Commanding General Purpose: The U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence pub- Brigadier General Gregg C. Potter lishes the Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin (MIPB) Deputy to the Commanding General quarterly under the provisions of AR 25-30. MIPB presents Mr. Jerry V. Proctor information designed to keep intelligence professionals in- formed of current and emerging developments within the Deputy Commander for Training fi eld and provides an open forum in which ideas; concepts; Colonel Dennis A. Perkins tactics, techniques, and procedures; historical perspectives; Chief, Doctrine Division problems and solutions, etc., can be exchanged and dis- Mr. Stephen B. Leeder cussed for purposes of professional development. MIPB Staff: Disclaimer: Views expressed are those of the authors and Editor not those of the Department of Defense or its elements. Sterilla A. Smith The contents do not necessarily refl ect offi cial U.S. Army Associate Editor positions and do not change or supersede information in Hugh M. Lewis, PhD any other U.S. Army publications. Official: Design and Layout By order of the Secretary of the Army: Gary V. Morris GEORGE W. CASEY JR. Cover Design General, United States Army JOYCE E. MORROW Gary V. Morris Chief of Staff Administrative Assistant to the Issue Photographs Secretary of the Army Courtesy of the U.S. Army 1107511 FROM THE EDITOR In addition to all the great articles and book reviews, the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) con- tributed its lessons learned on intelligence operations during Rotation 11-01 for this issue. The 3rd BCT, 82nd Airborne “Panthers” paratroopers deployed to the JRTC at Fort Polk and conducted the fi rst full spectrum operation rotation in eight years. We continue to receive excellent articles from the fi eld on the current operating environments for in- telligence as well as suggestions for improving training. Please continue sending MIPB your ideas and thoughts. Please note that we have a new department, Culture Corner, which will provide insights on cul- tural competency on a regular basis. Throughout 2012, the Military Intelligence (MI) community (USAICoE, INSCOM, DA G2, and FORSCOM) will be commemorating the 50th anniversary of the establishment of the MI Branch and the 25th anniver- sary of the MI Corps. Activities are being planned to educate as well as build professional interest in the history and heritage of Army Intelligence starting with the American Revolution through experiences and events throughout the year. MIPB is proud to participate in this celebration by publishing a July September 2012 50th anniversary commemorative issue in collaboration with Lori Tagg, USAICoE Command Historian and Michael Bigelow, INSCOM Command Historian. While content for this issue will be supplied by Lori and Mike, I would like to invite you to submit historical Army Intelligence related articles for publication in issues leading up to the July September 2012 publication. Suspenses for these issues are: July September 2011 S: 30 May 2011 October December 2011 S: 30 August 2011 January March 2012 S: 30 November 2011 April June 2012 S: 30 January 2012

Sterilla A. Smith Editor MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

April - June 2011 Volume 37 Number 2 PB 34-11-2

FEATURES

JRTC 45 The Threat of Mexican Cartels’ IED Proliferation North of the Border by Sergeant 5 Joint Readiness Training Center: Full Matthew Ludwig Spectrum Operations Overview by Lieutenant Colonel (P) John Haynicz, Senior Intelligence 51 Intelligence Support to the Prevention and Trainer Mitigation of Civilian Casualties by First Lieutenant Nathaniel L. Moir 9 Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance in Full Spectrum Operations 55 By, With, and Through Human Intelligence by by Kirk Drennan and Heather Greaves Major Thomas Handy 14 The Intelligence Architecture in FSO by 58 Taliban Networks: Assessing the Role of Non- Lieutenant Colonel (P) John Haynicz and Major Kinetic Operations in the Battle of Kandahar Brian Hayes and Beyond by First Lieutenant Tyler Jost 18 The Role of the Company Intelligence 62 Intelligence Analysis: Confronting North Korea Support Team in Full Spectrum Operations and Iran by Robert J. Leach by Thomas Tomes and Christopher Maxwell 73 Knowledge Management and Value Creation 21 Military Intelligence Company Support to Within an Organization: U.S. Army Wartime Brigade Operations: Integrate to Synchronize Operations Relief In Place by Edwin K. Morris by Major Gualberto J. Marrero III 24 HUMINT from COIN to FSO: A Way Ahead by Chief Warrant Offi cer Three Conan Payne and Chief Warrant Offi cer Four Chad LeBoeuf Departments 27 Signals Intelligence in Full Spectrum 2 Always Out Front Operations: “Outside the Wire? What Wire? by Warrant Offi cer One Larry Jones and Sergeant Culture Corner First Class Timothy Rodriguez 67 Operationalizing Culture: Consequences of the Defi nition 30 The Shadow Tactical Unmanned Aerial of Cultural Intelligence by Hugh M. Lewis, PhD System: Enabling the Enablers by Sergeant First Class Bryan J. Ward 69 Cross Cultural Negotiations: Skill Building in an Operational Environment by Mahir J. 33 Tactical Intelligence in Operation New Dawn: Ibrahimov, PhD Notes From the Front by Captain Christopher 77 Professional Reader M. Gin and Staff Sergeant Bennett J. Strobel 84 Contact and Submission Information 40 Uncertain about Uncertainty: Improving the Understanding of Uncertainty in MI Doctrine Inside Back Cover: 2011 CSM Doug Russell by Major Ismael R. Rodriguez Award always out front by Brigadier General Gregg C. Potter Commanding General U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence

Leading Change1 Two-plus decades ago, when I attended the U.S. paring them to meet current and future challenges. Army Intelligence Offi cer Basic Course at Fort Leader development must build leaders who can Huachuca, Arizona, training was not on a computer handle the complexities they face now and in the and our Nation knew its threat, the Soviets. Since future. then, our Army has drastically changed force struc- Second, we must identify innovative and relevant ture and how it operates. We have moved from a intelligence capabilities for the current and future corps and division-centric army to a brigade-centric force. We must focus resources on where risk is army. Our Army has modifi ed how it equips and greatest so that we can maximize emerging Military trains our Soldiers to perform the intelligence mis- Intelligence (MI) capabilities. Then we must inte- sion in light of the changing operational environ- grate those capabilities into the operational force, ment and our Army’s structural changes. building an Intelligence force that wins the “fi ght for Change is constant in our business, whether it is knowledge” in all terrain and across the full spec- the security environment or fi elding new equipment trum of military operations to achieve decisive vic- or instituting new training models. Acclimating tory. To guide our Soldiers, we must provide them people to change and encouraging them to embrace the doctrine needed to operate in the fi eld. Where we it and move forward is challenging. Since taking previously used 40 to 50 intelligence Field Manuals command of the U.S. Army Intelligence Center of we now have four. The rest are Training Circulars Excellence (USAICoE) and Fort Huachuca, I have and Army Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures stated that our mission is to train, develop, and publications that we will rapidly update in a rapidly educate our Army’s Intelligence Soldiers and lead- changing security and technology environment.2 ers, military and civilian. Our mission is also to USAICoE will execute our mission as good stew- design, develop and integrate intelligence capabili- ards of natural and national resources. One means ties through concepts, doctrine, requirements, and by which we will accomplish this task is by imple- materiel development that support expeditionary menting training guided by principles of the U.S. full-spectrum operations in a joint, interagency, in- Army Learning Concept for 2015 (ALC 2015). ALC tergovernmental, and multi-national environment. 2015 is our Army’s vision of how we will train and I have identifi ed several critical tasks to accom- educate our Soldiers and leaders and develop the plish this mission. First, we must provide to our skills, attributes, and abilities to execute full spec- operational force the best trained Soldier to support trum operations in an era of persistent confl ict. One operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. To do this, we of our biggest challenges is to deliver quality train- must attract the best and the brightest talent from ing, doctrine, new concepts, and equipment to our our offi cers, warrant offi cers, noncommissioned of- Soldiers and leaders. This training must be deliv- fi cers, Department of the Army civilians, and con- ered through relevant, tailored, and engaging ex- tractors to train the next generation of intelligence periences throughout a career-long continuum of Soldiers and leaders. We will provide relevant train- learning that is location independent and accessed ing to transform Soldiers into agile and adaptive when needed. We will adjust our training, examin- combat leaders and intelligence professionals, pre- ing what needs to be trained at Fort Huachuca and

2 Military Intelligence what should be trained in the operational units.  Manage complexity. USAICoE will focus on two core competencies of  Focus on precise decision making. MI–Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance  Simplify organizational processes without 3 (ISR) Synchronization and leading edge ana- overly simplifying the picture of the operational lytic training and education. From Initial Military environment. Training through our Pre-Command Course, we must devote the requisite time and effort to the  Build a unifi ed partnership across the intelli- training of the very diffi cult and most important gence community and promote a unifi ed effort skill of ISR Synchronization. Our intent is to en- to support the force with the most effective intel- sure that every intelligence Soldier knows how to ligence solutions. direct and leverage our ISR collection systems and As USAICoE undertakes this new focus, we need our analytical processing, exploitation and dissemi- your involvement, ideas, and feedback to ensure nation systems. Our intelligence force must excel that we develop team solutions. We here at USAICoE at the fundamentals and techniques for both man- develop the concepts that will infl uence our Army ual and digitally assisted multi-disciplined analytic and the doctrine that you will execute. We partici- processes to convert sensor-collected data, infor- pate in materiel development for those systems that mation, and combat information into intelligence you will operate. We train those Soldiers who you that answers the Commander’s priority intelligence will lead and serve with through the years. These requirements. are the challenges that excite me and they should USAICoE must produce an adaptive, knowledge- excite you as the primary stakeholder. able warrior who can think by leveraging data, in- formation, and intelligence to accomplish any mission. We will emphasize human cognition, cog- nitive analytics, critical thinking, problem solving, Endnotes and knowledge management. Additionally, we will 1. I highly recommend for your professional reading, “Leading tie these topics to foundational doctrinal concepts Change” by John P. Kotter, Harvard Business Press, 1966. such as the military decision making process, in- 2. Currently the Army is drastically restructuring the Army doctrinal telligence preparation of the battlefi eld, targeting, hierarchy and changing the way doctrine will be developed and and ISR Synchronization. Our intent is to enable maintained in the future. We will provide more information in a Soldiers to understand the value of analysis, to ex- separate article about these signifi cant Army doctrinal changes in cel at the fundamentals, and to perform analysis the near future. using any tool set, manual or digital. 3. Recently the Army senior leadership decided to eliminate the term and acronym for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) Our goals are to: as a part of the development of the new draft of FM 3-0, Operations.  Create a culture that promotes a passion in peo- Therefore, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command will develop new constructs and terminology for FM 3-0 and subsequent ple for our Army Values and the intelligence busi- Army doctrine. These changes will include replacing the term ISR ness, innovation, accountability, and teamwork. synchronization. Always Out Front!

April - June 2011 3 4 Military Intelligence by Lieutenant Colonel (P) John Haynicz, Senior Intelligence Trainer

“Our Army will embrace FSO with the best leaders FSO is defi ned in FM 3-0, Operations, 27 February and Soldiers we’ve ever had–and because of their 2008, as “Army forces combine offensive, defensive, acute ability to rapidly absorb and apply warfighting and stability or civil support operations simulta- skills, we’ll be stronger and much more capable than neously as part of an interdependent joint force to we’ve ever been.” –Brigadier General James Yarbrough, seize, retain, and exploit the initiative, accepting Commanding General, JRTC prudent risk to create opportunities to achieve de- In October 2010, the Joint Readiness Training cisive results. They employ synchronized action–le- Center (JRTC) conducted its fi rst full spectrum oper- thal and nonlethal–proportional to the mission and ations (FSO) rotation in eight years. The 3rd Brigade informed by a thorough understanding of all vari- Combat Team (BCT), 82nd Airborne “Panthers” de- ables of the operational environment.” The FoF por- ployed to Fort Polk, Louisiana and conducted the tion of the rotational scenario involved a country rotation with the augmentation of an engineer bat- that was experiencing a border dispute and required talion, aviation battalion, air defense artillery (ADA) the Panther Brigade to conduct a forced entry oper- company, and a chemical, biological, radiological, ation through parachute assault to seize an airfi eld, and nuclear (CBRN) platoon. The rotation spanned conduct a defense of the lodgment, and fi nally con- 21 days and consisted of fi ve days of situational duct an attack to defeat enemy forces. This design training exercises (STX), three days of command allowed the Brigade to work all three aspects of FSO post exercises (CPX), and eight days of force-on- in different proportions. force (FoF), while simultaneously conducting 15 As stated earlier, the rotation spanned 21 days days of live fi res. This article provides the gen- consisting of fi ve days of STX, three days of CPX, eral overview of the rotation and general observa- and eight days of FoF. The STX lanes ran concur- tions from the Task Force Leaders and Intelligence rently to CPX, allowing all company/troop/batter- Trainer/Mentors of JRTC. What follows are more in- ies to hone battle skills while their battalion (BN) depth articles focusing on specifi c topics and single- and BCT staffs were conducting the CPX. The in- source discipline observations. fantry companies conducted an attack to seize an It is important to mention that none of the ob- objective (terrain oriented), a raid to seize a high servations made during this rotation could have value target (enemy oriented), and a 36-hour de- been collected without the hard work and determi- fense which was conducted against a conventional nation of the Panther Brigade. They were the “men force that possessed unmanned aircraft systems in the arena” and it was an honor to partner with (UAS), indirect and direct fi re weapons (to include these great Soldiers and Paratroopers as they took BMPs/T-80 tanks.) The cavalry troops conducted any challenge or obstacle head on. The 3rd Brigade, a screen mission against a mechanized force, a re- 82nd Airborne continually internalized any lesson or connaissance of an infantry battalion objective, and observation and immediately implemented “fi xes.” fi nally a combined arms live fi re exercise. The for- Their energy, professionalism, and technical and ward support companies conducted combat con- tactical competence ensured that the lessons ob- voys that included replenishment operations and served from this rotation could be applied through- establishment and security of a logistic resupply out the Army. point against a determined conventional threat.

April - June 2011 5 All the STX lanes included time for planning, re- and a near peer conventional force (Regiment(-), hearsals, and execution. Intelligence Pre-Rotational that had defected from the legitimate government Training consisted of a daylong Intelligence Seminar of the host nation. The Level III insurgents were reviewing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnais- the only opposing force (OPFOR) in play when the sance (ISR), Fusion, and the multiple enablers avail- BCT conducted forced entry operations. The in- able at JRTC, followed by three days of Distributed surgents were equipped with small arms, mortars, Common Ground System (DCGS) refresher and One 107mm MRLs, limited shoulder fi red surface-to-air System Remote Video Terminal (OSRVT), unattended missiles and employed various forms of improvised ground sensors (UGS) and Biometrics Automated explosive devices/vehicle borne explosive devices. Toolset/Handheld Interagency Identity Detections Additionally, the insurgents were supported by a training. The Soldiers of the MI Company (MICO) neighboring threat nation with rotary wing support, conducted 9 days of Military Source Operations and logistics and intelligence information that included Interrogations training (both instruction and STX), UAS surveillance. These insurgents were present in low level voice intercept (LLVI) training (integrated and around the towns as well as in the surrounding into the cavalry troop STX), and a UAS validation area and remained operational during the entirety STX. of FoF, eventually conducting operations in coordi- The CPX was a computer simulation of the attack nation with the conventional force in a combined phase of the operation that lasted three days and purpose. ran concurrent with the STX portion of the exercise. As the Brigade was conducting initial entry opera- It allowed the BCT and BN/Squadron (SQDN) staffs tions, they received intelligence from the joint task to work current operations as well as planning for force (JTF) that a conventional force was moving in future operations. Tactical operation centers were their direction, most likely to attack in order to deny set up in distributed distances and stressed the the use of the lodgment by U.S. forces. The Brigade digital battle tracking and planning systems. The conducted a defense of the air-head and after re- Brigade planned, synchronized, and executed a bat- pelling the enemy attack, conducted a counterat- talion level air assault as part of their attack to se- tack against a hastily prepared defense position. cure objectives. The rogue conventional force threat contained many The FoF portion of the exercise lasted eight days of the capabilities that the U.S. Army possesses to and included a forced entry operation to seize an air- include attack and lift rotary wing support, CBRN, fi eld, a non-combatant evacuation exercise (NEO), Armor, UAS, and ADA assets, as well as limited a deliberate defense, and a deliberate attack. The C4ISR capabilities such as UAS with OSRVT. Out Brigade conducted a parachute assault to seize a of all the capabilities that were given to the enemy lodgment and secure an airhead line. Air-Land op- conventional forces, the UAS turned out to be the erations began as the unit started to build combat game changer. The enemy had two types of UAS, power while interacting with the civilian population, one replicating Shadow’s capabilities and one repli- conducting NEO operations, and fi ghting a Level III cating a Raven’s capabilities. The enemy’s ability to insurgency in the immediate area. Two days into obtain real time video allowed them to concentrate the exercise, the Brigade was informed that a con- their effects effi ciently and effectively on the BCT. ventional threat force was moving toward the lodg- This is but one of the major intelligence observa- ment in order to deny the use of the fi eld landing tions to come from this rotation. trip (FLS) to friendly forces. The BCT conducted a Major Observations deliberate defense to retain the airhead line. The en- Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefi eld emy did not secure the FLS during the attack and (IPB). Detailed terrain analysis was missing at all had to withdraw to defensive positions in order to levels and all Warfi ghting Functions (WFF). There regroup. The BCT then planned, synchronized, and appeared to be an overreliance on Terrain Team attacked prepared enemy positions in zone, culmi- products and PowerPoint map reconnaissance (un- nating the exercise. fortunately, this is not limited to FSO, JRTC ob- The threat faced by the Brigade was a Hybrid serves this during Operations Enduring Freedom Threat. It was a combination of a Level III insurgency and New Dawn rotations as well.) Additionally,

6 Military Intelligence units did not confi rm/deny planning assumptions (FSO, FSNCO, XO, RTO) to conduct Intel analysis of the terrain once on the ground and learned to and reporting. include this requirement in collection plans. This The lesson observed is that a small, dedicated was particularly important in determining enemy team that understands the IPB process and how courses of action (ECOA) using restricted or se- each patrol can answer PIR will provide much verely restricted terrain, and for the emplacement needed situational awareness to the company com- of obstacles. Unit S2s understood the enemy com- mander. Prebriefi ngs and debriefi ngs of patrols, position and range of capabilities, but struggled to with the analysis occurring in the command post fully develop Situational and Event Templates that are still critical to mission success. What was dif- incorporated all the enemy enablers. The S2s were fi cult, and impacted company Intelligence opera- also challenged with how to depict enemy actions tions the most was loss of robust communications and visualize the fi ght for their commanders. and the inability to data record/mine. The pri- This challenge was not only in the medium used mary reporting method was FM, followed by Blue (analog or digital), but in symbology and ECOA Force Tracker and in some instances, Global Rapid statements necessary to depict and describe en- Response Information Package (GRRIP). One reason emy actions across each WFFs in time and space. for the success of CoIST in COIN is routine access PowerPoint depictions were generally used in the to SIPR and intelligence databases. The fl uid fi ght planning phase and once digital systems were es- of FSO should give us pause to rethink how we use tablished, but for the beginning portion of FoF, these tools to provide Intel and improve communi- all the S2s utilized mapboards with acetate over- cations access at company level. lays to battle track and develop ECOAs. Lastly, young S2s were challenged in their ability to fi ght the full range of OPFOR capa- bilities during wargaming, when conducted. Enemy objectives and schemes of maneuver, syn- chronized with OPFOR enablers by task and purpose were sel- dom fully developed. This had compounding negative effects in attempting to synchronize deci- sions points (DPs) to priority in- telligence requirements (PIR) to named areas of interest (NAIs) to a specifi c collection plan. Intelligence at the Company Level. The lesson C4ISR and the Analog to Digital Challenge. observed is that intelligence support at the company Developing the Intel Architecture in an immature level is as valid in FSO as in counterinsurgency environment is a monumental task considering all (COIN). FSO is not entirely a top down Intel fi ght. the communications systems, tools and sources Bottom up assessments and refi nement are still re- available to a BCT. This was compounded for the quired for the complete picture of the operational BCT by having to operate in both an analog and environment. The Panthers did not formally estab- digital environment. The deliberate process of tran- lish a Company Intelligence Support Team (CoIST) sitioning from analog systems (mapboards and FM) program. Like many units, Fire Support Soldiers to digital systems (DCGS, Command Post of the made up the bulk of their CoIST efforts, and the Future) was a challenge. Additionally, units must BCT chose to employ these Soldiers in their tradi- determine a method to capture data in analog form tional Artillery role. However, company command- for entry into digital at a later time. The Panther ar- ers quickly learned the need to employ small teams chitecture was structured to allow all DCGS users

April - June 2011 7 access to a higher echelon tactical exploitation da- commander’s “eyes and ears on the battlefi eld” or tabase (TED). As capability grew, only select BALS is it employed as another maneuver force? Do we accessed higher DBs to reduce bandwidth usage. support the Recon SQDN with MICO assets in an- The BCT Fusion Warrant Offi cer was able to access swering the BCT CDRs PIR or do we employ them JTF TED via GRRIP within hours of insertion; how- separately? Is the Squadron commander (SCO) the ever the BNs did not utilize TED and share informa- Chief of Reconnaissance, tasked to execute the BCT tion with the BCT as much as they could have. collection plan across the breadth of the BCT area of This environment also challenged the BCT staff in operations, or just another maneuver force tasked planning future ISR operations. The S2 was reliant with specifi c ISR tasks? on CHAT and tactical satellite to request and syn- The Panther’s concept of the operation was to em- chronize future ISR support, until additional digi- ploy the SCO and the Recon SQDN as the Chief of tal capability was established. An additional lesson Reconnaissance; task organized with HUMINT and observed was one of processing, exploitation and LLVI enablers. The SQDN was partially successful dissemination of EAD assets. The BCT has limited in this role, leveraging an entire staff and command capacity to exploit beyond its organic capability. group to synchronize ISR across the BCT. The les- During initial entry with limited communications, son observed is to ensure the Recon SQDN is fully considerations and planning must occur between integrated into the overall BCT collection plan, that the JTF and the BCT for the exploitation and dis- organic and higher ISR assets are task organized or semination of EAD collections in support of BCT op- synchronized to support the SQDN collection tasks, erations. Lastly, the decision point to transition ISR and that they are prepared to act as the SQDN iden- from a JTF fi ght to a BCT fi ght was not based on a tifi es the enemy and answers PIR. geographic control measure. The decision to tran- OPFOR UAS Capabilities. As stated earlier, “Red sition to the BCT was determined by the BCT’s ca- UAS” was a game changer. This capability added a pability to monitor, communicate, and control that new dynamic to the battlefi eld and required units to asset. Transitions were based on full motion video, consider operational security and deception in their Signals Intelligence, Human Intelligence (HUMINT), planning and execution. Additionally, it required and Measurement and Signature Intelligence. Once predictions from the S2 on when the OPFOR was BCT systems (OSRVT, CHAT, Trojan Spirit II, CI most likely to employ UAS, so as to coordinate ADA and HUMINT Automated Reporting and Collection assets to counter. Lastly, the OPFOR is capable of Systems, and Common Ground Station) were es- viewing friendly UAS feeds with like capabilities, re- tablished and operational, Intel handover from JTF quiring adjustments to our tactics, techniques, and occurred. procedures. Unity of Intelligence. The Intelligence effort of In conclusion, JRTC would like to again acknowl- the BCT must be unifi ed in its task of answering the edge the commitment and determination of the commander’s PIRs. ISR operations must be planned Soldiers of the 3rd BCT, 82nd Airborne “Panthers”. and synchronized in detail to support the command- They are to be proud of their performance and we er’s DPs. The BCT commander remarked that deci- thank them for allowing us to be their partners in sions come faster in FSO. This requires wargaming testing the evolving FSO concepts. It was evident to to determine DPs with associated PIR, and develop- us that the foundations of intelligence operations ing the collection tasks in terms of time and space and analysis are well known from 10 years of per- (NAIs). One method to ensure the unity of effort is sistent COIN confl ict. It’s the environment that has through rehearsals. The Panthers conducted an ISR the potential to change and we must be prepared to and Fires rehearsals prior to every major BCT oper- adapt to overcome it, just as the Panthers did in ation, to synchronize sensor to shooter and ensure October 2010. subordinate units understood their task and pur- pose for ISR taskings. Lieutenant Colonel Haynicz is currently the Senior Intelligence Trainer/Mentor at the Joint Readiness Training Center. He This unity also includes synchronizing all inter- has served as an S2 and S3 at the battalion and brigade level nal assets and includes the employment concept of in addition to commanding a MICO and the 441st MI Battalion the Reconnaissance Squadron. Is this unit the BCT in Japan.

8 Military Intelligence by Kirk Drennan and Heather Greaves

Army forces combine offensive, defensive, Changes Kept On Coming and stability or civil support operations If anything, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq simultaneously as part of an interdependent joint force to seize, retain, and exploit the have accelerated changes within the force and have initiative, accepting prudent risk to create left some persistent “hanging chad” when it comes opportunities to achieve decisive results. to doctrinal issues. One of particular relevance to They employ synchronized action—lethal and the tactical intelligence community was the ques- nonlethal—proportional to the mission and tion of battlefi eld design. The 2001 version of FM informed by a thorough understanding of 3-0 laid out the ideas of FSO along with contiguous all variables of the operational environment. and non-contiguous areas of operations (AO). It re- Mission command that conveys intent and an appreciation of all aspects of the situation tained the use of close, deep, and rear areas in de- guides the adaptive use of Army forces. (Field scribing contiguous, linear operations. The January Manual 3-0 Operations) 2005 version of FM 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Introduction Production, (replacing the standard FM 101-5) con- tinued to use the close, deep, and rear construct As a community, the Intelligence Corps` faces cer- to describe planning. FMI 5-0.1, The Operations tain challenges in planning intelligence, surveil- Process, published in 2006, reinforced concepts lance, and reconnaissance (ISR) to support full from FM 3-0 and 5-0; although it dropped and ad- spectrum operations (FSO) at the tactical level. justed some terms, it did not address the battlefi eld Many changes have occurred in capabilities, doc- construct of close, deep, and rear. trine, and organization. Prior to 9/11, the ISR ca- pabilities and assets available at the division and Meanwhile FM 3-90.6, The Brigade Combat Team, brigade were much less than tactical command- was published in August 2006 to refl ect the changes ers enjoy today. Doctrinal changes call for modifi - of modularity. It superseded FM 7-30, The Infantry cations in the way tactical forces–including tactical Brigade (as well as FM 3-21.31, FM 3-90.3, and FMI intelligence units–operate. Through the 1990s the 3-90.6). Because it addressed a modular BCT that intelligence community still looked at the battlefi eld could fi ght as part of a division or independently, as a linear array and arrived at echeloned solutions the 2006 FM carefully laid out the concepts of FSO to meet its challenges. as well as contiguous and non-contiguous AOs. We offer what it said regarding deep, close, and rear That began to change with the promulgation of operations: the contemporary operational environment (COE) around the change of the century. The COE was for- mally established as a training model in 2003 with DEEP, CLOSE, AND REAR AREAS FM 7-100, Opposing Force Doctrinal Framework 2-9. The commander may use deep, close, and rear areas to and Strategy, which laid out how an opposing force describe his area of operations. In such situations, the should fi ght in the COE. Nevertheless the intelli- commander directs and focuses operations in these areas of gence community still tended to think in linear his AO. He describes his AO in terms of deep, close, and rear areas when the factors of mission, enemy, terrain and terms in respect to intelligence coverage by eche- weather, troops and support available, time available, and lon. Meanwhile organizational changes wrought by civil considerations (METT-TC) require the use of a spatial modularity shifted many divisional ISR capabilities reference. to the brigade combat team (BCT).

April - June 2011 9 We should also note that the 2006 FM 3-90.6 of- The 2008 version of FM 3-0 rescinded the terms fered graphics using deep, close, and rear for con- deep, close, and rear. While it offered close com- tiguous and non-contiguous battlefi elds. bat as a replacement for “close,” there were no sub- stitutes for deep or rear. The process was similar when it came to FM 2-0, Intelligence. The 2004 ver- sion retained the concepts of deep, close, and rear just like the 2005 version of FM 5-0. But the 2004 FM 2-0 was written with a divisional G2 perspective and retained concepts such as battlefi eld operating systems. The 2010 version of FM 2-0 eliminated dis- cussion of deep, close, and rear and took more of a generalist view of intelligence. The same can be said for the 2010 version of FM 3-90.6 the BCT, it of- fers a stripped down version of BCT operations, one without the close, deep, and rear framework. The best source for examining ISR support and plan- ning for a BCT in FSO was–and still is–the 2006 ver- sion of FM 3-90.6, The BCT. The BCT commander’s ability to see deep became

Figure 2-2. Deep, close, and rear areas in a contiguous battlefi eld. a doctrinal gap for the ISR community. He could look deep and he needed to plan for it, he just could not talk about it. FSO has again raised that issue. FSO and the JRTC We began this article with the offi cial defi nition of FSO as it set the stage for our discussion of ISR in support of the recent FSO training rotation at the Joint Readiness Training Center. Discussions about Rotation 11-01 began in 2008. Many of those dis- cussions centered around the idea that the rota- tion would involve major combat operations rather than concentrating on counterinsurgency as part of mission rehearsals for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. For a while, the proposed rotation was commonly–and erroneously–referred to as an ma- jor combat operation (MCO) training event. Rotation 11-01 incorporated offense, defense, and stability operations as part of the rotational design.

Full spectrum operations require continuous, simultaneous combinations of offensive, Figure 2-3. Deep, close, and rear areas in a non-contiguous defensive, and stability or civil support tasks. battlefi eld. FM 3-0 The description of the deep area was–and still is–es- pecially relevant to ISR: “The BCT commander’s FSO is deceptively complex. In addressing ISR improved ability to see in depth is one of the support to FSO, the current (2010) FM 2-0 dis- characteristics of the modular brigade.” That cusses intelligence support to the elements of FSO. statement refl ected the reality of the modular BCT The current FM 3-90.6 does the same. That is an and the intent of FM 3-0 in 2001. It highlighted the artifi cial convention because it allows one to exam- increased capabilities of the modular BCT in FSO, ine offensive, defensive, and stability operations or regardless of the battlefi eld. civil support separately. FSO dictates those forms of

10 Military Intelligence combat operations will occur within a unit’s operat- S3 was doctrinally responsible, development of the ing environment (OE). ISR plan routinely fell on the brigade S2 since he or A battlefi eld today could include some or all of the she normally coordinated ISR assets and was the following: primary user of ISR products. The complexity of the FSO rotation meant that the S3, S2, and other staff  Special operations forces and paramilitaries still elements were required to work together to develop scattered throughout the battlefi eld. the ISR plan. In order to drive the staff planning  Political entities in hiding. process, FM 2-01 identifi es the commander’s role  Weapons of mass destruction unaccounted for. in providing guidance to his or her staff in planning  Massive refugee situation, in the cities and on for ISR: the roads, affecting our ability to move.  Emergence of an insurgency (led by the paramilitaries.)  Famine and disease outbreaks.  Collapse of rule of law, and civil capacity.  Possible foreign MCO intervention.  Collapsing infrastructure to include deterio- rating roads, bridges, and dam breaches, all of which affected our freedom of movement, and our own sustainment operations. Rotation 11-01 encompassed many of those re- quirements and in doing so challenged BCT ISR planners. As stated earlier many changes had taken place within the Army. An entire generation of MI offi cers had entered the Army who had never con- sidered ISR to support an offensive or defensive op- eration, much less FSO in its totality. Synchronizing the ISR Fight in FSO ISR synchronization remains critical in providing Relooking Close, Deep, and Rear battlefi eld commanders the intelligence required The fi rst step in synchronization is establishing to make decisive decisions at critical times. FSO, a common framework to facilitate understanding if anything, heightens that need because even with of the OE. As Rotation 11-01 demonstrated, the the increased ISR capabilities resident in the mod- ISR fi ght is the BCT commander’s fi ght. As such, it ular BCT, the ISR planner has only so many tools should be framed in the same terms as the decisive, in the ISR kitbag. The ISR plan cannot focus en- shaping, and sustaining operations against which tirely on one element of the operation. In rotation the BCT commander commits the BCT. Ultimately, 11-01, the BCT conducted security and stability op- ISR operations must be nested from division to erations across its rear as it mounted a shaping at- company level to ensure integration of all available tack on a secondary objective to set the conditions assets towards a single purpose that results in in- for its decisive attack beyond. In all of this, the BCT creased security and fl exibility to gain and main- maintained a defensive posture around its initial tain the initiative. This is critical when commanders airhead. It was in all regards a near perfect display plan combat operations within their area of respon- of the concepts of FSO. sibility (AOR). In a widespread battlefi eld with mul- The basics of ISR did not change in meeting these tiple ongoing operations, allocation of combat and challenges. What did change was the degree of ISR ISR assets should and must share common control integration across the entire staff. The ISR plan was measures. no longer “the S2’s plan.” The ISR plan was inte- We believe that the terms close, deep, and rear, as gral to the commander’s concept; synchronization discussed in the 2006 version of FM 3-90.6, are of of the ISR plan was a command priority. While the great value in describing the battlefi eld during FSO.

