Fragile Future: the Human Cost of Conflict in Afghanistan
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Load more
Recommended publications
-
Afghanistan, 1989-1996: Between the Soviets and the Taliban
Afghanistan, 1989-1996: Between the Soviets and the Taliban A thesis submitted to the Miami University Honors Program in partial fulfillment of the Requirements for University Honors with Distinction by, Brandon Smith May 2005 Oxford, OH ABSTRACT AFGHANISTAN, 1989-1996: BETWEEN THE SOVIETS AND THE TALIBAN by, BRANDON SMITH This paper examines why the Afghan resistance fighters from the war against the Soviets, the mujahideen, were unable to establish a government in the time period between the withdrawal of the Soviet army from Afghanistan in 1989 and the consolidation of power by the Taliban in 1996. A number of conflicting explanations exist regarding Afghanistan’s instability during this time period. This paper argues that the developments in Afghanistan from 1989 to 1996 can be linked to the influence of actors outside Afghanistan, but not to the extent that the choices and actions of individual actors can be overlooked or ignored. Further, the choices and actions of individual actors need not be explained in terms of ancient animosities or historic tendencies, but rather were calculated moves to secure power. In support of this argument, international, national, and individual level factors are examined. ii Afghanistan, 1989-1996: Between the Soviets and the Taliban by, Brandon Smith Approved by: _________________________, Advisor Karen L. Dawisha _________________________, Reader John M. Rothgeb, Jr. _________________________, Reader Homayun Sidky Accepted by: ________________________, Director, University Honors Program iii Thanks to Karen Dawisha for her guidance and willingness to help on her year off, and to John Rothgeb and Homayun Sidky for taking the time to read the final draft and offer their feedback. -
Policy Notes for the Trump Notes Administration the Washington Institute for Near East Policy ■ 2018 ■ Pn55
TRANSITION 2017 POLICYPOLICY NOTES FOR THE TRUMP NOTES ADMINISTRATION THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY ■ 2018 ■ PN55 TUNISIAN FOREIGN FIGHTERS IN IRAQ AND SYRIA AARON Y. ZELIN Tunisia should really open its embassy in Raqqa, not Damascus. That’s where its people are. —ABU KHALED, AN ISLAMIC STATE SPY1 THE PAST FEW YEARS have seen rising interest in foreign fighting as a general phenomenon and in fighters joining jihadist groups in particular. Tunisians figure disproportionately among the foreign jihadist cohort, yet their ubiquity is somewhat confounding. Why Tunisians? This study aims to bring clarity to this question by examining Tunisia’s foreign fighter networks mobilized to Syria and Iraq since 2011, when insurgencies shook those two countries amid the broader Arab Spring uprisings. ©2018 THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY ■ NO. 30 ■ JANUARY 2017 AARON Y. ZELIN Along with seeking to determine what motivated Evolution of Tunisian Participation these individuals, it endeavors to reconcile estimated in the Iraq Jihad numbers of Tunisians who actually traveled, who were killed in theater, and who returned home. The find- Although the involvement of Tunisians in foreign jihad ings are based on a wide range of sources in multiple campaigns predates the 2003 Iraq war, that conflict languages as well as data sets created by the author inspired a new generation of recruits whose effects since 2011. Another way of framing the discussion will lasted into the aftermath of the Tunisian revolution. center on Tunisians who participated in the jihad fol- These individuals fought in groups such as Abu Musab lowing the 2003 U.S. -
Reconfiguring a Region
RECONFIGURING A REGION Opportunities and Challenges in the Middle East Hosted by the Council on Middle East Studies at the MacMillan Center at Yale University September 26‐27, 2008 Luce Hall Auditorium, 34 Hillhouse Avenue, New Haven, CT Friday, September 26 1:00 pm Opening Remarks and Overview Marcia Inhorn William K. Lanman Jr. Professor of Anthropology and International Affairs Chair of the Council of Middle East Studies (CMES) at the MacMillan Center 1:30 pm Peacemaking in the 21st Century: have the terms changed? Shibley Telhami Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development, University of Maryland and Senior Fellow, Saban Center at the Brookings Institution Daoud Kuttab Award winning Palestinian journalist, former Ferris professor of