Cicero's Presentation of Stoic Ethics in De Finibus Book

CEU eTD Collection CICERO’S PRESENTATIONOFSTOICETHICS “ In partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of TOTAS PAGINAS COMMOVERE? TOTAS PAGINAS IN Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy Doctor of Philosophy Professor Brad Inwood (external) BradInwood Professor DE FINIBUS Central European University European Central Department of of Philosophy Department Professor Betegh Gábor Budapest, Hungary Ákos Brunner Submitted to Submitted Supervisors: 2010 By BOOKIII ” CEU eTD Collection CEU eTD Collection Budapest, 04.12.2010 Budapest, unless person, another noted. otherwise publishedby materialswritten and/or institution or degrees in previously any other for any materials other accepted no contains this dissertation I herebydeclarethat …………………………………………………… Ákos Brunner CEU eTD Collection CEU eTD Collection never ceasing to believe in believe me. never to ceasing Lastleastnotbut Iwouldlike to thankmy my Zsóka, mother andwife my sister for Sciences. Artsand Academy of of the Institute Hungarian Philosophical the at junior researcher as years three work to opportunity the owe I generosity whose to Borbély, Gábor January February and of 2010 atHumboldtUniversity of Berlin. Iam grateful to spend forme grantingto opportunity the Excellence Cluster TOPOI the and to spendProgram forme enabling to the2005 attheUniversity fall of term Toronto, of Exchange Toronto – University of tothe CEU here.also owe I study andcoursework years from three of the benefitted have greatly CEU; of at I DepartmentPhilosophy I owetoall my atthe debt I wouldlike toacknowledgeandcolleagues the teachers meinmanyhelping years. ways the over for Bodnár István to also thanks Many conceived. were dissertation my of ideas basic underinspiring unforgettable his period of research insupervision the Toronto that was during my many subjects.It on discussions encouragementand illuminating would never have been written. Iam also deeply thankful Bradto Inwood for his kind invaluable supportand, dedicated constant patience guidance, attimes, this work Most of all I would like to thank my supervisor Gábor Betegh, without whose ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS v CEU eTD Collection vi CEU eTD Collection the limitations of Cicero’s of report Cicero’s limitations the we have redraw argue, to such I an of approach, moral inconsequence philosophy. In author of as the text the behind presence Cicero’s of is, awareness renewed –that as awhole renewed awareness of how of renewed awareness dissertationrecent debate over the I right understandingargue of the “foundations” of Stoicto fascinatinghighly extensive tothesubstantially emergence and the of contributed ethics. In my the effectthis that thispresentation debate ought to be isrecast highly in terms problematicof a in a way that has (as I see the matter) this has position come downtousin inpresentation Cicero’s only intrinsic “good” required to live a happy life. The fullest account of their case for on Socraticthe ethical legacy inAntiquity,by championing the view thatvirtue is the philosophical Stoics The work. have uswith presented mostthe radical development De finibus IIIof contributeCicero’s byexploring tothisMy toBook trend attempts dissertation works. inhis philosophical he discusses theories and doctrines of different the perception Cicero’s thatinformed factors personal and cultural pay various heedtothe due needto the of awareness an increasing last four years decades; philosophy the inover or three hasbeen there although recent Rome. This self-assessment has been mostly approved in scholarship on Hellenistic sufficient inexpositor, being addition to stylist anunmatched anda possessing person public even butheregardshimself asandintelligent a a professional philosopher; competent entirely tous.Cicerolost himselfconsider doesnot himself an original or thinker, almost been have philosophers– Greek the by written treatises ethical of hundreds –the sources whoseprimary theories it ontheHellenistic ethical information provides much in its originality or contribution theory, even if, in contrast to e.g. Aristotle’s Cicero’s De finibus De finibus gravitas , as our central source for early Stoic ethics and as part of Cicero’s and , a complex essay on what Cicero perceives as the central problem is certainly one of our most important texts on importantmost texts ancientethical is of certainly our one auctoritas De finibus as atestimony to effectively to promulgate Greek philosophy in ABSTRACT III functions and interacts as part of per se per vii Nicomachean Ethics Nicomachean , but in , rather invaluable wealth the of ; for, as I argue, Cicero views and Cicero as Iargue, ; for, De finibus , its merits lie not so III; but even De finibus CEU eTD Collection systematically distort the Stoic the theory. distort systematically isliable to that perspective interpretive an from theory theStoic interprets viii CEU eTD Collection atII The difference that Part the III context makes...... II.3 II.1 Part II Part I Introduction Abbreviations Table of contents Abstract Acknowledgements III.1 II.4 II.2 I.6 I.5 I.4 I.3 I.2 I.1 From II.4.2 II.4.1 II.3.2 II.3.1 I.3.3 I.3.2 I.3.1 ...... vii ...... Cicero’s Sceptical approach...... 2.4.2.6 Objections to II.4.2.5Annas’ conclusion ...... A striking consequence II.4.2.4of Annas’ interpretation...... Some remarks on II.4.2.3 Annas’ ...... solution Annas’ reconstruction of the core II.4.2.2 argument Annas’ interpretation II.4.2.1of Stoic ethics...... The two main lines of interpretation: the “cosmic” versus the “heterodox”...... Problems with ...... Cato’s account An outline of outline An The “problem” of Stoic ethics...... The account of Stoic ethics in ...... Conclusion After the exile: Cicero the writer at work The picture emerging: Cicero at hismost “pragmatic” Cicero’s philosophical education...... Cicero as an expositor of Hellenistic philosophy: theold and the new consensus Cicero ...... as a Source ...... 1 ...... xi ...... The “heterodox” view: Julia Annas on Stoic ethics...... The “cosmic” approach...... Problems that do not have solution...... Problems that have solution...... From 62 to 59: disillusionment and crisis...... The philosophical digression in Until the consulate: the upraise of Cicero’s career...... 78 to59 BC ...... ix ...... v ...... Further remarks and ...... conclusion for the Stoic theses on virtue and happiness...... De finibus : Cicero’s intellectual TABLE OF TABLE III 16-26...... De finibus Pro Murena ix CONTENTS life before his exile...... 84 ...... Book III: problems and solutions...... (60-66)...... 66 ...... 15 ...... 231 229 218 211 204 200 192 187 187 175 174 156 145 137 123 107 105 101 50 58 48 48 37 13 CEU eTD Collection Bibliography B Appendix A Appendix Conclusion III.2 III.3 III.1.3 III.1.2 III.1.1 Coda: self-love...... The theory thatstays standing: Antiochus’ accountof the ...... 321 ...... 339 ...... 327 ...... 347 The standards for assessing dogmatic theories Cicero’s sceptical approach in Cicero’s sceptical stance: an outline...... De finibus...... 244 x in De ...... 273 finibus summum bonum...... 278 305 235 CEU eTD Collection Nat. Hist. OCT ND NE M Luc LS Inst. In Cat. Hort Ep. EE Ecl. Diss. De Stoic. rep De Re P De orat. off. De De leg. DL De inv De fin div. De Comm. not. Brut. Adv. Colot. Ad fam. Ad Att. Acad...... Pliny, Oxford Classical Texts Cicero, Aristotle, Sextus Empiricus, Cicero, A. A. Long – D. Sedley, Lactantius, Cicero, Cicero, Seneca, Aristotle, Stobaeus, Epictetus, Plutarch, Cicero, Cicero, Cicero, Cicero, Diogenes Laertius, Diogenes Cicero, Cicero, Cicero, Plutarch, Cicero, Plutarch, Cicero, Cicero, Cicero, Historia Naturalis Deoratore Brutus Epistulae Ad familiares Epistulae adAtticum Academica De natura deorum Lucullus In Catilinam Hortensius De Re Publica De officiis De legibus De inventione De finibusbonorum et malorum De divinatione Epistulae adLucilium Adversus Colotem De Stoicorum repugnantiis De communibus notiis Nicomachean Ethics Eudemian Ethics Eclogae Dissertationes Divine institutes Frequently Frequently cited names and titles Adversus Mathematicos Lives of the Philosophers ABBREVIATIONS The Hellenistic Philosophers xi (LONG–SEDLEY 1987) CEU eTD Collection W Vit SVF Stob Q. fr. Q. Tusc Pro Pro Sest. Pro Pro Arch. PHP PH Phil. PE Parad. Orat. Opt. Doctr. . Att. Rab Clu. . . . Wachsmuth Cornelius Nepos, Hans vonArnim, Stobaeus Cicero, Cicero, Cicero, Cicero, Cicero, Cicero, Galen, Sextus Empiricus, Cicero, Eusebius, Cicero, Cicero, Galen, De placitiis Hippocratis et Platonis De optima docrina Philippicae Epistulae adQuintum fratrem Tusculanae disputationes Pro Rabirio Perduellionis Reo Pro Cluentio Pro Sestio Pro Archia poeta Paradoxa Stoicorum Orator Praeparatio Evangelica Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta Pomponii Attici Vita Pyrrhoniae hypotyposeis xii (ARNIM 1903-5) CEU eTD Collection (REYNOLDS 1998). translation(ANNAS 2001). Latin The textIuse throughout OCT the is editionof Unless otherwise indicated, all longer translations from 1 renderit if rationally compelling: premises the formallyof a valid reasoning arefound that many Stoic arguments are in fact inconclusive); but even this would not by itself out pointed Cicerohas just (though it heatedly depicted as Cato consistent internally is so Stoictheory the that may admit we argument of sake the For (48ff). good is only forthethe thesis virtue byCato, that Stoic presentedpreviously arguments, histhe of refutation successof the himselfover congratulate seems to pages?” Cicero whole or letter, a removing I am think: you do “what asking, rhetorically When be altered”. possibly which could is hereanything there down…notthat come tumbling edifice to whole the cause would piece, interlocking an like letter, asingle of removal “the that “firmlya such structure deductive welded” systematic organisation, incredibly which in culminated suggestionthe thethat Stoic ethical system has such an passionate eulogy of at response isThis Cicero’s the Stoic ethical theory byprofecta congruunt ipsa sibi et aproposito non aberrant.the Stoic spokesmanomnia interseapta etconexa –sicenimaiebas–, tamen persequinon debemus, falsis sia principiis Cato (III 74),paginas commovere?enim sitapudillos, quod ut id estatelaudatum,ordorerum conservatus et Et ais, si una littera commota sit, fore tota ut labet disciplina. utrum igitur tibi litteram videor an totas possit. nectitur,alio ut,siullamlitteram moveris, labent omnia?nectamen quicquam est,moveri quod posterius priori non convenit? quid sequitur, quod non respondeat superiori? quid nonsic aliud ex operibus manu factistam compositum tamquecompactum etcoagmentatum inveniri potest? quid inmortales! nonne miraris?quid enim autinnatura,nihil estaptius, qua nihil descriptius, aut in verum admirabilis compositio disciplinae incredibilisque rerum me traxit ordo;quem,perdeos 1 De finibus INTRODUCTION IV 53 as character in the dialogue to the 1 De finibus are from Raphael Woolf’s Raphael from are De finibus CEU eTD Collection would contend that Cicero’s critique is based on an interpretation Stoic earlier of interpretation an isbased on critique Cicero’s that would contend Most interpreters of Stoic ethics today would strongly disagree with this picture. They even or represents such asecondraises possibility of the hearing). Part III Part time: the Stoic theory presented in Stoic theory presented time: the arguments. But as far as Cicero’s late faras Cicero’s as But arguments. Cicero’s nextof his refutation presenthesuggests that is time Cato goingto in ispresented issue the how is this it is successful because the Stoic theory of the Stoic theory the is because itsuccessful victory; merely isa rhetorical not His refutation (55). herself” andtruth ofnature facts sense, “common the of firm support the to owing rather but masterpiece), rhetorical a his speech hecertainly considers Cicerowins case (though the that eloquence of mastery unrivalled his of in virtue not is It corollaries. ultimate to assumptions on a thorough understanding argument of wholethe from elaborate starting misrepresented atany Stoicor the ismisunderstood theory his point: based refutation he hasnot that throughout confident rather is actually Cicero IV 1-2), (cf. complicated rationem responseof the Stoic theory. His wholesale attack on Stoic ethics in Book IV is topresented as his Cato’she in itfor has that removedBut granted letter senseCicerotakes not another asingle elaborate of cards. asahouse collapse exposition must system whole the seriously, claim previous Cato’s if wetake thus, and theory, of Stoic in pages the whole hehas“removed” that sense this herespect; isconfident of in this deficient theseriously is theory Stoic the that shown have to believes Cicero “whole evidently false highly or reasoningcontroversial, the system” as a whole willfail convince.to (III 14: I shall argue that neither the end of end the neither that argue shall I ) of Stoic ethics in Book III, and although this theory is admittedly De finibus De finibus De Introduction philosophica 2 III does not get a second hearing (in summum bonum IV.Tobe inhissure, parting remark De finibus De are concerned, there is no next is no there areconcerned, V nor the fifth the Vnor is actually flawed –or Tusculan totam CEU eTD Collection crucial Butsuch philosophical point. observations and have considerations been rarely missesomitsCicero a or his account in presenting effectthat tothe have argued interpreters number of pointsIndeed, a ofdetail. important superficial sketchy on and tantalisingly is often ethics, Stoic earlier of account continuous and intelligent most general perception has rather beenthat rather has perception general of The system. Stoic the account an presentaccurate to large taken byand been theory put into Cato’s mouth in Book III. This does not mean that Book IV in theory refutation Stoic the and of Cicero’s criticism that customarily presumed has It been has neglected. been point this forgenerally Stoicdoctrine, as asource Antiochean. However, when it comes to using comes whenit Cicero’s to However, tradition). may have before turn, hisdogmatic Academic Academy drawn critical on an Antiochus (admittingit andalleged from this on “Old camelargely criticizing basis, tradition, Academic” that Antiochus himself, who had in of theory criticism Stoic the the that been a member of the New Madvig’s definitive modernMadvig’s definitive edition of doctrine is being wholesale presented in and “Oldthe Academy” by taught of as understood Antiochus Ascalon, whose ethical Stoic theory with anotherethics thatmissesignores crucial or andpoints, philosophical in the general theoryconflates with which it is not identical: the ethical theory of 3 20-21; GILL 2006: 167-173. 2 Madvig (MADVIG 1839: LXV) declared that both Books IV and V “ Cf.e.g. WHITE1979: 164-165, STRIKER 1996: 269 and 288; ANNAS 2001: 91 n. 2,3; 99-100 n. in 3 propria persona That is, the entire procedure of conflating the Stoic theory with the with theory Stoic the conflating of procedure entire the is, That does not affect the accuracy of the account of the Stoic Introduction De finibus De finibus 3 De finibus exposition De finibus III,although itprovides oursingle the scholarly consensus has been has consensus scholarly the V. of Stoic ethics in ethics Stoic of IV was for the most part 2 Indeed, ever since Nicolai ever Indeed,since totos ab Antiocho esse De finibus De finibus ”. IIIhas III CEU eTD Collection Cicero had drawn on some original Stoic source, a different source, that is, than is,the than that source, adifferent source, Stoic original onsome had drawn Cicero copier and weightless compiler. weightless copier and by as amechanic view of andfacilitated a widely Ciceroshared was encouraged aligns is)clearly it(if really misrepresentation Cicero’s possible for responsibility let this misrepresentation, alone thefact thisthat nineteenth century) the separation of separation the century) nineteenth Why is this so? In earlier times theory. Antiochean the Stoic the with conflate seems to above, as Iindicated (from Madvig until in Book V, andsome Cicero’s Antiochean criticismtime and refutation of the Stoic aftertheory that, the aspresented theory from Antiochus’ both absent is clearly end perspective cosmic V: the of the in thisethics–that have effect misrepresentation isaserious arguedtothe ethics Stoic of proponents of what I shall call,in perspective has nosignificantrole toplay. summum bonum the that thesis the for argument –the concerned is account his of argument central creating and governing force inforcecreating (see and governing universe the intelligent all-pervading as an nature conception universal of cosmo-theological of their backdrop the against argue significantly theStoics where issues ethical some believeare does there that Cato account. Cato’s not it on definitely was that Thus was “cosmological”; is prevailingStoicsthe ethics viewtoday that something (or in Cicero’s late 5 connected with considerations about what we find in find we what about considerations with connected 4 Ishall say more on this view in Chapter Cf. my remark on BOERI 2009 in Section De finibus III. But in this connection they have well-nigh nothing to say on that constitutes happiness consists in virtue alone– invirtue happiness this cosmic consists constitutes that philosophica ) atlarge. 5 It was generally assumed that in writing the book Part II Part I.1 II.4.2.1 . De finibus Introduction , the “cosmic” line of interpretation of Stoic of interpretation line of “cosmic” , the 4 . 4 Many distinguished interpreters –the interpreters distinguished Many III as a source from its proper context De finibus De finibus De finibus III with III 62ff); but as far as the IV, or in IV, or De finibus De De finibus IV and CEU eTD Collection be widely studied in isolation, virtually as a self-contained account. The as virtually answers to be inisolation, account. a self-contained widely studied continues to III Book III. in Book ethics Stoic of account positive the for responsible thought to wear an Antiochean hat in that Book–, from Cicero the author, who is also discussion ofin discussion ethics Stoic philosophy. years,writinglate his inhisAcademicsceptic discussing and/or approach to Cicero’s attentioninphilosophical pedagogicalto turningprofessed to concerns Today itis widely that thought resolutionthe to this puzzle lies in paying due secondary source. intexts has been lostgeneral– tous,and Cicerois earliest and our best known earlier Stoic ethicalpresented byhim inIV? Book The stakeishigh, as oncethe available vastamount of texts –togetherfinibus with the great faras bulk as Stoic on ethics, source and dependable well-informed as afairly Cicero of Hellenisticrefutation philosophical of and interpretation from hisAntiochean of interpretation ethics Stoic itour detach in Book IV? In of in knowledgeStoic ethics andpresentation other words, Cicero’s of view favourable arelatively retain both we can how following: howthe can we reconcileI think basic the that perpetuates challenge that tendency,this is summarised, crudely the picture of III as a self-standing has testimony strengthened. only philosophy, is which quite generallyheld resolution the read today. But to of Hellenistic asexpositor credentials Cicero’s of assessment more charitable a to faded gave way gradually and intellectual contribution of deprecatingCicero’s view Antiochean source he source usedAntiochean for 6 Ishall discuss this point in more detail in Chapter III is concerned, with the tendentious misrepresentation of the Stoic theory Stoic the of misrepresentation tendentious the with concerned, is III 6 Such considerations are supposed to allow us to bracket Cicero’s critical Cicero’s bracket allowto us to aresupposed Suchconsiderations De finibus De finibus Introduction IV, by distancing the Cicero character –whois IV and V.During twentieth the century this 5 I.1 . De finibus De III, and at the same time De finibus De CEU eTD Collection consistent representation of in late himself the of representation consistent goagainst in his to Cicero, nowprevailing consensus with the accordance that may seem theory charmsthe Antiochus’ of resist could not in Cicero idea that ethics the But untouched. III Book in theory the of presentation his leave not does distortion this ethics, Stoic distorts seriously perspective this as far in so and Antiochean; becalled may rightly that ethics Stoic on havea perspective does Cicero ethics. notwithstanding surrounding presentation are to be sought in be sought are to presentation pagesfrom his removes understanding those andwhy how Cicero clues the to that argue like to because Iwould outmoded; might or myseem naïve Moreover, attempt show neededthis. pagesare to further makingmight explicit corollary.this reasonably Soone hundredsquestion whether of even emphasising,interpretation fight shy proponents typically of lineof or of this entail although this, seem to theory ethical early of Stoic interpretations many recent pages seem forlikeargue unoriginal, I would Cicerothat to may outmoded. It naïve hand,or trivial, one hand,unoriginal other the or on and, on the may seem, in sentence, one whenstated argument, My be remedied. to needs is situation oddand this that proposal My dissertationthe modest revolvesaround components. from various pieces –but made patchworks reconstructions, arehypothetical of ethics Stoic resulting accounts presented are typicallytheory Stoic the meaningof true the about it raises questions interpretive the sought elsewhere, in other sources on early Stoic ethics; the whenpresenting Stoic in ethics philosophica De finibus De at large. I shall argue that Cicero’s Academic scepticism large. Cicero’s that argue Ishall at De finibus IV can be viewed as representing his Stoic views IVcanbeviewed asrepresentingon own De finibus III is always there as the source of some pivotal Introduction De finibus 6 IV and V,orrather philosophica III; and as I have just pointed out, pointed just have I as and III; does indeed remove whole , was a lifelong intelligent lifelong a was , De finibus and the and CEU eTD Collection cf. e.g. II 42); but in other cases he seems to mean by it the primary intrinsic good, or the combination term: sometimes he loosely equates itwith the “end” ( cf. SEDLEY1998:146(who optsfor I hope that in that I hope thought. be therefore for relied apropergrasp auseful inourquest upon of as ally ethical Stoic in Hellenistic ourscholarly ethics, andwhoprefigures can interest understanding relevantly someone attitude whose him for objective enquirer, and an open-minded portrayal his chosen of tradition (especially in the his attractive was but notwithstanding hisAcademicscepticism; certainly factors understanding burden ofhis possibleinformingof factors questioning the and perception of the differentcompetent philosophical for flair philosophymindless and real copier, had andisawell-placed compiler or a expositor finibus of Hellenisticdoctrinesfor reading apretext serveas not should such argue considerations that like to and ethicaltheories.I woulddiscussing But to philosophy. approach sceptic) his (Academic theoretical thought, One intentionsof or Cicero’s authorial concerning considerations general currentadequacy of these does notTo begin with this latter charge, Icertainly would notlike questionto release the relevance or us from andtheories. various doctrines Hellenistic the of of Academy,adherent Sceptic andthe is such the afairly as expositor dependable particular (as distinguished from Antiochus’ ethics Antiochus’ from distinguished (as particular the of theory Antiochean the that found sceptic Academic strong a rather it– with wascompatible and practiced he as understood Academic scepticism commitment to some aspects of Antiochus’ ethical thought. Cicero as 7 Cicero’s phrase in an unreflected way. The assumption that Cicero, rather than beinga than rather Cicero, that The assumption way. in an unreflected Part III Part summum/ultimum/extremum bonum I shall be able to show convincingly that Cicero’s scepticism – scepticism Cicero’s that convincingly show to be able shall I to agathon Introduction ). Cicero is not entirely consequent in his usage of the 7 has no obvious equivalent inGreek ethical texts; finis , cf. e.g. II 8), or “the happy life” ( tout court Lucullus ), we should not mistake ) 7 was the most plausible summum bonum beata vita beata in De ; CEU eTD Collection or so I or shall in argue – in matters independentsuch lackedan competence henevertheless among hispeers, background wasexceptional learning intellectual and ifCicero’s Greek because even issay, to that Larissa; of Philo of student learnedhad asa Cicero what line with in mostpart forthe hewas said andbecausewhat matters, in suchscholarly authority hadgreat because Antiochus forgranted, bulk doctrines of great take the these theory as a hereditary version of Old Academic ethics, and so on. Cicero could notbut Stoic the of origins the system, ethical Academic” “Old the of composition the sects, developmentof philosophy and after Socrates Plato, its fragmentation intoquarrelling of narrative his–I mean of amatter consider the historical sceptical doubt Cicero much evendid that involved not Antiochus’ Moreover, doctrines ethical distance.) sceptical formal convincing theory Antiochean the found have would he if even –but life; happy the for In any case, I use the terms similarly to him. combine his conception of his combine the of conception to caseAntiochus’inthe flawed, attempt of or did asheactually underprovided did preventcommitmentnot fromCicero facets finding other of Antiochus’ ethics with a view of winning anAcademic approval. sceptic’s (Onthe hand,other this were devised features of theory that some important reasonthat for the good result, arrive atthis asanAcademicsusceptible thisto scepticactually he way,butthat was ab ovo not only scepticismCicero’s not did argue that Ishall his sceptic Indeed, “approval”. s the on theory (“persuasive”) can say both that the Stoic intrinsicof the goods, theattainment of which constitutes end the and makes our life happy. Thus he prevent him from from prevent him “approving” Antiochus’ theory of the tout court Part I , this presumably not havewould compelled himtogive uphis summum bonum . ummum bonum summum bonum isvirtue (see IV28)andthat is“to it live morally” (IV45). Introduction 8 available, and that as suchit anddeserved available, that with the idea that virtue is sufficient is virtue that idea the with summum bonum in CEU eTD Collection way ofunderstanding howand why, as a testimony I propound that may support for indirect provide itby offering aviable interpretation;line of although I believe kindthe that of of reappraisal the “cosmic” interpretation.by of presented already proponents repeat, orrely argumentnotdoes arguments on, Nor do I have anything my of possible triviality–, unoriginality charge other charge–the As tothe or to say directly in favour of thisto give his ScepticAcademic to tradition. this is backdrop pertinent right tothe understanding of specificthe slantCiceroseems distorted interpretationsdistorted of Stoic doctrines. Thuse.g.in lastthe chapter I shall argue distinguish betweenin and sources authentic Stoic doctrines more our to keen ability a to conducive are considerations these run long in the that believe I negative. merely But Iamin the hopethat resultis the kindof the of Ipropound considerations not Stoic ethics to an extent that no party in mayquestion compromise thevalue seem of to this controversy may be happy to in welcome.say to more have Iwill which still ongoing controversy about the “naturalistic foundations” of Stoic ethics, on Answering this question, Ishallis animportantargue, it. ignore may to come have Cicero position, for Stoic ethical the central argument thought to substantiatethought to self-presentation.this In philosophica thatweshouldthis backdrop value assessthe ofhispresentation himself inof thelate the exposure to Greek philosophy. exposurethe to In to responses and attitudes intellectual his in appreciating etc.) optimate an politician, Cicero’s Roman cultural identity hisidentity (including as an eminent Roman orator- I shall also try to reinforce, both in both reinforce, to try also shall I , as well as the evidence in his earlier works and letters that are widely that andletters works his earlier in as evidence , aswell the Part II Part I Part I Introduction if . Admittedly, the answer that I offer to this the cosmic perspective was pivotal to the and 9 Ishall argue to the effect that itis against III Part III De finibus , the need to be constantly aware of desideratum Ishall argue in particular that III as a source for earlier in the recent and in recent the De finibus De III CEU eTD Collection inevitably a statesman inphilosophical whom we encounter philosophical is late the works importantin picture this qualify to meant are but merits, intellectual Cicero’s of assessment ways. fundamentallyvaluenot meant Myconclusions undermine today. favourable are Toto a put it face at readily is taken too this self-presentation that is Ibelieve credible. manner, crudely,philosophy, and hasbeen studying it his all lifein an Academicscepticopen-minded I shall argue to the effect that the deeply ethics was probably informedalways thoroughly byhis Academic upbringing and,in Stoic Cicero’s of knowledge that my for concerns: importance are of particular that probably fiction.a biographical Within picture this Ishall broader detailsout point is oratory of and rhetoric student eageryoung the Cicero with career; its continuity political his of crisis and sinking the with simultaneously and consulship Cicero’s in his itmainly itdevelopednevertheless is gradually, life; after alaterdevelopment the late in himself of farhisrepresentation how see whether and to in order career, political providing ageneral survey of evidenceour intellectual Cicero’s on life during his oikei of notion the with interchangeably self-love of notion the use to tend who interpreters IV.Thus inthose refutation Book its facilitating thereby Academic” theory, “Old the with it conflating by theory Stoic the distorts inadvertently Cicero which My text falls into two parts. In misunderstanding. “self-love” that we find in we find that “self-love” that the reformulation of the Stoic theory of theory of Stoic the reformulation the that ǀ sis in theStoicdiscussing no theory do less inadvertently an perpetuate old philosophica public persona as someone who has always nurtured areal for has nurtured passion always who assomeone De finibus ; Cicero may ; Cicero straightforwardly identify it, butwith Part I Introduction III is probably a part of through of is procedure the probably a part III I shall pave the way for my main argument by *** 10 oikei ǀ sis as a theory congenital asatheory about CEU eTD Collection positive efforts to give justice to the account of Stoic ethics in of Stoic account tothe ethics givejustice to efforts positive championedby Annas line herself. can be interpretation This makingof described as eminently interpretation, of line other the to be paid will attention More interpretation. of line cosmic the of proponents the by met been not has now until up that that effect the Annas to by Julia presented argument an reiterate simply shall I interpretation, of line cosmic the to As two main recent lines of interpretation in respect of their treatment of treatment of their in respect interpretation lines of main two recent In the second half of this part ( the ones which seem to represent asubstantial appeal to cosmic nature. set andin sources, led onother to theirproblems thatinterpreters many particular eyes evenframework, more pressing andirresolvable –significantly, these are the very by represented how some of these problems can be explained away within the interpretive framework most crucial questions raised by the first section of the account Ishall attempt to show of Stoic ethics in ethics Stoic of by the contextualisation ofthefrom account problems perspective offered specific the interpretive these of approaching desirability the about my argument developing begin understanding ofStoic the proper butalso widerconcerns ethics, about locate interpretiveshall notonly these our itwithin problems I challenges raises. whom we encounter in late the whom we encounter sceptic establishedAcademic the that andalso Antiochus’ teaching; tothat, addition later development (a point that we shall see more clearly when in clearly when more we shall see that point (a development later 8 In late of more inscepticism Cicero’s detailed account the For a more detailed plan of plan detailed more a For Part II Part I shall focus on the account of Stoic ethics in De finibus De finibus De Part I III in as a whole, while others appear, within the same see the end of Chapter II.4 philosophica De finibus De finibus ) I shall further reinforce my case by comparing the comparing by my case reinforce further shall I ) Introduction 11 III presents a methodological challenge methodological a presents III as a whole. In presenting what I find the find I what presenting In whole. a as (first in the (first I.1 . philosophica Lucullus De finibus ) is probably also a Part III Part De finibus ). 8 De finibus III and the I present a III, by III. CEU eTD Collection the Stoic theory with Antiochus’ “Old Academic” version it. version of “OldAcademic” StoicAntiochus’ the with theory conflate to instance susceptibility ofCicero’s farundetected is probably a thus most III.3 (mis)representation of ethics.Stoic Tounderline thislastpointI shall in turn, Chapter theory of the of theory Antiochus’ a towards indeedrather affirmative attitude to, with, prone compatible theory in theory Chapter After(in this action. life the of to approach statesman’s (optimate) a Roman of foundation intellectual the as scepticism Academic credibility the of demonstrate is meantto but that one argue, in view, Ishall –anaporetic view ethics sceptic Academic as amanifestoof Cicero’s In I shall mainly argue, historicalon thisthat isgrounds, notaviable reconstruction. and itwheresceptical toCicero’s perspective; close seems tocomepoint dangerously by her),failsconvince to me about Ishallthis. pursue Annas’ a reconstruction to Happiness The Moralityof inherbook interpretation Julia date, Annas’ to interpretation of lineof version this interesting philosophically and forceful most the even that argue shall I However, this line interpretation of besuccessful would my this neutralisewould argument. If elsewhere. from materials with it supplementing of form in the help for call would De finibus proposing interpretations on which the Stoic theory, as Cicero has Cato present it in Part III Part , to the occurrence of the notion of self-love in self-love notion of the of occurrence the , to III,actually doesmakesense: itinnot deficientis such a way this that , then, I shall turn again to again turn shall I then, , De finibus De summum bonum V and present my argument that Cicero’s scepticism is (and, with important qualifications, in subsequent papers in subsequent qualifications, (and, important with III.2 ) I shall turn to Cicero’s presentation of Antiochus’ of presentation Cicero’s to turn shall ) I –and correspondingly to an Antiochean Introduction De finibus 12 . I shall interpret the work as awhole work the . Ishall interpret De finibus De III, and argue that this and arguethat III, CEU eTD Collection CICERO ASANEXPOSITOR OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY PART I CEU eTD Collection CEU eTD Collection under Caesar’s dictatorship ( dictatorship under Caesar’s di expound philosophy tohis fellow-citizens in Latin ( As he inin declares repeatedly the prefaceshe iswrote hispurpose period, this to second edition of the Catulus De finibus notably further works, with be accompanied would trilogy the that anddecide plans POWELL 1995: 7-11. RAWSON 1975:230-48,SCHMIDT 1978,SCHOFIELD 1986:48-51, STEINMETZ 1990 and elucidation ofdevelopment the of and the Cicero’sreworking of plans the PHILLIPS 1986, and especially GRIFFIN 1997 and HUNT1998: 10ff,provide which anexcellent letters Cicero wrote to publisherhis and editorAtticus from Marchto June 54. Formore details see Hortensius 2 similar dramatic dates; cf. GRIFFIN 1997; cf. also BRITTAIN 2006: xi. two forming the first version of the (in late 46 BC) as a project for three books, for three 46BC)asaproject late (in programmewriting of seems tohave underway:been developed it probably off started originally commenced with protreptic dialogue lost the villa inthe 1 on ethics, work andtheoretical most technical Cicero’s consensus I.1 disputations main branches of logicphilosophy: ( in sequencecover of dialogues BC,devised written philosophical tree the 46-44 to The date and the progress of composition of the composition of progress the and date The These three dialogues had the same protagonists, were set in the villas of the protagonists (Lucullus’ protagonists ofthe villas the in set were protagonists, same the had dialogues three These v. II1, 4) as the best way open him,to in his enforced retirement from public affairs Cicero theoldandnew asanexpositor ofHellenisticphilosophy: and the and Hortensius , which he wrote in, which he May-June simultaneously wrote finishing45 BC, the with in Cicero’s circles (cf. ) and physics ( Lucullus , Catulus’ villa inthe Academica , and beginning to ponder their reworking (which led to the to led (which reworking their ponder to beginning and , De naturadeorum, De divinatione,De fato Luc , recast intofour books). . 6; Acad De fin Academica Chapter I.1 Catulus Academica Academica . I11; 15 . I2)apparently made Cicerochangehis Hortensius and Hortensius’ villathe in Tusc 1 –, but the immediate success of the and ), ethics ( . I1,II1; Acad De finibus , 2 Catulus . I 3, De finibus ND is made clear by a series of series by a clear made is De finibus Tusc Hortensius , Academica I7, Lucullus . I 1, . I forms part of a Lucullus De div ) –the cycle ND , . Cicero’s . –the latter . See further See . Tusculan . II6-7), ) and had I 7; De CEU eTD Collection on andon outlook the moralsits of prospective leaders effect positive in its lies commonwealth the to render can enlightenment philosophical benefitthat greatest the that declare March he will openly Idesof After the activity. contrary, hetakes painsin totie hisand hiswriting philosophising with political seal hisoff intellectual and pedagogical concerns from his main in vocation life; to the written written under Caesar’sdictatorship asa hidden spring running underground. theory, political on constitutional arrangementmajor governmenthehadenvisioned and that inhis work ideal of kind the “commonwealth”, real a of re-establishment advance the for this are presented in the in presented are this for of preface the in 5 4 parteseius De fin philosophy” ( death of hisquidem explicandaeac mihi philosophiae causam adtulit casusgravis civitatis daughter as a secondary and extra motive, enticing him to “grappletake refuge inreading and writing: to with firstCicero his for reactionstimulus was extra the an composition been have of well lost may his It fortune”. of blow the “severe this antedated clearly whole of I 7: first place” he found that to expound philosophy was his duty the in theto interest of adapt to the commonwealthof how ( changed politicalconsiderations circumstances. with do to Actuallymore this had is what he himselfphilosophy seems to suggest:writing for says he that “in reason the original also have influenced decision his tochange his original plans embark and on thegranderplan; but his Att. Ad his contemporary letters he repeatedly reports that he is writing day and night as he cannot sleep (see by February the ND rei publicae and “benefitting his fellow-citizens” had been Cicero’s professed credo in public life (cf. life public in credo professed Cicero’s been had fellow-citizens” his “benefitting and could not devise more effective alleviationthan “grappling withthe whole of philosophy” ( –He also refers to his grief over the death of his beloved daughter Tullia in February of 45, to which he 3 to keep upservingto commonwealth the ( Ever since his early his since Ever Pace De div the state.” (W. A. Falconer transl.) A.Falconer (W. state.” the to these studies. Would that a few may! Though few, their activity may yet have widea influence in the right way. Of course, I have no assurance –it could not evenbe expected– that they will all turn of the because present moralastray laxityfar so that the utmost gone have effort men will beyoung needed our hold to them that incheck and direct fact the them of inview in –especially youth the train and instruct to than commonwealth the to I render can service better or greater what “For I 9; on Tullia’s death see primum ipsius rei publicae causa philosophiam nostris hominibus explicandam putavi Klaus Bringmann (BRINGMANN 1971:esp.189ff) Idonotthink that by presenting this reason XII.14.3, XII.28.2; XII.14.3, . I 10; . I . II 4: ). ND ) and benefitting ( benefitting and ) Tusc Hortensius I9: De divinatione . I5; De inventione totam philosophiamtotam pertractandam De RePublica De Appendix A Appendix De div hadalready beencompleted, theidea of upphilosophicaltaking writing De div Ad fam. IICicero distorts his real motives forthe earlierwritings; my reasons . II3,22; , which he probably wrote still as a schoolboy,“serving the state” . II 1, 7, prodesse IV.5-6; VI.18.5; . . This idea is present throughout the throughout is present idea This . Tusc De div ) his fellow-countrymen ( De off Part I Part . I 65, 76, 83, III 71, I 65,76,76, IV63). 83,Tullia’s. death may 16 . II1: Ad Att. . I 1). ), and to deal with “all of its parts” ( XII.21.5; XII.23.1 etc.). However, since 3 consulere rei publica As we can see, Cicero does not 4 –which, as he believes, would believes, he as –which, Luc ); and alludes to the . 6; Consolatio philosophica ; II 4: Acad De inv ; 5 De div Acad. . I 11; . I munus , and in . I1ff). omnes . II 6: I 11; ND CEU eTD Collection Appendix A Appendix surrounding one “from every side” ( dictatorship the pessimistic talk of taking refuge philosophyin from “the various and acute afflictions” the the thesis isattributed to Theophrastus–; guarantee happiness to the wise virtuous and person(see sometimes he goes as far assuggesting that the whole 9 (actually made rather explicit at e.g. 8 7 “philosopher”; cf. further cf. “philosopher”; 1-3; in the latterpassage he admits that the title “orator” is more justly assigned to him than that of philosophy” see SMITH 1995; see further distress or crisis of in times support spiritual of a kind or pastime intellectual an as just not it seriousness hisof engagement with emphasisinghe by philosophy has that embraced appeared to be doing so. (…) Moreover, if the injunctions of philosophy all have a bearing on how we how on bearing a have all of philosophy injunctions the if Moreover, (…) so. bedoing to appeared attention and enthusiasm to studying it; and I was the most ardently philosophising whenI least …my interest in philosophy is no sudden impulse, forfrom my early youth Ihave devoted no little eminence. eloquence which –thevery hemainly political histo profession to owes raise Latin of mastery unsurpassed his is role the for eligible especially him makes what in andadvocate philosophy credentials Onhis as an of expositor Greek Rome. view, establish his to hetakespains course, for himself.Of heset task perform the to was well-placed ishow farCicerome however, concerns now, that The question 6 philosophy in philosophy particular. from his Greek learning inyouth early to developed aserious attachment general, and philosophy). and thorough knowledge in various fields of learning including law, history and a wide oratory requires therefore and that about, we aretalking subject mastering the impossible speakornately fully without and copiously to comprehending and isit that he contends on rhetorical theory inhis work contrary, the learning (to He does attimes recommend philosophy as sucha spiritual support in hislate Cf. e.g. Cf. esp. Cf. Ad fam. Ad Acad 9 De orat De De orat , but liveto byit: . I46(onCarneades’ expertiseevery in fieldof philosophy); IV.4.4; XIII.1.2. 6 , subsection 1). subsection , However, he does not want to suggest that eloquence can substitute for substitute eloquence can suggest that want to not hedoes However, 7 Throughout his Throughout . I2f; . III77-80. De ReP Ad Att. Ad 8 . I7; In the preface of XIII.19.5. For an analysis of Cicero’s conception of “rhetorical conception of Cicero’s analysis an For XIII.19.5. Brut. oeuvre Brut. Tusc 10ff, 266,328-333, 306, 315; Appendix A Appendix Tusc . V 121) conveyed a scantily concealed political message political concealed scantily a conveyed 121) . V he constantly presents himself as someone who someone as himself presents he constantly Chapter I.1 . V 1). In fact, in the political climate under Caesar’s under climate political the in In fact, V 1). . 17 Acad raison d’être , subsection 2). , subsection De naturadeorum De fin . I 11; . Orat . II . II 86; III11; V86-87 –Piso speaking, Tusc . 128and of philosophy lies in itspromise to . V 5; De fin De fat . I6, Acad he reinforces the reinforces he philosophica . I2-3, Tusc . I . 2). See further . I6-7, De off. De ; indeed, De off I4; cf. . I . CEU eTD Collection 11 Phaedrus and Zeno, both of whom he hadheard in his youth (I 15-16 and ff). teachers Epicurean leading bythe instruction personal on based system Epicurus’ of dialogue hefurther reinforces his objectivity and(I 28-9) professes a knowledgegood in I of It isthat with this Book inaccordance 11 –P. G. Walsh transl.) the truth, not to refute anyone adversarially” ( adversarially” anyone refute to not truth, the find to wish we “for proponents; own school’s the by given that than accurate less no ininto exposition mouthTorquatus the dialogue) (put theory of Epicurean the the of confidence thatBrutus,who is himselfin anexpert philosophy will(cf. I8), findhis this great and difficult enterprise, but Ican boast that I have made the attempt. to support the viewsof individual each philosopher.I do not claim to have developed practiced ease in them! Yet this is what we have to do if in the interest of discovering the truth we decide to criticise and …if mastery of eachindividual system isadaunting task, how muchmore difficult is to master all of theNewAcademy: to his adherence by isenhanced considerably of philosophy his competence asexpounder suggests that Antiochus,Diodotus, Posidonius. Abitlater ( hisphilosophicalheIn illustrious names also samethe passage Philo, teachers: discussion in discussion my See further consulship. his since policy declared his been had –which Senate) by the (dominated dialogue) entails a rationally grounded commitment to the traditional Republicangovernment of Romanpractical wisdom and philosophical learning (as exemplified by the character Scipio in the work on political theory, political on work The claim clearly has a political subtext: Cicero probably takes it to be amply warranted by his former 10 by andreason learning. recommended precepts the practice into put Ihave spheres private and public in both that believe I live, nam sisingulasdisciplinas perciperequanto magnumest, maius omnis;quod facere isnecesse est Nos autemsubito nec coepimus philosophari necmediocrem a primotempore aetatis in eostudio me fero. reicuius tantae tamque difficilis facultatem consecutum esse menon profiteor, secutum esse prae quibus propositum est verireperiendi causa et contra omnes philosophoset proomnibus dicere. rebus ea praestitisse quae ratio et doctrina praescripserit. doctrina et quaeratio praestitisse ea rebus si omniaet philosophiaepraecepta referuntur ad vitam, arbitramur nos publiciset etprivatis in operam curamque consumpsimus, etcumminime videbamur tum maximephilosophabamur… Appendix A Appendix 10 ( De Re Publica , subsection 3). subsection , ND I7-8 –P.G.Walsh transl., with minor modification) , inwhich he had attempted to show that his ideal combination Part I Part 18 De fin De ND I11)he evengoes further and De finibus De . I 13; cf. Cicero his expresses 11 Luc ( De Natura Deorum . 7). Within. 7). the I CEU eTD Collection interpreting the philosophical material in Cicero’s late in Cicero’s material thephilosophical interpreting Despite this self-presentation modernthe readingapproach scholarly to and quem admodumdiceretur quamquam a te, Cato,diligenterestexplicatumfinishicbonorumetquisaStoicis mouths of illustriousGreek sources, adapting insources simply inthem them arguments foundtranslation; Cicero reproduces inhis Roman to a Roman culturalcharacters, context from Greek original patchworks andpassages of paraphrases mostpart, the 4 are,for by putting themand into twentieth an incredibly philosophical written century,at the treatises high pace in 45- theaddingthe into well survived and century nineteenth the of half the second in the prevailed which flourishes guidedperiod by intellectual a deprecatingview of Cicero’s merits. Onthisview, of his oratory accuracy and lucidity of his presentation (IV 1: libris library “surrounded with (IIIby works” Stoic 5: Uticensis as Stoic the spokesman, portrayed as spendinghisleisure time inLucullus’ Cato by of accuracy casting to his commitment reinforces further presentation. He philosophy in inethics (and servesparticular) asaguarantee of accuracythe his of Moreover,in the preface IIIBook of (6) he emphasises again that Brutus’ erudition in had alreadynamed his Stoic Diodotus; other Cf. tutor Posidonium Posidonius, andreveals his Posidonius personal with tie ( and Brutus) works by, among others, Diogenes,Antipater, Mnesarchus, Panaetius and preface of Book I (6) he claims to have read( heclaims to I(6) Book preface of But he takes no less pains to indicate his well-versedness in Stoic ethics. In the )–, and later congratulated by Cicero as interlocutor in the dialogue for the in for as interlocutor by dialogue the congratulated andCicero later )–, , cf. , Tusc . II 61, . II ). ND I 7, 123, II 88 123, II I7, Chapter I.1 19 legimus –at ista exposuisti Brutus multim circumfusum Stoicorum , referring minimally to Cicero philosophica 309and Tusc … familiarum nostrum familiarum . V113, dilucide Lucullus was for a long ; also 14: ND 115he I 7). CEU eTD Collection kept his philosophical interests alive to the extent allowed by be his cannot it so BC; 46 to 51 cited from to undermine Cicero’s roughly otherclaims to the effectcomposition, of that forthe mostperiod partof politicalhis main careersecond he and first his between which,(during however, hisstudies “had neverbeenout mind”) may ofhis well gap referto the studies and work. That is, the “long interval” of abstention from studies mentioned at 51-50,in whenCicero’s tasksasproconsulCilicia in most probably himprevented from protracted Brundisium inlate 47(cf. years of the civil war, lasting until the consolidationof his situation and his return to Rome from show that Cicero is ready to admit a lapse in his scholarly literaryand activities during the tumultuous letter to Terentius Varro around the end of saysin Cicero the year what 47 with BC, and withconjunction in understood and beread should passage this that have been resumed after a long interval ( interval long a after resumed been have never been out of his mind ( 14 7. passage –often read in conjunction with Cicero’s other methodological remarks at methodological other remarks Cicero’s with in conjunction read passage –often have of This I plenty”. which much words, notgivesupply the Ionly do trouble. me verbatantumadferrominore labore quinus fiunt; abundo activities of a Roman Statesman’s 13 12 inAtticus, in remark to written a letter 45 May( most often his is the However, passageinthis connection cited self-deprecatory which, however, was spent in reading. philosophy asremainedafter dealing friends and with matters, all government of himselfdevoted public completely hadto service, he only much as fortime a young and whenhe serve at high political offices begun in to age,afterwards, Academica never detract allowed itfrom to his public work. heexplains virtually invisibleit –although thiswasbecausehethat kept and private indirectly been duringadmits that had hispubliccareer philosophical engagement This viewin findssome support own Cicero’s Atremarks. poetry). (includingfrequentinsertion the illustrations of from Roman and Greekhistory and At In his works Cicero is consistent about holding that philosophising and writing are acceptable only as Cf. e.g. GRIFFIN 1992: 719ff; STRIKER 1995: 57-58. Tusculans 12 I 11)he saysthatalthough he had beenimmersed in studies philosophical I1 Cicero seems to go even further and confess that although these studies ( Ad fam. retenta animo XIV.20, 23; otium : cf. e.g. longo intervallo intermissa revocavi ), they were neglected at times ( times at neglected were they ), 14 Ad Part I Part De ReP 20 Att . XII.1). In fact the lapse may have began earlier, . I7-8, Ad 13 Att At Luc negotia. . XII.52.3): . 