportionment Team, which the state would not provide (wanted apportionment based on percentage of effort) This out of Region Team had a fairly steep learning curve with several new state laws, as well as local nuances and politics (resident’s right to protect land, State MOB SOPs, etc.).

The IMT had several very close calls regarding personnel safety, including a dozer rolling on its side, a water tender roll-over, close call with a felled snag, snag hitting a rental vehicle and two incidents of anaphylactic shock from bee stings. While none of the incidents resulted in serious injury, it highlights the direct relationship between high fire activity (with high values at risk) and an extreme shortage of resources. Many trainees were forced into the fully qualified positions as there were no trainers available. Aviation Operation also had a couple of close calls, including a bucket / tail rotor strike and a sheared bolt contacting main and tail rotors.

A Type 2 Team (with no IC) taking a remote Branch (8 – Alta Spike) was very challenging because they functioned solo and not under the umbrella of the Type 1 incident. This led to two ICPs, two IAPs and two separate briefings. This situation lasted about 7-8 days, after which the T2 Team timed out and Branch was given to Chelan Complex (Minton).

The IMT had done some fatigue management by taking additional day off while in route (initially dispatched to CA and diverted. They also adjusted shift times for line personnel when possible, and established a spike camp to reduce driving times.

Communications were stretched and barely functional. There was one VHF frequency issue which caused air tankers to be turned around, and a second communications issue with a Guard UH-60 that had a tail-rotor strike, made a precautionary landing and didn’t report in. This led to AOBD recommendation that Guard units be issued AFF packages when working for IMTs.

Resources being attached to multiple fires made it impossible to track data sets. IMT had issues with getting the right non-standard heavy equipment. An example was a feller-buncher sitting in Wenatchee for 7 days and they still couldn’t get it. Need education and help with ordering that type of equipment. Dealing with State MOB was a learning process for an out of region IMT.

Non-traditional resources were a huge asset on these fires. The Australians are very skilled and were a huge help. Two of them put in position of Safety Officers. Two Guard UH-60 Helicopters were assigned. The fact that they could transport passengers was extremely helpful with the shortage of ‘traditional’ aviation resources. With the exception of the communication incident described above, the Guard did an excellent job. There were also 8 or 9 Military crews that, while not performing fully at the level of T-2 crews, integrated in very well into the organization and did a lot of very good work. The IMT was aware of, and able to name request and utilize a California OES (Office of Emergency Services) Strike Team, which in concert with the Military crews, were able to do a lot of effective work. Both were crucial components to successful operations during the time of critical resource shortages.

There were many contract resources assigned (Team had only 2 federal Engines for the first 16 days). Just as with other fires, common issues were lack of willingness to report injuries as well as contractors not returning to fire camp after shift (additional driving causing more fatigue issues). Again, with the critical resource shortages, the Team was willing to take just about anything they could get. For example, the team had 1 hotshot crew, and 1 SOF per 18 miles of a single division.

Other issues were the State of Colorado daytime IR Plane was invaluable to this Team. For several days it was the only eyes in the sky and provided valuable, real-time intelligence. Operation chiefs concurred that while they feel the lend/lease program doesn’t always work well, it did in this case. Although Agency Administrators made it cumbersome at times, the ICs affected thought that the”Theater of Operations” concept overall worked pretty well. The IMT felt that name requesting in R-6 went much better this year than in past years.

Early on in the Wolverine Fire, which started on 29 June, the Agency Administrator made decision to not commit ground resources due to remoteness and extreme terrain. She looked at risk versus gain and weighed it against values at risk. The fire eventually grew with the high winds in mid-August and forced evacuations and threatened communities. The team and agency tried to keep community abreast of situation and decision but received heavy public criticism of strategy/tactics used. This would make an interesting case study in risk management. IC felt that Division breaks were based more on administrative need as opposed to operational and aviation related needs. The fatalities at Twisp River had a huge impact on morale. People on the local unit appear to be affected the most and the FAST was concerned that when the fire activity subsides in the fall/winter that some people may find themselves with more down time and be overwhelmed by delayed grief.

Carpenter Road

The FAST met with IC Doug Johnson and IC Trainee Dan Quinones at the Carpenter Road (WA- SPA-000046) ICP near Fruitland at 1430 on 9/8/15. The FAST also visited with PIO, Ops, air ops, communications, Base Camp Manager, ICPI, and Whitman College assistant professor Alisa Cordner who was shadowing Johnson’s team for a research project in firefighter risk management. We also interviewed the previous team’s Deputy IC Shane DelGrosso. We closed out with Johnson, Quinones, and Cordner at 1930.

