United States Department of Agriculture

Twisp River Fire Fatalities and Entrapments

Learning Review Narrative

Fall 2016 Contents Twisp River Fire Fatalities and Entrapments ...... 2 Foreword ...... 2 Event Narrative ...... 3 About this Document ...... 3 Conditions on the Ground ...... 3 Incident Complexity ...... 8 1220-1245 – Resources Ordered ...... 8 1245-1315 – Resources Arrive ...... 10 1315-1345 –– Engaging the Fire ...... 14 1345–1400 -- Engaging the Fire ...... 17 1400–1430 ...... 18 Moving Engines Up Woods Canyon Road ...... 21 1430-1515 -- The Wind Shifts ...... 22 RTO! RTO! -- Reverse Tool Order! ...... 26 Incidents within the Incident ...... 31 Entrapment at House #3 ...... 32 The Search for Engine 642 and the Dozer Group ...... 36 1515-1530 –- Search and Rescue ...... 37 1530-1630 -- Search for Engine 642 ...... 37 1630 -- End of Shift ...... 37 Team Members ...... 39 Appendices ...... 40 Appendix A – Maps ...... 40 Appendix B – Glossary of Acronyms ...... 43 List of fictitious names and their roles ...... 43 List of acronyms ...... 43

Twisp River Fire Fatalities and Entrapments Learning Review Narrative Page 1 of 44 Twisp River Fire Fatalities and Entrapments Foreword

On August 19, 2015, USDA Forest Service firefighters Richard Wheeler, Andrew Zajac, and Tom Zbyszewski perished while engaged in initial attack on the Twisp River Fire. A fourth member of the crew was critically injured with severe burns. In addition, a heavy equipment boss and a heavy equipment boss trainee from the Washington Department of Natural Resources (DNR) and a contract dozer operator were entrapped but survived with minor injuries. Numerous other fire personnel were also entrapped but survived without injuries.

The Twisp River Fire was reported on August 19 at 1223 Pacific Daylight Time. The fire started when tree branches struck a nearby powerline. By 0600 hours on August 20, it was reported to be 7,231 acres and had reached the outskirts of Twisp, Washington. The fire’s final reported acreage on August 26 was 11,922 acres. This narrative describes the events that took place during the initial attack of this incident. The intent of this report is to capture—as accurately as we can—what happened on the Twisp River Fire so that we can learn how to prevent fatality fires in the future.

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Event Narrative About this Document This story is told from multiple perspectives, alternating between flanks and viewpoints and along a timeline. With the exception of the deceased firefighters, the names and resource identifiers in this narrative have been altered to protect the privacy of the individuals involved. Please be aware that there are small discrepancies in some of the time stamps in this document due to a number of reasons, including short delays in posting information at dispatch centers, recollections from the participants, and differences in watch or clock settings. All time references in this document are reported in Pacific Daylight Time (PDT) using Military Time format.

Conditions on the Ground The Twisp River Fire started along the Twisp River Road approximately five miles west of Twisp, Washington. The elevation at this location is 2,006 feet above sea level. The Twisp River drainage is a major west-to-east drainage running from the Cascade Crest out into the Methow Valley. The fire area is primarily on a south-southwest aspect with slope percent ranging from flat along the Twisp River to in excess of 35 percent. The area is dissected by three north-south running drainages: Woods Canyon in the immediate fire area; Myer Creek, which was approximately 0.3 mile to the west; and Elbow Coulee—the largest—which was approximately 0.6 mile to the east of the Twisp River Fire location. Surface fuels in the fire area were comprised of an understory of four- to six-foot tall bitterbrush and serviceberry on the lower portions of slopes and in the drainages. Associated herbs and grasses of arrowleaf balsam root, Idaho fescue, and bunchgrasses were observed in the area as well as some cheatgrass. The overstory tree species consisted of ponderosa pine with some Douglas-fir on favorable mesic sites, especially in Woods Canyon proper. Vegetation on the upper slopes and ridges consisted primarily of the grasses listed above, with isolated groups of ponderosa pine and Douglas-fir. Aspen, willow, and cottonwood were also present in the drainage bottoms along Twisp River Road and in Woods Canyon. The area was classified as being in “extreme drought.” The 2014/15 winter snowpack was 22 percent of normal levels in the Cascade Range The area was in west of the Methow Valley in April 2015 and was snow-free by May extreme drought. 2015. Between January and August, monthly precipitation totals in the area were 0.19 inches to 0.73 inches below normal for the year, with the exception of May, which was 0.46 inches above the historical average for the month. For the summer period (June-August), average temperatures in the area were the warmest on record (1895-2015). Fuel Conditions The combined effects of below-average snow pack, limited precipitation, and above-average temperatures negatively affected the entire fuel complex. All fuel types and size classes were available to burn during the fire. While local information on live fuel and dead fuel status were

Twisp River Fire Fatalities and Entrapments Learning Review Narrative Page 3 of 44 unavailable, field inspections adjacent to the fire area suggest that the live herbaceous fuel component was fully cured and available. National Fire Danger Rating System (NFDRS) dead fuel moistures were calculated and evaluated for seasonal trends. Compared to 2014, both 100-hour and 1,000-hour dead fuel moistures were low for early August 2015. The 100-hour dead fuel moistures had dipped down to all-time lows on August 2 (6 percent) but were trending upwards towards average for the time period. However, the 1,000-hour dead fuels were tracking at all-time lows for the August period at 8 percent. One-hour dead fuel moistures were at the historical average for the time of year at 3 percent. Under the fuel and weather conditions in the fire area on August 19, the calculated probability of ignition was greater than 85 percent. The energy release component (ERC) is related to the available energy released within the flaming front. Daily variations in ERC are due to changes in moisture content of the various live and dead fuels present. Since June, ERC values had been above average, and unlike 2014, had not received periodic rainfall to moderate their steady climb. While not at the all-time high for the first two weeks of August, ERC levels were above the 97th percentile and higher than the values recorded in 2014 for the same time period. Weather Conditions and Fire Behavior The North Cascades Smokejumper Base Remote Automatic Weather Station (NCSB RAWS, #452030) is located approximately 5.5 miles northeast of the fire location. From August 16 to 18, the recorded maximum temperatures were between 86° to 92° F with a daily minimum relative humidity of 16 percent. The Twisp River Fire was initially reported at 1223 on August 19. Weather readings recorded by NCSB RAWS (#452030) at 1200 were as follows: Temperature: 91° F; Relative Humidity: 21 percent. The 10-minute average wind speed at the NCSB RAWS was 2 mph from the south-southeast (163°), gusting to 8 mph from the southeast (147°). The maximum temperature (95° F) and minimum relative humidity (14 percent) were not reached until 1500. Winds at this time were 4 mph from the south (172°), gusting to 9 mph from the southeast (148°). The Twisp River Fire area is located within Predictive Service There was no mention in Area (PSA) NW08 and spans two Fire Weather Zones (FWZ the Red Flag Warning for WA684 and FWZ WA685). From August 15 to 17, no Red breezy conditions during Flag Warnings (RFW) were issued, and the high-level Haines Index was a 2-low for all three days. On the afternoon of the daytime period on August 18, the National Weather Service office in Spokane Wednesday, August 19. issued a RFW that covered both fire weather zones and was in effect from 1100 on Wednesday, August 19 to 1700 on Friday, August 21. This warning called for “an unstable thermal trough followed by breezy and dry conditions Thursday and a cold front passage Friday.” The RFW was re-issued/updated at 0451 on Wednesday, August 19. There was no mention in the body of the warning for breezy conditions during the daytime period on Wednesday, August 19. The general discussion at the top of the product noted the following: A thermal trough migrating through the region will bring dry and unstable conditions to the cascades and northern mountain districts on Wednesday. In addition breezy

Twisp River Fire Fatalities and Entrapments Learning Review Narrative Page 4 of 44 conditions will develop Wednesday evening through the cascade gaps...and spread across the region on Thursday with continued warm conditions and low relative humidities…

The area that covered the Twisp River Fire in this Red Flag Warning also covered areas to the east including the Okanogan Valley, the Okanogan Highlands, and the Northeast Mountains of Washington. Due to the large area that was covered in this warning product, wind conditions in specific drainages like the Twisp River Valley and the Methow Valley were not specifically addressed. The August 19 forecast (at 0341) for Fire Weather Zone (684-685) called for maximum valley temperatures of 89°-95°; minimum humidity of 11-21 percent; 20-foot wind speeds of upslope/upvalley 2-5 mph in the morning, becoming 3-7 mph out of the southwest in the afternoon; and a Haines Index of 5– moderate. The forecast made no mention of excessive wind Fire Behavior Potential conditions or specific timing of wind shifts. The morning to afternoon changes in the forecast Forecast — For Predictive Service could be normal diurnal wind patterns or Area NW08, the Northwest 7-Day synoptically1 influenced. Significant Fire Potential Forecast classified August 19 as, “High Risk and a A state ban on outdoor burning was implemented Critical Burn Environment and that the on June 26 and remained in effect at the time the thermal trough is expected to reside fire started. Campfires were banned on federal along the east slopes of the Cascades lands starting on July 7. At the time of the fire, through much of the day before drifting the Okanogan-Wenatchee National Forest (OWF) farther east this evening. This could and Washington Department of Natural result in critical burning potential on Resources (DNR) classified the fire danger for the fires located in NW05 and NW08 area as “Extreme,” (the highest fire danger today.” The forecast also noted that rating), which is defined as, “Fires of all types “Elevated burning conditions start quickly and burn intensely. All fires are particularly in eastern Washington potentially serious and can spread very quickly could create high potential for with intense burning. Small fires become big fires significant growth on some of the much faster than at the ‘very high’ level. Spot existing large fires in NW05, NW08, and fires are probable, with long-distance spotting NW09 through Thursday or Friday.” likely. These fires are very difficult to fight and may become very dangerous and often last for several days.” For additional information about weather conditions and fire behavior specific to this incident, see the Twisp River Fire Weather Conditions and Fire Behavior Supplement and separate appendix.