April - June 2011 11 BCTs will face a more sophisticated as well as more weapon system with the greatest range can “reach powerful adversary in the future that can fi ght as out and touch” friendly forces. a cohesive unit but still decentralize its efforts. As Regardless of defi nition, effective ISR utiliza- BCTs prepare the OE for defensive and offensive op- tion, triggers, and handovers must fall under the erations they will have to contend with security is- commander’s concept of the deep, close, and rear sues in their rear as well as providing situational fi ght. Unless directed by higher, the commander is awareness and target acquisition in their close and the only one who can defi ne these fi ghts whether deep fi ght. Certainly that was the case in Rotation through timing, geography, or mission completion. 11-01. He must ensure that his staff understands them. In Using close, deep, and rear allow us to better de- cases where he uses a defi nition different than that fi ne each echelon’s AOR in ISR planning. In the used by his higher headquarters, he must give his past, these areas took on certain characteristics in staff guidance on how he expects them to nest their order to coordinate responsibility for collection re- criteria with those of their counterparts in higher quirements based on organic ISR capabilities and headquarters. Commanders must also realize that availability. Intelligence coordination lines were their defi ned deep fi ght will often surpass that of established on the battlefi eld in order to defi ne their subordinate commanders due to more robust those responsibilities. These lines could be based assets, larger staffs and greater planning windows. geographically or time phased depending on the The question becomes at what distance from circumstances. the FEBA is the commander able to register cred- ible effects on the enemy and at what distance is the enemy able to reg- ister credible effects on him. In terms of ISR, this depends on the organic assets the commander possesses because each asset’s capability differs impacting its ability to collect. The ability to plan for the close, rear, and deep fi ght depends on the capabilities the organiza- tion possesses. Commanders at all echelons can nominate targets outside of their defi ned close fi ght. If the Figure 5-1. Defensive framework. (From FM 3-90.6) asset used to observe the target is pushed into the tactical control (TACON) of the lower level com- For today’s battlefi eld it may be more useful to de- mander, the lower level tactical commander’s close fi ne close, deep, and rear in terms of combat power. fi ght is effectively increased. In this case there must The demarcation between close and deep then be- be a clearly defi ned point in time and space at which comes the distance from the forward edge of the the observing asset transitions from TACON Higher battle area (FEBA) into enemy held terrain that the to TACON Subordinate. commander’s weapon system with maximum range can “reach out and touch” the enemy. The close and The 2006 version of FM 3-90.6 offers a useful rear fi ght are demarcated by the distance from the discussion of reconnaissance handover. In part it FEBA into friendly held terrain that the enemy’s states:

12 Military Intelligence 4-63. Reconnaissance handover (RHO) is the sition from one type of operation to another. Those process of transferring information and/or re- transitions–just like the defi nition of close, deep, sponsibility for observation, or surveillance of and rear–can depend on geographic, timing, or op- potential enemy contact, or an assigned area erational considerations. A BCT could, for exam- from one element to another. It may cover a ple, shift from a defensive posture into an offense, sector/zone, NAI, TAI, and/or threat contact. even as it maintains a defense around a key feature RHO can involve visual, electronic, or digital like an airfi eld. That is exactly what happened in observation and information sources in any Rotation 11-01. In that case, the defense of the air- number of combinations. RHO is usually asso- fi eld, formerly the close/close combat area, became ciated with a designated reconnaissance han- the rear fi ght for the BCT and the deep area shifted dover coordination point, or a PL designated west to encompass the area of interest and infl u- as a reconnaissance handover line. ence beyond the objective for the offensive. 4-64. RHO shares many critical tasks with bat- The essence of FSO is the fl uid battlefi eld, regard- tle handover, including relief in place, linkup, less of the OE. Doctrine helps frame that battlefi eld and passage of lines. Unlike battle handover, to facilitate situational awareness and synchronized however, RHO can take place without being in operations, driven by effective ISR. We submit that combat or being within threat direct fi re range. resurrecting the concepts of close, deep, and rear in Instead, it focuses on planning, preparing, and framing that battlefi eld is necessary to synchroniz- executing the seamless passage of informa- ing the ISR fi ght in FSO. tion, threat contact, or an assigned NAI—and the related responsibility for it—from one ele- ment to another without loss of contact.

It’s All About Framing Transitions Mr. Drennan has been an ISR contractor/instructor for Using close, deep, and rear allows a higher head- TRADOC G2 in support of the ISR TOPOFF program. He quarters to develop the common operational picture currently supports JRTC rotations as the JRTC OPS GRP outside a subordinate unit’s AO and identify targets G2 Division Collection Manager providing ISR training and mentoring during each rotation. He retired in 2010 after that may impact them as they try to achieve tactical serving for 24 years in the U.S. Army as an Intelligence Offi cer and operational objectives. Subordinate units must and has multiple deployments in support of Operation Iraqi be aware of the overall objectives of their higher Freedom. His most recent positions prior to retirement were headquarters because this will dictate what ISR as- the Corps Analysis and Control Element Chief and the Corps sets can be allocated for their own use. It is the re- Deputy G2 for the XVIII Airborne Corps. sponsibility of the higher headquarters to provide intelligence that may impact the subordinates close Ms. Greaves is a contractor with the 505th Operations fi ght whether they are expanding their AOR, defend- Squadron Joint Integration Team. She served in the U.S. Navy ing, or conducting offensive operations. as an Intelligence Offi cer for six years with assignments in Japan, Afghanistan, and CONUS. She has worked in the fi elds The deep fi ght requires coordination between of Strike Intelligence, Collections, and Special Warfare. She higher and lower echelons to provide situational holds an MA in Anthropology from California State University, awareness and target development as units tran- Fullerton.

April - June 2011 13 Lieutenant Colonel (P) John Haynicz and Major Brian Hayes

“Harder to Do Than I Thought” opment included JTF communication systems, air- Developing, implementing, and sustaining an fl ow of assets and availability of unit equipment, Intelligence Architecture is a monumental task for and coordination/communication with the BCT S6, any brigade combat team (BCT) S2. Considering or signal offi cer. The discussion in this article will all the communication and collaboration systems, focus on the In-Flight and Initial Entry phases of analytical tools and databases available, a BCT S2 the operation. Due to rotational design, the ISB por- shop can quickly become overwhelmed. Extended tion of the exercise was condensed and consisted operations in Operations Enduring Freedom/ only of a Green Ramp Intelligence update provided Iraqi Freedom/New Dawn have afforded Intel by the JTF. Architectures to mature and grow overtime, allow- The In-Flight phase of the operation planned for the ing in some cases for stable and robust communi- use of JACC/CP (Joint Airborne Communications cations, rapid access to intelligence databases, and Center/Command Post) and Secure En-route uninterrupted connectivity to intelligence, surveil- Communications Package-Improved platforms The lance, reconnaissance (ISR) systems and platforms. key information to communicate was a six line During Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) ro- Intelligence update, sent 20 minutes before com- tation 11-01, the 3/82nd ABN was presented with the mencing airborne operations. The PACE for all BCT challenge of developing an Intelligence Architecture communications during this phase consisted of the in an immature environment. Establishing the Intel following: Architecture was the “harder to do than I thought” P: mIRC Chat. event for the BCT S2. This article will discuss three A: TACSAT (The primary communication method challenges as noted by the BCT S2 and the trainer/ between aircraft). mentors of the JRTC: C: UHF (U.S. Air Force communications).  Establishing a communications plan. E: FM (limited).  The digital-analog-digital transition. Unfortunately, the JACC/CP was ultimately re-  The reconnaissance handover (RHO) from the moved as a communication platform for the opera- joint task force (JTF) to the BCT. tion, forcing the BCT S2 to revert to the alternate Communications method of TACSAT. Having established and com- In establishing a communications plan, JRTC municated a working PACE with the JTF prior to op- coaches a method using the acronym PACE erations allowed for a rapid transition. The six line (Primary, Alternate, Contingency, and Emergency) Intel update was successfully communicated from communications methods. This is to emphasize the the JTF to the BCT, providing critical intelligence development of multiple redundant methods to com- information on the condition of the fi eld landing municate during operations. In our current digital strip and enemy disposition. For initial entry opera- age, units must consider PACE not only for voice tions the BCT S2 PACE plan was as shown below: communications, but for data transfer as well. The BCT S2 had to establish an Intelligence information PACE for each phase of the operation (Intermediate Staging Base (ISB), In-Flight, Initial Entry, Follow On Operations) and adjust the PACE as communi- cation capabilities improved with the JTF and with subordinate units. Considerations for PACE devel-

14 Military Intelligence The unit employed an organic, air-droppable tac- duce mapping, link diagramming, spatial, and tem- tical command and control HMMWV (named the poral analytical products digitally using data current SHARC) uploaded with multiple communication and as of departure from the ISB as long as there was analysis systems for rapidly establishing command power available. Collaboration across all elements, and control immediately following the airborne in- as well as current data updates from higher head- sertion. For the Intelligence section, communication quarters (HHQ), was intended to be accomplished systems for initial entry included GRRIP (Global using DCGS-A Offl ine Case fi les and ARC Shape Rapid Response Information Package) for primary fi les transferred via the unit’s PACE plan. Once full digital communications loaded with “mIRC chat” Army Battle Command Systems (ABCS) capability capability and a stand-alone Distributed Common and digital connectivity was established, the intent Ground Station-Army (DCGS-A) to process data. was to shift collaboration and data update functions For communication with Battalions, the PACE was to the BCT and HHQ ABCS Publish and Subscribe primarily the same, replacing the Iridiums with Servers as designed. Blue Force Tracker/Force XXI Battle Command The BCT HQ established partial digital connec- Brigade and Below (BFT/FBCB2), and as a last re- tivity within four hours after initial entry and full sort, runners. digital connectivity on D+2. The Battalions followed This plan was effective in communicating with with full connectivity by D+3. The unit’s plan for subordinate battalions during the initial insertion. employment of DCGS was successful and facili- As operations continued and the BCT footprint in- tated limited situational awareness at the BCT level. creased, FM communications were strained due to GRRIP was also successful as an initial connectiv- distance, necessitating the use of digital systems. ity platform. The Brigade Support Element (BISE) For communication with the JTF HQ, FM commu- Chief was able to communicate with JTF counter- nications never materialized and the BCT S2 exer- parts (via GRRIP mIRC Chat) within hours of Initial cised their alternate plan, immediately switching to Entry and was able to access data resident on HHQ mIRC Chat over GRRIP. This was very successful systems, receive data updates via Offl ine Case fi les, in communicating and passing data. However, had and disseminate data to subordinate elements via the GRRIP system failed, there was no redundant Offl ine Case fi les shortly thereafter. method for data exchange and therefore would have severely limited intelligence support and coordina- The Digital-Analog-Digital Transition tion during the initial phase of operations. The unit learned that the transition from digital- As stated earlier, the past decade of persistent analog-digital must be a deliberate, planned pro- confl ict has afforded units the ability to fi ght digi- cess. As discussed above, the PACE plan must be tally, using assured communications and access to identifi ed by specifi c system with redundant meth- data. The rotational unit employed all of their digi- ods. The plan for DCGS connectivity must be devel- tal systems in the planning and preparation phase oped and understood by all operators. Additionally, prior to operations. The unit then shifted to ana- the BCT should not wait on battalions to establish log systems for Initial Entry operations, requiring digital capability, but should direct a set date-time- those units without connectivity, particularly at group for subordinates to establish connectivity by company and battalion level, to fi ght from analog a specifi c system. This needs to be wargamed, syn- systems, mainly FM radios and mapboards. BFT chronized and resourced, as with any operation. To was included in the PACE plan, but use was lim- ensure success, future units should employ plans ited. The plan for the employment of the DCGS-A similar to 3/82nd for initial operations considering called for all pre-deployment Intelligence products redundant communication systems whereby all an- and extracted data to be copied to all operator lap- alysts have access to data until more mature com- tops prior to departure in anticipation of the period munications and servers are established. As such, of limited to no digital communications inherent in 3/82 ABN chose not to employ their organic DCGS-A initial entry operations. Intelligence Fusion System (IFS) server sets at the This concept of operations (CONOP) was intended maneuver Battalions after considering the following to allow operators at all echelons to continue to pro- issues:

April - June 2011 15 1. A qualifi ed fi eld support engineer (FSE) is re- sections at all levels must take steps to properly quired to administer and set up the IFS. The current capture data during this analog period and trans- maintenance CONOP for DCGS-A prohibits admin- fer via data entry at a later time. Again, this must istrator level access by anyone other than a quali- be a deliberate process. Additionally, Soldiers can fi ed DCGS-A FSE except by specifi c authorization still use their DCGS-A systems without connectiv- from the system Program Manager’s offi ce. While ity. Data can still be entered for pattern analysis the BCT had negotiated this authorization, the four and the use of tools without being connected to the designated Soldiers were all assigned to the BISE network. which left no one at the three IFS owning maneuver Battalions with the level of access required to either power-on or power-off the DCGS-A IFS server sets. Given the dynamic nature of FSO, the probability that a Battalion would be forced to displace in reac- tion to enemy activity without the time or security required to transport someone authorized to prop- erly bring the IFS down from the BCT made it im- practical to establish the Battalion IFS. This issue must be part of the unit’s Intelligence Architecture planning process and the necessary coordination, authorization, and training must be in place well in advance of deployment. 2. IFS-to-IFS synchronization requires robust, stable communication. While DCGS-A remains a powerful weapon in the Intelligence Analyst’s ar- senal even without access to an IFS, the ability to RHO to the BCT collaborate effectively and effi ciently with other ana- The planning for and executing of the RHO from lysts, as well as the operators from other Warfi ghting JTF control to the BCT fi ght is another critical con- Functions, and access to near-realtime data for on- sideration when planning the architecture for FSO. going product development is signifi cantly impacted The ISR capabilities for a BCT have grown exponen- by the lack of connectivity. Achieving these effects tially with the transition to the modular brigade. however, comes at a signifi cant price in terms of the Both physical control of unit assets and capabili- amount of communications bandwidth potentially ties to access the data and temporarily control the- consumed in the process. The next step in collab- ater assets have allowed BCTs to “see” and detect orative effi ciency beyond the use of offl ine case fi les as far as a division. In the past, “fi ghts” were clas- mentioned above calls for the synchronization of the sifi ed as the deep, close, and rear, where the HHQ operator’s Tactical Entity Database (TED). This pro- was responsible for the deep fi ght and would pass cess consists of transmitting copies of the battalion Intelligence assets and the threat formations off TEDs to the brigade IFS where they are imported, to subordinate units at predetermined geographic compared to eliminate duplication, and merged into control measures. Now, we fi ght in contiguous or a single master database which is then transmitted non-contiguous environments and utilize a multi- back down to the battalion IFSs. The potential neg- tude of organic systems or request access to theater ative impact on bandwidth is signifi cant and only sensors. increases as the operational environment evolves. For this operation, a conditions-based approach Lastly, a signifi cant challenge faced by the unit was used wherein the RHO was determined based was the capture, tracking, and transfer of data from on the BCTs capability to monitor, communicate, analog to digital systems. Rough estimates con- and control specifi c assets. Initially, the JTF was cluded approximately 50 percent of the information responsible for providing all the intelligence sup- gathered during the fi rst three days of operations port the BCT required as it transitioned from ISB to was lost and never digitally captured. Intelligence Initial Entry.

16 Military Intelligence As the BCT established systems and built capac- vironment. Having to develop and sustain an intel- ity, transitions for ISR such as database access, full ligence architecture in an immature environment is motion video, Signals Intelligence, and Measurement a daunting task at any level. The three identifi ed ob- and Signature Intelligence occurred. Key to imple- servations from this rotation of establishing a func- menting this operation is communication between tioning PACE, preparing and executing a digital/ JTF and BCT, including understanding BCT PACE analog transition, and coordinating a detailed RHO plan and Digital Transition plan. Additionally, the can assist in successful accomplishment of this HHQ must fully understand the BCT collection plan, mission. priority intelligence requirements, and Intelligence operations for the Initial Entry phase in detail to support BCT efforts. Lastly, RHO includes not only Lieutenant Colonel Haynicz is currently the Senior Intelligence passing control of assets from one HQ to another, Trainer/Mentor at the JRTC. He has served as an S2 and S3 but the transfer of data and intelligence collected by at the battalion and brigade level in addition to commanding st those assets in support of the BCT fi ght, requiring a MICO and the 441 MI Battalion in Japan. digital capability at the BCT level. Major Hayes has over 10 years experience in the Army as an Conclusion Intelligence Offi cer. He has served as the MI Company Senior Trainer/Mentor and currently serves as a scenario planner at A functional Intelligence Architecture is para- the JRTC. He has deployed three times to Iraq where he served mount to collecting, analyzing, and disseminating as an assistant Brigade S2/Collection Manager, Brigade S2X, intelligence in order to drive operations in any en- Battalion S2, and MI Company Commander.

Check out the JRTC website at http://www.jrtc-polk.army.mil/OPS/index.html

April - June 2011 17 The Role of the Company Intelligence Support Team in Full Spectrum Operations by Thomas Tomes and Christopher Maxwell Introduction CoIST tasks such as intelligence preparation of the In the usual theater mission rehearsal exercises battlefi eld, CoIST system technology, battle track- (MRE) at the Joint Readiness Training Center ing, report writing, and other skills to be successful. (JRTC), the Company Intelligence Support Team “CoIST-like” duties were assigned to the CO CPs (CoIST) in each maneuver battalion (BN) is pivotal as opposed to identifying an independent element to in supporting company commanders (CO Cdrs) perform these functions. These CPs used SOPs spe- and BN S2s. Rotation 11-01 with the 3rd Brigade cifi cally designating responsibilities, processes, and nd Combat Team (BCT), 82 Airborne Division was the formats as well as a primary, alternate, contingency, fi rst full spectrum operations (FSO) rotation at JRTC and emergency (PACE) plan for communications. in eight years. Recognizing that CoISTs should play No two CP SOPs were the same for 3/82 ABN with a role in FSO, 3/82 ABN elected to use a modifi ed respect to CoIST duties. This caused much confu- CoIST concept with CO command posts (CPs) serv- sion across the BCT and never allowed the Intel War ing this critical requirement among all of its other Fighting Function to effectively connect from CO to requirements. BCT. Having an independent CoIST, resourced with What was discovered during the BCT’s rotation is personnel and equipment, and clearly assigning that FSO does not lessen the need for CoISTs at the that intelligence functions would have signifi cantly maneuver company; it modifi es the mission’s pri- enabled 3/82 ABN to make the intelligence connec- orities and adds to them. During this rotation, both tion. Additionally, CoISTs would have assisted BCT the 3/82 ABN and JRTC observed several CoIST CO Cdrs understanding of the threat and assisted challenges. This article will discuss three of those BN S2s with threat analysis at the company level. challenges: Soldiers manning a CoIST do not have to be in-  Manning a CoIST for FSO. telligence analysts. In most cases, a BCT will likely  Resourcing a CoIST with appropriate automa- not have the MOS 35F, Intelligence Analyst Soldiers tion and communication resources. available to man each maneuver company CoIST.1  Establishing standing operating procedures The BCTs will continue to have to train other (SOP) for CoISTs during FSO. Soldiers already in the company on how to generate, Building the CoIST build, and update map graphics and how to push and pull information from the BN S2 over the FM The initial challenge for the BCT was to select the operations and intelligence (O/I) net. This is a full right Soldiers to build these CoIST cells and provide time requirement and cannot be effectively managed those Soldiers with the necessary tools and training. by the Soldiers manning the CO CP. The BN or BCT CoISTs may not be the three to fi ve man elements S2 should create an SOP with the Cdrs and S3s that normally seen in a counterinsurgency (COIN) rota- specifi cally defi nes a digital and analog PACE plan tion because of manning constraints and priorities along with a timeline of how information and intel- but they need to have the same functionality. They ligence will be passed vertically. must be properly confi gured and properly trained. The Army has become much more technologically Automation Obstacles advanced in the last 10 years and is able to process The second challenge for CO CPs during this FSO much more data as compared to previous decades rotation was the reduced communication capabili- when we last trained for FSO. Analytical and battle ties (both digital and analog). During a JRTC MRE tracking cells (CoISTs) at the lowest level help pro- rotation, communication capabilities organic to cess this data in a near real-time environment. The the unit or JRTC issued, are shipped in on convoy Army must continue to allocate resources such as logistics patrols or signed over from the outgoing Soldiers, equipment, and time to “train” on critical unit and are setup at the CO CP with little effort or

18 Military Intelligence friction. The challenge seen during the FSO rota- Included in 3/82 ABNs PACE plan was the Blue tion was that 3/82’s communications systems were Force Tracker (BFT). While the BCT had the capabil- limited due to the forced entry airborne insertion. ity to communicate via BFT it lacked operator pro- It had only those automation systems each para- fi ciency. Soldiers operating the BFT could not text trooper jumped in with or air-landed on follow-on other elements because of what they believed to be aircraft after the airfi eld became secure. As an in- encryption problems. In reality, there were no en- terim fi x, 3/82 ABN elected to pass all information cryption issues as the units were capable of observ- within the company and to higher HQ over the com- ing blue force movements on the digital map, which mand net via FM. There was no designated O/I net uses the same encryption devices. BFT is a viable for intelligence related information nor were there option for a means of communication. The system digital systems at the company level to pass intelli- is able to send enough information, in a single or gence information.2 multiple messages, to interact with other elements within the patrol and send situation reports to and During 3/82 ABN’s rotation, BN S2s would gener- receive requested information from their respective ally pass intelligence information to the BN tactical CO, BN, and BDE. operations center (TOC) radio operator, or a battle captain to be forwarded to companies, troops, or 3/82 ABN issued Biometric Automated Toolsets batteries. Subordinate companies would push in- (BAT) and Handheld Interagency Identity Detection telligence information in reverse over the BN com- Equipment (HIIDE) kits to some maneuver compa- mand net to the BN TOC. This process provided nies that had the primary mission of owning battle the BN S2 limited visibility and no direct contact space and a distinct requirement to interact with with companies to assist with the Threat Common the local populace. Unfortunately, the units did not Operating Picture (T-COP). S2 situational aware- plan on how to transfer collected data in the HIIDE ness and understanding were therefore limited. from the company to the BN to be synched with the Most information relayed through the BN TOC was BAT computer, and ultimately uploaded into the in the size, activity, location, unit, time, and equip- BAT server. To address this issue, 3/82 ABN tried “a ment (SALUTE) format. The BN S2 section would HIIDE for HIIDE” swap; logistical convoys from BN then expend a signifi cant effort trying to analyze in- brought additional updated HIIDEs and swapped complete reporting, often resulting in an inaccurate them with the ones the company had fi lled with threat assessment. If CoISTs had been formed and entries. This procedure was somewhat success- active, the basic analysis of enemy activity could ful, depending on having enough HIIDEs to swap have occurred at the company level, providing BN and being able to reach the companies. Operational the beginnings of a T-COP as opposed to raw, in- tempo and battle space restrictions meant compa- complete information. nies often did not get new HIIDEs or send HIIDEs to be synched to the BN. This resulted in a signifi - Planning for an FSO mission should incorporate cant lag in valuable biometric data getting to com- CoISTs; units need to understand that these require- panies or getting into the larger BAT database for ments still exist. Communications and processes other companies and BNs to see. are the basic building blocks that must be assem- bled to complement training Soldiers. Historically, FSO and Intelligence SOPs the O/I net was the way to pass information in an Another issue identifi ed by the trainer/mentors analog environment and could have served 3/82 and 3/82 ABN was that there was no BCT or BN ABN well if the company CPs and BN S2s had run SOP or format to get fi nished or refi ned intelligence this net. The SOP for all units should address the products from one echelon to another. Often, intel- use of the O/I net to pass information directly to ligence summaries collection requirements, target the S2 section at BN and prevent a saturation of lists, requests for information, and other products the BN Command net. Additionally, instead of using developed by the BN S2s were seldom distributed SALUTE reports to pass information, units should down to companies as there were no independent consider developing a debrief format for any patrols CoISTs to receive this information. The “CoIST-like” or key leader engagements that could be passed CO CPs attempted to process this information re- over FM O/I nets. ceived from BN S2s but were often overwhelmed

April - June 2011 19 with operational requirements. issues, and dissemination issues, CO CPs were of- Patrolling is just as essential in FSO as it is in ten overwhelmed and unable to perform the nec- COIN, and patrol pre-briefs and debriefs are just as essary requirements that a CoIST is designed to critical during FSO as they are in COIN. A poorly address. As a result, companies did not effectively briefed patrol is placed at unnecessary risk as they perform precise target analysis, BNs struggled with do not understand the current threat, and a pa- target analysis, and both companies and BNs had trol that is not debriefed causes the loss of valu- diffi culty accurately assessing the enemy situation able intelligence for the commander. Without an which left many unanswered PIR/SIR and intelli- established CoIST SOP or functioning independent gence gaps. Companies struggled with the refi ne- CoISTs, 3/82 ABN struggled with pre-briefs and de- ment of the threat situation and BNs and the BCT briefs simply because no one was specifi cally as- were forced to often rely on reporting, specifi cally signed that responsibility in the CO CPs. BN S2s Human Intelligence collection teams and echelon had developed standard formats to pre-brief and de- above brigade Signals Intelligence, rather than in- brief patrols, but they were often not used. When corporating company assessments into their T-COP. companies did pre-brief or debrief, they were often By not fi elding formalized CoISTs with specifi c du- incomplete and vague due to competing require- ties and responsibilities outlined in SOPs, compa- ments within the CO CP. nies, troops, and batteries during this FSO rotation Whether in COIN or FSO, the crucial informa- depended solely on their respective BN S2s for all tion that patrols seek must be refi ned in patrol pre- intelligence information and threat analysis. In any briefs and collected in debriefs. This information environment, FSO or COIN, CoISTs are more than is not only relevant to the company but can assist the fi rst level of analysis of information for the CO with further refi ning the BNs’ and BCT’s T-COP. If Cdrs. If manned and trained, a CoIST can offer a a standing CoIST is not resourced, a standardized more accurate and timely intelligence picture for or abbreviated pre-briefi ng/debriefi ng format that their respective company than the BN S2 or BCT draws out more essential information than just a S2. SALUTE report can be used so that anyone within Endnotes the CO CP can pull and push information to patrols, 1. The British have been doing this for years as part of their conduct analysis for CO Cdrs, and provide that in- Northern Ireland operations. U.S. BCTs have used a similar concept formation to their higher headquarters. in manning CoISTs at the JRTC and deployments to theater. A standard fl y-away training package for CoISTs and “extended” Because of the limited communications from com- company CP operations across the FSO spectrum is needed. panies to BNs on debriefs and key leader engage- 2. This was part of a larger digital-to-analog transition issue that ments, targeting at the BN level suffered. Often, characterized the rotation. there was no identifi ed plan for personality targeting Mr. Tomes has been a CoIST instructor for NSTID/TD at Ft. or a formalized process to identify potential targets Huachuca for the past 2 years. and the JRTC CoIST Site Lead to the BN. For the company to contribute to target- for the last 12 months. He served for 25 years as a member ing, the CoIST must understand the BN’s lines of of the U.S. Army Chemical Corps. Mr. Tomes has served in effort or concept of operations, priority intelligence Germany, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Korea as well as requirements (PIR) and high value targets. The com- CONUS. pany can then nominate targets nested within the Mr. Maxwell has over nine years experience in the intelligence BN’s concept of operation. With targets identifi ed, it community with extensive experience in intelligence operations. would be benefi cial to conduct predictive analysis He has a diverse career with strategic analytical experience at the company level to fully understand the sec- in the Central Command’s Information Dominance Cell and ond and third order effects of any targeting effort. Intelligence Command’s Intelligence Operations Center. He Predictive analysis is critical for companies to suc- has deployed to Afghanistan supporting multiple large-scale operations and battles such as Operation Rock Avalanche cessfully nest within any BN effort. and the Battle of Wanat with the 173rd Airborne BCT. He Conclusion assisted in the development of the JRTC CoIST program as the JRTC CoIST Integrator. He is currently a Senior Consultant in With the signifi cant amount of reporting to navi- Fort Polk’s Counter Improvised Explosive Device Integration gate through, not enough man power, automation Cell, focusing on CoIST and Biometrics.

20 Military Intelligence Major Gualberto J. Marrero III

In past rotations, the Military Intelligence com- mission roles to the BDE Staff, not just the BDE S2. pany (MICO) of the brigade special troops battalion The MICO sections should analyze their capability (BSTB) has struggled to make full use of its intel- and recommend how best to employ that capability ligence collection assets as part of a mission re- for the BDE S3 as well as the BDE S2. Such recom- hearsal exercise (MRE). Rotation 11-01 was not mendations must include operational requirements an MRE; it was the fi rst full spectrum operations and limitations. For example, each section should (FSO) rotation in eight years at the Joint Readiness analyze the terrain to identify possible locations Training Center (or any of the combat training cen- that will allow the best emplacement for collection. ters). Nevertheless the MICO encountered the same This will, in turn, allow the MICO commander to diffi culties that plague a MICO from effectively pro- clearly articulate the capabilities and limitations of viding and synchronizing intelligence, surveillance, the respective systems and the second and third or- and reconnaissance (ISR) assets. der effects of diverting an ISR asset away from its recommend location. The MICO commander must When the MICO struggles, the brigade it supports continue to provide a clear task and purpose to ev- cannot see the enemy clearly or maintain an accu- ery ISR asset so that effective ISR feedback is pro- rate picture of the battlefi eld. MICO commanders vided to the BDE. Once the assets are emplaced, the and brigade combat team S2s must work together MICO command post (CP) must track all systems in to synchronize and manage MICO assets. Otherwise a running estimate updated with specifi cs on: systemic issues will disrupt MICO efforts to provide synchronized assets. These issues beginning with  Current status of asset (location, personnel, and poor MICO integration with the brigade (BDE) S2 system.) shop, are exacerbated by an ineffective primary, al-  Information the asset can provide (its intelli- ternate, contingency, and emergency (PACE) com- gence collection “foot print.”) munications plan, and brought to full effect by a  Requirements needed to be able to provide that poor understanding of their collection capabilities information. in general. The result is a severely degraded collec- tion effort. The BDE intelligence warfi ghting func-  How the current task organization impacts col- tion does not fi ght as a team, cannot communicate lection capabilities. effectively in that fi ght, and cannot agree on what Tracking must be done carefully and consistently. to collect because it does not understand how. The When more than one shop tracks the same equip- fi rst indicator of just such a failing collection effort ment you end up with an erroneous picture of sys- is a MICO that cannot manage and track its assets tem status within the BDE. Keep it simple. The for the BDE. Fixing that issue is therefore a great MICO owns the equipment; the MICO CP should leap forward for the MICO in bridging the gap with track its status and provide it to the BDE Staff on the BDE Staff, thereby enabling intelligence to drive a daily basis on trackers. Trackers allow the BDE BDE operations. Staff to synchronize ISR assets across the BDE. The effort begins with a common understanding of These trackers will ensure the BDE S2 has a clear collection capabilities and the requirements neces- picture of its intelligence collection “foot print” and sary to make full use of those capabilities. The MICO identify any intelligence gaps across the BDE’s lines must clearly defi ne its assets and capabilities by of effort (LOE).

