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Home , Actus primus, Summum bonum

Good

Theological reflection on the nature of good represents by of participating in that Form. In the Timaeus the confluence of two distinguishable streams of (29 eÐ30 b), suggests that this account of the thought, one deriving from the Bible*, the other from metaphysical priority of goodness could be developed philosophical traditions. By far the greatest philosoph- into a theory explaining the origin of the universe. The ical influence has come from Greek speculation, par- Neoplatonists developed this idea into a full-fledged ticularly that of Plato, , the Stoics, and the cosmology involving the emanation of all things from Neoplatonists. From the patristic period until the Ref- the Good and their return to it. ormation, Greek * formed a generally rec- Many early Christian thinkers found this cosmolog- ognized frame of reference and was used in thinking ical view congenial. They found it natural to identify about the idea of good contained in revelation* and the Christian * with the Good and, while recogniz- dogma*. The Greek framework remains influential, ing the incompatibility of the doctrine of creation* owing in part to the importance for Catholicism* of with Neoplatonist emanationism, they were able nev- Thomas* Aquinas’s synthesis, and in part to the con- ertheless to accommodate the notion of participation tinued and, today, particularly strong interest in ancient within the doctrine of creation. For Christian Platonists and . such as Augustine* and *, this idea meant that The predominant features of the Greek framework the created being necessarily depends on God, who is are its metaphysical account of good in general the Good; as for the goodness of created things, that (bonum in commune), and the idea of the importance arose from their participation in—their being derived of the metaphysical and psychological foundations of from—that which is good in itself. In the third of his specifically human or moral goodness. The latter fea- theological treatises (Quomodo substantiae, c. ture explains the eudemonistic structure of the ethical 140Ð50), Boethius uses the language of emanationism: theories associated with this tradition, and the central- created things are good in virtue of their having ity of the concepts of virtue* and right reason*. Within “flowed from” (fluxit ab) God, the Substantial Good. this broad theoretical framework, Christian thinkers In De divinis nominibus (IV, 693 bÐ700 c, 705 cÐ708 debated the nature of divine goodness, *, b), Dionysius* the Pseudo-Areopagite characterizes *, sin*, grace*, and the beatific vision*. Modern Good as essentially diffusive of itself, by its very na- philosophical accounts of good have been less ture pouring itself out into creation. This outpouring of amenable to broad systematic development and adap- the divine nature results in a hierarchy of created be- tation to theological purposes. For that reason, none ings that participate in the divine goodness to various has achieved the sort of hegemony in theological dis- extents. cussion of good that Greek speculation has. These ideas about participation led in the direction of an explicitly theological and relational conception 1. Good in General of good: God is the first and highest good, and all cre- Classical thought provides two models for understand- ated good is good in virtue of a certain relation—par- ing the nature of good, both of which postulate a nec- ticipation—to good in itself. essary connection between good (agathon, bonum) and fundamental reality or being* (einai/to on, b) Natural Teleology. The second model links the no- esse/ens). Each model is found in Christian thinkers. tion of good with the notion of an end. A natural sub- stance is constituted by a substantial form or nature, by a) Participation. In the first model, Plato and others virtue of which the substance possesses a capacity for pointed to a dependence of being on good. In The Re- performing the activity or function characteristic of public (508 bÐ509 b), Plato asserts that the form of substances belonging to that species. The end, comple- Good, that which is good in itself (agathon kath’au- tion, or perfection of a natural substance is its having ton), is the source not only of everything that is good, fully actualized its capacity, its performing the activity but also of all the other Forms, and hence of all being. for which its form or nature provides the capacity. All other realities have their being and their goodness Since the state or activity that constitutes a substance’s

