Cicero's Philosophical Position in Academica and De Finibus

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Cicero's Philosophical Position in Academica and De Finibus Cicero’s Philosophical Position in Academica and De Finibus Submitted by Hoyoung Yang to the University of Exeter as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Classics in November 2013 I certify that all material in this thesis which is not my own work has been identified and that no material has previously been submitted and approved for the award of a degree by this or any other University. Signature: ………………………………………………………….. 1 Hoyoung Yang University of Exeter Cicero’s Philosophical Position in Academica and De Finibus This thesis aims to examine the extent of consistency between Cicero’s epistemological position in Academica and his method of approaching ethics in De Finibus. I consider whether in both works he expresses a radically sceptical view or a more moderate one. I suggest that Cicero’s scepticism is best understood when we understand his dialectical inquiry as being, in both works, a positive procedure designed to find the most persuasive view by arguing for and against every opinion. In Chapter 1, I examine Cicero’s mode of writing in his later philosophical dialogues, distinguishing two levels of ‘Cicero’ (that is, Cicero the author and the persona in the dialogues). In Chapter 2, I examine how Cicero himself understands the key principles of scepticism (akatalēpsia and epochē) and whether his epistemological position in Academica is a consistent one. Chapters 3 and 4 form a bridge between the epistemological debate in Academica and the ethical debate in De Finibus by examining in detail two applications by Cicero of Carneades’ ethical division. In Chapter 3, I discuss the original philosophical context of Carneades’ division, and consider how Cicero applies it to the epistemological debate at Ac. 2.129-41. In Chapter 4, I discuss Cicero’s application of this division to ethical debate at Fin. 2.34-44 with reference to Cicero’s criticism of Epicurean ethics. Chapter 5 and 6 are concerned with Cicero’s attitude towards two competing (and more plausible) ethical theories, that is, the Stoic and Antiochean theories. By playing two roles (i.e. as the persona taking one side of the debate in each dialogue and as the author distancing himself from both of them), Cicero writes in a way that is consistent with his (moderate) Academic scepticism. He aims not only to free his readers from their dogmatic obstinacy, but also to help them to find out for themselves the most persuasive view on each philosophical issue. 2 Contents Introduction ………………………………………………………………………..... 5 Chapter 1 Cicero’s Philosophical Project 1.1 Consistency of Cicero’s Philosophical Position ……………………. 9 1.2 Cicero’s Dialogues …………………………………………………... 15 1.3 Radical vs. Moderate Scepticism ..………………………………… 21 Chapter 2 Consistency of Cicero’s Position in Academica ……………... 24 2.1 Dialectical Interpretation of Two Academic Principles …………... 25 2.2 Cicero’s Approval of Akatalēpsia .………………………………… 34 2.3 Cicero and the Wise Man …………………………………………... 42 2.4 Assessment of the Persuasive Impression ……………………….. 51 2.5 Persuasive Impression vs. Persuasive Opinion ………………….. 54 Chapter 3 Carneades’ Division in Lucullus ………………………………… 59 3.1 Form and Purpose of Carneades’ Division ……………………….. 61 3.1.1 Carneades’ Anti-Stoic Argument …………………………………... 64 3.1.2 Carneades’ Sceptical Argument ………………………………….... 66 3.2 Sceptical Use of Carneades’ Division at Ac. 2.129-41 ………….. 70 3.2.1 Broader Context of Ac. 2.129-41 ………………………………….. 72 3.3 Carneades’ Division at Ac. 2.129-31 in Relation to Ethical Debate ………………………………………………………………………………………… 78 Chapter 4 Cicero’s Criticism of Epicurean Ethics in Fin. 1-2 …………… 83 4.1 Positive Use of Carneades’ Division in De Finibus …………….... 84 4.2 Structure of Books 1 and 2 …………………………………………. 88 4.3 Torquatus’ Account of Epicurean Ethics ………………………….. 93 4.4 Epicurean Dilemma …………………………………………………. 97 4.5 Virtues Are Sought for Their Own Sake …………………………. 101 4.6 Cicero’s Positive Use of Carneades’ Division ……………………104 3 4.6.1 Primary Motivation …………………………………………………..106 4.6.2 Virtue ………………………………………………………………….111 4.6.3 Persuasive Views in Carneades’ Division ………………………..113 Chapter 5 Cicero’s Criticism of Stoic System in Fin. 3-4……………….. 115 5.1 Structure of the Second Dialogue …………………………………116 5.1.1 Cato’s Speech in Book 3 ………………………………………….. 117 5.1.2 Cicero’s Speech in Book 4 ………………………………………... 122 5.2 The Academic Tradition and Zeno’s Disagreement ……………..126 5.2 The Systematic Character of Stoic Ethics ………………………..131 5.4 Stoic Dilemma ……………………………………………………… 135 5.4.1 Question about Stoic Developmental Account …………………. 136 5.4.2 Questions about the ‘Consequences’ of the Stoic Ethics ………139 Chapter 6 Cicero’s Criticism of Antiochean Ethics in Fin. 5 ………….. 146 6.1 Piso’s Account of Antiochean Ethics at Fin. 5.24-72 ……………148 6.2 Cicero’s Criticism of the Consistency of Antiochean Ethics …….153 6.3 Antiochean Reading of De Finibus ………………………………..159 6.4 Comparison between Antiochus and the Stoics in Book 5 ……. 