The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office Issue: 63 1-15 December 2010

ANSO and our donors accept no liability for the results of any activity conducted or omitted on the basis of this report. THE ANSO REPORT -Not for copy or sale-

Inside this Issue COUNTRY SUMMARY Central Region 2-7 Kabul City, the epicentre of attributed to this recent 7 incidents recorded this 8-13 Northern Region CENTRAL, was character- intensification, and impact, period. These included a Western Region 14-16 ised this period by national of IMF operations, though SAF attack against an security force operations and civilian casualties caused by NGO vehicle in Balkh, the Eastern Region 17-22 interdictions along with both parties remain an is- temporary abduction of Southern Region 23-27 criminal activity, as evidenced sue. Inter-AOG rivalry in NGO staff at an AOG by the extortive threat against Nuristan underscores their checkpoint in Sar-e Pul, 28 ANSO Info Page an NGO staff member. Out- ‘eminent domain’, indicat- and the release of the 2 side of Kabul provincial ing a greater concern over INGO staff previously YOU NEED TO KNOW boundaries, for example internal dominance rather abducted in Takhar. Of Kapisa, dynamics were than a need to prosecute note, this last incident was • Criminality remains a con- shaped by low intensity the conflict. Khost also the first involving an expat cern within Kabul City AOG actions such as IEDs recorded the region’s sec- staff member this year and • Increased IMF pressure on and indirect fire attacks, ond recent mass abduction has been attributed to AOG within Eastern Region whereas further afield to the of demining staff. criminal actions. The com- south, the environment The murder of a female bined factors of a wide- • Various factors driving insta- spoke of a higher AOG pres- spread NGO presence and bility within Ghor NGO national staff mem- ence and activity level. This ber in Herat out WEST multiple ‘contested’ areas • Consistently high NGO included the 5th AOG ab- served as a further grim are two of the driving fac- incident levels within the duction of an NGO staff reminder of the impact inci- tors behind the high vol- North member in Wardak for 2010. dents outside the realm of umes in this region. To the west, areas such as • Regularly ‘contested’ terrain the wider conflict can have Kandahar Province in the within Southern region Daykundi were primarily upon the community. The SOUTH reported 2 sig- dominated by local power use of an airstrike to target nificant suicide attacks this structures and the conflicts the Pasaband District period, which combined they breed. ANSO is supported by Shadow Governor (in the resulted in 8 IMF soldiers Following a recent spate of south of Ghor) illuminates killed and a further 14 higher intensity AOG actions two key features of the con- wounded. Overall it ap- in Jalalabad, the regional cen- text in this province: the pears that AOG in this tre for the EAST, criminal importance of exogenous region are intent on carry- activity outpaced opposition AOG (the DSG was from ing on through the ‘end of activity this period. This is Helmand) and the steady the fighting season’ as well attributed in part to vigorous escalation of the conflict as maintain their tempo in counter-AOG efforts (seen recorded in the latter half of areas recently claimed in region wide) on the part of 2010. Badghis continues to security force operations security forces, in one case report incident levels on par (as in Helmand). Ghazni affecting an NGO collater- with the summer, a fact continues to be one of the ally. However, the suicide indicative of a resilient and most volatile provinces in attack against NDS on the persistent AOG presence. the country, and the recent 10th clearly telegraphs AOG The NORTH continued its election results could serve future intent for this prov- dominance of NGO inci- as a further destabilising ince. The dramatic drop in dent reporting for 2010, influence, highlighting the AOG incidents in Kunar, accounting for 3 of the total existing ethnic, social, and Khost and Paktya is partially political divides. THE ANSO REPORT Page 2

C ENTRAL REGION

NGO Incidents KABUL Year to Date 9 KABUL 50 This Report Period 1 On 11 December, an INGO fe- 40 male program manager received a landscape. Several successful op- 30 threatening phone call from an erations against suicide cells were 20 reported by security forces. For unknown individual, menacing the 10 instance, on 2 December at 0900 staff member and her family 0 unless a financial payment is made hrs, an NDS patrol engaged a to the 'mujahideen'. The case has group of three alleged suicide at- been reported to ANP. The rea- tackers in transit across Deh Sabz. KABUL AOG KABUL Crime sons behind the targeting of this As a result of the firefight, one of particular staff member have not the attackers was killed and two others were arrested and two sui- proactive disruption of AOG networks in Ka- been disclosed, however, the cir- bul. cumstances feature an underlying cide vests and three rocket economic, hence criminal, motiva- launchers were reportedly seized. Besides recurrent reporting of planned AOG tion behind the threat. Similarly, unconfirmed reporting suicide and/or spectacular attacks against the indicated that a suspicious vehicle typical high profile targets (GOA and military With 28 combined incidents as was apprehended by ANSF offi- installations, high-profile hotels, foreign em- compared to 31 in the last cycle, cers outside the Ministry of Inte- bassies), the only two effective AOG strikes, the incidents remained low in rior during the afternoon of 8 De- both kinetic attacks against static security tar- both volume and intensity and cember. Henceforth, several cases gets, were reported from Surobi, that is, an were consistent with the patterns were also noted of the ANSF re- inaccurate SAF attack against an ANP check- of the previous period. Kabul porting arrests of presumed sui- point on the highway in Tangi Abreshum, and Province hosted 27% of the com- cide attackers without specifying another SAF attack against an ANP check- bined number of incidents re- whether or not equipment related point in the Uzbin Valley. The Tangi Abre- ported in Central, but only 2 out to suicide attacks was found or shum attack came in addition to a total 4 ki- of the 36 AOG-initiated attacks recovered during the course of netic attacks against security targets (convoys occurred in the province. Police investigation. For instance, ANP and checkpoints) recorded on the Qarghayi disruption of AOG networks and sources reported the arrest of an side in Laghman. Given the recurrence of re- logistical chains (9 cases including AOG member driving a motorcy- porting on AOG concentration and planning an IMF-led operation and an cle rigged as a VBIED in the vi- in the area, AOG kinetic attacks along this part RCIED discovery in Bagrami), 4 cinity of Camp Phoenix near the of the Kabul – Jalalabad highway is most likely interventions against kidnapping Jalalabad Road (PD 9), on 7 De- to continue in the short term. Recent reporting gangs, and two arrests of drug- cember at 1000 hrs. However, no also emphasized that AOG operational tactics traffickers dominated the security further comments were released in Kapisa, Laghman and Surobi may encom- as to the case, and local ANP did pass wearing ANSF uniforms in order to pass KEY THREATS & CONCERNS not corroborate the information. thru the ANSF security perimeters. Local secu- Spectacular attacks within Kabul The fact remains that in contrast rity circles have widely debated the fact that City to very low levels of effective ANSF uniforms and military equipment in ANSF operations AOG strikes in the province, the general are readily available on the market in Criminality ANSF and IMF continue their Kabul. THE ANSO REPORT Page 3

NGO Incidents KAPISA KAPISA Year to Date 2 50

This Report Period 0 40 Following a lull in armed escala- tions in the first half of Novem- ployment of the victim’s brother 30 ber, and a consequent return to with a PSC. Four days later, an 20 low-intensity warfare in the vol- ANP convoy drove into an am- 10 bush in the same area, with the umes typical of previous periods, 0 Kapisa witnessed a two-fold in- AOG killing one and injuring an- crease of security incidents (from other serviceman before with- 5 to 12) during this cycle. drawing. In Nijrab, AOG attacked a road construction site in Wishar, KAPISA AOG KAPISA Crime Besides two AOG-initiated at- killing one and injuring an addi- tacks, an IDF incident in Mah- tional PSC staff. killed in action, no casualties were reported on mudi Raqi (and an additional the IMF-ANSF side. In a sad anniversary, one The intensity of the occasional ANP discovery of an IED planted year in captivity for the two French journalists on a primary district road), and a AOG-IMF encounters was illus- taken from the Tagab – Surobi Road was com- trated through one of the Tagab multiple but inaccurate IDF attack memorated on 15 December. against the Kohband DAC, the incidents, again a roadside am- bush staged by the AOG. While In the West, the developments pointed out to following 9 incidents pertained to an increased activity of AOG elements. Never- the volatile eastern districts. on a patrol, an IMF-ANSF unit received SAF from various fight- theless, all three (stand off) incidents remained In Tagab, AOG staged 4 kinetic ing positions located alongside the localized in nature and largely ineffective, pre- attacks against IMF-ANSF pa- main road. The patrol replied with sumably a tactical demonstration of presence trols; while a roadside IED and a direct and indirect fire over the rather than of operational skill and strike primed rocket were defused by course of several hours. In the power. NGOs should however remain alert to the security forces. In Alasay, course of action, close air support the potential of concentrated AOG expansion Shah Kot village saw an AOG- was used to repel the AOG. As in the flat parts of Mahmudi Raqi and Kohi executed killing of a local resident, the ground patrol left positions to Safi in the short and mid-terms. Interestingly, reportedly in reaction to the em- assess the battle damage following the presence of 15 Kapisa fighters was also the airstrike, the force was again spotted in the ranks of a 40+ AOG force, said to plan kinetic attacks against security targets KEY THREATS & CONCERNS engaged by AOG fighters, all of along the Kabul – Jalalabad Highway, on the AOG expansion them finally killed by the security border sections between Laghman and Surobi/ Factional disputes in western forces. While an unspecified larger districts number of AOG members were Kabul.