Independent suppression actions were reported on this incident with numerous incidents including burning out, building line, structure defense, and structure defense improvement. Specific actions mentioned were the burning out by private citizens which threatened 10 firefighters. Another incident involved a group of citizens nearly entrapped where they were urged to evacuate an area by a specific route and ignored the directions and the fire burned around them. Many other situations existed and managers were very concerned about their safety and accountability was not maintained. The previous IMT felt this might have been partially attributable to the legalization of marijuana, Washington’s new State Law that allows for private citizens to protect private lands, and that some that private landowners felt they had large assets not covered by insurance that they needed to protect. Lessons learned (RLS) and ASAT teams also visited this incident.

There were several issues related to communication on this incident that could be addressed and remedied fairly easily. The IMT reported that the Australians and New Zealanders were outstanding and were integrated into the operations and performed very well. The Washington National Guard was also a great help with road blocks, medical response and mop up. The IMT had some issues with contract resources that came from the DNR and when they tried to roll them over to a BIA EERA’s they found that some didn’t have RT-130. At one point the IMT identified critical resources and gave them the training, others that were not critical were

demobed. Similar issues were reported trying to get local fire district resources signed up under EERA’s since neither ROSS nor VIAPR could produce resources. Operations also had a steep learning curve with state mob resources on this incident. The rush to get equipment signed up and over to the incident had a lot of issues with inspections, qualifications, training and getting them into I-suite and then the RT-130 requirement as they were being signed up through the BIA. They also didn’t send radios or supervision with these resources something state mob usually does.

The team was also frustrated with the lack of a sterile fire environment, in that evacuation orders could not be enforced. The local law enforcement could not enforce any closures so there were a lot of public access issues and lots of people entering the area for other purposes than firefighting. One incident was a report of a shot fired, and law enforcement responded but nothing was found. With the lack of resources crews were not put into areas where little chance of success was calculated. When weather came in, operational shifts were shortened. With the lack of supervision some resources were placed in standby.

The IMT has been out for 54 days already this season. Cumulative fatigue is showing with camp crud and other signs. A 4 day break between assignments would help mitigate this. Contract crew and engines were more proactive on this incident around in rotating their folks out and bringing new fresh folks to keep managing fatigue. An expert was hired by the previous team to assess radiation exposure from the Uranium mine within the fire perimeter. It was determined the exposure was within acceptable limits. There was a green tree hazard tree situation where trees were burning from the inside out, and then when the wind blows they snap off 15 to 20’ up the tree. No outward signs were apparent and made this difficult to see. All DIVS were qualified, but TFLD and HEQB trainees were used without trainers because of the lack of this resource. Toilets and hand wash stations have been hard to get, but they are available; this is an ordering issue. The IMT couldn’t set up a spike camp for days and reduce driving because of this. Long-term fatigue does seem to be a bit of an issue and camp crud running pretty rampant right now. Team is campaigning hard at camp for hand- washing. Hand sanitizer bottles were visible everywhere. The land use agreement was not in place when they transitioned and the hand shake agreement went through with a lot of effort and resulted in a base camp that cost $14,000 per day. The team indicated that there were some initial difficulties / challenges to determine if the Carpenter Road Fire was going to be under Area Command or the Northwest MAC Group.

The IMT conducted an emergency simulation of an incident within an incident medical extraction and it went very well. The IMT was concerned about the lack of urgency at some

home units when PL5 was declared. They said there are still folks trying to make targets rather than contributing to the fire support effort.

Kaniksu Complex

The FAST attended the 0700 operation briefing at the Kaniksu Complex ICP near Usk on 9/9/2015. We then met with IC Tom Kurth, Ops, Air Ops, Safety, Military Safety Officer, Communications, Lead READ Jason Dobis, FMO Kent Contreras, and Agency Reps Janeen Tervo and Gayne Sears (Newport District Ranger). We closed out with Kurth, Tervo, and Sears at 1300.

Top safety issues have been bees, driving (4 deer hit, 1 bear dodged and totaled the truck), snags and falling green trees (duff burned off and low soil moistures. The IMT couldn’t get Safety Officers because this was a low priority fire. The IMT used risk management to avoid areas that had burning snags and kept crews out of them. The IMT was used to fighting similar types of fires in Alaska with low values at risk and limited resources. They avoided 100% lining which would have increased exposure and instead used point protection, and confine/contain strategy. One wilderness fire in the complex remained unstaffed. They felt much of the fire intensity observed was low-moderate and the forest needed this burn to reduce fuel loading.