journalism at Princeton University and Executive Director of the Community Media Network. Avi Shlaim Professor of International Relations, University of Oxford, and Fellow, St. Antony’s College Moderator: Asli Bali, Assistant Professor, University of California Los Angeles School of Law and Research Affiliate, Yale University Law School 3:30 pm Testing the Grounds for East‐West Relations: LeBanon and Syria in Flux Paul Salem Director, Middle East Center, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Murhaf Jouejati Professor of Middle East Studies, Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, National Defense University and Adjunct Scholar, Middle East Institute Marwan Khawaja Director, Center for Research on Population and Health, American University in Beirut Moderator: Sulayman Dib‐Hajj, Research -
Taliban Fragmentation FACT, FICTION, and FUTURE by Andrew Watkins
PEACEWORKS Taliban Fragmentation FACT, FICTION, AND FUTURE By Andrew Watkins NO. 160 | MARCH 2020 Making Peace Possible NO. 160 | MARCH 2020 ABOUT THE REPORT This report examines the phenomenon of insurgent fragmentation within Afghanistan’s Tali- ban and implications for the Afghan peace process. This study, which the author undertook PEACE PROCESSES as an independent researcher supported by the Asia Center at the US Institute of Peace, is based on a survey of the academic literature on insurgency, civil war, and negotiated peace, as well as on interviews the author conducted in Afghanistan in 2019 and 2020. ABOUT THE AUTHOR Andrew Watkins has worked in more than ten provinces of Afghanistan, most recently as a political affairs officer with the United Nations. He has also worked as an indepen- dent researcher, a conflict analyst and adviser to the humanitarian community, and a liaison based with Afghan security forces. Cover photo: A soldier walks among a group of alleged Taliban fighters at a National Directorate of Security facility in Faizabad in September 2019. The status of prisoners will be a critical issue in future negotiations with the Taliban. (Photo by Jim Huylebroek/New York Times) The views expressed in this report are those of the author alone. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace. An online edition of this and related reports can be found on our website (www.usip.org), together with additional information on the subject. © 2020 by the United States Institute of Peace United States Institute of Peace 2301 Constitution Avenue NW Washington, DC 20037 Phone: 202.457.1700 Fax: 202.429.6063 E-mail: [email protected] Web: www.usip.org Peaceworks No. -
Conflict in Afghanistan I
Conflict in Afghanistan I 92 Number 880 December 2010 Volume Volume 92 Number 880 December 2010 Volume 92 Number 880 December 2010 Part 1: Socio-political and humanitarian environment Interview with Dr Sima Samar Chairperson of the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission Afghanistan: an historical and geographical appraisal William Maley Dynamic interplay between religion and armed conflict in Afghanistan Ken Guest Transnational Islamic networks Imtiaz Gul Impunity and insurgency: a deadly combination in Afghanistan Norah Niland The right to counsel as a safeguard of justice in Afghanistan: the contribution of the International Legal Foundation Jennifer Smith, Natalie Rea, and Shabir Ahmad Kamawal State-building in Afghanistan: a case showing the limits? Lucy Morgan Edwards The future of Afghanistan: an Afghan responsibility Conflict I in Afghanistan Taiba Rahim Humanitarian debate: Law, policy, action www.icrc.org/eng/review Conflict in Cambridge Journals Online For further information about this journal please go to the journal web site at: ISSN 1816-3831 http://www.journals.cambridge.org/irc Afghanistan I Editorial Team Editor-in-Chief: Vincent Bernard The Review is printed in English and is Editorial assistant: Michael Siegrist published four times a year, in March, Publication assistant: June, September and December. Claire Franc Abbas Annual selections of articles are also International Review of the Red Cross published on a regional level in Arabic, Aim and scope 19, Avenue de la Paix Chinese, French, Russian and Spanish. The International Review of the Red Cross is a periodical CH - 1202 Geneva, Switzerland published by the ICRC. Its aim is to promote reflection on t +41 22 734 60 01 Published in association with humanitarian law, policy and action in armed conflict and f +41 22 733 20 57 Cambridge University Press. -
Which Law Applies to the Afghan Conflict?
