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PRISM VOL. 7, NO. 3 | 2018 COUNTERING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION THE JOURNAL OF COMPLEX OPER ATIONS PRISM ABOUT VOL. 7, NO.3 2018 PRISM, the quarterly journal of complex operations published at National Defense University (NDU), aims to illuminate and provoke debate on whole-of-government EDITOR efforts to conduct reconstruction, stabilization, counterinsurgency, and irregular Mr. Michael Miklaucic warfare operations. Since the inaugural issue of PRISM in 2010, our readership has expanded to include more than 10,000 officials, servicemen and women, and practi- tioners from across the diplomatic, defense, and development communities in more DEPUTY EDITOR than 80 countries. Ms. Patricia Clough PRISM is published with support from NDU’s Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS). In 1984, Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger established INSS ASSOCIATE EDITOR within NDU as a focal point for analysis of critical national security policy and Mr. Dale Erickson defense strategy issues. Today INSS conducts research in support of academic and leadership programs at NDU; provides strategic support to the Secretary of Defense, INTERNET EDITOR Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, combatant commands, and armed services; Ms. Joanna E. Seich and engages with the broader national and international security communities. DESIGN COMMUNICATIONS PRISM welcomes unsolicited manuscripts from policymakers, practitioners, and Ms. Jamie Harvey, scholars, particularly those that present emerging thought, best practices, or train- U.S. Government Publishing Office ing and education innovations. Publication threshold for articles and critiques varies but is largely determined by topical relevance, continuing education for national and INTERN international security professionals, scholarly standards of argumentation, quality of Ms. Eva Kahan writing, and readability. To help achieve threshold, authors are strongly encouraged to recommend clear solutions or to arm the reader with actionable knowledge. EDITORIAL BOARD Our review process can last several months. The PRISM editorial staff will Dr. Gordon Adams contact authors during that timeframe accepting or regretfully rejecting the submis- Dr. Pauline Baker sion. If the staff is unable to publish a submission within four months of acceptance, PRISM will revert publication rights to the author so that they may explore other Ambassador Rick Barton publication options. Dr. Alain Bauer Constructive comments and contributions are important to PRISM. We also Dr. Hans Binnendijk welcome Letters to the Editor that are exclusive to PRISM—we do not publish open letters. The PRISM editorial staff will contact authors within two months of submis- ADM Dennis Blair, USN (ret.) sion if they accept the letter for publication. Ambassador James Dobbins Please direct all electronic comments and contributions to <[email protected]>. Dr. Francis Fukuyama Hard copies should be senU to the address listed below and include a note that Ambassador Marc Grossman highlights a preferred phone number and email for feedback; PRISM does not return hard original hard copy submissions. Ambassador John Herbst Dr. Laura Junor (ex officio) Editor, PRISM Dr. David Kilcullen 260 Fifth Avenue, S.W. Ambassador Jacques Paul Klein Suite 2500 Fort Lesley J. McNair Dr. Roger B. Myerson Washington DC 20319 Dr. Moisés Naím Ambassador Thomas Pickering DISCLAIMER This is the authoritative, official U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) edition Dr. William Reno of PRISM. Any copyrighted portions of this journal may not be reproduced or Lt. Gen. John F. Sattler, USMC (ret.) extracted without permission of the copyright proprietors. PRISM should be Dr. James A. Schear acknowledged whenever material is quoted from or based on its content. Dr. Joanna Spear The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of DOD or any ADM James Stavridis, USN (ret.) other agency of the Federal Government, or any other organization associated with Dr. Ruth Wedgwood this publication. COUNTERING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION FEATURES 2 Nuclear Terrorism—Did We Beat the Odds or Change Them? By Graham Allison 22 WMD Terrorism—The Once and Future Threat By Gary Ackerman and Michelle Jacome 38 Improving our CWMD Capabilities—Who Will Lead? By Al Mauroni 50 The CWMD Strategy Gap—Capacities, Capabilities, and Collaboration By Margaret Kosal 68 The State of the Art in Contemporary CWMD Thinking By Amy Frumin, Tracy Moss, and David Ellis 84 The Forensic Challenge By Dan Kaszeta 90 North Korea’s CBW Program—How to Contend with Imperfectly Understood Capabilities By John Parachini 102 “The Irreducible Minimum”—An Evaluation of Counterterrorism Operations in Iraq By Richard Shultz 118 Perils of the Gray Zone—Paradigms Lost, Paradoxes Regained By John Arquilla INTERVIEW 130 An Interview with Congressman James R. Langevin BOOK REVIEWS 134 The Age of Lone Wolf Terrorism Reviewed by James Mis 136 Dirty War: Rhodesia and Chemical Biological Warfare 1975–1980 Reviewed by Seth Carus 137 The Darkest Side of Politics, II: State