April - June 2011 21 Targeting is another critical area where many not have effective contingency plans to get informa- MICO commanders miss a golden opportunity to in- tion from its own assets when digital communica- tegrate with the BDE S2 specifi cally and with the tions go down or during movements. It is absolutely entire BDE staff in general. As stated above, the critical to maintain communication to all MICO as- MICO commander is by mission and organization sets. The most important question to ask in de- the subject matter expert on MI collection assets in vising a PACE plan is “How does the asset report the BDE. Yet the MICO is rarely involved in the mili- information?” tary decision making process (MDMP) and BDE targeting process. Instead Defining the PACE in the MICO the MICO reacts to requirements com- “ A WAY” ing from these processes rather than PROPHET participate in them to identify intelli- C2 TUAS HUMINT DRAGON Current SENSOR gence gaps and recommend asset se- lection for all phases of the operation. P FMFM/TACSAT JABR BCS3/Email JWICS FM/TACSAT Communications and information FACE BFT/FBCB2/ BFT/FBCB2/ to Email Breeze UHF exchange between the MICO and MCS MCS A FACE BDE S2 are limited by the absence of well established standard operating C N/A HF VOIP CPOF NSA Net HF procedures (SOP). Failure to fully un- MCS/BREEZE/ derstand and implement an effective N/A Cell/Iridium FM Cell/Iridium Cell/Iridium JABR SOP leads to a lack of understanding E of how the MICO supports the MDMP process. A well established SOP dictates how the Answering that question cannot be a “big hand— MICO integrates with the BDE S2 shop and defi ne little map” wave toward SIPR, VoIP, FM, or courier. those roles between these two elements. The SOP The answer must be specifi c to the type of infor- should include a PACE communications plan to mation being passed and the asset passing it. An support that integration. unmanned aerial system does not pass the same Every organization struggles with where the MICO kind of information as a Human Intelligence collec- commander fi ts into the puzzle. Is the MICO com- tion team nor is the communications link the same. mander a collection manager, asset manager, or an Similar differences imply dissimilar solutions when analysis and control element chief? Does the MICO a PACE is devised. Establishing a separate PACE commander work for the BDE S2, the BDE S3, the plan for all the MICO assets works as a way to cross- BSTB commander, or the BDE commander? The cue assets and share information in a timely man- BDE commander who establishes roles and respon- ner which will allow for the MICO CP to maintain sibilities for the MICO commander will help allevi- an accurate portrayal of asset status. Defi ning the ate some of the frustration between the BDE S2 and PACE communications methods in advance reduces the MICO. MICO commanders should be involved confusion when those alternate communications in every assessment and mission analysis meeting are needed. The MICO commander must commu- and integrated into the BDE targeting cycle so that nicate the method to everyone. The establishment they clearly understand the identifi ed intelligence of a MICO-level PACE is paramount to continued gaps associated with the BDEs LOE. Without MICO improvement in the fl ow of information and inte- expertise the efforts to apply assets to confi rm or gration of intelligence at every echelon within the deny threat courses of actions or to answer intelli- MICO. gence gaps will be desynchronized across the BDE. Regardless of the shift to FSO, the MICO remained Clearly defi ned priorities of work and duties and re- the BDE’s number one collection asset. And just as sponsibilities within the BDE S2 are vital to the suc- in the past several years of MREs, the MICO and the cess of the MICO’s integration into the BDE. BDE S2 struggled with their separate and collective If information is important for successful opera- challenges. The most pressing is the synchroniza- tions, its timeliness is crucial. Often, the MICO does tion and the ability to maintain an accurate under-

22 Military Intelligence standing of asset status. If employed correctly, the Major Marrero is currently the Task Force 4 (BSTB) Senior MICO is able to provide the BDE with the critical MICO Trainer/Mentor at the JRTC. He served as the Bravo st th intelligence needed to maintain situational aware- Company Commander, 201 MI Battalion, 470 MI Brigade from March 2008 to June 2009. During the Battalion’s ness and understanding of the battlefi eld. However, Operation Iraqi Freedom 07-08 deployment, he served as if these assets are used without a clear understand- the Interrogation Control Element OIC at Camp Cropper, ing of their tasks and purpose, they will more often BIAP. His previous assignments include OIF (3), OEF (3), and than not fail to achieve their full collection poten- Seoul, South Korea. His stateside assignments include Fort tial. The MICO’s integration into the BDE Staff and Benning, Georgia, Assistant Intelligence Offi cer, Joint Special its ability to adequately providing accurate asset Operations Task Force Intelligence Offi cer, 3rd Battalion, 75th st management and tracking for the BDE will alleviate Ranger Regiment, and Assistant Operations Offi cer, 201 MI Battalion. He holds a BS in Psychology from Sam Houston these problems and ensure that the BDE will get the State University, Huntsville, Texas. most out of its intelligence collectors.

April - June 2011 23 Chief Warrant Offi cer Three Conan Payne and Chief Warrant Offi cer Four Chad LeBoeuf

Introduction overages or by pulling HUMINT Soldiers from the Over the last several years the focus for both Iraq three existing HCTs. and Afghanistan has been on counterinsurgency As the BCT shifts from COIN to FSO, it becomes (COIN) as opposed to full spectrum combat oper- necessary to shift resources to support interroga- ations (FSO). As a result, the Army shifted its fo- tions as well. Interrogation requirements are typi- cus for Human Intelligence (HUMINT) at the brigade cally heavier in the initial phase of FSO. This initial combat team (BCT) to emphasize Military Source requirement to support interrogations forces the Operations (MSO) over interrogation operations. BCT to keep all of its HUMINT assets for interroga- This shift affected the BCT’s ability to conduct si- tions at the onset and then begin to task organize multaneous HUMINT collection operations during them for MSO as the operation allows. However, FSO. First, the modifi ed table of organization and this leaves the BCT without any organic MSO capa- equipment (MTOE) for the standard modular BCT is bility during the initial entry period. Moreover, ma- geared specifi cally toward MSO. It does not provide neuver elements have become accustomed in COIN suffi cient manpower to conduct simultaneous MSO to having their own HCT. FSO doctrine calls for a and interrogation operations. Next, the emphasis on BCT to conduct simultaneous offensive, defensive, MSO within the BCT and parallel shift of interroga- and stability operations (including COIN) as neces- tions to Military Intelligence (MI) brigades (BDE) has sary. Commanders are therefore wisely reluctant to created a functional rift within HUMINT, creating give up this capability. Soldiers that are not profi cient at both aspects of This initial requirement was evident during 3/82 their jobs. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, ABN’s FSO rotation at the JRTC. At the onset of the shortage of HUMINT collection capability has the rotation following the Airborne Insertion, 3/82 led to a number of tactics, techniques, and proce- ABN’s HCTs assembled upon predetermined loca- dures (TTP) in the current operational environment tions, where they were to perform screening opera- that are not conducive to successful HUMINT col- tions in conjunction with securing local townships. lection in any operational setting. As a result of the screenings, many HCTs were able Modular BCT Manning Creates False to identify potential leads of intelligence, whether Choices for interrogation or for development under MSO, yet The standard modular BCT contains enough there were no additional HUMINT assets available HUMINT soldiers at the MI company (MICO) to staff to pursue these leads. an operational management team (OMT) and three One more consideration on this point, the BCTs HUMINT collection teams (HCT), as well as a four- have become reliant on previously established net- to-fi ve member S2 HUMINT (S2X) element as part of works during the last several years in both Iraq and the BCT S2 staff. Often this manning is insuffi cient Afghanistan. An FSO confl ict includes the possibil- to conduct MSO in a COIN environment, leading the ity of initial entry, whether into a theater or a re- MICO to create a fourth HCT either from HUMINT gion within a theater of operations, meaning that

24 Military Intelligence even more time and manpower would be required units). Both their interrogation inexperience and in order for the HCTs to spot, assess, and develop not recognizing FSO requirements resulted in lim- networks to support operations. The emphasis on ited exploitation of detainees following capture. interrogations at the outset would make MSO com- When transitioning to FSO the BCTs fi nd them- pletely unfeasible without additional manning. selves severely lacking in interrogation capabilities Ultimately, the BCT needs the capability to provide with their current MTOE. Even if the BCT receives each maneuver battalion an HCT and an interroga- a larger contingent of HUMINT Soldiers they may tion element while keeping a small cadre of HUMINT not, depending on where these Soldiers served pre- collectors to support BDE-level interrogations. This viously, receive Soldiers prepared to adequately would require the doubling of the current MTOE. support interrogation operations without a great A HUMINT House Divided deal of training. One way to mitigate this is to en- As mentioned previously, COIN emphasis has sure HUMINT collectors rotate positions rather than been on MSO almost to the complete exclusion of staying an entire career in one track or another, interrogations at the BCT. That is not to say that no thus ensuring balance of practical experience and interrogations are conducted in support of COIN. In training opportunity. Another way, one discussed to the current fi ght that role has typically been fi lled varying extents over the last several years, would be by external support to the BCT, usually HUMINT to make interrogation the foundation of all HUMINT assets from a separate MI BDE or Battlefi eld collectors and then providing the option, perhaps Surveillance Brigades, focused on interrogations to at the fi rst reenlistment, of training to become a the exclusion of MSO. Over time this has created source operator. A third option would be to divide two separate cadres of HUMINT collector–interroga- the military occupational specialty (MOS) into two tors and source operators. A collector assigned to a separate MOSs, making the interrogator distinct BCT has probably conducted few, if any, interroga- from the source handler. The benefi t to options two tions. When this Soldier returns to the U.S. he will and three is that slots could then be coded specif- probably attend advanced training in source opera- ically either by additional skill identifi er or MOS. tions, such as the Source Operations Course (SOC) Otherwise the BCT would still have to hope that its or Advanced SOC (ASOC). He will likely receive soldiers were well-rounded enough to support both no additional resident training on interrogations the interrogation and MSO missions. as long as he is assigned to a BCT. The opposite holds true for those assigned to the interrogation BDEs. They will likely attend courses such as the Joint Senior Interrogator Course (JSIC) or the Joint Interrogation Management Course (JIMC), and no further resident training on source operations. Only two HUMINT collectors within 3/82 ABN possessed substantial interrogation experience to provide internal coaching and mentoring to inex- perienced HUMINT collectors. These experienced Soldiers were members of the OMT. The OMT re- quirements precluded their ability to provide interrogation oversight and guidance to the less ex- perienced collectors tasked with supporting interro- gation operations. Additionally, 3/82 ABN HUMINT “Harry Potter” HUMINT Soldiers, assigned to the HCTs, experienced diffi - An issue that stands out amongst the others is one culty switching from the mindset of exploiting infor- not directly connected to the distinction between mation in a COIN environment to that of traditional COIN and FSO. Too many see HUMINT Soldiers as FSO requirements, threat order of battle factors a sort of “Harry Potter,” capable of waving a wand (identifi cation of command structures, strengths, over all collection tasks. Tactical leaders persist in and dispositions of personnel, equipment, and a fundamental misunderstanding of what HUMINT

April - June 2011 25 provides and how HUMINT collects its information. neuver in the current fi ght. For example a four Quite frankly, as long as this remains a problem, MRAP, twelve person, two crew-serve-weapon mini- no changes to MTOE or HUMINT training will likely mum for any mission can effectively shut down suc- be effective. Focusing on the trends from the COIN cessful HUMINT collection operations. These are fi ght, we see commanders continuing to think of theater specifi c rules and must be carefully weighed HUMINT as a passive collection asset; that some- rather than promulgated as an Army policy. This how the mere presence of a HUMINT collector in an type of thinking effectively restricts HUMINT collec- area will cause HUMINT information to begin fl ow- tors to either sitting on the forward operating base ing in. It has been a common TTP to see teams bro- or traveling with a platoon-sized element on a ma- ken down to the point where individual companies neuver-focused mission, which generally offers little each have one HUMINT soldier. or no collection opportunity. The company-level is too narrow in scope for even Consistently, the 3/82 ABN’s HCTs were restricted a complete team to be effective. A lone HUMINT from conducting source meets due to the imminent Soldier attached to a company cannot possibly take threat of the adversarial forces. Additionally, HCTs the necessary steps to properly maintain an existing were prevented from travelling throughout 3/82 source network, much less develop one in initial en- ABN’s lodgment area, where travel was relatively se- try operations. More often than not when HUMINT cure and unrestricted. 3/82 ABN adopted restrictive Soldiers are distributed as such we then focus on policies, based on operations in current theaters, tasks such as tactical questioning (TQ), document requiring teams to move in large convoys, which se- exploitation, and patrol debriefs, none of which are verely affected HCT military source operations. HUMINT tasks. As we see the BCT move into an As our focus changes from COIN to FSO, we must FSO scenario, we can count on seeing this failed ensure that our HUMINT soldiers get the technical TTP perpetuated given the need for simultaneous and tactical training they require to support both MSO and interrogations and the limited number of their interrogation and MSO roles on the battlefi eld. HUMINT Soldiers available. At the same time we must provide better training to Several 3/82 ABN’s HCTs were primarily envel- the Army leadership to ensure this limited resource oped in a traditional Scout operation of reconnais- is employed to its fullest potential. We need to care- sance and were not permitted to encounter the local fully preserve what we have learned in the past de- population in a manner conducive to source devel- cade. Not collecting HUMINT poses far greater risk opment. This restriction challenged the HCT’s col- to the deployed force. Finally, we need to ensure lection efforts and hampered their ability to develop units are staffed optimally to be able to conduct and a successful source network. manage both of these missions simultaneously. At present the BCT is simply not trained or organized Moving forward we need to ensure there is more to handle both tasks, and as such will likely fail at education for the tactical-level consumer of HUMINT both. with regard to how HUMINT is conducted and what missions the HUMINT Soldier is trained to conduct. CW3 Payne is currently the senior HUMINT Collector Commanders need to understand the difference be- Technician at the JRTC. His training includes the HUMINT tween TQ and an actual interrogation at the point Collector Course, Defense Strategic Debriefi ng Course, ASOC, Reid Technique of Interview and Interrogation, and of capture, understanding how impractical the lat- Modern Standard Arabic. Mr. Payne has served in a variety ter truly is. Then we might see a lower incidence of of operational assignments to include strategic debriefi ng source meetings being canceled for HUMINT collec- in Europe, interrogations and source handling in Iraq and tors to travel with line units for possible TQ mis- Afghanistan, and maritime interdiction operations with 6th sions. They should understand that HUMINT is Fleet. He holds a BA in Humanities from the University of neither a static sensor nor a scout; simply dropping Maryland. one off in a denied area will not yield immediate CW4 LeBoeuf has over 18 years of service in the U.S. Army HUMINT information. as a Counterintelligence Technician. He is currently assigned to JRTC as the Senior CI and S2X Trainer/Mentor. Mr Face Forward, Not Backward LeBoeuf has a diverse background in tactical and strategic We must examine some of the restrictions on ma- CI assignments.

26 Military Intelligence Signals Intelligence in Full Spectrum Operations: “Outside the Wire? What Wire?”

Warrant Offi cer One Larry Jones and Sergeant First Class Timothy Rodriguez

Introduction is limited and focused on their future battlespace. The tactical Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) missions SIGINT platoons do not train on maneuvering and and resultant observations from the 3/82 ABN full employing tactical SIGINT assets and focus instead spectrum operations (FSO) rotation in October 2010 on their next deployment. 3/82 ABN experienced all at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) were of these challenges before their rotation and expe- considerably different from our “normal” counterin- rienced the effects of these challenges during their surgency (COIN) centric mission rehearsal exercises FSO rotation. (MRE) missions and observations. The three major OE Tunnel Vision lessons learned were: In the current COIN operational environment, tra-  There is a lack of a comprehensive SIGINT ditional IPB is deemed unnecessary as units RIP Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefi eld (IPB). and “fall in on” a mature SIGINT enterprise. Tactical  There is too much focus on “sophisticated” com- SIGINT platoons deploying to Afghanistan and Iraq munication methods. commonly do not complete an IPB of the SIGINT environment; relying instead on products already  There is a lack of tactics, techniques, and pro- developed by the outgoing unit. SIGINT Soldiers ro- cedures (TTP) to use SIGINT collection systems tating into a COIN fi ght often fall into an already tactically. established SIGINT environment where enemy net- COIN is but a small part of FSO, it is nonetheless works are already identifi ed and targeting lines have driving how the Army is currently training SIGINT already been developed and often have been worked Soldiers. for months, if not years. There are three underlying reasons why FSO has FSO is completely different in that there is likely become a lower SIGINT training priority over the last an immature SIGINT environment compared to that 10 years. The fi rst major challenge involves live en- in Afghanistan and Iraq. Obviously, in a forced entry vironment training and the Relief in Place/Transfer situation, there is no RIP/TOA process. 3/82 ABN of Authority (RIP/TOA) process. Units focus their was challenged by the fact that their tactical SIGINT SIGINT platoon entirely on their future battle space Soldiers had limited training and experience to con- where the SIGINT operational environment (OE) is duct SIGINT IPB during the MDMP preceding their fully matured. Also, traditional SIGINT IPB is not forced entry operation. 3/82 ABN quickly discov- taught as part of the larger Military Decision Making ered that their diffi culty in defi ning the SIGINT OE Process (MDMP). The second challenge is that units prior to initial entry by identifying the best places experience a large personnel turnover in the tac- for signals collection and exploitation was an ab- tical SIGINT platoon and do not set priorities for solute necessity and prevented them from effective home station training focusing on traditional FSO collection until D+2. requirements. As a result, units default to their ex- Another challenge experienced by 3/82 ABN was periences in Iraq and Afghanistan and train accord- not having a developed SIGINT collection plan prior ingly. This focus on the CENTCOM mature theater to initial entry that tied back to a comprehensive eliminates the training on much of the SIGINT spec- collection plan focused on intelligence gaps and trum necessary for FSO. the commander’s priority intelligence requirements The fi nal challenge is time (operational tempo). (PIRs). Additionally, inconsistent communication Leaders do not have time to prioritize the necessary with the fusion cell hampered the SIGINT cells col- SIGINT training for FSO. Time between deployments lection focus.

April - June 2011 27 We have the SIGINT equipment to cover every second tier collection requirements, tactical SIGINT aspect of operations from initial entry collection assets collected from sanctuary sites or from inside and exploitation to follow on analysis and preci- fortifi ed forward operating bases (FOB) or combat sion targeting. We have the doctrine and the TTPs. outposts (COP). 3/82 ABN learned how this mind- Preparation for an initial insertion into a country set can cause collection degradation in an FSO that does not have established friendly presence environment. The BCT continued to move their col- has not changed. We do not have FSO experienced lection assets to sites with heavily established secu- or trained Soldiers. A generation of SIGINT Soldiers rity as opposed to points of optimal collection or in has neither the experience nor the training needed the current fi ght–with maneuver units. One example to conduct detailed MDMP, culminating in thorough during the rotation was collocating the Prophet col- SIGINT IPB and a written operations order for FSO. lection system with the tactical operations center. While the asset enjoyed security, collection suffered Target Fixation as this was the lowest lying point in the surround- Secondly, as SIGINT became decisively engaged in ing area. the current COIN fi ght so did its training and prod- uct development. The tactical SIGINT community In the last 10 years, SIGINT collection assets have has, as a result, forgotten about traditional “unso- become locked into these massive structures in Iraq phisticated” communication capabilities. The cur- and Afghanistan. The Prophet and Low Level Voice rent training for Soldiers deploying to Afghanistan Intercept (LLVI) teams have become fi xtures on and Iraq is based upon the previous Operation Iraqi FOBs and COPs rather than being mobile tactical Freedom-mode of “sophisticated” communications collection assets. Commanders do not fully under- being the most prevalent and therefore the priority stand their SIGINT capabilities and are sometimes for training. unwilling to apply the resources necessary to ensure their security outside a fi xed position. Additionally, Tactical SIGINT training moved away from more SIGINT Soldiers lack the skills and experience nec- primitive communications technologies that con- essary to provide asset employment considerations tinue to play a large role in the SIGINT environ- and recommendations in order to shape decisions. ment throughout the world and are critical in FSO. The intended use of the Prophet in FSO is to follow Special Intelligence (SI) assets have been widely used the forward line of troops on the battlefi eld provid- throughout the COIN fi ght and will continue to be ing the maneuver commander with near-real time an absolute necessity within any type of FSO. These SIGINT collection. Prophet Enhanced is an upgraded assets can quickly help determine where to place multi-functional system placed on a Medium Mine other collection assets and provide an overview of Protected Vehicle capable of moving over rough ter- the signals environment. Imagery, in conjunction rain. The upgraded Prophet is equipped with sat- with SI assets, is a tremendous help when trying to ellite on the move capability enabling immediate place SIGINT assets on the battlefi eld. SIGINT plan- analysis through database access. It increases early ners can look at a location during IPB and develop warning, force protection, and enhances forward employment considerations. Other ground SI as- collection capability while providing commanders sets will continue to be used for surgical targeting the data to enhance their targeting efforts at every during FSO focusing on networks and individuals. echelon. During the 3/82 ABN rotation, SIGINT fusion with other intelligence disciplines was a challenge that LLVI teams are a dynamic tool that should be uti- ultimately lead to a collection plan that was not fo- lized as a forward collection asset, reconnaissance cused on all sources or disciplines. tool, and operate in conjunction with other SIGINT assets. In COIN, these teams are often in fi xed sites; Fixed Site Employment, Rediscovering they are not pushed forward to fi ll collection gaps Tactical SIGINT because of security concerns. During FSO, the LLVI The COIN fi ght in Afghanistan and Iraq has con- teams can and should be attached to forward recon- sumed the majority of SIGINT resources for the last naissance elements, like scouts, for collection and 10 years pushing other FSO requirements to the early warning force protection. Training on FSO em- second tier of collection. In meeting those COIN and ployment and site selection of the Prophet and LLVI

28 Military Intelligence teams has suffered due to the COIN focus over the ment. The Army is more technologically advanced in past decade. Current training is often focused on SIGINT operations than ever before, but the critical equipment training and set up and fails to address fl aw in tactical SIGINT is that we have become fi x- tactical skills necessary for SIGINT Soldiers to oper- ated with the current COIN fi ght and let that fi xa- ate forward with maneuver elements. Additionally, tion shape our training for FSO. radio frequency and antenna theory classes have been removed from SIGINT training causing a WO1 Jones is an AOC 352N currently serving as the Senior BCT SIGINT Trainer/Mentor at the JRTC. Mr. Jones has over knowledge gap for operators. The days of teaching 14 years in the SIGINT community as a former Morse Code hide site construction and basic long range surveil- operator and Signals Intelligence Analyst. He has served lance tactics to LLVI teams are gone. This type of multiple tours in South America and Iraq with a diverse training is essential to the FSO fi ght. background in the Special Operations Forces community. His assignments range from national level strategic collection Many observations from the 3/82 ABN October and analysis to battalion and brigade size tactical SIGINT 2010 JRTC FSO rotation were similar to those from operations to include SI/ISR collection management. our normal COIN MRE rotations. The greatest dif- ference was the critical need for training SIGINT SFC Rodriguez has over 14 years of service in the U.S. Army as a Signals Intelligence Analyst. He is currently serving as Soldiers to operate in FSO outside of an established the Senior Brigade S2 NCOIC Trainer/Mentor at the JRTC and OE. The SIGINT community must allocate Soldiers, previously served there as the Senior SIGINT Trainer/Mentor equipment, and time to “retrain” on critical FSO for the 2 years. He has a diverse background in tactical and tasks such as IPB and tactical SIGINT asset employ- strategic Signals Intelligence assignments.

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April - June 2011 29 Sergeant First Class Bryan J. Ward

Introduction The Shadow tactical unmanned aerial system (TUAS) is a key part of the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) package directly under the brigade combat team (BCT) control. It is often the most valuable (or the only) means of collecting live video feed within the BCT area of operations (AO). That unique capability can be absolutely critical to the commander in full spectrum operations (FSO), allowing him to see contiguous, non-contiguous, and unassigned areas that would otherwise become defacto blind spots. Where is the Shadow Platoon? Only the Enemy Knows… In the moving gun fi ght called FSO, it is especially easy to leave that asset vulnerable. Years of mission readiness exercises (MREs) have accustomed commanders to secure base operations for TUAS. FSO, at least in part, strips away much of that security blanket. Most TUAS platoons across the Army are currently undermanned. During a confl ict where the platoon is launching and recovering from a location that is not built up and easily secured, the platoon is unable to provide its own site security. Remember, a TUAS pla- toon on the ground has an easily detectable signature but the Shadow at altitude is hard to detect. That all changes when it lands or takes off. In FSO, if the TUAS platoon is to operate securely it is essential that a minimum of an Infantry or Military Police (MP) platoon be assigned to provide security for the launch and recovery site (LRS) as well as engineer support to help provide a defensive perimeter and fi ghting positions. Securing the LRS, Secure the BCT A fully manned TUAS platoon will conduct split site operations effectively removing half of the platoon from the LRS. During consolidated fl ight operations the entire platoon is located at the LRS and is ex- pected to provide its own security. This is not a realistic requirement. Flight operations require at a mini- mum fi ve personnel for launching an aircraft, three to fl y the actual mission, three to prepare the follow-on aircraft for the next mission, and fi ve to conduct recovery operations. Using the platoon to provide its own security would hamper the ability of the platoon to provide continuous coverage. The unit would have to sacrifi ce security for operational necessity when forced to provide internal security at the LRS between phases of fl ight operations. As those phases of fl ight operations start, Soldiers have to be pulled from secu- rity leaving areas of the LRS perimeter exposed. Tasking an Infantry or MP platoon to provide LRS security will help alleviate the need for the TUAS platoon to have to provide its own security. Securing the TUAS provides better security for the entire BCT. Incorporating Engineer Enablers The same holds true for Engineer enablers. Providing Engineer support for runway preparation and re- pair is a no brainer. The same Engineer assets can help build up defensive perimeter or dig out fi ghting positions. This assistance will substantially increase the TUAS platoons chances of surviving contact with enemy forces. The TUAS platoon also needs to be provided with the materials (concertina wire, barricades, etc.) to assist with forming a perimeter around the LRS. While there is no way to ensure complete surviv- ability during combat, these changes would effectively increase the chances that the TUAS platoon would

30 Military Intelligence be able to survive enemy engagements and continue providing the BCT with live video feed of the AO and current maneuver unit operations. Proper LRS selection is vital to the performance of fl ight operations during any confl ict or exercise. During most operations, BCTs will locate the LRS at the same airfi eld where air land operations take place and often where all supporting rotary wing aircraft are located, especially during the initial entrance into an AO. This is ideal for consolidating all assets in one spot for security reasons. However if the TUAS pla- toon is required to launch/recover aircraft on the same runway being used for air lands and rotary wing, safety issues will require the TUAS platoon to displace their equipment after each launch and recovery. Incorporating Engineer support into the TUAS platoon will allow for the creation of and repair of an auxil- iary runway a safe distance from the main runway allowing for continuous TUAS operations. The TUAS platoon can operate from any location, given a clear fl at surface from which to launch/recover. A long runway setup as shown below allows for launching and recovering in both directions without being required to move any emplaced equipment due to wind direction change. The long runway setup requires a minimum of 900 feet total length and 164 feet wide, this is including 100 feet of runoff on either end.

A short runway setup as shown below allows for launching and recovering in both directions without having to move any of the emplaced equipment due to wind direction change. The short runway setup (to include 100 feet of runoff on either end) requires a total length of 710 feet and 164 feet in width.

April - June 2011 31 Engineer support provided to the TUAS platoon will allow them to create a runway in almost any area allowing the TUAS platoon to provide the BCT with continuous support. If the platoon is required to perform launch and recovery operations from a main runway or fi eld landing strip, operational support may be degraded due to having to displace equipment for safety reasons while rotary wing and air land operations are taking place. Summary None of this is rocket science but it still requires some forethought. Commanders have come to de- pend on Shadow to cover operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Years of operations and MREs have made the TUAS a key tool in the commander’s ISR collection. A return to FSO will not change that trend; it will however require some changes to how TUAS operations are established and secured.

SFC Bryan Ward is currently the Task Force 4 (BSTB) Senior TUAS Trainer/Mentor at the JRTC. He served as the TUAS Platoon Sergeant for the 3rd BCT, 4th Infantry Division from July 2005 to June 2009. During the Brigade’s OIF 05-07 deployment, he served as the Platoon Sergeant and LRS NCOIC at FOB Warhorse, Baqubah and during the Brigade’s OIF deployment 07-09 deployment, served as the G2 Fusion LNO at Camp Victory Baghdad and the Consolidated LRS NCOIC at Camp Taji, Iraq. His stateside assignments include Kelly AFB, Texas, Voice Intercept Section Supervisor; Hunter Army Airfi eld, Georgia, Guardrail Collection Squad Leader; Fort Irwin, California, Collection and Jamming Platoon Squad Leader; Fort Huachuca, Arizona, 111th MI Bde Training NCO, and Fort Carson, Colorado, 3rd BCT TUAS Platoon Sergeant.

Fort Huachuca became the “Home for Military Intelligence” when the Intelligence Center and School was offi cially created. The Intelligence School was formerly located at Fort Holabird, Maryland. The relocation made possible the long-range goal of consolidating all Army intelligence training at a single location.