1 Synoptic refers to the weather conditions over a large area at a given point in time.

Twisp River Fire Fatalities and Entrapments Learning Review Narrative Page 5 of 44 National and State Wildfire Activity The Nation and the Northwest Region were at fire Preparedness The Northwest Region Level V (the highest preparedness level), which means the area was at the highest was experiencing major incidents that had the potential to preparedness level. exhaust all agency fire resources. At least 80 percent of Type 1 and 2 Incident Management Teams and crews were committed, as well as the majority of other national resources. The August 19, 2015 National Interagency Coordination Center situation report listed 96 uncontained large wildfires in the Nation and 34 in the Northwest Region. In Washington, there were 18 large Washington had 18 wildfires and 2 wildfire complexes that encompassed more large wildfires and two than 279,000 acres with 3,502 personnel, 67 handcrews, 264 wildfire complexes. engines, and 25 helicopters. The situation report described nearly all the fires in the area as having extreme fire behavior, with crowning, long-range spotting, and group torching. Numerous structures were threatened, and evacuations and road and trail closures were in effect. Area Wildfire Activity From August 1 to 19, 2015, the Northeast Washington Interagency Communications Center (NEWICC) located in Colville, WA, dispatched resources to 161 wildfires. • August 1 to 12, there were 79 confirmed wildfires. • August 13 to 14, a significant weather event resulted in 49 new fire starts:

o On August 13, there were 19 starts, including the Nine Mile Fire, which became a Type 2 incident. o On August 14, there were 30 starts that burned over 1,900 acres in one day and grew to become the Okanogan Complex (Lime Belt, Blue Lake, Tunk Block), Carpenter Road, Marble Valley, Gold Hill, Roy, and the Kettle Complex (Renner, Graves). • August 15 to 18, the area had an additional 29 new starts. • On August 19, NEWICC responded to four new starts (which included the Twisp River Fire) and 13 smoke checks (false alarms).

Twisp River Fire Fatalities and Entrapments Learning Review Narrative Page 6 of 44 Figure 1: The two maps above show the large fire activity in the immediate area of the Twisp River fire. Perimeters are from August 19 and August 24, respectively.

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Incident Complexity The Twisp River Fire started on public, tax-exempt land and burned onto private land, with joint fire protection responsibilities shared by Okanogan County Fire Department District 6 and Washington Department of Natural Resources (DNR). However, the fire also posed an imminent threat to National Forest System lands. It was located on Twisp River Road about five miles west of Twisp, Washington. There were approximately 20 homes and cabins scattered throughout the 50-acre area. At the time of the initial report, the Okanogan Sheriff’s Office reported that the fire had burned about two acres. When this fire was reported, many organizations were already involved in fire incidents in the region. NEWICC, Central Washington Interagency Communications Center (CWICC), and Okanogan 911 dispatch center were working hard to provide resources to the Twisp River Fire while responding to new fire starts, a large fire, and a fire complex, which were exhibiting rapid growth and extreme fire behavior. Fire Staffing The Okanogan-Wenatchee National Forest brought in Terry, a Forest Service (FS) Incident Commander Type 3 (ICT3) from another forest under a severity2 assignment. At his August 18 in- briefing, he was getting a feel for the current conditions and fire activity. During this session, he was told that “Folks with 30 years’ experience in the area said they had never seen conditions quite like this, at least Carlton-bad, if not worse.” By “Carlton-bad,” they were referring to a series of four lightning fires (named the Carlton Complex) that started on July 14, 2014 and had burned over 256,000 acres and about 300 homes. The routine on August 19 was similar to the daily routines since the August 14 lightning event. Fire managers briefed the district and supplemental resources and assigned all but one of the local and severity engines to existing fires. These engines were also available for initial attack of new starts. 1220-1245 – Resources Ordered On August 19, calls about the fire came in through two different sources: from 911 and from Pat, an off duty Okanogan-Wenatchee National Forest fire manager. At 1223, a resident on Woods Canyon Road called the Okanogan County Sheriff’s Department (OCSD) to report smoke below the resident’s home. OCSD dispatched the following Okanogan County Fire District 6 (FD6) resources: • FD6 Fire Chief 1 (FD6 Chief 1) (IC). • FD6 Division Chief 1. • FD6 Division Chief 2. • FD6 Type 1 Engine (FD6-Engine 1). • FD6 Type 1 Engine (FD6-Engine 2). • FD6 Type 1 Engine (FD6-Engine 3). • FD6 Type 3 Engine (FD6-Engine 4).

2Severity resources are outside resources brought in on a pre-position assignment. They are paid for through a severity funding request the local unit submits when they think fire conditions are extreme enough that local resources will need help.

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• FD6 Type 3 Engine (FD6-Engine 5). • FD6 Type 6 Brush Engine (FD6-B1). • FD6 Type 6 Brush Engine (FD6-B2). • FD6 Type 6 Brush Engine (FD6-B3). • Tender 1. • Tender 2. While he was at the District 6 station in Winthrop, FD6 Chief 1 heard the smoke report from dispatch and paged Winthrop and Twisp stations. Because of the lack of resources at those two stations, he also paged Mazama and Carlton stations. While en route to the fire, he could see the smoke column and estimated that the fire was two to three acres. At about 1230, Pat (an off-duty Forest Service [FS] fire manager) saw the smoke and called Nate, the Methow Valley Ranger District duty officer (DO) to report a fire “…bring everything along the Twisp River Road. He was heard saying, “We’ve got we’ve got!” one…bring everything we’ve got!” The location given was approximate and could have been on or near Forest Service lands. Nate transferred his duties to another DO and responded as an ICT3 trainee with Terry, the qualified ICT3. At about 1238, the Sheriff’s Department called the Northeast Washington Interagency Communications Center (NEWICC), who dispatched the following: • DNR Heavy Equipment Boss (heavy equipment boss [Mark]). • DNR Heavy Equipment Boss trainee (heavy equipment boss trainee). • Dozer Operator (dozer operator). • DNR Engine 1 (comprised of engine lead and 2 crewmembers). • DNR Engine 2 (comprised of engine lead and 2 crewmembers). • DNR Rotor 1 (Type 2 helicopter with 4-person helitack crew). • DNR Rotor 2 (Type 2 helicopter) (first makes contact with Air Attack on this fire at 1506, after the entrapments occurred). While en route to the fire, Nate, the ICT3(t), contacted CWICC and ordered a heavy air tanker, heavy helicopter support, and Air Attack. A few minutes later, he ordered three dozers and three water tenders. CWICC worked on getting resources from the Black Canyon and Bear Mountain fires. They were aware that FD6 dispatch had ordered structural engines and brush trucks.

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Figure 2: A photo taken from the staging area looking across Twisp River Road to the fire’s point of origin. Photo was taken at 1240 local time. 1245-1315 – Resources Arrive Terry and Nate (the ICT3 and ICT3 trainee) responded to the incident at 1244. The Methow Valley Ranger District (MVRD) duty officer notified CWICC of the district’s response and requested additional resources to the Twisp River Fire. The MVRD duty officer dispatched the following ground resources: • FS Engine 642, a Type 6 engine with a crew of four from the MVRD, who were working on the Black Canyon Fire; (with Morgan, the assistant captain, and Bill, an engine boss trainee). • FS Engine 1, a Type 6 engine with a crew of four located at the MVRD; (with Randy, the captain, and Andrea, the assistant captain). • FS Handcrew, a 16-person Type 2 initial attack crew from the MVRD located at the Black Canyon Fire. • FS Type 3 IC (FS-ICT3, Terry, an out-of-area ICT3 who just arrived the previous day). • FS Type 3 IC trainee (FS-ICT3 trainee, Nate from the MVRD). • Dozer and heavy equipment boss on the Black Canyon Fire. • Cooperator Engine (COOP Engine-1), a Type 6 engine, assigned under severity. They arrived from Colorado on August 14, began working on August 15, and were at the Bear Mountain Fire.

Twisp River Fire Fatalities and Entrapments Learning Review Narrative Page 10 of 44 • Contractor Engine (Contractor Engine-1), a Type 6 engine, assigned under severity. They arrived from Colorado on August 14, began working on August 15, and were at the Bear Mountain Fire; (with Brad as the Captain). Air resources initially ordered through CWICC were as follows: • Light Helicopter. • Heavy Helicopter. • Air Attack. • Heavy Air Tanker, with Lead Plane.

Figure 3: A map depicting the dispatch response boundaries between NEWICC and CWICC. Notice Okanogan County contains an overlapping response area where NEWICC serves as the dispatch center for the state lands and CWICC serves as the dispatch center for federal lands.