NOTICE: The data in the graphs provided in this report are accurate as of the 15th of December 2010. THE ANSO REPORT Page 4

NGO Incidents LOGAR Year to Date 2 LOGAR This Report Period 0 50 A lull in security incidents has 40 trict, a maximum 300 local fight- been sustained in Logar during 30 this cycle, with a 30% drop in in- ers (with a limitation of 30 indi- 20 cident volumes as compared to viduals per village) will be armed, the second half of November, and trained and put on the MOI pay- 10 a combined number of incidents roll. While the security implica- 0 representing only 16% of the total tions of the program are yet to be volume recorded in Central. Out seen, opposition to the initiative of 16 incidents, ANSF and IMF has been voiced. The first stream LOGAR AOG LOGAR Crime of thought emphasized the fact activity (75%) outweighed AOG intimidating the communities against any co- strikes. that such initiatives are estranging local traditions of tribal militias operation with GOA and IMF-and the IMF On the IMF and ANSF side, 5 (since imposed via the central stemming up ‘population-centric’ interventions cases of AOG arrests (including government and possibly falling (with priorities emphasized as health and edu- prominent mid-level command- prey to external influences) and cation) and PDF funding schemes (besides the ers) and 5 roadside IED discover- will create parallel structures to traditional infrastructural rehabilitation, some ies (including another ‘daisy chain’ the ANP instead of strengthening of the PDF funding will be allocated to more consisting of 4 charges emplaced the outreach and capacities of developmental schemes such as micro-grants on a primary district road in Ba- already existing structures. Sec- for small-scale businesses). Such scenarios rep- raki Barak) were reported. Two ondly, such programming can be resent a complex environment for NGOs, unfortunate incidents in Charkh (a prone to becoming a destabilizing caught in-between the communities accepting civilian collateral damage ensuing factor itself when introduced into the IMF funding, exposing the population to from an IMF strike in Sarkand, such precariously balanced and AOG reprisals, and the military programming and 1 ANA fatality and an addi- fragmented tribal environments converging in areas and sectors traditionally tional 6 ANA casualties resulting as Khushi. Some assessments sug- covered by NGOs. Eventual cooperation of from an IMF ‘friendly fire’ inci- gest that the ALP will simply in- national NGOs with PRTs and other IMF dent in Charkh Bazaar) comple- troduce ‘just another armed units (mostly via funding schemes and often mented the picture. The last two group’ into the districts, not nec- with no visibility requirements) further blurs incidents were abundantly com- essarily changing the local dynam- the picture, sending out mixed messages both mented upon in the local media, ics to the worse or to the better. to AOGs and to the communities as to the seemingly contributing to the impartiality and neutrality of not-for-profit non growing criticism of local security Two developments are of note. -governmental actors in the province. Firstly, the province has not wit- developments by the community On a more positive note, several NGO initia- and GOA in the province. Most nessed a single effective IED strike. Secondly, all recorded tives looked into programmatic roll-out in the notably, such negative outlooks complex Azra and Kharwar districts, largely no came to the fore during the Minis- AOG incidents were kinetic at- tacks against security targets in -go areas for non-military governmental actors. ter of Interior’s speech to the pro- While Kharwar remains off limits to most ac- vincial shura in Puli Alam in what ‘travel situations on primary dis- trict roads’. The IMF shared in- tors, due to its mixed tribal structure shaping several witnesses qualified as a the political environment and the conflict bold denigration of the provincial sight about a suspected AOG in- tent to ramp up kinetic attacks ramifications, the road to Azra (similar to COP’s performance by the Minis- parts of Puli Alam – Gardez Higway) is where ter. against IMF stationary targets across the province, including criminality dominates local security develop- Meanwhile, the GOA and IMF deployment of suicide bombers ments and effectively interdicts overland ac- officially announced the roll-out and VBIEDs. While largely un- cess from other parts of Logar. Inside the dis- of the Afghan Local Police Pro- documented, but referred to by trict, the landscape is once again shaped by gram (ALP ) in Khushi and Baraki several actors, AOG continue local communities seemingly willing and capa- Barak, meaning that in each dis- shaping the environment in com- ble of interdicting AOG expansion, and exoge- munities located along the strate- nous AOG’s attempts at penetrating the dis- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS gic routes, namely the Kabul – trict and interrupting the local apertures to the Abduction while in transit Gardez highway. Several promi- central government. Targeted killings nent areas, such as Porak became Roadside IED a silent battlefield between AOG- THE ANSO REPORT Page 5

NGO Incidents WARDAK Year to Date 6 WARDAK 100 This Report Period 1 In the second consecutive period, 80 an INGO faced abduction of staff tors in the release of abducted 60 NGO workers. NGOs will gain a members in the southern part of 40 Wardak. An INGO community greater degree of acceptance if the 20 worker and his driver, transiting in local population believes or per- a rented low-profile vehicle en- ceives that local people work for 0 route towards Jaghatu DAC, were local interests. Familial or tribal links often exceed those of any taken from the main road in WARDAK AOG WARDAK Crime Ghazi Mohammad Jan Khan, ideological or political affiliations, providing an opportunity for local some 10km before their final des- and mid-level AOG commanders from the tination. The relatives of the two elders to negotiate the release of individuals abducted by AOG. operational theatre’. Indeed, a minimum 13 abductees, local and well-known documented IMF special operations led to the in the area, were able to establish For the rest, Wardak witnessed capture or killing of at least 4 senior AOG the usual portfolio of AOG at- communication channels with the leaders, a dozen AOG killed in action, an addi- tacks (close-range and abductions, AOG. The negotiations promptly tional four wounded, and a considerable num- IDF & IED), IMF capture/kill led to the release of the driver the ber of captures of individual fighters (23). 70% next day, and the subsequent re- operations and ANP IED discov- of these operations occurred in Saydabad dis- eries, with the exceptional occur- lease of the community worker on trict, where AOG teams collide with ANSF rence of pressure-plate IEDs and 5 December. It has also been un- and IMF presence alongside the Highway 1, several rocket attacks targeting derstood that the AOG was not 23% in Chaki Wardak, which seemingly hosts unknown to the INGO staff in security forces and road construc- the most extensive network of local tion projects (Jalrez Road) associ- question, who is himself a well- (predominantly IEA) commanders, and the ated with GOA and protected by known community member, im- remaining case in Maidan Shahr, the provincial PSCs. In terms of IED activity, 5 plying that the motivation behind capital. the abduction may have been effective IED strikes were wit- partly driven by personal dispute. nessed on Highway 1 in Saydabad IMF focus on the southern flank of the prov- This incident marked the 5th (2), Nirkh (1), and on the primary ince will be sustained by the introduction of a NGO staff abduction within War- roads in Maidan Shahr and Czech Mentoring Team (OMLT), embedded dak for 2010 (3 in Saydabad, 2 in Jaghatu (1 each). An additional 3 with local ANA units along 3 forward operat- Jaghatu). The case illustrated once IED discoveries were reported ing bases in Sayadabad and Jaghatu. The intro- again the implication of local from Nirkh (2) and Jalrez (1). duction of 5 mentoring teams into the large community acceptance of the Saydabad and Jaghatu district is not likely to For the overall patterns, the inci- dramatically reverse the current balance of INGO programming, combined dent volumes actually increased by power in the districts. However, this develop- with the local identity of the 20%, although the number of INGO staff, as determining fac- ment is expected to develop ANSF capacities AOG attacks remained consistent to police the major roads in the districts in the with the current 19 cases against mid-term. KEY THREATS & CONCERNS the previous 21. The spike was Attacks along main roads mainly due to the higher reporting AOG expansion of pro-active IMF-initiated opera- Abductions tions aiming at ‘removing higher THE ANSO REPORT Page 6

NGO Incidents DAYKUNDI DAYKUNDI Year to Date 0 50 This Report Period 0 Besides criminality, security devel- 40 opments in Daykundi are tradi- continuation of a more compre- 30 hensive stand-off between a tionally dominated by local rival- 20 ries among influential command- Pushteruq-based commander, a ers, some of them having ensured dominant figure on the provincial 10 government positions, rather than warlords’ scene, and local GOA 0 by the overall political conflict. In authorities loyal to a rival jihadi such an environment, access to faction. The clashes re-emerged governmental positions easily be- during the past two cycles with a DAYKUNDI AOG DAYKUNDI Crime comes a strategy of gaining legiti- series of abductions on both sides. macy and discrediting one’s oppo- Interestingly, the commander in the individuals’ implication in the infamous nents. This was once again illus- question rejects any involvement abduction of 2 INGO staff members in the trated by an attack on the in anti-GOA efforts and dismisses past. Miramor Chief of Police and a it as negative propaganda by his enemies, pointing instead to the Similarly on a positive note, in Ashtarlai the subsequent series of arrests con- sons of an influential commander, who passed ducted by ANP. In the evening fact that his rivals simply hap- pened to access governmental away earlier this year, seem to have found hours of 3 December, a group of common cause with GOA authorities, tempo- fighters engaged a convoy escort- positions and that the present conflict dates from well before rarily freezing the drivers of instability ob- ing Miramor Chief of Police served by NGOs operating in the area. In through the Kurga Olya Valley, their current assignments. As such, a message has been commu- Miramor, the district wuluswal confirmed that Khadir, killing one and injuring ANP are currently upgrading their presence another ANP serviceman. Three nicated to the NGO community that this particularly commander with the aim to secure the roads against crimi- individuals were arrested by ANP nality. While in the south, alleged AOG sea- the same day, and an additional will not target the NGO commu- nity in his zones of influence, sonal migration has not materialized into tangi- two on 5 December. The attacks ble security incidents. Whereas the snow will were locally interpreted as the which stretches over large parts of the province. Although a positive soon interdict overland travel, intensive reha- development, the commander’s bilitation works seem to be ongoing on the KEY THREATS & CONCERNS commitment to NGO safety is Nili airstrip, aimed at enabling flights by fixed- AOG migration into south interpreted cautiously by the com- wing assets. Criminality munity, in particular in the light of

NOTICE: The data in the graphs provided in this report are accurate as of the 15th of December 2010. THE ANSO REPORT Page 7

NGO Incidents PARWAN Year to Date 2 PARWAN This Report Period 0 50 Out of 9 incidents during this cy- 40 emphasizes the authors’ intention cle, 2 non-lethal AOG strikes 30 against IMF and GOA targets to accurately target security forces, (respectively an RCIED and an NGO’s proximity to such targets 20 IDF) and a targeted killing of a in the Shomali plains increases the 10 prominent mullah ascribed to the likelihood of collateral damage 0 nexus of local commanders’, un- and should be avoided. In Sadat derlined NGO risk factors per- Khel (Chaharikar), an ANP mem- taining to the security landscape ber was killed while manipulating PARWAN AOG PARWAN Crime of the province. Despite the low the charge of another IED dis- intensity and lethality of the inci- covered in the early morning Kapisa and a more permanent influx of fight- dents, and the fact that two thirds hours along another primary dis- ers into Kohi Safi regularly appear in security of data entries pertain to ANSF- trict road in close proximity to the reports. base. Another IED, emplaced in IMF police operations, NGOs Following the NGO incident in Monara re- need to be aware of a) continued the early evening hours, was dis- covered and safely defused on the ported during the previous cycle, the Ja- IED activity in the Shomali plain, balusseraj area witnessed another, and more namely in the vicinity of the Ba- road connecting Bagram DAC (and BAF) to Puli Sayat and fur- serious, escalation of force. In the evening of gram Airfield Base (BAF); b) ele- 1st of December, an unknown attacker armed vated risks of inaccurate IDF at- ther towards Kapisa. IED activity along the main road networks will with an AK 47 entered the mosque in Eshqa- tacks in Bagram (BAF again) and bad and gunned down a local mullah. The vic- Kohi Safi (security targets in the likely continue during the winter months. tim was a young Pakistani-trained conservative DAC); and c) potential for contin- cleric, popular with the young religious con- ued warlord driven escalations in IDF represents another stand-off stituency in the area. An outspoken critic of the areas to the north of Chahari- (and primarily overnight) tactical the unabated influence of local warlords and kar. method of choice for AOG to mafia kingpins, as much as of the IMF in the IED activity materialized in an demonstrate their capabilities in country, the mullah clearly stood in the way of inaccurate RCIED strike on the the Shomali Plains. During this local power-holders. Given the unpredictability Kabul – Chaharikar Highway in cycle, primed projectiles were dis- the impacts of local power-struggles can have Dosaraka Area (close to the Ba- covered in Kohi Ibrahim (Kohi on the security landscape, NGOs will benefit gram junction), with the charge Safi) and Qalai Dasht (Bagram), from a thorough avoidance of exposure to any detonating some 20m past the last while two projectiles impacted at security and high-profile targets there may be military vehicle. The use of re- the Kohi Safi DAC, causing no in northern Parwan. harm or damage to the property. mote-controlled charges, as op- Meanwhile, the Ghorband Valley remained posed to victim-operated devices, Similar to IEDs, irregular IDF attacks will likely constitute the calm despite reports, impossible to corrobo- brunt of local AOG activity dur- rate, indicating that local AOG leadership re- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS ing the lean winter period. Winter- quested cells to intensify kinetic attacks against  IED/IDF in Bagram time intensification of stand-off the road construction project taking place AOG/ACG in Ghorband attacks in the Shomali plains there. AOG expansion in Kohi Safi linked to AOG infiltrations from THE ANSO REPORT Page 8