Terrorism, “Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Religious Extremism, and Organized Crime Reviewed by Brendan G. Melley 139 The Politics of Weapons Inspections: Assessing WMD Monitoring and Verification Regimes Reviewed by Margaret Sloane and Justin Anderson The chances of a successful nuclear terrorist attack in the decade that began in 2015 are better than even. –Graham Allison 2 | FEATURES PRISM 7, NO. 3 Nuclear Terrorism Did We Beat the Odds or Change Them? By Graham Allison t has been more than 13 years since the publication of Nuclear Terrorism: the Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe, which sounded the alarm about the clear and present danger of nuclear terrorism. The book Imade the case for two seemingly contradictory propositions: first, on the current path, nuclear terrorism is inevitable; second, nuclear terrorism is preventable by an agenda of actions that are feasible and affordable. Juxtaposition of these propositions presented a paradox that the book attempted to resolve. By highlighting the gap between what the United States, Russia, and other nations had been doing in the decade prior to 2004, and what could be done if they made preventing nuclear terrorism a first-order priority, I argued that on the current path we would likely see terrorists succeed in their aspirations for an “American Hiroshima.” At the same time, I argued, there existed a feasible, affordable agenda of actions the United States and other civilized nations could take that would reduce this risk to nearly zero. As reviewers later noted, the book “caught a wave.” During the 2004 Democratic presidential pri- mary, the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) led a concerted effort to raise the visibility of this issue. Former Senator Sam Nunn, a NTI co-chair, called the book “essential reading . calling citizens to arms against the real and rising threat of nuclear terrorism.” The world’s most successful investor, whose company’s share value has increased a thousand fold during the five decades he has managed the investment corpo- ration, selected Nuclear Terrorism as the Berkshire Hathaway annual meeting’s “book of the year.” Warren Buffett declared: “Nuclear terrorism is by far the most important problem of our time. And this is the most important book that has been written on the subject.” In the final months of the 2004 presidential campaign, the question of what the United States should be doing to address the threat of nuclear terrorism became a compelling issue. Both contenders—John Kerry and George W. Bush—declared in their first debate that nuclear terrorism is the “single most serious threat to the national security of the United States.” By the time he had won a second term, President Bush not only understood the threat, but he had embraced it emotionally. As he frequently stated, he was determined to do everything possible to “keep the world’s most dangerous technologies out of the hands of the world’s most dangerous people.”1 His successor, President Barack Obama, also made preventing nuclear terrorism a priority, having read Nuclear Terrorism as a young senator who in 2005 accompanied Senator Richard Dr. Graham Allison is the Douglas Dillon Professor of Government at Harvard Kennedy School. PRISM 7, NO. 3 FEATURES | 3 ALLISON Lugar on a congressional delegation to inspect is 10 percent, and if that condition persists for 50 Russian nuclear sites.2 years, the likelihood of nuclear terrorism occurring Not surprisingly, the book attracted critics as is almost 100 percent (99.5 percent to be precise).3 well. The most common objection focused on what But as Chart 2 illustrates, if actions were taken skeptics argued was an irresolvable contradiction to reduce that likelihood from 10 percent a year to 1 between the core claims of “inevitable” and “pre- percent, the probability that in the next 50 years there ventable.” If something is preventable, then it cannot is no successful nuclear terrorist incident rises from be inevitable, they said. almost zero to 60.5 percent. These extrapolations are, My attempt to answer their point was proving as Buffett explains, simple probability calculations.4 largely ineffective, since for the most part, I just Prior to publication, a number of referees kept repeating the argument stated in the book. But pointed out that even if one agreed that the risks fortunately, I was rescued by none other than Buffett of nuclear terrorism were much greater than had himself. In making judgments about buying stocks, been previously recognized, the policy community and even more in owning and running several rein- would ask: how likely is such an event, now? As one surance companies, Buffett had become a legendary wag put it, what moves most Washingtonians are oddsmaker. Those businesses had also forced him consequences that could happen on their watch. to think seriously about nuclear terrorism as one of Even those who found Buffett’s response analytically what investors call “fat tail” risks. He had concluded correct argued that it was too “academic” for many that such an event was virtually inevitable and that participants in the policy debate.

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