32 Military Intelligence by Captain Christopher M. Gin and Staff Sergeant Bennett J. Strobel

New Dawn Challenges and the Way more prominent than “white” and “green” concerns. Ahead Predictive analysis was the goal of our Battalion S2 September 2010 heralded a signifi cant time of shop almost to a fault in order to keep Soldiers safe change across the nation of Iraq in more ways than and improve our tactics, techniques, and proce- one. September saw the end of Ramadan, where dures as the enemy improved theirs in an unending the most devout Muslims spend their days fasting game of one-upmanship. Looking at insurgency in and their nights reinvigorating their relationship terms of counter- versus anti-insurgency is helpful with Allah. For the American Army, and specifi cally in the context of the Advise and Assist Mission, but our unit (the 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry Regiment needs to be appropriately facilitated from the top to (Stryker)) of roughly 600 Soldiers, it also marked the achieve the desired implementation at the bottom. advent of Operation New Dawn and an end to com- Reconciling the strategy with the implementation is bat operations. Now nearly eight months since this the preeminent challenge for the Battalion S2 sec- benchmark, it is prudent to look at what the change tion deployed to Iraq. of mission means for the Intelligence Community Identifying the Problems and (IC). Shortcomings Prior to deploying to the last months of Operation Advising the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) on how to Iraqi Freedom this past June, all intelligence per- take a holistic assessment of their operating envi- sonnel in our Brigade were required to read Major ronment helps them understand what drives the General Flynn’s paper, “Fixing Intel: A Blueprint insurgency, and ultimately where they can apply for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan,” infl uence to help counter it. To measure our mis- and consider it the way ahead for conducting op- sion success, we ought to measure ourselves by erations during our deployment. The paper was not how effective we make our ISF partners in securing only suggestive as a paradigm shift, but even more the population and identifying where civil issues–if so directive to the IC for its implementation of new unresolved by civilian government–will morph into methodology for collection down to the junior ana- security problems. These are precisely the target lyst level.1 The main takeaway from General Flynn’s points that insurgent groups like the Islamic State article, as briefed by our commanders, was that the of Iraq and Ansar Al Sunna take aim at to achieve methodology behind our intelligence collection and the effect of discrediting the government and se- analysis was fl awed because of how narrow and en- curity forces. Attacks against U.S. Forces are in- emy-focused our scope had become. frequent when compared to provincial data at the Admittedly, in our previous deployment when height of the war and are assessed mainly as infor- this Battalion partnered with one Iraqi brigade and mation operations (IO) to win populist support for was in charge of nearly 200 square kilometers at groups vying for position in post-U.S. Iraq. Where the height of the surge, focusing on “red” was far we, the Army, fall short in the “advise and assist”

April - June 2011 33 model is the lack of appropriately trained personnel increased, but in a different way. We still roll out- with experience and credentials to advise and assist side the “wire” with up-armored vehicles, in full pro- on more than just military matters. tective gear, each wielding a personal weapon, and Our senior combat leaders have experience travelling in convoys. Unilateral travel to and from through their time in grade and multiple deploy- specifi c destinations is still permitted by Iraqi law, ments, but they are used sparingly through key as is the inherent right to self-defense to include leader engagements and well-crafted talking points force protection patrols. What does this mean for with Iraqi leaders across a much larger landscape Intelligence? than in previous deployments. Simply put, there are not enough commanders to go around and those that are on the ground experience a diminishing marginal utility as the Iraqis react and plan for our withdrawal. The companies and platoons that inter- act daily with key ISF partners are typically limited by virtue of their own work experience, being young military professionals. It does not take a Master’s Degree in Social Sciences to identify problem sets in various subsections of Iraqi society, but coming up with solutions for the Iraqis to realize and enact does take training, innovation, and throughput. It is even more diffi cult convincing ISF that they should take up the mantle of responsibility when their faith in the civil leadership wanes and var- ies, especially in a diverse cultural landscape like Kirkuk Province. Pervasive issues of personnel, mis- sion clarity, and strategy versus execution are the IA and IP offi cers planning a mission based on Joint Intelligence. biggest challenges to tactical intelligence personnel from here until end of mission in Iraq. This article If anything, it means that instead of assessing only is meant to provide some simple recommendations the enemy, we need to readjust our focus to security in a not so simple environment and only speaks to in a broader sense and “target” infl uencing those our experiences as one of a handful of battalion S2 Iraqis we think can have the greatest lasting im- sections left in Iraq. pact on security. As physical enablers like ground troop sensors pull back from engaging the popu- Embracing the Change of Mission lation directly, collection assets like human intelli- The media attention that Operation New Dawn re- gence (HUMINT) source pools and unabridged notes ceived did not clarify for the American public what from key leader engagements are the best way to the military’s role in post-combat operations in keep situational awareness. The question we pose Iraq is, and is not. In our microcosm, this was evi- to ourselves and our team daily is how can we en- denced by the scores of phone calls and emails from gage ISF Intelligence offi cers and assist and advise confused family members after President Obama them? However, the more we ask this question, the stated prior to 1 September 2010 that the last com- more we realize that we rely on them in terms of in- bat troops had left Iraq. The mission, as described telligence collection. by our commanders, is the only thing that has It is important for commanders to have realis- changed. The “advise, train, and assist” mission is tic expectations of what battalion S2 sections and still being carried out by American Soldiers, who by company intelligence support teams (COISTs) can defi nition are combat trained troops. do to “advise and assist” Iraqi Intelligence offi - The paradigm shift to ISF completely in the lead cers on, since they live in and amongst the pop- has not meant that we sit around on bases and wait ulation, speak the language, and know the people for the trip home. On the contrary, operation tempo more intimately than we ever will. However, there

34 Military Intelligence are a number of areas in which we can help them Finding Intellect in Intelligence develop an enduring capacity, and because time is Eighteen months following this unit’s redeploy- so limited we must move to set the conditions for ment, reset, and an NTC-rotation focused on the Iraq post-December 2011 now. Reinforcing the ex- transition to an Advise and Assist Brigade, and here isting intelligence architecture by getting under- we are back in Iraq, in a new province with new trained personnel into the Intelligence schools their problems spread over 4,000 square kilometers. As of own forces offer or offering exchange scholarships 1 September 2010, the total strength of U.S. Armed at Fort Huachuca to the brightest and most promis- Forces was capped at 50,000 personnel versus ing young offi cers might be a start. The problem is nearly 170,000 at the war’s height. In operational that even though the Iraqi Army (IA) has an estab- terms, this translates to roughly two battalions per lished system of schooling, training, and on-the-job province. In Kirkuk, where we are deployed, there experience, the culture of mistrust when sharing is a Cavalry Squadron partnered with the IP in the information hampers further holistic development. City. Our Infantry Battalion is partnered with the As our Commanding General put it, “We must do ISF (to include the IA and IP) and Sons of Iraq (SoI)) some expectation management of what we can af- in all areas outside of Kirkuk and the Combined fect because we are looking at the IA system from an Security Area. The challenge is being responsible American standpoint and looking for ways to make for, “Kul Kirkuk, maad Medina,” or, “all of Kirkuk, it more effi cient, whereas they are looking at the except for the City,” as our IA counterparts like to system with a legacy of corruption and attempting say, highlighting the fact that everything affecting to fi x that internally fi rst.”2 our area stems from the political developments in It seems we spend half of our time trying to catch- the provincial capital. In order to meet reduction in up with the Iraqi brigade and division S2s who are force numbers, our Intel section was reduced below not so willing to share information about their cur- the modifi ed table of organization and equipment, rent targeting, not only with us, but also with each without the augmentation of analysts that General 3 other and especially with sister security force orga- Flynn’s article advocates. nizations like the Iraqi Police (IP). As the country Analyst shortfalls, however, have helped us focus attempts to transition to police primacy, IA leaders on being more effi cient and utilizing all available must also understand how this affects the nature assets to include building competent COISTs that of their organization. In turn, the U.S. Forces’ mis- work in conjunction with direct-support HUMINT sion to advise, train, and assist can ultimately be Collection Teams. What COIST leaders lack in for- successful if we have the Iraqi Forces’ cooperation. mal intelligence training, they make up for in ag- Evaluating staff integration and coaching staff ex- gressive attitudes of would-be platoon leaders. Prior ercises to the willing may be an effective way to get to deployment, familiarization with our proposed the ISF to see the battlefi eld with a cross-sectional targeting process and tactical intelligence equip- lens, but they have more on their plate than simply ment was essential for their ability to cope with an attending our recommended staff classes. ever-demanding deployment battle rhythm. Most Our focus should assist through tangibles like of the COIST offi cers-in-charge are from the Field Actionable Intelligence derived from our technologi- Artillery branch and use this additional assignment cally advanced platforms, but also signifi cant time as an effective way to help focus their company’s or more efforts spent on the advising aspect such as targeting efforts. Still, getting the right personnel in teaching tradecraft in bilateral programs and pro- the right jobs is always a challenge. viding a focus through which the ISF will be able to While there has been some continuity in COIST conduct a full security assessment, not limited to makeup, many of the junior Soldiers were redistrib- threat actions. In order to be relevant and contribute uted in order to meet line platoon shortages. That to mission success in the Intelligence Warfi ghting leaves us heavily dependent on OICs and NCOICs Function, the mission tasks of “advise and assist” to take the initiative and be more than just an IST must be accomplished simultaneously, but should and who are, in reality, the company command- also take into account on what the Iraqis want to be er’s staff for all areas in which he wishes to advise advised and assisted. and assist the ISF. What we’ve tried to instill in our

April - June 2011 35 COIST members is that their focus must be broader an accurate, historical picture long after the pre- than just the enemy; otherwise, we’ll always be in vious unit departs. The typical two-week Relief in a reactive posture. This is achieved by command- Place/Transfer of Authority process is not an ad- ers involving the COIST in all lethal and non-lethal equate amount of time to conceptualize all the en- missions. emy and allied problem sets in an Iraqi province. In many ways, it is tougher being a COIST OIC Retaining institutional knowledge is a premium in than a Battalion S2 because of the amount of full- the IC and will pay lasting dividends throughout the spectrum data one must gather, process, and an- deployment. alyze to several layers of command often without the required personnel support to dig through data and review notes from every commander’s meeting. While this model for implementation does align with General Flynn’s suggestion to separate analysts by geographic area (partnered IA brigade boundaries in this case), its overall effectiveness is hindered by too much information. In light of troop drawdown, bat- talion and higher intelligence shops do not have the manpower to detach to the companies even though it is the companies who provide the raw intelligence that shapes commanders’ decisions at higher lev- els. Thus, the strategy for augmenting intelligence personnel and the implementation of this strategy at ground level are still divorced from one another. Three recommendations come to mind for intelli- gence sections in units that are preparing to deploy to Operation New Dawn and facing similar manning issues. These may also be prescriptive as we begin the Afghanistan drawdown in the next few years. First, achieve greater effi ciency through cross-train- The Battalion S3 and the author with children at a school opening ing all analysts in current and future planning of built using U.S. CERP funds. operations so that no position is one person deep Third, identify your Soldiers’ and junior offi cers’ in terms of technical know-how. Instilling senior best traits and assign them meaningful work that leader confi dence in your assistant or NCOIC is par- will help drive the intelligence that in turn drives amount to an effective S2 section since this confi - operations. People–and Soldiers are people–tend to dence will translate to authority when the primary have more satisfaction and achieve greater success is out on mission and subordinate and higher ele- in their profession when their daily work consists ments require the “S2” input. Improving Soldier and of autonomy, complexity, and a connection between NCO writing skills by sharpening their verbiage and effort and reward.4 Morale, in an environment like getting them more comfortable with their own lan- today’s Iraq, is as important as intellect because it guage in order to brief and write is far more valu- keeps people engaged and helps ensure information able than sending them to sporadic Arabic classes. is not lost in the shuffl e because someone simply Advising and assisting skills must fi rst succeed with does not care. The human factors certainly affect our own commanders before we can hope to apply the effi ciency of any section in an ambiguous en- them to the host nation forces. vironment and promoting professional growth and Second, send the S2 personnel forward soonest critical thinking on a daily basis is necessary when during the transition period and ask to keep the tackling a challenge as big as a province. A good current unit’s S2 for an extra two to three weeks. It example of this was when we took a branch-de- is the S2 Offi cer who has the greatest responsibil- tailed Infantry lieutenant assigned as the Battalion ity for data exchange in order to give the battalion IO Offi cer and made him the Assistant Intelligence

36 Military Intelligence Offi cer. While it took some convincing, reassigning odology for collecting, analyzing, and processing in- him to a set of tasks he was more professionally in- formation for higher visibility. terested in created the opportunity for on-the-job However, these “specifi cally trained analysts…em- development in his future fi eld of Intelligence. It also powered to methodically identify everyone who col- reenergized his efforts to perform above and beyond lects valuable information, visit them in the fi eld, the standard even eight months into a deployment. build mutually benefi cial relationships with them, Merging Strategy and Execution and bring back information to share with everyone In a recent issue of Harvard Business Review, who needs it,” have not yet materialized down at Roger L. Martin writes about how the idea that exe- the battalion level.6 In fact, coordinating for brigade cution distinct from strategy is a fl awed assumption, Intelligence fusion has been a challenge because of and that it is not good management practice to say, how spread out we are geographically. “We have a brilliant strategy, but it may fail because of its implementation.”5 Looking at the Intelligence mission through a wider lens, it is imperative that the leaders who developed the strategic vision for Iraq during Operation New Dawn see to it that the tactical implementers have more than just “buy-in.” “Buy-in” has been misused in corporate and mil- itary planning sessions and has lost its intended meaning of getting everyone to an agreeable com- promise based on near-equal vested interests–like shareholders in a joint venture. In Operation New Dawn, the term seems to have adopted a lingering connotation of a cheap deal in which one party (U.S. Forces) gets another (the ISF) to agree on means in order to achieve the former’s ends. If we are not de- liberate in our information campaign, the “buyers,” in this case the ISF, will feel they do not have a Escorting the BN S2 from an intelligence sharing meeting with the say in the best methods to achieve those ends. They District Police Chief. Hand grenades and sniper fi re still pose a se- rious threat to U.S. troops in urban areas, so Infantry dismounts thereby run the risk of being too dependent on the are often used in conjunction with armored vehicles going to and U.S. military to reach the stated ends, since they did from meeting areas in the heart of cities. not take at least equal part in endstate formulation. Collecting intelligence that is of immediate inter- In order to move further into the advisory role, est to higher echelons is important, but allowing the ISF needs to have more than just “buy-in” in or- the ground unit time to analyze at their level before der to achieve the best results. At the tactical level, sending the information directly to the policymak- we are trying to enforce this new deal on a daily ers is absolutely necessary. First, going around the basis through interaction and infl uence. The same traditional chain of command and stove-piping the compromise should be the goal at the strategic ver- Intel is a tenuous proposal and makes ground com- sus tactical levels of the Intelligence Warfi ghting manders wary because they are responsible for the Function. Tactical units and the intelligence staff Intelligence that their staff provides higher. Second, that support post-combat missions in Iraq ought if an S2 provides unanalyzed intelligence directly to to have genuine access to strategists and forums a policy or strategy maker which may then turn into in the IC where policymakers look for the ground directives for that S2’s commander, it leaves little truth. This way, they remain a part of strategy’s on- room for further development or argument against going refi nement and not just its execution. Sending top-driven operations. I agree with General Flynn’s specialized, handpicked analysts from higher to cir- argument that commanders need to hold S2s ac- culate at the battalion level would be welcomed by countable for answering the command’s priority S2 shops that are under manned in order to build information requirements, but being relevant still rapport and understand the ground analysts’ meth- means conducting analysis at the ground level be-

April - June 2011 37 fore information is pulled away by higher and ana- a transparent legal system equipped with checks lyzed by echelons that are not “in the fi eld.” and balances. Gone are the days when a warrant Strategy and execution should not be distinctly was enough for the ISF to hold someone on suspi- separate in the environment that currently exists cion of terrorism for an indefi nite amount of time. In in Iraq. The volume of enemy attacks is not nearly order to make the society a more secure place, the as high as it was in previous years, so there is time Iraqi Government must continue to emphasize the to refl ect on the best way ahead between the strat- rule of law and show its ability to build cases and egists and the executors. Taking the time to build exercise fair judgment. a cohesive Intelligence sharing network among the few units and agencies still in Iraq is benefi cial for everyone’s situational awareness, but more impor- tantly accomplishment of the advise and assist mis- sion. As the transition to the New Dawn mission is fully realized at the strategic level, it is likely to be more successful in its implementation if the tactical Intelligence personnel feel their efforts and ideas of how to accomplish that mission are routinely inte- grated in the planning process. Additionally, assuming that there is a ready pool of the hungriest analysts ready to serve on the stra- tegic Intel “pull” teams is not the reality. In my humble experience, the lower an analyst is in the food chain, the hungrier the analyst is to get af- ter information of real Intelligence value. In addi- IP squad conducting a raid at a suspected location of a warranted tion to pushing strategically tied analysts down to insurgent. the ground level, it would be effective to pull bat- On February 25th of this year, we witnessed Iraq’s talion analysts up to the strategic level on occasion version of the widespread, anti-government pro- for short durations in order for them to see how tests that caught fi re throughout the Middle East their information affects the broader strategic plan- in recent months. In the province of Kirkuk, the ning. Empowering the executors by including them largest protests occurred just down the road from in the strategic vision and ongoing review helps en- our Contingency Operating Location. Although sure higher and lower echelons stay tied in with one the protest began peacefully with an emphasis on another. more government provision of essential services, the demonstration eventually turned violent and Advocating the Rule of Law a mob stormed government and police buildings. In order to secure the population, the IP must Paramount in the protestors’ demands was the im- win the trust of the people they serve by adhering mediate removal of the City Council and the Police to the letter of the law. Advising the ISF on how to Chief. In addition to the underlying ethnic tensions identify the challenges in their own systems and ag- that keep Kirkuk at the forefront of Arab and Kurd gressively assisting them in overcoming Intelligence relations, the rule of law and the way the govern- shortfalls at the ground level may be the best way ment and security forces apply it to their society ahead in the limited time we have left. The current needs improvement. As tensions mount between of- biggest challenge the ISF now face is evidence col- fi cials and unoffi cial leaders, we have had to come lection and management within the legal system. to terms with our effectiveness in infl uencing the Evidence has become the greatest Intel gap and the judicial process at our local level. Fixing the judicial system for detainment has a revolving door if there and security systems at higher levels is a desirable is no evidence against the accused. end state, but it will take the Iraqis’ own commit- This is likely to be an enduring issue as the gov- ment to social justice and judicial transparency de- ernment of Iraq tries to curb corruption and develop velopment long after U.S. advisors depart.

38 Military Intelligence Realizing our Enduring Partnership Endnotes Our enduring vision is for a strategic partnership 1. Michael Flynn, Matt Pottinger, and Paul D. Batchelor, “Fixing with an Iraq that has a professional force able to Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan,” Center for a New American Security, January 2010, 9-10. secure the population internally and keep disrup- tive international infl uence at bay as it pertains to 2. MG David G. Perkins, 4th Infantry Division Commanding General, security within the country. What that means for during a visit to the 1-14 Battalion Headquarters at JSS McHenry, Iraq following a full-spectrum briefi ng by the Battalion Staff on 19 Intelligence Warfi ghters is that their relevance is January 2011. inextricably linked to providing overall security as- 3. Flynn, 12. sessments and advice. These security assessments ought to be rooted in raw intelligence that is ana- 4. Malcolm Gladwell, Outliers: The Story of Success, (New York, New York: Little, Brown, and Company, 2008), 149. lyzed at the grassroots level to best inform policy and strategy makers at higher levels. Utilizing the 5. Roger L. Martin, “The Execution Trap,” Harvard Business Review, July-August 2010. available assets like the COIST and experienced Intel analysts that have already begun to under- 6. Flynn, 17. stand an area will help in the aggregation of cross- section security information that is not limited to the threat. Embracing the mindset change and our role as Captain Christopher M. Gin serves as the Battalion S2 for advisors is diffi cult, but necessary, for an honorable 1-14th Infantry currently deployed to JSS McHenry, Kirkuk, reduction of U.S. forces. It is also humbling when Iraq in support of Operation New Dawn. He is a 2005 graduate the ISF now reserve the right to say “no” to our sug- of the USMA with a BS in English and Field of Study in Chinese. gestions. The positive effect of ISF evolution is that He earned his Master’s in Asian Studies from the University of they are taking more deliberate action in the plan- Hawaii while a Fellow at the East-West Center. His military ning and execution of missions targeting violent ex- education includes the Armor Offi cer Basic Course, Airborne, Air Assault, and Ranger Schools, as well as a deployment as tremist networks. After we realize that we’re limited the Battalion Assistant S2 in Iraq from 2008 to 2009. on what we can assist and advise them in terms of Intelligence based on our own training and capabili- Staff Sergeant Bennett J. Strobel serves as the Senior ties, our action still cannot simply be inaction. U.S. Intelligence Analyst and NCOIC of the 1-14th Infantry S2 section currently deployed to JSS McHenry, Kirkuk, Iraq in leaders making strategic decisions about advising support of Operation New Dawn. His military education on all Warfi ghting Functions and beyond should includes MOS 35F AIT and the Warrior Leaders’ Course. He also understand the challenges that we, the execu- was awarded the Bronze Star award for his contributions to tors of that strategy, are facing and the support we defeating Al Qaeda in Iraq networks north of Baghdad on a need to succeed. 15 month deployment from 2007 to 2009.

April - June 2011 39 by Major Ismael R. Rodriguez laws of probability.”3 It was Clausewitz’s notion of the fog of war which is most prevalent. Indeed, he Military operations are uncertain and unpredictable… portrayed all information as uncertain, arguing that Leaders who understand the dynamic relationship that time and uncertainty have on enemy and friendly forces “the general unreliability of all information presents are better equipped to develop effective plans. Given the a special problem in war: all action takes place, so nature of operations, the object of planning is not to to speak, in a kind of twilight, which, like a fog or eliminate uncertainty but to develop a framework for moonlight, often tends make things seem grotesque 1 action in the midst of it. and larger than they really are. Whatever is hidden How do intelligence professionals contend with from full view in this feeble light has to be guessed 4 uncertainty on the battlefi eld? Is uncertainty a sim- at by talent, or simply left to chance.” ple concept? Is there more than one way to defi ne Jomini had a somewhat different take on uncer- uncertainty? Uncertainty has long been central to tainty. While he does not address uncertainty ex- the way the American Army conducts operations. plicitly, he offers a prescription for attending to it. Despite this, the Army has no clear defi nition of un- In particular, he argues that it is essential to under- certainty. More importantly, there is a limited un- stand both military geography and the type of cal- derstanding of how uncertainty fi ts into the broader culations involving military order of battle. He noted planning and intelligence responsibilities within the that there were misunderstandings by different mil- Army. There are many ways of considering uncer- itary organizations throughout Europe on not just tainty. While the prevalent approach of the Army the lay of the land, but also the strengths and weak- is essentially mathematical, the fi elds of organiza- nesses of military organizations. Above all, he con- tional design and wicked problems offer compel- sidered the study of such conditions as a scientifi c ling alternatives for the intelligence community to endeavor necessary to properly develop military consider. plans.5 At the operational level, Jomini had several The grand theories of warfare that developed specifi c recommendations. He strongly affi rmed during the Napoleonic era are fundamental to the that through a thorough, multi-faceted collection of understandings of uncertainty. Two prominent mil- information, and despite the risk of misinformation, 6 itary thinkers provided compelling descriptions of the truth can be discovered. Still, Jomini recognized uncertainty. That said, Clausewitz and Jomini of- that there is a need for probability to determine fered differing points of view. Perhaps the more fa- likely enemy courses of action. Notably, he confi - mous description of uncertainty is from Clausewitz, dently proclaims that for a military leader who fol- who directly addressed uncertainty and probabil- lows such a prescription “nothing very unexpected 7 ity in his writings on intelligence. Building upon can befall him and cause his ruin.” Perhaps most an earlier discussion of the probability and risks tellingly, he immediately anticipates criticism of this of warfare, he noted “no other human activity is so concept, recognizing that while surprises happen, continuously or universally bound up with chance. even these could in all probability be determined. And through the element of chance, guesswork and Clausewitz and Jomini cemented a traditional ap- luck come to play a great part in war.”2 He later goes proach to understanding the role of uncertainty in on to remark that “many intelligence reports in war military operations. Like other tenets attributed are contradictory; even more are false, and most to them, their descriptions have largely withstood are uncertain…an offi cer…should be guided by the the test of time. As the American military evolved

40 Military Intelligence in the 20th century, these themes of friction and complex and the extent to which events are stable fog, or reconnaissance and surveillance, would be- or unstable.”12 With this basic defi nition in hand, it come increasingly evident in American military doc- is easy to identify different ways in which an orga- trine, as expressed in the Cold War era FM 100-5, nization contends with its environment. Put simply, Operations: these two variables create a simple two dimensional framework for interpreting an environment. The Combat intelligence provides knowledge of the enemy and the area of operations vital to the successful fi rst dimension spans from simplicity to complexity. conduct of operations. It reduces the unknown Think of this as all the different types of information factors and, therefore, is of great significance to necessary to survive. The second dimension spans the commander and his estimate of the situation.8 from stability to instability. Think of this as the pace of change taking place. Some organizations operate Perhaps the simplest understanding of uncertainty in a stable, simple environment. In such a world, it derives from the realm of mathematics. Solving for is fairly easy to predict what will take place. Still, the unknown is a concept familiar to anyone who other groups may face a great amount of instability has completed a course in algebra. As in an alge- in addition to a very complicated set of environmen- braic equation, there is a problem and ultimately tal conditions.13 a solution. Indeed, engineers and scientists are fa- miliar with this clear cut framework for problem- Wicked problems emerge from this challenging solving.9 The military has a host of problems that fi t environment of uncertainty. By defi nition, a wicked these criteria, of which risk management is a promi- problem is one that cannot be easily solved. Horst nent example. Army doctrine requires a consider- Rittel and Melvin Webber offer an enduring obser- ation of probability in the calculation of risk. FM vation of such problems. More importantly, they 5-19, Composite Risk Management, uses an implic- critique the planning profession as inadequate for itly mathematical approach that includes estimat- a complex environment, noting that “the classical ing the frequency that a event may occur.10 Whether paradigm of science and engineering…is not appli- fi ring artillery, delivering an aerial resupply drop, or cable to the problems of open societal systems.”14 planning the company organization day, there are They continue by challenging a central tenet of mili- calculations to be made and risks to be mitigated. tary planning, arguing that the step-by-step process The Army demands that its leaders determine “an of fi rst understanding the problem, then gathering initial risk assessment that compares the poten- information in order to analyze and then solving a tial for threat (tactical) and hazard (accident) risk problem cannot work for a wicked problem. Instead, against the factors of METT-TC.”11 Indeed, this fi rst Rittel and Webber contend, “For wicked problems… step of risk analysis aligns closely with the thinking one cannot understand the problem without know- of Jomini about uncertainty. Arguably, this notion ing about its context; one cannot meaningfully of risk and probability offers the most widespread search for information without the orientation of a framework for uncertainty available to the Army. solution concept; one cannot fi rst understand, then solve.”15 Outside of the military arena, there have been vast improvements in the description of uncertainty. So how does uncertainty relate to wicked prob- One fi eld that deserves attention is organizational lems? For one, the complex open societal model de- design. In essence, organizational design considers scribed by Rittel and Webber is similar to that of how an organization relates with the larger world. In the organization design model of uncertainty driven defi ning uncertainty within an environment, there by complexity and instability. Still wicked problems are two essential variables. As Richard Daft ex- present other aspects of uncertainty. Because there plains in his text Organization Theory and Design, are no underlying rules for solving wicked prob- “…uncertainty means that decision makers do not lems, it is impossible to know if the problem has have suffi cient information about environmental been solved. A planner stops work on such prob- factors, and they have a diffi cult time predicting lems not because a defi nitive solution has been external changes…Characteristics of the environ- found, but because critical resources run out.16 It is mental domain that infl uence uncertainty are the moreover impossible to identify all the potential so- extent to which the external domain is simple or lutions to a wicked problem, sometimes there may

April - June 2011 41 be no solution at all. Thus, determining the feasi- science related fi elds in order to predict certain hu- bility of potential plans is dependent “on realistic man behaviors and activities. These applications judgment, the capability to appraise ‘exotic’ ideas should also have strong spatial components. As and on the amount of trust and credibility between such, the application of geospatial information sys- planner and clientele.”17 tems could be of great value. For instance, military As evident in FM 5-0, Army Planning and Orders doctrine has taken notice of these trends. FM 3-24, Production, some military doctrine takes a realistic devotes much of its Appendix B to Social Network 23 view of the world. It fully accepts the notion that Analysis. The intelligence community has invested uncertainty exists and that it yields unpredictabil- heavily in geospatial capabilities that could have the ity.18 Yet, is this commonplace in other military doc- potential to tap into cutting edge techniques used trine? Unfortunately, the doctrine is inconsistent, by the academic and research communities. and there seems to be a disconnection between The doctrinal foundations of the intelligence and operational and intelligence doctrine on this sub- operations planning community offer several prac- ject. Predictive intelligence analysis has long been tical means to decrease uncertainty. The tenets of the gospel for intelligence professionals. At a mini- the Military Decision Making Process present a sys- mum, FM 2-0, Intelligence pays lip service to the tematic method of understanding the intricacies of uncertain environment of the modern battlefi eld, an operation. While intelligence planners may wish accepting that “The environment we operate in is to focus their efforts on defi ning the operational characterized by violence, uncertainty, complexity, environment and assessing the capabilities of the and asymmetric methods by the threat.”19 This is enemy, there are still other important ways to con- not quite the case with other intelligence doctrine. tend with uncertainty. By sorting out a complicated In fact, quite recently, the dogma of predictive in- landscape and describing an adaptive enemy, the telligence is still evident throughout FM 2-01.3, intelligence planner essentially presents an uncer- Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefi eld.20 tain environment. The intelligence planner can then On the other hand, operational doctrine is largely turn attention to the means of contending with that clear in its perception of uncertainty. TRADOC uncertainty. Pamphlet 525-5-500, The U.S. Commander’s One possibly overlooked method of contending with Appreciation and Campaign Design even builds upon uncertainty is task organization. Simple changes the wicked problem theory.21 Instead of harping on to the command and control of intelligence organi- prediction, FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, chooses to zations can have profound effects. Major General emphasize understanding. The fi eld manual’s chap- Flynn, Captain Pottinger, and Paul Batchelor re- ter “Intelligence in Counterinsurgency,” contends cently noted this phenomenon in Afghanistan. In that “the purpose of this IPB step [determine threat their example, a Marine infantry battalion chose to courses of action] is to understand insurgent ap- send its intelligence analysts down to the company proaches and tactics so they can be effectively coun- level, placing skilled professionals at a level where tered…The insurgents’ approach is based on their they could have fi rst hand access to an assortment objectives, desired end state, and requirements of of front line collectors.24 From a theoretical stand- the operational environment.”22 Understanding es- point, this approach makes sense. From the per- sentially replaces prediction. If the very nature of spective of organizational design, a decentralized uncertainty makes it is impossible to predict, then organization can contend with the challenges of a the emphasis on prediction seems ill informed. complex and dynamic situation.25 Is there a way to reconcile prediction and uncer- Flynn’s proposal to use a journalist-style network tainty? The linear methods of solving certain intel- of contacts fi ts within this context as well. In es- ligence problems may still hold some relevance. For sence, these investigative offi cers provide a critical one, not all adversaries are insurgents. Moreover, linkage to the outside environment, creating what the scientifi c methods used to determine cause and Daft terms “boundary spanning roles” in order to effect will continue to have value. Even in a chal- “link and coordinate an organization with key ele- lenging human environment, the military intelli- ments in the external environment.”26 In any case, gence community could tap into a variety of social the traditional top heavy bureaucratic fi eld organi-

42 Military Intelligence zations of the Army do not present a good fi t for concept, there is no easily referenced defi nition. As an uncertain environment. Large intelligence units the Army evolves in the 21st century, a more nu- may play an important role in some future con- anced multi-faceted understanding of the concept ventional confl ict. However, such use by large in- will become useful. The Army has learned much in telligence units would be best in a case of a fairly its operations over the last decade. These opera- simple, stable environment.27 Developing an organi- tions have taken place in a complex and changing zation that has inherent fl exibility would give com- environment. In essence, this is the kind of diffi cult manders the ability to contend with more uncertain environment that should form the basis for defi n- challenges. ing uncertainty. While there will be a continued role Of the tools available to decrease uncertainty, for the traditional, largely mathematical concept, perhaps the most effective is a strong relationship the two-dimensional, organizational-design based between the commander and the intelligence offi - construction deserves a central role in the planning cer. Nearly two decades ago, Major General William and implantation of future Army activities. That Hertzog encapsulated this point in his “Intelligence said, such a framework highlights where an organi- Commandments for Commanders” when he decreed zation can seek to contain uncertainty. Whether by “to defeat the enemy, you must tell your intelligence modeling the dynamic activities of an enemy, or pri- offi cer what you must know and when you must oritizing the volumes of information available to an know it.”28 The method for doing this has largely re- analyst, the end result may not be less uncertainty, mained unchanged since World War II. Originally but instead an effective means of operating “in the 33 known as Essential Elements of Information, this midst of it.” selective information was “needed by a commander in a particular situation in order to make a sound Endnotes decision and avoid being surprised.”29 1. FM 5-0 Army Planning and Orders Production, 2005, 1.