An extraction of a victim of anaphylactic shock was done with a Blackhawk. There were some minor issues, but went well overall. An AAR was done that has changes that would make this better. Communications was a challenge early on because of distances involved. Other fires in close proximity caused bleed over on command channels, sometimes Tac channels if truck radios were used. Camp crud was minimal because this was a good camp with large foot print allowing folks to spread out some. Adequate hand washing stations and hand sanitizer helped. Utilized spike camps to cut down on driving. Some VIPR contracts pay less than Emergency hires, this caused friction. Private citizen suppression efforts need to be coordinated with the plan for the fire, major safety concern for all involved. There was good cooperation with the neighboring agencies. The deliberate risk assessment tool works well and was discussed at the

morning briefing. Medevac procedures need to be better understood by military. They have a tendency to launch independently (because that is their procedure), which doesn’t work well on fires. There was only 1 safety zone in the very Southern part of the fire. Instead of typical safety zones, the IMT used “disengagement plans” where ground forces would disengage if fire behavior picked up. Agency Administrators were proponents of the fire organization and a huge benefit to the IMT with managing things outside the fire environment.

With the help of finance, operations were able to convert three fires into the complex in I-suite and reconcile the orders. This team did not have any state fire Marshall’s resources or state mob. Because they didn’t have a lot of restrictions they were able to track and reconcile the local equipment hires. The US Army was assigned, in addition to the WA National Guard and Idaho National Guard. Military resources were actively engaged with several line crews that had hotshots embedded with them as liaisons and trainers. This coupled with a set of contract faller really was a great risk mitigation strategy. This allowed the military troops to fulfill the hand crew mission with less risk. It has been suggested that the Army send infantry instead of artillery which is hoped to improve the unit’s physical fitness. Australian and New Zealand overhead were engaged and were folded right into operations and also performed flawlessly.

The IMT integrated Risks and Risk management into the daily tasks and daily briefing. With the lack of resources and smoke air operations on this incident were reduced. Low success probabilities for success also limited bucket time. Deliberate risk assessment was implemented and also saved a lots of fire fighters undue fatigue by not going direct in a lot of areas. They did however make lots of progress in areas that had less risk.

This IMT did not carry any ICPIs nor did it get many of those resources and when they did get them they had had no issues. There were no issues with private parties doing any independent actions on this incident. No issues were observed with contractors, vendors or equipment.

The IMT managed their own fatigue by taking 2 full days off (not including travel) after 14. They stayed at a local resort on their days off where they were able to rest. The local unit also has done a good job managing fatigue locally. There was a very good relationship between FS R1 (Idaho-Panhandle NF) and FS R6 (Colville NF) and AAs from both unit worked together on the WFDSS. To do the SRA in the WFDSS, the AA simply answered the 10 questions in the Red Book and she felt this approach worked well. One thing that worked well for safety was to have the team extend to keep the continuity and consistency intact. Another positive was to have 185 local people who were shut out of the woods due to IFPL4 signed up to take the fire refresher classes. The IMT was then able to use these heavy equipment resources assigned to the fire.

The IMT mentioned the cost of the Baldy Fire seemed excessive (previous IMT). It was about 500 acres and cost close to $6 million. They attributed this to aircraft use without enough

ground support to reinforce. The AA mentioned they were well positioned this year on the Colville NF for the big fires because they had trained for it and planned ahead.

Grizzly Bear Complex

Umatilla Vet crew burning out, night ops Pyrocumulus column in Wenaha-Tucannon Wilderness

FAST members attended the operational period briefing for the Grizzly Bear Complex (OR-UMF- 00947) in Elgin, OR. Although the fire code is an Oregon code, the incident originated in Washington in the Wenaha-Tucannon Wilderness. We then met with IC, planning ops, safety, air ops, PIO, communications and Agency Administrator Mike Rassbach (Walla Walla District Ranger). Afterwards, we closed out with Incident Commander Kim Soper.

Safety and risk issues included limited resources throughout the entire incident. For example, no Type 1 handcrew was ever assigned to this fire even though it threatened and entered several communities. Another safety issue was limited communication with multiple dead spots to the unavailability of extra repeaters. The IMTs managed risk by evaluating areas of the fire and gauging success or paying attention to the WFDSS thus not putting fire fighters out in low priority areas (Wilderness) and concentrating on the higher priority areas. This focus on certain areas reduced risk and exposure of fire fighters. Another risk issue was long hours worked with 30-40 hour shifts during the initial fire siege on Troy, OR when the fire exhibited extreme fire behavior (plume dominated and long range spotting) and moved over 8 miles down canyon in a single burn period. These firefighters saved multiple structures including much of the town of Troy although some of the IMT felt initial operations were very aggressive and risky. In contrast, a non-local branch director was viewed as being too conservative in tactics which led to fire growth and the near loss of some strategic holding lines. Risk was mitigated by activing the Oregon conflagration act and mobilizing the Green Team which let local resources return to a 2:1 schedule. Risk was further decreased by siting four spike camps around the large fire, but increased when contractor resources elected not to stay in spike camp adding drive time to their day and resulting in one off-clock vehicle accident. Use of 200 National Guard soldiers also helped the team manage firefighter fatigue and meet incident objectives. The Australian