633 Good full actuality is that substance’s end, and since the end Anselm*, we can identify pure perfections by finding is good, that state or activity constitutes the sub- those attributes that it is unqualifiedly better to possess stance’s good. On this account, good for a substance of than not to possess. The supreme nature must possess a given nature is the end determined by its nature, the every pure perfection (Monologion, 15). fact of its being fully actual as a thing of that nature. The natural-teleology account defines a hierarchy of One does not arrive, in this case, at an essentially theo- in terms of degrees of actuality. Different sub- logical or relational conception of good: the goodness stances belonging to the same species possess more or of a thing consists in the actualization of a nature, and less actuality depending on the extent to which they the state that results from it is intrinsic to the thing it- have actualized their specifying potentialities. More- self. over, substantial forms (the first actualities, in virtue of The natural-teleology account has extremely influ- which things are the kinds of things they are) vary in ential proponents in Augustine and . their degrees of actuality insofar as they constitute Aquinas in particular developed its Aristotelian under- kinds whose activities are more or less rich, full, and pinnings in elaborate detail. The rational *, for ex- complex. It is from this perspective that one can under- ample, is a human being’s substantial form (its first stand Augustine’s famous hierarchy, which rises from actuality or actus primus) and gives to that human be- inanimate beings by way of living beings to beings en- ing the complex set of faculties and capacities (pow- dowed with reason. The activity characterizing each ers, potentiae) grouped together under the heading level of being includes the activity of lower levels of “reason” (ST Ia, q. 95, a. 1). These “powers” are dis- being: human beings exist (as stones do) and live (as posed for the relevant activity (operatio) or final activ- plants and animals* do), but they also understand (as ity (actus ultimus) by certain settled dispositions neither stones nor animals do). The highest good in the (habitus), which are the intellectual and moral . hierarchy is God, who not only exists, lives, and un- The activity characteristic of human beings as such is derstands, but is Truth* itself, the eternal and im- living in accordance with reason. Aquinas, then, iden- mutable measure and source of all understanding. tifies good with actuality or being, claiming that good Augustine’s hierarchy, therefore, is a ranking of things for a given substance is that substance’s actualization both according to their goodness and according to their of its specifying potentialities. A thing is good to the degree of being. The supreme good, Augustine argues, extent that it has actualized the potentialities specific to is also the Supreme Being, the God whose name is “He its species. who is” (Lib. arb. II, 3Ð16). In similar fashion, Despite their differences, the participation and Aquinas describes the summon bonum as pure and natural-teleology approaches are not necessarily in- complete actuality () and as being itself (ip- compatible, and philosophical theologians such as Au- sum esse) (Ia, q. 3, q. 4, a. 2). gustine and Aquinas have held them together. They thought of natural teleology as specifying or explain- d) The Universality and Transcendentality of Good- ing what it is for a created thing to participate in the di- ness, and the Nonreality of Evil. It is a consequence vine goodness. Each created thing’s nature is a limited of both the participation account and the natural- and partial representation of God, and a created thing teleology account that everything that has being is participates more fully in the divine nature to the ex- good. A thing is good either in virtue of participating in tent to which it realizes or actualizes its constitutive that which is good in itself—that is, in God—and ev- potentialities. erything that exists participates in him; or it is good in virtue of actualizing its nature, and everything that ex- c) The Hierarchy of Goods and the Highest Good. ists is in actuality to some extent. Christian philoso- Both these accounts of good imply a hierarchy among phers and theologians were intrigued by the the constituents of reality. On the participation ac- universality thesis not only because of the support that count, a thing is more or less good to the extent to it received from respected authorities, but also because which it participates in, or in some way represents, it was confirmed by the Bible, for example in Genesis good. In accordance with the metaphor of “emana- 1:31—“And God saw everything that he had made, tion,” things that participate to a greater degree in good and behold, it was very good”—or 1 Timothy 4:4— are “nearer” to it and things that participate less are “For everything created by God is good.” “farther” from it. The highest good (summum bonum), The medieval doctrine of the transcendentals is the reality at the top of the hierarchy of goods, is that closely related to the universality thesis. Beginning in that possesses in its own unified nature all the perfec- the early 13th century (see Philippe le Chancelier, tions represented in fragmented and diminished ways †1236, Alexandre de Halès c. 1186Ð1245, Albert* the in the variety of particular goods. According to Great, *, and Aquinas), this idea was dis-