WHICH LAW APPLIES TO THE AFGHAN CONFLICT? By W. Michael Reisman and James Silk* Soviet armed forces have been directly engaged in combat in Afghanistan for more than 8 years.1 The level of international protest, sanctions and media coverage diminished after the initial outcry over the large-scale So- viet intervention in December 1979. With the conclusion in many diplo- matic and professional quarters that the Soviet presence in Afghanistan would be of long duration, the focus of international disapproval shifted from the question whether the Soviet presence in Afghanistan was lawful or not to whether Soviet conduct in Afghanistan was lawful or not: fromjus ad bellum to jus in bello. Access to Afghanistan has been extremely limited, but various individ- uals, commissions and credible international organizations have reported extensive abuses of human rights by Soviet forces there; most of the reports are based largely on refugee testimony.2 While the practices of the Soviet occupation and campaign have emerged with increasing clarity, the ques- tion of which law these practices are to be tested against is still controversial. * W. Michael Reisman is Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld Professor of Jurisprudence, Yale Law School. James Silk expects to receive aJ.D. from Yale University in 1989. The authors gratefully acknowledge the comments and criticism of colleagues on the Board of Editors and of several scholars in Europe. The authors are, of course, solely responsible for the contents. I By the time this article is published, it is possible that the Soviet Union will, at least, have begun to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan. -
Leveraging the Taliban's Quest for International Recognition
Leveraging the Taliban’s Quest for International Recognition Afghan Peace Process Issues Paper March 2021 By Barnett R. Rubin Summary: As the United States tries to orchestrate a political settlement in conjunction with its eventual military withdrawal from Afghanistan, it has overestimated the role of military pressure or presence and underestimated the leverage that the Taliban’s quest for sanctions relief, recognition and international assistance provides. As the U.S. government decides on how and when to withdraw its troops, it and other international powers retain control over some of the Taliban’s main objectives — the removal of both bilateral and United Nations Security Council sanctions and, eventually, recognition of and assistance to an Afghan government that includes the Taliban. Making the most of this leverage will require coordination with the Security Council and with Afghanistan’s key neighbors, including Security Council members China, Russia and India, as well as Pakistan and Iran. In April 2017, in a meeting with an interagency team on board a military aircraft en route to Afghanistan, U.S. President Donald J. Trump’s new national security advisor, retired Army Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster, dismissed the ongoing effort to negotiate a settlement with the Taliban: “The first step, the national security adviser said, was to turn around the trajectory of the conflict. The United States had to stop the Taliban’s advance on the battlefield and force them to agree to concessions in the process .... US talks with the Taliban would only succeed when the United States returned to a position of strength on the battlefield and was ‘winning’ against the insurgency.”1 1 Donati, Jessica. -
House Votes to Keep Guantanamo Open 5/26/2015
House Votes to Keep Guantanamo Open 5/26/2015 The House passed its version of the 2016 National Defense Authorization Act (2016 NDAA), H.R. 1735, on May 15, 2015. After rejecting a floor amendment that would have eased Guantanamo detainee transfer restrictions after the Administration’s submission of a detailed plan to close the Guantanamo Bay detention facility, the House voted to clamp down on detainee transfers, prohibiting them altogether in certain circumstances. The bill would also beef up reporting requirements regarding detainee recidivism, and require receipt of a set of unredacted correspondence and documents related to the controversial transfer of five high-level Taliban detainees to Qatar in