N ORTHERN REGION

NGO Incidents BALKH Year to Date 12 BALKH 50 This Report Period 1 In Balkh Province the first week 40 of December witnessed another Bolak District, where usually these 30 serious incident along the Mazar- were AOG direct attacks on 20 ANSF/IMF convoys and static Shibirghan Road involving an 10 NGO. On 6th of December, positions. 0 around 1220 hrs, an NGO vehicle Early December also saw direct travelling from Faryab to Mazar-e attacks in Sholgara, Chimtal and Sharif with six passengers came Chahar Bolak. In Chimtal District BALKH AOG BALKH Crime under small arms fire in Khana- on the 6th and 8th of December, bad area. Accordingly, one visible two logistical convoys came under IMF support units, and is expected to last until gunman fired several shots to- AOG attack in the area of Arab early January with a phase of ‘high intensity’ wards the vehicle. The vehicle was Mazari Village. It is likely that the lasting at least two weeks in the targeted dis- hit by 3 or 4 times, impacting the spike in activity observed along tricts. As past practice indicates, it is very likely front and the right side of the car, the Mazar-Shibirghan Main Road that the current operation will displace com- resulting in the injuring of one in the PRP, mixed with political batants into surroundings area. Reporting indi- NGO national staff member and pressure (a recent appeal to the cates that several AOG members, including a teenage boy. The NGO driver government and security forces commanders, have been arrested, however no sped up and managed to drive made by the Provincial Gover- significant clashes have so far been recorded. away from the area. At this point, nor), resulted in a large scale Similarly, an increase in IED deployment will the exact motivation behind this ANSF deployment into the areas most likely be observed, particularly in Chimtal attack remains unclear; however, surrounding the main road. The District. This was underlined on 10th of De- the modus operandi points to- said military operation was cember, in Joye Shor Village, when an IED wards an opportunistic attempt to launched on the 10th of Decem- detonated against an ANP vehicle, killing two target a ‘high-profile’ vehicle ber, with the objective to secure ANP, including one officer, and wounding (Ranger), rather than a deliberate the Mazar-Shibirghan main road another three. Taking into account that the targeting of the NGO. As seen in and clear the area of AOG pres- military operation will be conducted district- the past, the Mazar-Shiberghan ence. The operation will largely wide, in order to minimize the chance of col- Road has experienced numerous focus on Chahar Bolak and Chim- lateral damage and association with the ambushes, particularly in Chahar tal, with limited activities in ANSF/IMF presence, the best course of ac- neighbouring districts, particularly tion for NGOs will be to avoid the affected KEY THREATS & CONCERNS the eastern areas of Fayzabad and areas. NGO abduction Maroyan districts (Jawzjan). The AOG checkpoints operation involves a significant Military operations ANSF contingent, along with THE ANSO REPORT Page 9

NGO Incidents BADAKHSHAN Year to Date 4 BADAKHSHAN 50 This Report Period 0 In Badakhshan Province the over- 40 all level of reported incidents has by air assets) which located an 30 remained consistent with the pre- ammunition cache concealed in a 20 vious reporting period. The prov- residential house. The same day, 10 ince continues to be a permissive but in Sari Jaar area, ANP located 0 area for NGO operations, with and seized assorted weapons and ammunition from an abandoned only seven reported incidents in BADAKHSHAN AOG BADAKHSHAN Crime the past two weeks. Kishim Dis- house. Another ANSF search op- eration was reported on 10th in the trict, which usually hosts AOG The detonation caused no casualties; however Kohistan District Centre, and re- activity, was this time the scene of the residence sustained damage. Yaftali Sufla sulted also in seizure of weapons two separate ANSF and IMF op- District had been the scene of several demon- nd and ammunition. Besides three erations. On 2 of December, in strations related with the latest parliamentary incidents related to criminal activi- Sarae Sharqi Village, IMF con- elections and some tensions seem to persist in ties that were recorded in Wardo, ducted an operation (supported the area. In regards to the aforementioned inci- Warduj and Wakhan districts, an dent AOG responsibility remains a possibility, incident of note occurred in Yaf- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS however local rivalries should not be excluded tali Suflta on 12 December. In Instability in Kishim & Darayem as well. districts Nishrin Village, an IED emplaced in front of the District Attorney's IMF operations residence prematurely detonated.

NGO Incidents KUNDUZ KUNDUZ Year to Date 2 100 This Report Period 0 Kunduz Province witnessed an 80 increase in AOG-initiated inci- ians wounded. It is interesting to 60 dents, which affected Imam Sahib, note that according to ANSO 40 Khanabad, Kunduz and Chahar data, the said district witnessed 20 Dara districts. The latter district four suicide attacks in the past 0 saw its first reported incident in- three years. One incident was re- volving a suicide attacker for ported in 2007, and three in 2008. KUNDUZ AOG KUNDUZ Crime 2010. On 11th of December, in Of note, all of them were target- ing IMF convoys. While IED/ Dubani Area, which is located tions against ANSF/IMF convoys, resulting in RCIED deployment remains a around 1 km north of the Chahar a total of three ANP injured. Dara District Centre, on the main distinctive concern across the On another note, Khanabad District was the road to Kunduz, an SVBIED province, it should be noted that scene of several armed clashes that occurred detonated targeting an ANA IED-related incidents in the past between two pro-government militia groups checkpoint. Besides the death of two weeks concentrated on Imam over an interpersonal dispute. In addition, the attacker, the attack resulted in Sahib, Khanabad and Kunduz Imam Sahib saw two armed clashes, this time five ANA soldiers and three civil- districts. As it had been already observed in the PRP, the village between AOG and pro-government militias of Zarkhadir, in the north of that occurred on 12th of December in Delshad KEY THREATS & CONCERNS Kunduz City, has continued to area and three days later in Gharaw Village. IEDs remain the area of IED concen- AOG offensive tration. During the present period IMF operations there were three separate detona- THE ANSO REPORT Page 10

NGO Incidents SAR- E PUL Year to Date 2 SAR‐E PUL This Report Period 1 50 In Sar-e Pul, the presence of 40 AOG checkpoints continues to the area and subsequently located 30 pose a significant challenge to the NGO vehicle, riddled with 20 NGO movement across the prov- bullets. Although an illegal check- 10 ince. In this reporting period the point in Sang Tuda area consti- 0 province witnessed the second tutes a new development, the NGO direct incident in 2010. On main Sar-e Pul-Shibirghan road SAR‐E PUL AOG SAR‐E PUL Crime 2nd of December, in Sar-e Pul Dis- has continued to experience AOG trict, three NGO staff members activity, with another day-time heavy equipment. checkpoint occurring on 9th in the were temporarily abducted in There were also several AOG direct attacks area of Zaka Village. At approxi- Sang Toda at around 1545 hrs, during this period, which concentrated mainly mately 1030 hrs, AOG attempted after driving into an AOG check- on Sar-e Pul District, in Khardar and Imam to stop an ANP truck. The truck point while travelling on the road Jaffar areas. Further, two ANP checkposts driver did not stop and managed between Sozma Qala and Sar-e came under attack in Ingishkak (a village on to escape from the area, however Pul District. Until now, this loca- the confines of Sayyad and Sar-e Pul districts). the gunmen opened fire, wound- tion has not seen any security inci- In addition, on 7th of December ANSF con- ing one ANP. It is worth noting dents. It seems that due to its pro- ducted a search operation in the area of that according to ANSO data, file (Toyota Hilux with green Sheram Village (Sar-e Pul) following the ab- there have been at least 13 AOG NGO plates), the NGO car at- duction of two GOA employees which had checkpoints (including the latest tracted the attention of AOG occurred earlier in the neighbouring province incidents) reported on the Sar-e members manning the illegal of Jawzjan. The operation resulted in clashes Pul-Shibirgan Main Road in the checkpoint. Afterwards, several with AOGs, during which four ANSF were past four and half months. The armed men isolated the NGO reported missing. Their corpses were later lo- majority of these checkpoints vehicle from the other cars. The cated in Sharam area, but the whereabouts of were localised in Adbakhshe area NGO staff were forced to pro- the GOA abductees are still unknown. ceed to an unknown location es- with 7 incidents, then respectively It is possible that the security situation in Sar-e corted by several armed men. in Zaka (3), Sa Shanba (3), Imam Pul will be further affected by AOG elements During the trip they managed to Jaffar (1) and Sayidabad (1), and dislocating in light of the recent military opera- escape by taking advantage of each were reportedly set up in tions in Balkh. NGOs operating in the prov- darkness and a moment of inat- order to search for GOA and ince should closely monitor local dynamics as tention of their guards. Following ANSF employees. Of note, the this AOG spill over from neighbouring areas is the incident, ANSF deployed to Sayidabad area is the site of the NGO abduction which occurred anticipated. KEY THREATS & CONCERNS on 13th of November, when three AOG checkpoints INGO staff members were taken AOG spillover from Balkh from the main road while driving a marked white truck transporting THE ANSO REPORT Page 11