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The fire was burning behind a vacant home on Twisp River Road that backed up to a steep Fire Behavior — The initial attack embankment. The initial report stated the fire resources first on scene described the fire was running up a steep hill, with a very high behavior as a low-to-moderate intensity spread potential. Wind speeds were fire, primarily fuels and terrain driven with predominately easterly, light, and terrain-driven. light easterly up drainage winds from 2-4 mph. Fire size was initially estimated at 2-3 As the FD6 Chief reached the scene, he assumed acres. the role of Incident Commander (IC). As he was On the left flank, the fire burned up onto driving, he caught sight of the fire from about a the bench just north of Twisp River Road mile and a half away. Since he knew the area, he and west of house #1. It spread to the told his resources to stay down near the highway northwest with wind and slope alignment and set up at the back (or heel) of the fire. When towards houses #7 and #11 (see Area Map) he got on scene, he drove up the fairly steep, as a head fire. winding Woods Canyon Road and told residents This also allowed the fire to become in the houses along the road to evacuate. He established on the east-facing aspect above established a staging area along Twisp River Road Woods Canyon drainage. In this area, the at the back (or heel) of the fire to brief incoming fire was backing downslope through a mix resources (see figure 8). He was worried that he of grass-shrub fuels with an intermittent would not be able to get additional resources overstory of ponderosa pine and Douglas- because of all the surrounding fire activity (see fir. figure 1). He told his resources to protect The fire continued to burn cross-slope powerline poles and to keep the fire from towards the Myer Creek drainage as a head spotting across Twisp River Road. fire and as a backing fire to the south DNR Engine 2, with a crew of three, had been in towards Twisp River Road. Winthrop when they were called. They arrived by 1250 and met up with the FD6 IC. DNR Engine 2’s lead said he asked for as many helicopters as they could send because the fire was running up the hill and there were places they couldn’t get into. • DNR Engine 1 arrived at 1300. • FS Engine 1 arrived at 1300. • FS Handcrew and FS Engine 642 arrived around 1330. When Terry and Nate (FS IC Type 3 and trainee) arrived on scene, they tied in with FD6 IC, who was located about 200-300 yards away from the fire’s point of origin. To establish command structure and accountability, they asked the FD6 IC who the Incident Commander (IC) was. At that time, they set up a Unified Command structure comprised of the FD6 IC, the FS ICT3, and the FS ICT3 trainee. The FD6 IC told the FS ICT3 to take the lead. Communication Challenges CWICC transferred the fire to NEWICC at 1307. Phone conversations took place between the two dispatch centers to transfer resource orders. Assigned resources began changing to the appropriate command frequencies assigned by NEWICC dispatch.

Twisp River Fire Fatalities and Entrapments Learning Review Narrative Page 12 of 44 An Air Attack plane was re-routed midflight from another Radio frequencies were assignment to provide aerial supervision for the Twisp River changed when the fire initial attack effort. While en route to the fire, Air Attack was transferred from heard Nate (IC Type 3 trainee) give a size-up (or an CWICC to NEWICC. assessment of the fire) and ask about an air resource and dozer order that was placed through CWICC. Air Attack was told by CWICC as he arrived over the fire that NEWICC would be the dispatch center responsible for the fire. Air Attack said for the first 10 minutes he was on scene, he spent an inordinate amount of time trying to program new frequencies into the radio and trying to contact NEWICC. Air Attack was frustrated because he was originally given incorrect frequencies for NEWICC, which significantly delayed establishing contact with them. Air Attack As the Air Attack pilot arrived on scene, he said he noticed a lot of “up air.” He said he likes to make his orbits at about 120 knots, but the up air was causing him to gain a lot of speed. He used 1/3 flaps to slow down, but he still was gaining more speed than he The Air Attack wanted. Then he used 2/3 flaps and was still flying too fast. Then he pilot reported a put his landing gear down, but the combination of his gear being down and the throttle level being set so low caused an alarm to go off lot of “up air.” in his aircraft. The Air Attack pilot had over 4,000 hours of flying as an air attack pilot and said he never experienced anything like that. Later after the fire blew up, he wondered if the up air he was experiencing could be used in the future as a telltale sign or precursor to an extreme fire behavior event.

Figure 4: Photo taken at 1309 local time looking north-northwest on Twisp River Road. House #6 is in the foreground, lower left (photo courtesy of Don Nelson, Methow Valley News).

Twisp River Fire Fatalities and Entrapments Learning Review Narrative Page 13 of 44 1315-1345 –– Engaging the Fire Incident Command

The FD6 IC, the FS ICT3, and the FS ICT3 trainee met and developed a plan. They observed three- or four-foot flame lengths at the head of the fire and about two-foot flame lengths on the flanks. The FS ICT3 and trainee discussed engaging the fire up Woods Canyon Road. The FD6 IC was feeling more comfortable moving up off of the highway now because the head of the fire had burned away from the Woods Canyon Road area; the right flank was less active; and he trusted the expertise of the FS ICT3s. FS ICT3 Terry said the fire was not a wind-driven fire and that topography The fire was not was the main driver. Weather conditions were warm, with winds less than a wind-driven 10 miles per hour. From the bottom of the hill, he said the right flank was fire. not a running fire but was backing or flanking downhill with two-foot flame lengths. The fire was split into two flanks: The left flank, with Randy (FS Engine 1 captain) as the “point-of- contact”3 and the right flank, with Morgan (FS Engine 642 assistant captain) as the “point-of- contact.” The Incident Command Post was at the staging area at the Twisp Acclimation Pond. The Incident Commanders’ objectives were to protect life and then property. The strategy was developed to anchor and flank from the point of origin. Terry initially estimated the fire to be about 10 acres; however, Randy had a better vantage point and estimated the fire to be much larger.

Figure 5: A depiction of common terminology for different parts of a fire.

3 Type 3 ICs typically ask experienced people on the fire to take responsibility for a section of the fire (e.g., the right flank). This position is typically referred to as a Division Supervisor. On Type 3 fires, it is common to staff this position with someone who is not Division Supervisor-qualified (but is single resource-qualified), even though that person is still called a Division Supervisor for the Type 3 fire. On this fire, there were two people assigned to this role. They were called “points of contact” and were assigned to the fire’s left and right flanks. When engaged in fighting Type 1 or Type 2 fires, Division Supervisors must have the Division Supervisor qualification listed on their red (qualification) card.

Twisp River Fire Fatalities and Entrapments Learning Review Narrative Page 14 of 44 Left Flank

By approximately 1320, Randy (left flank “point-of-contact”) was working with a heavy helicopter, a medium helicopter, and a light helicopter that were making water drops at the head of the fire and on the left flank. The fire was starting to get into the timber, with an active flank and an obvious head (see figures 5 and 8). The left flank was named the priority flank because the fire was running upslope in the timber towards houses on that side of the fire. The left flank stretched from the point of origin around to the west towards the Myer Creek drainage. When the resources arrived, the head of the fire was running uphill to the northwest with wind and slope alignment. Portions of the left flank were also backing down towards Twisp River Road. DNR Engine 2 stayed on Twisp River Road to watch for spot fires “If the fire would go and to cool things down. The engine leader noted that the into there…you’d need “topography was sloppy, lots of different draws; two canyons, an air show.” chute after chute after chute through there. If the fire would go into there, there’s nothing you can do. You’d need an air show.” DNR Engine 1 established a hoselay off Twisp River Road to create a wet line from the road, which the FS handcrew tied into when they began digging handline. The DNR Engine 1 lead noted that their work was frequently Pine cones kept interrupted because they had to respond to hotspots and to rolling down, pine cones that kept rolling down towards them, creating spot fires. They were working along the road towards house #5 and creating spot fires. asked DNR Engine 2 to drive up to protect it. As Engine 2 approached the house, they noticed it had a composite deck heavily covered with pine needles. The DNR helitack and the FS handcrew put line4 around the house. A wood pile and some outbuildings were burning, and a powerline pole was on fire. The DNR Engine 2 lead was closely monitoring the handline progress because the wind was blowing at the handcrew, and they had to respond to numerous spot fires. When the DNR engines began to run low on water, the engine lead contacted Incident Command, who provided a water tender. Randy heard Nate (FS ICT3 trainee) say twice on the radio to “keep Remember to keep one foot in the black.”5 Randy was scouting along Myer Creek Road one foot in the black. and was not directly on the fire’s edge. He elected to stay on foot because he didn’t want to lose track of how far he committed himself up the road. FD6 Division 1 offered to give him a ride, and he declined, opting to continue on foot. He was out in the green and was very aware of how far up the road he had travelled. His escape route was back down the road to Twisp River Road. He had a good view of the fire’s proximity to Myer Creek Road. At his farthest point, he was not more than one minute’s walk from the safety zone that he had earlier identified while walking up the road. Had he continued on up Myer Creek Road, he would have lost visibility of his escape route.

4 Fire line is a lot like a hiking trail. Firefighters cut vegetation and scrape the ground clear of all organic material. The idea is to have the fire burn up to it and stop when it runs out of fuel. 5 Keeping one foot in the black means to stay right on the edge of the fire. It is direction to stay right on the fire’s edge, which is much safer than having unburned fuel between you and the fire (both feet in the green).