6, Brutus De officiis –“they are transcripts; they transcripts; are –“they De naturadeorum Acad. 11-19. These two passages ). I tend to think, however, think, to tend I ). remissa temporibus I 11, ΦΔϱ·Ε΅Κ΅ II 3-4 (cf. also Tusc Ad fam. . I1, Tusculans studia I6-7he De div De IX.1, a IX.1, sunt, ), and ) had I 1 De . II CEU eTD Collection may be relatively easily explained away. apparently by ignored ChapterCicero. In evade that objection; but actually muchof what Cato had to say onthe issue (esp. 21-25, 33-34) is Cicero’s elaborateguidance. critiquepractical inBook rational IV turnin is meant abolishes to showhappiness vice to that Cato’s and elaborationvirtue beyond has failed to everything of indifference (characterised by three the classes of goods) and the position attributed to Aristo, onwhichthe by Cicero, that the Stoic theory fails to establish astable position between Peripatetic the position Cato’s exposition, as we shall see later(Chapter 17 the in material of doxographical use haphazard Cicero’s nature and content of the rational reasons underwriting such actions all the three sources are silent. For facti probabiliter ratio reddi posit question-beggingly perfunctory: a duty is anactionthat has a rational explanationorjustification ( doxographical sources, atStobaeus II58,13ff, atDL and VII 108, especially in respect ofbeing the Stoic notion of notion Stoic the alongsidethe inin that century, nineteenth Germany emerged the first “compiler” of Cicero the picture coincidental not is It power. real its a gained drastic composition of method Cicero’s of view this that intellectuality his on life political Cicero’s of demotion effects attenuating or encumbering the ofsuspicionsabout backdrop a against ithowever,was Importantly, of CiceroBook IV, firstemphasised by Rudolph Hirzel. the politician from his pedestal as a the account of Stoic ethics in ethics of Stoic account the is bythe onhissources between mechanical apparent discrepancies reliance presented paraphrasing. translating or Cicerothat suspect to begin did reasonably may one that perfunctory and sketchy so are notwhich (or did not outlineswe still doxographical sourcesthat of doctrines philosophical possess, or care to) other passageswhich “doxographical” echo curiously epitomist’s activity: fully comprehendThe suggested by picture fortifiedthis passage isfurther by of sings alleged the the argument method composition. standardly asevidence on Cicero’s cited of that he was 16 I 159. fin 15 HIRZEL 1882:II,620 There are several instances of these phenomena in phenomena these of instances several are There Seeesp. . I 6 and Luc . 11-12 and 102, De off officium . I5-6, and his references frequent his to sources ; cf.THIAUCOURT e.g. also 91-102; 1885: LÖRCHER120-121. 1911: (=Greek Ad Att. 16 = De finibus A particularly strong apparentindication of Cicero’s eulogon apologian ekhei kath XIII.19.5; Ɲ II.3.2 kon Chapter I.1 ) at III 58 is similar to the ones we find in our more III and the critique of the theory presented in II.2 , subsection XIII.18; 13.1, 19.5; XVI.11.4; 21 ), is presented as a rejoinderto the criticism, raised De finibus 17 Lucullus , a) hosa logos hairei poinein I shall argue that these discrepancies these that argue shall I Book III. For example, theaccount Book III.For of see BRITTAIN 2006: 69, n. 178. De off. 15 III 8 and 34, cf. 34, 8and III ); but as to the – has been – has eius CEU eTD Collection order to cull evidence regarding his ulterior motives, secret jealousies, fears, motives, hopes, secret tocull his ulterior order regarding evidence minute scrutiny in Cicero’s a subjected correspondence to (firstpublished in1841) German historianinfifth Wilhelm the of his whoDrumann, part contemporary hand,scholarship. On one the hewas influenced certainly by the Notably, Mommsen only threw together threads that were already presentin Cicero. published in1856),aspart of his attack on wholesale personandthe achievementof (612-613) productions inworks so writtencan only be advised to study in literary matters abecoming silence.” have inabundance.’ Against this nothing furthercould be but said; any one who seeks classical friend who wondered at his fertility; ‘they give me little trouble, forI supply only the words and thesethick tomesI might very quickly come into existence –‘They are copies,’ wrote the author rapidly himself works to who a and and knowledge boldly, shows philosophic to in the reproductioneven or of dialectic thinking trains of philosophic thought. to In thisattained way not no doubt has who amultitude of deportment of the orator in the subjects irrelevant butto more familiar digressed to sometimes the writer and and the reader, suchreferences, as theand treatmentexamples of Roman the interwove he as inasmuch character, popular certain a impart to him; beside had he which works future for prefaces of collection ample And alldialogue. so-called that a into hand, his to he given were or didcame they as problem, on same the his handling writings ownSyncretist partand Stoic, Epicurean, the was, together stitched Cicero to systems, older supply different of the criticising an introduction prefixedwritings of Aristotle, in which the toform of dialogue wasthe employed chieflynew for the setting forthbook and fromcouple of themonths a philosophical library. The receipt was very simple. In rude imitationof the popular applied himself to philosophy with and equalproper, peevishness and precipitationcomposed a in Cicero’s late to period ofrespect With philosophical(611-12). composition,conspicuous” however, least, Mommsen defects his and shows most, are no mercy: author the of excellences the are “not devoid of merit”;and “they are originality”, no great works comparative of some “possess art, but undoubtedly them, from borrowed directly they also are are the works details in the whichof many oratore rapidly by orcompilationgottranslation up a readable essay”Cicero’s (609). chief works, the applied his there washand… whichdepartment no in could the he notwith of help booksa few have him such aprolific and many-sided writer: “it was pretty much amatter of indifference to what work he himself says, in words,is “thoroughly a dabbler… by Cicero a journalistnature poor worst inthe science” sense of term –abounding,the as he professional of beyond ofsubjects treatments of “artistic all awriter as conceptionparticular, In statesman”. a as low as quite “stands he inauthor of an ideas”. character the in speeches): output and letters Indeed, literary his copious (including of his segment every itin was through shows this character of his barrennesswant” “grievous that made solely on hismastery of style, “it and is only as a stylist that heshows confidence in himself”; but the assessment of Cicero’s literary activities ( Culture, Literature and Art’) expressly he picture startingtakes asthe this pointfor his disparaging last chapterof work,the presenting an overview of culture in republican Rome (Ch.12: ‘Religion, opponent of progressiveCaesar’s (see centralism esp.MOMMSEN 1866:169, cf.the in also 608); and Cicero as “notoriously a political trimmer”, aunscrupulous advocate, and a short-sighted reactionary 18 Mommsen’s grandiose and extremely influential in Theodor found is formulation devastating most Its statesman. and hero Republican “…the compiler… completely failed, when in the involuntary leisure of the last years of his life he Telling the story of thelast decades of the Republic Mommsendraws utterlyan repulsive picture of and the 18 De RePublica , though their scientific groundwork belongs entirely to the Greeks, and Greeks, the to entirely belongs groundwork scientific their though , De Officiis ibid ; and to exhibit that sort of bungling, which a manof letters, . 608). OnMommsen’ verdict, Cicero’s importance rests Part I Part 22 The History of Rome The History of History of Rome of History (Vol. III,first De CEU eTD Collection sources for sources also GIGANTE1995: 40-41). The hypothesis that Philodemus’ work was one of Cicero’s major secondary place in Cicero’s life, or because it was inevitably informed by his life,needs,it informed inevitably in orbecause secondary Cicero’s was place its suffered from hislatter because the either pursuit, philosophical attenuated suspicion has been Cicero’s that must involvementpolitical haveskewed or evaluationhis and writings” of philosophical explanation ( become have from his gathered andspeeches tendedcorrespondence to “thebasisfor be can they as life political and personal Cicero’s of facts the criticism of fabric this man,the and political (NICGORSKI leader, Within the philosopher” the 1978:76). of Cicero anassessment together iswoven in which criticism “aof as fabric described has aptly Walter Nicgorski lifewhich his intellectual political with Cicero’s pursuits of entanglement of kind the represents paradigmatically treatment Mommsen’s source-analytical speculations. wideto door the doctrine or theory it literally;quite indeed,hefor alsotook granted thatin aphilosophical presenting Cicero habitually relied on a Phaedrus,mentioned as a source by Velleius in Epicurean the as author the identified material Herculanean of the editions first the that striking deprecatory at remark deprecatory philosophical writings Cicero’s inphilological(and in criticism general), took self- finibus the the EpicureanPhilodemus’ work etc. overlaps betweenpassages in Book Iof Cicero’s 22 21 20 1922. preceding following and the Frenchrevolution”. See e.g.BOISSIERalso SLAUGHTER 1897: 23and Renaissance, and partly “the to importance attached to Cicero’s philosophical and political writings admirationCanter’s diagnosis the previous adulation” “blind of Cicero was due partly to “the undoubted felt forwas greatly undervalued not only as apublicmanbut as author”an see CANTER 1912: 159ff. On CiceroDrumann and Mommsen “directly as responsible succeedingthe for aslong period during which Cicero a stylist”,19 the impeding influence of which is apparent already in the MADVIG 1839: lxiv 2;n. cf.MANSFELD 1999: 19, n. Madvig59. was also influenced by the Cf.BARNES 1985: n. 2. Cf.BARNES 1985: n.6. DRUMANN 1841:206ff.DOUGLASe.g. Cf. early Foran 1968: 4. ofperceptionreport of the 19 On the other hand, already Johan Nicolai Madvig, whose edition of Cicero’s of whoseedition Madvig, Nicolai Johan On hand, other the already in 1839 marks the beginning of a new era in the study of Cicero’s ND I seems tenable even today, see WALSH 1997: xxviii. Ad Atticum Onpiety , preserved on Herculanean papyrus scrolls, which were so were which scrolls, papyrus Herculanean on preserved , XII.52.3 –or rather his reading of the remark Chapter I.1 ND De natura De natura deorum 23 I;cf. MADVIG 1839:lxiv; HIRZEL 1877:1,5;cf. 22 single authority and newly discovered fragments of ibid . 77). In general, the 21 , thereby opening , thereby 20 De – CEU eTD Collection evidence asfound canbe in the limited from such inferences source-critical part most for the but sources; Cicero’s became it.equal It to cull evidence for astandardpreoccupation on dialogues the than rather of Greek thought a life intellectual transmitter as Roman viewof general a owing to and plausible sources, assecondary texts Cicero’s need using for great the sources as he could in working out asingle theme) was found both appealing owing to and argumentsHellenisticin philosophicalThe presenting schools. ideathat philosophical doctrines Cicero the of development and doctrines the in reconstructing century, twentieth closelyearly and relied in late nineteenth the interest, scholarly wasarenewed mechanic copier or compiler on GreekA further factor in the formation of sourcesthe widespread scholarly perception of Cicero as a (and thatprobably hadno aptitude for time, its more useor and theoretical technical aspects. he used an politician,orator in he participated only philosophy degreethathe to the could, and as few mightphilosophymore his assertions as was superficial own primarily suggest: than Greek to attitude Cicero’s however, thecriticism, of version mildest the Even on we become about the sceptical professed more philosophicalthe foundationsright, it of get his did approach or to politics. fellow-citizens, his and commonwealth “serving” the ideal liveof his professed upto was ableto Cicerobelieve are to that addition rather strong assumptions on Cicero’s methods of composing, such as the and/or moral shortcomings as a politician (cf. influence –depending on how unfavourableassessment our is of Cicero’s intellectual for avehicle or of life courses, andnever-endingquest andpolitical for hisreckless criticism, Cicero’s philosophical work served as simply a rationalisation for his way concerns and commitments as a Roman politician. On more hostile versions of the philosophica Part I Part 24 are inconclusive unless one accepts in oneaccepts unless inconclusive are ibid . 77-79). The . 77-79). more disinclined we CEU eTD Collection 51; WARDE 2006: 28. 1975: Ch.13; MACKENDRICK 1989;POWELL 1995: esp. 20,DYCK 8-9, 1996:n. 18ff,50- 2004: STEINMETZ 1989; BARNES–GRIFFINS 1989and 1997, POWELLFORTENBAUGH– 1995. Cf.furtherin e.g. RAWSON collected articles the see philosophy and Cicero on contributions recent further 26 favourable response in his review editionof the (RACKHAM 1930). e.g. Jules Martha’s introduction to the Budé edition of 25 review by J. G. F. Powell, the aid in thisto come may regard. source-criticism to approach For reflective and a more moderate a more that argues scepticalwho 20-21, 1996: reading of his source (namely Panaetius’ three booksduties’), cf. ’On ATKINS–GRIFFIN DYCK 1991:xxiand II, however, where we are onthe firmest ground, it is difficult to tell just how dependent Cicero is on 24 PHILIPPSON 1939. authors, including Chrysippus Diogenes); and SCHÄFER 1934(Antipateror amember of school); his Arnim, fashioned source-critical approach toCicero’s work isTHIAUCOURTsee further 1885; e.g.von Hirzel names Polemo as theconsideration probable careful After it. soruce forunderstands the book and knows he (592ff).as theory Another Stoic of the classical account continuous example of the old- conclusion only assumptiononthat the Cicero himself cannot himself be expected toproduce a bereits vorgefunden undsich darangebunden Darstellendehat der denZusammenhang dieGedanken in erst nicht hineingebracht sondernihn clearly show that Cato does not consider himself the author of the plan heis following (575: fin at system Stoic of the structure deductive and coherence the on eulogy short by Cato’s supported philosophische Schiftlerei kennen,fern liegt Cicero diesen Planselbs entworfenist habe, eine Annahme, diewohl denen,dieseine allen coherent and well a thought out plan, represents which cannotexposition Cato’s be that plausibly grounds the onattributed case, to Cicero’s bethe must former authorship:the that „ He argues sources. 567ff)weather asks inwriting bookthe source, Cicero a single onrelied used orhe aplurality of Besides a growing awareness of the methodological problems with source-criticism as andmany others. Miriam Griffin by Barnes, Jonathan contributions more recent to 1973), 1965,1968(esp.28-9), (DOUGLAS A. influential discussions Douglas’ E. principle that Cicero habitually relied on a single source for a single topic. a single for source asingle on relied habitually Cicero that principle of source-analysis isRudolphHirzel’s (HIRZEL 1882)treatment of 28ff;cf. BARNES also 1985:229,DYCK 1996:18-19and 2004: 50-51 23 on attack seminal Boyancé’s from now, longhistory havePierre a also tothis approach reactions Revisionist (such as in the case of (such as in case the standing consensus hasbeen andreached regarding convincing Cicero’s source(s) long-In therarecases a where decisivefailed Cicero. produce for results most part to even by such questionable assumptions investigationssource-critical have for the BARNES 1985;STRIKER 1995; GRIFFINMANSFELD 1992:715-728;1995; 1999:13-16; for Boyancé was not the first to question the traditional view of Cicero’s lack of originality, though; see Cf. DYCK Cf. 1996:17-21 and 28; ATKINS–GRIFFIN 1991:xix-xxi.in Even thecase of See the axioms of . III . 74, and his frequent references tothis structure throughout hisspeech(26, 33, 41,50, 55),which SVF , Ixxviii-xxix(who opts fora doxographical source); LÖRCHER 1911 (various Stoic Quellenforschung Bryn Mawr ClassicalReview De officiis Quellenforschung asoutlined and criticised by Douglas,A. E. DOUGLAS 1968: ) this is due to strong internal or external evidence. external or internal strong to is due ) this ” (575) Chapter I.1 ). Needlessto say,passages these support Hirzel’s 25 . This conclusion, according to Hirzel, is further is Hirzel, to according conclusion, This De officiis De finibus , 2002.08.40. (BOYANCÉ 1936(=1970)) (BOYANCÉ (MARTHA 1928), and H. Rackham’s I-IIsee LEFÈVRE 2001;seealso the De finibus . A typical example of thiskind III. Hirzel first ( 25 De officiis 23 , through Indeed, Hiernach Dass ibid 24 De 26 I- . CEU eTD Collection 28 27 On the one hand, as we have ofhisand procedures. approach by own descriptions Cicero’s evidence presented the seen, Cicero’s professed to pay due respect havefailedto source-criticism practitionersFirst, of old-fashioned general aim in embarking claims. on two following the involves summarised, andtransmitteran of expositor ThisHellenistic consensus, thought. crudely consensus has been which inthelastemerging decades meritsconcerning Cicero’s as new by the false assurancegenerated from a also further encouragement receive But this methodologically approach Cicero’squestionable seemsto texts me to to writer. the Cicero dismembering virtually “fragments”, or as “testimonies” from Cicero extracts of number Philosophers excellent Sedley’s David and Long’s Anthony example– recent such von Arnim’sas today. inquiteHellenistic philosophy Latin dead not long survived, andtranslation– even is interpreting passages asif reading on and primary they Ciceronean sources were –thehabitof as asourcebook Cicero mere habitreading of the trends these Alongside philosophical works: traditionthe Academicof Scepticism. he of in claimsadherenceinhislate which the tradition twentieth the century, to contribution from gained impetusalso interest,a renewedin scholarly secondthe half his intellectual re-evaluation use of the him of makesource, as better a doxographical in is philosophy in to needed concerns andprocedures order Hellenistic discussing background, ofCicero’s investigation systematic and that a practiced, traditionally Cf. e.g. STRIKER 1995: 57-58. Cf. e.g. BRITTAIN 2006: viii. 28 Partly, may widespread beuse of the sourcebooks dueto authoritative this (LS), which (their obvious merits notwithstanding) present agreat notwithstanding) present merits which obvious (their (LS), Stoicorum Veterum FragmentaStoicorum Veterum Part I Part 26 ( SVF 27 ) or –to mention a more The Hellenistic CEU eTD Collection officiis 1992: 721).Even he when admits his a single on reliance main asinsource, (GRIFFIN them” understanding really but issues the repeating just “not it, put has involves, paraphrases:it asMiriam producingGriffin translations patchworksof or nevertheless he that his insists as work a philosophicalinvolves writer more than thinker; original particularly to bea boast not does Cicero see,then, can As we founders of his school (especially as they are “written with brilliance”). by a Hellenistic philosopher is of the same subject that has already been covered by adiungimus ( composition” “judgement” and ea, quadictasuntabiis,quoprobamus “preserves the views” of the philosophers whom ( “he sound” “preserves views” the of whom considers philosophers the 1) Cicero “does in “puttingintoLatin have subtly themes which philosophers treated Greek” ( not perform the task of a translator ( probamus refer to Cicero’s assessment of a dogmatic authority as source for a given school’s doctrine –note that On this account (which has parallels in parallels has (which account this On right. own in their interest of devoid not are that literature philosophical of tradition his arenotinsists that works thoroughly they are contributionsderivative: to rich the inof he natureof clear the and method his philosophical statement writing general, of preface in the however, hand, other the On philosopher. aprofessional rather than Greek wisdom of interpreter andan pedagogue and especially politicallythe ambitious youth. Thatis, he regardedhimself a his fellowadvance learning citizens, of the soasto audience, before awiderRoman philosophical years in writing last the lifeof his was putphilosophyto on display method of examining the dogmatic views (on which see discussionmy inChapter 29 Iassume that Books I and II (where he draws on Panaetius’ has persons, rather than views as its object here; note also the immediate context. immediate the also note here; object its views as than rather persons, has ), so his treatments are noless worthy of reading probamus does not refer to the kind of “approval” which is the aim of the Academic nostrum iudicium et…nostrum scribendi iudicium ordinem Chapter I.1 Acad 27 29 . I 10 and ), while adding his“order of own De finibus De De off interpres I, where he gives afairly he gives I,where per se Peri kath . I6, II 60, III 7), in than any treatment )” (I 6; cf. 7); he III.1 Ɲ ibid ); rather, itmay kont .: De fin ǀ tuemur n ), he ), De . I CEU eTD Collection Budé edition of evidence of the of evidence 8 n.20,WARDE 2006:29 and n. 102. importance The of 30 emphasises his independencerelative in uphisworking material ( remark refers to the the that assuming by even (ii) that and uncertain, reference the makes quotation the preceding immediately corruption textual the (i) that grounds the on it dismiss by presented evidence contrary alleged the supposed to know, are fictitious (see the famous reference to famous reference (see arefictitious the toknow, supposed the dialogues. To be sure, the dialogues, as Cicero’s own in himself and hiscontemporaries between conversations depiction philosophical of contemporary readers were Cicero’s itby out pointing augment further could is we concerned, indications– think that as far as the first part Indeed,I thatIlargely assessment. I wouldfavourable like torecord agree with this of the above argument –the appeal to Cicero’stranslation or paraphrase.(BARNES 1985: 232) continuous to resort to or source ownsingle a follow to need no He had him. aid to libraries capacious upon, which hewas thoroughly versed. He had a lifetime’s study behind him, a prodigious memory to rely When, in his later years,…[he] all equipment,had the bothmentalCicero andmaterial, for what doing the turned to the writing of philosophy, he wasJonathan Barnes has it:put dealing with a subject in argument goes– that Cicero was well-placed toperform the task he set for himself.As so the –or certain fairly be can we evidence this of basis the On intellectuals. Greek philosophy, his readings and hisexchanges with other learned Romans and leading information hisintellectual on background,his early and ongoing engagement with expositor of philosophy.Second, For from his works mock-modesty. characteristic and letters we can gather a wealth of For the dismissal the For there is no good reason todiscredit there isnogood apographa De finibus Ad Att (MARTHA 1928). . XII.52.3 cf. DOUGLAS BARNES1965: 136; 6;POWELL 1985: n. 1995: passage) has been noticed already by Jules Martha in his introduction to the to introduction his in Martha Jules by already noticed been has passage) philosophica 30 in general,it may well represent Cicero’s Part I Part 28 Ad Atticum Cicero’s self-presentation as acompetent as self-presentation Cicero’s De fin . I 6 and XII.52.3, weshould XII.52.3, altogether De off. mos dialogorum De finibus I 6 ( De off vis a vis claims he does. he claims . I 6). As to the alleged the at Ad CEU eTD Collection to recast the recast to get in get we that ethics Stoic of The account library). the entered before Cicero just was doing by knowledge reading wheneverhecaninit topreventfrom order getting rusty (as he inwidely the Stoic authorities,hasthoroughly his read them,and renewsabsorbed points of interest to is,continuous speech heisfully –that selecting andrecalling, capable of arranging him into a coherent account by Lucullus’ library surrounded canexpoundStoic works, “the whole system” ina of thein leisure his Stoicspending as portrays Cicero whom Cato, that is realistic theory,it particular, In because he is schools’ own proponents ( the by given those than accurate less no are him by given expositions the I that book Brutus as dedicatee, morecf. or less I realistic;8, III Cicero’s 6) choiceis of meantthem asbe to meant and are Piso spokesmen Cato Torquatus, with conversations is thatthe conjecture to (asunderline well as his choice of his claim in the preface of the characters he chose in he writing characters chose the discussion hold indirectly same thatthe problem the not of forsuggests problem does supposed to keep in to mind actual of is(cf.the supposed CiceroI account author again that the are readers the however, same Atthe time, from a person. such becan expected fam. significant. strategy the statusto raise of philosophy (cf. STRIKER 1995:53),but the political subtext isalso 31 for rewriting the reason scholarly matters putintoscholarly matters theirmouths belongingan elderaristocrats to generation his speakers in originalthe version, Hortensius, Catulus and (all Lucullus optimate Cicero’s choices of famous Roman statesmen as speakers in his dialogues is no doubt part ofhis part doubt no is dialogues his in speakers as statesmen Roman famous of choices Cicero’s IX. 8. 1; cf. also De finibus Academica III, Cicero wants his readers understand, is that thekind Cicero his of wants account III, readersunderstand, De Or. with Cato and Brutus as his main interlocutors. The natural ashisand maininterlocutors. with Brutus Cato Academica De fin I 97;II13; II 22; . I13). De finibus was that, contrary to his own claim at Chapter I.1 ( Ad 29 Att. 31 ; indeed, we learn that his first idea was ), were well known not to be up in the up be to not known well were ), XIII.12.3; 16.1; 19.3-5); and hisbrief De Re P. I 15). But Cicero’s main Cicero’s But 15). I Lucullus 4, CEU eTD Collection theory, by missingtheory, points philosophical substantial and conflating the Stoic theory Stoic the misrepresent name wearing inthedialogue–seriously character does his the –through IV Book in presents he theory Stoic the of refutation and criticism the is It agreedthat perspective. widely maybe wrong with there that Cicero’s something indication is analarming there case particular in as this strange more isthe This all force Cicero’s question (only the ignoring probableconcerning source). in be still would transcriber a clumsy as Cicero of view obsolete if the as way same in Stoicvirtually the and doctrine, directevidenceonorthodox analysedare quoted as particularly in the case of the account of Stoic ethics in ethics of Stoic in of account case the the particularly motivesin Yetthis happens, is and writingoften perspective, etc. concerns what philosophy his tolearnmorewe have about cultural background,and his intellectual source on Hellenistic important him asan make useof better to inorder that behindthe intellectual considerations respectable reappraisal Cicero’s of contribution: indicationsfairly and promises, Thisdependable isneglectingtestimonies. oneof the various philosophical anddoctrines in theories hisare, with accordance own reading Cicerowe shouldnotI wouldhowever,forlike toargue, that takethisconsensusas a pretext in a mechanical hepoints needsguidance. way, simplyauthorities, and has at least some of them at hand to look into when on particularassumingsceptic– that who is Cicero’swell ittranscript; is an by account given an educated Roman –and atthatan Academic acquainted accountswitha is not ethics of Stoic hisaccount is clear: is, rather message, that Cicero’s systems). the theory ofas presented master all is dogmatic an the to supposed Academic sceptic hewheresuggest that by the School’s own Stoic authorities as his character (cf. also his self-characterisation at his self-characterisation (cf. also ashischaracter authorities Stoic 13: a nobis… expositam ), who, as De finibus Part I Part 30 I 6 suggests, is I 6 suggests, nearly as versedwell in De finibus III: passages of it of passages III: ND I11-12, CEU eTD Collection stance allows him to pursue and analyse such debates from an external point of from externalview,stance of pursue suchdebates an point and him allows analyse to sceptic Cicero’s Academic that in assumptions) with above the (often conjunction is itassumed often issue).Again, into the dig deeper readerto for the is aninvitation that he has more to say in response to Cicero’s arguments, this is not hot air (rather, IV(80)Catoindicatesaccount (such endthe itso whenatas 21-25,33-4etc.); Book of dialogue has failed to take into account some of the importantthe in pointsname his of Cato’swearing character the by presented theory Stoic the of refutation the is case closed: the that his think readers want not actually does Cicero that even argue may one this with In connection direction. inanyparticular or on any particular point influencepersuade them than with engagementor problems– philosophical to rather introduce edifythem intoseriousfiguring the–to in to readers them, serves characters including Cicero the in dialogues, the machinery employed whole dramatic the that suggesting concerns, didactic professed Cicero’s stress often Interpreters identified with Cicero’s actual views. interpretation and refutation of the Stoic theory in the effect that furthersome tothe assumptions be ethics, must this dueto is of as compromising notthought the value of for the two sources books: aStoicdifferent uses Cicero treatisethat for assumption Book by the III and Antiocheanexplained be readily could materialthis copier for mechanic Booksas IV and V. expositionand Cicero’s response, see my discussionabove, n. 17;on and theoutdated view of Cicero agreed that professed authority finibus tradition. with Antiochus’ knows(through what Cicero presentation)Academic” as “Oldthe 33 20-21; GILL 2006: 167-173. 32 The separation of WHITE Cf.1979: 164-165,STRIKER e.g.99-100 1996: 269and 2,3; 288; ANNASn. 2001:91n. III; which warns me that in addition to blind reliance on Cicero’s self- 32 This fact is Thisfactwhen it neglected Stoic habitually ethicsand comes to De finibus De finibus there are also some further factors at play here. If itis generally IVis strongly informed byan Antiochean perspective, but this III and IV is underwritten by the apparent discrepancies between Cato’s between discrepancies apparent by the underwritten is IV and III 33 Chapter I.1 31 De finibus De De finibus III as a testimony on Stoic IV is not to be directly De CEU eTD Collection investigate he arguments for feeling of security about Cicero’s treatment of Cicero’s of in treatmentStoic ethics feeling ofsecurity about presents as an interlocutor in the This means that we should be cautious in inferring Cicero’s views directly from the arguments he of methodthis is that Cicero takes both(or all) sides seriously invitesand his readers to do the same. subjected to a critical examination, and the debate is left unsettled by the interlocutors. One implication compromising his stance as an Academic or imposing his ownauthority onthe reader. Eachside is adversarial dialogue thus allows Cicero to introduce ofa range philosophical viewswithout least at was fellow-citizens partly his influencedto by ownhis philosophical of philosophy position as an exposition Academic the sceptic.for form (…)The format of appropriate the as dialogue the Stoic life”.Cf. viewallhis BRITTAIN e.g. also 2006: xi-xii:“Cicero’s choice adversarial ofthe suggests that the fact thatCicero “appears to have gone back forth and on the arguments forand against positions seriously,but always beopento force againstthe of them”.arguments Moreover, Annas(xii) author Marcus Tullius emphasizesCicero. that the Cicero characterin the dialogues‘Cicero’ “is not to be straightforwardly identified is with the theAnnas rightly presented”. notes figure thatCicero being “does ideas notthe pretend to be about neutral himself”; themselves for who nevertheless think to she (xvi-xvii)shows readers forces it way the one, usepistemological that the searcher forpositions truth that philosophers debate. major the with (…) willThe mostengagement important function to philosophical takeof reader the dialogue the form introducing is thus is he its aim; different a has he life the combination of such assumptions. According to Annas (xv) “in the works written at the end of his Cicero to a mindless copier: that his intellectuality must to some extent have been have extent some to must intellectuality his that copier: a mindless to Cicero layresurrectdegrading consensus of behindtheold thesuspicion thatwould like to than (1936:seeesp. andhisfollowersBoyancé n.3,294-7) haveheld.Ina way I engagement with by philosophy are lessfirmlysupported biographicalthe evidence scepticism:moderate for some wehavereasons is concerned, as justification far that asthis argue shall I consensus). new the of summary above my in point second (the Cicero’s works and letters in philosophy his former of aexpositor Greek self-presentation as competent own claimstime being, however,Iwouldlike tore-examine thejustification alleged Cicero’s of to the effect that he had a lifelong serious 34 In Academic approach). the persuade isthe anything andpreferability usefulness hisaboutwantsof to this readers way hismethod of pointconsideringfrom every debated both points of viewif (so he in theory Antiochean without compromising his objectivity and impartiality; his advocacy of the Annas’ introductionto Part II Part and III I shall argue to the effect that such assumptions create a misguided a create such assumptions that effect tothe argue Ishall De finibus De finibus and 34 against …, not to show that one side is right”. in ANNAS 2001 seems to me to provide an excellent illustration of Academica against the Stoics simply represents in a dramatised ina represents simply Stoics the against Part I Part (or elsewhere): the purpose of the dialogue is to is dialogue ofthe purpose the elsewhere): (or 32 De finibus III.For the CEU eTD Collection 68 BC onwards).interests and pursuits in periodthis comesfrom correspondencehis with Atticus (from I shall intellectual bulk in onCicero’s of 56BC.The great evidence the literary composition argue to theCicero’s return to Romeeffect from Asia in 78 BC to the beginning of his first period of that (Chapters Second the picture emerging in developments ethics. from and his specific concerns of be curiously unaware seems Ciceroto but his time; this learned ethicsfrom him. in Posidonius was mostturn famousthe Stoic philosopher of indirecthaveevidence thatCicero or not direct figure, andshadowy any we do in this period seem giveto raisesome to worries. Diodotus on the one handis a rather and ishislaterby ethics claims taught havebeen concerned, Posidonius to Diodotus for philosophy. later claimsHowever, to the effect that from his early youth on he developed a real zeal and flair I shall been by extraordinary standardsthe of hiswhich day, seems lend to to his support argue that as farlost sight of his ensuing careeras as an orator, his philosophical educationCicero’s seems tohave knowledge 90 78) Ciceroformative as ayouth. years(from neverabout to Although during these of Stoic shall evidence himself) byCicerosurvey hisphilosophical schooling(provided the on his knowledge and perception of Stoic ethics in particular. For a start (Chapter a start For inparticular. ethics Stoic of and perception his knowledge life during his political career, but throughout I shall keep an eye out for indications of raise some general about worries value the of allegedthe evidenceofhisintellectual Ishall ofliterary composition. period first his up until career intellectual Cicero’s In followingthe chaptersIshall less amoreprovide or comprehensive survey of Cicero’s as a project philosophical writer when hiswe read testimonies. impacton that determinants various the on systematically reflect needto essential the real make is to so doing in aim my However, life. political his by compromised I.3 - 4 ), I shall focus on the more than two decades that passed from decades that more two than ), Ishall focusthe on Chapter I.1 33 I.2 ), I CEU eTD Collection more radical version of ethical moralism than represented by Platonic–Aristotelian the than represented moralism of version ethical more radical establish attempt a to it anunsuccessful a public man,and(b)represents as theory aRoman for isunsuitable ethics of Stoic content and rhetoric (a) the views: that same the intonation, and emphasis in variations with upholds, constantly he onwards from from in philosophical the digression his views on Stoic ethics do not seem to undergo much development throughout his life: Cicero’s conclude, asIshall Indeed, period. in this considerably deepened ethics Publica ( theory political and rhetorical on works voluminous his writing in research life andmadeextensive intellectual his clearly Ciceroresurrected period statesman. public personaasanoptimate learning of indeveloping resources Cicero’s the Greek tomakeof use attempts in they were least part at concerns; intellectual or scholarly their political practice. political their informing actually those and elite optimate ofthe self-presentation public the by projected concerns and values the between distance the diminish to been have to seems ideology this developing in concerns main ofCicero’s one and ideology; optimate coherent a traditions, intellectual Greek adopting 35 Third (Chapter and in from pursuits letters the this period. value intellectual various of referenceshis especially interests to (and philosophical) friendship Atticus, with and indeed politicalto manoeuvring– may compromise the his fostering to –related concerns pragmatic probable Cicero’s inwhich ways out WELCH 1996)Ishall point Welch’sarticles (DAMON2008, thought-provoking Building for which oninsights mainly toCynthiaI owe Kathryn Damon’s and his life.intellectual throughout person and aphilosophically statesman enlightened seriously a as self-presentation later Cicero’s with interferes slightly evidence On a more positive note, they may be rightly regarded as the first serious attempt to develop, by , De legibus 35 Moreover, we have no positive evidence that his acquaintance with his that with Stoic we haveacquaintance positive Moreover, evidence no I.5 ), I shall turn to Cicero’s first period of literary composition. In this In composition. literary of period first Cicero’s to turn shall I ), ). But these works were evidently not the manifestations of wereevidentlymanifestationsBut not works purely ). of these the Part I Part 34 Pro Murena (surveyed in Chapter De oratore , De Re I.4 ) CEU eTD Collection encounter in late encounter the I.5 andinlate thisin toAcademic work scepticism attitude the Cicero’s between is adiscrepancy there that true itremains leanings, Academic Cicero’s reveals rather but philosophy, Antiochus’ of adherent an by written is not I if we give heed Woldemar to Görler’s forceful arguments tothe effect that the (Chapter in when clearer become will that point a indicate also shall I Finally, philosophica he andexpositor order interpreter to become claims bein unbiased the that to his late intellectual Roman, ever remained one simply an eitheror is sceptic as Cicero, Academic sign asan no day,that there then, to one with Stoic ethics,the of end the At judgement. asindependent he own his than should rather influence Antiochus’ have to in maybeindebted sympathy here Cicero’s aswell arguethat themes.Butrelated Ishall andsome reason, law inright foundations of natural the friendship etc., self-sacrifice, life, and altruism, social virtue between of connection the conception mean Stoic the –I iswhich sympathetic more Cicero of to ethics Stoic aspects are there beTo sure, Stoics. the against argument Academic) also (perhaps a philosophical ideology of andculture political native his to adaptation Cicero’s is it either: invention own Cicero’s not is independently Antiochus’ on butwhichof Antiochus alsoteaching drew),the former Cicero to known been have may that traditions Academic New to presumably (and influence Ascalon’s of Antiochus to viewowes clearly While the latter tradition. end). Lucullus III.1 and also in also and . ) I shall describe Cicero’s presentation of his Academic scepticism in scepticism Academic his of presentation Cicero’s describe shall I ) philosophica De finibus De isnot present inthis form in theearlier works; even : that the confident Academic sceptic whom we Chapter I.1 35 philosophica (see Chapter (see De legibus Part III Part CEU eTD Collection Part I Part 36 CEU eTD Collection early educationuntil approximately 88 BC see CORBEILL 2002. At go material on. we havenobetter in to and case, any andformative years, as Roman himself hea highly educated is a competent witness); his education his of of in accuracy as account of the serves a guarantee dialogue the an interlocutor (Atticus Atticus’ as himself indicates (at 307), as Cicero but presence philosophical education; was an associateCicero the philosopher; of and thus often in principle a first thereco-student fruit of Cicero’s is retirementa possibility in 46 BC, written as a supplement that ofto the threehe booksCicerooverstates his in his on his on education. philosophical intellectual In the the autobiography of deal of time he spent in these studies seems to indicate a genuine enthusiasm. todistinguishedof exposed and teachers majorall great philosophical the schools, the was He was indeedexceptional. hea youth receivedas education that philosophical 5, being instructed by the teachers he made his friends”; cf. also cf. friends”; his made he teachers by the instructed being were but Crassus, attracted which subjects those studying only “not were they home whose in Crassus, Rome96 (inBC) they, together with two ofcousins them, were attended by famousthe oratorLucius was very active36 in promoting the education of him and his brother Quintus, and that on moving to muchyouth he philosophical devoted enthusiasm studiesand (cf. timeto e.g. then First, I.2 Anotherimportant autobiographical passage is De div De oratore Brutus Cicero’s philosophical education 306 Cicero says: . I22; , a concession. Inhis writings Cicerois consistent about claiming that in his – Cicero was perhaps already contemplating the idea of idea of resurrecting the contemplating already was perhaps – Cicero De off . II 4); and for all we know, the breadth and depth of the 36 To be sure, at the time of writing the Chapter I.2 Brutus De oratore 37 (305-316) Cicero puts noticeable Cicero stress puts (305-316) II 1-5, where Cicero relates that his father Orator 146. Foran 146. account of Cicero’s Brutus Tusc –the . V CEU eTD Collection Brut renowned work in rhetorical in theory. work rhetorical renowned in asabuddingorator interest Philo’s atleast in partly his practical originated the truth for the rest of his life. time promising thathe will continue practicing the Academic method of forsearching work, identified himself as an Academic Sceptic –at least he does so in his first rhetorical renowned expert in jurisprudencerenowned ( expert 40 again (see Rhodes of Molo rhetorician of the lectures the attended sameyearhealso the fin concerning Cicero’s lifelong scepticism in Chapter in scepticism lifelong Cicero’s concerning to the9; BRITTAIN questionview, returnI shall Cf. n. 2007: xi e.g. ANNAS2001:xvand n. 9. see Görler (GÖRLER 1995); see also GRIFFIN 1995:334-5, which seems to have restored the traditional compose the and returned to the New Academy only some time 45in BC, immediately before setting out to they both argued that during his stay inAthens in 87 BC Cicero converted to Antiochus’ recently Old questioned by GluckerAcademy,John (GLUCKER Peter been 1988) and Steinmetz (STEINMETZhas 1989); Scepticism Academic to adherence ofCicero’s continuity The boyhood”. my of notebooks Phaedrus ( he lectures in philosopher attended Rome whose wasprobably Epicurean the firsthere: start the not did with philosophy acquaintance Cicero’s beTo sure, 39 38 37 ever. for disappeared have to seemed courts law of the order although the variety and magnitude of the subjects themselves held me with great delight– was that the enthusiasm for philosophy I gave my time wholly to him. The reason I spent so long in his study – Academy) fled Athens with the Athenian the with Athens fled Academy) At the same time [89-8 BC On Cicero’s view the Academics and Peripatetics offered the best training in oratory: training best the offered Peripatetics and Academics the view Cicero’s On In consulship. Pompey’s and of Sulla’s year the gave Cicero line preceding the In ratio iudiciorum videbatur. varietas magnitudoet summa me delectationeretinebat –,sed tamen sublata iam esse in perpetuum philosophiam studio concitatus; inquohoc etiamcommorabar –etsiadtentius rerum ipsarum bello domoprofugisset Romamque venisset,totum ei me tradidiadmirabili quodamad eodemque tempore, princeps cum AcademiaePhilo cum Atheniensium optumatibus Mithridatico . I16).Andheconfine certainly not did philosophy his attention in to point; atthis . 120, 332. Deor. Brut. De inventione I5Cicero dismisses Ad fam. Academica 306), and by 306),andhe himselfQuintus timethis had attached a to Scaevola, XIII.1.2; XIII.1.2; cf. and (II 9-10), presumably sometimes in written same 80’s,atthe the De finibus 37 ], when, owing to the Mithridatic War, Philo (the scholarch of the De inventione Ad Att . Their arguments. Their have been forcefully countered by Woldemar 39 But his interest in Buthisinterest NewAcademy the probably 40 optimates ibid . XIII.39.2, . XIII.39.2, XVI.7.4; Part I Part .). Apparently, .). from this time he onwards 38 as an immature effort that “has slipped out of the III.1.2 , and had arrived in Rome, stirred by an amazing . 38 (Charles Brittain transl.) Brittain (Charles Phil . V13, ND De orat I 93, . III80, De CEU eTD Collection Diodotus as Diodotus “particularlyhis personal inpreceptor, logic”,in butalso various other Atany it was rate, during employed period this Cicero that the Stoic philosopher omni noctes et dies in which he preoccupied himself “day and night” in ensuingthe years ( young Cicero, and that it remained(82-79). Thus itseems notunlikely greatinfluence philosophythat exerted onthe a Sulla’s dictatorship (82-81BC; cf. under commonwealth” the of restoration “the and judicature”, of courts and laws debutas pleader in which court, the he delayed until up “the re-establishmentof the and optimates the between violence and WarSocial upheaval, (91-88) ensuingyearsof ledthe open constant which to coincided with an extremelyperiod of turbulent Republic’s Late the history, the emphasises) himself he (as years formative Cicero’s that in mind keep also should We honestissimis studiisrationis etofficii andvirtuous andduty” of honourable studies reason ( most the “neglecting who someone them: to advantageous never and mischievous, little use tostates ( country ( his to mischievous and himself for useless become to himself is training speaking republic, and upholds the view that while wisdom whilerepublic, the andupholds view( that wisdom the and fellow-countrymen his of advantage the about concerned being as himself actions. same year); same BC, but at the beginning of the speech Cicero refers 42 to other cases he had undertaken (probably in the Nevertheless in the preface of book Iof book of preface inthe Nevertheless comprehensive mastery of every “part” of learning; cf. e.g. cf. of learning; “part” every of mastery comprehensive 41 Cicero’s first published speech, delivered in a private case on behalf of P. Quinctius, dates from 81 from dates Quinctius, of P. behalf on case private in a delivered speech, published first Cicero’s Inhis rhetorical works Cicero constantly insists that the ideal oratorbe equippedwith a De inv Pro Quinctio . I1). parum prodesse civitati was perhaps the most significant among these first appearances in civil in appearances first these among significant most the perhaps was omnium doctrinummeditatione versabar Brutus populares Chapter I.2 per se per ) devotes all his attention to the practice of practice tothe his attention all ) devotes 311-2). 39 De inventione ), eloquence without wisdom is often most often is wisdom without eloquence ), part of the “studies of with “studies of kind” every partof the in 83-82, and to Sulla’s dictatorshipin83-82, andto 42 De orat De sapientia he for the first time presents . I 5ff,II 5ff. omissis rectissimis atue rectissimis omissis ) without eloquence is of is eloquence without ) ) 41 , before he made his Brutus 308-9: CEU eTD Collection (P.G. Walsh transl. –my amendment). them” refuted Philo well how appreciate readily more I would school, of their leader the by expounded doctrines Epicurean the hearing after so that doubtless lectures], [his attend to me encouraged himself chorus-leader’, Epicurean ‘the Zeno call to used who Philo, teacher our fact “in lecture: 45 88. in Sulla under 89 and in Strabo Pompeius 44 XIII.4.6. V 39,113, 43 himself in suggests the decade) younghave the Ciceroseemsto studies. spentwith protracted Partly, he as a over (probably time much how realise to striking is it been, have may this However characteristic penchant for extraordinary precaution and hesitation in the face of in face the hesitation and precaution for extraordinary penchant characteristic Another reason in was perhaps launching a careerpublic Cicero’s speaking. forleave butencouraging everything Atticus–in for Athens later Italy 85) were politicalyears disturbances friend inCicero’s made thesePomponius (which –the learningof parts ( avowal avowal at andhis tophilosophyhis among than peers(cf. technical attitude was usual again atan have age As pupilhemay early adopted Philo’s a moreprobably open-minded havebeen in exceptional. yearsmust received these Cicero education philosophical philosophical illustrious teachers. death in 59, and inhis writings later Cicero often mentions him on a par with his more his remaineduntil household, upresidence he where inCicero’s philosopher took in order to discover the truth reflects Philo’s approach Philo’s reflects truth discover the to in order systems all philosophical dogmatic mastery the of at as aiming Academic scepticism 5years.for 4or enjoyed his teaching he that remained inRome until inhis death 84-3 BC Cicero–thus may possibly have after city’sthe occupation by forcesin Sulla’s 86 BC; for all iswe knowit possible At Gnaeus under service military short a by halted were pursuits other and philosophical Cicero’s Cf. ND Luc I59Cotta says during that his time inAthens (in the early often80’s) he Zeno heard of Sidon . 115 (where he says that he listened to Diodotus from his boyhood ( De inventione Ad Att. II.20.6, Brutus II 9-10; cf. Ad fam. Brutus 309: IX.4.1 (where Cicero refers to Diodotus’ views Diodotus’ to refers Cicero (where IX.4.1 cum aliis rebus tumstudiosissime in dialectica , this may have been due to the circumstances: the circumstances: have duetothe may been , this 43 It is unclear weather Philoever returned to Athens Lucullus 44 Part I Part 40 If so, and if Cicero’s characterisation of 8-9). 45 , then the breadth of the of breadth the then , a puero )); peri dunat ND I 7, ). The ). Tusc ǀ n ), . CEU eTD Collection Sidon. famous Epicureans he knew (whom Phaedrus already from Rome) and of Zeno his acquaintance with philosophythe of Garden,the lectures attending the of the 49 Meanwhile hetooklessons by rhetoricianthe of Demetrius ( Syria For Antiochus of Ascalon, see further Chapter further see of Ascalon, Antiochus For Cf. 48 youth. earliest my from improve indeed and cultivate to ceased never I had which studies philosophical philosopher of the old Academy; and under this most excellent teacher and scholar I renewed those When I came to Athens,back tophilosophy: I spent six months with Antiochus, the principal and most judicious the from abovequotation (seee.g.the learning greatpleasurehe in took been simply that Cicero’s frequentown claims in hislater writings a and letters, third reasonmay have at suggested isalso (this appearance first decisions: avoid making hewanted important to of any chance lesssuccessful a than 75 BC, to study rhetoric with Molon(cf. Suetonius, Caesar,Iulius who launched hisforensic careeraround 80BC, the at age of 23, travelled toRhodes in wastraining not unusualCicero’s in time,cf. 4-5. GRIFFIN the Even1989: quite unphilosophical crossed theschemes of Sulla’s confidant Chrysogonus). Importantly, travelling to east to get advanced explanation, suggesting that Cicero left Rome fromof fear wrathSulla’s (by defending Roscius Cicero recover47 from46 a serious illness of his lungs; Plutarch, however, ( ( when in toundertake further 79BChedecidedtotravel training rhetorical abroad end Cicero’s in studies didnot Moreover, He“hadbeentwoyearsatthe bar”82-81. Romans. Aswe learnfrom the Athens in companythe Atticus,of hisbrother Quintus, cousin Lucius youngand other Brutus He does not mention this in the According to his ownexplanation ( Cf. MAY 2002: 4. semper auctum hoc rursus summo auctore et doctore renovavi. philosopho fui studiumque philosophiae numquam intermissum Cum venissem Athenas,sex menses cum Antiocho veteris Academiae nobilissumo et prudentissumo De fin. Brutus 48 49 ( 314). Brutus From From Athens hejourneyedAsian to coastal cities, where he was by attended V 1: “I had been listening, Brutus, as I often did, to a lecture by Atticus with Marcus Piso”. : me delectationeretinebat 315) 47 He forremained years, abroad two the sixmonths first in being spent Brutus Brutus Brutus , cf. however cf. , ). Chapter I.2 313)Cicero protractedneeded this orderholiday to in II.3 , in , Cicero’s Athens focus temporarily shifted 41 , and the literature listed in note 27 to Chapter Iulius Brutus Acad 4). . I 46 and 311). a primaqueadulescentia cultum et 46 De fin But, if we are to believe Cicero . I16. 