634 Good cussed as part of a larger doctrine that holds that being tivity constitutive of happiness. The account in the (ens), the one (unum), and the true (verum), in addition early books of the Ethics suggests that to good (bonum), transcend the Aristotelian categories. consists in an active life lived in accordance with prac- While the ten categories identify ten irreducible ways tical wisdom*, whereas the account in Book Ten sug- of being, being transcends the categorical structure of gests that it is to be found in the activity of the world. Anything that is ontologically classifiable is contemplation*, which is characteristic of the . a being, and to say of anything that it is a being is not Each of these accounts has attracted Christian thinkers, to identify it as a member of some kind distinct from the former providing a model for the active life of ser- other kinds of things. According to the classical doc- vice to others, the latter providing a model for the life trine, being is the primary transcendental, and other of prayer* and contemplation. properties are transcendental because the ontological However, from the Christian perspective, Aristotle ground of their application to a given thing is the same provides at most an account of imperfect or merely hu- as the ontological ground in virtue of which that thing man happiness. For , the ultimate end of can be called a being. In the case of good, for example, human life is supernatural union with God, a state the actualities in virtue of which a thing is good are unattainable in this life. The ultimate good for human precisely those in virtue of which it has being. Tran- beings—perfect happiness—is therefore beyond this scendental terms are convertible, or the same in reality world, and beyond the natural capabilities of human (idem secundum rem). They are not synonymous, how- beings. According to some theologians, special revela- ever, since they are conceptually distinct (differunt se- tion is necessary in order for human beings to come to cundum rationem). know what their supernatural ultimate end is, and spe- If goodness is a transcendental, and therefore uni- cial divine aid (grace) is necessary for attaining it. versal, feature of reality, evil cannot be a reality. In Book Seven of the Confessions, Augustine explains b) Virtue, Right Action, Right Reason. According to how this idea was the cornerstone of his intellectual the Greek tradition, the specifically human capacities reconciliation to Christianity. Augustine had returned (those possessed by virtue of having a rational soul, in to Manichean dualism because it offered a clear expla- particular, intellect and ) require certain habits nation of the existence of evil: just as good things have (habitus) that dispose them toward their complete ac- flowed from that which is good in itself, have tuality. These habits are the intellectual and moral flowed from that which is evil in itself—a highest evil virtues, and they dispose a human being toward the opposed to the highest good. His reading of the Platon- performance of the activities in which human perfec- ists, however, convinced him that evil is not a nature or tion consists. The acquisition and exercise of the substance, but a corruption or privation. If evil is cor- virtues, then, is an integral part of attaining happiness. ruption, it must be corruption of something that is In addition to the traditional that dis- good in some way and to some extent: what has no pose human beings with respect to purely natural, im- good cannot be corrupted. Moreover, there cannot be perfect beatitude, Christianity has held that there are anything that is pure corruption or privation, and so certain —faith*, hope*, and charity there can be no pure or highest evil opposed to the (love*)—that dispose human beings toward their su- highest good, as the Manicheans supposed. All sub- pernatural end. Moreover, the notion of grace gives stances are good to some extent and, as goods, all flow rise to the notion of infused virtues: these are not only from God, the highest good. theological virtues, but also moral virtues, which are needed to incline human beings toward their supernat- ural end, and which are infused by grace rather than 2. Human Good acquired through moral effort. a) Happiness. The metaphysics of good inherited Later medieval philosophers applied their meta- from classical Greece provided grounds for a eude- physics of goodness not only to agents but also to hu- monistic account of the human good: the human good man actions*. Actions can be viewed as realities or is the state or activity in which complete actuality as a beings, and they can be judged good to the extent to human being consists. Following the ancient tradition, which they possess all the attributes (actualities) that thinkers in the Middle Ages called this state “happi- they ought to possess. Since any human action is an ness” (felicitas) or, with a theological nuance, beati- entity—a reality—just in virtue of being an action, it tude* (beatitudo). Aristotle’s , possesses goodness to some extent (natural goodness), which, after its full recovery in the early 13th century, but it may also possess generic moral goodness, spe- exercised enormous influence over reflection on good, cific moral goodness, or gratuitous goodness, provided presents two apparently conflicting accounts of the ac- that certain other conditions are satisfied. Provided the