Future doctrine would refi ne the concept into in- 2. Carl von Clausewitz, On War Rev. Ed., Translated and Edited by telligence and operations requirements. Commonly Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton recognized as Commanders Critical Information University Press, 1984), 85. Requirements (CCIR), these guidelines are essential 3. Ibid., 117. in the effort to cut through the vast stores of in- 4. Ibid., 140. formation available to the modern intelligence or- 5. Antoine H. Jomini, The Art of War (Novato, California: Presidio ganization. At fi rst glance, the doctrinal decree that Press, 1992), 39-40. “the commander designates intelligence require- 6. Ibid., 273-274. ments tied directly to decisions as CCIR” seems too restrictive.30 This construct may work well in 7. Ibid., 274. a conventional setting with a well defi ned enemy. 8. FM 100-5 Operations, (Change 3), 1958, 47.

Fortunately, there is some leeway in the doctrine 9. Horst Ritteland & Melvin Webber, “Dilemmas in a General Theory since a commander can singlehandedly designate of Planning,” Policy Sciences 4 (1973), 155-169, 160. 31 any information requirement as a PIR. Moreover, 10. FM 5-19: Composite Risk Management, 1-8. information can support decisions in different ways. 11. Ibid., 3-6. For instance, information that provides context can aid in decision making. Indeed, a lack of context 12. Richard Daft, Organization Theory and Design. 8th ed. (Mason, Ohio: Thomson/South-Western, 2004) 144. has been a critical defi ciency in recent military op- erations.32 So, if context is a gap, then the com- 13. Ibid., 142-143. mander could choose to prioritize collection and 14. Rittel and Webber, 160. analysis of information that fi lls in context. Indeed, 15. Ibid., 162. the decision becomes how best to allocate intelli- 16. Ibid., 162. gence resources in order to contend with an uncer- tain environment. 17. Ibid., 164. The Army should revisit how it approaches un- 18. FM 5-0, 1 certainty. While its doctrine regularly refers to the 19. FM 2-0 Intelligence, September 2008, 3-2.

April - June 2011 43 20. FM 2-01.3, MCRP 2-3A: Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefi eld 29. FM 100-5 Operations, 1944, 49. /Battlespace, 2009. 30. FM 2-0, 1-11. 21. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5-500: The U.S. Commander’s Appre- 31. Ibid., 1-12. ciation and Campaign Design, January 2008. 32. Flynn, Pottinger, and Batchelor, 2005, 1. 22. FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, December 2006, 3-20. 33. FM 5-0, 1. 23. Ibid.

24. Michael Flynn, Matt Pottinger, & Paul Batchelor. Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan, MAJ Ismael Rodriguez is a 2010 graduate of the Naval (Washington: Center for a New American Security, 2010) 14. Postgraduate School Special Operation Irregular Warfare Masters degree program. He is currently in ILE at Redstone 25. Daft, 152. Arsenal and is on orders to the AF/PAK Hands Program. He 26. Ibid., 145. has deployed to Iraq with the 172nd SBCT, and has served as an intelligence planner at the ASCC and brigade level, an SBCT 27. Ibid., 152. Surveillance Troop Commander, and a battalion intelligence 28. FM 34-8 Combat Commander’s Handbook on Intelligence, 1992 offi cer for both a Field Artillery and light Infantry battalion. Front Cover. He can be contacted at [email protected].

44 Military Intelligence by Sergeant Matthew Ludwig upstart Los Zetas and their allies. The fi ghting be- tween these two factions is the reason for the cur- rent cycle of violence that has left Mexico in turmoil. The opinions expressed in this document are my own The effort to gain power and infl uence has led to an and do not represent any offi cial Department of De- fense or U.S. Government policy or position. increase in ruthless and brutal tactics. As with any confl ict, innovation breeds imitation and Mexico is Introduction no exception. Los Zetas are the driving force behind The U.S. was caught off-guard by the use of impro- the increase in brazen violence. Their consistent ef- vised explosive devices (IEDs) in both Afghanistan fort to instill fear in their enemies is driving their and Iraq. In Afghanistan, IEDs were an unexpected opponents to retaliate in kind.1 threat used by remnants of the Taliban after their The New Federation, headed by two former en- removal from power. While IEDs were expected to emies, namely the Gulf and Sinaloa Cartels, is be used by pro-Saddamist insurgents following the currently the larger of the two alliances. The Gulf invasion of Iraq, the level of sophistication achieved and Sinaloa Cartels joined forces due to the threat by groups affi liated with alternate extremist move- posed by the newer cartels. The violence propa- ments could not have been foreseen. Despite the gated by groups such as Los Zetas had destroyed lessons learned about IED use from these two con- the symbiotic relationship the cartels had previ- fl icts, the U.S. has failed to prepare itself and will ously maintained with the Mexican people and their again be caught off-guard, this time by the cartels government. The New Federation appears to receive currently causing turmoil in Mexico. Despite news less attention from the Mexican government and se- reports detailing the cartels’ use of IEDs and their curity forces than their competitors. The reasons recent transition to vehicle borne IEDs (VBIEDs), for this vary, but the prevailing theories are gov- the situation remains under-analyzed, and secu- ernment corruption and the fact that the Sinaloa rity forces are unprepared for a situation that may and Gulf Cartels are similar to the American Mafi a, involve IED use along the border. If the U.S. does as they prefer to keep their operations quiet in or- not prepare for this eventual occurrence, it will run der to draw less attention to their activities. The the risk of attempting to play catch-up again, only likely truth is that the New Federation is the lesser this time with an enemy who is harder to catch. of the two evils in the eyes of the Mexican govern- Accurate prediction as to when IED use will move ment, and the initial decision was to focus security north requires an understanding of the situation in efforts on defeating the most violent of the cartels. Mexico and the conditions and events that could Despite the New Federation’s stated intentions, prompt the use of this tactic. whether grounded in truth or not, the current vio- Warring Cartels lence spurred by Los Zetas shows no sign of lessen- The current reality in Mexico is that the govern- ing. The New Federation continues to practice the 2 ment is caught in the middle of a war between two same type of violent tactics as their rivals. groups of cartels. On one side is the New Federation, Los Zetas have a history full of twists and turns. led by the Sinaloa, La Familia, and Gulf Cartels, They were initially a group of former Mexican while on the other side is the group consisting of the Special Forces members who deserted to become

April - June 2011 45 a bodyguard and assassination unit for the Gulf Mexico. The explanations for these disasters have Cartel. After the death of Gulf Cartel leader Guzmán been ambiguous at best. PEMEX production, along Decena in 2002, Los Zetas began their own drug with its profi tability, has reportedly been crippled smuggling efforts, thereby transforming themselves by Los Zetas, and analysts worry that its fall will into a group allied with, but separate from the Gulf drag the government down.7 As the center of grav- Cartel.3 Los Zetas organization has grown in both size ity for the Mexican economy, PEMEX is not allowed and infl uence since 2003, and their vicious tactics to declare bankruptcy. If it is unable to achieve its have brought unparalleled violence to the Mexican production goals, Mexico’s fi nancial problems will drug war.4 Los Zetas turned against the Gulf Cartel be exacerbated by the loss of revenue from exports in early 2010 and have since allied themselves with and the need to import what it cannot produce.8 If the Beltran-Leyva Cartel. The Beltran-Leyva Cartel Mexico’s fragile economy collapses, it is very likely was originally formed by the Sinaloa Cartel in re- that the government would shortly follow suit, cre- sponse to Los Zetas, but the group changed sides ating the failed state that is currently feared. to work with Los Zetas in their fi ght against their Another key indication of a step towards both in- former parent organization. Los Zetas may also be surgency and blatant terrorism is the attack on ci- assisting the Juarez Cartel in their fi ght against the vilians, particularly those belonging to the news Sinaloan Cartel’s effort to seize the city of Juarez media. All of the cartels are known to retaliate and the key traffi cking corridor in the vicinity of against those who report on their activities. The in- El Paso. The Sinaloa Cartel’s aggression has pro- creasing attacks on members of the media are tak- vided Los Zetas with a prime opportunity to gain a ing their toll, and many Mexican news organizations critical ally and to undermine their adversaries in are unwilling to report on cartel activities. Los Zetas one stroke. The use of VBIEDs by the Juarez Cartel will go to great lengths to portray their alignment members is an indication that an agreement is al- as coinciding with the desires of the Mexican peo- ready in place with Los Zetas. ple, despite the destructive nature of their activi- Los Zetas and the Mexican ties. Videos showing children stating that they want Government to be members of Los Zetas are reminiscent of the various media portrayals of Arab children claiming While all the cartels routinely conduct audacious their desire to be martyrs. They are also indicative and often brutal attacks, Los Zetas appear to be on of a generation that is growing up accustomed to ex- a path that would lead them to be classifi ed as a treme violence.9 fi nancially-motivated insurgent organization rather than an international cartel. Their recent actions Los Zetas claim to give back to the communities imply that they are taking steps aimed at completely under their protection, and they hang signs and collapsing the Mexican government rather than banners declaring themselves part of Mexico’s cul- simply attempting to take advantage of its current ture.10 Any news outlets or journalists that broad- weakness. While their attacks on law enforcement cast a message counter to this are targeted for and military personnel, as well as the professional attack. This was exemplifi ed by the 27 August 2010 assassination of political fi gures, are obvious at- VBIED in Ciudad Victoria, which targeted a TV sta- tempts to increase their infl uence, other events are tion that had been reporting on the Los Zeta mur- of a more covert nature and suggest a well-thought- der of over 70 immigrants who had refused to work out effort to destabilize the Mexican government as for the cartel after traveling into the U.S.11 If allowed a whole. to continue, events such as this will perpetuate the cycle of violence and will serve to undermine any se- Los Zetas have been targeting Petróleos Mexicanos curity gains experienced in Mexico. (PEMEX), Mexico’s state-owned petroleum indus- try, which is the third largest producer of crude oil Threat of IED Attacks in the world.5 While limited to siphoning oil from The lawlessness in Mexico and its government po- pipelines in 2009, Los Zetas began kidnapping tential for collapse should not provoke the use of PEMEX employees in May 2010.6 Mysterious explo- IEDs north of the border. The use of this type of sions have frequently occurred at pumping and re- weapon falls into a cost versus gain debate for the fi ning stations throughout Zeta-controlled eastern cartels, and it is currently not worth the attention

46 Military Intelligence it would garner. However, it is a fact that these de- and Los Zetas fail in their recent bid to expand vices could serve a very practical purpose in the ef- their infl uence in Monterrey, they will face an in- fort to move drug shipments unimpeded across the creasingly desperate situation. With less traffi cking border. While it is unlikely that Sinaloa and its al- routes available for use, they will be hard-pressed to lies will turn to IED use, largely due to their effort match the growing resources of the New Federation. to avoid garnering unwanted attention, Los Zetas Their only recourse will be an attempt to do more have shown no such inclination. They appear to with less, providing a prime opportunity for IED conduct their attacks with the intent of gaining ad- use. The cost of an IED pales in comparison to the ditional exposure and to instill fear in those who re- amount of funds a successful shipment can pro- sist them. Therefore, Los Zetas are the most likely vide, and any fallout in the form of additional border group to use IEDs in the U.S., and it is not surpris- security would affect the New Federation as much ing that they are the cartel that has been the most as it would Los Zetas. As has been seen in other in- proactive in increasing the use of IEDs in Mexico. surgencies, a pressured organization commonly re- The reason Los Zetas have not begun using IEDs taliates by increasing attacks in an effort to increase north of the border is because they still have other public and political pressure on those who are tar- successful methods to traffi c drugs into the U.S., geting them. If Los Zetas fi nd themselves backed and they fear that the attention that would be into a corner, the use of IEDs would serve the dual- drawn to the border by the use of IEDs would result purpose of increasing pressure on the Mexican gov- in increased security and decreased profi ts. This ernment as well as hampering the activities of the is likely to change in the near future since border New Federation. security is currently a key issue, even without the Once any of the cartels decide to begin using IEDs, use of IEDs. As systems such as the Secure Border the time between order and action is likely to be Initiative Network (SBInet) are emplaced along the very short because the infrastructure necessary to border, traffi cking will become increasingly diffi cult, build the devices and to conduct the attacks already and the likelihood of apprehension for traffi ckers exists. Spotters, whose only job is to monitor the 12 will become extremely high. In addition, the in- U.S. Border Patrol movements, are actively assist- creased use of National Guard Forces on the border ing traffi ckers, and the transition from solely watch- to supplement the increasing numbers of Border ing patrols to executing attacks would likely be very Patrol agents will provide the manpower necessary quick. The intent to injure or interdict Border Patrol to respond to the alerts given by the newly emplaced agents is already present, as exemplifi ed by the systems. As Los Zetas and their associates face an occurrence of barbed wire being stretched across increasingly diffi cult smuggling environment, the patrol routes and sharp objects being placed on fear of increased attention and border security as a footpaths. Drug mules face varying threats if they result of IED use may become a non-issue. return home without delivering their product, and In addition to the threat of increased border se- they will carry and use weapons in order to defend curity, a second factor may hold the potential to their product. IED use is the logical next step as the force Los Zetas toward IED proliferation. The New traffi ckers will have to adopt new measures to dis- Federation led by Sinaloa is not only the largest al- rupt Border Patrol operations as their likelihood of liance of cartels, but it frequently declares its desire capture increases. to eliminate Los Zetas due to their increasingly un- The cartels already contain many former engi- 13 orthodox and casualty-producing tactics. In addi- neers and miners who are experienced in the use of tion, the government has focused its attention on explosives, and they could easily transition into IED Los Zetas and their allies, with the Beltran-Leyva builders. TOVEX, a water-gel explosive that was re- Cartel suffering the most from the recent capture of leased by E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company 14 multiple high-ranking leaders. (DUPONT) as a replacement for dynamite, is prolifi c While Los Zetas are currently holding their own, in Mexico and has been found in both caches and they are beginning to show signs of weakening due IEDs throughout the country.15 Despite the rugged- to the constant attrition of their personnel and re- ness of the border, many areas have a stable cellu- sources. If Sinaloa completes its takeover of Juarez lar network, thus allowing spotters to detonate the

April - June 2011 47 device from a distance without exposing themselves early attempts to employ IEDs, they will be much to capture. Since not all IEDs are emplaced on road- less willing to spend the time and money to ad- ways, it is likely that alternate tactics that are used vance their devices and to overcome any counter- in Mexico, such as placing the device next to a body, measures. However, if the cartels experience early would also be employed. Cartel members know that success due to a lack of preparation on the part of security forces will have to react to this discovery, the U.S., they will have the opportunity and moti- making a successful strike all but certain.16 vation to build upon their experiences, and to ad- The emplacement of an IED inside a drug bundle just their tactics and upgrade their devices, as any is also a likely scenario. The Border Patrol is known countermeasures are likely to arrive piecemeal. If to simply stack these bundles together and to move early IED attacks by the cartels succeed, this kind them into a warehouse or holding area after they of tactic will be perceived as cost-effective, and will are found which provides numerous opportunities turn what might have been a short-term threat into for a casualty-infl icting remote detonation. a long-term one. In addition, the cartels have the po- tential to create more sophisticated de- vices than those that have been seen in either Iraq or Afghanistan. They have the luxury of learning from these insur- gencies since the methodologies learned by those who participated in fi ghting U.S. forces are widely available on the Internet. The cartels have greater fi nan- cial capabilities than the threat groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, and they have the money to construct devices that use technologies that cannot currently be defeated. The cartels would also have a distinctly different target set, as the Border Patrol is a paramilitary force that is not trained in or equipped for CIED (counter- Protective Measures against Potential IED) operations. The cartels would likely outpace IED Threat current CIED efforts and capabilities very quickly, A critical measure that must be implemented and the U.S. would fi nd itself at a serious disadvan- is the addition of various cartels to the Declared tage in a short time period. Terrorist Organizations list that is maintained by In reference to the threat of IED proliferation, the the U.S. State Department. This list currently con- intelligence community has been limited to reac- tains no groups related to Mexico’s violence, despite tive rather than proactive measures, and the situ- these groups meeting all the necessary criteria, as ation along the southern U.S. border is shaping up they are an obvious threat to both U.S. citizens and to become a scenario that will be similar to what interests.17 The parallels between the cartels and has been seen in the past. The only thing currently other groups already on the list are readily identifi - preventing the use of IEDs along the border is an able, particularly since some of their more heinous unsteady decision by the cartels. Appropriate mea- acts of beheading, assassination, and mutilation sures must be in place and concrete steps must be are identical in nature. taken to diminish any potential gain that could be Adding these groups to the Declared Terrorist obtained from IED use if the U.S. is to avert this Organizations list would open new avenues for the threat. prosecution of individuals associated with these or- The reason IEDs are employed is because they ganizations and would provide a secondary bene- are easy to use, effective and relatively inexpensive. fi t of encouraging detained cartel members to work If the cartels suffer more loss than gain from their against their former comrades due to the threat of

48 Military Intelligence long prison sentences. Offi cially declaring the car- ble of detecting explosive residue are widely avail- tels as terrorists allows for the freezing of business able and can be used in a variety of practical ways. and organization assets known to be associated with Any attempt to have counter remote-controlled IED these activities. This would provide agencies such (RCIED) electronic warfare (CREW) systems placed as the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and on Border Patrol vehicles on a large scale is unlikely the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) due to both cost and high frequency of clearance more opportunities to target those responsible for issues involving the Federal Aviation Agency and working with the cartels to provide the counterfl ow Federal Communications Commission. However, a of money, weapons, and supplies into Mexico from plan to have few vehicles per sector equipped with the U.S.. These pipelines remain a primary con- CREW devices for limited use only during suspected cern since 36 percent of the illegal weapons found IED threats would likely be authorized and would in Mexico in 2008 were sent to the ATF for tracing meet budget constraints. As there is a large pool and 90 percent of these weapons were found to have of professionals who have vast experience in deal- originated in the U.S.18 Security agencies would ing with IED attacks, an effective training program have a greater case when seeking more resources would be easy to implement and would be low cost to combat these groups since working against a de- if combined with existing programs. clared terrorist organization makes for greater justi- Intelligent procedures must be implemented so fi cation when requesting the allocation of additional that the cartels lose far more than they gain from resources. conducting these attacks. This will also ensure The intelligence community must signifi cantly im- that these threats have limited duration. The pri- prove its interagency sharing of information that mary intent of an attack will be to draw Border already exists, as the individuals and networks be- Patrol agents away from their duties to respond to a ing hunted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, situation thus opening the way for traffi ckers. It will DEA, and the ATF, for their smuggling activities be much easier for Border Patrol agents to main- would also be the ones responsible for any IED use. tain their assignments if they know that the situa- The information on these individuals and networks tion is being handled effectively, rather than being must be shared between these organizations and caught off-guard with no set of tested procedures in with the Border Patrol in order to hasten any poten- place for emergency response. Training for an IED tial incident interdiction and response once an IED event in advance will result in reaction based on es- event occurs. Cooperation and liaison with Mexican tablished procedures rather than on hesitation and authorities to jointly target individuals associated will result in a manageable situation rather than a with the current IED use in Mexico must increase, crisis situation. The secondary motivation for these as this will degrade the current and future capabili- attacks is to instill fear and caution into Border ties of the cartels. Information sharing with Mexico Patrol agents and to slow their response due to the will provide the groundwork required to understand real or perceived threat of an IED. Proper training and defeat the cartel networks responsible for opera- that involves IED recognition and reaction proce- tions north of the border. Using the time available to dures, along with the availability and presence of obtain fi ngerprints of builders, to establish building countermeasures, will undermine this more sub- styles, and to identify the more experienced build- tle effect, which is the intent of current IED use in ers will ensure a quick, precise, and decisive action Mexico. following any IED event. These, and other forensic Conclusion measures, will prove critical in defeating IED net- As the saying goes, the intelligence community works in Iraq and Afghanistan, and bringing them must stay left of boom, and the opportunity to do into play now will greatly enhance the targeting ca- this is slowly slipping away as this threat draws ever pabilities of the U.S. and Mexico. nearer. Rather than wait until the situation gets out New tools and training regarding this threat must of control, security services must prepare now to also be given to the Border Patrol and regional law ensure that any attempt to exploit the border using enforcement organizations, as they are the most IEDs is short. The U.S. has learned numerous les- likely targets of any attack. Various sprays capa- sons in regard to IED use due to its experiences in

April - June 2011 49 Iraq and Afghanistan. None of these lessons, how- 9. John Murray, “Ciudad Juarez: War against Los Zetas, Along the ever, are being used on the border. The longer this Gulf and Into America,” The AWL, 22 April 2010, retrieved at http:// www.theawl.com/2010/04/ciudad-juarez-war-against-los-zetas- threat is ignored, the more devastating its effects along-the-gulf-and-into-america. will be once attacks occur. The U.S. has willingly 10. Martin Barillas, “Is Mexico on the Verge of Collapse?” Spero ceded the initiative, and its inaction has provided News, 9 February 2009, retrieved at http://www.speroforum. the cartels an opportunity to implement explosive com/a/18087/Is-Mexico-on-the-verge-of-collapse. devices whenever they so desire. As conditions in- 11. E. Eduardo Castillo, “Car bomb Damages Mexico TV Building,” side Mexico and along the border change; and as it The Washington Post, 28 August 2010, retrieved at http://www. becomes more worthwhile to risk reaction to IEDs, washingtontimes.com/news/2010/aug/27/car-bomb-damages- mexico-tv-building/. the attacks will begin. If the U.S. undertakes a quick and comprehensive strategy now, it still has an op- 12. Border Patrol Announcement. SBInet, 2009, retrieved at http:// www.cbp.gov/xp/ cgov/border_security/sbi/sbi_net/. portunity to both prepare for and eventually negate its effectiveness. 13. Jen Phillips, “Mexico’s New Super-Cartel Ups Violence in Power Play,” Mother Jones, 13 April 2010, retrieved at http://motherjones. com/mojo/2010/04/evolution-mexicos-cartel-war. 14. Earl Cebedo, “Alleged drug cartel leader in Mexico, arrested,” All Voices, 12 September 2010, retrieved at http://www.allvoices.com/ contributed-news/6741041-alleged-drug-cartel-leader-in-mexico- arrested 15. Alicia A. Caldwell, “US Offi cial: Industrial Explosive Tovex Likely Used in Car Bomb Attack Against Mexican Police,” The Associated Press, 19 July, 2010, retrieved at http://www.news1130.com/ news/world/article/79260--us-offi cial-industrial-explosive-tovex- likely-used-in-car-bomb-attack-against-mexican-police. 16. Oscar Villalba, “Massacre in Mexico: 17 killed at party,” The Associated Press, 8 July 2010, retrieved at http://www.wfaa.com/ news/world/Massacre-in-Mexico-17-killed-at-party-98705879. html. 17. Offi ce of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Foreign Terrorist Endnotes Organization, 6 August 2010, retrieved at http://www.state.gov/s/ ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm. 1. Kimberly Dvorak, “Los Zetas Drug Cartel Seizes 2 U.S. Ranches 18. William La Jeunesse and Maxim Lott, “The Myth of 90 Percent: in Texas,” The Examiner, 24 July 2010, retrieved at http://www. Only a Small Fraction of Guns in Mexico Come from U.S.,” Fox examiner.com/county-political-buzz-in-san-diego/los-Zetas-drug- News, 2 April 2009, retrieved at http://www.foxnews.com/ cartel-seizes-2-u-s-ranches-texas. politics/2009/04/02/myth-percent-small-fraction-guns-mexico- 2. George W. Grayson, “Mexico and the Drug Cartels,” Foreign Policy come/. Research Institute, August 2007, retrieved at http://www.fpri.org/ enotes/200708.grayson.mexicodrugcartels.html. Works Cited

3. Samuel Logan, “Los Zetas: Evolution of a Criminal Organization,” Ganor, Boaz. The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle: A Guide for Decision ISN Security Watch, 11 March 2009, retrieved at http://www.isn.ethz. Makers. (NJ: Transaction Publishing, New Brunswick, 2008). ch/isn/CurrentAffairs/SecurityWatch/Detail/?id=97554&lng=en. Walsh, Mark. “Explosion at Pemex refi nery kills 1 in Mexico,” The 4. Ibid. Associated Press, 8 retrieved at September 2010, retrieved at http:// www.760kfmb.com/Global/story.asp?S=13111843. 5. Robert Campbell, “Drug War Puts Mexican Oil Industry on Defensive,” Reuters, 4 August 2010, retrieved at http://www. reuters.com/article/idUSN0417574420100804.

6. Tracy Wilkinson, “Mexican Drug Cartels Cripple Pemex Operations in Basin,” Los Angeles Times, 6 September 2010, retrieved at http://articles.latimes.com/2010/sep/06/world/la-fg-mexico- Sergeant Ludwig has deployed twice in support of OIF, in pemex-20100906. 2006-2008 with the 1st Cavalry Division G2 assigned as the 7. Ibid. Al Qaeda in Iraq High-Value Individual Targeting Analyst and in 2009, again with 1CD as the Lead AQI and Sunni Insurgent 8. Matt Badiali, “One of the World’s Biggest Oil Producers Is Going Bust,” Daily Wealth, 10 April 2010, retrieved at http://www. Analyst until the Division redeployed in 2010. He is currently dailywealth.com/1323/One-of-the-World-s-Biggest-Oil-Producers- assigned to the CIED Branch of the Intelligence Electronic Is-Going-Bust. Warfare Test Directorate at Fort Huachuca, Arizona.

50 Military Intelligence by First Lieutenant Nathaniel L. Moir

Introduction tional impact of CIVCAS in the public’s perception It is an oft-quoted truism that “Intelligence drives at both local, and potentially, international levels. Operations,” as the Intelligence Section is respon- CIVCAS–Why it is Important, Why it is sible for the preparation and assessment of the bat- a Problem tlefi eld. However, many Intelligence sections do not always fully utilize enablers in shaping and assess- The issue of civilian casualties continues to be a ing the battlefi eld environment as it relates to pre- major issue during OEF and directly impacts the venting and mitigating civilian casualties (CIVCAS). effectiveness and legitimacy of the International This may lead to an incomplete assessment of the Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission. Therefore, battlefi eld which potentially weakens the preven- the importance of preventing, and quickly respond- tion of CIVCAS. What, then, is the role of Military ing to CIVCAS in the battlespace, whether caused Intelligence (MI) as it relates to CIVCAS incident by insurgents or Coalition Forces (CF), is critical. prevention and mitigation and why is it important? In this regard, CIVCAS has important operational implications for the local base of support for the The issue of CIVCAS is addressed in this arti- CF. Insurgents seek to manipulate incidents of cle along two main themes. The fi rst regards sup- CF-caused CIVCAS. They further blame the CF of port that may be provided in preventing CIVCAS. CIVCAS that insurgents themselves have uninten- This is examined by looking at how force ‘enablers’ tionally caused and, in many cases, intentionally may contribute to Intelligence Preparation of the caused for the explicit purpose of weakening sup- Battlefi eld (IPB) as a tool in mapping human ter- port for the ISAF’s mission. rain more extensively. Increased use of enablers is Due to the speed and ease of communications also discussed as a way to increase population-cen- technology, reports of CIVCAS may be broadcast tric approaches to counterinsurgency (COIN) opera- internationally. This factor is manipulated by in- tions such as Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). surgents to decrease support for Coalition and the Population-centric approaches, versus enemy-cen- Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan’s tric approaches, are keys to more effective preven- efforts in courts of public opinion. CIVCAS, thus, is tion of CIVCAS and this may be achieved through an ostensible strategic concern; its prevention and greater inclusion of enablers into the IPB process. mitigation should be a priority for battlespace own- The second theme of the paper addresses the mit- ers from squad leaders and up the chain of com- igation and control of CIVCAS when it does occur. mand. Unfortunately, Intelligence Sections are This focuses on how intelligence sections, through not fully utilized in efforts to prevent and mitigate use of enablers and Information Operations (IO), CIVCAS. All too often, S2 Sections demonstrate an may more effectively assist in lessening the opera- overall enemy-centric focus.