Twisp River Fire Fatalities and Entrapments Learning Review Narrative Page 15 of 44 Right Flank

Right flank fire resources were directed to the Woods Canyon Road, It was a low-intensity which is about a half-mile long, dead-end, one-lane dirt road with several hairpin curves. At the time fire resources arrived, fire backing fire with two- behavior on the right flank was primarily a low-intensity fire backing foot flame lengths. downhill into the wind with two-foot flame lengths. Essentially, the lower end of Woods Canyon Road was the heel of the fire. FS Engine 1 was parked at the staging area, and the crew hiked to the first driveway off Woods Canyon Road (this intersection was dubbed the three-way; see figure 8). Andrea (FS Engine 1 assistant captain) was assigned as right flank “point-of-contact” for bucket work. She left her two crew members at the three-way, then walked the left fork of the three-way (which was actually the driveway to house #1) to scout for potential bucket drops. She saw a propane tank, woodpile, and other burning debris at house #1 (but the house itself was not burning). Andrea consulted with the FD6 engine lead, and they concluded that the house was not savable. Twisp River Road Protection FD6 resources (including FD6 Engine 4) were holding the fire at the junction of Woods Canyon Road and Twisp River Road to protect the origin, douse spot fires, hold the heel (or back) of the fire, and protect structures. There were fire apparatus, other vehicles from the rural fire department, and a lot of private vehicle traffic on Twisp River Road.

Figure 6: Photo taken at 1359 local time. Twisp River Road is in the bottom left, and house #6 is just above the road (photo courtesy of Marcy Stamper, Methow Valley News).

Twisp River Fire Fatalities and Entrapments Learning Review Narrative Page 16 of 44 1345–1400 -- Engaging the Fire

Left Flank

Randy, the “point-of-contact,” continued to work with helicopters, to coordinate structure protection, and to direct handline construction operations. Right Flank

Andrea (assistant captain on Randy’s engine (FS Engine 1)), was assigned to direct helicopter water drops for the fire’s right flank, which was backing toward houses. Incident Command

The final Unified Command member was Bronson, a qualified ICT3 Still working on all from Washington DNR, who arrived at 1345. The ICs agreed to getting all resources continue engaging the fire with the resources they had. The to NEWICC Unified Command established a communication plan that would not require reprogramming radios (cloning). It took some time to command/repeater coordinate within the different fire agencies assigned to the fire to frequencies. establish two tactical Ordering Air Tankers — As far frequencies. They were still working on getting as the Learning Review Team can tell, air all resources to NEWICC command/repeater tankers had been ordered but were not frequencies. They said the communication plan going to be launched until aerial was RedNet for the left flank and OSCCR for the supervision was on scene. This practice is right flank. The incident commanders agreed consistent with aviation policy for the that Bronson would head down Twisp River Road State of Washington. According to to an area with cell phone service. He would established federal interagency then contact NEWICC to get more air resources standards for fire and fire aviation assigned to this fire. He left the area and was operations: soon several miles away making phone calls. “Aerial supervision resources will be Terry, the FS ICT3, and Nate, the trainee, split up dispatched when available to the radio frequencies to try to ensure nothing initial/extended attack incidents in order was missed. Terry took tactical communications; to enhance safety, effectiveness, and Nate took command/repeater communications efficiency of aerial/ground operations.” because “there’s no way to catch all [radio] traffic.” Terry cussed himself for not having more “Incidents with three or more aircraft radios. Nate continued working to get the over/assigned to them should also have dispatch coordination duties transferred from aerial supervision in the form of ATGS CWICC to NEWICC. All resources worked to get [Air Attack] or ASM [Aerial Supervision the right radio frequencies. Module].”

Twisp River Fire Fatalities and Entrapments Learning Review Narrative Page 17 of 44

1400–1430 Incident Command

Nate asked Air Attack about the status of the heavy air tanker order that was originally placed through CWICC about an hour earlier. Conversations about air tanker orders were being held over the phone between CWICC and NEWICC. At 1417, the lead plane was dispatched. At 1422, Air Attack called NEWICC and inquired about the status of the air tanker order. Air Attack’s recollection of that conversation was that the NEWICC dispatcher told him that no air tankers had been ordered for the Twisp River Fire. NEWICC’s log shows that Air Attack was told that a heavy air tanker and lead plane were ordered through CWICC. NEWICC had the capability to record radio traffic on the federal repeater frequencies but did not have the capacity to record traffic over the state repeater frequencies. Since this fire was under state jurisdiction, NEWICC’s repeater traffic was not captured for this incident. CWICC did state that they decided to delay launching the heavy tanker order until Air Attack was on scene because both helicopters and fixed wing resources would be sharing the same air space. Air Attack was unaware that the heavy tanker launch had been held up pending his arrival.

Left Flank

Resources on the left flank noted fluctuating winds. Fire leadership noted shifting winds and an increase in fire behavior. The DNR Engine 1 lead said he noticed the wind changed direction with no warning. No one recalled the exact time, but they said that the fire was spotting across the line because the wind was now blowing across their line. That’s when they got the spot fires between the line and Twisp River Road. The wind was blowing the head back into itself, which helped moderate fire behavior and overall fire growth. The FS handcrew and DNR helitack crew continued to put in handline with direct helicopter water drops. As they were constructing line, they noticed a spot fire below house #5, so they went back to deal with it. More spot fires started from the initial spot fire. They spent 10 to 20 minutes digging line below house #5 and below the road (see figure 8) to secure their flank. As they finished picking up the spot fires, Randy, the left flank “point-of-contact,” noticed that he could clearly see Air Attack, which meant the column was standing straight up. This suggested to him a wind change had occurred above the fire. After they finished picking up the spot fires, the handcrew took a tactical pause. Air Attack also noticed the column standing straight up and was able “It was like playing to see the structures much better and get a sense of where the ‘whack-a-mole’…” structures on the left flank were located. Before the column stood up, a helicopter pilot said, “It was like playing ‘whack-a-mole’ in there. Sometimes you could see a house and make a drop, but when you come back, that house has disappeared into the smoke.” Randy (left flank “point-of-contact”) called Morgan (right flank “point-of-contact”) to tell Morgan that he could have the air resources because “It looks like you need them more than we do.”

Twisp River Fire Fatalities and Entrapments Learning Review Narrative Page 18 of 44 Right Flank

Forest Service Engine 642 drove up Woods Weather Forecast — The majority Canyon Road to the three-way and backed it in of resources responding to the Twisp River to the driveway (facing it downhill). Three crew Fire heard the Red Flag Warning and Fire members from FS Engine 1 were on foot and Weather Zone Forecasts read over the radio met FS Engine 642 at the three-way. during the morning fire weather briefing by both NEWICC and CWICC dispatch centers They briefed on LCES (L = Lookouts; C = or during their morning operational daily Communications; E = Escape Routes; S = Safety briefing at their respective duty stations. Zones). The resources were told they were their own lookouts; for communications, they However, several resources responding to were to use OSCCR as their tactical frequency; the Twisp River Fire were assigned to the their escape route was down the road; and Black Canyon Fire on the Chelan Complex their safety zone was the staging area. and available for local Initial Attack (IA). These resources were at the 0600 daily Morgan also provided weather information, operational briefing and heard the fire including information he had received at the weather briefing provided by the Incident Black Canyon Fire morning briefing about a Fire Behavior Analyst (FBAN) at the spike potential wind shift expected around 1500. He camp. interpreted that the wind change could increase fire behavior on the east side but did The Black Canyon fire was planning a not foresee a 6,000-acre blow-up. backfire operation and were told to complete the burnout by 1500 to avoid At the conclusion of the briefing, they agreed burning after the predicted wind shift that Morgan would go up Woods Canyon Road (predicted to shift sometime between 1500 to assess what was above and Andrea would and 1700). scout for potential dozer line. She tasked Bill (an engine boss trainee off of Engine 642) to The Incident Meteorologist (IMET) was at look for a potential dozer line. Bill took Rick the Chelan Complex ICP and provided a Wheeler with him, and when they returned to similar weather briefing at that location. the three-way, Morgan yelled down to Rick to This forecast had general weather bring up FS Engine 642. Rick drove the engine information for the fires within the complex up the road and Morgan jumped in and they but also contained specific information began scouting the structures along the road. regarding the timing of wind shifts for each fire as well as for specific drainages in area. While scouting the upper portion of Woods This briefing did not cover the drainage in Canyon Road, Morgan checked houses for which the Twisp River Fire was located (see occupants but did not see anyone. Morgan figure 7). then scouted out where to put the dozer line farther up Woods Canyon Road above Andrea’s location.

Twisp River Fire Fatalities and Entrapments Learning Review Narrative Page 19 of 44 Figure 7: Weather report discussing the predicted timing of an expected wind shift for different fires in the area. Andrea (assistant captain on FS Engine 1 and right flank air operations “point-of-contact”) was at the three-way waiting for the dozer. However, the dozer group ended up driving up a private drive off Twisp River Road (house #6) because they thought it was a good place to off-load the dozer from the transport. After off-loading, they drove (high-tracked the dozer) cross-country on to switchback 1, bypassing Andrea’s location (see figure 8). The heavy equipment boss walked down to the three-way and decided against a direct attack with the dozer because it was too steep to push direct line. He saw some engine people at that location but did not communicate this change. He walked cross-country from the three-way up Woods Canyon Road to the flat bench below house #2. The heavy equipment boss tied in with Morgan (right flank “point-of-contact”), and they discussed placing the dozer line on the flat bench between the fire and the structures. Morgan also asked the heavy equipment boss if he was comfortable crossing the drainage and putting in direct dozer line,6 but the heavy equipment boss said he was uncomfortable with that and wanted to stay on the bench. The dozer group began to build dozer line from the road along the bench below house #2 and continued along the bench up to house #3. Morgan decided he didn’t want any engines besides FS Engine 642 on the Woods Canyon Road until the dozer line was completed. Andrea was at the three-way when she noted that the fire was still backing into the wind and going up valley. The fuels around the propane tank at house #1 were burning more intensely, and the propane tank had started to vent. The fire also flared up below the driveway of house #1 near the three-way, and Andrea tried to reach Randy (left flank “point-of-contact”) to request a helicopter to

6 Direct dozer line refers to keeping the dozer right on the fire’s edge. Indirect line entails moving out into the unburned vegetation and having unburned fuel between the fire and the constructed dozer line.