635 Good act (for example, the giving of alms) has an appropri- manded consists solely in their being commanded by ate object (a person in need), the act has generic moral God, and they take the prohibition of adultery and goodness: that is, it satisfies the most basic of several theft, for example, as falling within this category. Ac- conditions necessary for the action’s being purely and cordingly, these acts are morally wrong because God simply good. It has specific moral goodness if it is has prohibited them, and would be right if God en- done for an appropriate end, in an appropriate way, and joined them. Scotus and Ockham maintain, by con- in appropriate circumstances. Finally, an action pos- trast, that natural moral laws command or forbid sesses gratuitous or meritorious goodness if it is per- actions the rightness of which is independent of the di- formed out of charity. vine will. According to Ockham, not even God can al- Since the determination of the conditions of a good ter the moral value of acts that depend on these laws, action is a matter for reason, these conditions were of- because that would involve a contradiction. ten summarized by saying that a good action must be The view that God’s commands or God’s will funda- in accordance with right reason. On the model of Aris- mentally determine what is good or right represents a totelian deduction, practical reasoning came to be kind of theological subjectivism. This position prima viewed as starting from self-evident principles and facie appears to preserve God’s independence and progressing deductively to more determinate princi- sovereignty by making God the creator of value, but ples, and to applications of those principles in particu- the greater part of the Christian tradition has joined lar circumstances. The body of practical principles, Augustine and Aquinas in eschewing it, preferring to whether self-evident (either to all people or only to the think of the divine reason rather than the divine will as learned) or derived from such principles, is the body of the ground of value. *. 3. The Philosophy of Good after the Reformation c) Law and Divine Commands. For Augustine and In the modern period, philosophical reflection on the Aquinas, the notion of law is closely connected with nature of good has generally led away from the idea that of reason. Augustine identifies what he calls the that goodness supervenes on being. The most radical eternal law as the source of all that is just and right in alternative is that presented by subjectivism. David the laws that human beings develop to govern their Hume (1711Ð76), for example, argues that value is not temporal affairs, and he calls the eternal laws “the an objective property: a thing’s having value consists highest reason” (Lib. arb. I, 6Ð8). Developing these solely in its being valued by some agent. Value is ideas of Augustine’s, Aquinas holds that law is essen- something that agents impose on the world, not some- tially an expression of reason. The eternal law, to thing they discover in the world. Christian thinkers which we have partial access through reason and reve- have for the most part found subjectivist accounts lation, is an expression of divine reason. The part of unattractive. the eternal law to which we have access through rea- The deontological tradition deriving from Kant son is the natural law (Ia IIae, q. 90Ð94). Kant* falls leads away from the traditional idea of good in a dif- squarely within this tradition that connects law with ferent direction. Kant argues that the only thing that is reason. For Kant, pure practical reason is the giver of unconditionally good is the good will, the will that is the moral law. The rational will’s dignity and auton- manifest in acting for the sake of duty. Kant conceives omy consists in its being subject only to its own legis- of duty as an imperative that is imposed on us by the lation (Grundlegung 1). universal moral law. His account therefore places the All Christian thinkers have recognized the existence notions of duty and law at the center of moral philoso- of divinely revealed laws and precepts*, paradigms of phy, and philosophers who follow Kant in this respect which are found in the Decalogue*. However, contrary begin not from an account of good, but from an ac- to some caricatures, very few have unequivocally en- count of justice*. dorsed a “divine command” theory of rightness and Finally, modern consequentialism is similar in struc- wrongness. Such a theory holds that the moral value of ture to the tradition stemming from Greek thought: any act consists solely in its being approved or disap- both provide what we might call a metaphysical ac- proved, commanded or forbidden, by God. Aquinas count of good, and hold that morality has to do with claims that only commands that issue from reason promoting, maximizing, or bringing about good. The can have the force of law. Some thinkers, however, hedonistic * of John Stuart Mill such as John Duns* Scotus or William Ockham (c. (1806–73) exemplifies this view. According to Mill, 1285Ð1347), clearly distinguish between positive and the only thing intrinsically good is pleasure. All other natural moral law. They claim that, in the case of di- goods are good, and actions are morally right, only in- vine positive moral law, the rightness of the acts com- sofar as they promote pleasure. Mill’s utilitarianism is