3.2-5)gives another ibid .), and renewed .), II.1 . CEU eTD Collection the only oratorwho profited from study of Stoic dialectics. 51 Posidonius’ visit to Rome –if so, recall Cicero is may forgetting thatVelleius Cotta was inand exile Balbus in 87-6BC. himself, of acquaintance an as Posidonius to reference Cotta’s where when the latter served as an ambassador to Rome in 87-6 BC, cf. Plutarch, (written60in BC); seePlutarch, further before discussingin it his years probability and necessity concerning argument a technical with acquaintance Diodorus’ position. As Boyancé pointed out, the letter not only reveals Cicero’s Chrysippus and Diodorus between disagreement tothe reference aplayful with which opens IX.4) written to Varro in 46 BC (the same year in which Cicero wrote the various arts”, but particularly in logic. butparticularly arts”, various As for the former, in the connections. these of significance with forget neverphilosophy notice totake it. of we should But not overestimate the engagement and ongoing Cicero’s education whostress and those promising start; Diodotus, and Posidonius, the famous Stoic master in Rhodes. Atfirst glance, this is a unknown included otherwise the connections Stoic Cicero’s see that Thus far,wecan Posidonius asone of his main andphilosophical friends.teachers curiously mentioning inomits thisencounter, his writings later he constantly refers to Posidonius,friendship;he whom up with thoughin a close struck the met the Stoic havemust hein also Rhodes But Molon. in rhetoric former teacher his with reunited he where Rhodes, to finally and Smyrna), in exile self-chosen with Rutilius whowasspendinghis statesman pupilof Rufus, Panaetius, Roman the 50 principal rhetoricians (as we learn from (as welearn principal rhetoricians As we can gather from Cicero’s references at references Cicero’s from gather can we As Cf. Hort. fr. Hort. 18, peri dunat peri De fin . I6, ǀ n , and to “our teacher Diodotus”, who “could not stomach” Tusc De fato Brutus . II61, , but also suggests that it may date back to the times Cicero says that Diodotus had “inDiodotus says beenhistutor that Cicero Cicero ND 51 I 7, 123, II 88, I7,123, This claim is confirmed by a letter ( aletter by isconfirmed claim This De Re P. Part I Part Brutus 4. 5.It is possible Cicerothat first met Posidonius 42 114,205fand I 13 De div , he alsospenta couple days of . I 6, II 47; cf. also De orat De Marius 50 . III78, Cicero was not 45.7, and Ad Att. Brutus ND Brutus Ad fam. II.1.2. I123, he ), CEU eTD Collection he does not want to offend the memory of memory his master). wanttooffendthe not of he does manner Posidonius’emphasising inadismissive (though that topics the of treatment extensively used hisPosidonius as source; that in writing that natural relating metaphysicsis to and (viz. philosophy widely theology). It thought compositionfrequently Cicero in Posidonius’consulted writing works abouttopics mention itisin obvious But technical philosophy. rather hislate period of that to not pursuits, intellectual with do to nothing has letter inthe reported exchange Notably, the written). wassobrilliantly work becausethe interpretation, Cicero’s (on that Posidonius refused doto so, answering tactfully that he was plain frightened off it hiswrite own consulship, askinghimto elaborately upmore on but samethe topics, boastingvain, hehad that sentPosidonius to a copy hisof memoir ( 53 92, 116-121. whenstudied Cicero with Diodotus. adopt at of the event predicted occurrence the (and its falsityinvolves necessarily the impossibility prediction of a of the truth occurrence)the which –theto position according heis going to argument, ‘Master’ 52 from 60 BC( by a letter testified is him with contact ongoing Cicero’s worse. even is situation the Posidonius, With comprehension of Stoic philosophy in general in and ethics particular. Diodotus’ views, andhave nohisclues whatsoever to possible influence onCicero’s metaphysical fateand doctrines Beyondon this, weknownothing providence). of treatment in which mainwas the Cicerostudied subject with (althoughDiodotus Cicero’s logic, necessity andpossibility belongs otherhand,however,the topics to the of discussedDiodotus some rather theoretical and technical issueswith his student; on On Cf. GRIFFIN 1995:339-340;see also SHARPLES 1991:i, n. 6.Cicero refers to Diodorus Cronus’ ND De fato II see e.g. WALSH 1997: xxix-xxx; on De fato 12-20, inoppositionto the view toattributed Chrysippus; cf. ALGRAet al. 1999:86- De naturadeorum reveals that he is fully conscious of the topic’s relevance to relevance topic’s the of conscious fully is he that reveals Ad Att Book Book II and Chapter I.2 52 . II.1.2), in which Cicero relates to Atticus,in a If so, we can see, on the one hand, that hand, one the on see, can we so, If De div 43 53 . Isee WARDEe.g. 2006: 32ff. and at De divinatione De fato 5-7he mentions Book ICicero commentarii ) on CEU eTD Collection 57 56 55 Panaetius left this important issue undiscussed camefrom Posidonius. source for a fair amountDespite this ofdismissive tone theAndrew Dyck ( first third of libri the Book. In fact, it seems likely that the very notion that preface of preface off kephalaia in his treatise unorthodoxy is ( Galen main onPosidonius’ our that source alleged by fact the The issueis complicated Stoic theory of emotions. touches uponthis subject hupomn Att. ( book Posidonius’ for sent both he that and problem concerning the conflictsbetween morality expediency–and been has upby taken Posidonius, XVI.11.4) Cicero explains to friendhis that the problem left undiscussed by Panaetius –namely the in the and Chrysippus’ psychology, is which especially conspicuous when in ishis ethical ofPosidonius’ unawareness work famousapparent criticism of neglect of Posidonius’ general Cicero’s sign moreof alarming A second even and disappointed brevity about the Posidonius’ of treatment of problem the ( his is knowledge imprecise andindirect. yet hasapparently read Posidonius’ he not something but itsknows of work: content, he of title, same the inhiswork by Posidonius been laterhas taken up Panaetius, conflicts between morality and expediency, has which been left undiscussedby is that in 44 November, when Cicero in a letter reports to Atticus that the topics of 54 of of of Book III composing and/or of some his sort outline Athenodorus– atthe workbyPosidonius’ of time pupil Posidoniushis – useof our explicit concerns,possess testimony about More wedo to Cf. also DL VII 103 128,and onsee which COOPER 1999: 450 n. 4. Cf. STRIKER 1996: 259-60. Cf. DYCK 1996: 485-6. Cf.esp. DYCK1996: 484ff; ATKINS–GRIFFINIn 1991:xix-xxi. aletterto Atticus ( . III . 63and89 he also refers toaworkDuties’ ‘On by Posidonius’ otherpupil Hecato.Finally,in the XVI.14.4) he says that there is no occasion to whip Athenodorus: he has already sent a very good very a sent already has he Athenodorus: whip to occasion no is there that says he XVI.14.4) ), especially as he himself states that there is no more urgent topics inthe whole of philosophy. Ɲ ma ) of the ) ofwork. He the asks Atticus to giveAthenodorus areminder; butweek about( a later De officiis (presumably the summary of Posidonius’ book Cicero requested of him). Notably, at Notably, of him). requested Cicero book Posidonius’ of summary the (presumably Tusculan Disputations Tusculan On Passions III(8) expresseshe disappointment his about fact Posidonius the that only briefly in quibusdamin commentariis PHP 56 De officiis rejected Chrysippus’ unitary conception of Chrysippus’ rejected unitary conception soul the of and 4-5) 57 III and IV (esp. IV 11ff) he expounds the orthodox the he expounds 11ff) IV (esp. IV and III , but his testimony, according to which to Posidonius according , buthistestimony, . ibid 54 What is curious about thisis evidence,however, curious What liber .) argues.) thatPosidonius may servedhave asCicero’s Part I Part 44 55 ), and wrote to Athenodorus for an outline ( outline an for Athenodorus to wrote and ), When he finally gets the book, he is (probably commentarii is here an equivalent for equivalent an ishere De finibus De off . III 8). III35 Ad Att. De Ad ta CEU eTD Collection Chrysippus and Plato between intermediary forge an position an interpretation hetried to adopt on which –or Stoic unorthodox asan Posidonius view of (Galenic) traditional the accept If we Acad cf. position; inseparable Stoic (the are virtues the view),or Platonic–Peripatetic (the are separablefrom wisdom that virtues are“non-rational” question the there whether Posidonius’ unorthodoxy thought to be due to Posidonius’ influence. If,however, we completely reject crucial difference between Stoic and Platonic–Peripatetic moral psychology because moral psychology and Platonic–Peripatetic Stoic between crucial difference moderated as the Peripatetics contend (cf. e.g. (cf. contend Peripatetics asthe moderated only or hold, Stoics as the altogether, be erased to are emotions whether the striking inviewhis awareness of acute issues, of likeclosely related the question model (Cic. part-based presentingStoic he psychological doctrines alanguage evokingrepeatedly the uses realisingbe soul the in to aprerequisite secession):(which Posidonius’ would of Stoic (monistic) the conception and (part-based) Platonic–Aristotelian between the unaware of Posidonius’ unorthodoxy, but he also fails todraw a clear distinction from orthodoxy on divination, cf. secession fact a signal secession Posidonius’ silence about Cicero’s consider typically interpretations such sceptical returned tothe Platonic model, tripartite hasrecentlybeen questioned. 62 2003: 200. 61 60 2003: 200; cf. 288ff. 59 5. 58 This is Teun Tieleman’s view,see TIELEMAN 2003: 2001ff. This is thecourse bytaken FILLION-LAHILLE 1984and COOPER 1999 (=1998); cf.TIELEMAN Cf. GILL 2006: 214-215. FILLION-LAHILLE122-23; 1984: cf.COOPER 82-93; 1999 (=1998): 451and 5;TIELEMAN n. FILLION-LAHILLECOOPER 1984, 1999 (=1998) and TIELEMAN 2003: 198ff, GILL 2006: 214- . I 38). . I 60 61 59 –, Cicero’s conflation of the two psychological models may be may models psychological two the of conflation Cicero’s –, De (by contrast, Cicero is well aware of Panaetius’ digression 62 , we will have to argue e.g. that Cicero fails to see the fails to Cicero that argue e.g. to we will have , off . I 101, 132, II 8; 101, 132, . I De div Chapter I.2 45 . I 6). In fact, not only is Cicero quite Tusc Tusc . IV 41-2, 39, 57; 41-2,39, . IV . IV 10–11). This is allmore . IV10–11).This the 58 Acad Proponents of . I 38); or CEU eTD Collection that rules cosmos”. whole the that everything the divinity in oneself,which is akin andsimilarinnature to thedivinity follow in to is failure life miserable andthe disagreement emotions, cause of the nonrational and unhappyand orparts(?)]godless of [powers soul”,the while “the with “thenature, principal inhappinessthing is being ledin nothing by the 65 issue)? controversial a was knew Cicero seen, wehave as which, question (a or extirpated be moderated should emotions the whether on debate the conflict remained latent forcenturies, if, as Gill rightly points out, it is pertinent to such debates as e.g.219), he does not address what seems to me the more crucial question: how is itpossible that the that the conflict between the different models first becomesexplicit inPlutarch and Galen(2006: 216- Seneca’s himself (thoughit also finds some support inArius’ account of the Stoic theory of emotions, and in translating Platonic ideas into Stoic form. But Gill’s mainevidence forthis hypothesis is Cicero unlike Chrysippus, may discuss explicitly the relationbetween Stoic doctrines and Platonic texts, factthe they that not too had marked itas anindeed, issue; in texts the followed byCicero Posidonius, passages Cicero drawsonPanaetius Posidonius, and and his failure to highlight the difference is due to of debate; itisonly Plutarchin thatissue the conflict anexplicit as becomes defined explicitclearly yetbeen for not the first had models time. two the In the between relevant contrast the time Cicero’s 64 472-80. mentionedare by 36,GILL 2006:214,n. togetherwitha third explanation represented by LÉVY 1992: 63 that on Posidonius’ explication of the Stoic thesis that the Stoic theory of the dowefind Nor of inviews trace anypalpable Posidonius’ Cicero’s the of exposition conception. Platonic–Aristotelian to the opposed soul, of for as the aunitary argues conception Chrysippus, orhe failed take to notice that, in agreement with Chrysippus, Posidonius notice Posidonius’failed take criticism of of he either to 5.6.2; cf. 4.7.23-4)–: Galen reports, Posidonius regarded as the necessary foundation of moral theory ( onthe really inwas not work theory wellversed of emotions –which, as Posidonius’ his concerns are moral rather than psychological. than moral arerather his concerns GILL 2006: 214-5 proposes asolution that seems to be more sympathetic to Cicero: on hisview in former Forthe view see INWOOD 1985:120-121; for latterthe see TIELEMAN 2003: 248-9 –both Ω·ΉΗΌ΅΍ȱЀΔϲȱΘΓІȱΦΏϱ·ΓΙȱΘΉȱΎ΅ϠȱΎ΅ΎΓΈ΅ϟΐΓΑΓΖȱΎ΅ϠȱΦΌνΓΙȱΘϛΖȱΜΙΛϛΖ σΛΓΑΘ΍ȱΘХȱΘϲΑȱϵΏΓΑȱΎϱΗΐΓΑȱΈ΍Γ΍ΎΓІΑΘ΍ΐχȱΎ΅ΘΤȱΔκΑȱρΔΉΗΌ΅΍ȱΘХȱπΑȱ΅ЀΘХȱΈ΅ϟΐΓΑ΍ȱΗΙ··ΉΑΉϧȱΘΉȱϷΑΘ΍ȱΎ΅ϠȱΘχΑȱϳΐΓϟ΅ΑȱΚϾΗ΍Α ΘϲȱΈχȱΘЗΑȱΔ΅ΌЗΑȱ΅ϥΘ΍ΓΑ De ira De 64 , cf. GILL 2006: 215 and n. 37). Moreover, though Gill takes pains to explain why it is summum bonum , ΘΓΙΘνΗΘ΍ȱΘϛΖȱΘΉȱΦΑΓΐΓΏΓ·ϟ΅ΖȱΎ΅ϠȱΘΓІȱΎ΅ΎΓΈ΅ϟΐΓΑΓΖȱΆϟΓΙ 65 Similarly, according to Clement of Alexandria of Clement to according Similarly, in De finibus Part I Part (…) 46 ΔΕЗΘϱΑȱπΗΘ΍ΑȱπΑȱ΅ЁΘϜȱΘϲȱΎ΅ΘΤ 63 III. At In any case, it seems that Cicero telos PHP is living in agreement in living is 5.6.4-5 Galen 5.6.4-5 reports . µ PHP ΋ΈξΑ , Θϲ CEU eTD Collection soul”. promoting it as far as we can, in no way led by the irrational part ( teachers andfriends. teachers given frequentlynames Cicero that Posidonius as hisone of main philosophical concerned, influence isimperceptible, Posidonius’ which isdisconcerting, somewhat is ethics Stoic of understanding asfargeneral as Cicero’s short: DL In VII 88). are able (which incidentally closely resembles as Chrysippus’ ownwords atquoted truthandthe it”in of “helping asfar universe” arrangement the and promoting aswe heignoresleadingidea also ideally the an that liferational “contemplating involves in us,but theirrational by resisting passions the on escaping of importance stress the andof universe( live contemplating order truth the the ( 66 Stromateis ΘϲȱΊϛΑȱΌΉΝΕΓІΑΘ΅ȱΘχΑȱΘЗΑȱϵΏΝΑȱΦΏφΌΉ΍΅ΑȱΎ΅ϠȱΘΣΒ΍ΑȱΎ΅ϠȱΗΙ·Ύ΅Θ΅ΗΎΉΙΣΊΓΑΘ΅ȱ΅ЁΘχΑ Ύ΅ΘΤȱΘϲȱΈΙΑ΅ΘϱΑ 66 These ideas are absent from Cicero’s account. Not only Notonly henotlay These areabsentfrom ideas account. Cicero’s does any II.21.129.4-5, fr. 186 E-K) Posidonius’ “definition” of “definition”the fr. of Posidonius’ 186E-K) II.21.129.4-5, , Ύ΅ΘΤ µ ΋ΈξΑȱΦ·ϱΐΉΑΓΑȱЀΔϲȱΘΓІȱΦΏϱ·ΓΙ Chapter I.2 47 µ νΕΓΙΖȱΘϛΖȱΜΙΛϛΖ Wǀ n hol ǀ n ) and helping in helping and ) meros telos . (!)) of the is: “to CEU eTD Collection to the Athenian Academy and Lyceum. and Academy Athenian the to talking (cf.talking 28) M.Antonius’ ibid. “Tusculan calls the site (presumably a garden) where the interlocutors are taking their afternoonstroll while also barely knownto us, see DILLON 2003:3-16). Cf. also gymnasia and philosophical schoolsAthenian after famous which ofthe they ambience were cultural named (the the evoke to physical meant structure gardens– peristyle of its whichperhaps, is rather –or est Hermathena: “Hermes is a common sign to all gymnasia, and Minerva special to this to special Minerva and all gymnasia, to sign isacommon “Hermes Hermathena: Atticum ‘Lyceum’, which, as he explains, is the name of his “upper ofhis name the is explains, he as which, ‘Lyceum’, Cicero’s estate at Tusculum hehis“Academy” (cf. and Cicero’s estate keepscalling which marble statues that he had purchased in Greece for place. decorating the thathehad inGreece marble purchased statues 8; cf. also he and hisguests and to“strollhe down”had ( anewlybuilt to we find references praetor, when hewaselected 68 letters of his career is LINTOTT and speeches his 2008: in evidence Parts the of C survey and useful D. another 1; Ch. 2004: FANTHAM see consulship, 67 In letters written to Atticus in correspondence from this his of period, continuing enthusiasm forand books learning. 67-6 BC ( surviving Cicero’s in indications, remarkable some however, have, We (though Diodotus resided in his household throughout). year.his consular endof the conspiracy at Catilinarian the suppressing in and success uncovering great eminence, pinnacle the washis of tothe consulshipwhich election in63 BC, andhis The ensuing fifteen years witnessed Cicero’s remarkable raise to forensic and political I.3.1 I.3 Cicero refers to his Academy also at a good For summary of Cicero’s political career, including decliningthe years following his ). The physical structure of these ’gymnasia’ is unknown, but presumably they were parts of his villa Until the consulate:theraiseofCicero’scareerUntil the From I.4.3 he expresses his delight at the news that these statues include a statues these news that at the I.4.3 heexpresseshis delight De or 78 to 59 BC 78 to . I 98): he . I98): send repeatedly Atticusasks to him soon as as possible the 67 During this time he most probablyhad little opportunity study to : Cicero’s intellectual Tusc descendibus . II. whereIII 9,7, suggests he thatorder in to therereach palaestra Part I Part Ad 48 Att ); at ); ” and “suburban ” life before his exile . I.1, I.4, I.7, I.9, I.10, I.11), the year De divinatione De oratore gymnasium I 98: here Sulpicius playfully gymnasium ” ( I 8 in turn we hear of his superiori gymnasionomen ”, and compares it compares and ”, gymnasium De div. De 68 In on Ad I CEU eTD Collection heart seems to be indicative of the focus of his intellectual life. intellectual his of focus the of indicative be to seems heart the to gave Cicero name the but in them, explicitly placed on a as herm support) that came fashioninto just around the time; cf.DILLON 2006: 30-31. into referred the ‘Hermathena’ The Hill. Capitol on the letters ofJupiter temple the in it placed and Rome in home was probably a statue of Athena in the “herm portrait” format (that is, a head or bust also (cf. childhood” from myself immersed leisure people than other because varieddelightsof the of studiesinwhich the I had my from rewards greater achieve could who person of sort been the always had I 7:“I at later statement Cicero’s inline life, andare with in political suffered XII.25.1;Plutarch, intellectual for longing anincreasing report clearly These passages you been away” (I.11.3). have short time inthe been has everything find will you worse the for changed how believe never would You else. all for feel I loathing the with iscommensurate them for enthusiasm enjoying myself, when I retire, depend kindness” onyour (I.7); “my boundless expresses his desire to buy a valuable he repeatedly in sameletters In the it. not he is librarywhen even hisspirits place raises ( his own dedicationAs to Athena, to Cicero the worshippedschoolsservice were traditionally decorated with herms, as Hermes washer associated with educationasof of theyouth.protector the Roman of the city, state: and regarded as heher reportsas an ample symbol at of and shan’t envy man any his and manors meadows”( in “if it bemine],millionaires purchased I ever[make Greece: richest Ishall the of one”. 69 The Hermathena eventually arrived not long before the middle of July, 65: cf. 69 In Ad Atticum Cicero 31), when going in exile in 58 he took his own statue of Minerva from his I.11.3 hefinds ithow themere I.11.3 “astonishing” thoughtof the otium as a refuge from and frustrations the disillusionments Chapter I.3.1 49 De or bibliotheca . I2).Philosophymentionednot is gymnasium Ad Att ) Atticus happened to have to happened Atticus ) . I.4.3); “all my hopes of hopes my “all . I.4.3); De legibus that was so dear to his Ad Att. II42(cf. De RePublica I.1.5. Athenian Ad fam. CEU eTD Collection BERRY 2004 background of trial, Cicero’sthe for reasons undertaking defencethe and his defence strategy the see –For imitate. to of excellence patterns propagate and convey can it hand other the on Empire); the the one on can, it statesmen and generals hand, of Roman achievements glorious the bolster celebrating by Rome: to service Roman authorityand his poetry in favourable light before(note the jurors. Its hub is that Greek thathistorical poetry(2). His eulogycanGreek do a greatof literature another” is intellectuallyone with kinship undemanding and certain was have is carefully and bond devised common by a to presentthetogether Archias woven are culture more of branches commonly“all that idea the on based as but also (1), oratory his in involved skills technical spoken ofthe source the as merely language not arts”, “liberal the in learning wide his avows openly Cicero Here 4a). one: bein to deserved he literature (which Cicero presents in order to demonstrate that evenif Archias were not a Romancitizen, Archias’ entitlement to citizenship, regarding butadvocacy the greaterlegal a part with of begins it (12-30) speech consists The in anencomium innocent. ofcertainly was he ofwhich crime a of Cicero’s boyhood teachers: see teachers: boyhood Cicero’s of response to Cato’s speech, Cato, who brought the full moral weight of his Stoic faith Lucullus and Crassus, undertook defence.the Ascanbe gatheredfrom Cicero’s auctoritas considerable already butpossessing time atthe (atribune-designate Uticensis 72 Greek inparticular; culture cf.JOCELYN 1976:esp. 359f.; BERRYAt 2004:302. juries (and, perhaps, of passers-by the constituting the intellectual content –an indicationof the hostility of typical upper-class citizens constituting the Roman 70 the (under election his any without taken adotorepresent views further real and sentiments. we keep inmind that the views expressed by Cicero in a forensic speech can never be 71 Crassus went as far as feigningcontempt towards it (cf. furtherI 47, 102, 221, II 18). learn that Antonius wished audiencehis think he was completely ignorant of Greek learning, while of elect, consul the Murena, L. Licinius year,accused next for the election in consular the candidate unsuccessful an Rufus, Sulpicius Servius philosophical background. Cicero’s of estimation the to relevance has adirect former that is the itonly two Pro Murena his learning on display.Greek In his surviving and forensic politicalspeeches alikeCicero asa avoidsrule putting I.3.2 He feels necessary to adopt a reticent tone when he is discussing subjects with any kind of kind any with subjects is discussing he when tone a reticent adopt to necessary Hefeels Cf. esp. his manifesto as an advocate in Pro Archia The philosophicaldigression in , cf. 3,13,58ff)joined Sulpicius in prosecution,the with while Cicero, is an oration presented in defence of Aulus Licinius Archias, a professional poet (and one (and poet a professional Archias, Licinius Aulus of defence in presented oration an is and Pro Archiapoeta Lex Tullia 72 Pro Arch 70 , a law passed in Cicero’s , alawCicero’s passedinconsulship: Yet survivingtwo forensic from speeches 63 and 62– Pro Cluentio respectively– shed important lightimportant it, on shed providedrespectively– . 1; cf. ProMurena Part I Part 50 De div 139. corona . I . 79) accused ofnotbeing a Roman citizen – (60-66) ) towards intellectuality generalin and ambitus De oratore De inthe bribery , Mur 71 . 3). Cato From the II 4 we CEU eTD Collection slightly distorted by hisStoic by distorted slightly thanksvirtuous, and right always are tointentions Cato’s that argues hisCicero shortly: it put To excellent “natural” moral endowment, but that they are sometimesjustice. about worries their over necessity political of question the to priority the circumstances present in the year, that and of coming start the the at consulsin office elected both which requires justified by imminentthe of danger civil by strife presented Catiline and his allies, thathisinvolvementconvince(despite Murena’s jurors the evidentguilt) fully was In his defence speech Cicerobehalf of Murena (3, 6). brings all the dignityTullia of his consular rank to bear to oratore attack on Cato’s Stoicism (cf. which 3), hisprefigures criticism Stoicof ethicsin lampooning a launches he (60-66) ally– political important an also was Cato since beingdo offensive, this–and strength of without (58) too wholethe to prosecution” neutralise moral to order Cato’s whom authority, he “the regards as foundation and pointing out thatit did not accord with him,for defending Cicero healsoreproached Moreover, 13) andprevious career. free tickets to the games), butlaunched a wholesale attack against his person (cf. Rome him whoescorted and in banquets of hiscampaign,andalso giving and voters thecrowd welcomedMurenawho specific (of the himbackpaying of charges to philosophical passage see CRAIG 1986 and STEM 2006. 75 and his ancestral tradition to bear in bear 66-67; cf. 74) case(cf.the esp. to andhis ancestral tradition 73 74 8. November For thespeechin general, see LEEMAN 1982, ADAMIETZ 1989 and BERRY 2000:59; forthe A reference to the to Areference Cf. also , and in “hadaddition banishedCatilinefrom by city the words” (III65) and in Pro Flacco Pro First Catilinarian 98, Ad Att De finibus . II.1.8. doctrina (cf. esp.IV21-22 and 55-6). , which led Catiline to leave Rome under cover in the night of iudices Chapter I.3.2 , which is “little more harsh and severe than severitas 51 tooshould follow hisexample and give for him, who had proposed the 75 , not only accused only not 73 , to speak on , to Mur 74 Lex In De . CEU eTD Collection 77 639, 640, 641, 643. Forfavour orgratitude, see my discussion below. sometimes he changes his mind, for all the virtues are moderated by a certain mean. by certain a moderated are virtues the all for mind, his changes he sometimes that doso; to better be would it if said has he what changes sometimes he that or appeased, be entreated man often holds opinions about whatdifferent penalties; thathe there is a placedoes forforgiveness with the man of notresolution; that evenknow, the wise that this man characteristicis of sometimesa good manto feel pity; thatthere are distinct types ofcrimes and appropriately angry, that he can moderate and temperate men, say that favour does sometimes have weight with the wise man; that it is ability, the sought support of learning– our philosophers, natural I my say,in descending from Plato Aristotle,and confident not and youth my in while too, I, that Cato, confess, I –for philosophers Our his belongs toan adherence earlier in phase his life): that indicating by issue whole the from himself distancing time same the at (though tradition going back to Plato and Aristotle, to which Cicero now claims adherence withvenerable themore contrasted is, then, doctrines, these of The “harshness” Luc unerring, while everyone else is slave, exile, enemy and lunatic (cf. lunatic and enemy exile, slave, is else everyone while unerring, person is equal, only and virtuous beautiful, wise the and that akingand rich, Stoic views of which his audience islikely disapprove:to thatevery wrongdoing is 76 acrime of partiality pardons out or partial interests heed to moved by either favour( wisemanisnever the which,whenit tojustice, comes to moral ideal, according severe Cato’s with sympathy found have might jurors the be sure, To amendment. principles were in accord with the inflexiblyhisjudgement holds on (61-2). The jurorsmightto have these thoughtthat natura patitur nature wouldeitheror (60: permit” truth For the Stoic aversion against leniency ( aiunt apudaiunt sapientem valere aliquando gratiam; viri boniessemisereri; distincta genera esse adiumentadoctrinae– nostri,inquam,a Platone illi etAristotele,moderatihomines temperati, et Nostri autem illi–fatebor enim,me Cato, quoque inadulescentia diffisum ingeniomeoquaesisse . 137; De fin . IV . IV 21-22). cf. De fin gratia . IV55-56),and require some gentle guidance and ) or leniency ( mos maiorummos epieikeia Part I Part paulo asperior etdurior quamautveritas aut 52 ) and pardon ( misericordia , but Cicerolinks , Cato’s severity with suggn ǀPƝ ) –that is, he never gives ) see ) 76 – and (thus) always (thus) and – SVF 77 De orat ( III450-453;637, Pro Murena . III 65; . III 63) CEU eTD Collection nefarium father (61: own one’s aparwith killing of a cockon slaughter needless the gradations among offences, considering all them of capital andthus crimes, putting Cicero, DL VII120, e.g. Stoic the misrepresent to seems (=1993): section V. would allow. the ForStoic attitude towards mercy reason see RIST 1978:sectionIII right NUSSBAUM and by 1995 prescribed law ideal and perfect the than severe more is that punishment a predict live to bound is he which in society actual the governing laws imperfect the when cases particular 80 consisteremus quam naturavelletprotulisse cumadultimum ut, animo contendissemus, tamenubi ibi oporteret 79 60 and 64); forthis point see also CRAIG 1986: 246; GLUCKER 1988: 46; STEM 2006: 217-8. insituation. course present the and amoreprudent tactful adopted teachers, he have becomeinclinedwould alittle leniency, more to have would and fortune ledHad withendowed his Cato, excellentnatural tothese disposition, as, they as, they from rightrepresent deviations whatreason would demand. 78 In translating passagethe I have consulted D. H.Berry’s translation (inBERRY 2000). to right reason, and rejectleniency ( conformity aconstant involving disposition rational is justice a strictly virtue the that hold they reason; right of embodiments perfect less or more as systems legal consider explain Stoics the hefails that to On hand, one views. the conflicting the presenting being CiceroActually,may isfarfrom atthis in point, objective as one observe (65). to” ought we [actually] souls to the ultimate limit [in an endeavour tolive up to them], we do stand fast where while innature, further isthat, westrain to duties than somewhat agreeable order our generously maintain to willing that even own Cato’s “carriedteachers theboundary of My description ismeant to leaveopen possibility the the that wise jurormight show mercy in Etenim isti ipsi mihi videntur vestri praeceptores et virtutis magistri finis officiorum paulo longius Prudentia quadam esse moderatas. interdum, si ita rectius sit,mutare, de sententia decedere aliquando; omnis virtutes mediocritate saepe aliquid opinariquod nesciat, irascinonnumquam,exorari eundem placari,et quod dixerit delictorum etdisparis poenas; esseapud hominem constantem ignoscendi locum; ipsum sapientem , cf. 63: is conspicuously absentfrom the list of the virtues that Cicero is ready to grant to Cato (cf. . For the interpretation of sentencethe see CRAIG 1986: 236. distincta genera esse delictorumetdisparis poenas Parad 79 paradox . 3,20-26),when he maintains it that abolishes all epieikeia Chapter I.3.2 that all vices that are all andwrongdoings equal(cf. 53 ) and partiality because,) andpartiality much andin as 78 Indeed, Cicero is Cicero Indeed, ). Tobe sure, the 80 Moreover, he Moreover, scelus… CEU eTD Collection speech he “played alittle to the passion, 84 punishment 83 82 might seem to suggest that insuch cases leniency is desirable. of the Academic theory =path is wise viewthe ( the byemotions disturbed nevermoved or that person Lucullus with the wiseman” ( sometimeshave weight does “favour this camp according to that bysuggesting ethics On the other hand, Cicero treatment. its appropriate certainlyflaw receive seems to misrepresent Platonic and Peripateticand suggesting that according toitsome actsofwrongdoing becan tolerated ( while others only a few. But here Cicero seems to distort the Stoic doctrine in the otherdirection, better to forhim stay that alive; (ii)some and wrongdoings transgress many aspects ofone’s duty, him, even if he is not wise, there is still hope (that he will become wise and virtuous), and therefore it is 81 late the In pacified by entreaty, he will correct his opinion (63). upon, and hisjudgementsare influencedsometimes byanger,later on,when and heis ignoscendi locum man to feel pity ( between distinction Aristotelian the abandoned vices and wrongdoings (cf. esp. inflicting Stoics among didpositgradations But actually without due punishment. the be pardoned should crime no that insistence Stoic the with beconnected may claim Cicero shows his awareness of this misrepresentation at Cf. e.g. Cf.NUSSBAUM 1995(=1993): 32.n. Here we learn that on Zeno’s doctrine (i) Plato is not in the same condition as Dionysius, since for hamart Ɲ ), first, on the ground that this is inconsistent with his view that the Old 82 SVF 135 Cicero criticises Antiochus of Ascalon for agreeing with the Stoics on they seem to have subscribed to the therapeutic conception of conception the therapeutic have to subscribed they to seem 83 philosophica Ɲ III332. mata , and correspondingly are likely to have regarded it important that each important that it have regarded arelikely to , andcorrespondingly ); or that even the wise man sometimes has only opinion to rely to opinion only has man sometimes even wise the that ); or , wrongdoings done from weakness of will with regard to some misereri sapientem aliquandogratiam valere wecan find origins tothe someAt clues of such claims. summum bonum corona ) or a resolute man to forgive ( ”. De fin 84 Part I Part . IV 56 accepted other (bodily acceptedother and external) goods 54 adik 81 De fin , cf. 21-22). Though , cf.21-22). Though they perhaps Ɲ mata . IV 74,when he admits that in his ); that it does become a good , crimes from bad character, esse hominemconstantem esse tolerabilia permotiones ), which CEU eTD Collection may have formed a part of an Academic criticism of Antiochus’ dogmatic conversion. dogmatic ofAntiochus’ criticism Academic ofan part a formed have may which Academy, Old the of epistemology the of view un-Antiochean an represents it rather, accepted”: and isadmitted Academy Sceptic the of view the where passage our in “place a such as and Scepticism, Aristotle’s theory of moral virtues as means in means the as moral virtues of theory Aristotle’s the For survivingonly which explicit theory to thisrelate doctrinewe can is 87 2003: 216ff. Tusc allow for the claims attributed to the Platonic–Aristotelian tradition in tradition Platonic–Aristotelian the to attributed claims the for allow iscouldTo besure,it seehow here still doctrinebyCicero to the presented difficult opinions (thistime hedoesnotmention as any source evidence for thisinformation). has sometimes wise person the that admit didactually Academics Old and Peripatetics 86 4. endurance of pain–; and “a letter to Tubero” ( Tubero” to letter “a and pain–; of endurance De fin Quintus Tubero at in mentioned Jerome, Crantor’s inevitabilityteaching on the and usefulness the pain of ( (and view of point Stoicising a from criticised and Peripatetics, the to attributed time addition ineliminable, natural the important cf. 22)with emotions the that are this III Crantor’s work addressed to him). addressed to ( ( “mean-state” or measure appropriate and natural wasa there that adding courage”); us for our advantagethe Old Academics actually taught that nature gave the emotions like anger and pity to (e.g.andis evilsover and above what honourable and shameful, and second, arguing that pity to stimulate clemency, anger as a “whetstone of 85 praecipit modus Cf. also Cicero to is reported followedhave work Crantor’s his in Pace . III IVsee. III and GRAVER 2002: 163;TIELEMAN 2003: 245ff.Crantorsee On also DILLON GLUCKER 38,1988: 46, n. does this not count as a reference to Carneades’ brand of . V 76) Cicero argues that, V 76)Cicero. , Ep. mediocritas De off ) to Quintus) to Tuberolearn to byheart(possibly in anepistolary treatise 60. 5. Cicero refers to a treatise by Panaetius on the endurance of pain, dedicated to Tusc . I 89. For an extensive discussion of Cicero’s treatment of the topics of emotions in De fin On Grief 85 . III 12, 71; alsoI115). cf. 12, . III The same position is presented in is fourth the The position presented same ) for all) emotions. As a proof he mentions “the Old Academic . IV 23 –notably, the quotations from Crantor at ”, which “we and advises which Panaetius haveallread”, Chapter I.3.2 pace epistola quadam, quae est adQ. Tuberonem 55 Antiochus’ Stoicising epistemology, the 86 Again, in the Again, Nicomachean Ethics Consolatio Tusc (Pliny, Lucullus . III 12 and 71 are . III12and71are onthe Tusculan Nat. Hist.Nat. praef . Among other (112-113; Cf. (112-113; dolor Pro murena (IV38-47; ) at ) ) is) also Tusc . 22; . . IV 87 . CEU eTD Collection ( 1146a2, 61149b4, 71150b8; see IRWIN 1999: 341, glossary entry ‘pardon’. 88 same sort of misrepresentation as the claim that the Platonics and Peripatetics, unlike Peripatetics, and Platonics the that claim asthe misrepresentation of sort same favour or gratitude sometimes has weight with the wise person, seems representto the view, tothe Stoic opposed view,as Platonic–Peripatetic on the ideathat the Finally, decisionrevise or madea judgement he influenceof under the anger. virtue as a mean does notseem to allow for the possibility that the wise man may later moral of conception is the leastas far concerned, theory reason; so at asAristotle’s direction of deficiency ( the right length of time”,“at theas right things,reason toward the right people,prescribes in the right way, at the right time and for–if sometimes view onAristotle’s does feelanger,butonly “mild” the Moreover, person he errs at all, he errs more inapproval. their won have thehardly would admonition verbal a even without go Murena letting of idea the punishment, of conception and deterrent a therapeutic to committed also were Peripatetics andthe Platonists haveno hadproblem with some heed giving of to them). anycase, since In the wherethey in cases Murena’scase(whereas apply to with). isconcerned in or action consists the which circumstances particular the of other or some of ignorance agent’s the to owing or endure”, would one no that and nature, human overstrain “that conditions some to owing isinvoluntary action the when as (such action of type tothat attached exemptfactors agent actionhe the the from that findsmitigating blameusually the ( things Aristotle says here thatthe person virtuous is “mild” ( eleos epieikos Cf. NE ) about certain wrongdoings, namely when on considering the circumstances of circumstances the considering on when namely certain wrongdoings, ) about III1, 1109b32,1110a24, 1111a2; IV5, 1126a3; V 9,1136a5; VI11, 1143a19-24; VII2, ), and as such is ready to pardon ( NE IV5,1125b31ff).is, That hisis controlled anger byright Part I Part 56 88 But such considerations do not seem to suggn ǀ monikos esti were relevant, the Stoics may Stoics the relevant, ), or even to feel pity praos ) and “lenient” CEU eTD Collection arguing self-respect of Roman citizens,strategy of compromisingand, not theStoic least,ethics the tradition, Platonic–Peripatetic unifiedcontrasting with of Stoic an allegedly by intimatingviews that that ithe presents will anlater offenceresurface in hislaterphilosophicalincluding works, anAntiochean-inspired uphold to the in on the other oversimplifiedhand, and tendentiously distorted so as to suit the needs of Cicero’s case. But CiceroTo conclude,shows a whatacquaintance we have here is the presentation with ideas of a philosophical and themes issue that that is will former: to use the discard nodoubt will justice, Stoics the of against go considerations Cicero’sgratitude own examplethe Stoics, ( approve of leniency. In as much as considerations of personal favour or requiting gratitude ( requiting gratitude presumably on drawing Panaetius, is thatthere says more necessary no duty than at example, For men”. wise the with weight have sometimes may “favour that idea the with problem no have may Stoics the apart conflicts such hand, other the On conflicts. such on views their with do to nothing has reason) right by measure imposed insists the right (butonly on emotions extirpation complete of demand their orthat not non-moral the does being theory forsome goods, there vehemently demand less no certainly impartialitywould Platonists the or Peripatetics the and situations such unconditional respect for the laws; the fact that they allow disregard considerations concerning past or future services or cooperation. future servicesor or past concerning disregard considerations demands that in considering whether their request is just or lawful the senatorsmorality Stoic contract), their tax of shouldrevision the (requesting Senate the to petition see INWOOD 1995b: 241ff . 90 89 Fora brief but useful overview of traditionofthe philosophical discussionof benefits andgratitude For Cicero’s possible reliance onPanaetius seehere DYCK 1996: 156ff. against Antiochus’ presentation of Academic–Peripatetic Antiochus’unified presentation Old of the referenda gratia ). Chapter I.3.2 90 Pro Murena 57 62),if publicans submitthe a De officiis I47Cicero, 89 But in But CEU eTD Collection LINTOTT 2008: 197-8. ( closely related to interest of “all the best men” ( individual; but at chosen so as to have a double meaning. At 92 62 or 61 BC. Crantor’s work, and where he refers to Panaetius’ advice to Tubero, is very close to the Murena trial: 91 combined with dignity” (Cicero’s ideal of ideal (Cicero’s dignity” with combined and continue to hisforensic activities. This could havemeant alife “leisureof (ex-consul, normally exercising greatauthority indetermining senatorial decisions), beforea major resume returning as to hisplace province, inthe a senate After his consulship Cicero couldhave spent two or three years abroad as governor of I.3.3 isinfluence atoofar-fetched (butthis perhaps conjecture). Panaetius’ may to havewhich owed turn in by Crantor, a treatise with acquaintance his owed to mean-states) of theory the (includingviews Platonic–Peripatetic raiseto possibility the of hisknowledge that a non-Antiochean interpretation of the on the doctrine of wise man sometimes has opinions, and the view that they did not agree with the Stoics the that view the hold did Academics Old and Peripatetics the that –namely, system devote hisdevote his time to beloved studies. return toonehim ofhisvillasandaffordeduse summer recesses and to springthe to pacatae tranquillaeque civitates At any rate, the dramatic date of the Pro Sestio From 62to59:disillusionment andcrisis 98, Ad fam. Pro Sestio consensus bonorum apatheia I.9.21(cf. also 98 it is described as the end of optimate politics at large, which seeks the optimus quisque . Importantly, Cicero’s remark at ) are described as being dominated by orator-politicians. dominated being as described ) are ; see also Lucullus ibid Ad fam . 23), and esp.. 23),and ); cf. also e.g. Part I Part De or 58 , in which Cicero declares that “we all have read” have “weall that declares Cicero which , in . I.9.21 and otium cumdignitate . I 30, where “pacified and tranquil societies” tranquil and “pacified where I 30, . Ad fam. De orat De or . I. 1 it denotes the conditionof an V.21.2, where . I 1-2. The slogan was carefully 91 Lucullus 92 ), which would have would which ), 135may seem honestum otium consularis See further is CEU eTD Collection It is utterly lost”. heap of heap of Dicaearchus’ piled books upathis feet(and readinghis lost ‘Constitution of 95 status. social their of irrespectively regime, where Cicero (re)defines the notion of true notion the (re)defines Cicero where in these studies.” In ( December In studies.” in these labours, legal my from me left time in the relaxation, further Iseek day Every left. he necessity for the Greek works, which I suspect, and the Latin books, which I am sure, of Greek and books Latin from his friend Paetus; heas adds, “…Ihave urgent involved, including freedmen and even the slaves. A similar strategy is pursued later in later pursued is strategy A similar slaves. the even and freedmen including involved, “orders” of the list a giving populace, Roman whole the to conception the extends Cicero where cooperation between the senators and the wealthy business classof business and wealthy the senators betweenthe cooperation (his classes” social the of “concord the In May60( Atticus. with friendship his from benefitted life intellectual Cicero’s cf. join, to refused inhe and between unofficial 60BC(which the coalition Pompey Crassus, Caesar Cicero’s disillusionmentongoing intellectual longing towards with the turn events took,philosophos especially after the formationΚ΍ΏΓΗΓΚ΋ΘνΓΑ of ( politics about care much to alternative an attractive June he is the ideaasfollowingentertaining Atticus’ “philosophising” example and of had asa forged consul insuppressing Catilinarian conspiracy. the himself in these years, a the front line of politicschose Cicero a differentfrom course: 59he tomaintain62 to attempted in his position as a 94 93 Cf. Cf. e.g. MAY Cf. 2002:9, 148,150. Ad Att. Ad Att. Ad II.18-21 (June orJuly 59), especially “Why II.21.1: write detail aboutto youstate? in the ); and some of the letters written in the second half of this period report an Ad I.17.10, I.19.6;see further Att , id quodtu et , istos consulatusfacis, non flocci facteon . I.20.7; cf. II.1.12) Cicero informs Atticus of a gift of a collection Ad Att dux . II.3.3-4). or princeps princeps civitatis imperator Ad Att optimates otium 95 Chapter I.3.3 Pro These letters are also indicative of indicative of ways the Theseletters arealso . II.2.1-2) Cicerodepictshuge himself . II.2.1-2) with a 59 Clu. togatus , which apparently ingrew proportion with concordia ordinum so as to include all supporters of the senatorial 152; (indeed, as he sometimes referred to 93 Pro ), in), order to secure and strengthen Ad Rab. Att 27, and . I.16.13: , meaning a level of In Cat. 94 But already in 61 qua re,utopinor, equites 4.14-17and 22, ; cf. 18.3: ) that he that ) Pro Sest. nos , CEU eTD Collection Cicero attained auguratethe only yearsseveral later,53 in BC. 99 windows. Forthe interpretationof the passage see KEYSER 1993. had formerly made the same remark, that greenery Cicero whom to is Cyrus, less pleasant whenviewed architect through ofCicero’s broad response the and villa, built newly Cicero’s of windows from eye. the witticism Cicero’s is provokedby Atticus’ remark about narrowness the of gardenthe whereas the Platonist theory explains vision by assuming an “effusion” of rays ( 98 account of all the Muses. But now,learnt having by experience how the pursuitsempty are Iconsidered glorious, Iplan totake attention to why do these issues preoccupy me,when Iam eager to abandon them, and to devote all my energy and That [the augurate] is the only bait with which they can lay trapa for me—what a fickle man Iam! But he says: growing isolation and the idea entertaining of histurning back onpolitics altogether, Cf. however Cf. passage provides positive evidence that Cicero had not abandoned Philonianhis position in these years. 97 In April 59 ( illi solebant, do, with viewIprefer”the ( Socraticsides giving fashion, both of question, ending,the astheSocratics however, ( his describes own actual political attitude 96 vision ( theory of andthe Platonist (Epicurean) between atomist the debate philosophical library Theophrastus’ treatise Theophrastus’ library December(II.3.4, letter 60)he Atticus bring asks him to Quintus’from his brother andProcilius. Dicaearchus between acomparison andmakes Pellene’), According to the Epicurean theory sight results from the impact of images ( For a similar passage see passage similar a For Procilius was a contemporary historian, cf. Pliny, …quo quidem uno egoab istis capi possum. Vide levitatem meam! sed quid ego haec, quae cupio Musis rationem habere cogito. nunc vero,quoniam quae putavi praeclara esse expertus sum quamessent inania,cum omnibus deponere animo ettoto omniatquecura ibid philosophie De oratore . 2). . Ad χȱΦΕνΗΎΓΙΗ΅Α ΘχΑȱ 98 Att ? This, I declare, is my intention. I only wishthat I had done it from the outset. III 80 etc. –see my discussion in 99 . II.5.2), writing in a more pessimistic mode, lamenting his lamenting mode, pessimistic more in a writing II.5.2), . (transl. P. G. Walsh) Ad Att. ̕ΝΎΕ΅Θ΍ΎЗΖȱΉϢΖȱοΎΣΘΉΕΓΑ VII.9.1-2; cf. also IX.4.3. According to GRIFFIN 1995:335this On Love of GloryOn Loveof ) 97 Κ΍ΏΓΗΓΚΉϧΑ ; and also refers, in a jocular vein, to the to vein, jocular in a refers, also ; and Part I Part 60 ЀΔϱΗΘ΅Η΍Α Nat. Hist Appendix Appendix B ? sic, inquam, in animoest;vellem? sic,inquam, abinitio, . 8. 2. 2. 4. ; in the same letter (II.3.3) he nostram , . sed tamen adextremum, ut ac ΉϢΈЏΏΝΑȱπΐΔΘЏΗΉ΍Η ΔΓΏ΍ΘΉϟ΅Α σΎΛΙΗ΍Η 96 In another In radiorum ) “in a ), ) CEU eTD Collection contemplated earlier is unclear; at any rate, Cicero refers to Dicaearchus again (“You again Dicaearchus to refers Cicero atany rate, is unclear; earlier contemplated will bemore isWhether clarified. still theenvisaged work geographical work the like a state of inferment, have must autumn”; things settled down,hiswritingwhen April ( In a further letter written from Tres Tavernae (underway to Formiae to from letter written Tavernae(underway In afurther Tres Atticus’ ears only in the manner of Theopompus “or in an even bitterer vein”. is written fromenjoys himself with his books (of which he has “a jolly good lot at Antium” (the letter Cicero’she rather utterly”) “repels soul his which (at writing of Instead monotonous. and villaexplain to hard confoundedly Hipparchus), and Serapion by there),criticised is (Erathostenes and entertainsthat he would be able tobusiness” a difficult accomplishis it certain; for writing that project: a private thework; first (II.4) he reluctantly subjectagrees (“I will try satisfyto you, but Ipromise nothing matter memoir is controversialAtticus’ write firstthe April,half hesuggestion a earlierof geographical refersto to to writing. In three letters written from Antium ( Antium from written letters three In writing. Other letters from April provide evidence for an early (and abortive) attempt to turn to with engagement I shalltechnical –but to philosophy return this issuelater). systematic a indicating of short fall by Theophrastus– treatise ethical an and works, historical/political Procilius’ and –Dicaearchus’ readings to references former his (moreover, as yetpursuits Cicerohashimself in intellectual that immersed not really it suggest seems any andto becan hardly rate, at seriously; taken theatrical outburst 102 apparently discussed aboutdifficulty the of writing geography. 101 of it”. part Nonetheless ( geographer, cf. geographer, 100 For Cicero’s plans to spend the second half of April in Formiae see Inthe same letter he first refers to his acquaintance with the Greek scholar Tyrannio, with whom he In the same latter he thanks for Atticus for having sent him a book by Serapion (presumably the Ad Att . II.12) he reports histhat material is but increasing, “everything is still in Ad Att. ibid . 3) he is eager to hear more about the political situation, so his so situation, political the morehear about heis. 3) eagerto II.6, below),between you “though me, Iscarcely and understood athousandth 100 Chapter I.3.3 ), but in but ), 61 Ad Ad Att Atticum . II.4, II.6, II.7), where he spent II.6 he II.6 expresses hisdoubt Ad Att. Ad II.8; cf. also II.13. 