exchange for U.S. Army Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl, a swap that was challenged as unlawful by its critics, and limit expenditures by the Office of the Secretary of Defense until their submission is accomplished. TheAdministration has objected to the Guantanamo provisions and threatened to recommend a presidential veto if Congress approves them. Transfer of Guantanamo detainees into the United States. The bill would continue the absolute bar on the transfer of Guantanamo detainees into the United States for any purpose, as well as the prohibition on building or modifying facilities in the United States to house such detainees. As amended on the floor, both prohibitions would apply to all federal government agencies and would extend for two years after the bill’s enactment. Transfer of Guantanamo detainees to foreign countries. The bill would repeal Section 1035 of the 2014 NDAA (described in a prior Legal Sidebar post and this CRS report) and revert to the previous set of restrictions on detainee transfers to foreign countries (as described in more detail in this CRS report). -
Afghanistan: Sikhs and Hindus
Country Policy and Information Note Afghanistan: Sikhs and Hindus Version 5.0 May 2019 Preface Purpose This note provides country of origin information (COI) and analysis of COI for use by Home Office decision makers handling particular types of protection and human rights claims (as set out in the basis of claim section). It is not intended to be an exhaustive survey of a particular subject or theme. It is split into two main sections: (1) analysis and assessment of COI and other evidence; and (2) COI. These are explained in more detail below. Assessment This section analyses the evidence relevant to this note – i.e. the COI section; refugee/human rights laws and policies; and applicable caselaw – by describing this and its inter-relationships, and provides an assessment on whether, in general: x A person is reasonably likely to face a real risk of persecution or serious harm x A person is able to obtain protection from the state (or quasi state bodies) x A person is reasonably able to relocate within a country or territory x Claims are likely to justify granting asylum, humanitarian protection or other form of leave, and x If a claim is refused, it is likely or unlikely to be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded’ under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. Decision makers must, however, still consider all claims on an individual basis, taking into account each case’s specific facts. Country of origin information The country information in this note has been carefully selected in accordance with the general principles of COI research as set out in the Common EU [European Union] Guidelines for Processing Country of Origin Information (COI), dated April 2008, and the Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation’s (ACCORD), Researching Country Origin Information – Training Manual, 2013. -
Joint Force Quarterly, Issue
Issue 100, 1st Quarter 2021 Countering Chinese Coercion Remotely Piloted Airstrikes Logistics Under Fire JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY ISSUE ONE HUNDRED, 1 ST QUARTER 2021 Joint Force Quarterly Founded in 1993 • Vol. 100, 1st Quarter 2021 https://ndupress.ndu.edu GEN Mark A. Milley, USA, Publisher VADM Frederick J. Roegge, USN, President, NDU Editor in Chief Col William T. Eliason, USAF (Ret.), Ph.D. Executive Editor Jeffrey D. Smotherman, Ph.D. Senior Editor and Director of Art John J. Church, D.M.A. Internet Publications Editor Joanna E. Seich Copyeditor Andrea L. Connell Book Review Editor Brett Swaney Creative Director Marco Marchegiani, U.S. Government Publishing Office Advisory Committee BrigGen Jay M. Bargeron, USMC/Marine Corps War College; RDML Shoshana S. Chatfield, USN/U.S. Naval War College; BG Joy L. Curriera, USA/Dwight D. Eisenhower School for National Security and Resource Strategy; Col Lee G. Gentile, Jr., USAF/Air Command and Staff College; Col Thomas J. Gordon, USMC/Marine Corps Command and Staff College; Ambassador John Hoover/College of International Security Affairs; Cassandra C. Lewis, Ph.D./College of Information and Cyberspace; LTG Michael D. Lundy, USA/U.S. Army Command and General Staff College; MG Stephen J. Maranian, USA/U.S. Army War College; VADM Stuart B. Munsch, USN/The Joint Staff; LTG Andrew P. Poppas, USA/The Joint Staff; RDML Cedric E. Pringle, USN/National War College; Brig Gen Michael T. Rawls, USAF/Air War College; MajGen W.H. Seely III/Joint Forces Staff College Editorial Board Richard K. Betts/Columbia University; Eliot A. Cohen/The Johns Hopkins University; Richard L. -