April - June 2011 51 This, of course, is Intelligence’s modus operandi Intelligence can better adapt to COIN however, but all operational approaches must be consistently by adding substantive augmentation and greater refi ned and adapted to the confl ict at hand. This is population-centric assistance as it relates to the not to suggest that targeting and destroying the en- prevention and mitigation of CIVCAS. Including emy effectively should be shortchanged or under-re- enablers such as Human Terrain Teams (HTTs), sourced in any way. Finding, fi xing, and destroying Psychological Operations (PSYOP), Red Teams, and the enemy is absolutely critical to achieving security Civil Affairs (CA) provides such augmentation for in an area of operations (AO). The scope here how- developing more population-centric IPB. Perhaps ever, is preventing and mitigating CIVCAS. Gaining paradoxically (but not surprisingly), most of these local support for operations entails support for mul- enablers are not organic to brigades which may ex- tiple lines of operations to include governance, and plain why Intelligence, Operations, and Planning development, not just security. Regarding COIN, Sections (which are organic to brigades) are hesi- population-centric efforts remain the preferred ap- tant, slow, or even refuse to incorporate enablers proach to achieving long-term success as multiple into their operations. historical case studies indicate.1 Even within brigades, some battalions will be very receptive to ‘outside’ organizations while oth- ers may not. Ultimately it depends on the unit. However, until maneuver elements plan and direct population-centric op- erations, and thus direct Intelligence Sections to increase its focus on the population rather than solely on the enemy, COIN will continue to challenge the U.S. military’s abil- ity to achieve the results it seeks. Such a “shift” in approach is a paradigm change with many chal- lenges that authors such as John Nagl and David Whether a maneuver unit is enemy-centric or pop- Kilcullen have cogently discussed at great length.3 ulation-centric is demonstrated by the operations it conducts. In the case of enemy-centric operations, Prevention of CIVCAS–Mapping Human the obvious and inherent focus is the enemy and its Terrain courses of action (COAs). The army is traditionally Increasing the communication channels between enemy focused so the process of IPB is inherently S2 sections, HTTs, Red Teams, CA Teams, PSYOP enemy-centric. In the case of OEF, enemy-centric Teams, along with other enablers, is a key factor in approaches have caused the U.S. Intelligence com- making Intelligence Sections more relevant in the munity to conduct an anti-insurgency campaign prevention and mitigation of CIVCAS. An example rather than a COIN campaign. As one source states, is in order to highlight this issue. The Field Artillery “Anti-insurgent efforts are, in fact, a secondary task is one of the most lethal capabilities within the U.S. when compared to gaining and exploiting knowl- Army; it is critical to emphasize the importance of edge about the localized contexts of operation and ground clearance of fi res. One way to achieve this is the distinctions between the Taliban and the rest of by utilizing Collateral Damage Estimation method- the Afghan population.”2 ology. This process is already in place for lethal en-

52 Military Intelligence gagements but could potentially be used every time CIVCAS is caused by insurgents, communicating a lanyard is pulled to include ground clearance. the occurrence to the local population more appro- This is relevant because indirect fi re is a primary priately falls within the IO (S7) lane. However, S2 source of CIVCAS. However, while all CF-caused sections, and potential population-centric Fusion CIVCAS is unintentional, the source of CF-caused Cells, are relevant and provide critical support to CIVCAS is irrelevant. shaping the Information Environment. Regarding improvised explosive devices (IEDs), for Mitigation of CIVCAS–The Information example, local nationals still hold CF accountable Environment for having failed to protect them. A commonly stated S7 staff sections cannot work in a vacuum. To argument by Afghans is, to paraphrase, “Insurgents more accurately and quickly address CIVCAS, S7 wouldn’t plant IEDs if the CF weren’t present.” The sections should proactively assist in contributing CF are regularly put into such paradoxical situa- to the population-centric elements of IPB that S2 tions regarding CIVCAS in the public’s perception. staffs develop. Naturally, this entails S2 sections Direct fi re, and especially indirect fi re, however, seeking and accepting S7 sections’ contributions. may be potentially prevented, and certainly miti- CIVCAS preventive steps, as clearly articulated gated with more success, through a greater under- steps within the IPB process, could be a reference standing of the human terrain in AOs through Open that demonstrates measures in place to prevent Source Intelligence and greater input from enablers. CIVCAS. Further, these steps could be referenced, Population-centric approaches to successful in an unclassifi ed format, as insurance when COIN operations are imperative. To be success- CIVCAS incidents still occur that CF did everything ful with more population-centric approaches, S2 possible to prevent. When CIVCAS does occur, effi - Sections must allocate more analysis of the civil- cient mitigation of its negative consequences in the ian environment rather than allocating its attention Information Environment has a signifi cant impact solely on the enemy. Clearly, this would require a on mission success at tactical, operational, and po- major shift in priorities but one that is necessary tentially strategic levels. This is especially true in for conventional forces to truly address counterin- COIN where success is measured by local nation- surgencies successfully. As it is noted in the paper, als’ confi dence in counterinsurgent forces’ efforts. Fixing Intel, co-authored by Major General Flynn, Failure to successfully mitigate authentic CIVCAS a “vast and underappreciated body of information, incidents at the tactical level may have operational almost all of which is unclassifi ed, admittedly of- and strategic consequences. Therefore, S7 sec- fers few clues about where to fi nd insurgents, but tions, which synthesize multiple enablers such as provides information of even greater strategic im- PSYOP, Public Affairs, Combat Camera, and may portance: a map for leveraging popular support and include HTTs and Red Team depending on the bri- marginalizing the insurgency itself.”4 Reducing CF- gade combat team, should be more directly part- caused CIVCAS, and communicating the fact that nered with Intel Sections regarding assessment and insurgents are the primary cause of CIVCAS, is pos- IPB development. sibly one of the most powerful tools to successfully For example, IPB development may be affected conduct COIN that the CF can further refi ne. One by nomadic populations that enter an AO as part possible solution, as discussed earlier, is to bring of seasonal migrations; the Kuchi Tribe in Eastern enablers and analysis of human terrain together for Afghanistan is one such example, possible infl uxes more effective and relevant IPB. This could also be of refugees into an AO is another. However, under- accomplished by an extended Fusion Cell Structure standing human terrain is more than knowing sim- that incorporates and applies more population-cen- ple facts of where people reside. A possible COA, and tric analysis to operational planning. one discussed earlier, is utilizing Intelligence that Due to the importance of gaining Afghan local supports specifi c efforts made to prevent CIVCAS nationals’ confi dence and support, MI has an im- (for example, as part of pre-operations check-lists portant role in preventing and controlling the nega- similar to Karzai’s 12). Just as Most Likely COA and tive effects of CIVCAS when caused by CF. When Most Dangerous COA are articulated, clearly de-

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4PMVUJPOT enemy. In counterinsurgencies, lack or loss of popular support for counterin- Prescriptive Solutions surgents is arguably as much of an en- emy, possibly more, than insurgents themselves. Preventing and effi ciently Conclusion mitigating CIVCAS is a cornerstone to fi ghting both Civilian casualties will happen in war. However, enemies effectively. any mistake in this area is inexcusable to the ma- jority of local nationals. It thus begs the question: Is Endnotes any potential CIVCAS worth the operational risk of 1. David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerilla: Fighting Smalls Wars in losing local national trust or confi dence? In coun- the Midst of a Big One (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). terinsurgencies, such as OEF, CIVCAS typifi es tac- tical incidents that have strategic repercussions. 2. Major General Michael T. Flynn, Captain Matt Pottinger, and Paul D. Batchelor, “Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence As one source states, “one of the peculiarities of Relevant in Afghanistan” Center for a New American Security guerrilla warfare is that tactical-level information is (Washington D.C., January 2010) 23. laden with strategic signifi cance far more than in 3. Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerilla and John Nagl, Learning to East conventional confl icts.”5 Conventional IPB and cur- Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and rent approaches to preventing CIVCAS can always Vietnam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005). be more effective. To achieve this, population-cen- 4. Flynn, 7. tric approaches to IPB and greater synchronization 5. Ibid., 11. between IO Cells and S2 Sections is necessary. This may happen through greater inclusion of non-tra- ditional ‘enabler’ assets into IPB: HTT, CA Teams, 1LT Nathaniel L. Moir is a PSYOP Detachment Commander who recently completed a deployment to Afghanistan in sup- PSYOP Teams, and, overall, an increased focus on port of 1BCT, 101st Airborne Division (AASLT) for OEF XI. He and analysis of human terrain. is branch qualifi ed as a Military Intelligence Offi cer and has In conclusion, CIVCAS must be effectively pre- an ASI in Tactical Information Operations. His parent com- vented and mitigated in order to gain the trust of pany is the 319th PSYOP Company..

54 Military Intelligence by Major Thomas Handy

Editor’s Note: HUMINT team numbers have been Teams (MiTT). HCT 356 partnered by, with, and changed to preserve the sensitivity of the teams and through Iraqi forces as they supported 10th Iraqi members. Army (IA) MiTT under the direction of 4/1 BCT from Fort Hood, Texas. Within a year, the HCT was able Introduction to gain intelligence from the 10th IA Division and the The country of Iraq went through tremendous local Iraqi Police (IP) intelligence sections to gather changes in 2009 with the implementation of the information to answer the battlefi eld commander’s security agreement. One U.S. Army unit in partic- priority intelligence requirements and the lines of ular witnessed these changes fi rst hand. Charlie operation. Company, 303rd Military Intelligence Battalion, 504th Battlefi eld Surveillance Brigade (BfSB), based During the course of the year, several other HCTs out of Fort Hood, Texas, deployed to southern Iraq in theater also partnered with Iraqi Forces in lo- in the fall of 2008 to provide Human Intelligence cating weapon caches and deterring rocket attacks (HUMINT) in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. on U.S. and Iraqi installations. This new partner- Charlie Company’s HUMINT Collection Teams, ship drastically improved the intelligence collec- (HCTs) composed of three to four personnel, pro- tion and analysis capability of Iraqi forces. FM vided direct support to four brigade combat teams 3-24, Counterinsurgency, states “even in situations (BCT) in southern Iraq. During this critical period of where the U.S. goal is reducing its military force the war, the U.S.-Iraqi security agreement provided levels as quickly as possible, some support for HN more authority to the Iraq military. U.S. forces institutions usually remains for a long time.”1 The needed to minimize this change while still provid- overall intent of the HCT and Iraqi partnership was ing intelligence to support battlefi eld commanders. for Iraqi forces to increase their capacity building as they provided their own intelligence, while U.S. Iraqi intelligence receives training from the Taji forces begin to draw down in Iraq. Academy where basic Military Intelligence is taught. To further Iraqi’s intelligence education, Charlie FM 3-24 served as a basis for this partnership. Company was given the mission to validate a proof The framework for this discussion is described in of concept to partner with U.S. Military Transition the manual:

April - June 2011 55 Insurgencies are protracted by nature. Thus, the use of GPS, map reading, and basic question- COIN operations always demand considerable ing techniques. This training foundation gave the expenditures of time and resources. The populace Iraqis the confi dence to use these enablers in their may prefer the HN government to the insurgents; daily operations and prove their ability to the Iraqi however, people do not actively support a government unless they are convinced that populace. the counterinsurgents have the means, ability, stamina, and will to win. The insurgents’ primary battle is against the HN government, not the United States; however, U.S. support can be crucial to building public faith in that government’s viability. The populace must have confidence in the staying power of both the counterinsurgents and the HN government. Insurgents and local populations often believe that a few casualties or a few years will cause the U.S. to abandon a COIN effort. Constant reaffirmations of commitment, backed by deeds, can overcome that perception and bolster faith in the steadfastness of U.S. support. But even the strongest U.S. commitment will not succeed if the populace does not perceive the HN government as having similar will and stamina. U.S. forces must help create that capacity and sustain that Establishing an Iraqi partnership is not as easy as impression.2 it sounds. The Iraqi unit must be willing to engage The Iraqi Partnership Program in the partnership program. This may require sev- As the security conditions in Iraq changed, the lo- eral informal agreements between the U.S. and Iraqi cal populace needed to see the Iraqi face on military military prior to formally establishing the partner- operations as the Iraqi Security Force (ISF) defend- ship program. There are also several external fac- ing their country. This capacity building provided an tors necessary for the partnership to be successful. assurance that the country would be in the capable First, the HCTs supported unit has to be willing to hands of the ISF as they carried out the operations. support the HCT and align it with an Iraqi unit for To ensure this transfer of authority was complete, the partnership to begin. The HCT may have the the ISF needed to adopt some U.S. methods to en- experience to begin the partnership immediately, sure they could capably assume the mission given but without the unit’s support, the HCT and Iraqi the withdrawal of U.S. forces. The HCT proof of con- partnership will be ineffective. Also, the supported cept was the critical link to ensure the intelligence unit has to provide the logistical resources for the process would develop and provide the framework HCT to establish operations since the team is not for Iraqi forces in future military operations. an organic asset to the BCT. The HCT brings ba- sic requirements such as computers, printers, and In early January, HCT 356 began the process to intelligence equipment but basic necessities such partner with the 10th IA Division MiTT. HCT 356 as offi ce space, lodging, and meeting rooms are still conducted training with their IA and IP counterparts needed to conduct operations. The supported unit over the course of the year. Team members trained needs to provide the logistical support for the HCT the Iraqis on tasks such as tactical questioning, evi- to be effective so they can concentrate on establish- dence collection, gathering sworn statements, and ing the intelligence partnership program. the warrant process to detain suspected persons. As part of the security agreement, the Iraqi warrant Once the ISF was prepared to conduct operations, process had to be explained to the IA and IP so they they demonstrated that they can locate indicators of could understand the process U.S. forces used to impending attacks as well as weapon caches. With detain suspected persons. The HCT led the Iraqis the assistance of HCT 098 and the supported unit, through a crawl, walk, and run training plan to en- 172nd BCT, the IA identifi ed over twelve weapon sure the lessons were accurately retained. Other caches. The items found were improvised explosive HCTs who partnered with Iraqis taught classes on device components and rockets that were planned

56 Military Intelligence for use in future attacks. This partnership saved an Endnotes unknown number of lives. 1. FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, 2006, 1-134. Conclusion 2. Ibid. The partnership program is a valid concept that Major Tom Handy is the former Company Commander for C was implemented as U.S. forces began to draw Co, 303rd MI Battalion, 504th BfSB during OIF 09-11. Currently down in Iraq, paving the way for the future. The he is the 162nd Infantry Brigade S2 as the senior intelligence Iraqi forces continue to partner with HCTs with ef- offi cer advising the Foreign Security Forces Combat Advisor fective results. Still, more learning is required for for units deploying to OEF and OND. He holds a BA in Iraqi forces but they are on the right path and will Political Science from Norwich University and an MA in Public continue to improve over time. The same concept Administration from Central Michigan University. Previous th can be utilized in Afghanistan when certain condi- assignments include Current Operations Offi cer, 504 BfSB, 504th MI Bde Planner in OIF; J2, Joint Logistics Command in tions are met and the Afghanistan National Army is OEF; S2, 2-35th Infantry BN; AS2 1-27th Infantry BN, and DISE prepared to conduct operations on its own with lim- Platoon Leader, 532nd MI BN. Major Handy can be contacted ited assistance. at [email protected].

April - June 2011 57 by First Lieutenant Tyler Jost

In 1994, a group of relatively unknown Afghan stu- Hiding themselves in two tarpaulin-covered Hino dents based in southwestern Pakistan, and now trucks and reportedly paying off forty-two high- commonly known as the Taliban, began a campaign way checkpoints along the way, Taliban drivers to oust the Burhanuddin Rabbani regime in Kabul. under the command of Mullah Omar and Mullah This article examines the Taliban’s fi rst military en- Borjan transported the fi ghters to the depot unde- gagements in the battle for Kandahar Province and tected, took enemy commander Mullah Akhtar Jan the ways in which the Taliban tailored their strategy by surprise and quickly secured the area.2 In cap- to fi t the political realities in which they operated. In turing the depot, the Taliban gained approximately doing so, it argues that the kinetic aspects of the op- 18,000 Kalashnikovs, dozens of artillery pieces, and eration are necessary but insuffi cient to understand hundreds of thousands of rounds of ammunition.3 military outcomes. The non-kinetic components of More importantly, the victory lent credibility to the Taliban operations played an equally, if not more, Taliban movement vis-à-vis the array of competing signifi cant role in securing the Taliban’s victory. warlord networks.4 The fi rst documented kinetic operation began The second major operation came in early on 12 October 1994. A group of Taliban militants November, after a local warlord named Mansur raided a Hizb-i Islami arms depot, which was lo- Achakzai stopped a Pakistani military convoy con- cated fi fteen kilometers north of Spin Boldak (See taining thirty vehicles loaded with medicine, con- Figure 1) and was operated by the political-military sumer goods and foodstuffs. The convoy was network under Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.1 detained near Takht-e Pul (See Figure 1) in hopes of exacting political concessions from Islamabad. Mansur and two other Kandahar commanders–Amir Lalai and Ustaz Haleem–sought two outcomes: To tax Pakistani trade transiting through Kandahar, and to end Pakistani support for the Taliban move- ment.5 On 3 November, Taliban commander Mullah Borjan led two hundred followers in assaulting and defeating forces detaining the convoy. In the following days, Mullah Omar and Mullah Borjan, although outnumbered, initiated a fi nal ma- neuver to secure the provincial capital. According to one former Pakistani military offi cer, government forces under General Naqib consisted of “2,500 troops, 120 tanks, 80 to 90 artillery pieces, six MiG-21 fi ghter aircraft, and six Mi-8 helicopters.”6 Figure 1. Taliban Activity in the Battle of Kandahar However, Taliban leaders successfully co-opted

58 Military Intelligence Naqib. In fact, one recently released fi rst-hand ac- one source estimated that 1,600 offi cers from the count from a former Taliban fi ghter refers to Naqib People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) re- not as “general,” but as “mullah.” That is, the gime were serving with the Taliban by 1995.10 Taliban radically redefi ned battlefi eld force distri- It is worth asking why the Taliban succeeded in 7 bution by turning potential adversaries into allies. network mobilization, as opposed to their competi- Moreover, while Naqib may have been the most tors.11 As Abdulkader Sinno describes, one impor- powerful warlord that the Taliban co-opted, he tant reason was the Taliban’s understanding of certainly was not the only one. The Taliban devel- human geography, which informed their decisions oped numerous relationships with other Kandahar on which approach (co-option, repudiation, or as- strongmen, including Keshkinakhud administrator sassination) to utilize with adversary commanders Hajji Bashar and Argestan religious leader Mullah (See Figure 2).12 In particular, Taliban leaders often Rabbani Akhund.8 Indeed, the decisive victory in engaged subordinates of a targeted leader fi rst in Kandahar seems to have come–not on the battle- order to undermine his power base, before subse- fi eld–but during a meeting in Panjwayi, in which quently offering the leader the choice of disbanding six Taliban leaders forged an informal agreement to his militia, joining the Taliban organization, or fac- coordinate efforts against the last remaining war- ing lethal persecution.13 lord, Ustaz Abdul Haleem. After the removal of Ustaz, the Taliban quickly gained control of the capital, with only a minimal number of governor Gul Agha Sherzai’s troops resisting.9 The Taliban’s ability to mo- bilize previously existing po- litical-military networks in order to alter battlefi eld dy- namics highlights a broader trend in their campaign to control Afghanistan. Indeed, Figure 2. Taliban Networking Operations14 the Taliban established a unique set of tactics, techniques and procedures In addition, Taliban identity itself increased per- that differed signifi cantly from the mujahedeen era suasive effi cacy. In Afghanistan, tribe, ethnicity, hit-and-run tactics. Instead of relying on insurgent and clan (qawm) infl uence identity far more than in advantages in guerilla warfare, the Taliban adopted Western nations.15 As such, many of the failures of a dynamic, mobile, and aggressive operational Afghan state modernization can be traced back to tempo. organic preferences for local autonomy and tradi- tional power structures that oppose a central state.16 While Taliban propaganda suggests that success Yet, the Taliban were not commonly associated with in employing such tactics stemmed from the move- such state centralization efforts, as Taliban did not ment’s popular support and Taliban combatants’ share the anti-tribal, urbanite background com- ideological zeal, Anthony Davis argues that Taliban monly associated with political leaders seeking to profi ciency in mobile warfare instead resulted from revolutionize Afghan society, such as rival Pashtun successfully integrating networks of former soldiers, warlord Hekmatyar.17 On the contrary, the Taliban who had been trained during the Soviet occupation marketed themselves as a neutral party capable of in the employment of air, artillery, mortar and ar- restoring justice and order in a country plagued by mor assets. The most notable of these networks was warlord exploitation and brutality. that of Defense Minister General Shahnawaz Tanai, who mobilized and persuaded former colleagues Finally, Taliban networks enjoyed support outside to assist in Taliban military operations. In fact, Afghan borders, most notably in the Pakistani Inter

April - June 2011 59 Services Intelligence (ISI), the organization that had tion, as foreign advisors will never be able to match previously coordinated mujahedeen resistance to the Taliban’s understanding of human geography. the Soviet occupation.18 These connections sub- The Afghan National Army (ANA) may prove more stantially shaped operations in Kandahar. One re- adept, but even they will face challenges, as most port indicates that Pakistan provided indirect fi re ANA soldiers deploy to locations outside their native support during the Spin Boldak raid. Pakistan also province.22 At the same time, the Taliban has gradu- provided logistical assistance. In the fi nal assault ally lost its reputation as a neutral and just gover- on Kandahar City, Taliban combatants were report- nor in many parts of the country.23 This presents edly armed with new weapons, supplied through an opportunity for ISAF to leverage popular discon- Pakistani channels.19 In addition to military assets, tent in order to solicit intelligence that facilitates Pakistan provided political and fi nancial support. network mapping in exchange for security and so- For example, Colonel Imam, the Pakistani ISI repre- cio-economic assistance. As stated in Major General sentative in Afghanistan at the time, reportedly as- Michael Flynn’s recent report on intelligence in sisted in securing Naqib’s cooperation through a 1.5 Afghanistan, the key is to focus on the non-lethal million USD bribe.20 elements–including network manipulation–rather The Taliban’s ability to shape the battlefi eld than massing resources to plan the next “kill-or- 24 through managing political-military networks be- capture” mission. fore kinetic operations commenced proved an over- whelming advantage against a clearly divided group of self-interested warlords. Such insights might help inform modern International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operations in Afghanistan. While his- Endnotes torical comparisons must be drawn cautiously, co-opting political-military networks represents a 1. Reports on the exact number of individuals involved in the attack viable strategy that would likely assist counterin- range from forty to two hundred. surgency (COIN) efforts. As Michael Semple argues, 2. Abdul Salam Zaeef, My Life with the Taliban, Editors: Alex Strick the Taliban is a patchwork of political loyalties: van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 72 and David Loyn, In Afghanistan: Two Hundred […] the current insurgency is not Years of British, Russian and American Occupation (New York: St. monolithic, but rather a loose association Martin’s Press, 2009), 181-2. Zaeef’s account indicates that fi ghting of different commander networks that may have ended in as little as fi fteen minutes. have some overlapping interests but that also have varying degrees of adherence to 3. Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in the leadership of the Taliban movement. Central Asia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), 27-8. Although […] the prospects of a general 4. Kamal Matinuddin, The Taliban Phenomenon: Afghanistan 1994- political agreement between the Afghan 1997 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 60-2. government and the insurgency are poor, […] there is potential for the reconciliation 5. Anthony Davis, “How the Taliban Became a Military Force,” Fundamentalism Reborn: Afghanistan and the Taliban, Editor: of particular commander networks William Maley (New York: New York University Press, 1998), 47-8. [emphasis added].21 However, ISAF cannot exploit these divisions if 6. Ibid, 67. it does not invest suffi cient intelligence resources 7. Zaeef, 72-3. Some scholars argue that then incumbent President into mapping human terrain. “Friendly” link dia- Rabbani supported Naqib’s decision to cooperate with the Taliban. grams and orders of battle are just as important as See also Davis, 49-50. Such explanations seem plausible given that Rabbani likely viewed the early Taliban movement as a means to their “enemy” counterparts, as distinctions between undermine Hekmatyar, who was heavily engaged in armed confl ict friend and foe in a COIN environment should be against the Rabbini coalition in Kabul. Whatever the case, not proactively manipulated rather than passively ac- only did Naqib not resist, but he offered heavy weapon support for cepted. Thus, ISAF intelligence operations can and Taliban fi ghters as well. should incorporate lessons learned from Taliban 8. Zaeef, 69-70. successes into its own process. 9. Ibid, 73-5. Some reports indicate that additional militants under Yet, the Taliban continues to possess a substan- Mansur Achakzai, Amir Lalai and Sarkateb continued resistance tial advantage over ISAF forces in network mobiliza- into the fi nal two days of fi ghting.

60 Military Intelligence 10. Davis, 54. The PDPA was the communist regime that ruled in 17. Sinno, Organizations at War in Afghanistan and Beyond, 242-3. Afghanistan from 1978 to 1992. Given that the allegation was made 18. Ahmed Rashid, “Pakistan and the Taliban,” Fundamentalism by one of the Taliban’s adversaries, Hekmatyar, the number is likely Reborn: Afghanistan and the Taliban. exaggerated. However, even if infl ated, the report still highlights the extent of Taliban infl uence in former military networks. 19. Davis, 49-50. Reports from the battle describe a plethora of grease paper left “everywhere as the madrassa students removed 11. For background information about warlordism and the political the new weapons from their wrappings.” landscape in Kandahar, see Antonio Giustozzi and Noor Ullah, ““Tribes” and Warlords in Southern Afghanistan, 1980-2005,” LSE 20. Ibid, 49. Crisis States Research Center, September 2006. 21. Michael Semple, Reconciliation in Afghanistan (Washington, 12. Abdulkader H. Sinno, Organizations at War in Afghanistan and D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 2009), 3. Beyond (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), 240-1. 22. See Samuel Chan, “Sentinels of Afghan Democracy: The Afghan 13. Abdulkader H. Sinno, “The Taliban’s Ability to Mobilize the National Army,” Military Review, January-February 2009 and Pashtuns,” The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan (Cambridge: Antonio Giustozzi, “Afghanistan’s National Army: The Ambiguous Harvard University Press, 2008), 79-82. Prospects of Afghanization,” Terrorism Monitor Vol. 6, Issue 9, May 2008. 14. Drawn loosely from various sources, including: Mohammad Osman Tariq Elias, “The Resurgence of the Taliban in Kabul: Logar 23. Semple, 46-7. and Wardak;” Decoding the New Taliban: Insights from the Afghan 24. Michael T. Flynn, Matt Pottinger and Paul D. Batchelor, Fixing Field, edited by Antonio Giuztozzi,51; Pravin Rajan, “Networks of Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan Faith and Community: The Taliban and Political Mobilization in (Washington: Center for New American Security, January 2010). Contemporary ‘AfPak,” unpublished paper, and Sinno, Organizations at War in Afghanistan and Beyond. First Lieutenant Tyler Jost is a Military Intelligence offi cer 15. Anthony Hyman, “Nationalism in Afghanistan,” International with 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. He holds a BS from Journal of Middle East Studies 34 (2002): 299-300. the U.S. Military Academy at West Point and an MA from the 16. David B. Edwards, Before Taliban: Genealogies of the Afghan School of Oriental and African Studies at the University of Jihad (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002). London. He can be contacted at [email protected].

The order creating the Army Intelligence and Security branch is signed by Army Chief of Staff Gen. George H. Decker on 1 July 1962. The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Maj. Gen. Alva Fitch, is at the far left

April - June 2011 61 by Robert J. Leach

In the U.S., intelligence analysis enables policy Evil” by President Bush with predictable hostility.1 makers to make informed decisions that reverberate The expected reaction, based upon previous acts of globally. This article explores two major challenges aggression, led North Korea to admit: “to U.S. of- facing analysts over the next twelve months that fi cials that it was pursuing a highly enriched ura- will infl uence U.S. policy for many years to come. nium program in violation of several international The fi rst challenge is the question of what North agreements, including the 1994 Agreed Framework Korea will do given its self-declared nuclear capa- signed with the Clinton administration.”2 Through bility. The second question revolves around Iran’s the Six-Party Talks, which involve the U.S., North nuclear capability. Korea, South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia, North Korea has declared its nuclear capability. North Korea agreed to disband its nuclear pursuits The intentions of the declaration remain a mystery to in exchange for energy resources and also received most analysts and government organizations alike. further commitments from South Korea for food- North Korea, arguably the most reclusive nation in stuffs and cooperation with building the “Kaesong the world, remains in the headlines of news organi- Industrial Complex just north of the demilitarized 3 zations around the world. Even China, its greatest zone.” ally, seems to be at a loss on the recent escala- The South Korean equation limits military action tion of nuclear rhetoric displayed by North Korea. against North Korea by the U.S. Any U.S. military Historically, when North Korea behaved in a man- response would likely cause North Korea to un- ner unbecoming of a nation, they sought conces- leash a wave of military counter-responses, which sions. Policy makers previously rewarded deliberate would cripple South Korea. Protection of South and hostile North Korean behaviors with energy and Korean and Japanese economies is vital in any re- other nation stabilizers (i.e., food supplies and com- sponse by the U.S. or any U.S. ally. North Korea merce.) Perhaps the concessionary negotiations of understands the vital role played by the economies the previous policies with North Korea allowed it to of South Korea and Japan in measured responses formulate a standard behavior in order to achieve a by the U.S. and its allies. Based on decades of tit- desired result. for-tat exchanges of rhetoric and sanctions, North It is possible that the U.S. currently faces nuclear Korea plays a chess game one move ahead of U.S. rhetoric, testing, and possible proliferation by North policy. The North Korean advantage stems partly Korea as a direct result of a standard practice of from regime and policy changes on the part of the quid pro quo. Analysts focused on current behaviors U.S. However, the isolated nature of North Korea must look at previous activities and rewards to un- plays an additional role in staying one step ahead of derstand possible goals of the current escalation of American predictive analysis of reactions by party hostilities on the Korean Peninsula. In 2002, North leaders in Pyongyang. Korea faced severe energy and food shortages. It re- Kim Jong-Il’s recent health concerns brings into sponded to the labeling as a member of the “Axis of question who has really been in charge of North

62 Military Intelligence Korea. Information released by party leaders in with the instability of an ailing leader, this scenario Pyongyang spin the truth right out of the story becomes plausible. Having a new leader bring great broadcasted by the Korean Central News Agency fortunes to his country may give the appearance (KCNA). Party leaders, especially Kim Jong-Il, must that the new leader is in charge and self-reliant. represent a strengthened party at all costs. At times, Self-reliance, or Juche, is the key leadership prin- the KCNA released digitally altered pictures of Kim ciple or ideology that guides many awkward maneu- Jong-Il in order to create an illusion of a healthy vers by North Korea.7 North Korea relies on China leader. An example of this occurred in 2008, when for many staples to keep the nation running. If rumors speculating that the North Korean leader North Korea created a hasty and deplorable venue had a stroke.4 The KCNA released a picture that Kim to display their seemingly unstable might, perhaps Jong-Il had supposedly taken with military mem- the concessions drawn could reduce the amount of bers in order to quash speculation concerning the support required of China. These concessions could health of the North Korean “Dear Leader.”5 The pic- give the appearance of self-reliance to the people, ture showed shadows behind Kim Jong-Il that were and suppress any instability as the result of a re- at a different angle than the shadows of the soldiers gime change within North Korea. Another way to around him, proving that the picture was a fake. gain self-reliance is with the sale of military equip- ment and technologies to a paying customer. Weapons and weapons re- lated technology are the main goods that North Korea ex- ports. Consumers range from possible terrorist organizations to countries like Yemen, Iran, and Syria. In 2002, the U.S. along with the Spanish Navy intercepted a cargo ship bound for Yemen loaded with twelve disassembled SCUD missiles.8 Even though the sale of these missiles turned out to be within international legal guidelines, it brought to light the prolif- eration of military weapon sys- tems from North Korea to other Analysts may deduct that the current round of nations. Assurances by Yemen allowed for the con- rhetoric is in support of Kim Jong-Il’s third son, Kim tinuation of the shipment, as it made a guarantee of Jong-un.6 Kim Jong-un is reportedly in line to suc- sorts to the U.S. that the missiles would not end up 9 ceed Kim Jong-Il as the leader of North Korea. Kim in the hands of terrorists. In 2007, North Korean Jong-Il may want to put an increased amount of technology proliferation reared its head again in pressure on the international community prior to Syria. his death in order to set his son up for success. This Syria secretly built a nuclear reactor at Al Kibar is viewed from the perspective typical of many famil- that included specifi c technical help and assistance ial patterns of love and succession. Kim Jong-Il may from North Korea. In September 2007, Israel bombed feel that the increased pressure and nuclear rheto- this site, amidst speculation that the site included ric might bring about greater concessions to North a nuclear reactor similar in size, dimension, and Korea. This gift to his son would put him in great features to the nuclear plant in Yongbyong, North light in the eyes of the people. This logic may seem Korea.10 Supposedly, a video shared with members too risky for Westerners; however, when dealing of Congress showing North Koreans in the Syrian

April - June 2011 63 plant, gave concrete evidence to these lawmakers of of the U.S. unite and share information, technol- North Korean nuclear proliferation.11 Sharing this ogy, and equipment in order to defeat the common technology with Syria likely brought a signifi cant enemy. The commonality between the two nations amount of fi nancial support to the reclusive regime stems from purchasing technology and information in North Korea. from Abdul Qadeer Khan.12 A. Q. Khan, a renowned Pakistani with expertise in nuclear energy and The current show of nuclear capabilities by North weapons, purportedly sold centrifuge technology to Korea could include a capability demonstration North Korea and Iran before his capture.13 Iran is to potential customers. A North Korean sale of a likely paying great attention to western reactions to nuclear weapon to a terrorist organization like Al North Korea’s nuclear declaration and testing. Qaeda, Hezbollah, or Hamas would serve many pur- poses. A condition of a sale might include conduct- Iran’s policy to the U.S., Israel, and the rest of the ing a detonation on U.S. soil, or at least against a world will take shape as world reactions to North large U.S. military population such as in Iraq or Korea’s nuclear ambitions evolve. Confronting Iran Afghanistan. The sale would generate both reve- is diffi cult given the signifi cant U.S. military pres- nue for North Korea, and achieve a military victory ence in the Middle East. Analysts must determine against the U.S. The revenue gained would enable whether the intention of Iran is to build peace- North Korea to purchase both commodities and mili- ful nuclear energy or a nuclear weapons capabil- tary related equipment. The commodities would give ity. Given the limited resources, information from stability to the nation and satisfy Juche ideology. A within the withdrawn nation makes analysis diffi - military victory in a war of proxy against the U.S. cult. The miscalculated analysis of the presence of would cleanse North Korean hands of allegations of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq prior to mili- wrongdoing, and keep the U.S. military on its heels. tary confl ict in 2003, may lead analysts to refuse With the U.S. military reeling from a possible sig- to make a concrete determination on the capabili- nifi cant loss, the North Koreans could capitalize on ties of the Iranian nuclear program. This bias could this event and launch a preemptive strike against place the security of the Middle East in jeopardy. South Korea. A unifi ed Korean Peninsula under the If the U.S. does not engage Iran prior to a declared rule of North Korea has been a long-standing goal nuclear weapons capability, then it is forced to deal of the isolated nation. Key indicators should allow with the aftermath of a nuclear weapons capable analysts to determine intentions by North Korea. Iran. U.S. policy towards Iran would likely change in Analysts must take a holistic look at the entirety the advent of austere changes in Iran’s nuclear ca- of the North Korean military in order to determine pabilities. In the event that Iran is simply interested possible aggressive intentions from this rogue na- in peaceful nuclear energy, and the U.S. attacked tion. A North Korean military confl ict would be pre- Iran, the world would hold the U.S. directly respon- cipitated by movements of large units and pieces of sible for the aggression. A miscalculated judgment equipment from storage areas to areas of anticipated could cost the U.S. insurmountable losses in the fi - engagement. Indications and Warning would allow nancial sector, a loss of authority within the world, only limited time for reaction. However, the move- and create retaliations by Iran against the U.S. ment of such large forces would take time in or- with the gravest conditions. This burden on ana- der to be prepared for engagement. Understanding lysts creates a bias that unless gotten rid of makes non-typical military movements is paramount to the right decision by policymakers nothing short of the warning of potential direct military confl ict with questionable. North Korea. Proliferation of technology and weap- The analyst’s job is not to infl uence policy. The ons from North Korea to Iran are predictable and analyst’s job is to inform policymakers on events understandable from this perspective. and potential courses of action by the enemy. In- Many weapons, especially missile technology depth analysis utilizing the political, economic, mil- in the Iranian inventory seems to replicate North itary, social, infrastructure and information factors Korean missile systems. As the other remaining enable analysts to take into consideration multiple “Axis of Evil,” it would only make sense that the foes aspects when drawing conclusions. Competing hy-