102 ) on the 18th the ) on 101 CEU eTD Collection 104 24, 41, 51, 77; IV 71; from my labours, but rebukes mefor not having remained inactive all this time. So, my dear Titus, I Dicaearchus, and now am turningI my attentionto the otherschool, which not merely allows me to rest contemplative Dicaearchus and my comrade Theophrastus, with yourpreferringman friend your between disagreement such is there since decided, firmly I have stand, things as But taking refuge inhis studies (without mentioning any plans):definite and from (cf. II.7.4) further thealso of politics theme develops Cicero away turning Finally,in written aletter at beginningthe of May 59( magnum quid… et multaecogitationis atqueoti attempt something great, requiring much much somethingand great,requiringleisure’?”attemptthought ( me ‘Let promise my good make to I am this of in spite “and work: serious from him with of purpose the hisspending day“philosophising” whole prevent with Cicero) neighbour in Formiae, a certain C. Arrius, who has forborne to go to Rome, expressly Cicero’s (the to Dicaearchus’ 103 ( Formiae from letter another In changesubject? the to a former to he suggestion refer Does like it”. philosophy ( hearing the scandalous newsfrom “soRome; follow my advise and letusdo Att “on the… principle of like son’”. ‘like father, of “on the… principle ΦΗΔΣΊΉΘ΅΍ ̖ϟΘΓΑȱ ΔΓΏ΍Θ΍ΎϲΑȱ ΘϲΑȱ Κ΍ΏϱΗΓΚΓΖȱ “ greetAtticus hashis inGreek: endat the Marcus son letter the of any of these men great of towhom ours his name wouldapply” certainly not are rightadmiringabout he [him]; is a splendidfellow, and afar patriot better than Cf. howeverGÖRLER 2004:162 n.7. Although Dicaearchus was famous for his geographical work (cf. work geographical his for famous was Dicaearchus Although . II.13) he relates that he was the only one in Formiae who could remain calm at Life ofGreece De Re Publica , that I shall be seen to fall in with both. I believe that I have done abundant justice to Quare, mihi crede, mihi Quare, Descentinto Trophonius Ad or the De off Att ). For Cicero’s knowledge of Dicaearchus, see further Dicaearchus, of knowledge For Cicero’s ). Three-Citydialogue . II.14) he complains that his numerous visitorsnumerous his. II.14)he (especially complains thata . II 16; . II Ad Att. Ad Κ΍ΏΓΗΓΚЗΐΉΑ ), the remark seems to allude to political/historicalhis works XIII.30, 31, 32, 33. –the latter seems to have been a major inspiration for Part I Part 62 104 ). Moreover, a couple of days later ( ). I can take my oath there is nothing is there oath my take can I ). ” –as Shackleton-Bayley suggests, Ad Ad Att. Att . II.16.3, still in Formiae) la vie active VI.2, presumably referring presumably VI.2, De leg Ύ΅Ϡȱ̍΍ΎνΕΝΑȱϳ Ad . III14; and mine Att . II.14.2: Tusc 103 ), and ), . I 21, . la vie la Ad CEU eTD Collection PLEZIA 1975 and 1983. ( speeches consular by quoted Cicero himself in from benefitted his philosophical education. Inthesecondbook of luckily poem,the in hasgreatly politics achievement indeedwhose asastatesman particular, and ofinlearning himself devotee and philosophy Greek openly asapassionate presents first Ciceroitthat is in works alsobecause these important But they period. are the in inpolitics was immersed Cicero deeply ofhow testaments then, are These works, 60. in storms gathering face ofthe launchedinthe Cicero part of literary the propaganda 59( turn of 60 to in line with his later self-characterisation in later self-characterisation hisin line with in 60 BC (cf. to write a similar work for him (cf. speaking): include hislost self-congratulatory poem on his consulship, works These sense. Theophrastean a in “contemplative” called be rightly could which intellectual of activity products kindof the his notthe and exile were consulship not result in a scholarly did this work.months ensuing in the muses” The the “with time works some spend he did if even But Cicero memorial on his consulship in Greek106 ( never to have abandoned. to have never I ought which pursuits the to return last at now and fame, fair of studies the to myself devote must 105 On the title and content of the poem see further COURTNEY 1993: 156ff. Cicero also wrote a 106 nunc prorsus hocquoniam statuiut, tanta controversiaDicaearcho, est familiari tuo, cum et eounde discedere non oportuit aliquando revertamur. reprehendit nonsemper quia quierim.re incumbamus, qua o nosterTite,adillapraeclara studia, fecisse; respicio nunc adhancfamiliam quae mihi non modo utrequiescam permittit sed Theophrasto,amico meo, utilletuus ΘϲΑȱΌΉΝΕ΋Θ΍ΎϱΑ Ad Ad Att. Att Q. Fr , utrique amemosgestus esse videatur. putoenim meDicaearcho adfatim satis . II.3.4), and his essay-letter to his brother Quintus written at the at written Quintus brother his to essay-letter his and II.3.4), . 105 II.1.3). For auseful account of the letter to Quintus and . I.1), when the latter was propraetor in Asia. Both texts were texts Both Asia. in propraetor was latter the when I.1), . (P. G. Walsh transl.) De divinatione Ad Att. Ad Ad Att. Ad ΘϲΑȱΔΕ΅ΎΘ΍ΎϲΑȱΆϟΓΑ Chapter I.3.3 II.1.1; Nepos, II.1.1; I.19.6, 63 I 17-22 (Fr. 2), Cicerodescribes I17-22(Fr.2), himself Ad Att. Ad De Re Publica De Re did Vit II.1.1), andapparently Atticuspersuaded . compose in the period between inthe compose period Att. longe omnibus anteponat, hic autem 18, 6).He also published 12 his I7-8 (the Muse Uraniais Consulatus suus Consulatus suus , written see CEU eTD Collection the acquisition of learning, virtue and culture. and virtue of learning, acquisition the supreme power vested in commonwealthone as a whole had suchgoodwho fortune; at any rate yourfrom province surely ithas today, with boyhood haswisdom given the greaterand powerpart energiesof his cantime andbring energy tohappy,towelfare eitheracquiring when wise and learned mento came to communities.rule themThe great Plato, aprinceor whenamong thinkers and scholars,those believedlearning who that commonwealths ruled would only be devoted all their Perhaps and instructors.wisdom.there was our of eyes the before learned wehave what exhibit to a wish we must Thatpointprecepts, their by schooled inis timeto say,whenowe a special dutyour heto this people, to be thought well laidwe may overTherefore, ofGreece. and teachings and above literature the usin to down ourhanded been commondown good faith which is duethat to all mankind; indolencethis and frivolity: everything I have attained I owe to those studies and disciplinescombination which have … I say it without of shame, especiallyletters of advice to rulers, he says: as my life and record leaves no opening for my suspicion of modifications) 108 Quod patriaestudiis vacat, id nobisquesacrasti. Tu tamen anxiferas curas requiete relaxans, Te patria in media virtutum mole locavit. E quibus ereptum primo iam a flore iuventae Fuderunt claras fecundi pectoris artis. Inque Academia umbrifera nitidoque Lyceo Otia qui studiis laeti tenuere decoris, 107 Again, at your country you have devoted to these pursuits and to us. to and pursuits these to devoted have you country your by up taken not is that time the relaxation, in worries stressful your relieving Nevertheless, exercised. things in the first brilliantflower of your theories youth,piety] profoundly their wisein reflections, andin shady Academe ordazzling Lyceum poured outin fromthe midst their of Thosea fertile who joyfullyburdensome occupied their leisure with noble studies understood these duties [i.e. the duties of genius. place whereYour manlycountry virtues set areyou, who had been snatched from these in virtute atque humanitate percipienda plurimum apueritia studi fuisset et temporis. quidem profecto isti provinciae contigit,ut in is easummam potestatem haberet cui doctrina, in cui saluti censuitcivitatibus esseposse. quod fortasse aliquando nostrae, universaereipublicae nunc studium doctrinain etsapientia collocarent. hanc coniunctionem videlicetpotestatis etsapientiae putavit si aut docti ac sapientes homines eas regere coepissent aut ii qui regerent omne suum quorum praeceptis sumus eruditi, apud eos ipsos quod ab iis didicerimus velimus expromere. fidem quae omnibus debetur, praeterea nos isti hominum generi praecipue deberevidemur ut, esse adeptos quae sint nobisGraeciae monumentis disciplinisque tradita.qua re praeter communem residerepotest inertiaeaut levitatis ulla suspicio,nos ea quae consecuti simus studiis iis et artibus Haecadeo penitus cura videre sagaci, non enim me hoc iam dicere menon enim hoc pudebit, praesertim vita inea rebusgestis atque non iis inquibus Atque illeAtque quidem princeps ingeni etdoctrinae Plato tum denique fore beatas respublicas Ad Quintum Fratrem I.1.28-9, writing inamannerimitating the genre of Part I Part 64 108 (transl. R. Shackleton-Bayley –with minor 107 (transl. D.Wardle) (transl. CEU eTD Collection aliquando universae rei publicae nostrae opposed to political career) is basically ispoliticalmisleading. to basically opposed career) as self-fulfillment intellectual (as Atticus to in letters the presented idea isoften ( leisure” requiringand much great, thought “something literary writing launching career and a Atticus Cicerothat suggest was seriously they actually contemplating the ideaof composition in put togetherwith57-50; by evidence the letters presented the to of period great first inhis self-presentation Cicero’s prefigure closely passages These makes clear at clear makes that hadalreadyI.2) Rome,reached could and have been turnedagainst a campaign,him inas he In fact, at the time of writing Cicero was well aware of the scandals of Quintus’ governorship (cf. Ad Q.Fr Att . II.14.2). In what follows, however, I shall argue that the way this . I.1.43.As Shackleton-Bailey ( ’ is a reference to Cicero’s own consulship. own Cicero’s to areference ’ is Chapter I.3.3 65 ad loc .) has pointed out, the clause out,.) haspointed the ‘ quod fortasse Q.Fr. CEU eTD Collection pursuits, and the collection does not cover the next years. next the cover not does collection the and pursuits, from 62 BC ( 109 financial manager, confidential informant and counsellor (not to mention his active his mention to (not counsellor and informant confidential manager, financial (cf. environment political competitive and ruthlessly calculating in a gift rare –a friend intimate most his he remained career political Cicero’s Let us pause here and consider what we can actually make of the I. 4 himself emphasises at emphasises himself To be sure, Atticus was a companion for wehavescepticism. reason some however, examination, of Cicero’s in (cf.characterisations his works e.g. from theirself- later his to, support lend and with, youthline in are self-revelations these (and, as Cicero him then, on Atfirstsight, to take meantthis point. seriously Atticus isapparently throughout he is consistent about presenting himself as by nature a man of letters; and withdrawto from active politics andhimselfdevote tohis cherished studies. But in otiumvenerimus (I.7: retires he eventually honour, ageand appropriate the having reached when, passage hesimply in pleasure takes of prospect the himself enjoying in hislibrary his in topolitics: shiftswritten attitude 67BC.Cicero gradually in about earliest the letters, in surviving from earliest life,is correspondence the political the recurrent otium Atticus. to letters Cicero’s from is above collected Ihave bulk evidence of sections.the Thegreat two last Theearliest letters in the collectionof Cicero’s letters to his friends ( , especially as a response to the frustrations and disillusionments sufferedin The pictureemerging:Ciceroathismost “pragmatic” Ad fam. V.1, 2, 5, 6, 7); but these reveal nothing about Cicero’s intellectual interests and ); in (II.16.3, lastthe passage quoted 59May)he seems determined Brutus 109 As we have seen, the theme of wishing for intellectual for wishing of theme the seen, have Aswe 307, awitness ofhis youthful education); throughout Part I Part 66 De Re P. Re De I 7, De or Epistulae ad familiares data De amic . I 2). On closer surveyed in the surveyed . 64)–;his ) date ) cum CEU eTD Collection matter or would not please the addressee. the please not would or matter letters: Cicero can switch this mode off onceat whenever thinks he that it would fitnot the subject especially Varro, Quintus Cicero and his secretary Tiro; but it is absent from a great many of other was unconscious”. Asimilarstrategy is apparent inCicero’s letters to other highly educated associates, inappropriate to describe code-switching of type this as‘unmarked’,as something or of which Cicero (as and has beenstressed repeatedly here) as agame playedAtticus.with It wouldbe obviously contemplate switching into Greek, itisjustifiable to treat his code-switching as contrived and artificial, exile, at the high point of the Civil War, orshortly afterthe deathof Tullia] he seemed unable to dimension toCicero’s code-switching. Since at a time of crisis [viz. shortly and before during Cicero’s (ADAMS 2003:308ff). AsAdams( 112 approaches Atticus is often emphasised by Cicero himself, cf. e.g. Cicero so often professes in his letters to him (cf. esp. him (cf. to in hisletters professes so often Cicero Atticus certainly fondness forlearning exhibitdid kindof the Greek unqualified that his longing for intellectual sometimes rhetorically expressionsoverstated) ofhis fondness for Greeklearning and First, we should self.of his at revelation true face asunguarded value, letters these take into etc. worries, account the personalities andcontemporary hispolitical events, ambitions, activities, plans, possible roleapparently candourabouthis uninhibited domestic reflections affairs, onleading that Cicero’sintended recurrent for literary activity). Cicero’s role in encouraging publication; (and in them Cicero writes with an easy informality and an 111 110 interests” ( interests” him between and namely his “their correspondent”, background shared and cultural 13ff): a complex stylistic strategy devised “to convey the existence of a special bond version of what Jon historians,Hall has recentlyand regular and poets and Latin Greek of frequentevocations banters, occasional philosophical switchestermed from“affiliative Latin to with Cicero’s together Greek, expressions, these that argue reasonably may Atticus. One politeness”are constitutive (HALLof a particular 2009: Hall refers to J. N. Adams’ examination of “code-switching into Greek” in Cicero’s letters Cicero’s in Greek” into of “code-switching examination Adams’ N. J. to refers Hall The tone of lettershis to other Cf. Shackleton-Bailey’s descriptionof their relationship, SHACKLETON-BAILEY 1965: esp. 12. ibid 111 .). Nevertheless it would be too naïve to take whatever Cicero says in naïve whateverbe Cicero to it Nevertheless would too take 112 otium intimi ibid mayhave in played fostering hisfriendship with . 342-3) points out,“there was clearly a psychological Chapter I.4 is palpably less intimate; the candour with which he 67 110 Cicero’s letters to him not to letters were Cicero’s Ad Ad Att Att . I.18.1; VIII.14.2. . XII.6.2:“knowledge is CEU eTD Collection comfortable. From Cicero’s frequent assurances that he finds Atticus’ choice of frequent thatassurances life From choiceof comfortable. hefindsAtticus’ Cicero’s entirely was them of neither which with relationship their to obstacle an presented This difference career. anactive political avoiding both in their the greatestextentlifeof possiblein to publicdoctrines keepingout career and of school’s Gardenheto the the wasfaithful Roman many adherents unlike other professed outlook on life seems to have the Epicurean Phaedrus as his tutor, cf.his Epicureanthe tutor, Phaedrus as (cf. himself in upona ‘Hellenic’lifestyle –heeven himselftook ‘Atticus’ nickname the time in Rome, hesold hisholdingsin Italy and moved to Athens, where heimmersed lines). In85BC, fear presumably of out of politicalthe went atthe that upheavals on with this orientation (actually, it was more in line with typical with in line more was it (actually, orientation this with in line more life surface, acourseof was, atleaston the chose Atticus that outlook with Q. Mucius Scaevola, cf. him byAtticus).sent to law (including theirshared education Butdespite studying Att by commenting book Atticus cf. onascholarly which Tyranniopraises; also e.g. discussionbelow. Welch(WELCH article1996); her sheds new onCicero’slight Atticus’ relationship and –see my biography, that Atticus was apolitically inactive optimate, has recently beenchallenged by KathrynE. Cicero’s letters to Atticus (SHACKLETON-BAILEY 1965: 3ff). view, The ultimately basedonNepos’ relationship with Cicero in the introductionof the first volume of his translationand commentary of politics see PERLWITZ 1992;see to also Shackleton-Bailey’s attitude analysis his and of Atticus’ person andhis businessman equestrian an as career of Atticus’ account modern extensive an For 115 114 tastes and experiences; but attitudes, this does not tendencies, meanby his that it was less influenced thancertainly heartfelt. was adherence of choice Atticus’ guess. mere a is assumptionsuch that Atticus “light-hearted”had a attitude towards philosophy GRIFFIN(cf. 1989:12) Hellenic he had to have a philosophy Epicureanismand suited him betterthan any other”; but the have Epicureanism]professed… [his partly befashion to andpartlyin because as adevotee of things 113 your desire, the only food of of your only food mind” desire, the The main sources 1989. FOWLER e.g. see for politics to attitude Epicurean Atticus’ Onthe life are Cicero’s letters to him and a biography by Cornelius Nepos. According to Shackleton-Bailey (SHACKLETON-BAILEY 1965: 8) Atticus “may be supposed to . II.4.1, where Cicerohas problems with digesting by ageographic book Serapio De fin . V 2). From his early youth he identified himself as an Epicurean (he had as himself an Epicurean . V2).Fromhisyouth he identified early De legibus 115 Part I Part 68 De fin scireenimvis,quounoanimus I 13), similar social status and political . ibid ., De leg . I 21-2, 53-4) . I equestrian 114 –that is, alitur – 113 career , and , Ad CEU eTD Collection you to honourable ease ( ease honourable to you contrasted with that a books”,which utilitarian quite manifests towards be correspondence attitude can of Atticus as emergingin we meet“thethe Cicero has that argued Damon article Cynthia In a recent from the same letters: Ciceroscrutiny of these passages does to some“reads extent confirm our worries. to mea closer that it to seems And life. intellectual Cicero’s into glance more direct which represent actual intellectual exchange between twomen the and thus providea interests,sharpen ourfocus in whichshould on passages thethose correspondence his intellectual overstates or he overemphasises possible that psychologically ornaments(after all, associate to glad be he would his Atticus wasbelieves he whom with person ready intellectual of kind “Academia”,to spend huge amountsOf course, of money it does to buildnot necessarily andor furnish strategy.followto with that buyCicero is merelyextremea encomia of worldthe andbooks of learning fitjust aswell within such a pretendingvaluable to be the book collection). But it is his alleged indolence, alleged his me to seekfor distinction, led while of ambition another A touch perfectly career. a laudable of choice motiveour ( except me, youand between difference any was there from the words brotherhis Quintus allegedly used about Atticus, writes: “I have neverthought that activities, esp. cf. business Atticus disregards tactfully Cicero case which (in life of choice Atticus’ the into politics from withdraw to intends he that avowals occasional his context this In learning. pains topersuade Atticus of his fondness ownenduring for Greekculture and himself for hisabstention from life. public justify need to constant Atticus’ of haveglimpse an can we agreeable perfectly example (mentioned also by Welch) is 116 pointing out that Atticus was not the only Cf. WELCH 1996: 451 and Cf.WELCH n.9, and 1996: 451 vita contemplativa Vit. Att. Vit. Ad ad honestum otium Att 15.4. . I.16.13: pace Ad Att. Ad SHACKLETON-BAILEY 1965:5(who inis certainly right ).” Cf. also Nepos’ discussion of charges against Atticus for may be understood as indirect compliments to Κ΍ΏΓΗΓΚ΋ΘνΓΑ eques Chapter I.4 I.17, where Cicero, taking pains to disentangle himself todisentangle pains taking Cicero, where I.17, 69 116 who preferred to keep outof offices). best The On the other hand, Cicero visibly takes , id quodtufacis minime reprehendenda ratio ); but his less his but ); ) led ) CEU eTD Collection understandable who thatCicero, was contemplating the possibility makingof his constituent of its intellectual-moral basis (cf. e.g. (cf. basis intellectual-moral its of constituent important an as also but activity, political from arelaxation as merely not presented is inlearningfrom general, have cited them and passageswhich the philosophy, I in works: later in Cicero’s prominent become will that but Atticus, to letters earlier motif from is of the a emergence absent the that witness wecanfirst period preceding in the written works in propagandistic the that notice again once totake is important It commitments. and views political own his conveying work for a source model and asa Dicaearchus useof possible the regarding considerations at patriotism praise of Dicaearchus’ –on which he will actually draw some years later in later writing years draw some actually which hewill –on Only Dicaearchus’ historical and political work raises his interest (cf. hisinterest raises work political and historical Only Dicaearchus’ (presumably as ofinspirationa source and a literary model for theplanned work). that he has problems with digesting the book by Serapion that Atticus had sent to him write geography write (cf. esp. should he that suggestion Atticus’ about unenthusiastic is clearly Quintus, brother his to an epistle his of and consulship, account encomiastic speeches, an his consular includingof a selection of publication the literary campaign launchedpropaganda a whoCicero, by timethis his wasstruggling for sinking political position, and had ideathe of writing inApril 59. by Cicero’s AtticusBut evenmore on examples with areprovidedexchange obvious a scholarlyabout by AtticusTyranniohim.work that hasreadand recommended to from 46 BC ( letter late a Damon, according is, rather clearly out comes difference this cases when write, or to connect with contemporaries, orboth” (DAMON 2008: 176-7). One of the Ad Att . XII.6.2), in which Cicero is “polite but clearly unenthusiastic” Ad Att . II.4 and 6). Indeed, at Ad Part I Part 70 Atticum De orat II.12.4 may ahintgive his of Ad . I 1-2, Atticum De RePublica De ReP II.4.1 he II.4.1confesses Ad Att . I 7-8). It is . II.2.1-2) ; and his ; and CEU eTD Collection current interest in (namely a philosophical work Theophrastus’ II.3.1-3, II.9.2, II.16.3), and only one of these, ( arguments or doctrines works, particular philosophical to references wefind afew works only his historical/political Dicaearchus and references to sense (i.e. exclusively 13,14and II.12, itnarrow is whetherspeaks Cicero in 16)philosophy unclear of the comprising logic, physics and ethics). In fact, apart from the Cicero’s historical readings, see e.g. LINTOTT 2008: 298-300. habere atque omnicura geography.or loosely, as synonymsintellectual for activity in general,including e.g.reading history and “philosophising” (first at and (first “philosophising” “philosophy” of specifically speaks Cicero when Even letters. in these emerge topics Before turning to this,itis noting also seldomworth how properly philosophical eye. the meets than 59 of spring in the exchange of series entirely to studies and May)hishimself April;from II.5.2, retire intent II.7.4, to of and devote politics writing? I think he was not, and there is more to the whole this Was point. he misguided byCicero’s professions in letters( preceding friend at his behelpful to failure to Atticus’ apparent is is What rather odd writings. andimpressed wasmore by displayed by civicthe virtues andpromoted Dicaearchus’ intellectual side apartof his little foundfantasy inpublic persona, writing geography, Peripatetics (including Dicaearchus); cf. e.g. cf. Dicaearchus); (including Peripatetics 117 This usage was certainly encouraged by the range of subjects covered by Aristotle and the other the and by Aristotle covered ofsubjects by range the encouraged certainly was usage This (cf. Ad 117 Att This is obviously the case at Κ΍ΏΓΗΓΚΉϧΑ . II.4.2, cf. also e.g. is taken to be equivalent with Ad Att De fin Ad fam. Chapter I.4 . I.16.13), he tends to use these terms rather terms use these to he tends I.16.13), . 71 . IV3-7, V9-12; I.9.23), and in other cases (as in Ad Ad Atticum Atticum Acad II.5.2, where omnibus musis rationem II.3.4, does indicate a . I19-33; On Love of Glory On Loveof De div De Ad Att toto animo . II3-4.For . II.1.8, Ad Ad ); the ); Att Att . . CEU eTD Collection only only is omen defence of one’s ownnative land”.The curious thing aboutthis avowal commovet assureshis have friend,still hold astrong onhim ( “fame andthepraises men” of good maintainto towhich course the from he youth, hasaspired increaseearly and his to him. cites lines from He his poem hisown on in consulship, which urgeshim Urania 119 Stoics. in the condemns reference to the kind of high-minded but unrealistic philosophical approachto politics that he also political philosophy forits abstraction and impracticality; the allusion to his utopianRepublic is a of glory” ( is peaceful involvesit age).Butthe“full “some firstold alternative, though struggle”, with Caesar and Pompey,it decision (for would havewonpopularity among the cementfriendshipplebs, his and reconcile him with his enemies, thus allowing him a ( support the bill ( (iii)villas, else, countryside to or of into one his and retire indifferent remain (ii) or to in theSenate, bill Caesar’s ( letter in As hemakes the clear Atticus. ongoing agrarian reforms –or rather, as I shall argue, in rationalising or defending it to hopedfrom some sort of in itsupport Caesar’s on his towards deliberating attitude he intellectual: than rather practical was book in Theophrastus’ interest Cicero’s Even in the case of criticism of Cato’s attitude to politics in Politeia 118 learning (though as we (though learning shall see, fourreferencesother may simply well represent hisandAtticus’ shared philosophical ibid At hos retine atque auge famam laudesque bonorum. quosque adeo consul virtuteanimoquepetisti, interea cursus, quos prima a parte iuventae . 4), the last of these three possibilities would have been the most expedient most the been have would possibilities three these of last the 4), . Ad Att . He alludes to events that postdate the Murena affair, but his remark clearly to has do with his ), and ), bindhim credotakenfrom the to the sed plena laudis . II.1.8 Cicero complains that Cato often speaks and acts as if he would live in Plato’s Ad Atticum ), and Cicero insists that this weighs more heavily with Ad Att II.3.4, however, the context seems to suggest that seems to context the however, II.3.4, Pro Murena 119 . II.9.2 and II.16.3 may be related to II.3.4). . These “aristocratically written” lines, Cicero written” “aristocratically . These Part I Part 72 ibid . In . . 3), he had three options: (i) to oppose De RePublica ibid Iliad sed me . 3). As he further explains . 3).Ashe ( Il . XII 243): “the best, the best, “the 243): XII . Cicero will criticise Plato’s Ύ΅Θ΅ΎΏΉϠΗ mea illa 118 CEU eTD Collection that our real aim in seeking honour is virtue (cf. virtue is honour seeking in aim real our that person’s actual merit, and therefore its single-mindedhonoured the on than it pursuit give who is onthose to be more avoided;depends it rather,worth, weof one’s should realisejudgement people’s argument in that work did rely onAristotle’s doctrine that since glory orhonour ( back to Theophrastus’ apparently theupsand downsmeaning of publicpopularity and opinion. is that Assuming he harking Theophrastus”, from and experience from both learned “I have things the to refers he turn in date) by experience how empty those Ionceare things thought glorious ( 122 in Quintus’ hisbrother library,his idea consult was to book the probably not ablind knew Cicero a copy that was available treatise the fact that from of mind. Judging the his changed eventually he arguments Theophrastus’ of influence the under and book, into Theophrastus’ but he then looked Atticus letter, promise inthe to as heseems to itwouldNow naïvebe too Cicero tothink that was about tooppose agrarian law,the be treatise canhardly acoincidence. particular this to allusion the so, did actually never he that likeliness the and glory, of name billthe into attack inthe letter willingness the apparent between Cicero’s discrepancy and futile (or at any rate he was widely perceived to have done so). the active and the contemplative life is conveyed in conveyed is life contemplative the and active the between relation of the conception “Aristotelian” Antiochus’ commentaries). the (with S20 L91, L79, 1993: 385ff. Foroursources onTheophrastus’attitude to glory see FORTENBAUGH 1984:L31, L69, virtue was not sufficient for happiness; cf. Cicero, cf. happiness; for sufficient not was virtue conjecture that in that conjecture his Cicero’s former reactions to Flavius’ bill, the bid of the Asiatic contemplative life ( contemplative Laertius:messagein his last viewof to pupils byDiogenes alleged Theophrastus’ (preserved DL V 40-41) letter clearlythe Although itself has work survived, special gains the significance. not andAgainst this backgroundfor his Theophrastus’ request Cicero’sissue. the of out kept and option, second the chose he eventually references bill;itthe seems against that spoke actually Cicero evidence that we havenois that to him as an advocate of the 120 121 Pompey’s eastern settlement in 61-60 would have made it difficult for him to oppose Caesar’s bill. As we have seen in the previous section, at section, previous the in seen we have As Cf.LINTOTT 2008: 166 168;and cf.also Similarly, Theophrastus was widely taken to have argued in his Ad On LoveGlory of On Love of Glory On Loveof Att . II.16.3, cf. , itseems reasonable to conjecture that Theophrastus’ Ad Att. Chapter I.4 Ad Att Theophrastus spoke against ambition as vain NE De fin 73 I 5, 1095b23-31). De fin . II.5.2. (April 59)hesays he has now that “learned II.16, on which see below. As Lintott emphasises, De fin 122 . V 11) it seems to be a reasonable . V 11 and 57. . V 85, publicani Peri philotimias On Happiness Tusc praeclara . V 24-5; see further ANNAS see . V24-5; further (tax collectors) in 61 and in collectors) (tax 120 )”; at II.9.2 (the same and 121 tim In view of the Callisthenes at the end of end the at Ɲ ) reflects other ) reflects that CEU eTD Collection ought never ought Theophrastus’ view). tohaveabandoned(on himself ( work ( judgementjustice hehas Dicaearchus already abundant done former byhisto public his on since and both; with in fall be to must policy his life, contemplative the practical life, friendthe andhisown ( ( “intimate” Atticus’ between controversy firmly decided( ( direction hisof hisis now finalandreasoning self-justification, word on issue the inposition ismore last whatpossible was ahint explicit: to the December only his time this by –only intervene to reluctance same the express to in order theme Cicero agrarianhas law same supplement tothe tothe recourse passedinJanuary), writingina letter reply by to Atticus on Caesar’s allotmentof Campanianthe land (a This interpretation is further supported by the fact that four or five months later, which he totake. eventually decided actually contemplating the second course of action –that is withdrawal into is –that of withdrawal action secondcourse the contemplating actually Compitalia feastof meetingupcoming atthe for their Atticus probably asawarningserved to would bring him glory was more a probably than harmless that action of course the to his commitment to himself reminding after right work for this particular request Cicero’s wecan that premise.knew its at Thus leastsee or had isAtticusreadTheophrastus’ hadtreatise, before. too it equallylikely that It read guess. He knew more of work itsthe than itis meretitle; indeed, notunlikely he that Ad Att puto enim me Dicaearcho adfatim satisfecisse adfatim puto enimmeDicaearcho . II.16.3,April May or in59, quoted previousthe section).By this time, he has incumbamus that the case was far from being closed, and indeed that Cicero was Cicero andindeed that closed, being from casewasfar the that prorsus hocstatui ) “into those noble studies” ( ) that, seeing that there is such an endless an such is there that seeing that, ) amico meo Part I Part 74 familiari tuo ) Theophrastus, who gives priority to priority gives who Theophrastus, ) ad illapraeclara studia ) Dicaearchus, who approves who Dicaearchus, ) ), now he is about to throw post scriptum ) which he note. It note. otium –, CEU eTD Collection present ironically heisthat “sluggish” getting so thathewould rather hislifein spend his meant to carry much weight. isitnever –andperhaps weightless Thus hisrationalisation was rather “philosophical” In a previous letter ( inand toseek prestige favour.order their and disloyalty hisof alleged he supporters: is not any more willing to risk his security what he claims. Sohis reluctance is due more tohis exasperation about the selfishness is –or this Caesar and Pompey oppose way findsome heto energy, would certainly to himself rouse to he really Were others. and Lucullus, Hortensius, friends optimate Atticus’ is, –that ‘good’” called are who men those of “ungratefulness the with more they have to do with his fear from the alarming presence of Caesar’s armies, but even reasons forparticipating not nothing have dowith to philosophical considerations: inAgain, Cicero lineshas (II.16.2) previous the made clearin that actual the case his would actually dofail justiceany to to of twothe opposing positions. such equilibrium that object mightreasonably one moreover, political the arena; into withdraw returntime give from up contemplation either into to to or practice order But this position does not by itself But this indeciding not providerational position guidance does we can dois to try to reach an equilibrium of contemplation and action in our lives. best the is decide view correct, in to which position the in wearenot and are balance, histhroughout may life:Cicero argue seem sinceto that the arguments onboth side evidencefurnish indirect view for the thatCicero maintained hisAcademic scepticism philosophicalwhich issue to heAt isappealing. firstglance, the passage mayseem to the towards attitude of Cicero’s thefrivolity notice of but take One cannot II.1.6-7, II.9.1. 123 ForCicero’s disappointment about optimate his supporters see esp. otium underin despotism than participating any is brightstruggle, however Chapter I.4 123 75 Ad Att . II.14.1,April he59) says Ad Att. Ad I.18.6-7; I.19.6; I.20.2-3; when it is CEU eTD Collection the one hand, he naturally raised the interest of various members of Roman the of members ofvarious interest the raised he naturally onehand, the a pointwhere, on to wealth inherited increased his and financier, a successful became In Athens Atticus –following a career path that was typical for wealthy equestrians– as his other self shares the responsibility of downfall.his 125 disillusionment and retirement is not to be takenentirely seriously. paragraph (II.5.3) he nonetheless asks Atticus to write to him more about political news; so his passage Cicero admits stillthat he finds winning the augurship an attractive perspective,and inthe next illustration an is doctrine orTheophrastus’ a source however, here, Even of Theophrastus. confirmation from and experience” “from rather than the basis of his judgement.“sluggishness” isdisillusionment Moreover, overthe vanity and unreliability inof theglory, which he formerhas learned both 124 natura anybody neverthelessnot owe did anything ( who as politician”, Atticus “a born knew betterwhenhe characterised Cicero is false, and biography, on Nepos’ based ultimately this viewofAtticus’ character, seriously.self” too “other his as Atticus of praises later Cicero’s is taking this But inactive. politically was views, optimate Cicero’s mostly sharing though men becauseAtticus, two the between Atticussuch lifelongexist only friendship could that to letters often assume the from unfolds that relationship the of candour and intimacy exceptional the stress who time. Those atthe relationship Atticus’ and Cicero’s backandre-consider step a take haveto see this wewill to order In significance. any practical special without mean, Cicero’s is This doesnot use of a philosophical here however, that theme to gethimself involved. reluctance his expressing of way is another it theme; same the on variation rhetorical another but represents Dicaearchus and between Theophrastus debate unending to the tabescimus malim ( success of prospect the Cf. To be sure, at Ad Att. Ad ΔΓΏ΍Θ΍ΎϱΗ III.15, which hewrote from exile, begging Atticus forhelp, and intimating that Atticus Ad Att , πΑΘΙΕ΅ΑΑΉϧΗΌ΅΍ 125 tamen nullam habes propriam servitutem . II.5.2 and 9.2 he suggests in a less playful manner that the cause of his Kathryn E. Welch (WELCH 1996) has forcefully argued that 124 ego autem usque eo sum enervatusuthocotioquonunc ego autemusqueeo quam cumoptimaspedimicare quam Part I Part 76 Ad Att . IV.6.1: ...... ). nam tuquidem,etsi es ). The reference CEU eTD Collection presumably meaning Hortensius, Lucullus and other senatorial associates ofAtticus– meaning presumably associates Lucullus Hortensius, and senatorial other see Atticus as not just the mediator universally acknowledged, as well as his good word to important powerand brokersdocumented well in is Rome.importance Inall, it is Atticus' where to East, the in investment to access and market money debates anddecisions was constant protectionof theirown financial affairs in anincreasingly unstable viewmind; that the‘pay-off’in whichsenators received fortheirsupport ofhiminvarious crucial this with developed was senators, particularly friends, of network whose world; uncertain an in increase politics not from any ideological point of view but because he has a financial empirein to protect interested is who and financier, the of Atticus character the address to problem: the of essence the is This formulates it, key understanding him. of facets certain As with to Cicero’s Welch correspondence political the But thishow bankers approachalsoprovides situations. to about react think to and Republic late inthe money of manager influential an as Atticus treat learn to have to Empire,we to Republic from transition the into us give can character Atticus’ininsight uniqueWelch, toappreciatethe that According with to them.order political élite, and, on the other hand, he could not but take interest in being influential those written between Cicero’s consulship and exile. and consulship Cicero’s between written those of the letters as manifest and large-scale as in the collection of the letters to Atticus, and particularly in maximize the political opportunities inherent to republicangovernment.” Nowhere else is this function style….Cicero's letters articulate a style shallI label the republicanstyle, which is the style designed to … This question reveals the object of Cicero's letters, which is the articulationof a particular political choosing his allies to concluding his next speech– in orderto be the public figure he wishes to become? is, how is heto comport himself –inall of decisions,his from selecting his place of residence to through his artistic engagement withall his interlocutor. composure, Hisinternal question,an gain also then,and is What is Cicero identity, public to be? ofhis That substance the create may he so that responses readers' his awaits eagerly and plans, and complaints, fears, thoughts, ofhis others to writes described146-7) has function:and this tells “As usagain he hewrites again, to compose himself. He soundingwith boards for political his deliberations and rhetoric. Robert Hariman (HARIMAN 1989: 126 winhelping to hisover “noblefriends”(Atticus’) ( Atticus to come home to Rome as soon as possible and do him the greatest service by for the consulship candidature Cicero’s in thesuccess of part animportant have played to Atticus seems in 64 BC. In a brief letter and politically as wellas emotionally, with long reaching consequences. (WELCH 1996: 452-3) from thoughts the summer of 65 Cicero asks One of the main functions of Cicero’s extensive correspondence was no doubt that it provided him 126 , but as an active manipulatorwith his owninterests to whom Cicero was tied, financially par excellence Chapter I.4 77 , which soundingwas, he board for and Cicero's tuos familiaris,nobilishomines ) – CEU eTD Collection exasperation about the unreliability of Hortensius and other “good men”. Pompey with ties closer establishing from promises vanity Cicero’s as wellbymaking unwarranted of prospects the policy.this particular, In his best hedid–by fosteringplaying on and evenindeed course when disappointed, worried,became about latter increasingly the 61-60 clearlyhe showthatpains took toensure thathis friendfaithful tothis remain of the and guardian creator stanceas political new Cicero’s of formation the in role active an played have to seems Atticus is, That of of 63 ( capacity, Capitol in asleaderof whocordoned the loyal lastequestrians the the days in a public inhislife, time last firstand for the far as he as year; appearing, went 133 132 speeches). consular of oppositionthe agrarian to and debtreforms, well in hisdocumented surviving 131 130 Dio Cassius’ (37.25.3-4) account to of refers Atticus’ activity.and scenes”; the behind doing been have must he what to compared iceberg of the tip the only 129 128 127 WELCH 1996: 457; 460-61, 463. II.1.6-7.ForAtticus’ attitude to Cicero’ policy 63 seeafter SHACKLETON-BAILEY 1965:14ff; transformation from mitigated from a transformation which leadwas to toamarkedin shift Cicero’s political position (i.e. his conservatives senatorial influential and the Cicero between alliance the of formation documented in sources– our probably served asan importantmediator in the cf. I.1.2). gossip, ( Cicero’s a current consulship oppose to according who, would ForCicero’s disillusionment about his optimate friends see esp. Cf. esp. Cf. Cf. WELCH 1996: 460-1; 463. Cf. SCHACKLETON-BAILEY 1965:14; WELCH 1996: 462-3. AsWelch points out, “this was Cf.e.g. SHACKLETON-BAILEY 1965:11-12; WELCH 1996: 457-8,463. For thebackground see e.g. LINTOTT 2008: 4-5, 129ff.WELCH 1996: 457. Ad Att. Ad Ad Att. 127 Att I.16.11; I.17.10; I.19.3, 6; I.20.2-3; II.1.4. Atticus come did home somemonths later, and –thoughthis is not . II.1.7; cf. II.19.4). II.1.6. 128 Atticus was strongly supportive throughout Cicero’s consular 129 popularis Part I Part 78 into a defender of the of a defender into 131 concordantia ordinum or Caesar or Ad Att. 132 130 , and to calm down his – to discourage Cicero – to I.18.6-7; I.19.6; I.20.2-3; status quo ; and the letters of letters ; andthe Ad Att 133 andleader Indoing . I 2.2; . I CEU eTD Collection diminished. in Cicero’s forming the fornew manoeuvringspace power-centre, dramatically Cicero’sforexpected his support bill, agrarian virtually and himmembershipoffered obstruction again (cf. himtojoin of presumably forces encouraged the changed. Atticus considerably optimates ( optimates risks he hadtotake,so as justifyto his manoeuvring between Pompey and the the emphasised and friends, optimate Atticus’ of behaviour the about disillusionment opposed Flavianthe bill, in Atticusto though his report he expressedhis Yet Cicero toAtticus wasindebted andhis inassociates; March so 60 he obediently charges included Atticus’ lack of loyalty to Cicero. 136 (WELCH 1996: 461). his ownpersonal security by cultivating Theophanes of Mytilene, Pompey’s chief advisorat the time Atticus refused to allow friendhis the optionof developing association his with Pompey, he ensured 1996: 458ff.argues Welch charge that the wasfrom far being groundless. Itis a signal fact thatwhile esse voluisti …eam partem epistulae tuaeper quam teacmorestuos mihi purgatosacprobatos of “putting and straight” “clearing” himself and hischaracterin Cicero’s eyes ( done thisfor favourhim: tohis thanks in unpleasantremarks, Atticus nowstood need couldnot openly express hisAtticus, doubtsabout his brother Quintus probablyhad manipulated. His Atticus letter to in late61( being was he that semi-aware least at been have to likely is in turn Cicero interests. Cicero’s to attentive was he nor particularly disinterested; but so hewas everything catastrophe; cf. catastrophe; Atticus performed less wellcouldthan have beenexpected, thus contributed and to his personal 135 134 On this event see e.g. LINTOTT 2008: 161-62. Later,during exile andhis shortly afterwards, he repeatedly thathinted in capacity his as advisor Cf. SHACKLETON-BAILEY 1965: 14; WELCH 1996: esp. 461; together withPERLWIZ 58. 134 Ad Att ), and Cicero’s tactful and generous answer ( Ad Att. . I.19.4ff). III.15.4; IV.1.1; see furtherSHACKLETON-BAILEY 1965:20ff and WELCH Ad Att 136 . II.1.6; 15.4); but with Caesar as consul elect, who But by the end of the year the political situation had Chapter I.4 79 Att . I.17) shows that even though he though even that shows I.17) . 135 ibid . 5ff) suggests that the ibid . 7: CEU eTD Collection was so conspicuously negligent of write him of inadvising was soconspicuously negligent actual concerns Cicero’s to exchange himandAtticus between Atticus Iam see wecan propounding, readily why the of interpretation Andon the year. previous helaunched the had that propaganda asa vehicleliterature newways readingfurthering and contemplating using of the for something. As far as we know, he did not write anything; canat see from bestthe letters of 59 April, he he did retirespent histo countryside villassome as if writeto time his eyes on the tranquil life of study and writing (cf. also now claimshave to tired become struggling of for political have influence, and to set injustice” ( injustice” politicalhisleaders interests “our and in tooppose Cicero encouraging remarks politikos rolesthe have been intoagreatreversed: Atticushas fanturned andof a Dicaearchus, opinor, of of muchcaring unfavourable too about political events ( first expressed his tofollowwillingness instead Atticus’exampleand “philosophise” The development of the latter argument canup ambition. be traced back to 61 June, whenhonestum otium Cicero ease”( “honourable chose who assomeone because alsobut him), becauseis (it heand deserted alleged hasnot whohave hispartners principles –partly blameAtticushim cannot forhaving hisformerly political deserted adopted stance doingnot (that whatexpediency would is,supporting dictate Caesar’sbill), that and wants Atticus understand best the to that hecanexpect from him in this is situation Atticum in appealtoTheophrastus his repeated seethat wecan background Against this II.3and 16forms partof Cicero developeda gradually strategy. evasive Κ΍ΏΓΗΓΚ΋ΘνΓΑ ( Ad ibid Att .: ) for himself Atticus is not in the position to reproach him for giving isti nostri isti . II.12.4, 59 April) –these are probably allusions to his probably ongoing. II.12.4, 59April) to are allusions –these , idquodtufacis ΦΈ΍Ύ΅ϟ΅ΕΛΓ΍ Part I Part ; a pun on Dicaearchus’ name)– while Cicero while name)– Dicaearchus’ on ; apun ; 18.3: cf. 80 nos philosophos Ad Ad Att Att . II.5.2). Indeed, as we . I.16.13: ). In the meantime the In ). Ad Att qua re,ut . I.17.5: Ad CEU eTD Collection correspondence is further corroborated by Cicero’s by tendentious and manipulative Cicero’s isfurthercorroborated correspondence the from emerging picture the Again, Atticus). with controversy subtext mostly ina his shield as use Theophrastus to he seems seen, as wehave (rather, doubt reason heto isthat led by intellectual-moral nourishment a genuine needfor expresses hisintentlook intoan to haveby ethical we seem Theophrastus treatise to literature that suits tothe proper; contrary,historical he andpoliticalprefers literature (the kind of best his propagandistic particularly henot fond of read, isof philosophy whenheworks to 60). Even turns concerns), and manipulate him), todevelopor hisin publicpersona (in his propagandistic literary the only case when friendship Atticus with asin he(or, case the exchangethe of inthespring of 59, to in Heuses pragmatically oriented. learningbackground foster hishisGreek to De off. inclusa habebametneobsolescerent renovabamcumlicebatlegendo in the introduction to his edition of Cicero’s G. Walsh’s P. claimssuch strong ase.g. lend to not support does between 67and59 Atticus to letters by Cicero’s furnished evidence the that effect the to I haveargued Cicero’s professed intent to retire into study seriously. geography, evensending and Cicero adry pretending geographical book, that hetook excuse forcooperating, not buthe avenged himself by advising him write to lessbut straightforward acceptCicero’s reluctantly not than geography. Hecould reading when he could, to stop them from stop themfrom he getting( reading could,rusty when to while he was at the helm of effectthat tothe claims more moderate somewhat own Cicero’s confirm do they the sate he renewed his philosophical “philosophythat his from daysearliest had focus been the of intellectual his life”. Nor interests through II 3-4). Actually, the Cicero emerging from the letters seems to be much more Chapter I.4 *** 81 De natura deorumDe natura Acad (WALSH xvii),1997: . I 11: . I ; cf. animo haec ND I6-7, CEU eTD Collection fully persuade by the sceptical view of his attitude to learning thatIhave to andbooks viewhisby of attitude fully persuade sceptical the letourselves not do and temptation, pessimistic this if weresist even are today. But eraasthey in the Republican in life for public success elements which wereascrucial auctoritas shape, establish andmaintain his public (evaluated persona in terms of his to concern in with, accordance by, calculated and motivated aspotentially letters) writing says andor philosophical rhetorical in or his (whether works) works speeches, virtuallyinterprethe everythingfact, themore this does(including to that wetend of aware are we more the and through-and-through; politician a was realise, to have ideals, howeverstrongly and earnestly he may strive to internalise them or to identify with them.would not rule out the psychological possibility eventhat a Republicanstatesman may fall modern short ofand his Roman ancient political between ethos (I tend ofcontrast to thinkkind that it this stronglyof idealises plausibility the Romanthe practice),about butdoubts evenif it serious wouldhave hold, it virtue epitomises Alasdair McIntyre’s theory of social obligations in one is essentially how one is thought of by others.” Hence Cicero’s striving for imitating republican external to the individual –as a commodity that canbe manipulated– in Cicero reputation means that simultaneouslyhe because is articulatingculture a strong political sense ofcontemporary in shame. Whereas counterpart today no has reputation letters the is understood in we observe as that reputation laterjustify self-presentation. fully Cicero’s biographical evidence to Atticusletters afirmseem written constitute the to between67and59donot to and problematic; is any event life at of Cicero’s realities and the persona this between relationship the But fictitious. is completely persona this that follow automatically first emerges in propagandisticthe workswritten in it60. Of course, does not statesman philosophical the Cicero its basis. of) (a part than rather activity political alternative to or figures inas acontrast general, intellectuality philosophy, and in notice, between letters Finally, again, 67 andthe once take also weshould 59 that increasingly characteristic of modern electoral politics” ( politics” electoral ofmodern characteristic increasingly reputation asanembodiment of republicanethos withthe “cynical obsessionwith image-making 137 Murena in ethics andStoic Academic–Peripatetic between of contrast the presentation Robert Hariman(HARIMAN 1989)warns usagainst conflating Cicero’s obsessioncraftingwith his , as part of his rhetorical strategy to undermine Cato’s , status etc.), to position himself and to facilitate political connections – Part I Part 82 ibid . 