Contents EDITORIAL, POLITICAL ANALYSIS, 3 a Quarterly Publication of MILITARY REPORT
AECHAN JEHAD Contents EDITORIAL, POLITICAL ANALYSIS, 3 A Quarterly Publication of MILITARY REPORT, The Cultural Council of Grand table of Afghanwar casualties Afghanistan Resistance (April -June, 1988) Afghans and the Geneva accordon Afghanistan 14 MANAGING EDITOR: ® MAJOR DOCUMENTS: 21 Sabahuddin Kushkaki 1. Text of charter for mujaheddin transitional April-June, 1908 government; (2) Text of Geneva accord on Afghan- istan; (3) IUAM and the Geneva accord; (4) Muja- SUBSCRIPTION heddin offer general amnesty; (5) IUAM President urges trial for PDPA high brass; (6) Biographies Per Six Annual of IUAM transitional cabinet; (7) Biographies of copy months three IUAM leaders; (8) Charters of the IUAM Pakistaa organizations; (9) Annual report of Amnesty In- (Ra.) 30 60 110 ternational on Afghanistan, Foreign AFUHANISTAN IN INTERNATIONAL FORUMS: (s) 6 12 30 1« Islamabad Conference on Afghan future 2. Karachi Islamic meeting 3. Paris Conference: Afghan Agriculture Cultural Council of Afghanist- 0 IRC Survey on health in Afghan refugeecamps.97 Resistance CATALOGUE OF MUJAHEDDIN PRESS House No.8861 St. No. 27, G /9 -1 99 103 Islamabad, Pakistan 0 DIGEST OF MUJAHEDDIN PRESS Telephone 853797 (APRIL-JUNE 1988) ® BOOKS BY THE MUJAHEDDIN, FOR THE 164 MUJAHEDDIN 0 CHRONOLOGY OF AFGHAN EVENTS 168 (APRIL-JUNE 1988) 0 AFGHAN ISSUES COVERAGE: 318 By Radio Kabul, Radio Moscow (April -June, 1988) 0 MAPS 319 -320 0 ABBREVIATIONSLIST 321 FROM MUJAHEDDIN PUBLICATIONS MA Juiacst-- April -June, 19 88 Vol.1, No.4 AFGHAN JEHAD Editorial Q o c':. NC(° IN ME NAME OF GOD, MOST GRACICJUS, MOST MERCI.FU AFTER GENEVA Now that the Russian troops are on than way out from Afghanistan,' the focus on the Afghanistan issue is on two subjects; the nature of government in Kabul and finding a channel for the huge humanitarian assistance which the international community has indicated will provide to the war,ravaged Afghan- istan after the Soviet. -
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR)
Special Inspector General for OCT 30 SIGAR Afghanistan Reconstruction 2018 QUARTERLY REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2008 (Pub. L. No. 110- 181) established the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR). SIGAR’s oversight mission, as dened by the legislation, is to provide for the independent and objective • conduct and supervision of audits and investigations relating to the programs and operations funded with amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for the reconstruction of Afghanistan. • leadership and coordination of, and recommendations on, policies designed to promote economy, efciency, and effectiveness in the administration of the programs and operations, and to prevent and detect waste, fraud, and abuse in such programs and operations. • means of keeping the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense fully and currently informed about problems and deciencies relating to the administration of such programs and operation and the necessity for and progress on corrective action. Afghanistan reconstruction includes any major contract, grant, agreement, or other funding mechanism entered into by any department or agency of the U.S. government that involves the use of amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for the reconstruction of Afghanistan. As required by the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2018 (Pub. L. No. 115-91), this quarterly report has been prepared in accordance with the Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation issued by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efciency. Source: Pub.L. No. 110-181, “National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2008,” 1/28/2008, Pub. L. No.