NGO Incidents BAGHLAN Year to Date 5 BAGHLAN 50 This Report Period 0 In Baghlan Province AOGs were 40 particularly active in Pul-e unabated along the Pul-e Khumri- 30 Khumri, Baghlan-e Jadid and Da- Mazar Road. The first week of 20 hana-i-Ghuri districts. Whereas in this reporting period saw five 10 AOG attacks which were concen- Pul-e Khumri District AOG di- 0 rect attacks continued along the trated around the traditional ‘hot- spots’ of Cheshma-e-Sher, Bagh-e Pul-e Khumri - Mazar-e Sharif BAGHLAN AOG BAGHLAN Crime Main Road, Baghlan-e Jadid ex- -Shamal and Sorkh Kotal areas. perienced another attack targeting The potential risk of collateral Kotal and Saqi villages. Only one significant telecommunication infrastructure. involvement was underlined in clash was reported the first day in Cheshma-e- nd On 2nd of December, a group of Cheshma-e-Sher area, on 2 of Sher, when AOG attacked an IMF convoy armed men set fire to a telecom- December, during an AOG attack with RPGs and SAF, injuring two IMF soldiers munication tower, destroying all on an ANP check post, when a and damaging one IMF vehicle. The operation equipment inside the facility. This transiting logistical convoy was is still ongoing, mainly in the north-east areas incident marks the fifth such at- caught up in the fire fight. One of Dahana-i-Ghuri District with armed clashes tack to occur in Baghlan in 2010. fuel tanker was set ablaze, but the reported from Jo-e Naw, Wardak Ah, and driver and his assistant managed AOG direct attacks targeting Ahmadzai Ah Villages. In addition, Dahana-i- to escape from the scene un- ANP checkposts also continued Ghuri witnessed significant clashes between harmed. AOGs and pro-government militias in Joi In reaction to recent attacks, Now and Charmab areas. Finally, on 14th in KEY THREATS & CONCERNS ANSF/IMF launched military Baghlan-e Jadid District, Gerdab Village, AOG Attacks on Baghlan-Kunduz road operations on the 6th of Decem- attacked a private company convoy with SAF , Tensions in Baghlan-e Jadid ber. This operation was con- slightly damaging a truck while it was travelling Military operations ducted in Cheshma-e-Sher, Sorkh on Kunduz-Old Baghlan Main Road.

NGO Incidents JAWZJAN Year to Date 1 JAWZJAN 50 This Report Period 0 In Jawzjan the overall incident 40 volumes have decreased com- in possession of suicide vests and 30 pared with the previous reporting despite numerous accounts, a 20 period. However, recent develop- doubt persists in regards to the 10 ments indicate the potential for a credibility of this particular threat. 0 change in dynamics across the Also in Shibirghan District, in province. On 6th of December, in Qawchin Village, AOG abducted JAWZJAN AOG JAWZJAN Crime Shibirghan City, Proje-L Area, two GOA employees (a driver two suspects were arrested in pos- and an engineer) along with their have been GOA/GOA related targets. In re- session of two suicide vests. Ac- vehicle (Toyota Surf) as they were sponse to this recent abduction of two GOA cording to ANSO data, this is the conducting a road assessment in employees, ANSF conducted a search opera- second reported arrest of its kind the said area. The incident marks tion in Sar-e Pul, Sheram Village (see Sar-e Pul in Jawzjan Province in 2010. The the second reported abduction in Province). first incident occurred on 23rd of Shibirghan District this year. Ac- Another incident of note occurred on 5th of August when two suspected sui- cording to ANSO data, there have December, in Mingajik District, Abas Village, cide bombers were arrested while already been nine abductions re- when a group of approximately twenty AOG travelling from Maymana (Faryab) ported across the province in members armed with RPGs and heavy ma- to Shibirghan City in a public bus. 2010. The majority of incidents chine guns surrounded a mosque and warned In regards to the recent incident, have so far been concentrated in the local civilians against sending their daugh- the investigation revealed that the Darzab (5) and Qush Tepa (2) ters to schools and letting their sons join two individuals were actually not districts. Although, as reported in ANSF. This is the first significant incident re- the previous report, the province ported in the said district since March 2010, KEY THREATS & CONCERNS saw an INGO temporary abduc- when two suspected armed robbers, stopped AOG/ACG activity tion (in Sae Shanbi Afghani Vil- two local civilians and robbed them of their Abduction lage), the main target of abduction cash and valuables in the area of Kharabai Alamleak. THE ANSO REPORT Page 12

NGO Incidents TAKHAR Year to Date 5 TAKHAR 50 This Report Period 1 Events in Takhar were shaped by 40 the release of the national driver gests that it could be related to the 30 and the INGO expatriate staff fact that the said INGO was in 20 member abducted on 25th of Oc- the process of closing its opera- 10 tober from the Kunduz-Taloqan tions and the information about 0 Main Road in Bangi District. Both victims’ departure was well known locally. The investigation into this staff members were finally re- TAKHAR AOG TAKHAR Crime leased unharmed on 2nd of De- incident is still ongoing, with sev- cember in the afternoon through eral related arrests having been of December, in Qaber-e-Qazi area, Kunduz- the negotiations involving differ- reported from Taloqan City. Takhar Main Road, early in the morning, a ent actors. Further information The majority of reported incidents group of armed individuals set up a temporary seems to confirm that the abduc- during the present cycle were con- check point and robbed passengers of their tion was ACG-initiated and re- centrated in Taloqan District. On valuables. Another armed robbery, occurring lated to ACG elements operating 11th, in Ochqudoq Village on the 11th in Khetayan area on the usually between Takhar and the western (approximately 12 km north-west safe Takhar-Badakhshan Road, involved armed areas of Kunduz Province (Bangi of Taloqan) an IED detonated individuals stopping four private trucks and and Khanabad districts). In addi- IED detonated against the vehicle robbing the passengers of their cash and valu- tion, the motive for the abduction of the Provincial Council Chair- ables. It is likely that due to the relatively clem- appears to be financial rather then man. The official escaped un- ent weather conditions, armed robberies along political. Peripheral reporting harmed but one of his bodyguards districts roads will persist. seems to confirm that the abduc- was injured in the incident. While In addition, on 8th of December, AOG at- tion was premeditated and the it has not been possible to identify tacked Taloqan airport with mortars and SAF, perpetrators had prior knowledge the exact motivation of the attack marking the first complex attack in the area of the victims’ movement, based so far, as in different areas of the since last August. Another incident of note on a combination of surveillance Northern Region, the incident occurred in Khwaja Ghar District, on 7th of and information gathering. At this may be seen as a deliberate target- December, when AOG executed a woman stage, it is unknown why this spe- ing of GOA officials. accused of adultery. Along with frequent mi- cific organization was targeted. Except an AOG attack on an grations of AOGs into Khwaja Ghar from Unconfirmed information sug- ANP CP that occurred in Chinzae Dashte Archi this incident may indicate AOG area and an RCIED that was lo- intent to increase the control over the area. KEY THREATS & CONCERNS cated in Cheshmey Bangi area, on Tensions in northern Takhar Takhar-Kunduz Road, road secu- Banditry along Takhar-Kunduz rity in the district was affected road mainly by criminal activity. On 1st THE ANSO REPORT Page 13

NGO Incidents SAMANGAN Year to Date 4 SAMANGAN This Report Period 0 50 Two incidents were reported in 40 th Samangan in the past two weeks. lies and local elders. On the 13 , 30 Both occurred in Dara-e Suf the area of Dara-e Khusk wit- 20 Payan District and were related to nessed another incident. This time 10 abduction cases. Further informa- a group of armed men abducted 0 tion was received in regards to the two international staff working for a private construction company abduction of the three GOA em- SAMANGAN AOG SAMANGAN Crime ployees reported in the previous along with two ANP officials who cycle. The said employees, at first escorted them. Following this ab- tionals) were abducted from Kotal area. Also believed to be road construction duction, ANP launched a search in this case they were released after ANP con- company staff, were abducted on operation in the area of Safid Ko- ducted a rescue operation in Bayana Village. 29th of November from Dara-e tal and released the abductees un- Although unconfirmed, it seems that the latest Khusk area. They were finally re- harmed. During the operation a incidents are related to local armed groups re- leased unharmed on 4th of De- prolonged fire fight erupted be- sourcing their activities via banditry. Further- cember, from Surkhawai Village tween ANP and the abductors, more, an increase in AOG presence has been of Dar-e Suf Payan District, fol- resulting in one perpetrator killed. observed in Hazrati Sultan District. This pres- lowing negotiations by their fami- The incident marks the second ence does not represent an automatic threat to abduction involving an interna- NGO activities as AOGs are known to mi- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS tional in Samangan this year. On grate in small numbers from Kunduz and nd AOG/ACG checkpoints 22 of July, four staff members Baghlan seeking safe haven. Abduction of a road construction company (one national and three interna-

NGO Incidents FARYAB Year to Date 17 FARYAB This Report Period 0 50 In Faryab, AOG initiated inci- 40 dents continued to affect the of Pashtun Kot District. In addi- 30 south-western districts of the tion, armed attacks on ANP 20 province. During the present cycle checkposts occurred in Shirin Ta- 10 AOG presence was particularly gab, Khwaja Sabz Posh, Bilchi- 0 visible in Qaysar and Pashtun ragh, Dawlatabad and Qaysar dis- tricts. Kot. Along with numerous attacks FARYAB AOG FARYAB Crime on ANP checkposts, ANP & lo- In the latter district, AOG activity gistical convoys have been in- was focused on the area of Sinji- Almar. For instance, in Qaysar District, Shan- creasingly targeted. The most sig- tak Village. In the past two weeks bah Village, AOG attacked the private resi- nificant AOG attack occurred in AOG led two direct attacks in the dence of an ANP officer. On 8th of December Pashtun Kot, on 4th of December area against ANP checkposts. another ANP officer was abducted in Almar, in Masjed Safed area, when an Furthermore, between the 2nd and Khodaymat Village along with his transport ANP convoy came under AOG 8th of December four IEDs deto- and equipement. AOG operating in Faryab attack while it was carrying eleven nated in the area, killing a total of also attempted to target a high ranking GOA containers which were to be used two ANP and eight pro- official, also on the 8th. In Khwaja Sabz Posh for reinforcing ANP checkpoints. government militia members and District, ANP engaged an AOG in process of As a result, ANA reinforcement wounding an additional two ANP setting up an ambush targeting the Faryab Pro- and IMF air support were called and eight militia members. The vincial Council Chairman in the vicinity of his in and the ensuing fire fight lasted effectiveness of this particular residence. Lastly, an illegal AOG checkpoint for almost five hours, resulting in AOG tactic was demonstrated on was reported on 2nd of December, in Qaram- the killing of three ANP and the 8th, in which a single IED qol District, Jangle area, where two AOG wounding of the Chief of Police strike killied six militia members members on a motorbike stopped and and wounded an additional eight. searched several private vehicles for GOA em- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS The targeting of individual ANP ployees. Sustained attacks in Qaysar officials was also recorded in the Targeting of ANP districts of Qaysar, Kohistan and THE ANSO REPORT Page 14