157):“the constant chattering about After Virtue auctoritas . I have to tell that I 137 Cicero, as we . dignitas Pro , CEU eTD Collection character. evenletters into Atticus, self the of the true many-facedmercurial lead and our presentedit above, should certainly us with confront limitationsthe of discerning, Chapter I.4 83 CEU eTD Collection originally employed as tutor Tyrannio of Quintus’and his sons, cf. (cf. greatest 140 library ( consultin 54,he Tyrannio was to on fillingupof the his Quintus’ brother Greek considerable satisfaction (IV.8.2: “the house seems to have acquired a soul”). Cicero’s to Antium, in library his Atticus) by sent slaves library of assistance the inTyrannio’s services (with rearranging refers Cicero to andalso IV.5) IV.4a 8; cf. BARNES 1997: 17ff (with further references) and BONNER 1977: 28ff. practically silenced is his sorrow.” great such endure to beable to 139 strong sufficiently is teaching philosophical see esp. interest; Caesar’s and Pompeius’ in eloquence usehis to pressured is Cicero and excluded, is silence 56 onwards showmanifesto, for the last time,not of his political credoonly –see further e.g. KASTER 2006. His lettershis from May awareness that he has lost his freedom( of speech;Cicero’s deep depressionand despair. As writesevenhe to brotherQuintushis from Thessalonica inJune 59 the option2008: Ch. XII; KASTER 2006: 6-7. The letters writtenoffrom exile to Atticus otherand intimates show needed him to neutralise Cicero whileKASTER 2006: 6-7); but iswidely it he thatCaesarsurmised broughtwas Clodius into play because he abroad in Gaul; cf. e.g. FANTHAM 2004: 7, LINTOTT138 hiswriteAtticus promise former to “something In letters to great”. June of 56 ( fulfil to leisure abundant him afforded impotence political frustrating his However, following of real influence. conference Lucca (May56)he the remainedwithout for half-decade the and triumvirs, thethe reunion of heprecipitated law virtually land in AprilSenate onCaesar’sCampanian re-opening debate the early 56 about of in the motion miscalculated his By politician. leading a as standing former his restore a trial withoutdeath to in consul he 63December haduncoveredas Catilinarian conspirators the putting for Pulcher, Clodius tribune hostile the of instigation the at exile into sent inhe was early 58 BC activities werehalted when alike private Cicero’s public and I.5 Q. Fr Q. The library in Antium was probably not Cicero’s only library, although it may have been the Cf. e.g. LINTOTT 2008: Ch. XIII. One of the last speeches Cicero delivered before he was he before delivered Cicero speeches last ofthe One XIII. Ch. 2008: LINTOTT e.g. Cf. The background of the sham surrounding Clodius’ election to tribune remains unclear (cf. e.g. (cf. unclear remains tribune to election Clodius’ surrounding sham the of background The 138 . I.3.5: “…I cannot continue in my present existence, forneither practical wisdom nor Ad Att. After the exile: Cicero the writerwork Cicerothe at theexile: After Q. Fr ; and although eighteen months later he was recalled, he was not able fully to fully able not he was recalled, he was later months eighteen although ; and Ad Att. IV.5, discussed by FANTHAM 2004:9ff. Cf. also . II.4.5 –as . II.4.5 he remarks,heshouldhappy if be Quintus’ wishes would be II.6.1). In II.6.1). Pro Sestio De fin . III 10 Cato calls Cicero “the owner of so many volumes”. He (February 56); Cicero famously usedoccasion the to make a Part I Part 84 Ad Ad fam. Q. Fr. Q. I.8.3,II.9.21; II.4.2.For Tyrannio,see Ad Att. Ad 140 Ad Later, IV.18. 139 Att . CEU eTD Collection there (especially fromgive him tohis inaccess library because he wantsRome, to use passagesfrom books works of Varro) to “those I have in hand, which I hope will spring andsummer workingit. on latter is “almost aminor Thucydides”). In May 54 ( on the Greek historians Callisthenes and completionSiculus of ( studia referam litterarumstudia referam return In a letter written early in 55 Lentulusto Spinther he already speaks of his intention to the the letter see LINTOTT 2008: 215ff. latter found some excuse to refuse writing work,the andCicero eventually to writehad ithimself (on historianLucceius to compose a monograph on his consulship exile and restoration; but apparently the adds thephilosophical tag“ andsee of Dionysius IV.15.1), manumission 11,14;onthe Dionysiusalso IV.8a, (cf. freedman, “extraordinary” the learned ofAtticus’ with assistance the literature” the lost poem see HARRISON 1990. In a letter from 55 ( In the next letter in the manuscript sequence ( sequence in manuscript letter the In next the berather in that ofniche yours under Aristotle’s statue than intheir curule chair… the state of the commonwealth, the more support and recreationdo I find inliterature, and I would …upon my word the more I am deprived of other enjoyments and pleasures on account of my age and adds, Atticum carried out, especially as they are useful to him as well; cf. also III.5.6). At completionof the reports he time same the at youth; his since done have they as others, than delight greater that he is now withdrawing from oratory “returningand to the gentlerMuses”, which now give him 143 142 Amaltheum. famous his in perhaps villa, Atticus’ in alcove adecorated to refers Cicero 141 Cf. FANTHAM 2004: 13. Cf. also OnCicero’s relationship withM. Pomponius Dionysius see BONNER 1977:30-31. imagine Aristotelis sedere quam in istorum sella curuli…. propter rempublicam, sic litteris sustentor etrecreor maloque illa tua in sedeculaquam habessub sed meherculeaceterisoblectationibus deseror etvoluptatum , as the political situation allows, toliterary activity ( IV.10.1 (April 55) he is“feasting on” Faustus Sulla’s library in Cumae; he as De oratore De oratore , together with a poem in three books on his career, ); and ); : apparently, Cicero stayed away from Rome the whole the Rome from away stayed Cicero apparently, : ΓЁΈξΑȱ·ΏΙΎϾΘΉΕΓΑȱύȱΔΣΑΘ Ad Atticum Ad fam. 143 In February he54 gives his Quintusopinion to Chapter I.5 I.9.23 (to L. Spinther, October54), where stresseshe 85 IV.13, written in November 55, shows the shows 55, in November written IV.13, Ad fam. Ad Ad Q. Fr Q. Att Att V. 12) Cicero invites the amateur the invites Cicero 12) V. ' . II.12.3; on his opinion the . IV.14.1) he asksAtticus to . IV.11) he “isdevouring ΉϢΈνΑ΅΍ Ad fam. De temporibus suis ”. I.8.3: 142 141 ad nostra me . On . Ad CEU eTD Collection turning it into a dialogue with himself as the main character and his brother Quintus brother his and character main the as himself with a dialogue into it turning in shouldbe speaking BC on thatCicero grounds the friend (not calledSallustius historian)the him criticised for setting the dialogue in 129 cf. works, his exoteric work, whichnine-book (as forhadhave would eachbook Aristotle apreface in did 51. with AtticusCicero’s correspondence 54 andCilicia between his to in departure May The rest of the history of the composition of you. with philosophy into delve can I perdition. to be consigned can politicians these me, with are yourself heights from which Ihave fallen, but of the depths fromwhich Ihave risen. So long as my brother and my delight in oratory. My house and my country estates give me pleasure. I remind myself, not of the most accords with nature, that is, to literature and to my studies. The labour of pleading I mitigate by Many things bring me consolations without my forsaking my prestige. I turn back to the life which Republic: same year books ( hehasfinished two the wideness and difficulty of the topic would require, by October or November of the October ( October mentions his mentions certainly begun begun writing certainly Cf. also 145 and November and V.3.3, May 53. 144 myself as and my of well”. of Cicero instruction Dionysiusandcome exhort” toassoon as “that he maycontinuepossible the houses, and aboveour all two boys, furnish my enjoyments”. In 54 ( July hearty approval”. your meet with Dionysius probably could come the not before year,next cf. 19.2, and written IV.18.5 Octoberin mecum et tesi habebo, per meisti pedibus trahantur; vobis domus rurame et nostradelectant. non recordor unde ceciderimsedunde surrexerim. fratrem etstudiaad eammerefero, nostra. ad litteras dicendi laborem delectationeoratoria consolor. multa mihi dantmulta mihi solacia,nectamenegodemeostatu demigro, quaequevitamaxime adnaturam est 145 Ad Quintum (P. G. Walsh transl. –with minor modification) Q. Fr Att . III.9.2.: “Literature and my favourite studies, along with the retirement of my country . IV.18.2), describinghis feelings whatabout heconsiders lossthe of the politika III.5.1-2 shows, however, that Cicero’s original plan was to write a ), and although he complains that he has not got the leisure that leisure the got not he has that he complains although and ), De Re Publica De Ad Att . IV.16) instead of alternate books, and that when a when that and books, alternate of instead . IV.16) (cf. Q. Fr Q. Part I Part 86 Q. Fr Q. Ad De RePublica . III.5.1-2). As he writes to Atticus in Att 144 . II.13.1-2, written II.13.1-2, written in. May,where he By July 54 ( . IV.15.10) he asks Atticus to “beg πΐΚ΍ΏΓΗΓΚϛΗ΅΍ propria personapropria is by obscured a gapin Ad possum Att , he considered , . IV.16) he has he . IV.16) . CEU eTD Collection Notably, Cicero knew about esoteric works by Aristotle, and reports to have looked into them –not in Tyrannio and Aristotle suggests that Tyrannio did not get into Sulla’s library until afterCicero’s death. 1997: 17ff.Barnes (ibid. As 18) rightly out,Cicero’s points silence aboutconnection any between 148 also “services to theMuses”. Forfurther indications of Tiro’s involvement inCicero’s intellectual life cf. have been in a veryin progressbad shape as “myowing poor studies,to Tiro’s or rather illness, ours” ( and urges him to recover so he can renew his and secretary Marcus Tullius Tiro: in a letterto him inMay 53 ( 147 11). dictatorship he may foundimpossiblehave itinany update to meaningful fashion(DYCK 2004:10- of Caesar’s establishment the and war civil ofthe hiatus the after hand, other on the ensued; prevented from finishing the work by his unexpected posting to Cilicia, and the tumultuous times that as interlocutor. As of thesurvivingas interlocutor. parts 146 works). esoteric Aristotle’s known for having worked on Sulla’s library,where he reportedly came upon he frequently consult could various is technical questions on (Tyrannioalso well close with includingcontact Greek scholars,eminent Tyrannio Dionysius, and whom De finibus librarythese inwe can mentionedadd the younger in Lucullus’ Tusculum,certainly To libraries. Sulla’s younger the and Quintus’ Atticus’, libraries, own his above and for study research. and resource sufficient than more and leisure of plenty had and life, intellectual his resurrect As inwe cansee, seriously this periodat last Cicero took his former to own avowals 51). Publica finish had he after immediately or simultaneously write to same timeadd a he decided to contemporary which he pendant, most probably began at the that surmise to plausible seems it and books; in six but setting, original the to legibus Cf. Strabo Plutarch,13.1.54, Cicero’s literary pursuits in this period also benefitted from the assistance of his young freedman young ofhis assistance the from benefitted also period this in pursuits literary Cicero’s On the dating of the composition of Ad Att. Ad 146 , which he apparently never, whichhefinishedlearn (as apparently from we was already in circulation at Cicero’s departure for Cilicia in the spring of VII.5; III 7-10 (the dramatic date of the dialogue is 52 BC). Moreover, he was in Ad fam. Ad XVI.17, 18, 21, 22, 23. 148 Sulla 26; see Jonathanfurther Barnes’ seminal discussion, BARNES 147 He had access to several libraries, including, Hehad libraries, over accesstoseveral De legibus Chapter I.5 De RePublica litterulae meae sive nostrae 87 see DYCK 2004: 5ff. Cicero may have been Ad fam. show, he eventually returned eventually he show, De RePublica XVI.10) he refers to the works Ad fam. ); he complains that they that complains he ); VIII.1.4, . This is This . De Re De CEU eTD Collection himself on the sophisticated Aristotelianismcongratulate seems In Book IICiceroto in is order. even heresome caution Yet of the rhetorical theory presented in that dissensit audierat Platonem,magnoopere quiuna nihilabAristotele, Polemo etCrantor, Platonis etXenocrates,sororis audierat,filius quiPlatonem etquiXenocratem 62), butcertainlyPhilo’s also to andAntiochus’ teaching (67: III Cynics, the and Antipater of successors the are Stoics the idea that the –cf. esp. contemporary literature “On sects” and “Successions” ( “Successions” sects” and “On literature contemporary general knowledge of philosophical the tradition, which probably somethingowed to cultural cultural firsthistory he at beginning the presented of version Greek the of sophisticated onwards –amore from “rupture” Socrates their 139-40) of III originalthe wisdom eloquenceandunity of developmentof of the and Phaedrus classic Platonic texts which frequently surfaced in those surfacedclassicindebates texts whichfrequently (the those Platonic 82–93,(cf. I45–47, III56-73). esp. philosophers whichflamed up in secondhalfthe of the second century BC in Athens and rhetoricians between debate disciplinary the of keen shows awareness Cicero 151 150 Sulla’s library, butin the library of Lucullus the Younger( in philosophical So reading. exceptsubjects, philosophy) 149 1997: 48-9. from learn aswe (who, Varro and Siculus) Diodorus period? In the did books friendsBut what andkind hisscholarly in read discuss of with Cicero this letters we hear mostly of Greek Historians (such as Callisthenes, For adiscussionof Cicero’s history see FANTHAM 2004:248ff. Cf. e.g. WISSE 2002: 361ff, 375ff; FANTHAM 2004: 53, 58. At Ad fam. Ad ). ). Moreover, his). quasi-historical(III 56ff; account 42-43, 49,55, cf. I also 151 I.9.23 Cicero mentions Aristotle’s populardialogues as his literary models. De oratore 149 ; but the works themselves do testify to Cicero’s 150 Unsurprisingly,he is also acquainted with the Part I Part , the first fruit of this cycle of composition, 88 De fin Academica Peri hairese . III 7, 10; cf.V 12);cf. BARNES De inventione De I 3, wrote on many ǀ nam Speusippus n Gorgias and – displays his Diadochai and the and CEU eTD Collection sources in this cycle Cicero’s of question tothe relating considerations and the difficulties with all engage of composition. Rather,Here Icannot suggest. seem to or hesuggest may as andcomprehensive as thorough I would like to focus atany learning, philosophical his of point career asaphilosophical may be not writer, on the question Cicero’s serveunconvincinga warningthat should comparison this of as result or negative The treatment. actual compare Cicero’s to with which Greek source the original in dopossess for thiswe case sources; hisindirect Greek allusionsto De oratore ( Aristotle’s iswork approximate andprobablyindirect, from deriving a handbook conclusion that despite heCicero’s finds implicit pretension Nevertheless 1999:50-53). end(BARNES the of at dayBarnes the hastoadmitthat no his knowledgetext of the contentor ofargument which firmly refutes the “orthodox” pessimistic time, and that Cicero most probably refers to this work at convincingly that our three-volume our that convincingly the dissemination of Aristotle’s texts in Rome Jonathan Barnes has argued know itfrom our as we theory Aristotle’s with rhetorical acquaintance actually adirectshows work further 160, hisout systems the (II Antonius of predecessors isspeaking; cf. expoundedhis own views on the art [of rhetoric]”, as well as the book in which he set in developinghadhe it read andabsorbed in books “the which… [Aristotle] LONG 1995: esp. 55ff. book (the book view Cicerothat knew the 152 ibid FANTHAM 2004: 161ff presents a more optimistic view. For recent versions of the “orthodox” . 53-4). De inv technologia provides an important test-case for the reliability of for apparent theCicero’s of test-case reliability animportant provides 152 . II6; Rhetoric Ad fam. referred to at Rhetoric remains a controversial question. In his seminal article on I.9.23 and only from handbooks seee.g.FORTENBAUGH 1989: 43-6 and Rhetoric Ad Chapter I.5 Orat Att 89 . IV.16.3);indeed,suggest heseems that to . 114). But whether and towhat extenthis had been available in or before Cicero’s before in or available been had De oratore ibid . 152;see II160 CEU eTD Collection that the virtues are “equal and on ( a par” andon are “equal virtues the that from premisethe Mnesarchus) started (attributed to rhetoricians, which againstthe Crassus harks back toAntonius’ former (dismissive) report (I83) of a Stoic argument and nature”, which is accommodated to the general safety and well-being, through the through safety and well-being, general tothe is which accommodated andnature”, world “thefrom whole value: functional and aesthetic of convergence the about point digression in whichCicero(177-80) Stoic adopts apparently ideas inhis underlining man. speakingis well, supposedtobe avirtue, real eloquence is an of attribute wisethe haberet omnes haberet ( them of all possesses virtue one possesses who one the therefore (cf. isactually one wise no Stoics the to according etc. andslaves, madmen all wrongdoing is equal, that only the thiswise passagetoo reveals Cicero’s knowledge Stoicthe notorious of “paradoxes” that man is free, that all who are not wiseand principled political (oratorical) activity in theRoman Republic. Like are underpinning view vaguely tothe hehas that at advanced dialogue) at 3 andFANTHAM 2004: 247-8. speaking well. interpretation The of pointCrassus’ atIII55is controversial; cf.and WISSE e.g.392- 2002: ofthinking excellence combined the is wisdom reality in because wisdom, true from inseparable 38, 154 raise he will objection the foreshadows quoniam omnino irasci nesciunt anger” when he says 153 in Cato levelled against criticism further develops the that At in displayed and assumed ethics Stoic of and the knowledge understanding adumbrate far works how these For Cicero’s knowledge of the Stoic doctrine of the inter-entailment of the virtues see also Cf.who DYCK1996:225, suggests Crassus that “hadof poked abit gentle funat the Stoicof view De oratore Tusc 154 . IV 30-31. Crassus –that is Cicero– is aware that theStoic positionoffers aphilosophical Finally,in the of IIIwediscussion inbook findrhythm prose interesting an De finibus III 65-6 Cicero makes Crassus present against the Stoics anargument Stoics makes against the 65-6 Ciceropresent Crassus III Stoicos autem,Stoicos quosminime improbo, dimitto tamen iratos nec eos vereor, IV 21-22: that Stoicism cannot form the basis of a successful ), and concluded that, since scienceof asthe and eloquence, that, ), concluded De finibus 153 (De orat (De ; but here Cicero adds the further information information that thefurther adds ; buthere Cicero . II 65). and surrounding the works. in Part I Part 90 propria personapropria esse inter seesse inter aequalesetpares De oratore Tusc . V 4). In the same passage (that is, as character in the III 55: that real III55: eloquence is qui unamvirtutem Pro Murena Pro Murena Acad ), and ), and . II . , CEU eTD Collection indications of Cicero’s strong sympathy with Academic scepticism. oratore, valdeabhorreat ( forming” whom we are is“certainly Stoicthat muchthat thought with widely inconsistentorator contains the characterises Cicero’s later dialogues such as such dialogues later Cicero’s characterises 156 There is more to Cicero’s criticism of Stoic ethics at ethics of Stoic Cicero’s criticism is more to There ‘On gods’: Plutarch, structure prefigures the didactic use of the Academic method of method Academic the of use didactic the prefigures structure further my discussionin Chapter levelled against the Stoics, so Cicero’s knowledge of it may go back to his limitations relationshipthe with with us Philo. See of human confronting so reason. This is presumablyponens), modus oneof of the stock validity objections the and that the Academics traditionally ofbivalence principle the as (such achievements previous own its even undermine which and solve cannot it which paradox) liar the cf. indeed,createsthatobstacle it an by updiscoveringending various difficultiesas (suchthe valid andinvalid inferences, without teaching us how to distinguish trueand false premises; and, that from a practical point of view it isof limited use because it teaches us how to discriminate between at large (cf. his brief account of Antiochus’ cosmology and theology at may have thought they that OldAcademicrepresent the –Peripatetic tradition –Stoic may have absorbed such ideasfrom Antiochus as well,his and owing to teaching he Cicero know, we all for all: at source aStoic from derive not may it indeed, them; III, presented inbook though doubtless Stoicis inspirit, explicitly not to attributed authors. these any of with a close acquaintance in these passages requires us to assume that around the time of writing Cicero fostered 160; Babylon:Mnesarchus:155, 157, 83; Panaetius: II I45,75,III78),nothing I46, although mentionsCicero four Stoics byname (Chrysippus: I50; Diogenes of day; inCicero’s Stoics the about werecommonplaces allpresumably But these non casu ( chance than rather design by functional perfectly all are organs and limbs whose geocentric and system cosmos itsthe of orderly living tothe revolutions, beings 155 As GörlerWoldemar(GÖRLER argued,1995: 98-101)has At Luc De oratore . 86-7, 118-121, 126-27; . 86-7, ), everything), demonstrates in that nature beauty and utility handingo hand. II 157-9 we find the same criticism levelled against Stoic dialectic as at Lucullus ). First, the Stoics claim allthat who are not wise are “slaves, Sed nimirum est in his, quodabhoc,queminstruimus Sed nimirumestinhis, III.1.3 28.8). De fin . 156 Chapter I.5 . IV11noteAntiochus awork alsothat wrote De finibus 91 155 and The teleological view of nature viewof The teleological De oratore De oratore De naturadeorum utramque partedicere is also important because its III 65-6. III , andabounds in Acad Crassus says Crassus . I 24-29; sorites Luc which . 91ff: . arte, and CEU eTD Collection because they were not members of the civic society proper. Soto proper. society civic members the of not were they because from of they audiencewere excluded political the of activity: oratory as such, public than madmen. Slaves, lunatics and outlaws were completely excluded from the sphere body law-abiding citizens men,any body implicitly thatthe speaker of regards of members presupposed the that rather thanAthens), Ancient in as well (as Rome criminals Ancient In overtone. or slaves, reasonablemoral have a to seem may of criticism the part first the But practice. oratorical persons rather usage” ( common to inapplicable completely theory] is, Stoic the it[that renders that approach to make afigurein ( eloquence quite independently of whether they are true, if we follow them, we will never be able … et videnturStoicis bonaetmala[etc.] et ceteriscivibusvelpotius gentibus are so remote from those of their countrymen, and indeed of the rest of the world ( notions of good and bad, the power of honour andignominy, reward and punishment, pragmatic slant, pointing out the pointingpragmatic out slant, As it the argument stands, hasanambiguous Itssecondcharacter. halfclearly hasa Parad videatur hominum committere, cuinemo illorum,quiadsint,sanus,nemocivis, nemoliberesse free” ( to someone who believes any men or an body of assembly,entrust [orexpose] asenate, is to absurd “itutterly none of thoseBut wise. actually is no one that maintain present also they yet madmen”; enemies, robbers, to be sane, to be a citizen or to be returns repeatedly throughout his throughout returns repeatedly abhorrens abauribus vulgi,obscurum,ieiunum inane, . 2; valde autemestabsurdum ei contionem autsenatumullum coetum ). Then, after a remark that the Stoics’ oratorical style is style oratorical Stoics’ the that aremark Then, after ). ac tameneius modi,quouti ad vulgus nullomodo possit Brut . 94, 113ff, 114; . 94, nullam umquamremdicendoexpedire possimus De fin inexpediency oeuvre . III3,IV heitits 6, 7)–is continues:“yet Part I Part 92 (cf. ofStoicism as the basis of successful De orat De . I 43, 50, 83, 159; 43, 50, II . I addressing –a point to which Cicero exile, inusitatum, exile, ); for the Stoics’ an assembly, or think that our that ). ), that, Stoic. alia CEU eTD Collection 159 the impracticality and of inconsistency the Stoic internal approachthe both to commonemphasises affairs. it that in reasoning Cicero’s resembles conclusion The mot reported by Cicero at byCicero reported mot light In from the of bon-context. a Greekphilosophical were actually the transposed view, of point optimate) (and Roman a specifically from levelled Stoicism, against His aversions later). was touse too (whichPlutarch tradition an existing he on drew the inventor of the criticism he raises against the Stoics in Stoics the against heraises criticism of the inventor the was not Cicero likely itmakes that passages between the two This striking similarity of activity. needs practical aswell as forthe and affairs, public for Stoic the social were good that doctrines areunsuited admitting things,life thereby 158 in should public addressingthe wiseperson the speak At1034B Plutarch also blames Chrysippus for teaching inhis treatise senseless. and defective were all these that claim they –while laws were Solon or Lycurgus by Cleisthenes, created things the and generals, were vote by elected those judges, and senators were lottery by elected those cities, were politics with meddle Forthey hold offices, adjudicate, advise, legislate, reward and punish asif the habitats whichin they blames theStoics whoparticipated in forpolitics contradicting their own doctrines: objection objection we find in Plutarch’s Importantly, on this interpretation Cicero’s argument seems closely akin to the forincompatible Roman with lawrespect andinstitutions. iswould berespectable citizens, Stoic inherently act: an is faith disingenuous outright ifthey as them address to yet and outlaws, and lunatics slaves, of consists audience Cicero’s diverse accounts of the composition of Roman society see society of Roman composition ofthe accounts diverse Cicero’s LINTOTT–RAWSON 1992:493, 534-5;MORSTEIN-MARX–ROSENSTEIN 2006: 308-9, 314ff; for 157 cf. also ΦΑΣΕΐΓΗΘ΅ȱΎ΅ϠȱΘ΅ϧΖȱΔΕΣΒΉΗ΍Α Ύ΅Ϡȱ̎ΙΎΓϾΕ·ΓΙȱΎ΅Ϡȱ̕ϱΏΝΑΓΖ ЗȱΏ΅·Λ΅ΑϱΑΘΝΑ ΘЗΑȱ Θ΍ΐЗΗ΍Α Ύ΅Ϡȱ·ΤΕȱΩΕΛΓΙΗ΍ȱΎ΅ϠȱΈ΍ΎΣΊΓΙΗ΍ȱΎ΅ϠȱΗΙΐΆΓΙΏΉϾΓΙΗ΍ȱΎ΅ϠȱΑΓΐΓΌΉΘΓІΗ΍ȱΎ΅ϠȱΎΓΏΣΊΓΙΗ΍ȱΎ΅Ϡ ΓΖ ϱΓΖ ЁЗȱΦΉϱΓΖ Ϩ΅ȱΎϠ ΔΏΘϾΓΖ ΅ȱΘȱΈ·΅΅ ΅Ζ ΛΕΉϟ΅΍Ζ Θ΅ϧΖȱ Έϱ·ΐ΅Θ΅ȱ ΘΤȱ Ύ΅Ϡȱ ΦΔΓΏ΍ΘΉϾΘΓΙΖȱ Ύ΅Ϡȱ ΉϨΑ΅΍ȱ ΦΑΉΒϱΈΓΙΖȱ ΅ЁΘЗΑȱ Ώϱ·ΓΙΖȱ ΘΓϿΖȱ , De fin Ζ ΔϱΏΉΝΑ БΖȱ . IV21-22; , Θ΅΋ЗȱΈȱΘΑ ΛΉ΍ΕΓΘΓΑΓΙΐνΑΝΑ ΘЗΑȱ Έξȱ ΗΘΕ΅Θ΋·ЗΑȱ µ ΑΓΗΑπȱϩȱΔΓΏ΍ΘΉϾΓΑΘ΅΍ ξΑȱΓЁΗЗΑȱπΑȱ΅ϩΖȱ Parad Lucullus , ΓЃΖȱΚ΅ϾΏΓΙΖȱΎ΅ϠȱΦΑΓφΘΓΙΖȱ·Ή·ΓΑνΑ΅΍ȱΏν·ΓΙΗ΍Α . . De Stoicorum Repugnantiis praef .; for the legal and social status of slaves see CROOK– 137(whichbut hewas in Clitomachus, read Chapter I.5 158 93 , ΓΏΙЗȱΈȱΎϠ ΍΅ΘΑ ΦΉϠ Έ΍Ύ΅ΗΘЗΑȱ Ύ΅Ϡȱ Έξȱ ΆΓΙΏΉΙΘЗΑȱ ibid as if 157 , ϱΝȱΈȱΘΑ ̍ΏΉ΍ΗΌνΑΓΙΖ ΘЗΑȱ Έξȱ ΑϱΐΝΑȱ De oratore . 300ff. 1033E-F. HerePlutarch wealth, fame and health 159 On Oratory and elsewhere: and . that CEU eTD Collection FREDE 1989: 77ff. For the various theories on the sources for sources on the theories various the For 77ff. 1989: FREDE 163 philosophy see BARNES 1989: 63, n. 50. seems insufficient evidence; fora critical assessment of Dillon’s approachto reconstructing Antiochus’ the doctrines of the Old Academy and Zeno’s agreement with it” (cf. my discussion below). But this on the onthe grounds that 162 161 utmost importance that the philosopher’s way of life be in accordance with his principles. is inconsistent. But Plutarchbegan the whole treatise with a moralising remark, pointing out that it is of 160 wecan however, only conjecture. or sources, source immediate to its 3, 39a,38a,33; V 5;for afurther passagethatshows Stoic influence see I26-7). is a common city for gods and humans, cf. lawin of origin the of account in Cicero’s most prominent is influence This provenience. are of Stoic law clearly expounded in mainly ( rooted inthePeripatetic tradition is his subject the Cicerosuggeststhat workon now tothe politicalworks. us turn Let and mayhaveindirect derivative. Stoicbeen which he the criticises doctrines is thatit further fortifies our suspicion that Cicero’s knowledge and understanding of combing philosophical combinganalysis knowledgepractical philosophical with especially fond of because he consideredhim as aman similar tohimself in ideally he was whom of Phaleron, Demetrius especially and Dicaearchus, Theophrastus, appearance inRome. first make amongin 2ndcontest century agood BC to the schools Greekphilosophical in itthe may originated have andthat tradition; was partof anAcademic argument the 155 Carneades wasin Rome asmembermyan Athenian of is that guess commission) in when question his to reply clever Carneades’ about Albinus, Aulus by originally Fora useful discussion of difficulties the to relating deducing the sourcesof John Dillon(DILLON John 1977:80) arguedhas thatthediscussionof law natural mustbe Antiochean, For Demetrius, seealso Demetrius, For Notably, thecriticism is, strictly speaking, “dialectical”: itconsists in pointing out that the opponent De RePublica De legibus De leg 160 I “contains the characteristic mark of Antiochean presence, a survey of survey a presence, of Antiochean mark characteristic the “contains I For present our purposes, however, the significance point . II 64-66, and De legibus De legibus De off Part I Part 94 I16ff (see esp. 23, the idea that the cosmos . II 61 (with reference 61(with II . De fin concerning the naturalness of justice and justice of naturalness the concerning De leg . III64; see further De legibus . III14,naming Aristotle, 161 to DeRePublica to Isee DYCK 2004: 49ff. ). But the conceptions the But ). 163 De Re P De RePublica ); De off . I41, III 162 . I 3. see As CEU eTD Collection on Plato’s political theory see Chrysippus. For a discussionrecent of early Stoicespecially theory political see VOGT and 2008.For Cicero’s viewsCleanthes, Zeno, as oratory and jurisprudence governing, and obedience state, the about impractical –the same criticism as levelled against Plato). levelled against as criticism same –the impractical and were abstract theories but their commonwealth, the on write did Stoics earlier man”) as the only Stoics whose work on political theory is worth consideration (the learned and singularly great (“a himself andmaster) Panaetius Babylon (Panaetius’ Diogenes of to refers theory, political on literature in heis Stoic that well-versed provided by Greek political theories, the result does not justify the assumption that in that justify assumption not the does result the theories, Greekpolitical provided by though the admitted that, theoretical most detractors ruthless EvenCicero’s composition. philosophical framework for his discussions in these works clearly was represent Carneades’ view). According to Plutarch, to According view). Carneades’ represent verborum momentis, nonrerum ponderibus examinet Chrysippo nihilmagnum necmagnificum desideravi, qui suoquodam more loquitur, ut omnia Re Publica in writing procedure and his approach Moreover, research. with time considerable First, as we can seebehind Cicero’sStoicising views;butI doubt that we can muchget further here. from the letters,to Panaetius makes him the most obvious candidate for being the main inspiration in this period of composition Cicero spent at Moreover, includingPolybius himselfalso Dicaearchus drew, perhaps and Theophrastus). mixed constitution clearly owes more to Polybius and to Peripatetic sources on whom superiority the the aboutany hismainargumentof by singlerate, (at Panaetius work he useda that however, mean, necessarily not does which andPolybius; Panaetius were in book sources main the Cicero’s been writing that often as evidence taken has This inpublic affairs”. Greeks most experienced “probably two the Polybius, with of inthe discussions expoundhadPanaetius through presence crystallised At 164 Cf. De RePublica De Re P. Re De and III 12, where Chrysippus’ defence of justicementioned is in adismissive tone: De legibus De legibus I 34 we are told that the political theory that Scipio is going to III13-4Cicero, intending apparently togive theimpression De Re P differed from that adopted during of his laterproject adopted that differedfrom . II 3; 21-22, 52; IV 4-5c. Chapter I.5 95 De Stoic. rep (note, however, that thejudgement is meant to . 1033B, few have written so much 164 This repeated reference Thisrepeated Nam ab De CEU eTD Collection philosophy see elsewhere, see LONG 1995: 44and forn.14; an assessment of Cicero’s knowledge of Plato’s cf. much more manifest in these works. Cicero presumably got first his introduction to Plato from Philo, Cicero’s knowledge of Plato(“that god of ours”: 3 that Aristotle was unfamiliar even to the philosophers themselves, apart from a very few. By contrast, 1997: 46ff.Cicero’s relative ignorance of is Aristotle not surprising in view of BARNES ownhis remark at further see Aristotle of knowledge Cicero’s On justice. natural against speech of Carneades’ report Philus’ in contained is reference the as directly, used been have not need work that even that he either. usedhimashis source that indications direct 167 166 165 Politics in Aristotle’s conveyed theory political the of elements basic of ignorant is he show), his letters as on years before embarking writing, several whom he certainly read and/orDicaearchus, (Theophrastus sources some early probably Peripatetic consulted and/or III, set in 52 BC –at a timesubject of civic affairs”). To these we may add that inwhen the opening scene in he whole the wasilluminated (“he general in theory probably political on work pioneering Aristotle’s still working on dialoguefourAristotle’s books (lost) Nevertheless the scholarly consensus is that although in writing in although that is consensus scholarly the Nevertheless ( treatises esoteric some consult to order at authority. Similarly, that actually used has in Aristotle’s reference to apparent as wehavethe in thecaseof seen Second, it doubtful that he did follow any source very closely. we findisin these a works of ideaskind various amalgam makes of and theories that writing Cicero confined himself atranscriber’sto orcompiler’s role. Cf. e.g. FREDE 1989: 81. As to the reference on Aristotle’s on reference the As to 81. 1989: FREDE e.g. Cf. Cf.FREDE 1989: 77-78. Cf.e.g. MOMMSEN 1866: 611-12, see note 18 above. De oratore Acad . I 46. Fora list of Cicero’s frequent references to Platonic texts, in De legibus . 167 Thus his references to Panaetius cannot be automatically taken as taken be automatically cannot Panaetius to Thushis references ibid , in Cicero a reference to an authority does not necessarily entail that he that entail necessarily not does authority an to a reference Cicero in , .: 44ff. .: – Cicero the character claims to have visited Lucullus’ library library in have Lucullus’ claimsvisited character to the – Cicero On justice Part I Part 96 Ad Att. De Re Publica commentarii IV.16.3; cf. also e.g. , and at , 166 On justice De legibus ) written by Aristotle. III 12 Cicero refers to , Frede ( De Re Publica De Ad fam. III 16 he praises De Re Publica De Re 165 ibid De RePublica Rather, what Rather, . 80) points out points 80) . I.9.12,18) is De finibus Rhetoric Cicero Top and . I CEU eTD Collection undertake defencethe to of persons whom thoughtbe prepared he guilty (cf. should advocate an that recommended he example, for Cicero; for importance particular that Cicero himself was happy to apply. To these, he seems to have approved views which were of audience, as and Cicero’s heroes (he casted him as main character in character main as him casted (he heroes Cicero’s politician could find agreeable. Hewas himself an aristocrat, and a friend of Scipio Africanus, one of 169 34. and as worthless”). andgood conventional evils like pain areindifferent] seem mestandto to condemned was himself a Stoic, those formulations of them [i.e. their theses that virtue is the only (cf. ethics on“OldAcademic” variation unsatisfactory and theoretically asadeceptive ethics Stoic disparaging of Antiochus’ strategy these observations on Panaetius’ deviation from old-school Stoic orthodoxy sit with Panaetius actually abandoned the orthodox Stoic view that virtue is the only good: cf. III may, in nature presented of theteleological view about whatIhavesaidFourth, instruction. Antiochus’ to hisunorthodox tendencieshis owed –and fondness corresponding writings– of indicates thatat contrary, the to Stoic; theis distinctively “principles”presenting is he theory that he has posited for his ensuing discussion of law Contrary apparent suggestionthe to of ipsius scripta declarant ut Theophrastum, Dicaearchum, Xenocratem, habuit inorePlatonem,Aristotelem, ( tradition Peripatetic Academicand the leaning towards Panaetius’ stresses also Stoic ethical theory hand other ( the on ethical theory Stoic hand, and the “severity” finibus and “tortured way of reasoning” in drawn contrast parallels the Stoic doctrines of early dullness and negligence the characteristic of Third,orthodox the contrasting of Panaetius’ more tolerable approach to political theory with 168 Apparently, there was much more in Panaetius that Cicero the Roman aristocrat, orator and orator aristocrat, Roman the Cicero that Panaetius in more much was there Apparently, Cicero also knows about Panaetius’ unorthodox doubts about divination, cf. between Panaetius’ “gentler” ethical doctrines and more lucid style on one lucidon the style andmore doctrines ethical “gentler” between Panaetius’ mutatis mutandis De officiis 168 Thusis it notunlikely Cicero’s that awareness of Panaetius’ 169 I-IIshows, often he used Roman historical ; cf. , apply here too. Cicero does not seem to think that the that think to seem not does Cicero too. here apply , Luc . 135); and we cannot fail to take noticefail take all howwell cannot andto we . 135); De fin Chapter I.5 . IV23(cf. also DL VII 128)Cicero that does not think De fin 97 De Re Publica . III 3, IV . III3,IV 23, 79).In De off De fin . II51). ). Moreover, he wrote to a Roman exempla . IV 23: “since Panaetius De legibus Luc , a rhetorical element De finibus . 107, De off De oratore De I37-8he De div . III 12, 18 . III12, Cicero ibid . I 6. I . De .: CEU eTD Collection 172 which Cicero himself is fond of using, cf. of using, fond is himself Cicero which audience (so much so that Panaetius sometimes used Roman historical Roman used sometimes Panaetius so that much (so audience 171 III 63). finibus bonum the on controversy philosophical the I on Book in says Cicero what of Finally, there is more to tenets. inspired byAntiochean and as an elements Stoic of Platonic amalgam writing Indeed, some havefound todescribe it theory the safer lawnatural of in dedicated toTubero Quintus ( especially here (cf.we findinCicero that syncretism kind the of resembled a veinwhich closely other hand, if Antiochus himself wrote on the same subject, itis likely that he wrote in late in the references from know we all, –after Panaetius from come account his in elements Stoicising consensus hehis asifdemonstrate into broad the ideasaccount, palpably Platonic to enmeshes is representing. Of course, it is not impossible that many Stoic or tradition. in him as a Stoic interest hetook asasource, used Panaetius Cicero Butevenif by, inspired Panaetius. whose writingsitmayIndeed, be even well possible that Platonizingare the passagescome from, or represented a return towards the Old Academic 170 inalso written an vein.Indeed,Platonising at unmistakably account”, as opposed to the Epicureans); and the Epicureans); as to the opposed account”, own their on desirable are things honourable and right all that “believe who those all of consensus consensus (the Academic–Peripatetic–Stoic common the representOld Cf. GÖRLER 1995: 86. Cicero may have found sympathy with Panaetius’ works also because they were written to a Roman Inadditionto Panaetius’ De officiis . In the “digression” at . In “digression” the closely prefigures his more elaborate treatment of the same subject in subject same the of treatment elaborate more his prefigures closely 171 De finibus That is, he viewed and read him from an Antiochean perspective. On the On perspective. Antiochean an from him read and viewed he is, That Cicero also looked into Hecato’s work Hecato’s into looked also Cicero IV 11-12, together with with e.g. together IV11-12, philosophica De fin De legibus Peri kath tou . IV 23, cf. De legibus De off that Cicero read some works by Panaetius. I than its Stoicising theory of natural law. Much law. natural of theory Stoicising its I than Ɲ kontos . II 76). Luc Part I Part 98 I 52-57 Cicero presents, as his own, the . 135), and a letter, also to Tubero ( Cicero refers also to his On Duties encomium ibid . 16-7,19,II45,V38, 65). , also dedicated to Tubero ( of of at58-62isphilosophy exempla De legibus , arhetorical flourish De dolorepatiendo Tusc De legibus I24-5he 172 summum . IV4).In De off De 170 I . , CEU eTD Collection Cicero’s view as character is not to be identified with the view of Cicero as author of author as Cicero view of with the be identified is notto viewascharacter Cicero’s finibus finished it may have beenthat he himself found the result unsatisfactory. understanding of the Stoic theory of the Cicero’s work in this isthat here emphasise like to I would pointthe But diiudicatio est, thoughts on this weighty issue are notnew (cf. Quintus at56: that his indicates itsand composition; Cicero before years already several presented conceived and written in conjunction with pareas is es,disputandononsuumiudiciumsequare,sedauctoritatem aliorum quiin following his judgementown (36: presented by SCHMIDT 2001. The majority view nevertheless is that the whole of engagement withthe problem of the Reitzenstein in 1894, see DYCK 1894, in Reitzenstein a discussion of the theory of the separate composition ofBook I, first formulated by Richard between strain the (for which ensues in Books between IIthe Stoic underpinnings of justiceandBook in the Iand extensive discussionof III lawsparticular is problematicStoic in ways (?) which argument Cicero never of caresBook orI daresclearly to address stands apart from the rest of Many scholars have argued for a later dating of 53, 55;cf. that his intended rolein the debate of the two schoolsis that of an arbitrator ( same Antiochean view as in summum bonum 174 attitude”. 173 Antiochus (54: Academicthat the Stoic theory theory of the seen,(53-54). Cicero first hinted at this point at agreedin37-9; as wehave Polemo) (55, substance andthe Peripatos Xenocrates, On the other hand, Cicero hints at his dissent from Even Quintus ( Cf. GÖRLER 1995: 103, who considers this a “massive indication of Cicero’s basically sceptical ). IV; and there is nothing in the context that would occasion the perception that perception the occasion would that context the in nothing is there and IV; 173 That is, the rudiments of the major argument of Tusc in a way that resembles Piso’s account in ut ex te ipso saepe cognoui cui tamen adsentiar in omnibus necne, moxuidero necne, tamen adsentiarinomnibus cui De leg . V 120). Moreover, elsewhere he has Atticus refer to his habit of De leg . I 56) describes the difference between the Stoic and the Old Academic Old the and Stoic the between difference the describes 56) I . . Iand II-III see e.g.Cf. ZETZEL 1999: xxiii-xxiv; DYCK2004: 238; for ibid De finibus summum bonum summum bonum .: 5-6, 239ff). The most recent version of the theory has been et scilicet tua libertas disserendi amissa est, auttu De Re Publica Chapter I.5 Pro Murena summum bonum III-IV: that the Old Academy that OldAcademy III-IV: (Speusippus, the 99 ). De legibus 174 and Antiochus’ and views,but partly becausealso the is but a verbal variant on the Old the on variant verbal a but is , and that part of the reason why Cicero never De finibus I, partly on the ground that it shows an 63and at is virtually the same as in as same the isvirtually De legibus V 19-20. nam istaquidemmagna De oratore De finibus ; indeed, the connection the ; indeed, ), and emphasises De legibus III 67), and III-V are arbitrus has been has De : CEU eTD Collection 176 175 return to this point in Chapter “approve” (cf.enables whathefinds“persuasive” him to e.g. in scepticism indiscussion atI53.Inline famous the passage Academic with of characterisation the from the tostay away been requested have sceptics Butactually Academic work. the in this leaning sceptical Academic Cicero’s of indication a further as ) GÖRLER Carneades back to philosophica late in the indications his of view of point the From theory. Academic Old the as we shall see in as see we shall ishe of Academic the unlike respect Cicero the rather views (on natural the foundationslaw, of the intrinsic valueetc.). virtue In of this positive endorsing with stance Academic an reconciling of see the possibility seem to power; noteven ifhe openly Academic does his disavow he doesnot upbringing, Antiochus, this agrees with he onthis point although in that 54, made itclear, has character the Cicero work. the On this see furtherChapter SeeChapter that the core of the Antiochean criticism of Stoic ethics actually goes actually ethics Stoic of criticism Antiochean of the core the that II.3 De oratore , esp. note 47. 175 Part III , this may be read (in line with Woldemar Görler’s arguments in arguments Görler’s Woldemar with line (in read be may , this III III.1.2 is , forcefully contends that his Academics sceptic stance sceptic hisAcademics forcefully that contends , 176 his own view: the Stoic theory is but a verbal variant on III.1.2; , note 51 and , Cicero depicts Academic scepticism as a destructive scepticism Academic depicts , Cicero see also Part I Part 100 Appendix B Appendix Appendix B . Lucullus ). and De fin De finibus . V 76; I shall , who, CEU eTD Collection warranted goals for goals political activity. warranted establish of to intellectual efforta lifelong continuous and worthy philosophically andinto research itswent writing.I Butfindit difficult view to itas culmination the resources of Roman traditions with those of Greeklearning). Obviously, much energy do the this ideology bycombining to (and optimate acoherentandattractive create to systematicfirst attempt the ideal –indeed political of Cicero’s statement grandiose his in facethe ofsinkingpublic persona influence. political putto tousehis background wide inGreeklearning improving inre-establishing or considerationsattempts and various protracted and emergesfrom theorist andwriter political statesman, philosophical the Cicero Rather, activity. political to substitute naturally as notoccur Again,a idea ofwritingdoes philosophy his the correspondent. and Cicero between relationship complex the into deeper delve to us requires which soI argue–partof tobe understandingproves –or a rhetorical proper the of strategy treatise proper (Theophrastus’ treatise proper (ethical) philosophical in a interest actual an professes Cicero when case single The political his in determining or ideals, or goals political articulating in either to useGreekphilosophy effort serious no and conscious can trace first we of period composition Cicero’s Before evidence. by warranted available the moral seem of his underpinnings not activity bepolitical does unequivocally to his an integral throughout political formed intellectual-part of the career philosophy late inhis not every that self-presentation of Cicero’s things.aspect basically, First, two It is high time to draw someI.6 threads together. In this part I hope to have shown, philosophica Conclusion can be taken at face value. In particular, the suggestion that suggestion the In face particular, value. beat taken can On Love of Glory On Loveof Chapter I.6 101 ) does notstand) does closerit scrutiny: De RePublica modus operandimodus is a . CEU eTD Collection particular subjects; and we may generously assume that his thestyle about of that remarks may assume generously and we subjects; particular As we have seen,all. at texts ethical Stoic acquaintance with Cicerohadsay is nodirect to This not that it is likely that he read at least some works by Panaetius on Part in more say I shall this (on Philo master Academic his from learned have may Cicero what incommon much hadwith apparently –whose teaching Ascalon Antiochus of of this, bythedoctrines to inaddition and, tradition, Academic sceptic by informed the philosophica late the in enquiry rational to impediment an as authority school traditional Aristotelian suggestAll notwithstanding tradition. seems that, this his to on remarks failing to attribute them to the Stoics, indeed conflating them with the Platonic– civilisation in the rational divineof government whole the but world,habitually manner,an on views Stoic-soundingapproving originslawthe of andhuman deceptive format. On the other hand, as we have seen,has he a tendency to present,in who actually tradition, unified Platonic–Aristotelian a great of lessdescendants worthy they are uphold the Romanthat practice; andpolitical values to harsh are and unsuitable ethical tenets same views their that joyless; and dry aswas authorities earlierStoic the to characteristic reasoning their predecessors of way the and style the that judgements: characteristic of by aset marked is ethics but present them in a From the earliest surviving reference (in reference surviving earliest the From original Greek sources (as the boasting remark at remark boasting the (as sources original Greek of onextensivereadings or solitary instruction by teachers, Stoic eitherprotracted on have based maynot of In Stoic hisknowledge ethics his scholarship. been particular, of depth the overestimate to not reasons have we thorough, fields, some in and, wide Greek learningI hope have wascertainly Cicero’s although Second, to shown that III ). (esp. Luc . 8-9), Cicero’s perception of Stoic ethics wasone-sidedly ethics Stoic of Cicero’s perception . 8-9), Part I Part 102 Pro Murena De fin ) onwards his view of ) onwards hisview of Stoic . I 6 may seem to suggest). to seem 6 may . I CEU eTD Collection De finibus theory in Book IV and, throughCicero’s presentation is skewed in a way that facilitatesthis, Cicero’s criticism of the Stoic the overall (sceptical) conclusion conveyed by presented by presented In than his with engagementrather classicinstruction literature. serious own the to Stoic conclusion that his basic understanding of Stoic ethics owed to Philo’s and Antiochus’ De legibus the earlier Stoics (as well as his appreciation of their contribution politicalto theory in Part II I shall build on this result in surveying some crucial interpretive problems interpretive crucial some surveying in result this on build Ishall as a whole (which I shall explore in turn in ) have some direct experience behind them. Butit seems an inevitable De finibus III as a source for Stoic ethics, and in developing the idea that Chapter I.6 103 Part III ). CEU eTD Collection THE ACCOUNT OF STOIC ETHICS IN OFSTOICETHICS THE ACCOUNT PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS AND PROBLEMS PART II DE FINIBUS BOOK III: BOOK CEU eTD Collection CEU eTD Collection rational soul (for the sake of the excellence and the perfection is “virtue”: etc.– worthwhile fully successful, of simplicityideal, is complete, –that “happy” life I human take a renders worth intrinsic it own its by that that “the fine” denotes only claim the that short– thing cutalong explanation –to theses theThese interrelated singular well into our list: our into well which, itis though countedamong not “paradoxes”notorious the inoursources, fits further claim we the can that theses understand two these is in with It connection virtue andvirtue happiness: IV 74). The most fundamental among these were the theses concerning the relation of contrary to common opinion” ( ( even they themselves called 1 counter-intuitive ethical In Antiquity famous Stoics the were most for having endorsed a set of provokingly tenets, some of which,II.1 as Cicero ( SVF For1) and 2)see 3) 2) 1) III16). The ( Only the fine ( Virtue is self-sufficientfor happiness,[because] huparkhei en t The “problem”Stoic of ethics telos of human action –that is happiness– consists in, oris identical to, thevirtuous life SVF to kalon to ǀ i / ison esti t III29-37 49-67;and for3) see DL VII87( – honestum paradoxa ǀ i kat’ aret admirabilia contraque opinionemomnium , “morality” inCicero’s translation) is good. Chapter II.1 , thereby admitting that they were “startling and “startling were they that admitting thereby , Ɲ n z 107 Ɲ n ). 1 SVF Parad III4), Stobaeus II 77-78W . praef . 4)reports, ; cf. De fin . CEU eTD Collection the Peripatetics obviously “say something” ( useful endowments, ifwe manage to find the right measure in them; and Cicero’s interlocutor finds that to a single object (in this case to virtue). But experience shows that the corresponding the that experience shows But virtue). case to (in this a single object to hedonistthe position upheld by in Epicureans the attributing asingularintrinsic value Second (B), the ethical position emergingof humanity,from such as compassion,mutual lovetheses and care among relatives and so on). 