636 Gospels a monistic account of good insofar as it holds that only J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism, London, 1863. a single thing—pleasure—is intrinsically good. Many G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica, Cambridge, 1903. consequentialist accounts, however, are pluralistic, Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, PG 3, 585Ð996, ch. 4. Thomas Aquinas, ST Ia, q. 5, 6, 49; Ia IIae, q. 18Ð21; De veri- identifying more than one intrinsic good. G. E. Moore tate, q. 21. (1873Ð1958), for example, held that personal affec- ¥ W. D. Ross (1930), The Right and the Good, Oxford. tion, aesthetic enjoyment, and knowledge are among O. Lottin (1942, new edition 1960), Psychologie et morale aux the things that have (1903). XIIe et XIIIe siècles, Gembloux. G.H. von Wright (1963), The Varieties of Goodness, London. ¥ Anselm, Monologion, in M. Corbin (Ed.), L’Ïuvre de S. S. MacDonald (1991), Being and Goodness: The Concept of the Anselme de Cantorbéry, vol. I, 1986. Good in Metaphysics and Philosophical , Ithaca, NY. Augustine, Confessions, BAug 13Ð14; De libero arbitrio, BAug L. Becker (1992), AHistory of Western Ethics, New York. 6, 155Ð529; De natura boni, BAug 1, 437Ð509. R.M. Chisholm (1996), “Bien et mal,” DEPhM, 150Ð154. Boethius, Tractatus and De consolatione philosophiae, LCL no. Scott Macdonald 74, 1973. D. Hume, ATreatise of Human Nature, l. II., 1740, London. E. Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, A.A. 4, See also ; Conscience; Ethics; Berlin, 1910. Manicheanism; ;

Gospels

Following contemporary usage, the word “gospel,” de- authors. The Gospels “according to Matthew” and “ac- rived from the Greek eu-aggelion in the singular, cording to John” were given the names of two of the means the declaration or the message of the “good apostles*; then the other two evangelists were named news” of salvation* in Jesus Christ. In the plural form, in the titles of the Gospels “according to Mark” and it is generally used to refer to the four Gospels re- “according to Luke.” These attributions were made at a garded as canonical—that is, accepted by the very early stage, during the lifetime of Papias, who churches* according to the rule (Greek kanon, angli- was Bishop of Hierapolis in the early second century. cized as “canon*”) of faith*. These four Gospels are They have every appearance of being historically au- arranged in the order Matthew, Mark, Luke, John, but thentic, even though it remains necessary to keep a dis- this has no chronological significance, and the order tance between the Greek scripture of the Gospel has changed from time to time and from place to place. known as Matthew, and the Semitic tradition* related John’s Gospel, for example, has sometimes been put at to this Galilean apostle. It is also very likely that there the head of the list; the sequence Matthew, John, Luke, was a considerable lapse of time between the earliest Mark is also found. Other gospels, referred to as apoc- oral traditions gathered from among the followers of ryphal, are known in addition: they include the Gospel the apostle John and the definitive compilation of the of Peter, of which no more than a fragment has been Gospel that bears his name. With that said, it is diffi- preserved, and several sections of the Gospel of the cult to date any of the Gospels with certainty. How- Hebrews, which was used by some Jewish Christians. ever, in line with the earliest approximations, and Finally, still other gospels, originating at later dates, following the mainstream exegetical consensus— were circulated in gnostic circles, including the Gospel while not denying that discussions continue on this of Thomas and the Gospel of Philip, which were re- subject—we can specify that: 1) Mark’s Gospel was cently rediscovered at Nag Hammadi in Egypt. written in Greek around the year 70, and, according to The canonical Gospels, gradually designated as Irenaeus*, probably in Rome* after the death of Peter* such over the course of the second and third centuries, (Adversus Haereses III, 1. 2); 2) Matthew’s was writ- were circulated initially in the form of anonymous ten around 80Ð85 in Antioch; 3) Luke’s was written writings before they acquired titles and were ascribed around the same time, perhaps in Greece; and

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