64 Military Intelligence potheses allow analysts to think of other potential According to one news outlet, “between 15 and 16.5 results without bias in order to inform the policy- million barrels of oil transit the Strait of Hormuz maker on threat courses of action. each day, roughly 20 percent of the world’s daily oil production.”14 Iran may attempt to close the Strait if attacked. This closure would severely disrupt the fl ow of oil to world markets. This could cause global infl ation never before seen. In fact, the likelihood of global chaos could include a breakdown of life saving services in many areas. Analysts should watch the movement of mine lay- ing equipment near the Strait of Hormuz in order to complete their predictive analysis. Based on previous Israeli strikes against Iraq under “Operation Opera” in 1981, and the attack against Al Kibar, predictive anal- ysis should lead analysts to be- An additional factor to take into consideration is lieve that Israel will not allow for a nuclear-armed Israel. Iran has vowed to destroy Israel. Israel’s na- Iran.15 In fact, Israel has already conducted much of tionhood is potentially in jeopardy given an Iran the preparations needed in order to conduct a pre- armed with a nuclear weapon. The U.S. has a cov- emptive attack against Iran. In June 2008, Israel enant with Israel to protect its existence. Analysts conducted an air exercise that mimicked the same must determine possible repercussions of an Israeli distance from Israel to the uranium enrichment preemptive strike against Iran. Additionally, Iran is plant in Natanz, Iran. During this exercise, over 100 known to be a state sponsor of terrorism to Hezbollah aircraft conducted what many analysts view as a and Hamas. Iran also supports Syria with weapons, prelude to an inevitable attack on Iran. technology, and additional considerations. The U.S. presence in Iraq creates a unique strain Any attack on Iran could unleash terrorist orga- on Israeli attack planning. The U.S. controls most nizations kept in reasonable reserve recently, or, in of the air space over Iraq; any Israeli strike against the case of Hamas, at least since the end of “Cast Iran would include the need to fl y through space Lead.” This period of relative calm has enabled these controlled by the U.S. Questions loom over how the organizations to rearm and rethink attack scenarios U.S. would react to a surprise maneuver by Israeli against Israel. With the support of Iran, Hezbollah Air Forces to strike Iran without approval by the likely upgraded its military capabilities since the U.S. to utilize Iraqi air space. Alternatives from fl y- end of the 2006 confl ict. With the help of North ing over Iraq are not realistic. Interestingly, Israel Korea, the potential exists that Iran could already has a history of militarily engaging the U.S. in a be in possession of a nuclear device. If such a device hostile manner when the need for security dictates were transferred to either Hezbollah or Hamas, with such intervention. deliberate instructions for use given a preemptive In 1967, during the Six Day War, Israel engaged strike by Israel against Iran, then the possession of the USS Liberty, which led to 34 Americans killed, such a device by terrorist organizations could throw and wounding more than 170.16 At the time, the the world into global chaos. USS Liberty was an information-gathering vessel lo- The need for additional consideration due to the cated off the coast of Israel in the Mediterranean possibility of Iran closing the Strait of Hormuz res- Sea. Although many believed the attack was inten- onates throughout the intelligence community. tional, “Israel has maintained since the attack that

April - June 2011 65 it was a case of mistaken identity, an explanation 3. Wonhyuk Lim, “Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation at a the Johnson administration did not challenge for- Crossroads,” Korea Development Institute, December 2006, retrieved at http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/07008Lim.pdf 2. mally.”17 Even if the U.S. did not inform Israel of the presence of this American vessel, Israel suppos- 4. Nico Hines, “Kim Jong Il Photoshop Error Betrays Leader’s Health Problems?”, The Huffi ngton Post, 6 November 2008, retrieved edly did not take the necessary steps to rule out the at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/11/06/kim-jong-il- vessel was American. The precedence of this his- photoshop-err_n_141927.html?show_comment_id=17767070. toric event must make analysts calculate to what 5. Ibid. degree Israel might be willing to attack Iran without 6. Kim Sue-Young and Michael Ha, “Kim Jong-il’s 3rd Son Emerges U.S. approval or possible notifi cation. The analyti- as Successor,” Korea Times, 15 January 2009, retrieved at http:// cal process must include “out of the box” thinking www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2009/02/117_37961. to evaluate a potential Israeli no notifi cation strike html. against Iran. 7. Global Security, “Juche [Self-Reliance or Self-Dependence?]”, 2009, retrieved at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/ The analytical process requires a “red cell” thought dprk/juche.htm. process in order to be unique and thorough. A mil- 8. Thomas E. Ricks and Peter Slevin, “Intercepted Missile Shipment itary analyst must formulate conclusions about Released to Yemen,” The Washington Post, 11 December 2002, potential enemy or even friendly scenarios that retrieved at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/ achieve their goals and objectives. The thought pro- A39775-2002Dec11?language=printer. cess must begin with: “If I were the leader of this or- 9. Ibid. ganization or country, what would I do to defeat my 10. Robin N. Wright, “Korea linked to Syrian nuclear plant,” The enemy?” The analyst must take into consideration Washington Post, 28 April 2008, retrieved at http://www.boston. many cultural aspects along with a historical per- com/news/world/asia/articles/2008/04/24/n_korea_linked_to_ syrian_nuclear_plant/. spective to evaluate an enemy using “red cell” think- 11. Ibid. ing. Although challenging, it gives great insight into the mind of an adversary with a unique spin. If per- 12. Gerald M. Steinberg, “North Korea and Iran: Will Any Lessons Be Learned?”, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 11 October 2006, formed properly, predictive analysis becomes an retrieved at http://www.jcpa.org/brief/brief006-12. easier task. 13. Ibid. As the next twelve months evolve, the two remain- 14. Kenneth R. Timmerman, “Iran Readies Plan to Close Strait of ing “Axis of Evil” countries will continue to be in Hormuz,” NewsMax.com, 1 March 2006, retrieved at http://archive. the headlines, and to draw the attention of per- newsmax.com/archives/articles/2006/2/28/181730.shtml?s=lh. sons globally. Understanding the ambitions of these 15. Avi Hein, “The Raid on the Osirak Nuclear Reactor”, Jewish countries to achieve a nuclear capability deserves Virtual Library, 2003, retrieved at http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary. great caution and understanding by the intelligence org/jsource/History/osirak1.html. community. Predicting behaviors, as radical as they 16. Israel B. Schweid, “US faulted in 1967 attack: But conclusions don’t satisfy some”, Associated Press, 13 January 2004, retrieved may seem, is paramount to national security in- at http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2004/01/13/ terests for the U.S. The potential for these rogue israel_us_faulted_in_1967_attack/. nations to transfer a nuclear weapon to a terror- 17. Ibid. ist organization to undermine world peace efforts is reaching a critical stage. Defeating the plausibility of this scenario falls to the hands of analysts with the ability to think unconventionally.

Robert Leach is a retired Intelligence Analyst and now teaches at the Intelligence Analyst Course at Fort Huachuca, Endnotes Arizona. He spent his career as an analyst at various tactical 1. Glenn Kessler and Peter Baker, “Bush’s ‘Axis of Evil’ Comes and strategic assignments around the world. Mr. Leach Back to Haunt United States,” The Washington Post, 10 October holds an MA in the Administration of Justice and Security 2006, retrieved at www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ through the University of Phoenix, and recently completed article/2006/10/09/AR200-6100901130.html. Lean Six Sigma and Project Management certifi cation through 2. Balbina Y. Hwang, “Don’t Make Concessions To North Korea,” The Villanova University. While in the Army, he completed the Heritage Foundation, 25 February 2004, retrieved at http://www. DIA Indications and Warning Course as well as the Joint heritage.org/Press/Commentary/ed022504a.cfm. Intelligence Analyst Course.

66 Military Intelligence by Hugh M. Lewis, PhD

All intelligence is anthropological intelligence, no unifi ed, and its primary object of study remains far matter what forms it may take. Intelligence is an- from being clearly or completely understood. It mat- thropological because it defi nes what it means to be ters most that the defi nition we adopt for culture human, how we organize our worlds, and the forms has inevitable consequences in how we think about and style-patterns that human civilizations take. things cultural, and for what we consider to be im- Our intelligence is of such a nature that it is unfi n- portant to cultural understanding or otherwise. Our ished business. We do not see the world or things in defi nitions of culture preclude how we operation- it so much for what they are, but for what they seem alize our methods and methodologies in acquiring to mean to us. This is especially so when what we cultural intelligence, and in how we apply our cul- see is ambiguous and uncertain in form—it is the turally-based knowledge and understanding to the nature of our intelligence to automatically superim- world. pose form and function upon what is otherwise con- What is critical to our understanding of culture fused and unclear. is the recognition that whatever formal or practical Human intelligence was born with the capacity to defi nitions of culture we may adopt, processes of deliberately deceive, exaggerate, tell half-truths and global culture currently impact upon multiple lev- prevaricate, and to also apperceptively recognize els, and the contemporary cultural realities we are when one is being deceived by imagining the pos- dealing with daily in our world are changing contin- sibilities of truth behind the deception. It is the veil uously, chaotically, often indirectly, and at increas- of culture that stands between our intelligence and ing rates. Culture in our world is itself changing, the hidden realities of the world, permitting both and the traditional and conventional boundaries possibilities of deception and enlightenment. that defi ned our cultures and our knowledge of What we anthropologically call culture underlies culture by which we were raised and educated are and contextualizes all of our intelligence. We are breaking down in the face of the digitial information culturally dependent creatures of intelligence be- revolution and technological development, by which cause without culture to predefi ne the form of what cultural values and variables, always soft in their we see and how we see it in the world, to provide human undercurrents, always hard in their fi nal common reference points, our intelligence would be consequences, are being transmitted and broadcast simple irrationality and insanity. This cultural pro- instantaneously around the entire world at acceler- cess works mostly upon an unconscious level in our ated rates. daily lives as well as in the larger human world, nec- These globalizing infl uences of modern human essarily so, because the more we fl y by habit and civilization create a transnational parallax, a shift training, the less we fl y by the proverbial seats of of realities of collective consciousness vis-à-vis one our pants. another. They determine how we adapt to the world There have been many anthropological defi nitions and challenge all of us with a fundamental sense of culture. The multiplication of defi nitions of cul- of discrepancy in how we see and respond to the ture tells us that the science of culture is far from demands of the world. This process is called trans-

April - June 2011 67 culturation, and one of its consequences is the trans- alities. Shared patterns of response upon multiple mission and development of global culture, or what levels of being and social interaction provide con- can be called human civilization writ large upon the sonance and coordination for our behavior in rela- earth, for technology knows no cultural boundar- tion to the world, and these patterns, internalized ies, but breaks these boundaries down through pro- since early childhood, become sanctioned and con- cesses of cross-cultural infl uence, cultural erosion, strained through secondary institutions and for- trans-cultural tectonics, and non-linear patterns of mally embedded and reinforced within a common transformational development. stock of knowledge, conventions of collective rep- A central challenge in the operationalization of resentation, and a shared, received symbology of defi nitions of culture has been the fact that all peo- meaning about the world, or “world view.” The inte- ple are themselves bound not just by a stratifi ed set gration of our reality, both behaviorally and symbol- of cultural realities, but by our universal cultural ically, upon multiple psychological and social levels, dependency upon its larger collective realities in depends fundamentally upon this process of insti- shaping both our world and how we see that world. tutionalized sharing of common knowledge and as- Scientifi cally, in the objective defi nition of culture, it sociated native cultural intuitions. becomes the case that if indeed culture shapes how Behind this defi nition looms the question of “what and what we know of our world in basic ways, then is human intelligence” and, in the structure of the we must confront the anthropological relativity of large and the long run, how can collective human human intelligence, and the fundamental dilemma intelligence (civilization) be best served and serve of not only our bounded knowledge of culture, but through military endeavor and dedicated service. of our very capacity to know and understand any Old models of culture, whether our own or others, or all culture in a completely disembodied and non- whether of law, or morality, of economy or politics, subjective manner. do not necessarily serve well new transnational sit- How do we operationalize the defi nition of human uations and patterns of globalized culture. We are culture, or its cultural intelligence, rapidly trans- all struggling to catch up to the globalization of cul- forming itself and our world, in a manner that will tural human realities, and all that we knew or have be of service to the military in the future? Each known before becomes subsumed under a new ae- branch of the U.S. military has its own defi nition of gis of globalized realities and alternative transna- culture, sometimes more than one, and each serves tional possibilities. critically, well or otherwise, how that branch ap- Human intelligence permits us to see the chang- proaches the problem of culture in its training, doc- ing world, and ourselves in relation to the changes trine and operational application. In a critical sense of the world, in ways we would not have otherwise as well, how we fi nally come to agreement in the or previously seen, and hence by so seeing, to adapt operational defi nition of culture will play critically to that changed world in a manner that serves our in serving to defi ne the role played by the U.S. mil- best long term interests. It permits us the freedom itary in future global politics of confl ict, resource to act outside of the constraints of received, tradi- competition and the inevitable human struggle for tion-bound culture, and provides us the operational power and freedom. This role will become increas- edge over those who cannot escape the boundaries ingly acute in the face of Malthusian realities as the of their own cultural boxes. We may never be able to global human population swells to carrying capac- ultimately escape the consequences of the cultural ity, as energy demand outstrips energy supply, as realities of our own making, but we can seek to food prices rise around the world and attendant en- shape those consequences in a manner that serves vironmental degradation and circumscription con- our greater mutual long term interests in the world. tinues inexorably and unabated to make food less and less available to more and more people. The operational defi nition of culture hinges criti- cally upon differentials of sharing of human patterns of response that result in coexistence and competi- tion of alternative collective and corporate social re-

68 Military Intelligence by Mahir J. Ibrahimov, PhD

This article previously appeared in the May-June 2011  The players and the situation. issue of Fires.  The style of decision making. Introduction  National characters. The U.S. Army’s Culture and Foreign Language  Cross cultural aspect. Strategy states that operational experiences in Somalia, the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq have  Interpreters and translators. highlighted critical gaps in the Army’s capability What We Need to Know about Culture to infl uence and operate effectively within differ- Culture (from Latin “cultura” to cultivate) is a ent cultures for extended periods of time. Battlefi eld combination of behavior patterns, arts, beliefs, and lessons learned have demonstrated that language institutions passed down from generation to gener- profi ciency and understanding of foreign culture ation. It’s the way of life for an entire society. It in- are vital enablers for full spectrum operations. cludes codes of manners, dress, language, religion, Negotiating in indigenous cultures adds new di- and rituals. There are other cultural defi nitions mensions to the military’s missions in Afghanistan, that leaders need to be aware of when preparing for Iraq, and elsewhere. Operating in joint interagency, negotiations, these include cultural knowledge, cul- intergovernmental, multinational environments re- tural awareness, cultural sensitivity, and cultural quires a new, more sophisticated set of skills that appropriateness. are very different than the traditional warfi ghting in a bipolar strategic environment of the Cold War era. CulturalCultural Knowledge:Knowledge: CulturalCultural AwAwareness:areness: FamiliarizationFamiliarization withwith culturalcultural SensitivitySensitivity and understanding of This new dimension is essential for winning characteristics,characteristics, history,history, values , belibeliefef aanothernother ethnicethnic or religiousreligious grgroupoup systems, and behaviors ofof another -including and appreciation for hearts and minds of the populace of regions and ethnicethnic or religiousreligious group.group. ttheirheir attitudesattitudes,, vvaluesalues and beliebeliefs.fs. countries which are of strategic importance to the U.S. and its allies. In this article we will consider the cultural considerations in negotiations and the factors which infl uence them in indigenous operat- ing environment. CulturalCultural SensitivitySensitivity:: CulturallyCulturally Appropriate:Appropriate: KnowledgeKnowledge and appreciation of the AdaptabilityAdaptability to cultural differences What is Negotiation? culturalcultural ddifferencesifferences as as w ewellll as as andand similarities,similarities, and effectivenesseffectiveness similarities.similarities. inin translatingtranslating it into actionaction.. Negotiation is derived from the Latin word “nego- tiari.” The root words neg (not) and otium (ease or leisure) together mean “not leisure,” refl ecting the Three Phases of Negotiation uneasy nature of negotiations. Negotiation is a pro- Generally, negotiations consist of three phases. cess in which two or more participants try to come Phase I is the pre-negotiation phase. This is often to a mutual consensus through a process of inter- the most critical phase. Each party identifi es its action and communication by using different nego- strengths, assesses its interests, and works to fi nd tiation techniques and methods. There are fi ve main a balance between short term tactical gains and elements of international negotiation: long-term strategic relationships. Phase II consists

April - June 2011 69 of the actual negotiation process, and Phase III con- “manim gozum sandan su ichmir,” which actually sists of post-negotiation efforts. means, “I am suspicious of you” or “I do not trust Phase I: Pre-negotiation. Just knowing defi ni- you.” The interpreter on the scene translated the tions isn’t enough; there are also several things that proverb literally to mean, “My eye does not drink must be done prior to engaging in negotiations. They water from you.” include learning as much as possible about the ne- In another incident which took place in Moscow in gotiating partners. This means knowing the players, the 1980s, a Russian negotiator used a very popu- their tribal affi liation, and their political and reli- lar, old Russian traditional saying, “vipyem na po- gious agenda. Leaders must also identify the initia- soshok,” while addressing the departing Western tor of the meeting. If the negotiation request comes delegation. This saying is usually used by Russians from a local key or infl uential leader, it is impera- to wish each other “safe travel.” Once said, every- tive to identify their socio-economic, political, eth- one would normally sit for a moment, raise their nic or tribal affi liation. Leaders must also determine glasses of vodka, drink, and wish everyone a safe an appropriate location for the meeting. If hosting, trip. However, this phrase is very diffi cult to trans- choose a quiet, private location away from possible late word for word. The interpreter struggled and internal and external distractions. could not give an English equivalent. Because the Finally, leaders must identify an appropriate meaning was not clear, the Western delegation was translator. Choosing the right translator is very im- not entirely sure of what was actually said. portant. If they are local, they might have a biased In all three cases, the culturally and linguistically agenda, tribal affi liation, or certain linguistic dia- incorrect translations caused major confusion and lect which might not be well perceived by another even laughter and were not obviously helpful for the negotiating party. Make sure beforehand if a fe- outcome of the negotiations. These experiences show male translator is appropriate, especially for high misinterpretations, either deliberate or because of level negotiation. It is imperative that a transla- ignorance of cultural, linguistic, political, ethnic or tor be knowledgeable of languages and cultures to tribal affi liations, can cause miscommunication. avoid possible misinterpretations, especially when it comes to proverbs, idioms, etc. and other cultural Cross-cultural negotiation training is an important nuances. Misinterpretations might negatively affect element of the pre-negotiation phase. Negotiators the outcome of the negotiations. Lessons learned must understand cultural etiquettes as well as cross have shown that the very lack of cultural knowl- cultural differences in negotiation styles and tech- edge, education, and exposure usually leads to niques when dealing with a Middle Eastern partner. misinterpretations. In a cross-cultural setting all leaders need to con- sider cultural factors impacting the negotiation pro- My experiences throughout the years in different cess, which can include different historical, ethnic cultural settings point to that pattern. For exam- and cultural backgrounds, possible emotional per- ple, during a negotiation a Middle Eastern delega- ceptions, political systems, and their socio-cultural tion member used the following Arabic proverb, origins. “min kasratil mallahin gariqat as safi na.” During the discussion, the interpreter literally translated Phase II: Negotiation. During this phase your the meaning as, “there were too many sailors on the cross-cultural training is no less important. Some boat and it sank,” when in reality it should have cultures adopt direct, simple methods of commu- been translated as “too many cooks in the kitchen.” nication, while others prefer indirect, more com- Because the interpreter did not have a clear sense plex methods. Middle Eastern cultures fall into the of the Western cultural realities, he could not trans- latter category. When communicating with Arabs, late the nuances of one culture into another. pay attention to body language, eye movement and Another example where literal translations can hand gestures. Any negotiation should begin with cause confusion comes from past negotiations be- greetings. tween Western oil companies in the former Soviet In the Middle East, negotiators usually prefer lon- Republic of Azerbaijan. An Azeri member of the del- ger, less formal sessions, insist on addressing coun- egation used the popular Turkic proverb or idiom, terparts by their titles, and are given to expressing

70 Military Intelligence philosophical statements that are often more im- Other “Do’s” and “Don’ts” cultural basics during the portant to the negotiation process than the techni- negotiation process are extremely helpful as well. cal issues of the problem. In an indigenous culture See Figure 2. it is extremely important to be culturally sensitive and to show your respect and understanding of the DO DO NOT culture of the negotiating partner. Speak slowly using short sentences; speak in the first person. Rush right to the point of the business. When communicating with Arabs, pay attention Start conversation with small general talk to body language, eye movements, and hand ges- and pleasantries, such as “How are you?” and then follow the Arab’s conversational lead. tures. The knowledge of the following basics can be Move away from the Arab negotiator if he helpful: Talk to an Arab as an equal partner. gets too close to you during the negotiations. Place your feet flat on the floor (if you are  Shake hands with the right hand and use the sitting in a chair) or fold them under you (if you are sitting on the floor.) left hand to grasp the other person’s elbow as a Try to convert a Muslim to your faith. sign of respect. Maintain eye contact.

 In close, friendly relationship, a hug and a kiss Address the most elderly and senior in the room. placed on both cheeks upon greeting are a nor- Talk about religion or politics. mal occurrence–if the Arab initiates it. Take Notes.  Placing a hand on the heart with a slight bow is Figure 2: Basic Do’s and Don’ts during the negotiation process. a sign of respect while greeting a person.  If a Middle Easterner touches you it is a posi- Each culture also has contrasting views of nego- tive sign, it means that he likes you (not a sign tiating. Gaining an appreciation for the contrasting of homosexuality.) views is vital. Goals refl ect the purpose or intent of  Rise to show respect when a respected or elderly the parties in a negotiation. In business, American person enters the room. negotiators typically regard the signing of a con- tract between the differing parties as their primary  You will be on the safer side if you always rise goal. They consider the contract a binding agree- while greeting people. ment that outlines the roles, rights, and obligations  Usage of common Arab greetings, however few, of each party. Americans prefer detailed contracts such as “As Salam Aleykum,” or “Peace be with that anticipate all possible circumstances. These you” accompanied with or instead of “hello” are agreements or contracts are usually binding and very much appreciated. See Figure 1. not subject to further negotiation or debate. This is known as the “Western Tradition of Legalism.” Gesture Meaning However, Middle Eastern negotiators tend to be- Palm of the right hand on the gin negotiations by establishing general principles chest, bowing the head a little Thank You. and closing one’s eyes. that become the framework on which to build an A quick snap of the head agreement. They usually seek sustainable relation- upwards with an accompanying No. ships rather than contracts and “prefer to leave click of the tongue. things vague.” This is known as the “Middle Eastern Placing the right hand or its It’s in my head to accomplish. Relationship of Trust.” Middle Easterners prefer an forefinger on the tip of the nose. agreement in the form of general principles rather Grasping the chin with the than detailed rules. They regard an agreement as thumb side of the right I am thinking. fist is a sign of wisdom. being relatively fl exible and symbolic of the rela- Holding fingers in a pear shaped tionship established, rather than a binding legal configuration with the tips document. Wait a little bit. pointing up moving the hand up and down. A Western negotiating team typically organizes Right hand out, palm down, with itself using a deductive process. Essentially, the fingers brought toward oneself Calling someone to come. group will organize in culturally specifi c ways that in a clawing motion. refl ect and affect how the group makes decisions. Figure 1: Appropriate Gestures and Body Language. A negotiating team usually will have a designated

April - June 2011 71 leader who appears to have complete authority to priateness of displaying emotions. Arab negotiators, decide all matters. See Figure 3. in a high-context culture, are more likely to display emotions than Americans. However, in Afghanistan, American Middle Eastern specifi cally in the Pashto culture, displays of emo- tion such as impatience, anger, etc. are considered Timetables and schedules Unbound by time for signs of weakness. Finally, in addition to attaching are important. negotiating. high importance to creating bonds of friendship and trust between negotiators, Arabs believe it is imper- Get down to business Exchange pleasantries at quickly. great length. ative that negotiating partners respect each other’s honor and dignity. Avoid silent intervals. Employ silent intervals. Phase III: Post-negotiation. End negotiations with a strong stance. Once objectives have been Tend to focus on future. Tend to focus on past. achieved, summarize what has been agreed to and confi rm the key points. Do not allow the negotiating Contractual agreements. Value well-established relationships of trust. partners to do so, this places them in power. Use common courtesy and tact in an effort to not offend Favor quick decisions and Favor consensus-based the partners. Try not to rush or push; it might post- avoid slow deliberation. decision making. pone or kill the agreement. It’s important to main- tain control of the negotiation throughout the entire Figure 3. Contrasting viewpoints, American vs. Middle Eastern. process, including the closing. An Arab negotiating team typically uses the induc- Negotiating is a way of life in Arab cultures. Apply tive process. In the Middle East, a hidden authority these cultural and negotiation strategies and any rests with the group, and decision making often oc- mission will reap the benefi ts. curs through consensus. Thus, negotiating teams may be relatively large due to the greater number of personnel thought to be necessary to the decision making process. Mahir J. Ibrahimov is the U.S. Army’s Senior Cultural and In Arab and Middle Eastern cultures, ‘saving face’ Foreign Language Advisor at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He is strategically important. Face has to do with a per- was the fi rst TRADOC Culture and Foreign Language Advisor son’s reputation and the respect in which others at Fort Sill from 2009 to 2011. Dr. Ibrahimov completed his PhD hold him. In negotiation, although compromises are at the Academy of Social Sciences in Moscow in 1991 and has reached, they must be done in a manner that allows attended several post graduate programs at Johns Hopkins the Arab partner to maintain dignity or prestige and University and other U.S. institutions. He also served in the Soviet Army and witnessed the break-up of the Soviet Union. not appear weak. To an American, losing face may As a former high-ranking diplomat he helped open the fi rst be embarrassing, but to an Arab, it is devastating. embassy of Azerbaijan in Washington, D.C. While working Losing face is the ultimate disgrace, and an Arab for the U.S. Department of State, he instructed diplomats in will go to almost any length to avoid it. U.S. leaders languages and cultures. He also provided vital assistance must keep the concept of “face” in mind when con- as a multi-lingual cultural adviser to U.S. forces during OIF II ducting negotiations in the Middle East. Failure to and became the subject of a Department of Defense newsreel, do so could freeze or kill a negotiation. Face and the “Jack of All Languages.” Dr. Ibrahimov specializes in the cultural issues of the former Soviet Republics, south central allied concepts of honor and shame are important Asia, and the Middle East. He is the author of “An Invitation to in the Middle East. Rain: A Story of the Road Taken to Freedom,” and numerous There are other aspects of culture to consider with other publications. He may be reached at mahir.ibrahimov@ us.army.mil. respect to negotiations. Some cultures are more risk- averse than others. In general, Middle Easterners seek to avoid uncertainty. This proclivity affects their willingness to take risks in a negotiation. Different cultures also have different views about the appro-

72 Military Intelligence by Edwin K. Morris set the stage within which this combat oriented KM Introduction approach operates, we will consider environmental The art of warfare is challenging but the role of units and organizational facets of Army operation from a rotating in and out of a war zone can impact effec- Military Intelligence (MI) point of view. tiveness. The process of transferring knowledge be- A combat unit is assigned to conduct its mission tween those units is critical to continuing effi ciently. within the designated boundaries of a specifi c geo- The impact of knowledge management (KM) is very graphic location. By conducting operations in that evident in the U.S. Army’s process of units replacing assigned area over time, the organization produces other units in a war zone. Commonly referred to as a very personal and subjective interpretation of that rotational warfare, Relief in Place (RIP) presents a period of time and its events, one which makes ex- battle fl ow challenge that relies heavily on the time change or sharing critical knowledge somewhat period both units are concurrently deployed at the diffi cult. The unit’s experience may also provide vol- same time. With high risk of life and limb, the task umes of explicit knowledge which can become diffi - of knowledge sharing of the current operational pic- cult for rapid integration by MI due to the massive ture (or knowledge base), becomes an insurmount- volume of declarative and procedural knowledge able responsibility upon which lives and missions thus represented. may depend. Soldiers are given a two-week window High levels of organizational familiarity achieve a in which to exchange knowledge capture and trans- level of expertise representing the internalization of fer expertise, which serves to demonstrate all re- experience into a personal knowledge base that is lated activities, and quickly build rapport between supported by externalized products. MI operates in the incoming and outgoing organizations. The Joint a knowledge set different than the rest of the Army Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and and through its operations conducts KM in a much Associated Terms, defi nes RIP as: more specifi c manner that is not a true doctrinally recognized KM methodology. Knowledge discovery “An operation in which, by direction of higher and combination are key and very intricate parts of authority, all or part of a unit is replaced in an area by the incoming unit. The responsibilities of the the MI process and the typical mission it performs replaced elements for the mission and the assigned when deployed in a war zone. zone of operations are transferred to the incoming Specifi c to the fi eld of MI is the discovering, cap- unit. The incoming unit continues the operation as turing, and applying of knowledge in a manner that ordered.” 1 is fast paced and hectic. In the operational tempo of The purpose of this article is to educate the reader the war zone a concept referred to as overcome by in the Army RIP process by illustrating from anec- events (OBE) exists. This concept recognizes that in dotal experience and explicit expertise the essence warfare the level of explicit knowledge via actions, of KM as a system that is not formally recognized as reports, and analysis may produce the effect of KM as such. The RIP process is not architecturally OBE, meaning that what is important at this hour KM instrumented into the standard RIP. In order to may be OBE by tomorrow. A fl urry of information