Twisp River Fire Fatalities and Entrapments Learning Review Narrative Page 20 of 44 drop water. However, after repeated calls on all designated radio frequencies, she was unable to reach anyone on the left flank. Andrea talked to the FS ICT3, who told her to contact the heavy helicopter directly. Bill (engine boss trainee off of Engine 642) was frustrated as well because of the heavy radio traffic on all frequencies and because he couldn’t find the dozer. Andrea contacted Morgan about a spot fire from the flare-up on the south side of house #1’s driveway. Morgan asked Andrea if she could handle it, and she responded that she could by utilizing helicopter bucket drops. Since radio traffic was very heavy, she instructed Bill to direct water drops. Andrea told Bill to monitor only the air-to-ground frequency, and she would monitor the rest of the radio frequencies. Andrea stated this was also a training opportunity for Bill. Bill made multiple attempts to contact the heavy helicopter before he was successful. The helicopter dropped water on the spot fire, which slowed it down a little bit. This was the last drop in the helicopter’s fuel cycle, so it returned to Chelan for fuel. Andrea and Bill both thought they heard the helicopter pilot say he’d be right back and were expecting a load of water soon. The heavy helicopter left to refuel and was gone for 50 minutes. Bill called on air-to-ground and asked for more bucket support. He made radio contact with another helicopter and asked for a drop. Although he spoke with the pilot twice on the radio, he was not able to get another bucket drop at his location. Morgan (right flank “point-of-contact”) called Andrea and asked her to “bump the boys up.” He had intended that they hike up the road to house #2, but Rick drove FS Engine 642 down to the three- way to pick up a reconfigured engine crew consisting of Rick Wheeler, Tom Zbyszewski, Andrew Zajac, and Jacob. He drove them to house #2, parked the engine, and they then started structure protection operations. Morgan told Andrea that the dozer line was progressing well and was very close to “tying in close to our location” at house #3. Andrea was perplexed that the dozer made it past her location without her knowing. Moving Engines Up Woods Canyon Road Morgan knew from his initial briefing that two available Type 6 engines were at the staging area. He called Terry (FS IC Type 3) to have both engines come up Woods Canyon Road. Terry said that there were also some structure engines available, and Morgan asked if there was a Type 3 engine. Terry said there was, so Morgan asked that the Type 3 (FD6 Engine 4) also head up Woods Canyon Road and meet up with him for a briefing and to continue assessing structures. The two Type 6 engines (COOP Engine-1 and Contractor Engine-1) were mistakenly directed to go up the driveway at house #6. Andrea had hiked from the three-way intersection toward switchback 1 when they pulled up to house #6. She told them they were on the wrong road and to go back to Twisp River Road and head west to the next dirt road. FD6 Division 1 and FD6 Engine-4 had been repositioned from the left flank to support what they understood to be a burnout operation that was about to begin on the right flank. At 1435, FD6 Engine-4 drove up Woods Canyon Road with COOP Engine-1 and Contractor Engine-1 following.

Twisp River Fire Fatalities and Entrapments Learning Review Narrative Page 21 of 44 The spot fire near Andrea was starting to heat up again, was never and neither Bill nor Andrea were able to contact the Air Attack informed that there were helicopter to request another drop, so Andrea started to resources up Woods Canyon hike down to the staging area to get her engine (FS Road. He was told that two Engine 1) for water support. She asked Morgan to watch engines and Nate were on the left over her people while she was gone. flank but heard nothing about As the dozer worked from house #2 to house #3, Mark, any resources on the right flank. the heavy equipment boss, was looking for a route across Throughout the incident, the the drainage to hook the top of the fire and tie into the aerial resources were having left flank. He told the HEQB trainee that the fire was difficulty seeing the ground bumping the dozer line, but the line was holding. When resources due to the smoke. they were near house #3, Mark saw ash fall and gave the order to get to house #3. He took the ash fall to mean that the winds above him had shifted even though they did not feel the shift or see any change in fire behavior down at ground level. The heavy equipment boss trainee motioned the dozer up to the house and then looked down the drainage to observe moderate fire behavior (two-foot flame lengths). Incident Command

At 1425, CWICC telephoned NEWICC to report that the lead plane was 19 minutes out, and the heavy tanker was still on the ground loading. At 1428, FS ICT3(t) reported to NEWICC the resources that were on scene. (Note: Not all resources on-scene were captured with this resource report, indicating that it was very difficult to track all the resources): • FS Engine 642. • COOP Engine-1. • Contractor Engine-1. • DNR Engines 1 and 2. • FD6 Engine 1, FD6 Engine 2, FD6 Engine 4, and FD6 Engine 5 (structure engines). • Brush Trucks 1, 2, and 3. • Tenders 1 and 2. • FD6 Resources Chief 1, Division 1, and Division 2. • FS Handcrew. • DNR Helitack. • Heavy Air Tanker and Lead Plane (en route). 1430-1515 -- The Wind Shifts At 1441, Nate (FS IC3 trainee) gave a size-up to NEWICC that the fire was at least 50 acres and was running, torching, and spotting. He also reported that 20-plus structures at the head of the fire were directly threatened and in imminent danger. He called for fixed wing heavy aircraft for added structure protection. He stated that if he did not get heavy aircraft support, they would have an additional 100-plus structures in a box canyon that would be in imminent danger. He reported to dispatch that helicopters and Air Attack were working the left flank to keep the fire from continuing

Twisp River Fire Fatalities and Entrapments Learning Review Narrative Page 22 of 44

up Twisp River Road. They had multiple crews and engines working on structure protection at this time. • At 1441, Air Attack ordered a second heavy tanker “Fire tripled in size; send me through NEWICC. all the tankers you can.” • At 1456, Air Attack contacted NEWICC and said, “Fire tripled in size; send me all the tankers you can.”

Figure 8: This map shows the Twisp River Fire area with approximate resource locations prior to the wind shift. Orange houses were burned in the fire; green houses survived.

Twisp River Fire Fatalities and Entrapments Learning Review Narrative Page 23 of 44 Figure 9: Photos taken by the lead plane pilot. These photos, taken within the same minute (1445), capture the fire behavior as the wind shift is happening. The photo on the left is looking south-southeast down Myer Creek drainage. The photo on the right is looking towards what was dubbed the “three-way” intersection. The fire is reaching the road above switchback #2.

Left Flank

Randy (left flank “point-of-contact”) said, “Around 1445, I looked up and saw Air Attack and thought, ‘That’s weird.’ I felt little wind and there was a forecasted wind [shift] out of the west that morning. We talked about it at some point in the day, so a lightbulb went off that this was probably the wind switch. I stood there and watched. My flank of fire had “I looked up and calmed down and was no longer the priority. I noticed the smoke saw the column starting to blow the other way; [it] wasn’t cranking, but I got the sticking straight up.” feeling things [were] changing. I looked up and saw the column sticking straight up. It was a light gray-colored column, not rotating yet, just a fairly large amount of smoke. No large sound [was] associated with the fire making a huge run on my side, yet. Everything seemed fairly normal.” Randy radioed Air Attack and said, “Looks like you got a wind switch.” Part of the reason he said it on air-to-ground was so others could hear it. “Radios [were] so clogged up at that time [I] couldn’t call everyone and wanted it to get around. Around this time, crew boss radioed to me there was a spot across the road. I believed it was the road I was on and so I jogged a mellow, slow jog back down to here (pointing down Myer Creek Road). It wasn’t a panicked run or anything like that.” The FS handcrew had been taking a tactical pause to reassess their situation when they heard over the radio a message between Morgan and Randy: “Priority bucket work to the east [right] flank.” DNR Engine 1 was continuing to suppress spot fires near house #5.

Twisp River Fire Fatalities and Entrapments Learning Review Narrative Page 24 of 44 DNR Engine 2 lead said he heard an explosion and radioed that propane tanks were blowing up, and he instructed his crew to watch out for propane tanks. He heard another explosion that had a high- pitched squeal and radioed his crew again with the same instructions. He said it was blowing up “left and right.” Shortly after that, “the main explosion” went off. Right Flank

FD6 Engine 4 tied in with Morgan on the driveway of house #3 and were briefed. They turned around in the driveway and began structure protection operations. COOP Engine-1 and Contractor Engine-1 tied in with FS Engine 642 at house #2. Rick learned that the crew in these engines had a lot of structure experience, so he asked their advice. COOP Engine- 1 said, “If fire is on the ground, you’re okay; [If] it’s in the trees, get the [expletive] out.” Morgan (right flank “point-of-contact”) saw COOP Engine-1 and Contractor Engine-1 talking with FS Engine 642. He whistled and gave them a wave, indicating he wanted them to come up and tie in with him near the wye.