1-3 seems to be analogousdetachment to seems to go against values that we normally attach to the positive aspect as such on the one hand level of level of detachment) a such of iscapable being human normal a whether is unclear it (because implausible (i) both seem reasonably might ideal But this flourishinglife in ispeace and prosperity or ruthlessly killed,persecuted, tortured, etc. a lives mercy; owner’s her at entirely are possessions and life whose slave defenceless a or citizen free a is diseases; or disabilities painful and incurable with struck else (including friends, herintimate spouse healthand children)enjoys is good or anyone is sheor of irrespective person happy whether The ideally and virtuous wise claim that further paradox we getthe 1-3 of theses correlate a as (A), First happiness). of views modern and ancient between differences typical and significant some are there that admitting intuitions, modern and ancient (both This viewhappiness of obviously basiccontradicts some intuitions on life happy the springingworks– from virtue). things–actionswere, on the and whichvalue tovirtue, emanates,asit attached 3 (=1988). the discussionof Stoic ontology metaphysicsand LS 44-45;seefurther in BRUNSCHWIG 1994 inthe whole of life” (DL VII 89), that is, a bodily entity; see furtherthe material collected inLS 61, cf. admit suchitems: according to them virtue is “a soul which has beenfashioned to achieve consistency 2 For example, in not does ontology Stoic but soul”, rational ofthe excellence or “perfection the as virtue described I 4) Everything beyond virtue and vice is indifferent ( indifferent is vice and virtue beyond Everything Tusc . IV 43-6 Cicero presents the Peripatetic doctrine that emotions are natural and natural are emotions that doctrine Peripatetic the presents Cicero 43-6 IV . ineradicable 3 and (ii) and 2 ( evelli dicantposse penitus esse nec undesirable mihi vero dicere aliquid Part II 108 or indeedsuch (because or abhorrent adiaphoron unrealistic [ ) with respectto happiness. videntur , that is, psychologically ), but on the other hand also ]). CEU eTD Collection right view in ethics. view right single the represent does position their notwithstanding objections intuitive other and these that themselves) us(and persuade to in order offer to have Stoics the arguments Justice human nature” (Plutarch, nature” human and being human with the be inaccord to not and beauty, and greatness immense admit that “theisIt then, surprising, some not evenChrysippus himself at that point feltbound to things we saydetachment” from these norms when the circumstances so requiremay or allow. seem unconditionally binding farelesswellin thosewho life like than “flexible arecapableof fictions morality of norms the whoconsider butthose etc., temperate bejust, to interest our ( widely thoughtis rather It sense. that instrumental merely a in even in “advantageous”, someunconditionally circumstances (or even or callmoral virtues unequivocally to Andmostare reluctant the people for the most etc. temperate brave, time)just, isalso person wise the well: as itvirtues “moral” mayspecifically be in the incorporates way insome soul human rational the of excellence or perfection the (ii)Stoics maintain that desirein life. the we really whatto secure need or Moreover, of rationality as advantageous in a merely instrumental sense: as an excellentmeans think to accustomed are people many But “wisdom”. to identical is and soul, human rational the of perfection inthe consists it intellectual: inherently is it, understand evil)is much intuitively more plausible. evidentand as Virtue, (i) Stoicsthe whichhedonist (and is only the painis thesis, pleasure to according only the good 4 ϵΐΓ΍΅ȱΏν·Ή΍ΑȱΎ΅ϠȱΓЁȱΎ΅ΘΤȱΘϲΑȱΩΑΌΕΝΔΓΑȱΎ΅ϠȱΘχΑȱΦΑΌΕΝΔϟΑ΋ΑȱΚϾΗ΍Α ȇΈ΍ϲȱΎ΅ϠȱΈ΍ΤȱΘχΑȱЀΔΉΕΆΓΏχΑȱΘΓІȱΘΉ ). 4 The question is, of is, whatrationally The plausible course, of compelling question or De Stoic. rep. Stoic. De µ Chapter II.1 Ή·νΌΓΙΖȱΎ΅ϠȱΘΓІȱΎΣΏΏΓΙΖȱΔΏΣΗΐ΅Η΍ȱΈΓΎΓІΐΉΑ 109 1041F; from Book IIIof Chrysippus’ from Book 1041F; plasmata .' ) owing to their to owing ) On CEU eTD Collection 9 8 7 6 with the innate preconceptions” (Plutarch, preconceptions” with innate the best life “is inharmony and Stoic the with that most puzzling theory connects claims forth. so and on so And happiness, despising thingsall for that seem troublesome”. be self-sufficient will virtue too than virtue, of part but is it if and everything, above far us raise “For –as he [Hecato in the second127) book of his At all events we are ashamed of our bad conduct as if we knew that only the fine is good. ( well if we allow either pleasure or health, or anything elseChrysippus says: that “we dissolve isnot only notjustice, magnanimity,fine, temperance,a place but all the other virtues among as the goods”. In his ‘Against Plato’, blaming Plato forthinking fit to allow healtha place among the goods, whatever is welcome is revered; whatever is revered is fine”. is is revered whatever revered; is welcome is whatever pleasing is praiseworthy; whateveris praiseworthy is fine”. And again: “whateveris good iswelcome; is good: “whatever is good is worthy of choice; whatever is worthy of choice is pleasing; whatever is In hiswork the Fine’ ‘On Chrysippus presents the following arguments asproveonly that is fine what selection: representative is a scarce feeble. Here forand bafflingly position the sources are indeed gymnasiis etinotio…probant (3: school own their of inthesolitude even tenets these prove” “scarcely Stoics of preface In the 5 Cf. e.g. DL VII 102-103, discussed by AnnasJulia at ANNAS 1993: 389-390. ibid ΘЗΑȱΈΓΎΓϾΑΘΝΑȱϴΛΏ΋ΕЗΑ Έξ ȈΉϢȱ·ΣΕ ΅ϢΗΛΙΑϱΐΉΌ΅ȱ·ΓІΑȱπΚ ΩΏΏΝΑ ΗΝΚΕΓΗϾΑ΋ΑȱΎ΅ϠȱΘΤΖȱΩΏΏ΅ΖȱΦΕΉΘΤΖȱΥΔΣΗ΅Ζ ΓЁ πΑȱΈξȱΘΓϧΖȱΔΕϲΖȱ̓ΏΣΘΝΑ΅ȱΎ΅Θ΋·ΓΕЗΑȱ΅ЁΘΓІȱΈΓΎΓІΑΘΓΖȱΦ·΅ΌϲΑȱΦΔΓΏ΍ΔΉϧΑȱΘχΑȱЀ·ϟΉ΍΅Α ΗΉΐΑϲΑȱΎ΅ΏϱΑ ΘϲȱΈ Ώϱ·Γ΍ΖȱΎνΛΕ΋Θ΅΍ Ύ΅Ϡ . 1040D) µ µ µ νΕΓΖȱΘϛΖȱΦΕΉΘϛΖ ' ϱΑΓΑȱΘχΑȱΈ΍Ύ΅΍ΓΗϾΑ΋ΑȱΚ΋ΗϠΑȱΦΏΏΤȱΎ΅ϠȱΘχΑ χΑȱπΑȱΘХȱΔΉΕϠȱ̍΅ΏΓІȱΔΕϲΖȱΦΔϱΈΉ΍Β΍ΑȱΘΓІ πΔ΅΍ΑΉΘϲΑȱΎ΅ΏϱΑ , ," ϶ Κ΋ΗϟΑ µ χȱΎ΅ΏϱΑȱπΗΘ΍Α .' , " De Paradoxa StoicorumDe Paradoxa · ' ΅ЁΘΣΕΎ΋ΖȱπΗΘϠΑȱψ ΘϲȱΦ·΅ΌϲΑȱ΅ϡΕΉΘϱΑ , ΅ЁΘΣΕΎ΋ΖȱπΗΘϠȱΎ΅ϠȱψȱΦΕΉΘχȱΔΕϲΖȱΉЁΈ΅΍ΐΓΑϟ΅ΑȱΎ΅Θ΅ΚΕΓΑΓІΗ΅ȱΎ΅Ϡ ' ΓϩΖȱΎ΅ΎЗΖȱΔΕΣΘΘΓΐΉΑ ' , 9 Ύ΅ϠȱΔΣΏ΍Α ." Over and abovesuch puzzling arguments wefind the Φ·΅ΌϲΑȱΦΔΓΏϟΔΝΐΉΑ ). And such arguments). be explicit as foundcan in our µ · ' Ή·΅ΏΓΜΙΛϟ΅ȱΔΕϲΖȱΘϲȱΔΣΑΘΝΑȱЀΔΉΕΣΑΝȱΔΓ΍ΉϧΑ ΘϲȱΦ·΅ΌϲΑȱΛ΅ΕΘϱΑ , ΘϲȱΈ Part II On Goods 110 Cicero gives the frustrating answer that the that answer frustrating the gives Cicero ' ΅ϡΕΉΘϲΑȱΦΕΉΗΘϱΑ , , 8 De Stoic. rep. De Stoic. БΖȱΪΑ ( ΪΑȱύȱΘχΑȱψΈΓΑχΑȱύȱΘχΑȱЀ·ϟΉ΍΅ΑȱόȱΘ΍ȱΘЗΑ µ . ibid ϱΑΓΑȱΘϲȱΎ΅ΏϲΑȱΦ·΅ΌϲΑȱΉϨΑ΅΍ȱΘΓ΍ΓϾΘΓ΍Ζ ] says– if magnanimity is self-sufficient to µ 5 . 128) µ (Plutarch, Ή · ΅ Ώ Γ Μ Ι Λ ϟ ΅ Α ȱΦ Α ΅ ΍ Ε Ή ϧ Η Ό ΅ ΍ ȱΎ ΅ Ϡ ȱΘ χ Α ϱΑΓΑȱΘϲȱΎ΅ΏϲΑȱΉϢΈϱΘΉΖȱΦ·΅ΌϱΑ , ΘϲȱΈξȱΛ΅ΕΘϲΑȱΗΉΐΑϱΑ De Stoic. rep. Stoic. De , 1041E, quotation from ΘϲȱΈ ' ΦΕΉΗΘϲΑȱπΔ΅΍ΑΉΘϱΑ 1039C) 7 (DL VII , vix in ΘϲȱΈξ , σΗΘ΍ . 6 , , CEU eTD Collection nature. Moreover, two of the three major sources on Stoic ethics that have come down ( ( Stobaeus’ report to Indeed, according reflective concept of virtue requires that virtue alone be counted as a good. as becounted alone virtue that requires of virtue concept reflective Lucullus Stob. II 78, 1-6 W): the of specification another with juxtaposed hope presents itself. In some of our sources the claim I presented as thesis 3) above of glimmer important an theory, is asaserious in ethics Stoic lose interest we Before curiosity). their them and satisfy placate than rather exasperation meantand alleged the feeling that to increase are theaudience’s proofs bafflement in the mayhave some caseswe (indeed, from serious thinkers wewouldthat expect behindinsights compellingpresentthe andrespectable admittedly the tenets puzzling not seem to representobjections theirargumentsseem startlingly unsatisfactory inappropriate;and they do the kind of focusedkinds of andobjections philosophically that immediately interesting awaited effort their to assertions; but in view of these se conlatio, peranalogiam Again, asIshall try to show in Chapter 89. DLVII at emerge to seems pattern A similar consistence. internal perfect involving as understood outline of an analytic derivation of the self-sufficiency thesis purely from the notion of virtue, 11 53) “theChrysippus),or that idea of arisesjustsomething andgood naturally” (DLVII 10 collatio rationis of the good would come about (Cicero, kat’ aret For honesty’s sake, I have to note here that Seneca’s account seems to represent the condensed the represent to seems account Seneca’s that here note to have I sake, honesty’s For 5) dzΚΙΗ΍ΎЗΖȱΈξȱΑΓΉϧΘ΅΍ȱΈϟΎ΅΍ϱΑȱΘ΍ȱΎ΅ϠȱΦ·΅ΌϱΑ ΉϨΑ΅ϟȱΚ΋Η΍ȱΘХȱΆϟУȱΎ΅Ϡ ̖ϲΑȱΔΉΕϠȱΦ·΅ΌЗΑȱΎ΅ϠȱΎ΅ΎЗΑȱΏϱ·ΓΑ 10 , accompanied byvague ofhow explanations natural the emergence of notion our The 138-40 Ɲ telos n z Ɲ is living in agreement with nature ( and n ) is “equivalent” or “identical” ( “identical” or “equivalent” is ) ; Seneca, De fin µ . III 29 seem to hang together and represent an attempt to show that the ΣΏ΍ΗΘ΅ȱΘЗΑȱπΐΚϾΘΝΑȱΧΔΘΉΗΌ΅΍ȱΔΕΓΏφΜΉΝΑ Ep ). 11 . 120, 3-5: . 120, As we have just seen, the Stoics were fully aware of the II.4.2 , Chapter II.1 ϶Αȱ΅ЁΘϲΖȱΉϢΗΣ·Ή΍ȱΎ΅ϠȱΈΓΎ΍ΐΣΊΉ΍ De fin ibid observation 111 , Section homologoumen .) living.) virtuously accordingvirtueor to telos … . III 33-4: through the mental themental of process . III33-4:through ison esti of human action (cf. esp. DL VII 87, II.4.2.3 plus , Plutarch’s ǀ ) tolivingin with agreement rerum saepe factarum inter factarum rerumsaepe s t Ɲ i phuseiz . De Stoic. rep. Ɲ n ). , Η Ι ΐ Κ Ν Α ϱ Θ ΅ Θ Γ Α 1040D, CEU eTD Collection ethics in some sense on their theory of theory their on insome sense ethics Hierocles’ work, gavefragments of and surviving doxography Laertius’ paragraphs the Diogenes of raise to the traditionalfirst the with parallels some has account of Cicero’s structure the that fact with the view that the Stoics ( whole theory the “grounded” their “morality is the only good” (adding that the latter claim “contains” ( sequitur omnes sapientessemper absolute, feliciter, viverefortunate and“all live are wise blessedlives” who necessarily ( perfect happy, in formula, “livingwith nature” goes by agreement and on asacorollary adding that consequentia quaeiamposui, sint praeclareillahis, followingthe follow points from Ihavelaidwhat just down”( evidently how see us “let says Cato 26 III at Thus theory. whole the for foundations incidental:anything but the function of firstthe section of accountthe islaying the is arrangement this that suggests strongly account see,Cicero’s asweshall To this, Stoicheiosis starting finibus from the famous topics of to us–namely in Laertius’ his account Diogenes introductions to the topics, was less specific about the precise function of the doctrine, but went even went but doctrine, of the function precise the about specific less was topics, the to introductions WHITEGrund derStoischen Ethik” (POHLENZ 1940: 11, fora brief summary of Pohlenz’ interpretation, see 1979).Englishspeaking scholarship, appraised thedoctrine of S.14 G.initial idea” (74: Pembroke,of the Stoics theory,which in “conclusion building unfailingly deductive strictly the and follows coherence fromthe premise,over later amazement development his to voice from gives Cato exposition his whose13 comparisonof twothe ofkinds account inSCHOFIELD 2003. 1971may be duereference to papersthe of David and Hahm article A. Long). ANNAS 1995:606 inturn suggests that it to thewho holds that this absence may be due to facta philosophically motivated reworking of Stoic ethics (with thatis12 “thestill passage one came ofdown the to us mostin a mutilated frequently state”. See furthercited the Already Max Pohlenz, whose pioneering work in the field of Stoic ethics exerted great influence in influence great exerted ethics Stoic of field in the work pioneering whose Pohlenz, Max Already Cf. STRIKER esp. 225-61996b (=1991):LONG and 1996: emphasises,139. AsLong atthe ofend structure This iscuriously Stobaeus’ inunparalleled on see account; this INWOOD 1995:654-5, Book III– commences with some sort of explication of the latter formula, seems to represent the same pattern. the represent to seems quid posterius priori non convenit? quid sequitur, quod non respondeat superiori disciplina ) but our entire life). oikei oikei Part II 112 ǀ ǀ sis sis oikei . ; and Hierocles’ fragmentary ; andHierocles’ 14 12 13 ǀ Vitae These indications, taken together taken Theseindications, sis as “der Ausgangspunkt wie der feste der wie Ausgangspunkt “der as ); he then first introduces the introduces first hethen ); and Cicero’s account in account and Cicero’s videamus nunc, quam videamus nunc, ), and further, that further, and ), continet necessario ) not only ) not Ɯ thik ). De Ɲ CEU eTD Collection about Plato and Plotinus) ethics is not an autonomous discipline, but can be understood only when it is it when only be understood based can ona transformedbut conception of reality”;see also ANNASdiscipline, 1995: 608. autonomous an not is ethics Plotinus) and Plato about 16 thus they objectsare of rational pursuit (while their contraries are to be avoided). identity of good,the reasonable and natural. Annas inturnexplicitly that theorydenies the of the fundamental Zenonianaxiom; it is no more than amode of arguing this axiom” (142), namely the with nature” ( accordance in “are which those namely things, ofthese some is vice happiness, to and regard with virtue beyond “indifferent” everything although that view paradox further the holding for reasons 15 playedfoundational a role in the theory (cf. ANNAS 1993: Ch. 5, esp. 169). stated without recourse to important part of Stoic ethics, but emphasises that “the fundamental principles of Stoicism may be extreme is represented by (BRINKBrink 1956: 112-3), who admits that the theory of support the central thesis of Stoic ethics, that happiness for manconsists in alife of virtue”. The other Stoic ethics”; nevertheless she thinks that it was an important part of “a system designed, it seems, to history to start”the andthat“the ancient tag aboutits Chrysippus could fairlybe from school’s transferred the doctrine: if there had been no (=1983): 295)ismore cautious whenshe suggests that and Brad Inwood’s discussion of Stoic(INWOOD 1985:194).The belist can furtherextended; see e.g.Long andSedleyLS Vol.351, in I, p. ethics in ALGRA et al. make good point his about orientation of because his entire doctrine systemof the of ethics would be founded version DL onthe on it” focussing Inwood, concerning the concerning believing this that formula arightand provides relevantanswer tothe question implications of this formula, and the philosophical reasons the Stoics had for if formula. we with case, Inthis unfoldin the “livingnature” can agreement of the orconsequences ascorollaries happiness and virtue between relationship the concerning theses their paradoxical treated Stoics the then, Apparently, furtherassessingin its significance, “ suggesting that inethics a metaphysical structure. groundlargewas to project at philosophical Ancient aspectof the animportant that Aristotle’s ethical thought, and ofPlato’s discussions from extensive deriving partly notionsmodern naturalism of in ethics, and also general the perhaps assumption, hasStoic fortifiedbyfurther including factors, ethics with been familiarity certainly Stoic find expectation The foundations” of here get ethics right. “naturalistic to the ittake this, that inanutshell,is informingmodern the ideabehindmost attempts to substantial and philosophically interesting argument for theirsubstantial interestingphilosophically tenets. paradoxical argument and Cf.e.g. Richard Kraut’ (KRAUTremark 1995:922):“according tothese philosophers (speaking Inadditionto this, the“living in agreement with nature” formula may help to understand the Stoics’ kata phusin telos of human life, we may at the same time uncover or reconstruct a ), nevertheless have “value” ( “value” have ), nevertheless oikei ǀ sis ” (141),and thatthe argument from 16 Chapter II.1 oikei 113 ǀ sis oikei , there would have been no Stoa”. Again, Brad oikei axia oikei ǀ sis ) and are “preferable” ( “preferable” are and ) ǀ was a central idea of Stoic thinking from thinking of Stoic idea central a was sis ǀ 1999: Ch. 21.Striker (STRIKER 1996a sis “was probably not the foundation of foundation the not probably “was argued that“Chrysippus wanted to oikei ǀ sis is“not identical with pro oikei Ɲ gmena ǀ sis oikei was an ), and 15 ǀ sis I CEU eTD Collection seen in seen Cicero is our earliest and,one thing,itis byfar more the continuous, discursive account. Toand intelligent this, at the same time, most Now well-knownof the accounts two of Stoic ethics Cicero’s is obviously the more dominant. For source. kath koinos nomos ‘universal nature’ (87-9: as is aspectof which denoted theactive cosmic reason pervading and divine all- andthe souls individual rational between our asa relation emerges “agreement” 89), esp. (cf. absent not is consistency internal of connotation the though turn, internal rational consistency selectingour of procedure itself. In LaertiusDiogenes in choice is of the our object genuine while ultimate, single nature, the to contrary pursuing what of procedure (“consistent”) rational in consists a perfectly nature” with agreement is “natural”in “living account Cicero’s it on shortly, very Toput concept. the to content to us, it interpretiveisnumerous that they clear different pretty problems, utterly give i.e. befitshave formula nature” with in agreement “living the of explication an with commence our nature,or the “foundations” of Stoic ethics takes its origin. For although andboth accounts which of rejecting“naturalism” the debate concerning recent extensive the is this alsowhere However, what is in Stobaeus’ text are Archedemus, Diogenes and Antipater, all of whom flourished in the 2nd century). 2nd the in flourished of whom all Antipater, and Diogenes Archedemus, are text Stobaeus’ in Athenodorus,and Hecaton all of whomflourished Posidonius, inare the first half titles) of the book first century to BC reference (the latestwith Stoics (often referred to account Diogenes’ in cited authorities have found his arguments on thispoint less than compelling). In addition to this the latest Stoic Göransson Tryggve by (GÖRANSSON 1995), but Itend to agree withBrad Inwoodchallenged (seeINWOOD been 1996)andothers who has philosopher court the Arius with doxographer discussionof Stobaeus’ see account LONG 1983. The traditional identification of DidymusArius the flourished in the late 1st century BC, ought to be dated back into that century. (Fora seminal account preservedStobaeus in is tobeattributed to Augustus’ court philosopherArius Didymus, who the view that shared widely the accepting which, source, acommon indicate seem to 1999) ANNAS back to the 1st the century3d and 4th AD respectively–to draw appear earlieronmuch sources, probably centurydating BC. In fact,17 the numerous overlaps between the two texts (on which see e.g. This remains true even if we take into account that Diogenes Laertius and Stobaeus –who wrote in wrote –who Stobaeus and Laertius Diogenes that account into we take if even true remains This Ɲ gemon tout Part I hosper esti ho orthos pant estilogos dia hoorthos hosper , we know much of the dates and circumstances of his literary and much dates the of , weknow of circumstances ǀ i t Ɲ s Wǀ n ont KƝ touholou/t ǀ n dioik Ɲ se Part II ǀ 114 s ǀ , n hol Wǀ n hol ǀ ǀ n/koin ǀ n erchomenos, autos ho n dioik Ɲ phusis Ɲ tos ). , identified with identified , 17 As we have Aswe ǀ n t ǀ i Dii, ho CEU eTD Collection the Epicurean theory Epicureanthe as presentedin theory I); is, Book instead of that doxographical outlines philosophersthe butalso thought, it “why” (cf. they 3 –inthought II connection with “what” only not explicating at aims Cicero theories these in presenting Importantly, V). of Antiochus Ascalon (Book influential at the time: those of Epicurus (Books I-II), the Stoics (Books III-IV), and and vivid most were that theories ethical three the of books, five over dialogues, philosophical individually”schools ( investigatinga fairly comprehensive discussion question the of of and highestthe goods evils, “not amongonly matters on these most learnedphilosophers” the ( thedisagreement “violent is there that seeing viewsCorrespondingly, in particular”. work this with which investigatingmorelife is worth in than philosophy questiongeneral, raised and the in I agree,in “nothing that declares Cicero atI12,where isstressed approach for aserious need but thosefinibus of each of subject. to the ofhisapproach indications of seriousness the frequentown Cicero’s the An Cicero’s presentation furtheroptimistic viewof Stoicof by ethicsis encouraged as intelligentandregarded a well-prepared, unbiasedphilosophical writer. being is he because consensus, new the on sources; Greek his on drew mechanically who epitomist and transcriber weightless a considered was he because consensus, old the on throughout: favourable been has thought Hellenistic of transmitter his and asource but appraisal twentieth century, the as considerably over altered Tobemerits intellectual sure, background, has etc. assessmentofCicero’s the composition, philosophical hisapproach to writing, his intellectual cultural and 18 quid asingulis philosophiae disciplinis diceretur, persecuti sumus. his litteris arbitramur, in quibus, quantum potuimus, non modo quid nobis probaretur, sedetiam nos autemhanc omnem quaestionem de bonorum finibus et malorum ferenobis a explicatam esse isin mostand technical ethics. beyondwork doubtCicero’s theoretical The Chapter II.1 ibid 115 .) . 18 This means a discussion in means This a three discussion ibid .) Cicero sets outtogive Cicero.) De CEU eTD Collection expected to give competent presentations of the theories they represent. they thetheories of presentations give competent to expected and note 31 of that chapter. 31 ofthat note and 6). serves as a guarantee of the seriousness and accuracy of Cicero’s treatment (cf. I8,III Posidonius at De finibus he indicates his credentials as an expositor by referringis, unlike menwho, LucullusCatulus in or version first the of the to his Epicurean (CatoMarcus Cato Younger)andMarcus Pupius the Porcius Pisorespectively –that teachers at theoriesthree discussion under Lucius Manliuswas widely known: Torquatus, the adherence to whose contemporaries theories for three the mouthpieces by usingas convincere tamquam adversariumaliquem volumus, non explicari; verumeniminvenire intelleges expositam, utabipsis,quieamdisciplinam probant,nonsoleat accuratius wish to find less accurate than that giventhe by the school’s own proponents. For we (i.e. Academics) truth, I,Book “you willfind exposition thatthe by [of Epicurean theory]the given nome is not refute of in preface the work) thewhole of Brutus (theaddressee to he as remarks contrary; anyonethe to theories: dogmatic the of adversarially”presentation his of reliability the from detract not heis this but does that writes as Sceptic, convinced an Academic To besure,Cicero (I 13: argumentsthe behind thetheses. Stoicorumque sententiam also (cf. theories entire the present to he wishes 20 19 For Cicero’s choice of characters see ofcharacters choice Cicero’s For Cf. STRIKER 1995: 59-60. ; cf. I16, and histo well-versedness inStoic and literature his ties with De finibus Lucullus 7-9; etc.; 65-66, 7-9; I 6. Again, the presence of I6.Again, as presence of Brutus addressee of the work the ), giving specific emphasis to the theoretical framework and framework theoretical the to emphasis specific giving ), 19 Ad Att. XIII.12.3; 16.1; 19.3-5; cf.my discussionChapterin Part II 116 ND I11) . He reinforces this confident claim confident this reinforces He De fin. De III 14: quamanobissic Academica totam Zenonis 20 Moreover, , can be can , I.1 CEU eTD Collection Chrysippus himself, whose work adheremay whichsources back both common the to paradigm go suggested that to assumption that Cicero’s exposition follows a standard Stoic pattern. It has been part of his defence of Stoic ethics against the criticisms of Carneades, head of headthe of Carneades, of criticisms the against ethics Stoic of of his defence part itAntipater,whointroducedas 22originates III with Diogenes’ pupil successor and 57 (together with anditisChrysippus)), nowgenerally agreed thatthe archer simile at Diogenesrepeatedly by 49 and Cicero ofBabylon Moreover, to 33, namerefers (III account. and in rigorousness Stoic expounding doctrine. the whose graceless is style somewhat andpedantic rendered byhis precision painstaking still him asthough personality, someone Cato’s portrayal of respectful presenting comic, slightly a in giving use to scholarship his puts effortlessly Cicero indeed, in the fragmentary of Hierocles’ remains in thefragmentary less explicitfirststructure of paragraphs the of Laertius’Diogenes presentation (and the first section of which, starting withexposition has afairly explicitand self-consciously presented argumentative structure, the Stoic idea of accuracy Cato congratulating the on lucidity hisand of Again,the presentation. as Cicero’s account of account Cicero’s such e.g. sources, in as other much attested well (often grasp of detail technical firm Cicero’s displays IIIinparticular in Book theory Stoic the of account Cicero’s 22 21 the Stoic the See INWOOD 1985: 188 and n. 25 (with reference to Dyroff). For Cicero’s portrayal of Cato see also ANNAS 2001, xvi and p. 69, n. 6. persona 22 telos in the dialogue– re-confirms the reliability of the account by account the reliability inof re-confirms the the dialogue– -formula, is, as I have already indicated, importantly paralleled in the paralleled importantly indicated, already have I as is, -formula, kath Ɲ konta ) as well as the terminology of the Stoic theory – On ends Chapter II.1 117 is systematically used by the author of DL’s Ɯ thik Ɲ Stoichei 21 At IV 1 and 14 Cicero –speaking AtIV 1and14Cicero oikei ǀ sis ǀ ). This the ). encourages sis and culminating in CEU eTD Collection survey of structurethe of expositionthe see Chapter detailed a more For presented. been already has wrong are Peripatetics the and right are Stoics the later”, whichis ratherout of place at this point of theexposition, as every argument to the effect that striking assertionthat “we think differently;whether rightly orwrongly is a question to be considered incomplete; and at44, arguing that the Stoics and the Peripatetics hold different views, Cato makes the context, but33-5isalso pretty out of place. The the to irrelevance its to due OCT the in bracketed again is 32 obscure. rather becomes exposition edition asit has no relevance to the context. From 26to 50 theargumentative structure of the 25 24 Antipater. and Carneades between debate Sceptic Academy around the middle of Sceptic Academy middle the 2ndaround of the century BC. 23 himself. single may been have inwritinga book main the source Cicero’s that speculations raise to treatise written in Diogenes’ or Antipater’s Stoa, perhaps by Antipater Striker (STRIKER 1995: 58-59) has rightly pointed out, CiceroStrikerhas out, notpossibly “could (STRIKER 1995:58-59) pointed rightly as bevirtue But Gisela morality andto cultivated). intrinsicimmense value to ought whichattach theories the that correspondingly, and isuntenable, utterly Epicureanism style.deny is notto This messages hehadthat important toconvey (e.g. that language and new philosophical Roman a of creation was and propagation on the material. his arrangementof with the hasty of Cicero’s struggling of –indeed, composition of Epicurean the and theAntiochean theories in I andBook V,this shows book signs of features be aredisturbing sure,there To tradition. Stoic orthodox and mainstream in rooted firmly as account groundless, these may passages provideseem supportfor further regardingto Cicero’s which Cicero wrote, and second, the fact that in his late writing factthat the and wrote, second, which Cicero high speed at extremely the first, into consideration, take flawswehave to these topics –perhapsadoxographicoutline–But inassessing wasalreadysketchy enough). (owing either Cicero’sto negligence or tothe factthat the source he was using for the To mentionsome examples, already at III 18 we find a paragraph literature). previous that to has beenreference (with bracketed 120 1971: PEMBROKE See inthe OCT Cf. e.g. LS ch. 64; 24 25 But even if we abandon the “one closely followed source” hypothesis as hypothesis source” followed closely “one the abandon if we even But At points the account gets sketchy or condensed to the point of sketchy gets condensedpoints point tothe At the account of obscurity or De fin. III22 iscited there together with Part II 118 reductio II.2 De finibus below. 31 is begunbadlyat rather organised and III. More More expositions than the III. De fin . V 16-20 as evidence on the 23 philosophica These passages gave These passages his focus CEU eTD Collection In fact, if we read the book in areits looking for. proper context, thatseemsfall to short of presenting the kind of substantialis argument for the thesisas that we part of 2002. 1978; BARNES 1989; TARRANT 1985; ANNAS 1993 (Ch. 6and 20.3); STRIKER 1997; SEDLEY 27 predecessors as well, would be lost… be would aswell, predecessors foresee that all the works, not only of his own teachers, but of their Hellenistic valuable contribution: most cf. his e.g. works of his eloquence the considered clearly Cicero Moreover, genre. “introductory” tali genere Κ΍Ώ΅ΙΘϟ΅ “it has no equal in its kind even among the Greeks” ( 26 unit. the of conception Stoic the of elucidation of although asort itprovides is that account with Cicero’s The real problem Greek books”.by relevant the getting of by hisbeen to pursueparticular outlinebe abledetail awakened wouldeasily points account of Stoic ethics in isolation from from restof the in isolation of ethics Stoic account Cicero’s interpreting of and reading scholarship in modern practice by widespread the obscured been has circumstance This position. Academic Old the from diversion their providenot substantialhaveshow, for andcompelling to do wants any argument to Cicero Stoics, The etc. only good isthe morality that conclusion radical reach the to unsuccessful attempt to develop on the theory inherited from the Old Academy so as Ascalon, Book IV. In Cicerothis book is generallyalign agreed to himself with Antiochus of the hero critiqueof Book of the V.Stoic the in with isfor accordance this comeresult a surprise: not as does whole, this theory presented by Cicero as the opponent of Stoic ethics in Fort the Fort the person philosophy and of ofAntiochus seeAscalon, 2003;DILLON GLUCKER1977 and At Ad Att decipit,in tali ut genere neapudGraecos quidem quicquamsimile renders the passage compatible with the idea that Cicero wrote in the “popular” or . XIII.13.1 Cicero boasts that the second version of his De fin . I 6, 27 Ad Att He argues that the Stoic theory represents an 26 Chapter II.1 he assumed that a reader whose curiosity had curiosity whose a reader that he assumed . XIII.19.5). 119 telos libri quidemita exierunt,nisi fortemecommunis as living nature, as in itagreement with De finibus Academica ). But the qualification , as a self-contained turned out so well that De finibus as a in CEU eTD Collection back For economy’s sake, I will at the same time begin developing the idea that placing proper of the theaccount which contains account the firstof the section to attached problems ethics in ethics testimony. First (in Chapter we have to take one step back and re-consider our approach to back our and step one take re-consider we have to account of Cicero’s presentation of Stoic ethics; in order to get over this debate first In what follows I isunderstood a interestingphilosophically one). shall argue so show thetheory that to timeattempting thesame (at sources other of in virtue that neithersupplementingit without be can understood accountof theory Stoic which the correct line of interpretationandto give Cicerojustice effect he arguetothe that to alargely actually provides Diogenes Laertius’ much moregives sketchy and incomplete account; and those who want satisfactorysupplement inhave Cicero’s to of presentation cosmicin the foundterms perspective reason he left it implicit), and that becausefor some or point in philosophical missed acrucial Cicero because (either order to reconstruct the Stoic theoryfound account the that argue proper we it is not much of an on overstatement rely greatly interpretation of lines both Actually to say qualification. needs that the actual divide is between thoseas see, observation we shall this which 2007: 85).But VII 85-89, does” (ANNAS who foreground and Diogenes who Laertius viacosmicpresent nature, those ethics Stoic that the key text to expound Stoic ethics isCicero ethics expound Stoic to key the that text between those who think a division “thereisof article, something noticed inarecent Consequently, main two lines interpretation of haveAs emerged. Julia Annas has De finibus De finibus summum bonum III into its proper context –that is –that context proper its into III III. Next (Chapter Next III. II.2 asliving in withnature.agreement De finibus ), I shall provide an outline of the account of Stoic Part II 120 III is as it stands deficient or incomplete or deficient stands it is as III II.3 ), I shall survey the basic interpretive basic the survey shall I ), De finibus De finibus as a whole– makes an makes as awhole– III, which does not De finibus De finibus III as a III; CEU eTD Collection virtue (which we can understand as the ancient counterpart appeals inmodern to (which astheancientcounterpart virtue we canunderstand effect Stoic that the distinctive theory the principally valuean appeal to on of relied the to Annas argues grounds. historical on credibility lacks and “dogmatic” theories, the of view sceptic deprecating Cicero’s on borders assessment, my on that, aconclusion herapproaches explanation But Stoic ethics. actually within grounded III, to show how the central Stoic thesis that virtue is the only self-sufficient good was basis the Annas partly of a reading on convince.of attempts, endfails it to interesting attempt togivejustice to Cicero’s presentation, but I shall argue that in the Happiness Annas’ interpretation in her famous and much discussed book date to present a viable alternative to the “cosmic” interpretations. This is Julia Finally Finally (Chapter full materials, without paying attention to the fact that itis obviously meant to provide a combiningfreely Stoic it the reconstructing with and or theory supplementing other for material a raw as account Cicero’s using of by practice the presented difficulty the thisthat interpretation line by is of methodological generally attenuated a problem: Third (Chapter support. This analysis serves as a forerunner to my main argument in rational attractive even or compelling lacking as demolition its in culminates turn finibus in subject the of treatment Cicero’s briefly: it put To irresolvable. and serious thethat solutions suggested rendersomeinterpretive other problems evenmore by some butdoes in interpretivethe of this account, the suchaway problems raised to solutions indirectly does offer Cicero arguethat I shall here. difference important account of the Stoic theory by its author. theory account Stoic of the prompts a largely Academic–Antiochean reading of the Stoic theory, which in which theory, Stoic the of reading Academic–Antiochean alargely prompts (ANNAS 1993). This interpretation aphilosophically represents This interpretation 1993). (ANNAS II.4.1 II.4.2 ), I shall briefly consider the “cosmic” approach and point out ), I shall discuss the most attractive and influential attempt to Chapter II.1 121 The Moralityof Part III De finibus . De CEU eTD Collection worries in my treatment. However, since the interpretation of Kant’s philosophy is beyond my competence, Ishallhuman rationalityset aside and suchits relationto reality constitutesthat the essence of Kant’s “critical” philosophy. to give justice to our sound moral intuitions by grounding them inthe overall revisionary conceptionof theory (includinglarge at the latter work as representing Kant’s settled view. But Istill find it tempting to describe Kant’s moral changed hismind about thefundamental issue inmoral philosophy; Annas’ and claim may take the historical context. historical in its Stoicthe of theory actual the development concerning considerations well with foundations. I shall argue that this description of the Stoic theory does not seem to sit ethical has which toaccount appropriate the theory rather than seeking itsfurther argued thatbetween writing the ungrounded first principle, or rather a fundamental ratherafundamental ethical principle,first or ungrounded as toan moral of reasons), nature distinctive tothe in Kant) (e.g. moral theories explicit aims and purposes the in interpretationof Kant’s moral theory,certain a andonepresupposes it, which grounds Ifind than difficult rather to phenomenon accommodatethis for withaccounts Kant’s that theory moral a develops that the idea that to Kant the distinctive nature of moral reasons is a fundamental phenomenon, and he 28 Infact, Ifind also the comparisonwith Kant’s moral theory ratherproblematic; forit seems to me 28 version of it presented in the Grundlegung Grundlegung and the Part II as I know and understand it. To be sure, it is often 122 Kritik derPractischen Vernunft Kritikder Pracischen Vernunft phenomenon or Kant basically ) as an attempt an ) as datum for CEU eTD Collection theme of 26 Five (?) arguments in response to the objection that the Stoic 22-25 account establishes two ends 22 21 20 19 Six (?) arguments for the thesis (one of them bracketed 16-18 in the OCT) 16 Here is a tentative outline of the major points of Cato’s speech: of the exposition. therest to relates section first the indicateand how to whole account, of the structure section, this on focusing Before formula. nature” with in agreement “living in the however,culminates it will be worthwhile to give a brief overview of the general 03 An application of 30-31 the Three (?) arguments in favour of 27-29 these implications the Stoic conception of the of conception Stoic the of explication an contains account Cicero’s of section first the above, indicated I As II.2 Formulationof the Stoic view of the ofone instead good ultimate ofour a part not is attainment their but actions, appropriate of objects the are objects” natural “first the Consequence: good” in“consistency” and “morality” Anaccount of human rational development, culminating indiscovery locationand of “the action appropriate and value naturalness, between relation The theory the presenting for style appropriate the on digression: First itself” preserve to care takes and itself, with “concerned birth from is being a living that thesis the point: Starting happiness its basic implications: the thesis that morality is the only good andthat it suffices for the “first natural objects”); and (ii) those which locate the naturalness/contrariness to nature to naturalness/contrariness virtue”,locate the but do away with the notion of choosing between things according to An outline of oikei ǀ summum bonum sis , on which Cicero is one of our most important sources, and De finibus Carneadea divisio in some non-moral good (such as pleasure, the absence of pain or summum bonum III 16-26 III Chapter II.2 summum bonum to eliminate other positions, including (i) those which 123 , which commences with the famous as “living in agreement with nature” and summum bonum in “the mind and in and mind “the in CEU eTD Collection 72-3 The The ethical relevance of the other parts of logic philosophy: and physics are virtues 72-3 71 70 69 68 67 67 the view that the (including whole benevolence and justice of The sociability, naturalness 63-66 62 The Stoic attitude to 60-61 death Further elaboration of the idea that appropriate actions aim 58-61 at the attainment of indifferent 57 56 55 of from a of starting the repetition rejection of An indifferents, between account ranking the 50-54 49 41-48 Comparison of Comparison the Stoic and of the conception Peripatetic the 41-48 40 63 Return to 36-39 the 35 The notion of “the good”, acquired through “rational inference”, is the notion 33-4 of a supreme 32 which they are not identical not are they which The wise person’s attitude towards justice towards attitude person’s wise The Friendship be equal not need latter of the distribution the hand; other the on “inconveniences” and “conveniences” and hand one the on “losses” and “benefits” between distinction The The wise man’s attitude to politics, procreation, family No problem with private property Animals excluded from the community universe is governed by willdivine is a city for menand gods) love of parental naturalness The things Reputation: theorthodox doctrine is thatit is advantageous only instrumentally things that are advantageous instrumentally those(and which are both) Divisionof “advantageous” (=“preferred”) things thingsinto that advantageous are both is wisdom both); (and “productive” and “constitutive” into of goods Division “preferred” things and its relation to “good” theories whichdo away withchoice among indifferents (at 31; category (ii)); the notionof comparison) The relevance of material goods to happiness (this may actually still belong to the previous morality (category (i) above) Second digression: on the Latin rendition of the Stoic terminology Stoic of the rendition Latin the on digression: Second A brief account of the emotions of the account brief A value that is a matter of kind, not a matterof degree independently of their outcome (bracketed in the OCT) An argument of purposeuncertain effectto the virtuous that judged are actions right divisio : further arguments against views which separate the supreme goodfrom supreme the separate which views against arguments further : Part II 124 summum bonum : respects in per se per and CEU eTD Collection ( provisional of his “theaccount It serves conception good”. asan“outline” summum bonum the of account Stoic the presenting section first the of function the order this Within logical order. follows and astandard indicate presentation the that painsto Cato takes initial of the challengeseeChapter more detailed account a (for position depart from Academic) Peripatetic(Old the compelling reasonsto have Stoics the (iii) that show must Cato challenge second the meet to order In either. position Academic) Peripatetic (Old the into collapse not itdoes trap escaping that (ii)in andthat asindifferents–, classified objects the between choosing for criteria –thatabolishcollapse positionthe into is, toAristo it attributed not does any rational one. To meet the first challenge Cato must show both that (i) the Stoic theory does not show tothe Peripatetic is preferable timethat rational (b)to position this on grounds same the at and position; different significantly a establishes but claimed, Carneades) before (andhim as Antiochus Academic) theory Peripatetic(Old the on variation merely is a that andhighlight point Stoicthe verbal theory not arguethe (a) to meant is it has focus: aspecific also speech thatCato’s makes itclear (10-14) and Cicero voluptate praeclare illahis, quaeiamposui, consequentia evidently following flowfrom the points laid what Ihavejust ( down” 26 Catomarks theend of sectionthis byinviting his interlocutor to consider “how Zenonis Stoicorumquesententiam ( system” “whole Stoic present the aim is to purported Cato’s note that to isimportant it First, reveal. not does outline above the is much that There 74-76 Conclusion perigraph ) in a continuous exposition. But the introductory conversation between Cato between conversation introductory the But exposition. in acontinuous ) Ɲ ) or a sketch laid down, the details of which can be “filled in” later. At III (16-26) is (16-26) somuch not from different function Aristotle’sthe of ; 13: cf. I e.g. Chapter II.2 125 Epicuri ratio ). However, it is insufficient to say II.3.2 … below). De fin. Epicuri sententia de III14: quam sint totam CEU eTD Collection 23) Erillus’ view. 50) attributedAristo,(12, to theNewV Academicposition II35, and (presumably, cf. elsewhere theposition includes –thisnature category to naturalness/being contrary to respect with objects other among choosing of in terms guidance with practical introduces we knowastheina version 30-31,he what of morality is theonly and presentsgood, a set of arguments in it.support of (iii) Third, introduce two ends instead Catocounters (i) (22-25), First possiblethe objection Stoicsactually the that of one. (ii) Second (26-29), he drawsvaguely related to the pointunder discussion (seeout esp. 49; cf. also 39). the thesis that orare at33-34), “good” notion of the of brief discussion Cato’s (see digressions as presented are or edition), in OCT the bracketed is even (32 context in their of place andis more interspersed with digressions whichareeither “doxographic” utterly out manner.indeedhas a This section argumentative complex,rather structure, muddled argumentative and inproceeds amarkedly defensive at22,Cato which commences part, second the In inthem. prevail which concerns different by the be distinguished whichcan parts, vaguelyfalls two into demarcated account Cato’s The remainder of requirement that an ethical theory ought to provide practical guidance (cf. guidance practical provide to ought theory ethical an that requirement II.3 adopting Antiochus’ procedure (who in turn apparently ona Carneadeandrew tradition, see Chapters indifferents (see LS 59andIOPPOLO 1980and FORTENBAUGH–WHITE2006); Cato, virtually 31 the locate do which theories asketchy presents that locates the of the of account the corollaries simply that from 26 onwards Cato draws out the theoretical implications and 30 29 Aristo of Chios (one of Zeno’s pupils) was famous for arguing against Zeno’s classification of classification Zeno’s against arguing for famous was pupils) Zeno’s of (one Chios of Aristo For the Cf.ANNAS 2001: 73 14.n. –esp. 47– n. and Carneadea divisio summum bonum III.2) 31 reductio (iv) Atis32 this by interrupted procedure shiftan a abrupt to , eliminates him on the ground that his theory does not conform to the basic the to conform not does theory his that ground the on him eliminates , see further Chapter of of viableethicalthe (i) positions, anyposition eliminating summum bonum summum bonum in anything distinct from from and inanythingdistinctvirtue, (ii) those III.2 Part II 126 ; for; further literature see n.67 to that chapter. “inthe mind but andvirtue”, doaway given in 16-26. Carneadea divisio De fin 29 . II 35, 43; III 12,50; . II35, 30 , and , CEU eTD Collection different positions; and they do not seem to rely on deeply theoretical presuppositions theoretical deeply on rely to seem not do they and positions; different that is, for the most part context; “dialectical” a characteristically presuppose seem inquestion to arguments they seem to be responsessearch for the “foundations” of Stoic ethics. Even apart from their value, however, the to objections disappointing that,as arguments Iexplained inthe previous motivated chapter, the and objections to the of kind eminently represents in sections these presented material argumentative Without going intosuggest that they are not). details I 44 and isvaguepresentation Cato’s (at rather48subfin.require), seems He to would like to take notice that the great bulk of the Stoic position (which the completion of the happiness). As to whether these points of difference isvirtue aresufficient notfor happiness, and thatthey have adoptan to additivemeant viewof to tell in favour of the hold that must Peripatetics the that views (including two of the consequences in the differences outsignificanthe points (41-50) Peripateticon one: the variantverbal is a (vi)After interlude abrief original turns to the (40)Cato charge theStoic that position point the under much significance to atechnical discussion). presents without detail foris,morality the thesis has that 39 he at anintrinsic value(34-38; again once 1985). was another unorthodox Stoic in Aristo’s generation (cf. esp. Cato seems to return to the to return to seems Cato At36 (v) indicated. is clearly not hereandrather out of are also place their relevance and “good” (34)which a brief notion of of emotions of account Stoic the doxographic supplement to25or 39 –thein passageto comes is OCT).Next(32-33) the bracketed asa (perhaps else somewhere better fit but would think cannot one topics that IV 43, 47, etc.;IV 43,47, see V23;73; my further discussionof the for eliminating whichseparate those positions reductio , presenting further and more elaborate arguments andmore elaborate further , presenting Chapter II.2 127 reductio the summumbonum Carneadea divisio of other possible positions would De fin . II43; see furtherIOPPOLO in Chapter from morality that morality from III.2 ). Erillus CEU eTD Collection complete. At 74Cato himself seems recognise this heto observes “Iwhen being am of Stoicthe theory theaccount making for apedantic concern passage represents the whole, the On argument. main Cato’s on bearing direct no have friendship– and justice benevolence, altruism, life, social of naturalness the –on presented doctrines establish63, in to points 65),and 62, manner (cf. specific e.g. the a non-confrontative serve simply arguments the but all; at arguments no find we section in this that say to to be “argumentative” init thesense been had for the partpreviously. most Thisisnot be StoicAnd the 60-61: the saidfrom cannot 62 onwards viewon suicide). discussion origin of the term (51-52: the into account is the of material enmeshed increasing“doxographic” amount an But natural) objects. (but indifferent of attainment the actionsat aim appropriate sense of. 58-61) –although for53-54, most partthese the aredifficultmake arguments to any The same goes (esp. contain tothis effect somearguments seemto actually followingAnd pages the for hisisbe eliminated as“absurd”. and to abolishespractical indifferents, thus guidance– furtherbetween choosing of principle the as distinction nature to contrary / natural the with elaborationsloppily earlier, that the position attributed to Aristo–and any position that does away (at 58-61)indifferents. Apparently,of the he 50 Finally Cato turnsat “expounding to (vii), principlethe ranking” of among wishes ideato further reinforce that the point that with others. dialectical debates into he made rather established their distinctive position on the of invirtue which atand arrived andarguments Stoics considerations the the “substantive”: more something should Stoics demandthe provide that or expectation accept. notto likely wouldbe opponents the that n. 4,BRUNSCHWIG 1991:90-1, 94-5; ANNAS 1993: 163. 32 For the notionthe Forof “dialectical” reasoning Stoicin ethical theorising see esp. IRWIN 1986:208-9and pro Ɲ gmenon ; 55: the division of “goods” into Part II 128 telos in the first place, prior to entering to prior place, first the in 32 This may also contribute to an telika andpo Ɲ tika ; CEU eTD Collection points flow from what I have just laid down”). illa his,quaeiamposui, consequentia follows what mustcohere”; 26: end especially quibus congruere debent quaesequuntur structure (16: structure argumentative strict a has section the that effect the to section in this indications the Stoic theory (including Stoicthe theory agreement” formula, and (iii) parallels the between survivingsome of of our accounts in formula the“living virtue” with to “livingaccording which connect the sources the (ii) tenets, ethical Stoic central the for sources in our be found can that arguments As I haveexpectation. this underlying motivations main be the told to take I what mentioned already there, apart from (i) the disappointing appearance of the explicit ground their theory in their conception of conception intheir theory their ground ratio postularet plan” ( my original of scope beyond the carried (=1996): 434ff; FREDE 1999: 72-3. 