April - June 2011 73 and data constantly bombards intelligence gather- This inter-unit teamwork process lends itself to ers and some things may end up falling on the fl oor. the true KM culture of socializing and relies heav- Knowledge is a shifting and constantly moving tar- ily upon personalities for increasing rates of suc- get that is impacted by many variables, and this cess. This structure is supported with much explicit sometimes leads to missed opportunities. knowledge representing the experience of the de- parting unit and its individual members that trans- Process fers to the incoming Soldiers, imparts a baseline Given the conditions and environment of com- comprehension, and highlights all factors relating bat operations in a war zone, the offi cial concept to the position, the organization, and the mission the Army employs is referred to as RIP and trans- of the unit. It serves to translate the operational 2 fer of authority (TOA). These two events coexist to- picture and make it personal in nature in order to gether in happening simultaneously but RIP and emphasize the importance and stress of current op- its impacts are critical to the focus of this article. erational and enemy situation. The departing per- The TOA is the culminating event as offi cial orders sonnel also set up related “meet and greets” with transfer authority to the arriving unit from the de- specifi c shared organizations, units, and personnel parting one. with whom the incoming unit will have to interact. Doctrinally, in Field Manual 7-15, The Army This provides a networking opportunity as not all Universal Task List, the conduct of a RIP is: units rotate at the same time. Such meet and greets provide the relational contacts necessary to secure “A relief in place is a tactical enabling operation mission success and install a foundation for future in which, by the direction of higher authority, KM opportunities and engagement. all or part of a unit is replaced in an area by the incoming unit. The responsibilities of the replaced Challenges elements for the mission and the assigned zone of Some diffi culties arise within the two-week RIP operations are transferred to the incoming unit. period that can lead to critical failure, and which The incoming unit continues the operation as could result in loss of life. The intrinsic factors of ordered. The relieving unit usually assumes the success and importance of this RIP KM transference same responsibilities and initially deploys in the is demonstrable in quick order. One challenge is same configuration as the outgoing unit. Relief in place is executed for a number of reasons including not to transfer personal biases and of keeping every- introducing a new unit into combat, changing a thing on an objective level. This is a signifi cant test unit’s mission, relieving a depleted unit in contact, for both the incoming and outgoing personnel alike retaining a unit, relieving the stress of prolonged and both need to be aware of mitigating attitudinal 3 operations in adverse conditions …” perceptions. A second challenge is that providing As in many operations, the business of war relies the key analysis and all points in an externalization solely on a military’s personnel; therefore perfor- process requires re-focusing to a degree by the ef- mance is subject to the infl uence and characteris- fect of departing unit members knowing that they’re tics of personality. In order to transfer knowledge leaving. Knowledge of one’s imminent departure re- effectively, the U.S. Army has provided an offi cial sults in a modality shift that can increase the work two-week window for the RIP cycle to operate. It is load and sometimes take away from functional op- commonly referred to as the left seat/right seat, erations. A third challenge is that the transference meaning that the fi rst week the departing unit is of hardware and data can be dependent upon equip- still driving, but in the second week the incoming ment, training, and capabilities inherent to the in- unit drives the operation under oversight of the de- bound unit. parting unit. During the fi rst week, personnel from Related directly to the mission requirements is the both units are teamed together in order to shadow challenge of shifting mission changes imposed upon and align to the outgoing personnel by personally the arriving unit, thus affecting the relevance of the conducting the transfer of knowledge. Members knowledge represented by the out-going unit. The are matched up by position to provide a one-on- effectiveness of transfer in this formal exchange is one exchange capability to reinforce overall mission not commonly evaluated and relies heavily for suc- capability. cess upon the attributes and strengths of Soldiers

74 Military Intelligence of both units. This tends to make the process diffi - Knowing that the volatility of conducting a war is cult for the command to gauge the level of achieved diffi cult in and of itself, it is diffi cult to relate the success. importance of such work without actually being in such a threatening environment. In my experience in monitoring and gauging this transfer, knowledge was stored and presented from So far, the challenges that have been highlighted a PowerPoint presentation. This product refl ected all are those presented during the operation, but look- critical knowledge by staff function or by individual ing at the problem foundationally for the Army, Soldiers, in order to calculate what was transferred, there is no training or simulation that might help and resulted in accountability by demonstrating establish or hone these skills and expectations nec- what had to be accepted and confi rmed by both in- essary to the successful conduct of this endeavor. bound and out-going units. Aside from the challenges mentioned above, en- tering into the second week presents an op- portunity for the incoming unit to occupy by position and start assuming respon- sibility of the out-going unit’s roles. This provides a mentored and closely observed practice of operating in assigned capacities. TThis hands-on approach serves to protect the new unit during its novice operational stage, in order to increase that unit’s op- erational confi dence and experience. It is a responsibility concluded at the end of the second week at TOA. This jointly operated two-week period becomes an intensifi ed internship to- tally designed to transfer as much critical knowledge as possible related to the cur- rent threat and operational picture, in or- This gauge provided the basis upon which the TOA der to quickly get the incoming unit up to speed; was authorized and executed. If the incoming unit taking it from an “how to” mode to “now do.” It pre- disagreed with the fi delity and confi dence trans- pares Soldiers for assuming their roles quickly and ferred via the RIP, it could push back the TOA and effi ciently in order to provide a continuum of op- delay departure. This analysis provided an author- erational effectiveness and impact and to minimize itative account and basis for agreement between operational interruptions. More importantly, in the units with the understanding they had received all eyes of the enemy and the regional inhabitants, this that was presented to a level of profi ciency that they represents a cycle during which the passing of the could continue the mission without interruption of baton needs to remain unnoticed. The second week military capabilities. allows for some latitude in conducting operations that gives the incoming unit a little wiggle room for In my personal case, I was the primary battalion making mistakes, because after TOA they will have staff intelligence offi cer. For the last month before the no side-by-side ability for oversight and assistance. RIP, an average of 20 to 30 percent of my section’s time and effort was spent working upon assembling Measures of Effectiveness imperative and empirically explicit knowledge to im- The two-week RIP window is both exhausting and part during the RIP. In our case, the checklist and rewarding, and represents a dual situation in which status of all critical tasks was developed with guid- one is expected to systematically approach and rap- ance from the battalion executive offi cer, which by idly learn to operate in a chaotic and violent venue, my observation, represented a huge focus for him in and to individually participate as an intricate part in preparation and monitoring during that last month. an Army conducting the art of warfare. This process

April - June 2011 75 relies heavily upon on a person-to-person relation- ties. The procedures inherent in this process add ship but also produces volumes of externalized ex- a safety net for the incoming unit to operate and perience in data in the some of the following forms: learn in a threatening environment and represent a  Standard operating procedures. temporary bridge for entering into their operational environment. The value created by this effort is as  Tactics, techniques, and procedures. reliant upon the creation of knowledge as it is upon  Briefi ng products. the reception and utilization of that knowledge. This  Reports. is a shared responsibility encapsulated in the true 4  Analysis. essence of what KM strengthens. Knowledge reso- In this process, the ability to codify experience nates in its individually assimilated conveyance for incoming units may only serve as a desk refer- but most importantly creates value organization- ence for knowledge that is often very diffi cult to ex- ally, representing a better prepared and innovative press, sometimes representing up to a year or more culture with attributes that impact operations posi- worth of effort, and sometimes representing lessons tively and enhance institutional wisdom. learned at a very painful price. It could also intro- duce mission creep in the out-going unit’s opera- Endnotes tional picture where mission focus might shift away 1. Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated from current operations to this RIP process. All the Terms, 2010. Retrieved 27 June 2010 from http://www.dtic.mil/ time and effort taken to create volumes of informa- doctrine/dod_dictionary/. tion representing externalized knowledge might end 2. Field Manual 101-5-1 Operational Terms and Graphics, 1997. up actually just collecting dust. Retrieved 23, June 2010, from http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ army/docs/fm101-5-1/f545con.htm - contents.

3. Field Manual 7-15 The Army Universal Task List, 2009.

4. U.S. Army, Center for Army Lessons Learned, Handbook 10-10, Appendix A, Relief in Place/Transfer of Authority Checklists, 2009. Retrieved 23 June 2010 from http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/ docs/10-10/ap-a.asp.

Other References

Sergeant Daniel Nichols, 2nd BCT PAO, 1st Armored. Division., MND-B, “Relief in place begins between Iron Brigade and Old Hickory,” (2009) Retrieved 22 June, 2010 from http://www.army. mil/-news/2009/05/09/20874-relief-in-place-begins-between- iron-brigade--and-old-hickory/index.html.

Chief Warrant Offi cer 3 William S. Sobat, “Relief in Place: Managing Transition of Authority” , Special Warfare, Jan-Feb., 2009, Volume TOA at FOB Danger, Tikrit. 22, Issue 1, Retrieved 21 June, 2010 from http://www.soc.mil/ swcs/swmag/Articles_Page6.htm. Conclusion As KM becomes increasingly institutionalized within the Army, these types of business-like pro- cesses, such as the RIP, will continue and only im- Mr. Morris holds a BA in Speech Communication from prove. The challenge is that as combat operations Edinboro University. He served in the U.S. Army with multiple cease or move from a war zone to peaceful opera- enlistments as an Infantry Soldier (active duty, National tions, critical steps to capture and transfer knowl- Guard and U.S. Army Reserve), a former Intelligence Analyst edge that are not institutionalized doctrinally could and directly commissioned as an All Source Intelligence hamper proper support to future missions as well offi cer with additional qualifi cation as a Civil Affairs offi cer. as training for such missions. The costs and re- While stationed at Aberdeen Proving Grounds, he earned a graduate certifi cate in General Administration from Central turn on investment is very much relative to the in- Michigan University. Additionally, he attained a certifi cate in dividual nature and culture of the organization, but Knowledge Management at Fort Huachuca. He is currently the entire RIP process is totally dependent upon attending Kent State University, earning an MA in Information the mission set of those units’ leadership capabili- Architecture and Knowledge Management.

76 Military Intelligence Professional Reader One Soldier’s War One Soldier’s War refl ects the tragic but inescapable reality that by Arkady Babchenko in war soldiers are often myopi- (Grove Press, New York, NY, 2008) cally focused on immediate tasks 432 pages, $6.23 without the understanding of the strategic importance of the war ISBN-13: 978-0802118608 they are fi ghting. The book paints a picture of frustrated soldiers fi ghting to survive Arkady Babchenko served against the enemy, the elements and their abusive as a Russian soldier in superiors. Babchencko’s inner struggles and narra- Chechnya in 1996 and again tive refl ect and illuminate these frustrations. in 1999. Babchenko’s book, The book also highlights for the reader several One Soldier’s War, documents his wartime experi- important issues beyond that of a soldier’s instinc- ences in great detail and through the use of easy- tual fi ght for survival during wartime. Babchenko to-read vignettes. Except for the short, six-page repeatedly describes how he and other junior sol- preface, the book is not strategic in scope or politi- diers are beaten by their superiors under the rep- cal in nature. Rather, it captures the essence of war rehensible system of maltreatment in the Russian from the perspective of a foot soldier on the ground army called “dedovshchina” or bullying. Under this in Chechnya during combat shockingly brutal practice, new conscripts are sys- In spite of its focus on the tactical aspects of tematically exploited and abused by their seniors. war, One Soldier’s War is an important book for Indeed, the violence is often exacerbated due to today’s soldiers and leaders at all echelons be- drunkenness. He also describes a broken Russian cause it reminds the reader of war’s horrifi c nature. supply system where staples such as food, water, Additionally, while Babchenko’s book recounts his and fuel are lacking and an insuffi cient property own experiences in Chechnya, many of his personal accountability system that fosters an environment observations on the nature of war–civilian casual- where soldiers and leaders routinely sell govern- ties, soldier privation, prisoner abuse, maltreat- ment property, at times to the enemy, for their own ment of subordinates, post-traumatic stress and, personal gain. above all, violence–could just as well have been One Soldier’s War provides an insightful, al- written about events in Afghanistan today or World beit singular, look at the Russian army’s war in War II seventy years ago. Chechnya from the front line and in the fi rst per- At one point, Babchenko describes how his unit son. And while the sketches Babchenko uses are mistakenly killed several civilians, including chil- choppy at times and perhaps a bit too lengthy in a dren, when they attempted to break contact from few instances, they are extremely effective in paint- a fi refi ght with Chechen rebels. He also describes ing a picture for the reader of the diffi cult condi- in great detail how Russian soldiers suffered ter- tions and ambiguous circumstances under which ribly from the cold, thirst, hunger, and fear. In a soldiers often exist in war. poignant illustration, he describes the intense cold At the strategic level, Clausewitz said “war is the he and his fellow soldiers endured during the win- continuation of politics by other means.” At the ter while waiting in an armored personnel carrier tactical level, Babchenko’s book reaffi rms General for the enemy to attack. In yet another anecdote, Sherman’s straightforward notion from the U.S. he describes how Chechen separatists stabbed or Civil War that “War is hell.” slit the throats of captured Russian soldiers and positioned their bodies in a town to lure out other Reviewed by Russian soldiers while Chechen snipers waited. Lieutenant Colonel John D. Johnson

April - June 2011 77 Eyes in the Sky: Eisenhower, fl ict between the human the CIA,and Cold War intelligence community and the nascent techni- Aerial Espionage cal intelligence commu- by Dino A. Brugioni, nity. He notably takes sides, observing that “we (Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, took vicarious pleasure in Maryland), 464 pages, $36.95 proving the value of aerial ISBN: 978-1-59114-082-5. photography over other in- telligence sources. The U-2 came to symbolize the ris- This fascinating book is a tribute to squints. ing power of the technical intelligence challenging Imagery Analysts rarely receive much attention, the Ivy League traditionalists and the OSS hold- let alone praise, sitting quietly in darkened rooms, overs in the Agency.” Nevertheless, such honest ac- making sense of distant places, and helping to solve counts of internal and external diffi culties add vigor the nation’s most diffi cult intelligence problems. to the book, while also exemplifying the passion that Dino Brugioni’s most recent work pays homage to Brugioni brings for aerial reconnaissance. these unsung intelligence professionals who served Unfortunately, that passion for strategic aircraft as Photographic Interpreters before and during the does not quite carry over to a passion for satel- Cold War. More so, Eyes in the Sky provides a use- lites. Despite Brugioni’s insistence that the Corona ful context with which to understand the roots of program was Eisenhower’s biggest intelligence tri- the American Imagery Intelligence program. umph, the narrative about this program seems While by no means an autobiography, Brugioni’s almost an afterthought. Instead of treating the de- personal story and his account of aerial reconnais- velopment of this important program as a separate sance are quite closely interwoven. The author, an topic altogether, he returns to it off and on through- award winning historian, would spend a full ca- out the book, before fi nally devoting a chapter to reer within the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), these satellites at the very end. Nevertheless, this positioning himself in an excellent vantage point is a minor objection. Taken as a whole, Eyes in the to observe the development of strategic Imagery Sky is a captivating interpretation of the not so dis- Intelligence. As a senior analyst within the National tant past. It meticulously details not only the intel- Photographic Interpretation Center, he had a front ligence problems of the day but also the innovative row seat in the development of both strategic aerial solutions to those problems. For today’s intelligence reconnaissance capabilities as well as the fi rst gen- professionals, especially those making the transition eration of satellite-based imagery collection. More from tactical to operational or strategic intelligence, importantly, the position also afforded him a unique it is a vital reminder of the necessary relationship look into the strategic decision-making and the as- between collector and analyst. Moreover, it regu- sociated intelligence problems of the day. From larly stresses the broad, holistic approach neces- this angle, Brugioni emphatically suggests that sary to provide quality intelligence. In all, Imagery President Eisenhower’s steady support for strate- Intelligence succeeded not on the abilities of collec- gic aerial reconnaissance laid the groundwork for tors or analysts acting alone, but on their efforts to American success in the Cold War. collaborate within the broader intelligence commu- nity. This is a timeless lesson, one as valuable today While Eisenhower is obviously a hero to Brugioni, as it was nearly half a century ago. he occasionally depicts villains. Perhaps most tell- ingly, Strategic Air Command’s General Curtis Le May comes across quite unfavorably, underscor- Reviewed by Major Ismael Rodriguez ing the sometimes strained dynamic between the CIA and the Air Force. Similarly, Brugioni docu- ments the rivalry within the CIA, exposing the con-

78 Military Intelligence Mussolini and His Generals of a nation capable of offen- sive and defensive activities. by John Gooch For example, in one situation involving Mussolini’s naval (United Kingdom, Cambridge University and air maneuvers, a com- Press, 2007) 651 pages, $35.00, mentator suggested that the ISBN: 978-0-521-85602-7 naval review was “stupefying” and that the Italian Air Force had reached a level of perfec- tion beyond that attained in Germany.(392) However, the ThereTh hhave bbeen many books written about the life reality of the maneuvers may well have been an- of Mussolini which is certainly understandable be- other matter and viewed differently by some other cause of his role in enacting a major fascist gov- individuals. A general conclusion of the author is ernment during the twentieth century and Italy’s that Mussolini’s foreign policy was infl uenced by participation under his leadership during the his military forces, but the same may be said about Second World War. However, this book focuses on a many other world political leaders then and today. much more limited aspect of fascism and Mussolini Mussolini’s military machine in this book is not by concentrating on the time between the World pictured in a favorable light. A number of reasons Wars I and II and the role of the Italian military dur- are given by the author to explain this view. For ex- ing that period. It is a time frame primarily limited ample, although Mussolini was the country’s leader, to the years from 1922 when Mussolini came into his lack of full control of the military was obvious. power to the year 1940. The attention given by the This might be explained by the fact that other mat- author to the role of the Italian military during that ters were taking much of his time, and that perhaps time and Mussolini’s relation to it are what sets this the military was insulated in some cases from his book apart from many other works concerned with direct infl uence. Another possible problem for the the period of Italian fascist history. military and Mussolini seems to be a failure on their The author provides some interesting informa- part to realize that the next war would be a long war tion about Mussolini and his military. For example, necessitating huge resources. Mussolini’s own lead- Mussolini increased the capability of each of the ership style also contributed to a lessening of the three major parts of the military because of a desire military’s capabilities because it lacked a clear form for Italian expansionism and security. Interestingly, of direction for them. it was the Navy that seemed to be his favorite branch, perhaps because of his view that the Mediterranean The author concludes his analysis of Mussolini Sea had important potential military and domes- and his military machine by noting that although tic benefi ts to Italy. However, Mussolini was never Mussolini was responsible for Italy’s entrance into in full control of his military machine as the leader the Second World War, his high ranking offi cers of Italy. Perhaps this was due to the pressures of also share some of the blame for the failure of the other responsibilities, and the fact, according to the military due to their ineffectiveness. author that as “military master of Italy, Mussolini The book was written by an excellent scholar brought to this work the limited perspective of his who used a wide variety of primary and secondary frontline experience and a confi dent assertiveness sources of information to bring it about. It should founded on ignorance.”(519) appeal to a wide variety of readers who desire more Nevertheless, Mussolini found the military useful information about a specifi c time frame of Italian in a number of ways, including its role in helping politics and the role of its military during that time. him project a powerful image of his country’s abil- For example, students of military history who focus ity to wage war. He did this by increasing the power their interest on the preparation for World War II by of his military forces and his use of military demon- Italy as well as a number of other countries such strations and maneuvers which projected an image as France, England, and Germany will fi nd some

April - June 2011 79 interesting types of information in this book. Other taining some interesting political information about readers who might be interested in knowing some- other world leaders and politicians who interacted thing about the role of politics in the preparation with Mussolini and his military leaders during the of war–especially diplomacy–should fi nd the book pre-war period. Hence, it is a valuable book written informative. In addition, students of Italian poli- about a novel interesting military topic occurring tics concerned primarily with the pre-Second World during an important time. time frame will be pleased with the book because one will fi nd numerous references in it to Italian na- Reviewed by William E. Kelly, PhD tional political leaders who were quite infl uential at the time. These readers will also benefi t by ob- Auburn University

Katyn: Stalin’s Massacre never forgotten because these deaths had come to symbolize and the Triumph of Truth the threat to eradicate Poland by Allen Paul and her people.”(xv) The event itself has been writ- (Northern Illinois Press, DeKalb, IL, ten about in several works and 2010) 422 pages, $24.95 a number of movies have been ISBN: 978-0-87580-634-1 produced about it. In addition, a Select Committee of the U.S. Congress conducted hearings about the massacre in the early The Katyn Massacre refers to the murder of thou- 1950s. Yet, what makes this book different from sands of Polish military offi cers and prominent citi- other works is that it focuses on a series of events zens of that country in a forest by the Soviet secret affecting three families who were affected by this police in 1940. The victims had been captured by persecution; the Hoffmans, the Pawulskis, and the the Soviets, interned in Soviet prisons, and their Czarneks. In each family a husband was lost who bodies had been found on Soviet soil. According to was a professional. One was an attorney, another, this author, its occurrence was a result of the Soviet a regular army offi cer, and the third a physician. All Government attempting to maintain its control over three husbands perished at the peak of their pro- Poland. We also learn that Stalin and the Politburo fessional career. The Hoffmans suffered separation approved the killings after receiving a memo from with the mother being sent to Siberia and her in- Lavrenty Beria, head of the Soviet secret police at fant daughter remaining in Poland. The Pawulskis the time. A copy of that memo is found in the ap- were deported but eventually made it to America. pendix of the work and is one of the important items The Czarnecks suffered daily repression under the adding interest to the book as it outlines reasons for German General Government. The book is a nar- the massacre to take place. rative of what happened to each family during the In this work the Katyn massacre is described as war period set around the Katyn massacre itself. part of a pattern of persecution experienced by the We learn of their personal and professional suffer- Poles fi rst by the joint Soviet-German occupation, a ings, but we also learn about how various govern- later German occupation, and then post-World War ment offi cials and others reacted to the wholesale II communist control. Yet in the end Poland even- murder. The author conducted numerous inter- tually becomes a free country in spite of the nega- views with relatives of families to obtain informa- tive experiences encountered during a long period tion about how the massacre and the persecution of of persecution. The massacre has become a sym- Poles affected each family. Hence the book has the bol of Stalin’s brutality to Poland and its people. added favorable element of personal interpretation According to the author “The murders of Katyn were based on actual experiences relayed among rela-

80 Military Intelligence tives. It is a story about tragedy, suffering, but glory the massacre it might have made cooperation with in the end as Poland eventually regains its freedom the Soviets more diffi cult at a time when Soviet help and independence. against the Nazis was needed. erhaps their reac- The views of some of the great powers toward the tions at the time refl ected the necessities of winning massacre are described in an interesting manner in a war against an enemy who should be defeated at this work. Germany and the Soviet Union each re- all costs. acted to the massacre in a manner designed to ben- Politically, the Katyn massacre has had tremen- efi t themselves. When the Germans fi rst discovered dous ramifi cations. For example, it is described as the graves, they recognized that it gave them a tre- perhaps the biggest obstacle today to good relations mendous opportunity to exploit a negative picture between Poland and Russia even though Gorbachev of the Soviet Union. They even invited the German in 1990 admitted Soviet guilt. Yet, the admittance of Red Cross to view the grave sites. They also hoped guilt by the Russians is not enough to satisfy many the massacre would weaken the alliance between Polish individuals. More information is wanted the Soviet Union and other countries united against about the events surrounding the massacre. There them. The Soviets, whose own secret police commit- are still many unanswered questions which are im- ted the massacre, attempted to benefi t by blaming portant to the Poles and to their history. Perhaps it on the Germans. Considering the negative image there will never be answers to these questions, but of the Nazis held by many this approach could be- the Poles will remain attentive to the subject since it come believable to some. The Americans and the is a very important part of their heritage. British are not pictured in a very favorable light in terms of their reaction during the war to their mas- sacre. However, if they had admitted publicly at the Reviewed by William E. Kelly, PhD time that the Russians were indeed responsible for Auburn University

The History of Camp Tracy Japanese WWII POWS and the Future of Strategic Interrogration by Major Alexander D. Corbin (Ziedon Press, Fort Belvoir, VA, 2009) 190 pages, Paperback: $21.95 ISBN-13: 978-0-578-02979-5

In The History of Camp Tracy: Japanese WWII POWs an answer to this question if we are going to effec- and the Future of Strategic Interrogation, Major Alex tively execute operations against extremist factions. Corbin provides the reader an extremely relevant Corbin uses the extremely successful operations at and previously unexplored study of the strategic Camp Tracy to answer that question by providing level interrogations program done at Camp Tracy, clear comparisons and lessons learned for today’s California during World War II. His book answers fi ght against extremist Islam. the key question of “How can the U.S. obtain the Of note, Corbin clearly shows how the mili- requisite information from a foreign and hostile en- tant, ideologically driven, and drastically differing emy while abiding by the law and without further Japanese culture from Western culture directly alienating the international community.” Based on parallels that of extremist Islam, which further the recent failures at the U.S. interrogation centers emphasizes the relevance of this case study in to- in Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib, we must fi nd day’s fi ght. Through his detailed account of how the

April - June 2011 81 Soldiers at Camp Tracy deliberately planned and interrogation program can be run without violating executed interrogations within the law of war and the rules of war, or the Geneva Convention. Geneva Convention, we able to fi nd specifi c tactics, Corbin’s logical and easy to follow writing style techniques, and procedures that can be used to- enhances the reader’s ability to rapidly assimilate day. The book is written in a very logical and easy the concepts presented leading the reader to an to understand manner allowing the reader to gain answer about “how can the U.S. obtain the requi- a deeper insight into strategic level interrogations site information from a foreign and hostile enemy operations done during World War II. His ability while abiding by the law and without further alien- to seamlessly blend the operations at Camp Tracy ating the international community.” So the reader with applications for today’s War on Terror makes can better understand the topic and comparison, this book a must read for anyone interested in the he provides an in depth historical background to use and execution of interrogations to achieve our the topic that includes comparison between radi- national objectives. It should be on every profes- cal Japanese and Islamic fundamentalists, and the sional reading list. operations at Camp Tracy. The book then fl ows into Corbin’s work provides critical lessons learned the interrogation and fi ndings from the case study. and best practices use that can be directly applied Additionally, the appendixes include an actual out- in today’s era of persistent confl ict. The most im- line for interrogations and an interrogation packet portant lesson, as recognized early by the Offi ce of from Camp Tracy. All of these factors combine to al- Naval Intelligence, is that the most critical part of low the reader to get the most from this case study any interrogation process is selecting the right in- of strategic interrogation. terrogators and is a hard lesson we continue to re- The History of Camp Tracy: Japanese WWII POWs learn in each confl ict, including most recently in and the Future of Strategic Interrogation is a must Iraq and Afghanistan. In order to accomplish this, read for anyone trying to understand how we can the Offi ce of Naval Intelligence applied strict selec- gain critical intelligence while remaining within the tion requirements that could be used today. An ex- law of war and the Geneva Convention. Corbin’s in- ample of a best practice that led to the success of depth analysis of operations at Camp Tracy, com- Camp Tracy was the stringent, multilevel screening parisons to recent actions in Operation Enduring process that was used to determine the prisoners Freedom, and the lessons learned provide the of war to be interrogated at Camp Tracy, ensuring reader many best practices that can have far reach- that the selected prisoners produced the greatest ing positive effects in this era of persistent confl ict. probability of success. Other best practices include This is a must read for anyone interested in wartime cultural awareness of the detainees, using peo- interrogation. ple of common background, remaining courteous, constant observation in order to use behaviors or weaknesses later, and team work between interro- gation teams. Based on the success at Camp Tracy Reviewed by and Corbin’s comparison to current operations, the reader gains insight into how a successful strategic Lieutenant Colonel John D. Nawoichyk

82 Military Intelligence What is the UMI? Where is it? How do I use it?

The University of Military IntelligencIntelligencee (UMI) is a training portal of MI courses maintained by tthe U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence (USAICoE) at Fort Huachuca, Arizona for use by authorized military (Active, Reserve, National Guard) and non-military (e.g., DOD civilian, Department of Homeland Security, other U.S. Government agen- cies) personnel. UMI provides many self-paced training courses, MOS training, and career development courses. In ad- dition, the UMI contains a Virtual Campus that is available to users with an abundance of Army-wide resources and links related to MI: language training, cultural awareness, resident courses, MI Library, functional training, publica- tions, and more. UMI is undergoing improvement and expansion to become available for any approved MI courses (from any U.S. Army MI source) that are designed to be offered as Distributed Learning (dL) via the UMI technologically advanced online delivery platform(s). UMI online registration is easy and approval of use normally takes only a day or two after a user request is submitted. Go to http://www.universityofmilitaryintelligence.army.mil, read and accept the standard U.S. Government Authorized Use/Security statement, and then follow the instructions to register or sign in. The UMI Web pages also provide feedback and question forms that can be submitted to obtain more information. Use of the UMI requires: • User registration (it’s free!). • An active government email address (such as .mil or .gov). • A sponsor (if user has no .mil or .gov email address) who can approve user’s access to training material. • Verifi cation by UMI of user’s government email address. • Internet access. UMI courses require Internet Explorer 7 or previous browser and Adobe Reader, Adobe Flash Player, Adobe Shockwave Player, Windows Media Player, and/or a recent version of MS Offi ce. contact and article Submission Information This is your magazine. We need your support by writing and submitting articles for publication. When writing an article, select a topic relevant  A cover letter (either hard copy or electronic) with to the Military Intelligence (MI) and Intelligence your work or home email addresses, telephone Communities (IC). number, and a comment stating your desire to Articles about current operations and exercises; have your article published. TTPs; and equipment and training are always wel-  Your article in Word. Do not use special document come as are lessons learned; historical perspectives; templates. problems and solutions; and short “quick tips” on  A Public Affairs or any other release your instal- better employment or equipment and personnel. Our lation or unit/agency may require. 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84 Military Intelligence The 11th annual CSM Doug Russell Award ceremony was held on 8 March 2011 during the Military Intelligence (MI) CSM/SGM Conference. This year’s award, as well as the Knowlton Award, was presented to Specialist Sasha Fleetwood. Specialist Fleetwood was born in Pampa, Texas, in 1989; the oldest of four brothers and sis- ters. She graduated from Borger High School, Borger, Texas in 2007 where she lettered in cross country, track, wrestling, cheerleading, and academ- ics. She then completed two semes- ters at Oklahoma City Community College with a focus on Engineering. She enlisted in the Army in February 2008, and graduated from Basic Combat Training at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, in August 2008. Specialist Fleetwood then graduated from the Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Collectors Course at Fort Huachuca, Arizona in March 2009. Her fi rst assignment was with the 202nd MI Battalion, 513th MI Brigade, Fort Gordon, Georgia. After ar- riving at Fort Gordon in March 2009, she initially conducted overt debriefi ng operations in support of U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command and U.S. Army Central mission requirements. After proving her- self as a HUMINT Collector, she was chosen to deploy with a Counterintelligence-HUMINT platoon from Alpha Company, 202nd MI Battalion. From October 2009 to October 2010, Specialist Fleetwood supported Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force–Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A). During her year in Oruzgan Province, Afghanistan, she was re- sponsible for conducting Military Source Operations and Interrogations in support of Special Operation missions. She wrote more than 40 Time Sensitive Intelligence Reports and 150 Intelligence Information Reports which resulted in a signifi cant reduction of attacks throughout the region. While deployed, she spearheaded the establishment of a female shura that gave political voice to the area’s female popula- tion. During her deployment, Specialist Fleetwood participated in more than 40 combat missions and was awarded the Combat Action Badge for her role as a member of a mortar team during an engagement with enemy forces. “I really didn’t do anything special; I just think I did my job,” Fleetwood stated when talking about her deployment and mission in Afghanistan. She went on to say that the best part of the deployment was being able to see she had made a direct impact. “I told myself when I went to Afghanistan that I didn’t want to leave feeling unaccomplished and I think I met my goal; I feel I did something good.” Specialist Fleetwood says she owes her success to the mentorship she received. For her meritorious service in support of CJSOTF-A, Specialist Fleetwood was awarded the Bronze Star Medal. She was promoted to Sergeant on 1 May 2011. The CSM Doug Russell Award recognizes a Soldier (Sergeant or below) who has made signifi cant contribu- tions to the MI Corps. The award was established in 1999. Nominees must be active duty, National Guard, or Reserve MI Soldiers or non-MI Soldiers assigned to an MI unit. Although the nominees need not be MI Soldiers, their achievements must be in direct contribution to the MI mission. Ten MI Corps Soldiers were nominated for the award—four Specialists and six sergeants.

Photo by Amy Sunseri. Portions of this announcement were originally printed in The Huachuca Scout, 17 March 2011 by Amy Suneri.