162 6.5 Antiochean Dilemma ………………………………………………..164 6.6 Test of Persuasiveness in De Finibus …………………………….168 Conclusion …………………………………………………………………………176 Bibliography………………………………………………………………………..179 4 Introduction Although Cicero was highly regarded in the Renaissance and Enlightenment, his reputation declined in the mid-nineteenth century. He was thought to be neither original nor authoritative and readers turned back increasingly to Plato and Aristotle as sources for ancient philosophy. In 1856, for example, Theodore Mommsen criticized Cicero for lack of originality, and treated him as merely an inaccurate copier or compiler of Greek sources. However, ever since the general collapse of his reputation, some scholars have attempted to reconstruct his reputation as a philosopher. The assessment of his philosophical significance has been gradually changing in recent decades, as part of the general upsurge of interest in Hellenistic, post-Hellenistic and later ancient philosophy. Few scholars would now dismiss him as merely an incompetent philosophical thinker. As a result, his philosophical writings are now regarded as worth reading not only as sources for the views of the main Hellenistic schools in each branch of philosophy, but also as documents with their own intellectual interest. However, while Cicero’s philosophical significance has been recognised from various perspectives, questions can still raise about the extent to which he is a serious philosopher. First, he does not seem to have made any innovative contribution to the progress of philosophical thought as regards new or original ideas. Most of the philosophical material which he uses in his works appears to have been adopted or borrowed from earlier thinkers. His methods are, in large measure, common to ancient philosophical dialectic and are, indeed, based especially on writings by Academics; and he himself attributes his own dialectical method to the Academic tradition beginning from Socrates. There seems to be little room for finding Cicero’s originality in the area of philosophical ideas or methods. Secondly, personal interest must have been a dominating factor in shaping Cicero’s philosophical position. Cicero’s affiliation to the New Academy sometimes appears to be a choice for some practical purposes (such as conveniently presenting the views of various philosophical schools for the 5 purpose of accomplishing his educational purpose) rather than being the consequence of his own serious philosophical considerations. Whenever he expresses his intention to raise the intellectual and moral level of the Roman people by introducing Greek philosophy to them, his primary concern appears to be personal glory, as we will see. He was, essentially, an orator and a politician, not a professional philosopher. Also, the impression that subjective elements dominated his philosophical position has often been reinforced by the general image of Cicero as a person who was notorious for sentimentality in his private life and wavering in public affairs. This image depicts him as a liberal, who listens to both sides and then does nothing. If we highlight these personal and emotional aspects of Cicero’s thought and character, we might think that he was not a serious philosopher. Finally, even if it is granted that Cicero was a serious thinker, it is not always easy to specify his philosophical position, which appears to vacillate between radical scepticism (which is characterized by endorsement of universal suspension of judgement) and a more moderate one (which allows for assent to persuasive view). On the one hand, his dialogues show a strongly sceptical mode of presentation: any given view is refuted by the opponent (often by Cicero himself); and the consequent equipollence of opposing views appears to end in suspension of judgment on each topic. On the other hand, Cicero sometimes seems to adopt another strategy, especially concerning ethical subjects: by assessing all available views, he intends to find the most persuasive one. Thus we may wonder whether and how it is consistent for his generally sceptical stance to be reconciled with his inclination toward certain (more persuasive) views. In my thesis, I will examine Cicero’s philosophical position in Academica and De Finibus, mainly focusing on this last point. I hope that, through illuminating this point, some light may be thrown also on the first two points. In Chapters 2 and 3, I will discuss Academica, which includes various debates which occurred at various stages of the history of the New Academy spanning more than two centuries. Here Cicero presents a series of philosophical discussions, not only between Stoicism and the New Academy, but also among the New Academics themselves. In this light, Cicero’s philosophical position presented in Academica may include distinct philosophical insights from a variety of philosophers. 6 We see some evidence in Academica pointing to the conclusion that Cicero supports radical rather than moderate scepticism. The position that Cicero’s persona appears to advocate in this work is the Clitomachean interpretation of Carneades, that is, radical scepticism.1 Cicero seems to construe ‘persuasive’ views as beliefs which one should follow in action, but to which one was not committed rationally.
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