FD6 Division 1 had also started up Woods Canyon Road to Burnout Operations — help with what he thought was a burnout operation. While Several resources mentioned a going up Woods Canyon Road, he stopped to talk to Andrea burnout operation to take place (assistant captain on FS Engine 1), who was hiking down to get her engine at the staging area. FD6 Division 1 then on the right flank along Woods continued up Woods Canyon Road. Canyon Road. Through the course of interviews of the resources on Everyone else went up the road, and Bill was by himself. He scene during the incident, the wanted to find FS Engine 642 because he was Learning Review Team uncomfortable with the situation. He hiked up the road as determined that this operation far as he felt comfortable and stopped at switchback 5. Then was never planned nor discussed. he got to a place where he could observe FS Engine 642 doing structure protection operations. Bill was looking There was no direction given by around to assess the situation as FD6 Division 1 drove up the ICs or other fireline and tied in with him. supervision personnel for such an action. This burnout never took Bill had just introduced himself to FD6 Division 1 when he place. felt the wind switch and hit him in his face (from south- southeast to a more westerly wind). Fire activity below him had increased and had started to “boil.” It began to run uphill towards house #2, and he saw FS Engine 642 crew members scrambling to get into their truck. He watched them drive up the road in

Twisp River Fire Fatalities and Entrapments Learning Review Narrative Page 25 of 44 the opposite direction of their safety zone. Bill noted there were 60-foot flame lengths and he Wind Switch and Changes could feel the heat when the fire hit and licked to Fire Behavior — The over house #2 moments after Engine 642 left. Bill perception on Woods Canyon Road said that the fire was ripping and that he “never (WCR) was that the wind changed from saw fire move that fast.” Bill immediately tried to out of the southeast at a low speed to hail any air resources to support suppression much stronger from the south- efforts and then started running down Woods southwest. The wind change rapidly Canyon Road. At switchback 3, he looked over his increased fire intensity and spread shoulder back up to switchback 4 and saw that the along the entire right flank of the fire. fire crossed the road and was established and In the forested area in the bottom of running across the other side. the drainage north of houses #1 and Andrea was walking west on Twisp River Road to #7, the fire quickly transitioned to a get her engine when she felt the wind change. She high-intensity crown fire with short- looked at her watch and thought how strange it range spotting moving uphill to the was that the weather forecaster’s prediction northeast and east towards houses #2 concerning the wind switch was accurate. She and #3. estimated the wind speed to be about 10 miles an The drainage running parallel to WCR hour. from the three-way intersection to the RTO! RTO! -- Reverse Tool Order! north-northeast towards switchback 5 was comprised mainly of a brush fuel COOP Engine-1 and Contractor Engine-1 drove up type with some aspen and ponderosa towards Morgan (left flank “point-of-contact”), pine overstory. who briefed COOP Engine-1 and directed them to This area also transitioned from a house #4. During the briefing, Morgan mentioned backing surface fire to a head fire he had heard about a predicted wind shift at 1500. moving through the entire vertical fuel As the briefing continued, the wind shifted and profile. Morgan said it felt like a blast. He said that there was no wavering of wind, no dead air. The fire Flame extension across Woods Canyon instantly blew up and ran and Morgan yelled, Road and short-range spotting allowed “RTO! RTO! RTO!” He said he looked downhill and the fire to move across WCR between saw fire running through head-high brush. Trees switchbacks 2 and 3 to the east- were totally involved; the fire was running straight northeast towards house #9 and across up the hill towards the fire crews. Morgan radioed, switchbacks 4 and 5 towards house “RTO! RTO! Evac! Evac! Road has been #10. compromised, [right] flank.” Morgan said that there were no cues that the wind was about to shift and that it came up really hard, “in your face.” Engine 642 turned up Woods Canyon Road when Morgan whistled and waved his hand over his head, signaling to them to turn around and head to their safety zone. They turned around in place and were the first engine to head down the road toward the safety zone.

Twisp River Fire Fatalities and Entrapments Learning Review Narrative Page 26 of 44 COOP Engine-1 went to house #4 and turned around. They “It was like a dog on noticed multiple spot fires south and southeast of house #4 and a chain that broke all paused for a few seconds to get a better look at what was going of a sudden. And the on. They decided to head down Woods Canyon Road to the dog was on us.” staging area. They said they could not see house #2 due to smoke and extreme fire behavior. As they drove down the road, they could see that Engine 642 had left their parking spot.

Figure 10: Approximate resource locations after the RTO order was called. Contractor Engine-1 drove up and turned around at the upper wye on Woods Canyon Road. The crew saw a tree explode with fire, and they said they had never seen or heard anything like that before. They couldn’t hear anything due to the deafening noise. It sounded like white noise, as if a TV was tuned to static and turned up full blast. Division 1 said when he was looking up Woods Canyon Road, he saw Engine 642’s brake lights as they headed up the hill from his location at switchback 5. Division 1 backed down the road and offered Bill a ride, who declined because he wanted to stay on foot. Division 1 kept backing down until he was able to turn around and then headed down the road. He then had clear visibility down towards the three-way. Morgan was escaping on foot as the fire was quickly bearing down “The trees were on him. He had his hand on his shelter ready to deploy. He explosive like the stopped and said he “was a scared rabbit for about two seconds.” wind turned to fire.” He stumbled over his feet and fell. COOP Engine-1 saw him stumble and when they pulled along beside him, they yanked him

Twisp River Fire Fatalities and Entrapments Learning Review Narrative Page 27 of 44 into their engine. Morgan immediately radioed, “Emergency traffic! Road compromised! Need aerial support!” He contacted Andrea to find out who was back at the staging area and learned that Engine 642 was not there. During this time, Andrea was hiking to the staging area to get her engine. When she heard Morgan “The steering wheel was so say, “RTO! RTO! Evac! Evac!” on the radio, she hot, I wished I had my started running to her engine. She got in her gloves on.” Traveling down Woods engine to drive up to the spot fire. As she neared Canyon Road was treacherous for the the Woods Canyon Road intersection, she found entrapped engines because of the heavy she could not make the turn because suppression smoke and fire. COOP Engine-1 and resources were blocking her route. She drove up Contractor Engine-1 reported heavy the driveway of house #6 to turn around, but smoke and conditions were black as before she could turn on to Twisp River Road, a night. They could only see a few feet past local homeowner used her car to block her in. The the hood of their vehicle and homeowner asked Andrea questions about what conversations inside the engines were to the fire was doing and expressed concerns about “go slow; go slow. Stay left, wheels in the her home. Andrea could hear all the frantic radio ditch. Everything bad is to the right; stay traffic and was extremely frustrated with this left; stay left.” “I don’t care if I cave in encounter because it delayed her from getting the left side of my engine, I’m staying back on Twisp River Road. left.” Engine 642 was at house #2 when the wind At switchback 5, they said the fire was switched. They had been at the house for 5 to 10 over the road and was black as night. It minutes when they noticed a dramatic increase in was blowing red; the fire was over the fire behavior down below them toward house #1. top of the engine. Engines reported They were confused about which direction to go driving through a few waves of fire at because their predetermined escape route and that point. safety zone took them in the direction of the hottest part of the fire. After a few moments of indecision, they turned up hill toward the wye and house #3. Morgan noticed them coming up the hill and whistled and “We were just driving waved his hand over his head, indicating they should turn through the fire and you around and go downhill. Rick Wheeler turned the truck can’t see your hand in around right where they were in the road and headed front of your face.” downhill into the fire. At the point, Jacob watched as the fire started “overtaking the road…we were just driving through the fire and you can’t see your hand in front of your face.” He “remember[s] the truck kind of like jumping down, and I felt like a couple of the tires blew on the truck ‘cause we were driving through the fire.” They continued driving for a few moments after the truck lurched (from what Jacob thought was the tires blowing) and then they went off the road and down an embankment. The truck came to rest when the front axle was high-centered by a rock. Rick tried to get the truck unstuck, but it was apparent to Jacob that they weren’t going anywhere. Jacob bailed out of the truck (through the left rear door), forced his way through the flames, made it back up to the road, and ran down toward the three-way to find help.

Twisp River Fire Fatalities and Entrapments Learning Review Narrative Page 28 of 44

COOP Engine-1 and Contractor Engine-1 continued down the hill through the flames and passed by Engine 642 without realizing it. They also passed by Bill who was walking down the road just above switchback 1. They made it around switchback 1 and came up on Division 1 who was stopped in the middle of the road near the three-way talking on his radio. This stopped the egress of COOP Engine- 1 and Contractor Engine-1. Since the engines were stopped, Morgan got out and started walking to the back of COOP Engine-1. Meanwhile, Bill (Engine 642’s engine boss trainee) had reached switchback 1. He saw that the fire was far enough above him, and he made the “evaluation that he had escaped.” He noted that communications at this point were “crap,” insinuating that the radio frequencies were extremely busy. He estimated the winds to be about 15 miles per hour.

Figure 11: Photo taken at 1448 local time. Twisp River Road runs along the bottom of the photo, and Myer Creek Road intersects with Twisp River Road in the bottom left corner. Woods Canyon Road intersects with Twisp River Road just right of center in the lower third of the photo.

Twisp River Fire Fatalities and Entrapments Learning Review Narrative Page 29 of 44 Figure 12: Approximate resource locations after the wind shift. The red shading in the background is approximate placement of the retardant drops that occurred during the entrapment of the dozer group. See Figure 14 for a view of the fire progression and spread direction.