W ESTERN REGION

NGO Incidents HERAT HERAT Year to Date 18 80 This Report Period 1 70 th In the evening of 30 of Novem- 60 ber, the corpse of a female na- local commander from the area, 50 40 tional NGO staff member was until he was killed in Kushk due 30 found in Nawbadam Area of Injil to a personal dispute. Since a 20 District. She had been reported commander from Kushki Kuhna 10 missing on the same day in Herat is now leading the group, tensions 0 City. In the two years there has in the area reportedly increased. only one similar incident recorded The commander from Kushki HERAT AOG HERAT Crime and in both cases, female national Kuhna operates as ‘AOG’ but tern which has been seen during the previous INGO staff were the victims also has criminal links. It is worth cycle. AOGs consistently target ANSF/IMF working in the microfinance sec- noting that this new commander with roadside IEDs, avoiding direct confronta- tor. Although AOGs might be was the head of the prison in Ka- tion. Therefore, an increase in IEDs on the opposed to even sharia-compliant rukh during the Taliban regime. main roads north of Herat City cannot be ex- microfinance activities and Therefore, his reputation is rather cluded at present. Kuskh itself saw an IED women working for NGOs, there negative, which limits his influ- discovery in Darzak Area and a detonation in is usually some kind of warning. ence and support of the popula- Yaka Dukan Area on 10th December, targeting Therefore, a criminal motive such tion in the district. At present, IMF. Of note, most unusual was an RCIED as a robbery or a personal dispute NGOs are advised to avoid the on the main Herat-Turghundi Road in Injil is assumed to be the reason be- area until a clearer picture on the District as AOG activities on this road typi- hind the killing. AOG capacity and actions is avail- cally concentrate on the areas north of the able. Although, authorities indi- In relation to the AOG threats Kushk DAC. On 11th of December, an cated that they are planning to NGOs in Palezkar Area of Ka- RCIED under a bridge detonated, targeting an deploy 60 Afghan Local Police rukh, further information suggests IMF patrol. Reportedly, the detonation missed (ALP) in north-western Karukh that an armed group linked to the targeted vehicle, but nearly hit a following bordering on Kushki Kuhna, the AOGs is active in the area around one. The incident serves as a reminder to keep actual benefit of this deployment Malikihar, Palezkar and Nayestan distance from ANSF/IMF and also high pro- for the stability in the district re- villages. Until one month ago, the file vehicles. Another two IEDs were discov- mains to be seen and will depend group had been operating under a ered on the main road to Pashtun Zarghun in very much on the recruitment Pule Hashimi Area of Injil on 6th of December. process of the ALP. KEY THREATS & CONCERNS In addition, on the same day ANP discovered IEDs The focus of AOG activities was an IED in Ishaq Soliman Area of Injil. again the area of Kushk as well as AOG activity in Karukh the Herat-Turghundi Road, a pat- THE ANSO REPORT Page 15

NGO Incidents FARAH Year to Date 0 FARAH 50 This Report Period 0 Farah Province has seen less inci- 40 dents – in particular, significantly ‘reconciling’ in Herat are from 30 less AOG initiated incidents – Farah. Further developments in 20 during the present reporting pe- the reconciliation process cur- 10 riod. The current level has re- rently underway in the Western 0 turned to those reported from Region might extend this trend. December last year; whereas the However, it is unlikely that AOG previous months had seen double activity in Farah Province will FARAH AOG FARAH Crime or triple the numbers compared to remain as low as now for an ex- is not the first time in these group have clashed 2009. This recent development tended period, and a increase in due to conflicting desires. Furthermore, AOG may be tied to the increase in AOG activities is to be expected abducted an engineer from Herat and an engi- ANSF/IMF operations during the in the mid-term. neer from Farah on 3rd of December in Mas- last months. These operations, Another continuing trend in saw Area. Both worked for the GoA on a wa- particularly the concentrated tar- Farah linked to lower AOG ca- ter project in the same area. The engineer from geting of command structures in pacity is the decrease of IEDs. Farah was released shortly afterwards. The key AOG districts (including the Only one IED was recorded in corpse of the engineer from Herat was found killing of the District Shadow the last two weeks. On 14th of by ANP on 6th of December. Abductions are Governor of Bakwa and the arrest December 2010, ANP discovered infrequent in Khaki Safed, with only one other of the DSG of Pur Chaman) may an IED in Deleram Area of abduction by AOG and three other abductions have affected AOG capacities. In Bakwa District, which was safely by ACG in 2010. The other abductions took addition, reports suggest that defused by an IMF EOD team. place in Kurghan Village (November), Kor- some of the AOG member The hotspot during this period gand Area, Jeja Village and Chapak Area. The was Khaki Safed. On 2nd of De- recent abduction seems to be linked to the KEY THREATS & CONCERNS cember, an armed clash erupted specific work of the engineers; however, the reason why one was released and the other Abduction between AOG members and vil- killed remains unclear. Intimidation in Kahki Safed lagers, when the AOG attempted to collect illegal taxes. Of note, it

NGO Incidents BADGHIS Year to Date 0 BADGHIS This Report Period 0 70 After a period of relative calm in 60 these were detonations, targeting 50 the first half of the current report- 40 ing period, incidents in Badghis ANSF and IMF in Kotale Khaki 30 Area of Muqur and in Folad Area 20 increased significantly towards the 10 middle of December. IED inci- of Ghormach. In Murghab, a 0 dents continue at high levels in roadside IED hit an ANSF/IMF comparison to the summer and convoy en route to Qala-I-Naw, the ratio between IEDs and direct killing one ANA soldier and BADGHIS AOG BADGHIS Crime wounding another. attacks – the prevailing AOG tac- trict, which since the elections in September tic before – was again nearly even. In contrast, direct attacks were became another area of concern in Badghis Of note, the historic AOG hot- concentrated on Ghormach with Province, saw its second airstrike within three spot Murghab, which saw major around 80% taking place in this weeks on 8th December, targeting Chah Talkh th ANSFG/IMF operations this au- district. On 8 of December, Area this time. tumn, accounted for the vast ma- AOG also attacked the District jority of all IED related incidents. Administration Centre of Ghor- Qala-I-Naw City remained quiet, reporting th However, only around 40% of mach, whereas all other direct only a peaceful demonstration on 12 of De- attacks focused on ANSF/IMF. cember. Supporters of candidates who lost in The shift of AOG-ANSF/IMF the parliamentary elections, protested against KEY THREATS & CONCERNS fighting to the north-eastern dis- perceived fraud during the electoral process, Armed clashes trict was already visible during the ultimately submitting a petition to UNAMA . Airstrikes in Qadis last reporting periods. Qadis Dis- THE ANSO REPORT Page 16

NGO Incidents GHOR Year to Date 10 GHOR This Report Period 0 50 The stability of Ghor Province, 40 currently facing a deterioration in likely to affect the dynamics in 30 both the south and Chaghcharan both Chaghcharan and Shahrak, 20 District, has been challenged fur- especially since common opinion 10 ther due to the killing of an influ- indicates that there is no leading 0 ential local commander on the (or strong enough) successor. 6th. He was ambushed in Allayer Nevertheless, the supporters of Area, close to Barakhana, on the the killed commander stated that GHOR AOG GHOR Crime main road to Chaghcharan City. they will continue to work with high-ranking AOG commander from Hel- The areas of the commander’s the GoA and welcome NGOs, mand, who was reportedly the District Shadow influence were Barakhana in while guaranteeing the stability of Governor of Pasaband. If, and to what extent, Chaghcharan District as well as the areas. Due to strong family his death will affect AOG structures in the Kamenj Area in Shahrak District. links with parliament members it district remains to be seen; however, a re- He was known as a supporter of is assumed that the supporters will grouping is unlikely to occur until spring. Fur- the GoA and both areas were very not arouse any armed clashes with ther ANSF/IMF operations are also likely in stable under his command. Re- other groups; however, actions the southern parts of Pasaband as well as Tay- ports indicate that he was killed against possible individual perpe- wara. trators are not unlikely. The effect due to a long-term personal dis- In Sharak District, reports indicate that ten- on the road will be debatable; pute with a group from his own sions are increasing due to a local conflict. On area. However, it cannot be ex- however, as illegal checkpoints by 10th of December locals gathered and ex- supporters of the deceased cluded that the perpetrators were pressed their concern with the handling of a (searching for people with links to supported by one of the other murder case by ANP. The gathering resulted in the possible perpetrators) can be power brokers in Ghor. In addi- violent action against official buildings in the expected. tion, it is likely that one of these district centre. Further information suggests other elements – including AOGs In Pasaband an IMF airstrike tar- that the situation remains tense and led to the from Badghis who have had no geted and killed a non-local AOG temporary closure of shops in the district cen- access to such areas so far – will commander on 13th of December tre during the closing days of the month. try to take advantage of the power in Kakuri Area. An earlier ANSF/ vacuum and expand their area of IMF operation in May already influence. Therefore, his death is included close air support in Kan- dalan and Khaja Rouf areas. Both KEY THREATS & CONCERNS operations reconfirm the deterio- Military operations in Pasaband ration in the southern districts of Local tensions in Shahrak Ghor. The recent airstrike struck a THE ANSO REPORT Page 17

E ASTERN REGION

NGO Incidents NANGARHAR Year to Date 3 NANGARHAR This Report Period 1 100 During this reporting period, 80 Nangarhar was relatively quiet Yet a number of those few inci- dents that did occur were signifi- 60 with regard to NGO incidents 40 and AOG attacks/operations, cant. Those of particular impor- 20 instead seeing an elevated number tance, as indications of continued of IMF and ANSF operations AOG capability and intention, 0 dominating the security picture. were a) the December 10th SVBIED that killed two NDS The sole NGO incident, minor NANGARHAR AOG NANGARHAR Crime damage to a clinic in Khogyani as officials and a civilian in Sorkh a result of an IED control deto- Rod near to the main roundabout detention of 25 suspects during a search of a nated by IMF, is symptomatic of into Jalalabad City; b) the Decem- private residence (released shortly after) and nd the developing threat environ- ber 2 IED strike on an IMF ve- the second, in Sherzad on the 11th, targeted ment faced by NGOs in the prov- hicle in Khogyani, injuring 5 IMF and detained the Sherzad District Shadow ince: that is, of collateral damage soldiers; c) two direct attacks on Governor and 9 of his associates, killing one sustained by proximity to the ANSF in Khogyani; and d) the who offered initial resistance as the forces ap- th higher levels of military conflict. unsuccessful December 4 am- proached the compound. Up to this point in Similarly, the absolute number of bush of the Sherzad District Gov- 2010, there had only been four IMF operations AOG-initiated security incidents ernor. That these attacks all oc- in Chaparhar,. Two of these were in the (9) was approximately 50-75% curred in, or likely originated month preceding this reporting period; and as lower than recent reporting peri- from, Khogyani/Sherzad is an such, these operations are a sign of IMF con- ods, and outnumbered by inci- indication that recent IMF opera- cerns about the creeping northward expansion dents of armed criminality for the tions in these relative AOG of AOG presence towards Jalalabad City from first time in recent months. This strongholds have not eliminated the southwestern AOG strongholds. However, drop can be attributed to a few the full range of AOG command- as the arrest of the Sherzad Shadow Governor different causal factors, most no- ers and operatives there, leaving at demonstrates, the IMF remain committed to tably the higher intensity of IMF least some figures there capable actively disrupting AOG networks in the prov- capture/kill operations in the pre- of, and disposed to, launching ince’s most insecure areas, and are scoring im- vious period and the associated such complex/high profile as- portant tactical successes. time-lag needed for logistical re- saults on GOA, ANSF and IMF Meanwhile, NDS arrested an AOG operative supply of armaments and AOG targets. in possession of 4 IEDs in Bihsud district, operatives, but also to the down- However, in spite of these inci- while the ANP were particularly active in com- turn in fighting usually seen over dents, this period’s pattern of op- bating drug and weapon criminality in the the winter period. erations shows a clear pro-activity province, the latter of which was particularly on the part of the security forces, common during this period, with a number of with a total of 21 significant shootings registered in Jalalabad City and envi- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS search/arrest operations. Most rons in the past fortnight. Criminality significant were two incidents in Collateral damage Chaparhar and Sherzad. The first, in Chaparhar, saw a temporary THE ANSO REPORT Page 18