33 the concerning thesis Stoic the for argument typically by begin focussing on this passage, in the passage Laertius, Diogenes “foreground” whothose suggested earlier, even We can now turn to the details of the first section of Cato’s speech (III 16-26). As I wise and happy man, who alone is rich, beautiful, free, etc. (75-6). organisation and structure of the Stoic system (74), and of the glorious ideal of the See STRIKER esp. 1996b (=1991):224(cf. ENGBERG-PEDERSEN 1986:158-9); COOPER 1999 hinc enimestordiendum ). The speech is than closed by an eulogy of the marvellous the of eulogy an by closed than is speech The ). De finibus De Chapter II.2 III), the idea that the Stoics did in some sense insome did Stoics idea the that the III), “let us now see how evidently the following , “since this is where we should start”; 20: is start”; should wherewe “since this , , “it is with these [the natural principles] that principles] natural [the these with is “it , 129 *** oikei 33 telos Videamus nunc,quamsint praeclare ǀ expecting to find here the central the here find to expecting longius provectum quamproposita longius sis . In . In previousthe Ihave chapter is encouraged by Cicero’s own CEU eTD Collection consider this thesis hetakespains establish it (16-18), self-evident; to with arguments notdoes Cato destruction. harm or it with objects which threaten escape those and to term Stoic of the translation as Cicero’s the animal’s the of are preservative that construed) (broadly objects secure those or attain to impulses inparticular itself manifests which itself, preserve to inclination non-derivative and fundamental a on birth from has humans) (including animal every thesis this On 16) 1998). it is alienated from its destructionand those things which appear to lead to destruction. preserve itself and to love its ownconstitution and those things whichpreserve its constitution, whereas They [i.e. the Stoics] hold … that every animal, as soon as it is born, is attached to itself, and is led to found at DL VII 85): of doctrine of versions Stoic the The psychological concerningthesis motivations animal is of one surviving the 1) its detailed of outline and structure content. turning the main to interpretive problems raised bythe passage, Ishall amoregive nature” (26: harmoniously with translation (in ANNAS 2001). The Latin text used is the OCT edition of Unless otherwise indicated, all passages from passages all indicated, otherwise Unless the of humans)animals (includingnew-born in (16),andculminates the that ethical thesis inclinations congenital the concerning thesis apsychological with starts The passage 34 Placet his… simulatquenatum sit animal ipsumsibi conciliari etcommendari ad se conservandum iisque rebus,iisque quae interitum videantur adferre. ad suum et statum eaque,conservantia quae sinteius status, diligenda, alienari autem abinteritu summum bonum De fin status . III16-17: psychology the of animal motivations. (literally “state”, cf. also 20, cf. “state”, also (literally , i.e. the convenienter congruenterque naturaevivere congruenterque convenienter telos oikei of human life, is “to live consistently and consistently live “to is life, human of ǀ sis Part II sustasis 130 De finibus (the other main source for othermain doctrinethe (the source is , “constitution”, cf. esp.DLVII85), in are taken from the Raphael Woolf’s naturae statu De finibus –generally regarded –generally (REYNOLDS 34 ( De fin ). Before . III CEU eTD Collection ǀΦΔϲ propterea 105, Stob.II88, 10ff), and such is as of “worthy selection” ( dignum aestimatione ( … coherefollowswhat (20: of must that nature” “starting-points 16: (III start” should where one is emphasises,As Cato farfrom is“this this point-of-departure being accidental: 2) 36 ENGBERG-PEDERSEN 1986: 150ff; BRUNSCHWIG 1986: 128ff. about something isabout is, that “valuable”( brings impulse– or of objectis a natural –i.e. proper the nature” with “is in accordance of brevity I omit discussing these arguments in detail now (cf.birth hedonistically I30andanimals arefrom motivated Forthesake II31). esp. formedof inEpicurus’ thestarting-point as presented theory might remember) readers (as the claim that alternative the with opposition markedin 35 this argument in Chapter this argument to briefly inhedonistic –Ishall terms) return hasnoadvantage acquired knowledge the (i.e. motive ulterior no is there when things discovering and in learning delight take to be observed can who infants of case the in be seen can which sake, own knowledge for theirtruth, valuableor scienceareconsidered and intheir own right which according is one my at17-18, has adirect concerns to bearing the on present sequitur autem haec prima divisio haec prima sequitur autem For asimilar claim see Stob. Ishall return to the first and the second argument in Chapter quibus congruere debentquaesequuntur > ΘЗΑȱΔΕЏΘΝΑȱΎ΅ΘΤȱΚϾΗ΍ΑȱΎ΅ϠȱΔ΅ΕΤȱΚϾΗ΍Α De fin sit –selectio . III 20: shift from psychological to normative/evaluative claims. normative/evaluative to psychological from shift 20: . III , where‘ is Cicero’s translation of II.3.1 Ecl . II79 (LS58C): aestimatio . ) that is as noteworthy as is mysterious. Whatever mysterious. is as is noteworthy as ) that hinc enimestordiendum Chapter II.2 ’ stands for the Greek term 131 aestimabile ̓Γ΍ΉϧΗΌ΅΍ȱΈξȱΏν·ΓΙΗ΍ȱΘϲΑȱΔΉΕϠȱΘΓϾΘΝΑȱΏϱ·ΓΑ . 36 . The first thing that follows is a division is a follows that thing first The ekklisis ) or “worthy of value” ( III.3 ) and “to be adopted for its 35 ; for further discussion see e.g. discussion further for ; ; the only one of them that ), for it is with these with is it for ), De finibus selectionem dignum principiis naturae axia ; cf. DL VII I-II, that I-II, habeat CEU eTD Collection preserve oneself in one’s natural constitution, the next is to take ( “With these established” ( established” “With these doctrine of “value” and “appropriate action”. “value” “appropriate of doctrine and action” areinline “appropriate meagre on evidence Stoicthe independent with our andnature” to according “things “value”, between relation the concerning claims his and terms, own Stoics’ inthe story the telling for care scrupulous Cato’s of example isatypical passage the Aslater.it it stands, to come back to have shall we and self-explanatory, means no by is claims– evaluative/normative This from is,“is” “ought”–that shiftfrom factual/psychological to to adipiscamur principia naturae eoreferri,ut ut rectedicipossitomnia officia necesse esteaadhaecreferri, principles” (22: natural of the attainment at the areall i.e.“they aimed latter”, the towards directed andmust former sothe be nature’s from actionsstarting-points, “originate appropriate later (22), elaborates Ashefurther opposite”. the andtoreject with nature accordance nature?” action” “appropriate is ( or attainmentobjects a“duty” these the of that ( is“non-valuable” nature cf. Stob. II 82, 20-21 (LS 58C), 83,1-6); on the other hand, whatever is contrary to ( conceptions Greek for the term standard Cicero’s 38 sake” ( own 37 arkh Cf. the material Cf. presented the inLS 58and 59;cf. esp.Chrysippus, quoted by ( Plutarch sequitur autem haecprima divisio: Aestimabile essedicunt –sicenim,ut opinor,appellemus– id, propter se sumenda sint contrariaque item reicienda… quod sitsuperiori contrarium. initiis igitur ita constitutis, utquae secundum naturamea, ipsa sunt, aliquod pondus habeat dignum aestimatione, quam illi quod aut ipsum secundum naturam sit aut tale quid efficiat, ut selectione dignum propterea sit, quod Ɲ ) of proper function and the material of virtue, if I pass over nature and what accords with 1069E ( propter se sumendum cum vero illa, quae officia esse dixi, proficiscantur cum veroilla,quaeofficiaesse dixi, ab initiisnaturae, SVF III 491)): “What am I to begin from, and what am I to take as the foundation inaestimabile initiis itaigitur constitutis ). –perhaps Cicero’s rendition of kath ) and “tobe rejected” ( Part II 132 Ɲ kon 38 ): “the first duty ( Later, at III 50 Cato shall return to the ΦΒϟ΅Α ), Cato continues, it also follows vocant, contraqueinaestimabile, reiciendum primum officium kath’ hauton teneat ). ) what is in 37 officium On common OƝ ) is to pton – , CEU eTD Collection 20: why the mere factthat 20: whythemere evidenceother much helpprovides in isunderstanding what actually onin going III our nor as wesee,neither passages but these actions (58ff); shall 53) andappropriate nature: indifferentquestion respecttotheirthings evaluation relation of (with of to impulse would entail that entail would impulse praised onits ownaccount. This goodlies whatin the Stoics call concludes thatthis isthe place to find the supremeone human good, goodthat which istobe reason sought and and learning through Hence of affection. objects first those than highly more much concordance this values then one do, to ought one which things the in concordance were it as and order call Stoic the (what “conception” orrather understanding, some gained has one is. it what for recognized and in agreementstable with nature.finally, Atthis pointand, that whichcan truly be continuous, said tobe becomes goodfirst appears and is selection such Then action. appropriate with hand in hand goes then selection discovered, been has rejection) likewise (and ofselection method this Once opposite. one’s natural constitution. The next is to take what is in accordance with nature and to reject its “agreement” if you approve.Herein lies that good, namely moral action and morality itself, atwhich (20) …the initial “appropriate action” (this is what I call the Greek set. Iquote motivational passagein full: this complicated reason of development and emergence the how explain to turns Cato move next the In 3) is hardly explanation correct. independent evidence on Stoicthe theory human of motivationpsychology of this II)already suggestsan in Book this; for explanation inview butthat of our interpretation Stoicthe of theory IVandconveyed inBooks V(andforeshadowed in Chapter –Later, action”. “appropriate is an , the distinguishing feature of and distinguishing, the feature humans, affects this transforms congenital (21) A human being’s earliest concern is for what is in accordance with nature. But as soon as soon as But nature. with accordance in is what for is concern earliest being’s A human (21) De fin . III20-22:intellectual anddevelopment recognition of “the good”. x x has “value”,is “worthy of selection”, or that its attainment is “in accordance with nature” or is the object of a natural Chapter II.2 133 II.3.2 I shall argue that the Antiochean the Ishallarguethat kath homologia Ɲ kon ) is to preserve oneself in . Let as use the term the use as Let . ennoia ), and sees the sees and ), CEU eTD Collection The developmental describedThe developmental involvesprocess several by successive stages. Cato to a far greater extent than all the earlierobjects, stimulates and, our pursuit.nature with accordance in too is it But said. I as development, later a and consequence a is action ultimate good, since moral actionis not included among our original natural attachments. Rather, such are aimed at our attaining the natural principles.It does not mean, however, that this attainment is our the former must be directed towards the latter. Thus it may rightly be said thatall appropriate actions account. own its on be sought to be sought in virtue of its own power and worth, whereas everythingnone else ought ofto bethe directed. Thoughprimary it is a laterdevelopment, objects itis none the less the only of thing nature is to 39 iv) iii) ii) i) (…) (20) se expetendam magis hortatur quam superiora omnia. actio; consequens enim est etpostoritur, utdixi. esttamen easecundum naturam multoquenos ad hoc sitbonorum ultimum, propterea quodnon inestin primis naturae conciliationibus honesta referri,ut recte dicipossit omnia officia eoreferri, utadipiscamur principia naturae,nec tamen ut (22) est expetendum. id solumvidignitate suaet expetendum est; eorumautem, quaesuntprima naturae,propter se nihil sint, honestefacta ipsumque honestum, quodsolum inbonis ducitur, quamquam post oritur, tamen Stoici, hominis perselaudandum et expetendum bonum, quod cum positumsitquod ineo, dilexerat, cognitione atque ita etratione collegit,ut statueretin eocollocatum summum illud ordinem et,utitadicam,concordiam, multo eam pluris aestimavit quamomnia quaeilla, prima intellegentiam velnotionem potius, quam appellant (21) bonum possit dici. constans consentaneaque naturae,in quaprimum inesse incipitet intellegi, sit, quod quid vere reiectioneitem sequitur deinceps cumofficio selectio, deinde perpetua, adextremum ea tum ut deinceps quaeea teneat, secundum naturamsint,pellatque contraria. quainventa selectione et gained some understanding ( said to be good”At (20). acertain stage of one’s intellectual development –“as soonas one has It is at this point that one begins to understand ( finally “in agreement with nature” ( Next, our selecting activity comes to be “continuous” ( action” ( appropriate with hand in hand “goes then activity selecting our happened has this once –and contraries are and thus their attainment is an “appropriate action”, “appropriate an is attainment their thus and are contraries their etc., valuable are nature with accordance in things that principle the is, that passage, First we “discover” ( we“discover” First cum veroilla, quaeofficia dixi, esse proficiscantur ab naturae,initiis ad necesse est ea haec prima est enim conciliation hominis ad ea, quae sunt secundum naturam. simul autem cepit (22) WhatI calledhave “appropriate actions”originate from nature’s starting-points, and so nos appellemus convenientiam, siplacet, cum igitur insit eo idbonum, quo omnia referenda primum est officium sequitur deinceps cum officio selectio invenire ( id enim appello intellegentiam ) the principle of selection ( ofselection principle the ) consentaneaque naturae Part II 134 ) or‘conception’ ( ). Ύ΅ΌϛΎΓΑ intellegi σΑΑΓ΍΅Α perpetua ) “what it is ( ) , utseconservetin naturae statu, ). selectio illi, rerum viditque agendarum notio 39 ), “consistent” ( “consistent” ), ( De finibus –Cato’s translation of the ) described in the earlier the in described ) quid sit III 20-22) ) that cantruly be constants ϳΐΓΏΓ·ϟ΅Α ), and CEU eTD Collection 40 ( situation isfurther complicated in 23, where the good is virtually further identified with “wisdom” elaborationdoes not make sufficiently clearthe relations that hold among these items –notably, the of what one ought to do”, “agreement”, “moral action” and “morality itself” respectively; but Cato’s 41 the notion of the good referred to at 20 at to referred good of the notion the of grasp the about than rather general, in ofconcepts acquisition the about talking here is Cicero that sapientia vii) vi) v) As we can see, the very difficult sentence in 21 involves four items: “internal order and concordance and order “internal items: four involves 21 in sentence difficult very the see, can we As Pace sint later development”. “originate” ( actions appropriate Since objects. these pursue to cease we that mean not does explains, actually not “to be sough on their own account” (21 nature dignitate on aiming at their attainment ( attainment their at aiming on directed to the latter( keep on performing appropriate actions for the sake of sake the for actions appropriate performing on keep The difference is that our actual end indoing so is no longerthis attainment itself; rather, we VII 89, account” ( The good that we have grasped in this way is the only good that is “to be sought on its own “the fine” or “the “the honourable”). or fine” “the specified as“moral action and morality itself” ( concordance –Cato opts for the term the for opts –Cato concordance in” or “lies in” ( to be located ( belocated to ought good the that actions– and choices our of concordance and order rational aforementioned ( “Hence”perhaps(or “and rather thisin way”: objects of affection ( affection of objects values one object, this recognised has one once –and (21); choices and desires of our objects immediate the above and over ownright, its in object of one’s choices and actions ( actions and choices one’s of Greek term Greek GiselaStriker (STRIKER 1996a (1983): 289) and Michael Frede (FREDE 1999: 73)I take it cognitione et rationecognitione et ) or “perfect reason” ( reason” or “perfect ) ). Thus as a consequence we also realise that the “first objects of nature” ( nature” of objects “first the that realise wealso consequence a as Thus ). ; also SVF ), and it is to this that “everything else ought to be referred” ( propter seexpetendum ennoia proficiscantur III 121, 131 and III91)or“invirtue own worth” of its power III121,131and ( and initia/principia naturae ut statueret in eocollocatum in ut statueret summum illud…bonum positum sit eo in )” quae prima dilixerat 40 necesse est eaad haec referri ), one concludes ( concludes one ), – one recognises ( recognises one – perfecta ratio ) from these first objects of nature, the former the nature, of objects first these from ) rerum agendarum ordinem et… concordiam 41 adipiscere sub fin ; perhaps Cicero’s translationof ( … ), i.e. the former objects of our natural inclinations, are inclinations, natural our of objects former the i.e. ), in eo sit eo in ). Chapter II.2 . –see also ENGBERG-PEDERSEN 1986: 157. convenientia vidit ). collegit ) –that keep is, on performing “appropriate actions”. 135 ) thisvery order concordanceinternal rationaland ) what the Stoics called Stoics the what ) honeste factahoneste ipsumque honstum = Gr. tokalon ) that “it is in atque ita as its Latin rendition–, and can be further can and rendition–, Latin its as ). Thus in our choices and actions we keep ( morality aestimavit sub fin ), through“learning and reasoning” ). But this,asCato further(22) , which is “a consequence and a and “aconsequence is , which this ) itfar higherthan those first ) (21). good This “is located di’ hauto ” –that is, presumably, the homologia ) as afurther practical quo omnia referenda necessarily ) haireton quae sunt prima , agreement or agreement , vi sua et must be , cf. DL , CEU eTD Collection “morality”. ultimate our and end, this manifests consistentway,maximallythat ordered such is is, that nature, with accordance actions tolive ina performing all appropriate reicientem naturam sint contra secundum naturametquae natura eveniant,seligentemquae rerum, quae vivere scientiamadhibentemearum (31: is contrary” what rejecting and nature with accords what selecting order, natural ChrysippusLaertius attributes himself:liveto “to applying of one’s knowledge the of firstwhich Diogenes part the in terms a formula of later bit a further specified are aresufficiently accountand bytheprevious implications definition elucidated this of (26: nature” with accordance translation of the Greek formula Greek the of translation the that thesis Stoic in the culminates evolution natural intellectual/moral ends of two insteadof account the one), Stoics introduce the objection After tothe inresponse that elucidation some further (22-25: arguments 4) De fin . III 26: conclusion –the Stoic congruenter naturae convenienterque vivere– homologoumen Part II 136 telos -formula. ǀ telos s t Ɲ (i) phuseiz in live “to is life of human ; cf. DL 87). To live in Ɲ n ). To Cato the Cicero’s CEU eTD Collection Cicero’s) own indications to the effect that his exposition follows a definite plan, and is, (that byCato’s encouraged arecertainly expectations these however, Partly, “livingthe in formula,agreement” follow a roughly similar pattern. introduction of the upto Hierocles), and Laertius (Diogenes of ethics accounts Stoic twoother of sections first the fact that by the andalso nature, with in agreement sources (in Diogenes Laertius and in Stobaeus) with the thesis that the that thesis the with Stobaeus) in and Laertius Diogenes (in sources the thesis that the herebe of “foundations” Stoic is sought areto by ethics inencouraged way the which theoretical missing the that idea the earlier, indicated as Ialso Moreover, issue, seee.g.the arguments23-25). at the on bearing a have to seem that arguments other the are nor (and either promising explicit proof that proof explicit as for example, exception: are no account of Cicero’s part (argumentative) second etc.forin fine happiness,the –Notably, onlygood, isthe argumentspresented the the forarguments presented inoursources central that the isself-sufficient virtue theses partly aroused by generalbafflementthe and felt disappointment about explicitthe the concerning their thesis Cato’s speech, expecting to find here an account of the Stoics’ central argument for passage in Diogenes Laertius typically begin by focussing on the first section of Chapter Chrysippan syllogism whichhas been as by preserved Plutarch (quoted example in As in Chapter I suggested II. 3 Problemswith Cato’s account II.1 ); and the two arguments thatfollowin 28 and 29arenot much more honestum telos is living according to virtue is juxtaposed in some of the telos II.1 is the only good Cato at III 27 presents a version of the , even those interpreters who foreground the parallel of human life. As I explained there, this expectation is expectation this there, explained I As life. human of Chapter II.3 137 telos isliving CEU eTD Collection philosophers, Cicero maintains, unanimously held following the views: These Aristotle. and Polemo of Xenocrates, names the with associated tradition from a tradition, Peripatetic “Olddeparture an Academic”–early common alleged dialogues– endorses Stoic as the be viewthat shouldthe position a understood in –speakingthe 24-26, 32,44-45,57-60) Cicero as acharacter 16-19, Book IV, finibus in account of Cato’s context wider by, the reinforced are considerably with, and in well fit indications these is that now emphasise and out point to like would I What quae iamposui,consequentia flow from what I have just laid down” ( sequuntur naturae est ordiendum ( “since start” iswhereweshould at16, this structure: deductive has astrict See further 39, 41, 48. initial idea” (74: the Stoics theory, inwhich of “conclusionbuilding unfailingly deductive strictly follows the and from premise, coherence the over later development amazement his to voice from gives Cato exposition 42 (d) (c) (b) (a) Cf. STRIKER esp. 225-6.1996b (=1991): (LONG AsLong 1996:139)emphasises, the ofend at his “nature’s companion and helper”); and companion “nature’s prudence orpractical wisdom is anart subordinated to this independently givenconcern (being of one’s constituents parts; constitution natural the in inherent excellences and powers of the actualisation the for concern care for maintainingself-preservation impliesoneself not oneself; preserve only to one motivates a self-love carein for“the one’s protectionbest frompossible danger motivation,or its congenitalharm, self-love; butcondition also a every living being, including humans, ismotivated to act by single a ultimateaccording source of to nature”, that is, a . Throughout (see10-14;II, 33-4,38,45-48;BookIII, thework esp.Book / naturalia ); and especially at 26, “let us now see howevidently at26,“letus followingthe and points ); especially ); at 20, “it is with these [the “natural principles” ( quid posteriuspriori nonconvenit? quidsequitur, quod non respondeat superiori )] that what follows must cohere” ( cohere” must what follows that )] ). 42 Part II Videamus nunc, quam sint praeclare illahis, Videamus nunc,quamsintpraeclare 138 quibus congrueredebentquae principia/initia hinc enim De ). CEU eTD Collection work: subscribe to view inthis when heintroduces of preface the Book I of subjectthe his to implicitly seems voice) authorial in his speaking time (this himself Cicero ultimate and final, is to be found by asking what the basic natural attachments are. originof the whole dispute about thehighest goods evils,and and the questionof what among them is it is at precisely this point of inquiry into the supreme goodthat philosophical controversy rages. The which moves us in this way and is the natural object of our desire from the moment we are born. In fact of arousing our desire (what the Greeks call Greeks the (what desire our arousing of something that is well suited and adapted to our nature, something that is attractive in itself and capable It is almost universally agreed that what practical reason is concerned withand wants to attain must be in theories general the in V(16ff) theviewthis (34) andelaborated thatstrongly suggests derivation of Book “primary natural “primary natural objects”. coherent argument that deduced the argument that coherent and explicit an on theory their ground did “ancients” the is that then, view, Cicero’s 44 43 (f) (e) For the notion of notion the For constititautem fere inter omnes quoin id, prudentia versaretur etquod assequi vellet, aptumet naturae; hisquaeritur, in quid sitextremum etultimum, reperiendus fons in quo sintprimainvitamentaest, dissensio. enim totius quaestionis eius, quaehabetur de finibus bonorum et malorum, cum appetatur,constat, non est deque eo interphilosophos, cum summum bonum exquiritur, omnis quem accommodatum naturae esse oportere et tale, ut ipsum per se invitaret et alliceret appetitum animi, summum bonum prescribing “appropriate actions”). (i.e. life in guidance practical systematic a us offering in principle or point reference ultimate Finally, prudence qua practical reason and the art of life must apply this conduciveare to this (such as a modicum of external assets). (ii) or excellence), intellectual/moral and beauty, health, bodily as (such desires natural one’s of consists in the attainment of all of the objects which are either(i) constitutive of which the fulfilmentnature”, with accordance in live “to is agency) rational for point orreference principle therefore the therefore ϳΕΐχΑ Graeci vocant. autemsit, quid quodita moveatitaqueanatura inprimoortu prima secundum naturam telos (the Antiochean(the spokesman is Piso speaking): from the natural eudaemonist from is ethical natural principles to the common of human life (that is the practical object which constitutes the governing the constitutes which object practical the is (that life ofhuman 43 Indeed, the (cf.esp. Chapter II.3 horm summum bonum Carneadea divisio 139 Ɲ ). There is less agreement, however, on what it is De fin . V18) see esp. INWOOD 1985: App. 1. from a consideration of the introduced first in Book II in Book first introduced 44 ( telos De finibus as the single V 17) CEU eTD Collection kinetic pleasures, while Epicurus’ while kinetic pleasures, misguided becauseonEpicurus’ view natural of the primary includeobjects pursuit is argues, it asCicero thusassumed (although, pattern general the conform to fact Epicurus’that theory, and aspresented in Iand criticised IIdoesseem Books to bonorumetmalorum necesse estomnem rationem provide the basis for any andtheory goods of evils” ( we originally love nature’s “must attributes seek primary and ourselves consequently where did you suddenly abandon thebody alland those things that in are accordance with nature but “living morally” (since that is what “living virtuously” or“living in harmony with nature” is). How and …tell us how you from thesame start principles but manageto the upwithend supreme goodof IV 26, at Cato asks rhetorically AsCicero for dissent. their grounds theoretical satisfactory however providing without justification), or any (withoutsubstantial reason track to be the only good, and everything else to be indifferent, that they go off the original It is19, 24,25-26, 45etc). 14, 15, pointwhen onlyatthe morality declare Stoics the the Stoic theory is in line with the Old Academic–Peripatetic tradition (cf. esp. IV 2-3, assumptions areconcerned, andbackground points far asitsstarting thatas contends IVCicero,inin speaking As for Stoics, the Book opponent asCato’s dialogue,the all). apleasureis not at Again, at she shun as the greatest evil? acting rightly should be directed? What does nature pursue as the highest good tobe sought, what does what is the end, what is the ultimate and final goal, to which all our deliberations on living well and 45 qui sit finis, quid extremum, quidultimum, quosint omnia bene vivendi recteque faciendi consilia referenda,quid sequatur natura ut summum ex rebus expetendis, quid fugiat ut extremum malorum? De finibus II 34 (speaking again as character) he reinforces that the factthat the that hereinforces ascharacter) II34(speaking again 45 ( De finibus summum bonum I11) Part II 140 ); and the claim is supported by ); and the claimissupported the consists in static pleasure –which instaticpleasure consists atque abistocapito fluere CEU eTD Collection of the of account thatthe expectation the encourage clearly they ownindications, Cato’s with setting that surrounds setting in exposition the that Stoictheory the of widerconceptual partof the viewsform these emphasise that like to being, Iwould time the For detail. more in theory Stoic the of criticism his and ethics Antiochus’ In the following chapters and in and chapters following the In theory. Academic on Oldthe variation a deceptiveverbal into collapses on scrutiny closer producing atheory that (see tradition this distorting for Stoics the criticising vehemently time same the at heritage, ethical Peripatetic Academic–early Old the of arecovery theory as hisethical presented I 16; for Antiochus’ reliance on Carneades, see esp. see Carneades, on reliance Antiochus’ for 16; I V and elsewhere ( V andelsewhere I.2 of Ascalon, one of Cicero’s former philosophical teachers and friends (cf. Chapter Antiochus views is these of all source directthe agreedthat itis there generally Now, (cf.19). also Xenocrates dissentfrom his teacherPolemoand his Speusippus, predecessors Aristotle and Academic theory is explicitly attributed to Antiochus at verbal owes to Carneades. The criticism that the Stoic theory is a disguised restatement of the Old On Cicero’s verdict, as stated already at IV 3, Zeno had no good reason ( reason good noZeno had IV 3, already at as stated verdict, On Cicero’s originally commended by nature suddenlyare forsaken by wisdom? not in our power, finally discarding appropriate action itself? How is it that so many of the things 47 46 At profectae subito a sapientia relictae sint. potestate, ipsumdenique officium. quaero igitur, quomodo haetantae commendationes anatura loco corpus subito deserueritis omniaque ea,quae, secundum naturam cum sint, absint anostra enim velest e virtutevel naturae congruenter vivere–summum bonumsit, etquonammodo autquo Age nuncistidoceant… quonam modo ab isdem principiis profecti efficiatis,ut honeste vivere –id ), who, as can be seen from Cicero’s discussions of his ethical theory in theory of his ethical discussions as can from who, beCicero’s ), seen De fin. summum bonum III 41 and Acad . I, 35-39; cf.. I,35-39; Lucullus Tusc –starting with . V 120 we learn that the claim that the Stoic-Peripatetic debate is merely 131-139, 47 Part De fin. Chapter II.3 oikei Acad III 141 De fin IIIand 10-14;etc.; V 22,88), IV 2ff I shall discuss Cicero’s presentation of ǀ . I, 19-23, 35-39, 43, I, . 19-23, sis De leg and ending with the account of the of account the with ending and . V16. . I54, 46 Acad De finibus . I35ff,43; III, and, jointly and, III, Tusc De fin . V21-2), De finibus causa . V 74; ) to ND CEU eTD Collection old and outdated view of Cicero as a transcriber they could do so on assumption so on the do theycould as atranscriber viewCicero of old outdated and the presentation of Stoic ethics in ethics Stoic of presentation the on commenting when context wider the neglect habitually ethics of Stoic interpreters throughout which isreinforced and conveyed from perspective, come this asasurprise.Indeed, not should resulthere, this disappointing argument ideathe asubstantial seeking of encourages so strongly that perspective in sameAntiochean view of the Importantly, Stoic thesis on the understanding of understandinglet reading alone of Stoican the reasoning, for itas might missneglectbe that itfor or crucial aproper seems sketchy: to points telos meaning Stoic of of the of the presentsomeelucidation bemeant sort seems to to It expectations. these meeting of short falls account Cato’s however, Notoriously, English language scholarship. oikei see in camefirst to other, from each theory Stoic the and Academic” “Old Antiochean the distinguish to failing for criticised rightly been has who Pohlenz, Max that conciliatione naturae 49 see further STRIKER 1996b (=1991): 227. interpretationof Stoic see ethics WHITE 1979:144-6(with references to POHLENZ 1970 (=1948)); 29n. (White refers toPOHLENZ 1940:95 as a typical example).For brief a summary of Pohlenz’ any warning as evidenceclaims for onStoic doctrine, for whichis criticised he by WHITE1979: 149, Stoic the former. Elsewhere, at Elsewhere, former.the Ethik” –cf. 14 note above.the same book In he repeatedly cites passages from the of conception Stoic 48 Cf. note 14 above. 14 note Cf. Pohlenz (POHLENZ 1940: 11) calls -formula, “living in agreement with nature”, but this elucidation is frustratingly is elucidation this but nature”, with in agreement “living -formula, ǀ telos sis the “foundation” of ethics, Stoic of “foundation” the , living honourably, is“derived from nature’s recommendation”, De finibus telos . I tend to think that it isit. Itend tothink that Ciceronean partly dueto this influence , the Stoic theory is perceived as essentially flawed. But . telos Lucullus – will contain some sort of derivation of the latter from 49 oikei De finibus 131 Cicero is even more explicit: he claims that the ǀ sis “derAusgangspunkt wie der feste Grund der Stoischen Part II 142 48 a view which became rather influential in influential rather became which aview III.Asin Isuggested Chapter De finibus argument I.1 ducatur a V without for the for , on the on , CEU eTD Collection plausible theory, andmuch adopting Antiochus’of narrative origins aboutthe and make him susceptible to– finding Antiochus’ theory finding make Antiochus’ to– him theory susceptible of the In theory Chapter telos in as the Academic spokesman the when speaking stating discussedin topics the of preface the first in when already perspective Antiochean the with agreement implicit an reveal to seems Cicero that out came also it discussion Inmyabove two). the between overlaps indicated may there by that traditions andbyAntiochus’ teaching (Ialso considerable may ethics Stoic knowledge of have been certainly is tradition Platonic–Aristotelian unified andan allegedly ethics between Stoic Antiochean). I concluded, in Part I, that, for all we know, Cicero’s the in occurs first theory Stoic Chapter But wehavealready of bytheend seen, identified with the views he endorses as a character in additional assumptions to the effect that Cicero’s views are not to be straightforwardly philosophy separation of this as an of Hellenistic expositor favourable of view Cicero on current the that there often even named Antiochus’ lost Antiochus’ named even often finibus that in writing that 50 Cf. Chapter Part III Part summum bonum is “derived from nature’s recommendation”, and IV and V(and perhaps also II)he drew, at least partly,Antiochus on (they tout court I.3.2 I shall Ishall further arguealthough that subscribeCicero doesnot toAntiochus’ I.1 ) that Antiochus’ presence is felt already in the feltalready is presence Antiochus’ ) that , notes 17 33. and De finibus , his Academic scepticism does not prevent him from –indeed, it does issomething that pursues” “nature ( III Cicero draw on some Stoic source, whilein source, writing Stoicdraw onsome Cicero III De legibus De De finibus Peri tel Chapter II.3 I (as Cicero’s own position), and also (in 143 III from its context seems to be due to ab ovo ǀ n as the probable source). De finibus I.5, ducatur aconciliatione naturae thoroughly informed byAcademic Lucullus that this Antiochean view of the of view Antiochean this that De finibus I he takes it for granted that itfor granted he Itakes sequatur natura he declares that the Stoics the that hedeclares summum bonum Pro Murena IV elsewhere. IV or 50 (the contrast (the I also noted ); and also and ); the most the . De CEU eTD Collection irresolvable. makes and problems theother two more sameinterpretation only the seem acute even interpretation of Stoicthe theory endorsed by Cicero throughout Antiochean the if weaccept explainedaway, or eliminated easily relatively be can problems two first the that however, argue, shall I deficient. otherwise offered by clues possible the shall consider I case each In intact. actions Cato’s of appropriate content speechobjects retain theirvalue and this thus drastic inourvalue change leaves system the to resolve natural indifferent), of objects and(b)pursuit claim the natural nevertheless that the the puzzles other the all (which renders good single the constitutes “morality” or “agreement” –to findharmony” as a of highlyconduct of valuable “conclusion”pursuitto the object that that they Chapter are vague or problem presented by his swiftidentification of “agreement” with “morality”. Next, in andorder harmony conductof asahighlyvaluable practical and object, on (b) the recognise to we come development intellectual of a certain our point at claiming that 26. First, in Chapter 26. First, In particular, I shall considerfour interpretive problems raised by view of view of Stoicby the theory conveyed embedded, and also with each other, so as to virtually facilitate the largely Antiochean is account in which Cato’s with widerthe interactcontext to come problems section of Cato’s text. But at the same time I shall try to show how first these the by interpretive raised problems interpretive main the on focus shall I chapter this In endorses in endorses he views Antiochean the argue, shall I Thus, theory. Stoic the of development II.3.2 De finibus , I shall consider (a) the mysterious shift from appreciating “order and from appreciating shift mysterious (a)the , Ishall consider II.3.1 II and IV are part of his Academic sceptic stance in IIandethics. part of stance IVare his Academicsceptic I shall focus (a) on the question what Cato may mean by De finibus Part II 144 as a whole. De finibus De finibus ; but that ; but III 16- III CEU eTD Collection really as obvious as Cato seems to think. Are those readers with a more or less healthy omnia illa,quaeprimadilexerat multo eamplurisaestimavitquam concordiam,agendarum ordinemet,utitadicam, in (… its object own right practical valuable as ahighly activity rational of andconsistency appreciate theinternal order comehumans to development When at III a) 21 we are toldsentence in 21. III that difficult the from come which of both examples, two with point this atillustrate me Let a certain missingthe links in reasoningCato’s bymapping it onto the Old Academicpoint theory. ofisfollowresponsive willingreconstruct to reader who these beable guidelines will to their intellectual/moralverbal (cf. II38; see further IV 2-4, 56-62, 68-74, 78; V 22); thus he can assume that a ismerely theories Peripatetic the and Stoic the between disagreement the idea that the had introduced he of III(10),stillthis speakingasanadvocate tradition, Book given a brief but sympathetic account of Old Academic ethics, and at the beginning of In Book II (33-4, 44-8),tradition. Peripatetic Academic–early Old the sharewith Stoics the that assumptions speaking as a andbackground points starting theoretical the of is corollary itlogical that a sometimes makesleave Cato some philosophicalimplicit point because he believes Stoic doctrine seemsIn someto be duecases, to his largelyCicero’sII.3.1 Antiochean negligence outlook: of itparticular seems that he points of detail in presenting the Problems that have a solution …), we may well begin to wonder if this point is point if this wonder to begin well may we …), Chapter II.3.1 persona 145 in the dialogue, Cicero had already Cicero in dialogue, the viditque rerum CEU eTD Collection then he continues asfollows: hethen continues humans “are endowedbynature with and intellect”. asharpandreason vigorous In 46 hedifference addsthat (45) humans greatest between the andotheranimals isthat A later bit of asof these). parts soul the body (as well the and the main constituents, parts safe and sound, and that this entails a care for the respective excellences of their theirkeep themselves self-love, makes congenital which them andall to wish their by act motivated youth are to the doctrine, Epicurus’ contrary to 33 he argued that, II at Thus Academics. Old the and Stoics the between ground common the to belong Epicurean theory Epicurean in he, Book II, the have of criticising which arguments the ploughed already through Cicero, however,may well assume that by the time his readers get to this passage they desires. natural (instrumentally), becausemuch asitmaximises andinas satisfaction the of our derivatively only valuable is consistency and order internal this that think to natural more seem might it point this At alien. and odd rather seem reasonably the objects that are contrary to our nature hasimmense are contrary our to that objects the escaping at and self-preservation) to are contributive (i.e.nature with our accordance and consistency order internal the that idea the Thus right). own its in attainment of worthy knowledge and truth consider all we of that see, soon shall we as only (adding a ourselves preserve selecting birthactivity value our own constitution,likefrom animals,we, other that point starting has establishedthe only Thus farCato that aims and recoil at fromattaining thisdestruction, a familiar experience? and thusobjects by (although all meansincomplete) intellectual/moral finddevelopment supposed to take care to that are in in propria persona , presented and endorsed views that on and, presented viewshis on that endorsed view Part II 146 intrinsic value might value CEU eTD Collection consistent; and likewise to hate what is deceptive… is what hate to likewise and consistent; of this desire stages early the From sphere. celestial the in on goes what we even discover to eager we are arewhen leisure, led on to love truthThis same innature general,has implanted in us a desire to namelyknow the truth, a desireeverything most manifest in our hours of that is trustworthy, open and 52 in general are Stoics the that idea the with familiar is already (and II Book through commended to preservediscussion,namely living every that being“isfrom birth toitselfattached and itself” (16); but a readerCato who hasdoes already notworked repugnant to us. makeher way itwhat clear is false,consist of cognitions and embrace anelement establishedhowthey by reasonand method. As forassenting they to because secondly and [the adoption, of worthy are contain they what these because firstly sake, own their Stoics] holdclaimseven whenthat themselves forthere out something worked of inhaving delight taking isobserve can we whom all young the of no case relate ulteriorthe things motive.within [18] that themselvestoWe also have they since areownright, intheir theattaining worth believe we consider an Greek), the from against element“catalepses” obscure, thatthatmajor asthe it nature,weresciences enfoldsNow shouldandcognitions pointembracethis be thetakenis truth. the(whichup Thisfor mostundermay bewe seen may in thecall(17-18), then,saying wefind Cato something considerably similar: graspings or perceivings, part concernbut of forour thesoundness III andIn Book perfection own parts. of our or, if these terms is for it desire are our thus soul; the characterising excellence aspectof specific the part or disagreeable or of “Knowledge canbe which ourselves truth” self-love. from the viewedasa springs perfect and preserve to inclination original the above and over motivation independent an not is truth” the know to “desire this theory Academic Old the on course, Of 51 et quoniamet eademnatura cupiditatem ingenuithomini veri quod videndi, facillime apparet, cum per se ipsi invenerint. autem in parvis intellegi potest, quosdelectari videamus, etiamsi eorum nihil intersit, si quid ratione adsciscendas arbitramur,quod habeantquiddam insequasicomplexum et continens veritatem. id placent autminus intelleguntur, katalepseis appellemus licet,eas igitur ipsaspropter se Rerum autem cognitiones, quasvelcomprehensiones velperceptiones vel,sihaecverba autminus fidelia, simplicia, constantia, tum vana, falsa, fallentia odimus… vacui curis etiam quid in caelo fiat scire avemus, his initiis inducti omnia vera diligimus, id est quae sint contra naturam, arbitrantur. rationeconstitutum et via. afalsaautem adsensionemagis nos alienatos esse quam aceterisrebus, aliquid dignum adsumptione, tum quod constent excognitionibus et contineant quiddam in se 52 [18] artis etiam ipsas propter seadsumendas putamus, cum quia sitiniis Chapter II.3.1 147 51 CEU eTD Collection 54 speaking. is Lucullus Antiochean the passage former apparently who adolescents of observation the thesis: initial the of favour in argument Notably,such interpretation on passagethe canbe taken as presenting afurther (289ff) argues that this is not what we find in also e.g. STRIKER 1996a (=1983): 284-289, who speaks of“argument an from perfection”, and further Stoic theory does not actually follow this pattern is largely based on finibus by conveyed picture theoverall intheories, with line thetwo conflate tendency to presentation of the Stoic theory in theory Stoic the of presentation “perfectionist”. or realisationist” “self- as termed sometimes pattern, “Aristotelian” broadly followthis actually not does theory Stoic the that out pointing in right are interpreters such that think the Antiochean theory and both from theory Stoic the on distinguishing are keen (me included) who interpreters the Antiochean descriptionwin modern not approval the certainly Now thisthose would of interpretation of the Stoic theory. I tendintellect. human the of toperfection the to pertinent nature becausethey with simply are thingsinaccordance cognitions) areamong the “sciences” upbysuch aswellthemade or “arts” individual “cognitions” (including conduciveparts; variousthe perfection the of one’s knowledge to forms of constituent to one’s from protection andharm also destruction, but those things whichare include nature” only whichareconducive inthings not those “things accordance with the interpretation this On self-preservation. towards impulse consequent the of and natural self-love here a our manifestation of as specific isintroduced and knowledge atIII10)maythinknaturaland findittemptingto that our fondness for repeated truth II 38 Academicsof substance,hinted at pointalready on with the agreement Old the 53 Cf.1979: WHITE 146-7etc.see furthermy comments in 96below note inChapter and Cf. also as a whole (which of course presents a serious obstacle if the claim that the Luc . 30-31, which obviously. 30-31,which acloserepresents ofparallel 54 My point here is, however, that as far that is, asCicero’s here however, My point De fin De finibus De Part II 148 . III 16-21; cf. also 226-7. 53 III is concerned, we can detect a De fin . III 17-18, althoughthe . III17-18, in De finibus III.2 III). . See De CEU eTD Collection “ isalaterdevelopment, by Cato’s moral explanatory although action (22)that remark a pointwell-nigh envisagedby at Ciceroof the Book II 38. It is further confirmed substance (itis only thethat Stoics dressed up the same ideas in anew terminology) – of point the on them between agreement an is there and coincide, Academics) conversationThis interpretation is further encouraged by Cicero’s claim in theintroductory (III 10) thatus”. repugnant to the arguments“among the of things the Stoicsthat are contraryand the Peripateticsto nature assenting (Old to what is false the is by far our understand why we valuethis the excellenceof is rationality, part andperfection desireandwisdom practical our of soundness the that crowns the we for self-preservation concern natural of our asapart because prudence, simply or natural development of our rationality. In order to quiddam ratione constitutum etvia quotation: (seethe above “art” an characterises which method” and reason andconcordancebecause this quality displays order by the “establishedbeingof is this conduct, of rational andconcordance” “order esteem the to Stoics wecome the when to understandthat according readily also wecan interpretation, Accepting this from birth hedonistically motivated. is being living every that claim the to counter-examples good offers motive, ulterior are fond ofworkingsomething out for themselves, even when is there obviously no 55 it tooisinaccordance with nature For the meaning of meaning the For most precious via inthis context see WHITE1979: 158, n. 59. constituent (cf. IV 4, 16, 19); it is for the same reason that above everythingelse ). 55 Chapter II.3.1 What we really come to desire is the art of life, and, to 149 a far greater extent a far we only have to add that reason that add to have only we than the earlier the than contineant most CEU eTD Collection which is 62-1 BC. Ishall say onmore this issue in Chapter the in day the won who Cicero sceptic Academic self-confident the of absence permanent the rather is point this at reader reflective a may trouble What platform. Peripatetic Academic– Old the and Stoics the among divide the downplays he Book II in Epicureans the against argument the in –only compatible as viewed be readily can Ciceros two the by viewsendorsed the and unproblematic: both dates belong to the period inwhich Cicero wrote and published fin 57 “agreement” in this context denotes the perfect internal rational order, concordance order, internal rational theperfect denotes in this context “agreement” (34: of “good”where 33-4, suggests at he “the that value of virtue is distinct:amatterof notdegree” kind, notion Stoic of the account brief Cato’s see By contrast, foolish. the than self-love by led less no is sage expetendam magis hortatur quamsuperiora omnia (III 21: itself” morality and action “moral as specified isfurther “agreement”, in lie or consist Wefind may also puzzling effortlessnessthe which “the with which is good”, told to b) Book IIwill be abletosupply linethis of reasoning. of arguments the recollect is to able who reader an attentive that he assumes because neglectall make points mayis Cicero these Cato well that else. My point everything above latter the value to come we how and why explain he does nor conduct; our of concordance” and “order the value to we come that claim the itto heconnect does nor attachment; natural initial our to relates knowledge and truth for fondness our how is Cato interpretation does inbeing farfrom account. not Cato’s make explicit it clear Weinmind, the line however, that keep should assumed of bythis reasoning (cf. IV4, 16, 19, 25, 32). 23.Again,reason” at III ishowunderstands Cicero this the theory IV Stoic inBook and (formerly “agreement” identified with “wisdom” “morality” with and“perfect pursuit” our stimulates objects, 56 Of course, the dramatic date of “ . I-II (52 and 50 respectively). But even a reflective reader may find this reverse chronological order chronological reverse this find may reader reflective a even But respectively). 50 and (52 I-II . Consequens enim estetpostoritur,dixi. ut est tamen ea secundum naturam multoque nosadse alia est igitur propria aestimatio virtutis, quae genere, non crescendo valet honeste ipsumquehonestum facta 57 De fin 56 . III-IV is a couple years earlier than the dramatic date of date dramatic the than earlier years couple a is III-IV . , as well as by his identification of by hisidentification , as as of good the well Part II 150 ”; cf. also 59, where Cato assumes that the Stoic ). It may seem natural to think that think to natural seem may It ). III.1.2 . Lucullus ). , the dramatic date of De Re Publica De ; CEU eTD Collection wonder how the perfect organisation of our selection of the things in with accordance of selection things the our of organisation perfect howthe wonder explanatory as they are to many of us today. But ifself- and obvious wereas connotations these this readers Roman contemporary is so, one cannot but begin to so on (cf. II 76), and it is only reasonable to assume that to most of Cicero’s conscientia “praiseworthiness”(49: as “fellowship” or“community” with (II45: others notions other such with “morality” associates Cicero II in Book virtues the of account The isproblem onlysharpened by wider context.the Incriticising the Epicurean preservation as its singleobjective. has self- is about talking consistencyCato or order whose activity practical on the other hand would require “agreement” or and concordance” “order and hand one on the “morality” or “virtue” further elucidation –all the more so, as the rational arbitrary and counter-intuitive definitions would not neutralise the problem. not in life important things (if themost asoneof or“morality” virtue accord his/her own on appreciate has to already come who is someone Stoictheory the of ideal addressee possible that, similarly to what is often said in connection to Aristotle’s ethics, the the whole life” ( does this apparently this does disposition” ( only to its internal order and to how this renders it capable to make our life happy: “a harmonious concordance of our present thought and conduct is but a vagueis precursor. buta and conduct thought present our of concordance and consistency which characterises wisdom wiseand activity,whichto the order and speaks of ‘ ‘numerical measures’ required by nature or has perfect proportion” (cf. proportion” perfect orhas by nature required measures’ ‘numerical 59 harmony with nature, do not admit of cumulative enlargement”. 