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Essence of Victory: Winning and Losing International Crises

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Essence of Victory: Winning and Losing International Crises ESSENCE OF VICTORY: WINNING AND LOSING INTERNATIONAL CRISES DOMINIC D. P. JOHNSON AND DOMINIC TIERNEY Appearances to the mind are of four kinds. Things either are what they appear to be; or they neither are, nor appear to be; or they are, and do not appear to be; or they are not, and yet appear to be. Epictetus1 Both sides could thus emerge from the [Cuban missile] crisis claiming victory, but there was little doubt as to who the real winners and losers were. John Lewis Gaddis2 HIS ARTICLE USES the case of the Cuban Missile Crisis to illustrate the criteria by which victory and defeat are assessed in international Tcrises. The evidence suggests that few objective criteria are actually used in such evaluations. Indeed, examination of the specific terms of crisis settlements can prove to be less important than a range of factors that do not conform to traditional rational actor assumptions. These include: i) prior biases in perception, ii) the experience of the crisis itself and the subsequent way in which it becomes framed, and iii) public opinion management during and after the crisis. This analysis has significant implications for policymakers who have to deal with the aftermath of a crisis, and also for the wider public and media, if governments are to be held accountable for their foreign policy. The literature on perception and misperception is an increasingly impor- tant part of international relations scholarship, but this literature has focused almost exclusively on the role of perceptions in the decisionmaking process.3 In contrast, this paper examines the role of perceptions in evaluating the out- comes of crises. We are concerned primarily with evaluations by observers: Dominic Johnson is a member of the Princeton University Society of Fellows; Dominic Tierney is a post-doctoral fellow at the Olin Institute, Harvard University. 1. Epictetus (A.D.c.50–c. 138), Discourses (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1925), chap. 27. 2. John Lewis Gaddis, Russia, the Soviet Union and the United States: An Interpretive History (New York: Newbury Award Records, 1978), 239. 3. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton Uni- versity Press, 1976); Pierre Allan and Christian Schmidt, eds. Game Theory and International Relations: Preferences, Information and Empirical Evidence (Aldershot, UK: Edward Elgar, 1994). SECURITY STUDIES 13, no. 2 (winter 2003/4): 350–381 AFrank Cass Journal / copyright C Taylor & Francis Inc. DOI: 10.1080/09636410490521190 Essence of Victory: Winning and Losing International Crises 351 figures including the media, certain politicians, and the general public, none of whom are directly involved in making foreign policy decisions. It is not so much perception and misperception in international politics which concerns us, but perception and misperception of international politics. These perceptions matter a great deal because there are significant political, social and security implications contingent upon who it is that people think have won. As we will argue, the reality can be very unclear. Policymakers are especially concerned with perceptions of their success because they must deal with the international and domestic political aftermath of crises. Leaders often care about international issues to a large degree because of the conclusions that other states will draw about them, regardless of whether these conclusions are well founded.4 A politician’s political survival may also depend on having been perceived to win, whether or not they did, in fact, achieve significant tangible gains. For the public and the media, perceptions are also important, since they can exert pressure on policy and ultimately determine the outcome of elections. A sophisticated understanding of the basis for their, and our, evaluations would produce more accurate criteria with which to hold policymakers accountable. UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS CCORDING TO Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, crises are charac- Aterized by the perception of an increased probability of war, the existence of a threat to basic values, and an awareness of the finite time which exists to resolve matters.5 Although international crises sometimes escalate into armed conflict, they are often peacefully ended by informal or formal settlements including, for example, the 1923 Ruhr Crisis, the 1938 Munich Crisis, or the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Such settlements produce judgments about which side won and which side lost, or whether the result was a draw. On what basis, however, are these evaluations made? Initially, of course, the terms of the agreement which settled each of these crises would appear to be an appropriate criterion with which to establish victory and defeat. If one was to follow this approach, such an analysis would, firstly, be based on a balance sheet of tangible gains and losses, which might include territory, other material exchanges, and future military and diplomatic commitments, as well as their resultant effects on the status of participant countries. Secondly,one could consider the relationship between these material 4. Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), 4–7. 5. Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, A Study of Crisis (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997), 3–4. 352 SECURITY STUDIES 13, no. 2 Figure 1 FRAMEWORK 1: INFORMATION FROM THE SETTLEMENT TERMS IS USED TO EVALUATE THE VICTOR AND THE DEFEATED ON THE BASIS OF MATERIAL GAINS AND LOSSES, AND THE SATISFACTION OF THE AIMS OF PARTICIPANTS changes and the aims of participants. Did each side achieve their goals? Actors may prioritize certain outcomes over others, and may have multiple aims of varying importance. These aims can also alter as the crisis develops. We can call such an approach based on the satisfaction of aims, and the achievement of material gains, Framework 1 (summarized in Figure 1). Both of these sets of criteria (material changes, and the satisfaction of the aims of participants) need to be separately considered. A situation where the decisionmakers of a country had achieved their principal aims in the crisis, yet emerged with substantial material losses, could only be described as an ambiguous victory. Similarly, achieving even substantial material gains, but failing to realize one’s primary aims would only, at best, represent an unclear result. Often, however, material gains and the satisfaction of aims converge to provide the same conclusions about which side has won and lost, since it is these material changes which tend to be the principal issues at stake. These different combinations of scenarios are made clear in Table 1. Using Framework 1, for example, Hitler could be said to have won at Munich in 1938 because he was given the Sudetenland, which represented a clear material gain (and also an express aim) compared to the pre-crisis strategic position. It should be noted, however, that this type of analysis is complicated by what an objective observer might expect participants to gain. A neutral balance sheet does not account for the fact that some players may enter the game with prior advantages and therefore might reasonably expect some gains. Essence of Victory: Winning and Losing International Crises 353 Table 1 THE POSSIBLE OUTCOMESOFACRISIS UNDER A FRAMEWORK 1APPROACH STATE 1achieves STATE 2achieves Nothing Aims only Gains only Both Nothing Ambiguous State 2 minor State 2 minor State 2 major victory victory victory Aims only State 1 minor Ambiguous Ambiguous State 2 minor victory victory Gains only State 1 minor Ambiguous Ambiguous State 2 minor victory victory Both State 1 major State 1 minor State 1 minor Ambiguous victory victory victory A further difficulty is that outcomes may represent absolute or relative gains.6 Whenstatesareconcernedonlyaboutabsolutegains,thenbothsidescouldwin in terms of achieving positive benefits, or both lose in terms of incurring costs. States, however, are sometimes more concerned about whether the overall balance of gains or losses puts them into an advantageous or disadvantageous position vis-a-vis` the opponent. This concern is compounded if incremental advantages can be translated into further exploitation of the disadvantaged state (for example, by using an improved military stance to extract further concessions later on).7 It is striking that a range of alternative factors can outweigh a Framework 1 balance sheet approach, leading to interpretations that bear surprisingly little relation to the original terms of the deal. In spite of Hitler’s material gains at Munich in 1938, the settlement led to a variety of contrasting assess- ments and reassessments of who had won and lost. The notion that war had been averted as a result of a negotiated agreement led British prime minister Neville Chamberlain to declare the settlement a diplomatic coup, producing 6. Absolute gains are the total value of the gains to oneself, without regard to the opponent. Relative gains are the comparative gains, or lesser losses, made over and above the opponent. 7. Robert Powell, “Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory,” American Political Science Review 85, no. 4 (December 1991): 1303–20; Michael Nicholson, “Interdependent Utility Functions: Implications for Co-operation and Conflict,” in Game Theory and International Relations: Preferences, Information and Empirical Evidence, ed. Pierre Allan and Christian Schmidt (Aldershot, UK: Edward Elgar, 1994), 77–96; Arthur Stein, Why Nations Cooperate: Circumstance
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