NGO Incidents NURISTAN Year to Date 1 NURISTAN 50 This Report Period 0 As has frequently been the case in 40 2009 and 2010, only two security ate commander from a Punjabi 30 incidents were recorded in Nuris- AOG was confronted and sav- 20 tan during this reporting period. agely beaten by a rival, more ex- 10 The first was an IDF attack on treme, commander and his associ- 0 the Nuristan PRT base located in ates. This commander was on the Kala Gosh area of Nurgaram the way to Friday prayers on the st rd district on December 1 . Two 3 at a mosque in the DAC area NURISTAN AOG NURISTAN Crime mortar rounds landed inside the of Waygal district, a key AOG base, injuring two Afghan guards stronghold in Nuristan. In 2009, stopped due to the withdrawal of IMF ground and two local labourers, albeit not the more moderate commander forces from Waygal (as with neighbouring east- seriously. Such attacks have been had confronted the more extreme ern districts), there has been a concomitant a regular occurrence since they commander about the latter’s kid- drop in security incidents in the district. In began in the second half of 2010, napping of local construction en- 2007 and the first half of 2008 when IMF with 13 different IDF or direct gineers in the district, and it is felt withdrew, there were 36 significant incidents, attacks on the base. Prior to this, that this attack was connected to mostly IMF-AOG sparring, while in the two before the PRT relocated to that this ongoing rivalry. and half years since there have been just 8 inci- area after withdrawing from the Waygal, along with other eastern dents, 2 of which have been IMF air strikes on east, the IMF-AOG conflict was districts, is now considered to be a AOG locations and the others AOG attacks concentrated to the east and south relative safe haven for AOGs in on GOA targets. of the province, and as such, what Nuristan, and was the site of the As such, with a weak and fragmented GOA remains of the IMF-AOG military infamous Battle of Wanat in June presence and no IMF resistance bar the rare air conflict has shifted focus to west- 2008, where 200 AOG fighters strike, there is little impediment for AOGs to ern Nuristan. surrounded an IMF OP, almost operate freely and consolidate their control in The second incident, by contrast, overrunning it and killing 9 IMF the area. Such conflict between AOG com- was both unusual and more in- and 2 ANA soldiers. The Punjabi manders in this manner provides an interesting sightful. A relatively more moder- AOG to which the rival com- insight into how the primary consideration of manders belong was thought to the AOG commanders in Waygal is currently KEY THREATS & CONCERNS be centrally involved in this at- enhancing their position vis a vis other com- AOG dominance tack. manders, rather than in relation to the less rele- Limited GOA presence Since 2008, as the active IMF- vant GOA or IMF. AOG conflict in the district has THE ANSO REPORT Page 19

NGO Incidents KUNAR Year to Date 9 KUNAR 200 This Report Period 0 Kunar has registered the greatest 150 decrease in security incidents in IMF operations, while in this pe- 100 the eastern region over the past 2 riod there were just 24 such AOG months, falling by 50% in the last -initiated incidents. In contrast, 50 the number of IMF or joint IMF/ fortnight. As in Nangarhar, this is 0 partly attributable to the number ANSF military operations doubled of pro-active IMF operations in from last period, jumping from 6 the province – which further in- to 12, with a particular rise in the KUNAR AOG KUNAR Crime creased over the past two weeks – number of air strikes, focused on and to seasonal trends, although the central belt of insecurity com- nity , no NGO staff or facilities were collater- the intensity of the conflict in prising Khas Kunar, Sirkanay and ally caught up in the fighting. Kunar has remained significantly Wata Pur districts, and the north- AOG attacks were also responsible for civilian higher than in its southern ern Ghaziabad and Nari. In all, casualties during this period, with one killed neighbour Nangarhar, concomi- reports indicate that approxi- and 18 injured in IDF attacks and ambushes tant with the much more violent mately 30 AOG fighters were on ANSF and IMF patrols and installations, realities faced by the population killed and another 7 injured dur- although no IMF soldiers were killed or signifi- of the mountainous province. ing these operations, a significant cantly injured in these mostly ineffective at- However, while the number of number, albeit lower than seen tacks. As mentioned above, the quantity of incidents decreased, this drop was during the highly intensive opera- AOG-initiated attacks substantially dropped, entirely recorded on the side of tions in Wata Pur last month. most likely as the cumulative results of con- Kunar’s AOGs: AOGs initiated However, unlike IMF operations tinually escalating IMF operations on their 48 attacks in the last period, as this Autumn, these most recent strongholds and logistical networks. However, they put up strong resistance to ones caused a substantial number of civilian casualties; with almost the likelihood of this present IMF campaign every operation accompanied by leading to a longer term drop in the scale of KEY THREATS & CONCERNS reports of civilians killed and in- the military conflict in the province remains an Insecurity along Jalalabad- open question. Asadabad road jured, with an unconfirmed tally of 7 killed and 10 wounded. For- Collateral civilian casualties tunately for the NGO commu- THE ANSO REPORT Page 20

NGO Incidents KHOST Year to Date 1 KHOST This Report Period 0 120 During this report period, Khost 100 was again highly insecure, with a AOG in the past 10 weeks (by the 80 large number and wide range of IMF’s own count). These opera- 60 security incidents. However, tions were again focused upon a 40 closely resembling the patterns in small number of key districts, par- 20 0 Kunar and Paktya, we have seen a ticularly the neighbouring Sabari, substantial drop in AOG-initiated Tere Zayi and Bak – accounting incidents (50% from 65 to 33) for 12 of the 15 and all but 9 of KHOST AOG KHOST Crime over last period, likely due to the the detained AOG fighters. The cumulative effect of the escalated one exception was the isolated profile AOG operations during the period. intensity of IMF operations Musa Khel, which backs onto the First, with regard to those directed at IMF and against high value individuals and dangerous Jani Khel in Paktya, ANSF, there were 4 direct attacks on IMF cells over the past month. where an IEA commander and 8 convoys in Sabari, Tere Zayi and Nadir Shah Before discussing the military associates were arrested in a raid. Kot, and 3 on ANP CPs and bases in DAC conflict, however, it should be Furthermore, IMF and ANSF areas of Tani, Khost City and Tere Zayi. Fur- noted that Khost saw the second have been considerably more ef- thermore, there were 9 IDF attacks on IMF, mass kidnapping of demining staff fective in disrupting and defusing ANSF and DAC targets, none of which was in the eastern region in the past IED emplacement. Whereas dur- effective in causing damage or casualties. month; 11 local staff members ing last period, 13 IEDs were suc- Moreover, the two attempts at larger, high pro- from a non-NGO demining or- cessfully targeted and 13 discov- file suicide bombings in the provincial capital ganisation were abducted along ered and defused, in this period each failed for their own reasons; the first, an with their vehicle and equipment ANSF and IMF discovered and SVBIED, being stopped on a secondary road in Musa Khel, all but one being defused 22 IEDs, two of which leading into Khost City, saw the driver flee on released after an IMF/ANSF targeted sitting and former GOA/ foot after being confronted, while the second search operation forced the ab- ANSF officials, including the Na- on the 13th saw the suicide bomber step into a ductors to flee Musa Khel with dir Shah Kot District Governor at shop and detonate himself after realising he the remaining abductee (the home in Jaji. Only 6 successfully was incapable of proceeding due to ANP driver), the vehicle and the equip- struck a target of value, making tracking him. ment. The driver was then re- the rate of disruption 100% Yet one high profile strike was effective: a leased a day later. higher even as the number of timed magnetic IED killed an unsuccessful The heightened level of proactive IEDs planted remained almost parliamentary candidate and former ANA offi- IMF operations continued, with at identical. One of these, in Sabari cial as he sat in his car in the city. While his st least 15 significant operations (as on the 1 , was effective however, position as a former ANSF official makes him compared to 24 last period) killing killing one IMF service member a logical target, that he had been unemployed 4 and detaining approximately 50 and wounding two others; yet for two years and failed in his bid to gain a AOG members, including about even in this case, a quick reactive parliamentary seat made the motivations be- th the 60 commander of the prov- search by IMF discovered two hind the attack less clear. Finally of note, there ince’s primary Waziristan-based further IEDs, which were safely were two attacks on the same telephone com- control detonated. pany’s towers in Sabari and Bak with SAF, KEY THREATS & CONCERNS However, indicative of the gener- causing moderate damage to each of them. IMF operations in central districts ally higher levels of violence and Attacks against DAC insecurity in Khost province, IEDs there remained a number of high THE ANSO REPORT Page 21