overhead also helped management of the fire, although a shadow period with local fire overhead would have been beneficial. Another good risk management tool was escorting the public into their structures to remove items such as propane tanks and fuel drums that would have been hazardous to firefighters doing point protection later. A final tool was not siting a helibase in Troy due to exposure on smoky, narrow, windy roads. Overall, the safety record was excellent on this fire with much of the risk management transferred to line overhead, who made excellent real-time decisions. For example one division pulled resources off the line and disengaged the fire on 5 out of 6 shifts.

Independent action was observed with the Blue Mountain Fire Protection Association which was detected during a cooperator’s call. This group constructed contingency dozer line in Asotin County, WA on the National Forest without authorization and outside the ICS and impacted some cultural sites. The local unit will work with this group in the future in pre-season meetings.

A local issue associated with this fire was a rancher who had cows in the area and wanted operations to hold off on burning out a critical piece of line until his cows were gathered. This situation became viral on Facebook because the rancher’s wife thought the Facebook page was a semi-private direct communication method with the IMT. This issue led to Congressional staffer involvement and was resolved locally.

Issues the IC wanted elevated to the MAC were the need for a technical memo regarding potential environmental risks with thermagel, the need to be able to use aircraft (contracted by ODF or WADNF) interchangeably between states during border fires, a transition/shadow period for international resources, and a provision in the crew contract to require them to stay in spike camps.

Selected quotes from FAST interviews

“We’re not just working with fires in the woods anymore. We are directing aircraft and other resources working in urban areas.” —Air operations

“The systems we have in place in to manage wildfires were not designed for these types of PL5 years. If these are becoming the new normal we need to change the systems.”—Deputy IC

“It’s very tough to keep operational control [when independent action is taken]. It’s a very difficult social fabric [in northeastern Washington], very proud, very independent by nature. Northeastern Washington is the last place to get resources when lightning hits the Pacific Northwest.”—Agency Administrator

“So many people from different areas came together to fight these fires and save these communities. It was an extreme firefight like I have only seen a few times in my career [as a former hotshot and Type 2 IC.]”—Agency Administrator

“I was very worried about firefighter health during the initial attack phase [of these large fires]. They were working 24 hours straight in 100 degree temperatures. It was not sustainable.” –IC who ordered an IMT

“We have a PL6 here. We need to model this and spend more time planning and preparing for this.”—Agency Administrator

“The theater of operations concept worked for the ICs but the agency administrators balled up the concept”—IC

“PL5 doesn’t have the same impact it did 10 years when it comes to agency folks dropping everything and helping out with fire. There are still folks back at our home units who are trying to meet targets instead of helping out with fire.”—IC trainee

“We were lucky. We probably could have had 10 fatalities associated with this fire. We had numerous near misses. Near misses equal near hits”—Deputy IC

“The state law [Washington HB 2093] is totally screwed up. Independent action was a threat to firefighters and public safety. It affected our thoughts with our guys. You always had to be looking over your shoulder wondering if they [private landowners] were going to leave then get friends and come back [to reengage the fire].”—Deputy IC

“Risk management doesn’t get in the way of doing our mission it is the way we do the mission.”—IC message in IAP

“Some areas are just not worth the risk to go into.”—IC

“Cumulative fatigue has been the #1 issue. We manage it by fitting everything into a 16-hr window so folks can get a true 2:1.”—IC

“I tell folks not to make the comment, “if we only had one more crew”. We don’t and we’re not going to get one, so make a plan with what we have.”—Operations section chief

“Patience was very important in managing this complex. We have a lot of can-do people [assigned] here.”—IC

“We do our best firefighting when we are shorthanded. Sometimes when resources are heavy there can be too much distraction. Firefighters are more engaged [safer] when resources are skinny.”—IC

“We don’t have enough resources. We just have to be creative and innovative with what we have.”—Agency Administrator

“The rules [2:1 work/rest ratio] go out the window when that stuff happens [fire threatening structures or communities]. Nobody’s going to walk away and let a town burn up.”—IC

“We lost some structures but we saved more than we lost.”—Agency Administrator

“We are very thankful that there are the people on IMTs who carve out and sacrifice their whole summer to help agency administrators manage large fires.” —Agency Administrator

“We all are totally exhausted but it is so fulfilling and rewarding to see our firefighters accomplish success [in protecting values at risk].” —Agency Administrator

Business sign, Wenatchee, WA, 9/7/15