Twisp River Fire Fatalities and Entrapments Learning Review Narrative Page 30 of 44 Incidents within the Incident As Bill continued down toward the three-way intersection, he heard his name being screamed, “Bill! Bill! We need help up there! Bill! We need help up there! Bill! Please! We need help!” As the person got closer, Bill recognized it was Jacob, who was severely burned. During his escape, Jacob had taken off his yellow shirt and was not wearing a hard hat. Bill yelled “Medical! Medical! to Jacob to keep running down to COOP Engine-1 and Contractor Engine-1, which were staffed with several EMTPs (Emergency Medical!” Medical Technician Paramedics). Bill ran behind Jacob and yelled, “Medical! Medical! Medical!” The EMTPs initiated patient care for Jacob while evacuating him to the staging area. While en route to the staging area, Brad, the Contractor Engine-1 boss radioed, “We have an incident within an incident and we need a paramedic at the staging area ASAP.” After seeing that Jacob received treatment, Bill ran down toward the staging area and briefed the FS ICT3. Andrea Inconsistencies with made it back to Woods Canyon Road and tied in with Bill, Approach to who told her about Jacob’s injuries. Both went to the Emergency Medical staging area to assist the ICs. Care — After interviewing Brad radioed again that he had an incident within an the EMTPs involved in patient incident and needed a paramedic (ambulance) at the care, it became clear to the staging area. Just as he concluded that radio traffic, the FS Learning Review Team that ICT3 showed up. Brad asked his crew EMTP what his needs although appropriate on-scene were and was told he needed a medical helicopter to emergency medical care was transport his patient. Brad forwarded that request to the provided for this patient in a FS ICT3. timely manner, inconsistencies existed in these emergency The EMTP never got past “A” in the ABC assessment medical professionals’ (Airway, Breathing, and Circulation). He wondered aloud if approach to patient care. he could perform a needle cric (cricothyroidotomy)7 in the State of Washington. COOP Engine-1 assisted Contractor These inconsistencies involved Engine 1 by trying to gain a rapport with Jacob—helping to (1) medical control and (2) cut off his clothing as part of the assessment, providing expediting patient transport to burn sheets, administering oxygen, and setting up an I.V. more advanced care vs. initial on-scene advanced care. The Contractor Engine-1 crew attempted to commandeer a Chief Officer vehicle to transport Jacob but were unsuccessful. The Chief sent another vehicle down to provide transportation, and it arrived just as COOP Engine-1 was in the process of starting the I.V. They loaded Jacob into the transport truck, and the medic from Contractor Engine-1 hopped in and they headed down Twisp River Road to meet an ambulance. Before the vehicle left the scene, the Engine Boss got information about what vehicle Jacob was in, where he was going, and who else was with him and then relayed that information to Terry, the FS ICT3.

7 Needle cricothyroidotomy involves passing an over-the-needle catheter through the cricothyroid membrane. This procedure provides a temporary secure airway to oxygenate and ventilate a patient in severe respiratory distress when other, less invasive methods have failed or are not likely to be successful.

Twisp River Fire Fatalities and Entrapments Learning Review Narrative Page 31 of 44 At 1510, the ambulance transported Jacob to a helispot where he was flown to Seattle’s Harborview Medical Center burn unit.

Left Flank

Randy (left flank “point-of-contact”) radioed the handcrew and asked, “Is what you’re doing buying anything?” He was thinking about pulling his resources down. He was listening to the radio and was still hearing information about someone being burned. He had a “heart-sinking feeling” and decided to suspend suppression operations on his flank of the fire. At 1508, the IC ordered all resources to disengage and return to Twisp River Road. He told them to get to their trucks and be mobile. Right Flank Entrapment at House #3 Just before Morgan gave the order to RTO, Mark, the heavy equipment boss, directed the dozer to move to The dozer group never house #3. In the driveway, the dozer operator spun detected the wind shift. The heavy equipment boss saw ash around and saw that the fire was licking around the coming down and had the dozer side of the house, so he parked near FD6 Engine-4. The group move. Their dust trail did not dozer operator said he was still not concerned because change direction, indicating the he had seen worse, and they thought they would ride wind did not shift in their location. it out near the house. The heavy equipment boss The dozer operator only briefly stayed in the dozer remembered stories of ash falling before it got really hot, despite FD6 Engine 4 spraying during the Thirtymile Fire and water towards the dozer the best they could. Heat decided to get his resources to forced the dozer operator to shut down the dozer and safety. Wind models also get out of the dozer. However, he didn’t take his fire suggested that the winds near the shelter with him because it was bungeed to the dozer dozer group would likely not have cage and he didn’t think he would need it. It was hot, been affected by the wind shift. but he still thought it was okay. The dozer group huddled between the garage and dozer. They “It went from daylight initially stayed near the dozer, and then they followed the heavy to midnight at the flick equipment boss to the garage. As they neared the garage, they of a switch.” “did the three stooges and collided.” The heavy equipment boss trainee used a shovel to pry up the roll-up garage door to open it. They entered the garage but left the door open about a foot. They saw fire on the other side and after a few minutes, they knew the structure was on fire and it was getting really hot. They knelt down on the floor near the opening in the door to find fresh air. The dozer operator looked under the door and saw three fire whirls. They called out on the radio in the blind8 and said they were

8 Broadcasting in the blind is a general broadcast intended for anyone who may hear it. Most radio broadcasts are aimed at a specific receiver.

Twisp River Fire Fatalities and Entrapments Learning Review Narrative Page 32 of 44 trapped in the garage. It was very loud in the garage and they were not able to hear any radio transmissions. They also called for the engine nearest to them (FD6 Engine 4) to put water on the garage, but they didn’t get a response. They were inside the garage for another minute or two when they heard FD6 Engine 4 leave. They stayed inside the garage for a few more minutes when they decided they needed to leave. FD6 Engine 4 was also at house #3 when the fire began running. The “I was hoping my engine was facing downhill away from the house. They had been window didn’t using their front bumper-mounted water turret to cool down the explode.” area for themselves and the dozer crew. They also sprayed a small group of trees east of the house, the house, and the dozer. They contacted FD6 Division 1, who told them to put on their structural fire protection gear and drive out. One crewmember donned his turn-out gear and left the truck to get another set that was in In their words… an outside compartment. He said it was so hot The “fire was going around us; fire was that he held his breath while he was out of the too hot, we’re going to die! [I] Wanted to truck. He retrieved the gear and got back in the grab stuff and run… [there were] less trees cab. They decided to wait to leave because the uphill…” They had lost sight of the dozer road was impassable. group, and in fear for their lives, they left. At that point, the house and the garage was on The cab was hot and smoky, and it was fire. The main part of the fire front had passed hard to breathe. There was no visibility. At while they were one point, one engine crew member “It was like parked at the house. considered donning his self-contained driving through a “It was just orange, breathing apparatus (SCBA) and walking barrel of fire.” there was no smoke. in front of the truck to guide it (FD6 Engine Everything was on 4). fire. You could just see tree skeletons burning.” “I was scared and upset and worried They saw an opening in the fire behavior, and about the three guys behind the garage. I they could see down the road about 100 feet, so didn’t think about yelling at them to get they went for it and made it as far as the wye in…felt bad” (FD6 Engine 4). when they had to stop again due to fire behavior. After that, they made their way down The dozer group made a conscious the road in “little chunks.” As FD6 Engine 4 was decision to go into the garage because driving down, they had the front-mounted they did not feel like they could safely get bumper water turret spraying on fog pattern. inside the engine. They did not feel The driver had to turn the windshield wipers on abandoned by the engine company and because the wind was blowing the water back understood that everyone had to do what on the engine. They said they used most of their they could to provide for their own safety. water at house #3 to protect themselves and the dozer. While the dozer group was in the garage, pieces of metal from the roof were starting to fall. Smoke was filling the garage, the windows were breaking, and the fire was rolling over their heads. They opened the door a little farther and the fire rolled in. Because of their structural firefighting experience, they recognized that the garage was about to collapse, so they left. As they left the garage, the heavy equipment boss was in the lead. In their haste, the dozer operator

Twisp River Fire Fatalities and Entrapments Learning Review Narrative Page 33 of 44 and heavy equipment boss crashed into each other and fell. The dozer operator’s beard was singed, and he burned his arm. The heavy equipment boss burned his hand because he had taken his glove off earlier to operate his radio, and all three had burned their ears and faces.

To get away from the intense heat, they ran to The Value of Shelter Woods Canyon Road just above the wye where Deployment Training—The men they deployed their fire shelters. They looked recalled all the years they had watched back towards the house and saw that the the videos of fire shelter deployment garage and house had collapsed. It was very training. They said the videos ran through smoky; their eyes were burning and watering, their minds over and over again, so and “snot was pouring out of our noses.” The deploying the shelters came naturally. three men had a large size fire shelter and a They were “very impressed how well it regular size fire shelter between them. They [the training] stuck…very pleased and configured to fit all three into the two shelters thankful.” The dozer operator who had (see figure 13). They recalled that it was left his fire shelter on the dozer stated, immediately much cooler in the shelters and “Everyone in my company will wear a that the air was much cleaner to breathe. Then shelter from now on. I don’t give a the heavy equipment boss trainee noticed that (expletive) how uncomfortable it [the a pack inside the shelter contained fusees and chest harness] is!” The dozer operator threw them outside and away from the shelters. said, “I was very thankful to be with two DNR ICT3 Bronson heard that Mark, the heavy good and fire-experienced guys who equipment boss, was not having any luck maintained their composure.” Two men contacting Air Attack over the FS air-to-ground commented that they remember being frequency. Terry, the ICT3, contacted Mark on physically exhausted—like after a 16-hour the command frequency and told him to try Air shift. Attack on the command frequency. Upon hearing about this conversation, Air Attack stated that the air-to-ground frequency was pretty open during this time because most of the helicopters were down for fuel. He could not understand how Bronson could hear Mark but Air Attack couldn’t. He wondered if Mark was using a DNR air-to- ground frequency instead of the air-to-ground frequency assigned to the fire.