NGO Incidents LAGHMAN Year to Date 1 LAGHMAN 50 This Report Period 0 The military conflict between 40 Tangi area and emplaced 3 mines AOG and IMF/ANSF continued 30 to escalate in Laghman during this in a roadside place known to be 20 reporting period, with a particu- frequented by ANA and IMF. larly radical jump in the number The next morning, an ANA sol- 10 and intensity of attacks in Alishing dier gathering firewood stepped 0 district, where 6 of the 12 AOG on one of the mines, wounding attacks occurred. Four of these himself and another, while a res- attacks were attacks on IMF, two cue team member called out to LAGHMAN AOG LAGHMAN Crime on the IMF base in Najil Village, respond stepped on another, also thority amongst the local population and deny- and two attacks on convoys in the injuring himself. A large com- ing access to GOA started in Dawlat Shah in Mail Valley and Watan Garo. Fur- bined ANA/IMF force was de- June 2010, and was seen a number of times in thermore, there were two am- ployed to the Highway and de- August around the elections before ceasing bushes of ANP poppy eradication fused a further device, and main- until now, apart from one occasion in Octo- teams in the Salaw area of the tained a heavy presence in the area ber. The increase in kinetic opposition to IMF district, one of which resulted in for the day as a precaution. As in recent weeks, and the economy of force and the death of a policeman. such, while security along the focus deployed by IMF in the district, makes it In Qarghayi, there were four Highway has been better in the likely that this tactic will continue through AOG incidents along the main last 2 months, this moderate spike 2011. Kabul-Jalalabad Highway. The in incidents recently indicates that Summing these incidents, the total number of first three were: an attack on an AOGs maintain the capability and AOG attacks rose by about a third on last pe- ANA CP in the Taragar area on intention to target along the High- riod (from 9 to 12), the highest of the Autumn the 5th, a midnight attack on a fuel way, and there are likely to be fur- and Winter so far, with the larger number in tanker in the Sakando Baba area, ther spikes of kinetic activity on it Alishing being partly compensated by a total and another on an ANP CP and in the medium term. absence of security incidents in the normally nearby IMF supply convoy in the Finally, in Dawlat Shah, the sole busy Alingar. Surkhakan area of the main High- AOG incident was a series of ille- Moreover, the targets of attack have shifted in way, near the Mehtarlam Road gal CPs established on primary the past weeks, with a greater focus on direct turnoff. The fourth was more so- and secondary roads in the attacks against IMF, and lesser emphasis on phisticated, and more effective. In Zarkamar area, an area well IEDs and attacks on non-military targets such the early hours of the 13th, AOG known as a focus for attacks as construction companies. This shift in em- fighters staged themselves in the against ANSF and IMF; the AOG members searched vehicles for phasis towards a more straightforward guerilla government workers, without suc- warfare conflict profile in the province, par- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS ticularly in the northern districts, brings with it AOG targeting of GOA affiliated cess, for a few hours on the personnel morning of December 5th. This a shift in threats to NGOs, particularly to- wards collateral damage from direct attacks Instability in Alishing AOG method of establishing au- and misidentification as GOA workers. THE ANSO REPORT Page 22

NGO Incidents PAKTYA Year to Date 1 PAKTYA 100 This Report Period 0 Similar to Kunar, Paktya too wit- 80 nessed a substantial drop in the AOG. 60 number of security incidents dur- However, this operation was 40

ing this reporting period, by al- marred by the accidental targeting 20 most 50%, with just a third of the by IMF air assets of a PSC work- 0 number of AOG-initiated inci- ing for a road construction com- dents recorded in the previous pany on the return journey, which period. As with Kunar, this is led to the killing of 7 Afghan PSC PAKTYA AOG PAKTYA Crime partly attributable to the cumula- guards. This accidental killing, also tive effects of a particularly in- a particularly visible feature in tense period of pro-active IMF recent operations in Kunar, led to approximately a month ago remains ongoing. operational activity over the last a sizeable demonstration in While in Khost and Paktika the notable suicide month, with the same number of Gardez City the following day, bombing incidents actually ended up as failed significant IMF operations (8) which turned violent as security efforts, Paktya saw an earlier, particularly conducted in both periods. As forces sought to disperse the deadly strike in the bazaar of the ANA Re- such, Paktya can be understood to crowds and defend themselves gional Corps HQ, which killed 2 IMF soldiers, have entered – partially through from repeated volleys of stones 2 ANA soldiers and 2 local merchants, and force – the usually quieter winter thrown by the protestors. injuring a dozen others. Such strikes will for period, and that the remainder of Other operations in Gardez led to the time being serve to accelerate aggressive the year and January 2011 will see a total of 12 AOG members ar- IMF targeting of AOG networks, as seen by a calmer period prevail in the rested, 8 of which were surprised the immediate push-back the day following the province. and subdued as they lay in wait suicide bombing, when IMF raided a com- IMF operations have shifted focus for an ambush. There was one pound on the outskirts of Gardez and arrested onto Gardez district, with just one other operation in two villages in a facilitator of the attack. search operation in last period’s Ahmadabad district’s Nisti Kot With regard to other AOG incidents, the most focus district of Zurmat, which area, which led to a firefight that notable was the execution of an AOG member led to the detention of 5 AOG killed four AOG fighters, with 4 accused of spying for the IMF by his col- members. The most significant of others detained and a weapons leagues in Zurmat DAC. Another was what at the operations in Gardez was a cache seized. first appeared to be an unsuccessful ‘rogue’ midnight capture operation of a As stated above, the number of ANP shooting of IMF soldiers in the Zurmat senior religious scholar and Zad- AOG-initiated incidents has DAC a few days later. While no casualties were ran tribal elder, and close family dropped substantially, with just 4 caused and the ANP member was arrested, it relation of the leader of the re- IDF attacks, 3 short direct attacks emerged that it was simply a negligent dis- gion’s primary, Waziristan-based on IMF convoys, and 3 ineffective charge of the officer’s weapon. IED strikes against IMF and KEY THREATS & CONCERNS ANSF vehicles. Yet the AOG Collateral civilian casualties suicide bombing campaign in Attacks on convoys Loya Paktya noted to have begun THE ANSO REPORT Page 23

S OUTHERN REGION

NGO Incidents KANDAHAR KANDAHAR Year to Date 8 200 This Report Period 0 Kandahar Province continues to 150 tained amongst the survivors host an enormous amount of se- 100 curity incidents as both AOG and mean that the death toll will un- IMF/ANSF operations continue, doubtedly increase over the next 50 albeit at a decreased rate. few days and weeks. 0 Zhari and Panjwayi Districts, re- An increase in search operations in the lower Arghandab valley by cently the focus of large IMF/ KANDAHAR AOG KANDAHAR Crime ANSF operations, are still plagued IMF/ANSF has netted a variety by a large number of AOG at- of weapons and explosives how- ever the northern parts of the val- tacks, IED strikes and targeted confusion following the attack, IMF shot and ley remain firmly in the control of killings designed to discourage any killed a pedestrian after the victim failed to AOG. NGO movement crossing collaboration from local and com- heed IMF signals to stop. munity leaders to the IMF effort such areas of control remains ex- Kandahar City itself witnessed a steady stream of stabilizing (“holding and build- tremely hazardous and is certainly of targeted killings including a total of seven ing” in COIN jargon) the areas. In not recommended until the tacti- ANP killed and two other truck drivers trans- one dramatic incident, a large cal situation of the entire area be- porting IMF goods shot in separate incidents VBIED destroyed a recently con- comes more clear. In fact, NGOs throughout the report period. In another high structed forward outpost operated should, at this time, seriously con- profile incident, AOG shot and killed the head by IMF/ANSF units in Zhari Dis- sider ceasing any operations in the of the District Council of Zhari District while trict. A van, ignoring instructions following districts: Zhari / Pan- he was travelling through the city in District to stop, pulled alongside a main jwayi / Arghandab / Dand, as 10. One other security incident stands out – wall of the compound and deto- these are: 1) experiencing a certain last week, a large VBIED – a Corolla contain- nated what appeared to be a siz- level of residual fighting from Op- ing a sizable amount of explosives – was able amount of explosives. The eration Dragon Strike; and, 2) parked near the main ANP HQ and detonated, walls of the checkpoint easily fell NGOs who are seen to be mov- wounding several ANP and civilians, in addi- into themselves, crushing a num- ing into recently secured areas will tion to shattering glass on most buildings ber of IMF and ANSF be seen as collaborating with the within a 1.5 kilometre radius of the blast site. troops. Those deaths, in addition IMF/ANSF efforts at reconstruc- This is notable due to the size of the explosion to some who were caught in the tion and will quickly become tar- – perhaps indicating that city-based AOG have explosion outside of the com- gets themselves. stockpiles of explosive material which they pound, combined to make this In addition, the outlying district of wish to reduce – and that usually an attack on one of single bloodiest attacks on Maiwand is becoming more inse- the ANP HQ is coupled with an AOG attack IMF/ANSF personnel in many cure, as IMF/ANSF seek to ex- on another target of importance (such as the months, if not years. In total, six pand their presence towards the prison, NDS HQ, etc.). It is expected that this IMF and two ANP were killed border area with Helmand Prov- pattern – a continuing series of targeted kill- immediately, with another 10 IMF ince. On 8 December, near the ings punctuated with the occasional spectacu- and 12 ANP seriously wounded. village of Chalgazi, a BBIED at- lar attack – will continue for the remainder of The severity of the injuries sus- tacker detonated his vest of explo- the December / early January period. sives while targeting an IMF foot KEY THREATS & CONCERNS patrol, resulting in the suicide IMF operations in rural districts bomber and two IMF soldiers AOG attacks against ANP killed and four other IMF soldiers AOG assassinations wounded. Tragically, in the initial THE ANSO REPORT Page 24

NGO Incidents HELMAND Year to Date 0 HELMAND This Report Period 0 200 The security situation in Helmand Province continues to be very a pressure cooker filled with ex- 150 fluid. After experiencing a slight plosives approached an ANP 100 decrease in security incidents over checkpoint on foot. Before he the past two weeks, levels are now could get close enough and deto- 50 increasing and AOG are conduct- nate his devices, he was shot and 0 ing all types of operations, includ- killed by the ANP sentries. The devices were then rendered use- ing: initiating a large number of HELMAND AOG HELMAND Crime direct attacks on IMF/ANSF less by ANSF EOD teams from units; increasing the emplacement the area. Lastly, near the village cessful and decisive action by IMF forces rate of roadside IEDs; and ramp- of Khiro in Khanashin District, a (Operation Moshtarak). roadside IED hit a civilian Toyota ing up the campaign against those IMF/ANSF operations appeared to be limited accused of ‘collaborating’. pick-up truck, killing 15 occupants and wounding four others. to the discovery and disposal of IEDs, in addi- RCIEDs used by AOG in the tion to the occasional raid on AOG houses. In DACs of Musa Qala and Sangin Direct AOG actions in the district particular, such two such raids in Kajaki and appeared to be particularly effec- of Nad Ali and the restive village Nad Ali Districts netted a total of 12 AOG, tive, resulting in the deaths of two of Babaji (Lashkar Gah District) including a mid-level commander, as well as a IMF and the wounding of another also resulted in a number of IMF variety of weapons, explosives and other mate- eight in four separate incidents. casualties within three separate rials. In another notable operation, IMF air Also in the Doo Aab area of attacks on dismounted patrols. assets identified and tracked a vehicle contain- Sangin District, an individual The DAC of Marja also experi- ing a prominent AOG leader. The vehicle was wearing a suicide vest and carrying enced a large number of direct fired on and the AOG leader and his family of attacks on IMF/ANSF patrols, four were killed instantly. It will be important KEY THREATS & CONCERNS underlining the lack of security in to determine whether there is the possibility of IEDs the area some nine months fol- some popular backlash against this in the im- AOG attacks lowing what was described as suc- mediate future within the local community.

