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Read Book Thirteen Days: a Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis Ebook THIRTEEN DAYS: A MEMOIR OF THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS PDF, EPUB, EBOOK Robert F. Kennedy, Arthur Meier Schlesinger | 192 pages | 26 Jan 2000 | WW Norton & Co | 9780393318340 | English | New York, United States Cuban Missile Crisis - Docs and Sites Crippled America , by Donald J. Trump United , by Cory Booker Smart on Crime , by Kamala Harris Guide to Political Revolution , by Bernie Sanders Promise Me, Dad , by Joe Biden Conscience of a Conservative , by Jeff Flake Two Paths , by Gov. John Kasich Every Other Monday , by Rep. Courage is Contagious , by John Kasich Shortest Way Home , by Pete Buttigieg Becoming , by Michelle Obama Our Revolution , by Bernie Sanders Higher Loyalty , by James Comey Books by and about the presidential election. What Happened , by Hillary Clinton Trump vs. Crisis greatly illustrated that. Rules of the status quo had been violated, trust had been broken, and a line needed to be drawn. However, they did show that there was no difference if one was killed by missiles launched by Cuba or by the USSR in a retaliatory strike. Absolutely superb. A sparse, eminently readable and quick summary of the US's response to the Cuban Missile Crisis from one of the key players. RFK knew how to write and to seamlessly convey lessons learned in the text, so much so that the roughly pages of text contain a bevy of nuggets. I was also delighted by the little tidbits and revelations both sides focused on the moral high ground , and how the movie was able to incorporate so many little lines and moments. If there are flaws, it's that some lessons can be repeated too often the weight of decision and that the afterword is dry academicese. But those are niggling flaws. Absolutely recommended for everyone as a case study of grace under pressure and lessons of history. TL;DR A fantastic summary of a complex and consequential crisis with easy to access lessons. Chad Loveland — Jun 28, Ok first off this book is not a light read or something that you'll just breeze through. It is heavy and there's a lot of technical and political jargon and time specific language that can make it trickier to understand in or later of you're reading this after that. This is an incredibly important book. It helps us realize how valuable and fragile peace is. Also this book proves how important Ok first off this book is not a light read or something that you'll just breeze through. There is no exaggeration that the world was almost completely destroyed in a nuclear war in the 60s. Reading about the back and forth and hidden upper level meetings that decided the US government reactions to nukes being moved so close to the US was incredibly fascinating. Honestly the US and the world at large is lucky that Robert McNamara was blessed with such a brilliant mind and that he was the Secretary of Defense at that time. If someone less pragmatic or more prone to impulse had been in that position Most alarming: in the event communications link with Moscow might be severed, Soviet field commanders were authorized to use tactical nukes against an American invasion. This last observation startled, and appalled, the Americans present. I was sitting next to Robert McNamara our Secretary of Defense during the crisis, and he almost fell out of his chair. Had their advice prevailed, as McNamara later said, nuclear war would have begun on the beaches of Cuba and might have ended in a global holocaust. A lot more information has come out or been declassified since this so we have a fuller picture. This is also a good example that we can all judge presidents and make assumptions about their motives. In reality we're unable to know the full picture and our quick outside judgements can be missing vital information that makes a huge difference in what we'd think. In history classes and other books I'd read it seemed that like JFK was not a good president because of various things. This book helps paint a fuller picture. I'm not saying he's the best president ever, I am saying he handled an incredibly difficult situation magnificently. And provided a good blueprint of how to form a decision committee that has multiple points of view. Sadly too often in our world today we all have times where we dismiss or ignore views different from our own. This is a good reminder that no one person, group, or thought has all the right answers. Rina — Sep 26, This is a book I've been wanting to read for a long time and only recently got around to it. Let me start my review by noting that I love JFK. I love RFK. I love all things Kennedy. It was only natural for me to love this book. The book was a simple narrative. There was not much commentary by Bobby. He simply outlined what transpired behind closed doors during the Cuban Missile Crisis. He never judged anyone's opinions, but simply stated the importance of having all of those people involved in This is a book I've been wanting to read for a long time and only recently got around to it. He never judged anyone's opinions, but simply stated the importance of having all of those people involved in the decision-making process. He emphasized the burden of decision that fell on the President. Without any illusions of storytelling, exaggerations, or hoopla, RFK managed to write a story that oozes with the very real tension of this time. He stated simply the gravity of the situation and, in a straightforward manner that did not even slightly smell of overdramatization, noted that they were facing destruction of mankind as we know it. I found this book to be an easy read text-wise , but a heavy read tension-wise. It was short, but I appreciated the appendices with the text of speeches, letters, and declarations from the time. The photographs were also important to help understand what they were seeing. The book was intended to have a commentary section with RFK contemplating the ethical dilemmas, but, as history indicates, he never got the chance to finish the book. They understood the gravity of issues, but, despite that, they were able to stay calm, rationally consider options, describe alternatives, and discuss in a reasonable manner. Even upon reflection, RFK indicated his full understanding of options, alternatives, and alternate realities if another route had been selected. Sarah T. I'll admit, the movie "Thirteen Days" has been a favorite of mine for a long time, and a big reason why I picked up this book, was to see just how historically accurate the film really was. I was pleasantly surprised! One reason why I changed my review from 4 stars to 5 stars is, when I was thinking of what to write in my review, I realized just how truly insightful the book was. If you've seen the film adaptation or even, you know, LIVED through the Cuban Missile Crisis , then you know what I'll admit, the movie "Thirteen Days" has been a favorite of mine for a long time, and a big reason why I picked up this book, was to see just how historically accurate the film really was. What you don't get in the film is all of the in depth political theory and philosophy. Reading about the political process, public and private, as both cases were necessary during the Cuban Missile Crisis, compared to politics today I'm amazed at what politicians were able to accomplish just a few decades ago, and am embarrassed by how blatantly partisan our politicians are today. Sure, there were disagreements with the blockade etc. They were so methodical about their decision making throughout the entire 13 days, and minds changed back and forth almost the whole time--but that didn't bring everything to a grinding halt. They still managed to put a stop to a very scary situation. I can't help but wonder how a situation like that would be handled today the thought actually scares me If you want to feel good about politics and have a renewed sense in the potential capabilities of politicians, then read this book. Good things can happen. People can work together. Grace — Mar 12, I love the idea of this book - a very short memoir about a specific very frightening time written by someone who was there. Its a snapshot into 13 very scary days of American history. It was very exciting and educational. It was also great that they included transcripts of speeches and letters written by JFK and Krushchev. This book made me so immensely relieved that I do I love the idea of this book - a very short memoir about a specific very frightening time written by someone who was there. This book made me so immensely relieved that I do not want to be a politician. Linda Lipko — Mar 02, As a child born in the 's, I now realize how scary times were. My mother was very interested in politics, and I listened to her times with friends round the kitchen table. I distinctly remember the Cuban Missile Crisis. When reading this book, I realized that my mother and friends had a reason to be so concerned. This was also during the times of "duck and cover. There were regular drills when the teacher told us to go under our chairs and stay there.
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