Twisp River Fire Fatalities and Entrapments Learning Review Narrative Page 34 of 44 Figure 13: A depiction of how the dozer group was oriented while in their fire shelters.

Figure 14: Estimated progression of the fire from 1230 to 1500 local time.

Twisp River Fire Fatalities and Entrapments Learning Review Narrative Page 35 of 44 At 1457, Terry (FS IC Type 3) called NEWICC and told them that they had an entrapment on the right Most of the air resources flank. Then he broadcasted a call in the blind on left this fire thinking no command for everyone on the fire to go to the one was seriously command frequency and that there had been an injured. There was a huge sigh of entrapment. Terry then contacted Air Attack and relief when the dozer group stated told him to contact the heavy equipment boss. Air that no more retardant was needed Attack asked the lead plane if he had the command in the entrapment area. The frequency programmed into his radio. The lead command channel was released back plane confirmed that he did and then called the to regular traffic. Most resources on heavy equipment boss on the command frequency the fire thought any major disaster to locate his position. had been averted. At 1509, the lead plane began retardant drops After the retardant drops were while communicating with the heavy equipment finished, a voice came over the radio boss. NEWICC then cleared all other traffic on that stating that all that were missing frequency. were accounted for and everyone was The first tanker in was a C-130, who split his load okay. It wasn’t until the pilots had into two drops. The next heavy tanker was a DC-10 landed that they learned of the that dropped four loads. Finally, a P2V dropped two fatalities on the Twisp River Fire. more loads. The heavy equipment boss radioed the lead plane and told him that no more retardant was needed for the entrapment. At least one of the drops made a significant impact on reducing the amount of heat the dozer group was feeling while in their fire shelters. Air Attack asked the dozer group if an air ambulance was still needed, but they said they didn’t need one. Air Attack also asked the IC if the air ambulance was still needed, and NEWICC recommended that the air ambulance not be cancelled until all resources were accounted for. All agreed with that suggestion, and the air ambulance order was not cancelled. The Search for Engine 642 and the Dozer Group Terry (FS IC Type 3), Andrea (assistant captain on FS Engine 1) and Bill (engine boss trainee on Engine 642) determined the known missing to be: Engine 642 with two crew members from Engine 642 and one crew member from FS Engine-1; the dozer operator; and the heavy equipment boss. Several firefighters were trying to get up Woods Canyon Road. Terry told Pat (the fire manager who initially reported the fire), “We need to get up there and figure out what is going on.” Terry walked up to the first switchback, but it was too hot. Then he hiked back to his truck and Morgan (right flank “point-of-contact”), Pat, and Terry got in the truck and drove past the hot corner on Woods Canyon Road. After that first corner, conditions were tolerable. They continued up the road to look for the dozer group and Engine 642.

Twisp River Fire Fatalities and Entrapments Learning Review Narrative Page 36 of 44 1515-1530 –- Search and Rescue

Left Flank

The FS handcrew and the DNR helitack crew had disengaged and returned to their vehicles on Twisp River Road. The “point-of-contact” for the left flank assessed the situation and heard about a spot fire south of Twisp River Road and was asked to suppress it. He declined due to the fire behavior and headed to an alternate safety zone west on Twisp River Road. Right Flank

Morgan said he thought he was radioing Engine 642 because he had heard someone say on three different occasions, “We crashed through the garage door, it’s fully involved and we need air support.” He radioed back each time, “Calm down. What house are you in?” He didn’t know he was hearing the dozer group, who could not hear his replies. That was his last radio contact. Terry, Morgan, and Pat (local fire manager) continued up the road to look for the missing resources. Their plan was to look at the garages on Woods Canyon Road. Terry noticed a helmet and yellow fire shirt (“it looked like a brush coat”) on the road but continued to search for Engine 642 and the dozer group. At the wye, they saw a fire shelter and honked their horn. Morgan saw what looked like three people come out of one shelter (it was actually two shelters). This turned out to be the dozer group. At 1515, Nate (FS IC Type 3 trainee) ordered a Type 1 incident management team and shortly after (at 1522) recommended that FD6 Chief 1 initiate a level 3 evacuation for Twisp. 1530-1630 -- Search for Engine 642 While taking the dozer group down Woods Canyon Road for medical care, Terry noticed what appeared to be skid marks leading off the road. He gestured to Pat and Morgan and pointed to the engine. Pat and Morgan hopped out, looked over the side, and saw Engine 642 with the rear door on the driver’s side wide open. It was pretty clear to Terry what happened because the engine was burned and the area was all black. Terry dropped off Morgan and Pat so they could assess the situation and survey the scene. Terry continued down Woods Canyon Road to take the dozer group to get medical care. Terry saw a sheriff deputy vehicle and stopped to ask the deputy to contact the sheriff because he believed there were three Forest Service fatalities. Terry found two ambulances on Twisp River Road, and they assessed the dozer group’s burns. Terry returned to the staging area where he discussed with Nate what he thought had occurred. This is when Pat confirmed over the radio that there were three fatalities. 1630 -- End of Shift Terry talked to Pat and learned that Pat had ordered smokejumpers with multiple qualifications who were starting to arrive. Terry told Nate to take people home and take care of them. Terry said that he would stay and transition when the new IC arrived. However, Terry was unable to find a qualified ICT3 willing to accept this assignment. Terry recognized the emotional impact on him and

Twisp River Fire Fatalities and Entrapments Learning Review Narrative Page 37 of 44 worked on transitioning to a new federal IC within the Unified Command structure when the time was right. The sheriff, a coroner, and a deputy arrived, and Terry escorted them up Woods Canyon Road. They drove by the scene and Terry pointed out his window to Engine 642 as they drove by. The coroner sent DNR Engine 2 up Woods Canyon Road to cool the ground down around Engine 642 so the sheriff, deputy, and coroner could access Engine 642. Nate heard that the fire was getting into other areas, and at 1559 asked FD6 Chief 1 to expand the level 3 evacuation order to include Winthrop. Terry ordered five dozers with heavy equipment bosses; five Type 1 crews; five structure engines; and five strike team leaders or division supervisors. He also wanted to verify that the Type 1 team was ordered (at 1827). Around 2030, Terry worked with FD6 Chief 1 to set up a new staging area for incoming resources. Around 2100, representatives from two nearby incident management teams met with Terry at a local high school to discuss how they could help. Eventually he was able to transfer to another incident commander at 2131, and Terry was able to stand down at 2200.

Twisp River Fire Fatalities and Entrapments Learning Review Narrative Page 38 of 44 Team Members

Twisp River Fire Fatalities and Entrapments Learning Review Narrative Page 39 of 44 Appendices Appendix A – Maps

Twisp River Fire Progression Map

Progression map of the Twisp River Fire from the afternoon of August 19 to August 26, 2016.

Twisp River Fire Fatalities and Entrapments Learning Review Narrative Page 40 of 44 Twisp River Fire Vicinity Map

Twisp River Fire Vicinity Map showing August 26, 2015 footprint.

Twisp River Fire Fatalities and Entrapments Learning Review Narrative Page 41 of 44 Woods Canyon Area Topographic Map

Topographic map of the Woods Canyon area. Myer Creek is on the left, and Elbow Coulee is on the right.

Twisp River Fire Fatalities and Entrapments Learning Review Narrative Page 42 of 44 Appendix B – Glossary of Acronyms List of fictitious names and their roles The bolded names interspersed throughout the document have the role associated with that name next to it. This was intended to make the story easier to follow. If you see a name and can’t remember the person’s role, just thumb through the document until you see that name in bold. The bolded name will have that person’s associated role next to it. Andrea – Assistant Captain for FS Engine 1 and air operations point of contact for the right flank Brad – Contractor Engine 1 Captain Bill – A crew member assigned to Engine 642 who is an Engine Boss Trainee Bronson – Incident Commander Type 3 from Washington Department of Natural Resources Mark – Washington Department of Natural Resources Heavy Equipment Boss Morgan – Assistant Engine Captain on E-642 and right flank point of contact Nate – Forest Service Incident Commander Type 3 Trainee Pat – Off-duty Forest Service fire manager Randy – Engine Captain of FS Engine 1 and left flank point of contact Terry – Forest Service Incident Commander Type 3 List of acronyms CWICC – Central Washington Communications Center DNR - Washington Department of Natural Resources DO – Duty Officer NFDRS - National Fire Danger Rating System EMTP – Emergency Medical Technician Paramedic ERC - Energy Release Component FBAN – Fire Behavior Analyst FD6 – Okanogan County Fire District 6 FS – Forest Service FWZ – Fire Weather Zone LCES – Lookouts, Communications, Escape Routes, Safety Zones IA – Initial Attack IC – Incident Commander

Twisp River Fire Fatalities and Entrapments Learning Review Narrative Page 43 of 44 ICT3 – Incident Commander Type 3 ICT3(t) – Incident Commander Type 3 Trainee IMET – Incident Meteorologist MVRD – Methow Valley Ranger District NCSB – North Cascades Smokejumper Base NEWICC – Northeast Washington Interagency Communications Center OCSD – Okanogan County Sheriff’s Department OWF – Okanogan-Wenatchee National Forest PSA – Predictive Service Area RAWS – Remote Activated Weather Station RFW – Red Flag Warning RTO – Reverse Tool Order SCBA – Self-contained Breathing Apparatus WCR – Woods Canyon Road

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