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ANSO: “..by NGOs for NGOs..” THE ANSO REPORT Page 25

NGO Incidents ZABUL Year to Date 0 ZABUL 100 This Report Period 0 Vehicle accidents appeared to be 80 Shahjoy Districts, with no sub- the biggest threat to life and limb 60 stantial results. In one operation, during the recent report period, 40 with five separate incidents result- however, AOG held 5 male work- 20 ing in a total of three civilians and ers who were cleaning the karizes four PSC killed, and 13 others of the DAC of Tarnak Wa Jaldak. 0 wounded. In the worst, a 303 They have yet to be released, al- though it would be difficult to Milli-Bus collided with a PSC con- ZABUL AOG ZABUL Crime voy in Qalat District, killing four imagine even the more radical PSC guards and wounding an- elements of local AOG consider- surely reveal a stronger trend either way. other three. Remarkably, only ing cleaning gutters as ‘collaboration with the GOA’ and IMF/ANSF activities focused in Shamulzayi three passengers on the bus were and Shahjoy Districts as two separate opera- hurt, none seriously. attempt to do them serious harm. Their release is expected shortly. tions in Shamulzayi involved the use of ground AOG elements did not conduct attacks as well as air strikes, and resulted in a many operations during the report There were a total of only four total of 12 AOG killed and a large variety of period, clashing with ANSF units IED incidents as well, suggesting weapons seized. In the village of Hilal Chena only twice, in Daychopan and that either AOG activity is indeed of Shahjoy District, a search and arrest opera- winding down for the moment, or tion netted two mid-level commanders as well KEY THREATS & CONCERNS the past two weeks have simply as an unspecified number of AOG, including IED strikes been a short rest and recovery several foreigners. IMF operations period for the units operating there – the next report period will THE ANSO REPORT Page 26

NGO Incidents GHAZNI Year to Date 1 GHAZNI This Report Period 0 250

Ghazni Province continues to be 200 beset with a huge number of secu- by SAF and, on the rare occasion, rity incidents; however there is RPG fire, and took place primarily 150 also the possibility of a serious in Dih Yak, Waghaz, Giro and 100 and potentially long-lasting politi- multiple times in Andar District. 50 cal crisis resulting from the recent In total, nine PSC guards were 0 Parliamentary elections. killed and an estimated 16 wounded. At least seven vehicles AOG direct and indirect attacks GHAZNI AOG GHAZNI Crime have continued to outpace those were destroyed in the 17 attacks. of other provinces, and there are IMF activity was extremely low by Hazara candidates under the obscure SNTV no indications of such attacks de- during the report period, with voting system, as well as the extremely high creasing. Rocket and mortar at- only three actions recorded – one levels of insecurity among the Pashtun areas of tacks occurred on 32 different airstrike in Qarabagh District the province, resulting in a low turn-out of occasions, mostly targeting the which killed three AOG, and two Pashtun voters. This issue has the ability to DACs within the province as well other search and arrest operations grow into a much larger problem, exacerbating as most IMF/ANSF facilities. in Ghazni District which netted current ethnic violence in the province and Despite this large number of at- two AOG and a small quantity of surrounding areas, as well as serving as a na- tacks, the damage sustained was weapons. tional proxy for other issues related to the sup- minimal and only three civilians As mentioned above, another po- posed grievances of the Pashtun people within were injured in total. tential source of insecurity will be the central government. In the last week, a AOG increased their focus on as a result of the recent parliamen- demonstration, consisting of approximately disrupting logistics to IMF/ANSF tary elections. Ghazni remains 200 persons, peacefully gathered in the com- units, ambushing convoys a total the focus of much debate as the pound of the Provincial Governor. Those of 17 different times. The major- recent elections produced a prob- gathered spoke of the need to re-run the elec- ity of these attacks began with the lematic result – all MPs from the tions in the province, however, that option had detonation of an RCIED followed province are from the Hazara eth- already been dismissed by the IEC / ECC. nic group, primarily to the exclu- Although the recent demonstration ended sion of the Pashtuns (and to a far without incident, it is difficult to imagine that KEY THREATS & CONCERNS lesser extent, the Tajiks) who also this issue will not persist and escalate into vio- Demonstrations reside in the province. The suc- lence at the provincial and regional level. Direct/indirect fire attacks against cess of the Hazara has been attrib- DAC uted to effective strategies utilized THE ANSO REPORT Page 27

NGO Incidents PAKTIKA Year to Date 0 PAKTIKA 150 This Report Period 0 While the overall numbers of inci- 100 dents appear to be slightly de- bly those of Omna, Barmal, creasing in Paktika over the past Gayan and Ziruk, using rockets 50 two weeks, AOG there remain and mortars. SAF and RPG at- active and continue to engage tacks were conducted against the 0 IMF/ANSF using both direct and DACs of Khair Kot, Yosuf Khel indirect means. An apparent de- and Yani Khel. In none of these crease in IMF/ANSF movement attacks were there substantial re- PAKTIKA AOG PAKTIKA Crime and patrolling could account for ports of casualties for either side. the lower numbers, in addition to In Waza Khwa, however, a mo- and surrender. There were no casualties re- the colder weather. torcycle-mounted IED detonated lated to this incident, which represents a rare close to an ANBP post, wounding As usual, the DACs of various victory for the ANP in defusing such situa- one ANBP and one civilian. Also, districts were attacked, most nota- tions. near the DAC of Urgun District, an individual equipped with a sui- As mentioned above, IMF operations were limited during the report period, primarily con- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS cide vest approached an ANP sisting of search and arrest operations in the  checkpoint in Urgun District. IEDs area of Jarkana of Yosuf Khel District, as well Airstrikes The ANP successfully persuaded the man to remove the explosives as several successful air strikes against AOG Attacks against DACs positions in the border area of Barmal District.

NGO Incidents URUZGAN Year to Date 1 URUZGAN This Report Period 0 100 Uruzgan has experienced a slight 80 increase in security incidents over headed for Kandahar and Hel- 60 the past two weeks, most proba- mand. IMF/ANSF responded by bly due to the return of some organizing an increased number 40 AOG fighters in Helmand and of search operations in likely stor- 20 Kandahar back to their homes in age locations. However, over the 0 Uruzgan after participating in op- past two weeks, direct clashes be- erations against ANSF/IMF in tween AOG and IMF/ANSF URUZGAN AOG URUZGAN Crime those two provinces. These in- have also markedly increased, as creased incidents primarily consist fighters target IMF/ ANSF units well as in a compound located in the Sarab of IEDs emplacement and discov- as they carry out their area. eries in the districts of Tirin Kowt searches. This period of insecu- Tirin Kowt City has remained relatively calm and Chora. rity is expected to last another two during the report period; however villages to Over the October – November weeks as the operations of IMF/ avoid in Tirin Kowt District for the time being time period, Uruzgan was increas- ANSF slow down, and fighters include Kajanik, Khorma, and the area of ingly used as a regional storage settle into their home villages, Kararak, due to repeated clashes. area for weapons and explosives especially those in the higher ele- Deh Rawud District has been another ‘hot coming out of Pakistan and vations to the north. spot’ in the province during the report period Chora District has been a fruitful with a total of three separate clashes in the area KEY THREATS & CONCERNS location for IMF/ANSF search of Anarjoy, as well as two IED discoveries in IED strikes operations, with sizable finds of the main bazaar area of Deh Rawud village. IMF/ANSF operations weapons and explosive materials in a house near Chora’s DAC, as THE AFGHANISTAN NGO SAFETY OFFICE - CONTACTS AND INFORMATION

CONTACT ANSO MISSING This report ANSO could not provide analysis for the prov- CENTRAL REGION OFFICE (KABUL) inces of: ANSO is hosted by Tomas Muzik - [email protected] - 0799 323 792 Deutsche Welthungerhilfe Mukhtar - [email protected] - 0799 322 116 Nimroz Panjshir NORTH REGION OFFICE (MAZAR) Bamyan Vacant - [email protected] - 0799 404 617 To Register with ANSO Firoz - [email protected] - 0799 408 252 This is because we contact: do not know enough [email protected] EAST REGION OFFICE (JALALABAD) about the area to Rory Brown - [email protected] - 0799 248 362 comment on the sig- Shohar - [email protected] - 0798 778 014 nificance of the inci- ANSO is managed by an NGO dents occurring Board. If you have any SOUTH REGION OFFICE (KANDAHAR) there. feedback, good or bad, let Peter Dimitroff - [email protected] 0796 688 416 them know on: Noori - [email protected] - 0700 492 550 If you can help us [email protected] understand the prov- ANSO ACRONYMS WEST REGION OFFICE (HERAT) ince better, please Rachel Adam - [email protected] - 0799 322 192 contact us. ACG-Armed Criminal Group / Sayed Karim- [email protected] - 0707 474 135 AEF-Afghan Eradication Forces / ANA-Afghan National Army / ANBP-Afghan National Border COUNTRY MANAGEMENT (KABUL) Police / ANP-Afghan National Nic Lee - [email protected] - 0799 325 349 Police / AOG-Armed Opposition Group / APPF-Afghan Public Nathan Ronaldson - [email protected] - 0797 165 017 Protection Forces (local depu- Patrick Malach - [email protected] - 0793 230 118 tised militias) / DC-District Centre / GOA-Government of Afghanistan / IDF-Indirect Fire (ex: mortars) / IED-Improvised Explosive Device / IMF- International Military Forces / NDS-National Directorate of Security (Intelligence) / PRP- Previous Reporting Period / REGISTRATION INFORMATION: PSC-Private Security Company / RPG-Rocket Propelled Gre- nade / SAF-Small Arms Fire / Please note that both the ANSO email and SMS distribution lists are updated VBIED-Vehicle Borne Impro- vised Explosive Device / PDO- once weekly, every Sunday. The registration deadline is on the Thursday Private Development Organisa- tion / ALP-Afghan Local Police of every week, therefore, any requests submitted after this will not be updated / LDI-Local Defence Initiative / until the following week. As well, NGOs are requested to provide their regis- IEA-Islamic Emirate of Afghani- stan (Taliban) / PSG-Provincial tration documentation (or to request the same) directly to the Operations Na- Shadow Governor (IEA) / DSG- tional Counterpart, Mr. Masoud Habibi, at the following email address: District Shadow Governor (IEA) [email protected]