58 Notably, atDL VII 100 “the fine” is defined in a rather abstract way as “that which has infull all the Cf. III45:“right conduct,as Isay, also consistency goodnesslikewise, and which is found initself, the most important one); but the relation between what is normally meant by meant is normally what between relation the but one); important most pulchritudo ), fairness, honesty fairness,), honesty (59: diathesis homologoumen psukh ’). Similarly, atDL VII 90virtue is defined innon-moral terms, withreference Ɲ pepoimen formal rectum feature of rationality have doto with “morality”? It is well Ɲ pros homologian pantos toubiou , Ɲ ), i.e. “a soul made capable of bringing about the consistency of laudabile 59 aequitas Chapter II.3.1 151 ), justice ), (51: , fides ), “righteousness”), (71: iustitia societas ). But the mere appeal to such to appeal mere the But ). Tusc . IV 30-31, where. IV30-31, Cicero ), “conscience” (54: ), ), “rightness” and “rightness” ), 58 pietas But what But ) and ) CEU eTD Collection earth” (45: earth” on person every with then and citizens fellow our with firstly ourselves associate and betweenaffection family and we friends, tomoveare prompted further gradually out company…alsobeginningeach “makes peoplewith bondsof the others want life”, “comprehending of wholecourse the a subsequent andplanthefuture, calculate First (i), Cicero claims virtues. moral the that of acquisition the same power of reason and nature the rational our of perfection the linkbetween a establishes close which enables us draws humans doctrineCicero onwhich itis the that quite andlucid, clear complete to honestatis morality is of (48: andpicture rounded complete” that he “a virtues presents in moral conception the Epicurean of the (45-7), later criticising Abit mental constituents. bodily and andexcellences one’s of respective powers the in forincludes itfor a harm avoidingconcern personal and destruction; concern also exhaust not self-love does congenital of our borne out concerns of scope practical the the that makes itclear II 33Cicero II.At in Book character the by Cicero endorsed However, a part of the difficulty dissolves if one pays sufficient attention tothe views by self-preservation). meant normally is what than more much comprises good our belocus of the out to turns which of and concordance order actions the appropriate of range the us, suchthat to “natural” arealso altruism and sociability care, parental that learn we that 63 III until not is it seen, already have we (As all. at Stoics isolation might reasonably wonder how justice can come into play according to the ( “embraces” wisdom of these andself-preservation–be would productive –i.e. thingsnature the to which are conducive similar other attitudes and character traits? At 25 Cato asserts that ); and although this picture ismuddled sketchy rather than ); andalthough actually and picture this eademque ratio fecit hominemhominumeademque ratio fecit adpetentem… ut profectusa complectitur ) justice; but someone reading Cato’s account in account Cato’s butjustice; someone reading ) Part II 152 expletam et perfectam formam perfectam expletam et CEU eTD Collection fraudem, periurium,fraudem, malitiam,iniuriam fallentia odimus,ut diligimus, idestfidelia,simplicia,constantia,tumvana,falsa, and deceptive, suchasfraud,malice andinjustice” perjury, (46: … everythingis that “trustworthy,and open but consistent”, also toshun iswhat “false stages of ouromnium mortalium societate atque natural caritate domesticorum serpatac suorum longiusetseimplicetprimum civium,deinde desire to know the truth we are led on, not only to love rational activity, or “agreement”, with morality. with “agreement”, or activity, rational lie and in“the concordance” which is identification order of to supposed good, of the mayswift one Stoicsskip overCato’s the backgroundassumptions, sharethese easily IV, that in does as CiceroBook for Taking granted, nature”. to according condition perfect in “most ispreservethe ourselves chief concern to whose as natural self-lovers overall rational of us excellence such have our intrinsicsoul, andas they appealto an be of to The parts virtues virtues. out turn acquisitionthe moral the moral the of involves nature rational our of fulfilment and perfection the clear:consideration on from isemerging rather this passage chief point the Although areobscure, details the anxious notdo sayto or anything may lack which to appear in courage”. thoughtlessness, from shrinks harming anyonean insolent with word deed, andor is following from on them,namely “order and restraint” (temperance), which “dreads (presumably justice makes its prudence, afourth courage) and contribution to one courage). Finallyof source be the to takes apparently Cicero (which trivial (iv),misfortune human all Cicero says that each suited togiving totaking than islofty better order that noble, them, regards and and of the three moral qualities mentioned 55ff (esp. 65-67). 60 The same doctrine The is touchedBook uponin IV, 17-18andis expoundedgreatdetailV 42-3,48, in in ). Again (ii), Cicero says that from the earliest Chapter II.3.1 ). Third, (iii) our reason has an element in it 153 60 omnia vera CEU eTD Collection actions from their intrinsic worth. and moral attitudes recognised deprive traditionally they to seem its ownaccount, its everyday andconnotations; byinsisting that this alonefrom and isgood choiceworthy on notion the detach to seem Stoics the “agreement” with morality identifying itisus, ison consideration though By natural indifferent. virtually actually to good liesfor the andgiving in“agreement”, common tothe precedence advantage, it does happiness; hispertain and it Nor is to with which order executed. consistency rational is perfect “moral” his activity renders what his activity; of “moral” the quality individual,himself.including Butacting on initself principle this pertain doesnot to are told at and evil, assuchhave and nobearing happiness. on our is HewhoIII we wiseand good, 64, considersfin (21 account” own their on be sought to “not are nature the with accordance in things welfare of all more than that of any particular “perfect proportion” rather than with any of the characteristics that are normally associated with associated normally are that characteristics the of any with than rather proportion” “perfect what else ‘ asto any clue any –atrate, conduct our of rational organisation eo in”says, ( “lies asCato Ourgood, good. an our of or aspect form a part morality with associate wenormally that traits andcharacter attitudes the that follow itnotwe are III 62-7–, theiron is tolddoes theory at what sociability,–this altruism the range ofitin his critique of the Stoicwhat theory in Book IV). For even if according to the Stoics is naturaladdress any hedoesnot at himselfdoes; rate, apparently Cicero genuine(as difficulty to usNotably, bypassing over this gapin accountone mayCato’s notice fail take to of a extends to such things as parental affection, or “the beautiful” ( 61 This interpretation isincidentally fortified by independent evidence on the Stoic notion of “the fine” ) “agreement”, that is, as I indicated above, a formal feature of rationality of the and rationality formal feature is,indicated a above, that asI ) “agreement”, .), and are “indifferent” (25), meaning that they are “intermediate” between good between “intermediate” they meaningare (25), that “indifferent” and.), are to kalon ) in DL VII 99-100, which shows a tendency to associate this notion with convenientia 61 ’ could denote in this context–; whereas the Part II 154 De fin . III 20-22 does not provide not 20-22does us . III positum sitin sub CEU eTD Collection Seneca displays the inherently valuable characterpeculiar to perfect reason (cf. also not that it done out of a sense of duty, displays genuine altruism etc., but rather the very fact that it with “praiseworthiness” ( “praiseworthiness” with fine” “the connects vaguely view which traditional ofthe aware well are Stoics The proper. “morality” Ep . 120,3-5, 8-11 (LS 60 E)). ibid . 100); but they seem to insist that what renders an actionpraiseworthy is Chapter II.3.1 155 De fin . II 49-50,III 32; CEU eTD Collection The Stoics claim The Stoicsclaim that Cicero is careful to present them right at the beginning of the dialogue (III 10-14). but they nevertheless insist that insist nevertheless they but in indicated my already (in overall of the III structure of overview Book Chapter views constitute the focus of his critique of the Stoic theory in Book IV; but as I have assumptions, and hence lack sufficient rational support within the Stoic theory. These also that they endorse ethical theses that are not consistent with these principles and basic principles and astheassumptions Old and Academics early Peripatetics, but same the adopt Stoics the that only not holds Cicero worse. even appear things makes this the in contrary,viewing way; to theframework them same interpretiveonly in be cannot resolved account problemshowever,the raisedbyCato’s In othercases, validity. itsmake providing thus framework, of readerto require confirmation the useof this theory; understanding Stoic and the some of in virtually gaps reasoningthe Cato’s for an interpretive framework is embeddedsuggests account in which Cato’s Thewidercontext II-IV. in Books by him acharacter as viewsendorsed Antiochean reconstruct the missinglinks in argumentthe along the guidelines offered bythe will be ableto reader an attentive that detail assumption animportantthe on or skip Cato makes point Cicerosometimes aphilosophical Thus farIhave argued that II.3.2 a) Problems that do not have solution end and and end happiness; one’s to respect with “indifferent” is nature– to contrary things the and nature with accordance morality only the correspondinglyis good, and elseeverything –including the things in Part II 156 II.2 ), CEU eTD Collection represents Antiochus’ argumentative strategy esp. (cf. strategy argumentative Antiochus’ represents criticism of line this that in Cicero evidence sufficient have we that believe I substantial position of their own by using a misleading terminology. have to a pretend butinsubstance, of point the agree with predecessors their actually Stoics the OldAcademicon the theory: verbalvariant viewed asamerely be cannot taken seriously atall. asCiceroat III10,it rightshould suggests Rather, be theory their day the of end the at Thus (a). endorsing by dissented they which from In upholding (b) the Stoics only reveal their reliance on the Old Academic theory, According to the elaborate argument that Cicero will expound in Book IV, Book in expound will Cicero that argument elaborate the to According summum bonum the of between OldAcademic conception establish the to attempt position astable is that these two claims13) reject. Cicero’s and (III are bound Aristoworry Pyrrho which to insisting on (b), cannot be consistently by Academic theory aspect of Old important retain the to an try they nevertheless held: the Stoic theory is an abortive tradition,line and themselves up with like philosophers and Pyrrho(12). Aristo In maintainingAcademic–Early divergefrom Stoics Old the (a) the Peripatetic 63 31, 50;IV 43, 49, 60;V 23. 62 The problem with these philosophers is that they give away with practical guidance, cf. II 35, 43; III See further note 47 above. 47 note further See (ii) (i) b) and reject the latter. the reject and former, the pursue and prefer to reason have we do deliberation: and choice rational to pertinent is nature to contrary things the and nature with accordance in things the between difference the them from providing rational support to (b) (46-48; cf.further 40-42, 57-60, 68-72, 78). prevents (b) and of(a) inconsistency the (a), to themselves committed have they once but this point ( drawnis conclusion atthe 26ff; (IV 44: (a) holding for “Zenogrounds rational had sufficient provide to nofail Stoics goodthe reason to depart from the teaching of his predecessors” on causa cur Zenoni non fuisset, quam ob rem a superiorum auctoritate discederet and the ethical radicalism represented by Pyrrho and Aristo. byPyrrho represented andradicalism ethical the Chapter II.3.2 157 Acad . I35-37). 63 For the time the For 62 But )); CEU eTD Collection of this developmental process (III 20-22) Cato emphasises that already already emphasisesour that Cato 20-22) (III process of developmental this of this pointis a matter of natural (that is, sound) rational development. In his account appreciation the insists that Cato good, only morality isthe that thesis the As regards a) presented by them. fortified further Cato’s exposition sharpens bycertain elements problem the of in bywider suggested context the interpretation Antiochean the that but in isolation, if considered even insufficient is rather points establish these to scholarship on concern inconcern Cicero’s of focus the only not constitute they for respectively, (b)), and ((a) points Let us now consider questions. answertothese provide aconclusive in some more to fails Cato’s account part: irony onCicero’s be apiece of to out turns expectation detail Cato’s – bebe avoided?” to there else will evil, what treatment ofmorality what is else only the to pursue?”good, willtherebeis and “ifvice only the the two challenged“if investigating” questions the (namely weare questions the inresolving assistance great “will beof exposition maintains thatthis Cicero any at rate, – theses conflicting exposition Stoicorumqueis sententiam to show(14: Stoics” the and Zeno of how system whole the “expound to the Stoics determines Cato criticism toCicero’s III.In response Book of beginning at the right attempt to groundbeing, however, whatI would like toemphasise this isthat criticism is foreshadowed and reconcile these two De finibus De finibus III-IV but also the focus of much speculation in modern ); nevertheless itis clear that the real challenge for his III and Stoic ethics. I shall try to show that Cato’s attempt Cato’s show that try to I shall and ethics. III Stoic Part II 158 ibid .). Of course, in retrospect this De finibus De totam Zenonis and CEU eTD Collection nature”; cf. 35,37 IV as Babylon, of Diogenes following (defined, good notion the of acquirethe we which through process kindcognitive of In a later explanatory digression it.account of underlying substantial the argument(s) (III 33-4) Cato adds, first,any view, not and ofthe Stoic “external view” oran mere“description” says, a that (i) the name of the the thesis on the on thesis come to this conclusion? of exactly what to train(s) premises,isreasoning– –from what onesupposed through It is only in termswork?” How supposed is to how process inference, that as arational reasoning, of these details, if278) has it: recently “ifput comes thenotion us by of good the to of a process at all, that the Stoic the For real from question is, emerging (INWOOD textthe asBrad Inwood 2005: viewing the passage asan viewing thepassage docuerit rational”. 65 discussionof Troels Engberg-Pedersen(ENGBERG-PEDERSEN 1986: 158-160). GiselaStriker, STRIKER 1996a (=1983) 1996b and (=1991); see esp. 1996:226and290-1; cf. the development as its prerequisite (21: as itsdevelopment prerequisite recognition of the order and harmony of rational conduct as such has some intellectual collegit it is a agreement/morality the is only as good afurther dueto genuine cognitive procedure: potius 64 Cf. DL VII 94, where the good is defined as “what is perfect ( For Inwood’s exposition of the problem see problem the of exposition Inwood’s For right … conclusion –see also 20: ). However, Cato fails to provide us the details that would be so crucial for conclusion to draw. What Cato has given us here instead is, as Inwood ( viditque summum bonum … reached through “learningreasoning” ( and reachedthrough aestimavit 65 intellegit ) is ‘ argument proper collatio rationis could be ; see further 25 …), and that the shift from this to appreciating quod esse natura absolutumquod esse natura Chapter II.3.2 simul autemcepit intellegentiam vel notionem ibid demonstrated 159 . 278ff. The problem hasbeen most clearly stated by for the thesis. the for ’, “rational inference” (distinguished from (distinguished inference” “rational ’, iudicet 64 , 33: –that is, could be shown to be to shown be could is, –that collatione rationis teleion ) fora rational being cognitione etratione , “what is perfect by ; 75: ibid ratio qua .) CEU eTD Collection Admittedly, mystery.the be up vague in helpful to clearing aretoo thesedetails that through which we are supposed to acquire this concept, that is,concept, that knowingacquire precisely to this whichthrough wearesupposed knowing procedure cognitivefrom process or the However, without inside the relevance at all (43: no has amount their life, happy the to comes it when that so (45), Croesus” of riches virtue”, “like the light by andgrandeur anddestroyed “unavoidably overwhelmed splendour eclipsed, of the of a lamp in the raysverbal; his conclusionof is that the value of the other thethings in accordance with nature is sun”, or “a penny than rather issubstantial Peripatetics andthe Stoics the between dispute the that show added to the than initself. ofvirtue value the value lesser or agreater produce will operation nosuch from each other; subtracted or meaningfully addedtogether bevalues cannot different these entail that seems to incommensurably ( addition in( terms beof construed nature cannot with crescendo valet virtutis virtue, to in valuewhichattaches grasp particular this way (the we that and (iii) value that of the good, the conception tothe nature with accordance (ii)by mind “ascends”our this ( process 67 the latter meaning in Lewis & Short). For a different reading of the passage see LS 60D. of the term are “bringing together” and “comparison” or “analogy” ( “analogy” or “comparison” and together” “bringing are term the of such other processes as processes other such 66 crescere On this point see ANNAS 1993: 122, 392,394. “Inference” is the widespread translation of translation widespread the is “Inference” ) is ) ) or comparison ( distinct if it is it found that thevalue (through whatever is procedure) virtue of ), such that its difference from the value of the things in accordance higher than the value of the things in accordance with nature, this nature, in with accordance things valueof the than higher the ( certe minus ad beatamvitam pertinet multitudo… alia usus ); a matter of kind rather than of degree ( comparare , coniunctio 67 Catodrawsout thiscorollary 42-45 in to at order ). But I tend to agree with Inwood ( collatio Part II and 160 ascendit similitudo in this context, inthis although standard the meanings ) from those things which are in are things) from which those ). 66 De fin Moreover, he explains that explains he Moreover, accessio . III . 33iscitedas a locus for propria aestimatio quae genere,non ), magnification ), ). ibid . 278) CEU eTD Collection Cato’s account does provide some sort of elucidation of the Stoic superiorum auctoritatediscederet rem a ( this point on his predecessors” of teaching the from reasontodepartno good “Zenohad(IV 44)that be in to justified out pointing seems Cicero is considered, theory Stoic of the account Cato’s as far least Thus, at “morality”,constitutes our only genuine good. this toconclude“agreement” that in its right, andcome own object practical valuable highly asa activity of rational order internal grasp the we come to development rational our of point certain a at that idea the to reference obvious or direct any have it than meets the eye. the meets than it convincing. and Cicerofinds neither of them feebleappearance, have adisappointingly earlier, arguments suggested (22-25andAs these I ismorality 26ff). onlygood the In splendour of virtue” (IV37;cf. 42). dazzling the with vision mental our blind to “try simply Stoics the verdict his pointrather easily, by simply appealing tooureveryday ethical intuitions (29-31);on further that the Stoics have to say on this matter. In Book IV he can discard the above believe thatthis And isthe case? seems Cicero unaware of beinganythingthere all-surpassingthe is valueof good this derivedfrom them,reason dowehave what to what concepts,assumptions other andinsights areinvolved theinsight andhow about inconclusive. In Chapter In inconclusive. are but premises accepted on build they because (ii) or concede, to compelled not are opponent the fond of that(III 26-28),arguing they ineffective,are either (i)because they buildwhich onpremises At 48-52 attackshe short the and pointed syllogisms called “consequences”,which Cato is particularly who considers pain (oranything else that is not moral) an evil canbe really brave magnanimous.and completely”. At IV53-54 he responds tothe more specificofversion claim (III25,29), the that noone to be counted as good we “destroy morality itself, the very light of virtue, and dismantle virtue 68 At40-41he responds toCato’s claim (III10)that by viewthe adopting anything that except virtueis De finibus 68 III Cato adduces several further arguments in support of insupportof Cato further thesis adduces several the arguments IIIthat But even if these arguments were more powerful, they do not seem to II.4.2 , Section II.4.2.3 Chapter II.3.2 I shall argue that the argument at 29 may have more to 161 ; cf. IV 3, 14, 19, 26). The first section of causa cur Zenoninonfuisset, quamob telos -formula. But CEU eTD Collection throughout viewedis theory which Stoic the from Antiochean the perspective Even without supreme good,they skip overeverything else… the at arrive to wish they when Yet nature. with accordance in are that things all are itself virtue even seem to anticipate that criticism. that anticipate seem to interpretation of the Stoic theory presented in Book IV seems ignore;to indeed, which Antiochean which the account inCato’s certain passages are there To besure, unacceptable. and more conspicuous even appears in reasoning the gap the this perspective call they –what desire natural that determine They amazement. endless me causes here Stoics ofthe inconsistency The lifetime. a of whole the for them guide to duty a has It charge. its under placed elements these ofall care take to ceases never reason So guardianship. …when reasonis acquired, such is its dominionthat all the primary elements of nature fall underits holding this view (26-29,32-43); as he vehemently says (38-9), Platonic–Aristotelian tradition, they sharethe with assumptions theStoics andbackground given starting-points that, the out pointing into energy much puts Cicero IV in Book hand, other the on Notably, life –that is,it seems to fail to represent an argument proper for the Stoic position. does in factdoes provide usthe there. thesis on the fail to seems to account Cato’s is formula true. by that conveyed thesis the that show to not is encompass to meant is formula the what elucidate to 70 69 I hinted at Ihinted this apparent discrepancy between BookIV inChapter IIIand secundum naturam sunt. cumautem adsummum bonum volunt pervenire, transiliunt omnia… vocant gubernare,mirari ut istorum satis inconstantiam nonpossim. naturalem enim appetitionem, quam subiciantur.itaque nondisceditab eorum curatione, quibus praeposita vitamomnem debet cum autem assumpta ratio est,dominatu tanto in locatur, utomniaillaprimanaturae huius tutelae ϳΕΐφΑ De finibus summum bonum , itemque officium, ipsam etiam virtutem tuentem volunt esse earumrerum,quae Stoicthe position wouldill-supported. Butviewed seem from right , i.e. to answer to the questionanswer to concerninghuman the end of 70 Such are e.g. Cato’s claims to the effect that could not could demonstrate 69 Part II 162 have any valid rational for haveanyvalid grounds rational that that formula,this understood, so horm Ɲ – and appropriate action, and action, appropriate – and I.1 , see esp. n. 17 and 33 justify the Stoic the CEU eTD Collection demonstrandum comprehension”,facilitate than cf. 54)proper: arguments they belong the to that best at “analogies like mere claims more(or they seem thesepoints presents arrow-shooting, or the“wisdom” is unlike arts other like medicine it ornavigation; is like rather practicing performative arts (22-25, see also 32). But in the form Cato defence of butdefence view(IV80); of Stoic the ignoring them.Again, at the end of the dialogue Cato insists that he has more to say in cf. 23, 60). eoreferri, principia naturae utadipiscamur officia omnia referri, utrectedicipossit quae illa, esseofficia dixi,proficiscantur ab initiis naturae, necesse est eaadhaec (22: natural the attainingour principles” actionsaimedat are appropriate beall may said that it thus rightly latter; tothe mustbe directed necessarily former the nature’s from points, actions originate starting called appropriate have I “sincewhat cryptic: is tantalisingly point this of explanation immediate Cato’s former? the for rational selection. How, standard isthe nevertheless nature to contrary things andthe nature if with accordance at all, doesin things the Catobetween difference the attempt that hold consistently cannot they to indifferent, fitare the latter claimnature with in accordance are in that things other with the and good, only is the morality that thesis the hold Stoics the as far so in that objection, other Cicero’s to turn now us Let b) has anysubstance. late of Cicero’s whole set rather than to the to than rather philosophica demostrans Chapter II.3.2 ) does not give the impression that his promise his that impression the give not does ) De finibus 163 , and so Cicero may seem to be right in as a whole (or, for that matter, the matter, for that (or, asawhole cum vero ; CEU eTD Collection evident that even those who are wise act in the sphere of intermediates, and so judge so and intermediates, in of sphere the act whoare wise those even that evident is“it that 59, atIII presented further argument, beline the with in seems to reasoning things, “reasonable justification” for everything she does. This in turn requires, among other give andto in given the circumstances, is “appropriate” action decide which use the Stoics’ own terminology,enabledecide, herto in every possibleis circumstance, what theright do.thing to To wisdom mustmustbe providemustit practical ableto wisepersonwith the guidance: sufficient enable the wise person is coherent aperfectly produce to infallibly organisation, consistency of and practical concordance our mustitactivity; what which make life.up ahuman As such mustitselfmanifest wisdom in the perfect “materials” the to applied reason as reason: practical or mean prudence we “wisdom” identifiedfurtherforget “perfect “wisdom”not by that reason”, weshould or with be can and “morality”, and “agreement” in consist to out turns good if the Even sense. ullum sapientiae munus autopus inveniretur indifferent is “flawed”and“absurd” (30-31: indifferent andvice completely beyondvirtue else everything takes ethical which theory every claimsIn thelightunderstand wecan that Cato’s of perhaps such considerations through action. her for as achievable across shecomes that objects between practical the and choose oporteretdilectum adhideri methodlife,conduct of no and so ofchoosing beproperly applied ( could the to pertain that things the between whatsoever be nodifference would “there else, anything nothingrank above sothat would indifferent, be completely vice would in (III50; argues on ifLater beyond thebook andthat31) Cato everythingcf. virtue some criteria of evaluation,in virtue of which the wise person can discriminate )”; thus “wisdom would have no role or function” ( function” or role no have would “wisdom thus )”; conduct oflife Part II 164 ). Admittedly, this seems to make some make to seems this Admittedly, ). vitiosus . In . In order toperform wisdom task this , perabsurdus ). Moreover, this neque ullum neque CEU eTD Collection sustulerunt virtuethe of wisdom bepractical “abolished”would (12: inevitably is andagainst nature what with in accordance ecundum naturam sint,haberedelectum accords with nature?” (Plutarch, nature?” with accords that are in accordance withthat are nature in accordance onechoices makes that virtue is“it of of claims the essence the that of wisdom”. material against, fall under the judgment of the wise person, and are as it were the subject and it with or in accordance are they whether ofnature, primary objects that“the declares completely Finally,untouched. 61 Cato,apparently at on Chrysippus,drawing developed, the and crucial between naturalness andhavingconnection valueisleft of throwing the knucklebone“knucklebone thrown so as to the (as achievement its to contribute sense some in so do is, essentially as(happiness) to the of form what part not do though indifferents, “preferable” the suggests that being ( preferable and being good of distinction the of facilitate comprehension” “to asimile offers pondus ( “some importance” notion of vague the with value associates 20Cato III At alone. naturalness in and “naturalness”, should consist practical deliberation for criterion such action to be appropriate action”. But from this it does not follow that the required from Chrysippus himself: “what am I to begin from, and what am I to take as the foundation of proper foundation the as function take andI to the material am what of virtueand ( from, begin I to am “what himself: Chrysippus from 72 71 Notably, the same metaphor, and the same puzzling brevity of inference occurs also in a quotation a in also occurs of inference brevity puzzling same the and metaphor, same the Notably, Cf.ANNAS 2001: 82 32.n. ); and again, at 58, with “usefulness” ( ; 31: tollatur… prudentia pro 72 Ɲ But here again the metaphor is unrevealing: it simply simply itrepeats is unrevealing: metaphor the Buthereagain gmenon Comm. not arkh land ). The simile is far from being illuminating, but illuminating, being from far is simile The ). Ɲ n kath ” (12: ” upright contributes to the achievement of the end the of achievement the to contributes upright ; cf. also II43; see further III 61). To Cato, this is . 1069E ( Chapter II.3.2 Ɲ ), and that without the choice between what is what between choice the without that and ), stand kontos kai hul 165 virtutis hocproprium sit,earumrerum,que SVF upright). quod usui possitquod esse no III 491, LS 59A)). selection would be possible, and so Ɲ n aret 71 But this ideafurther isnot Ɲ s ) if I pass over nature and what ). Again, at 54 heAgain,). at among thethings virtutem ipsam aliquod telos CEU eTD Collection the normativity of practical rationality as such. As we learn much later, at III 58,an at later,learn much Aswe as such. rationality of normativity practical the with to reference is understood value) normative (asa an action of “appropriateness” the that seems it hand, one the On action”. “appropriate and “value” of notions the between relation the considering by problem the reduce slightly may We either. helpful III where Cato elaborates on the same point (12,22, 31, 50-51, 58-59, 61) are not very is by no means self-explanatory; and as we have seen, the other passages in This shift actions”.sakes”,own “appropriate andthusarethe of objects corresponding for theirbe taken “are to “worthy selection”, of are “non-valuable”), are opposites those whichareconducivetotheir are“valuable”things (while attainment) their (aswell as objects andthese nature; its with are in accordance that objects the towards factual/psychological evaluative/normativeto claims: the animal has natural impulses inference 20Cato introduces from As wehaveIII a shift or at seen, CatoDoes have anythingfurther toprovide tomake sense of connection? this latter”. tothe bedirected must necessarily “the former points, starting nature’s from “originate” actions sinceappropriate 22 that at claim cryptic the back to Thus weget providedhas not proper to argument an this effect. all “perfectly “perfectly all obvious” (31: even be prepared to die for our home-country. for die to be prepared even case Cato infers not only that altruistic behaviour is preferable to selfishness, but also that we should Cato (63) argues that our tendency to form societies to and act altruistically is also natural; and in this one’s offspring preferable to not begetting children atallfrom the pointof view of prudence? Again, naturally loveif our(62). Butevenour foris children natural, why rendershould this taking care of caring forone’s offspring, the forprecise thatreason parental lovee.g. one’s for also offspring arises comprises range Its self-preservation. mere to conducive are which actions those than more much resolve the problem. For asit turns out much later (III 62ff), the class of “appropriatebe self-abolishing would actions”choice includes and and of evaluation ascriteria other suchon based life of way a thus contrarydestruction; to reason.whichthreaten with harm ordestruction, to do away with this distinctionThiswould soonlead to maythings which contributebe to the sustenancepart of one’s life, whileof the things contrarythe to nature include thosetruth,73 but unfortunately, it does not entirely At this point one might perhaps argue that since the things “in accordance with nature” include those include nature” with accordance “in things the since that argue perhaps might one point this At perspicuous … Part II 166 quid autem 73 apertius ). In fact, however, he De finibus CEU eTD Collection value, i.e. itvalue,hasi.e.“useful” seem it; something doesnot imply about anythingwhich to it; sufficientreason todo attained such and the has practicalan objectthrough action have we circumstances) (in certain means that isappropriate an action That reason. derive uninformative.rather from values seemto Both normativity the practical of is in itself their connection but closely such related; are at an object action directed an of and “appropriateness” the a object practical “value”of the then, Apparently, ipsa propter se sumenda sintcontrariaque itemreicienda,primum est officium… ( is…etc.” function to be taken for their own sake, while their contraries arebe to rejected, the first proper are nature in things with accordance the that thusestablished points “with starting the (cf. such of attainment atthe aiming 20: of object action an an “appropriateness” valuespeaking the speaking about thingsthe inaccordancewith of nature the to about x attain to in order act to reason sufficient have we circumstances undercertain cases or done with ( with reason” done as indicating that we that as indicating selection”, or that it is “to be taken”; and it seems natural to understand these phrases On the other hand, do” ( renders the Stoic phrase Stoic renders the probabilis ratio reddipossit explanation could be given for its performance” ( “appropriate action” is “appropriate . This reading would also explain the effortlessness with which Cato shifts from ut ratiopostulet agere ratione actumest initiis igitur ea, quaesecundumnaturamsunt, ita constitutis, ut x have ‘s being “valuable” implies or entails that it is “worthy of per definitionem eulogos apologismos reason ; DL cf.VII 108: ; cf. DL VII 107, Stob. II 85.13-15; ; cf. II DL VII107,Stob. to prefer to ). Chapter II.3.2 “an action such that, if itis done, a reasonable 167 x (over other objects), and that in certain andthat objects), other (over hosa logoshaireipoiein / apologia quod ita factum est, ut eius facti est, uteius quod itafactum ), “what reason demands to probabilis ratio ), or “what is ). CEU eTD Collection “appraisal of expert”the ( the to reference vague involved which of value, meaning the to approach further a mention passage (58: of “usefulness” that kata phusinkata bion contributive to the life according to nature” ( VII 105 we are told that the relevant definitionof ‘value’ is “some intermediary powerorutility “the measure of a thing’s being in accordance with nature or of a thing’s being of use for nature” for of use being ( thing’s of a or nature with accordance in being thing’s ofa measure “the Stobaeus (II 83,10-84,6)where we told are that the primary at sense Thus of ‘value’ is“contribution” ( naturalness. and value between connection the presuppose simply or vague uninformatively 75 and “merit and increasingly well-organised and consistent execution of activity selecting execution this of andconsistent well-organised increasingly itself manifests inthe action”. increasingrationality After this our with appropriate selection outlined previously; from this our point selecting activity “goes hand inhand 58E): to otherwaybe just an thatof saying “preferred” things havevalue”; “much cf. Stob.II84,18ff (LS 20 the process begins when we come to “discover” ( “discover” to we come begins when process 20 the precursory discussion of the initial stages of our intellectual/moral andfunctioning of nature Aspractical Cato’s wehave reason. according to seen, development at III lies answermay suggestthatto the in very this seemto Cato’s account question the nature? nature accordingto to things contrary preferring to things have for dowe reasons –what reason viewpractical of of point from the “valuable” if But isis is, thereal so, this what “natural”question it thatrenders it the about them). andreject escape to we havereason are suchthat nature are contrary to that such likewisewe havepursue are nature them with that thethings (and that reason to in accordance things the that statement uninformative but straightforward the to down at point Cato’s considerations of these light In the be taken”). “to more than that we have some reasonattain to that object (it is “worthy of selection” or subclass of the former: a “preferred” differs from merely valuable things in that “there is good reason good is “there that in to things prefer them valuable overmerely other things” from ( differs “preferred” a former: the of subclass ( 74 krisin einai,eph’ hoson kataphusinestin productum – Other discussions of the notion of value that we find in our sources are not very helpful here: they are they here: helpful very not are sources our in wefind that of value notion ofthe discussions Other The situation is slightly complicated by the further distinctionbetween valuable and “preferred” echein poll per se per Cicero’s translation of the Greek of the translation Cicero’s -cf. also Ɲ ” ( 74 n axian tim Ɲ kath’hauto quod usui positesse ). amoib De fin Ɲ . III 58, where Cato seems to vaguely connect the notion of value with tou dokimastou satis esse causae, quam ob rem quibusdam anteponantur – ), andthat Diogenes ofBabylonspecifiedfurther “contribution” as Ɲ eph’hoson chreian t ); cf. also III 20. Moreover, both the DL and the Stobaeus the and DL the both Moreover, 20. III also cf. ); mes pro Part II ). 168 Ɲ n tinadunamin Ɲ gmenon ). As Cato ). AsCato (III 51) explains, latterthe is a De finibus Ɲ Ɲ i phuseiparechetai chreian sumballomen invenire III 20 seems to boil 75 ) the principle of ). Again, at DL Again, at ). Ɲ n pros ton this seems dosis ) CEU eTD Collection given source of motivation: our congenital and natural motivation: congenital given of natural in our source self-love. Theand things fact basic the that is obvious it interpretation this on for actions: appropriate of objects arepotential thus and havevalue, nature with are inaccordance that the is things it that why understand we could readily interpretation such lines. On an It might seem tempting to interpret the Stoic doctrinedesires. reported by Cato actionsandour isby presenting uspracticablesatisfy out working ways to to these along these existing desires that we are pressed to act at all; and the only way reason can influence to have, antecedently and independently of any rational consideration. Itis by our pre- we happen that desires of the rather asamatter but of rational matter deliberation, as a motivation in its own right at all; our final ends and preferences are what they are not “Humean” manner, assuming that practical reason simply cannot be a source of in a this conceive of to tend we often reason practical of “instrumentality” the When about speak the matter. we formodel understanding conceptual familiarmind a may to Forcall modernnature). readersthis to which are contrary things escaping the in nature (and with inaccordance things the successinattaining our maximise to aninstrument ameans or asessentially picture the enters reason practical stages All this might seem to encourageefficient. us to think that, accordingnatutrae to the Stoics, at these given that) you want to attain you wantto that) given (characterised by the adjectives bythe (characterised reason is a controversial issue;practical on views but this “instrumental” actual of Hume’s interpretation interpretation The Reasons’. has beenExternal and particularly ‘Internal paper, influential.seminal 76 This is more or less what the term “Humean” is takento imply, forinstance, inBernard Williams’ to which practical must conform reason is ourantecedently independently and 76 ), presumably with the result that our activity becomes more and more and more becomes activity our that result the with presumably ), Thus practical reasons in general have a conditional form: “assuming (or “assuming form: aconditional have in Thus general reasons practical x , you should, do perpetua Chapter II.3.2 169 , ad extremumconstans, ij ”. consentaneaque evaluative CEU eTD Collection have reference to them). Again, in by desireact must considerations our stirring our (andtherefore of appropriateness starting point somethingstarting itself]”, point external (b) that “whatisit[to object, this and practical assumptions living that(a) the artqua the of “hasreason asits basis and Carneadea divisio ( motivate attachment) natural of our amatter (as that nature with it with rather way nature; other the isaccordance around, thethings inaccordance of appropriateness can motivate us motivate ( can of appropriateness postulat “as(16), demanded by primary natural (25: our desire” et adiutrix implemented to “assist” nature (16: nature to“assist” implemented way (cf. III20). derivative a in “valuable” are such as and objects, of such attainment the to conduce but themselves, nature” with accordance “in not are which things those to opposed as themselves, by desires those satisfy they such as and desires, natural the of objects immediate the are to nature according satisfy naturalse sumenda desires. Rather, the addition “for their own sakes” may mean simply that the things Peripatetics, that practical wisdom, as the “art of life” “art asthe ( practical of wisdom, that Peripatetics, early the by and “OldAcademics” the instituted doctrine,the originally agree to Cicero(IV 16,19,25,32,34-36, theStoicsIV. According 39), to themselves must book in criticism and comments Cicero’s by fortified is interpretation this Notably, have justification”. acquisition can “reasonable is with reference to this reason that the courses of action which are conducive to their ourselves andconstituent our Thisparts. is only our reason for acquiring them,it and dopreserve us anything all:namelytheimpulsesto from self-love andmotivate at to istheir satisfaction acquisition conduciveto the of impulses natural which spring the with on nature, valuable foraccordance usprecisely this are interpretation, because 77 To be sure, the “things in accordance with nature” are told “to be takenfor their own sakes” ( ; cf. 32). Again, at IV 48 Cicero takes ittakes as noconsideration that Again, 48Cicero self-evident ; cf.at IV 32). ). But this does not contradict the suggestion that they are to be taken because that they ) –by andnature bestows preserving what supplementingshe lacks what that, as he reports, Antiochus was also happy to apply, begins with adiuvare De finibus Part II impellere 170 ) as itshelper” “companion and ( 77 ) Book V Piso, in BookVPiso, presenting the per se ut primaappetitio naturalis to desire the things in vivendi ars commovere ), is a craft), ) us to comes propter CEU eTD Collection are in accordance with nature / contrary to nature retain their respective positive and positive respective their nature retain to /contrary nature with in are accordance that objects the notwithstanding indifference their that claim further the against go to assumptions byCiceroatIV 34), the same intheway suggested interpretation seems starting the wemodify example, is case(for this the weassumethat argument– (cf.account 21: be its noneconsequently natural sought original isto attachments own our on of that in consistsand “agreement”/“morality”, only the good recognisegenuine that room for the claim thatBut aswehave seen in previousthe section, interpretation this notseem does leaveto as a matter of natural intellectual development we come to proficiscantur ab nature’sand“originate “wisdom itself”, from starting thus (22, 23: points” action”, “appropriate that affirms when herepeatedly or (20); etc. be selected are to value, have nature with accordance in things the that declares simply he when mind have in can Cato possibly what understand interpretation wecan easily Accepting this important natural requirement, so that the same principle must apply to the art of life? theirs he actually disagreed with… Surely not the view that the purpose of all arts is to meet some …I would love to know what reason Zeno had for dissenting from this ancient order, and what view of the same model. As Cicero rhetorically asks at asks samethe Asrhetorically model. Cicero Antiochus’presupposes conception; andcriticism according Stoictheory the to too (Humean) modern familiar the to similar is significantly that reason practical assume amodel of to seems theory ethical “OldAcademic” Antiochus’ In short, to nature” (16-17). toattain, mustbeconcerned thatisand wants with something wellsuited and adapted 78 quaereret, idem statui debere de totius arte vitae… probatum…eo nonsit an, omnium artium cum isesset, finis quem naturamaxime …scire cupioquae causa sit, curZeno abhac antiqua constitutione desciverit, quidnamhorum ab initiis naturae propter se nihilestexpetendum ; cf. also 60). Chapter II.3.2 171 De finibus ). And if, –only for the sake of IV19: 78 CEU eTD Collection 80 IV 14, 22(see further rationally, we act for reasons rather than on instincts (the clause “there next comes “there next clause (the instincts rather than foron reasons weact rationally, be replaced by beliefs or judgements that are that judgements or bybeliefs be replaced to come usand motivate ceaseto impulses (non-rational) natural our acquire reason that we are at birth into from developmentOn this“cognitivist” then, our non-rational doctrine, the animals rational agents is marked by a radical discontinuity: as we our non-rational nature is well documentedCicero: in see 318; cf. also LS 53R; FREDE 1999: 74-5. –The doctrine that emotions derive from opinion rather than INWOOD in psychology 1985; see also INWOOD 9.Fora different2005 Ch. moral Stobaeus of reading phrase in the II see LSvol. of Stoic discussion seminal Inwood’s Brad to debt in are whom of both action”. For the interpretation of the Stoic doctrine see e.g. BRENNAN 2003 and LONG 1999: 572, ( is impressions what namely,“impulsive appropriate, of of rational ( emotions or passions so-called the even –including its motivations of (LS 53Q): Plato’s what Plato to contrary and that, such through, and Aristotle through rational is soul human developed fully taught (and similarly to what Socrates taught according to the well-documented Stoic doctrine that the that doctrine Stoic well-documented the be with atodds seems to helper” and companion “nature’s as by its characterisation suggested viewof instrumental reason (“Humean”) practical unaware. thoroughly The wrong with this Antiochean interpretation of the Stoic theory, of which Cicero seems pointis therelike out that obviously something to Iwould Before closing thissection actions untouched(cf.50ff).appropriate 22, of content the leaves system value in our change drastic this hence and value, negative 79 SVF Thispoint is rightly emphasised by FREDE 1999:74-5 and 91-2. See further Stob. further See rational III 175), where III175), Chrysippus isreported to definedhave impulse ( Protagoras , in, the sense that they are constituted by acts of assent tothe appropriate kind phantasia horm impressions (impressions whichhave (impressions impressions cognitive, propositional content); Ecl. SVF (358D)), there are no non-rational motivation arenosources (358D)),there of init: non-rational all II 86-88 ( III 379-85). Ɲ tik SVF Ɲ toukath III169, 173,171); see also Plutarch,e.g. Ɲ Part II kontos autothen 172 KƝ per se gemonikon Acad . I39, 41; motivating. ipso facto ). 79 horm , “commanding part” of a De fin Ɲ ) as “reason prescriptive of prescriptive “reason ) as 80 ” (Stob. II 86, 17-18 86, II ” (Stob. In so far as we act . III35; De Stoic. rep Tusc path . III24-5, Ɲ . 1037F )– are CEU eTD Collection again 22 andeven 23),not is pointthis as obvious asheseems (and Cicero) tothink. so toowisdom “originate”itself, from natural the starting (cf.principles or points the things contrary to nature)? Thus although Cato insists that appropriate actions, and to negative value nature” (and with “in accordance the things to value faculty attaches value judgements. In view of this, the question is why, on what basis our commanding satisfaction of our natural desire for self-preservation; the rather, to it is a mattercontribution their of of our owna matter not is nature with accordance in things the of is thequestion satisfaction independently conducivevalue an of desire.The to given in of action course the factthat inthe simply consist cannot reason this this way; and this or that course of action would be “appropriate”, i.e. that we i.e. that be “appropriate”, would of course action that this or Weonly because we act natural impulses. by motivated longersuch are no we stage at this that reason simple the for above, outlined way the in impulses natural toour bepracticalisof beingsubordinated talking thought notto as reason about Catoishere stage atthe that suspect may we Thus reasonably its significance). of selectio 20: (III iswhat appropriate” to selection according ) may well refer to this motivational shift, though Cicero seems to be unaware Chapter II.3.2 173 sequitur deinceps cum officio sequitur cum deinceps have reason judge to act in that CEU eTD Collection Academic theory, in favour of the thesis that the that thesis the of favour in theory, Academic Cicero’s competence as expositor of Hellenistic philosophy. In intellectual life, by and some aboutraising doubts overall the optimistic viewof Cicero’s of history in Stoic former the ethics to approach this origins of the In seem facilitateto Cicero’s criticism of the theory in Book IV. inunderprovided, way the butIn utterly Cato’s presentation gaps unintelligible. this only will seemnot account ofCato’s crucial other points some perspective, if views; invite these firstof aninterpretation the but which thisadopts we accept Ihave argued, inaccount, Cato’s interpretive Some of virtuously alone. problems the the of conception Academic Old the from dissent their for support rational sufficient provide to fail Stoics the that and theory; Peripatetic Academic–early Old alleged the on variation a is Stoic viewsbut the the theory involves that This of Stoicthe account theory. Cato’s for reading understanding and framework interpretive as awhole an offers have already introduced and developed a major thread of my argument. Cicero’s work the two major recent lines of interpretation that I mentioned at the outset. For thetime For outset. the at I mentioned that interpretation linesof major recent two the likeBeforeshould tooverview this, however,I Academic predecessor. alleged Old its and theory Stoic betweenthe affinity stress the to a tendency of account in Cato’s afurther,excessiveas anand by instance standpoint Academic out sceptic, pointing is itCicero’s compatible viewof with the how byexploring this corroborate reading, interpretiveIn survey by previous the problems the raised of II.4 Part I The two mainlinesofinterpretation: the“cosmic” versus the “heterodox” Itried topave way the for this readingof summum bonum , which is the logical conclusion of the Old the of conclusion logical the is which , Part II 174 summum bonum De finibus Part III Part by afresh considering De finibus consists in living in consists I shall further Ishall III 20-22 I III CEU eTD Collection presented by Cicero in byCicero presented same time major pointingof out points divergence betweenitand the version passage,atthe latter of methe let content expoundthe briefly continuing, Before in first parallel the section of in accountfoundthe (DL Laertius Diogenes VII 85-9). itis absentfrom Cicero’s presentation (up until 62), apparently plays a prominent role Cato’s reasoning mustCato’s be reasoning inpresentation lead Cato’s in them think toget that to order right this argument represent to is meant represent an argument for the Stoic position on the on position Stoic the for argument an represent isto meant account Cato’s of firstsection the assumethat often approach prominent and traditional more the of Proponents text. this by raised problems interpretive in ethics Stoic of both lines As Isuggested there, onCicero’s ofinterpretation greatly presentation rely II.4.1 here. authorial role Cicero’s reconsidering of desirability of the inreassuringfacilitate comprehension is tofurther this supposed respect; which result Cicero as a source on Stoic approach to themore adequate which of represents methodological them question ethics. I shall arguemore the rather but ethics, that of Stoic account more plausible the provides neither line of interpretationbeingmuch isnot so myconcern question the which lines interpretation of these of is The “cosmic”approach De finibus the De finibus substantial argument for this conception. However, the gaps the However, conception. this for argument substantial supplemented III; but they significantly differ in dealing with the with dealing in differ significantly they but III; III. Chapter II.4 by the theme of cosmic teleology that, while 175 telos of human life human of – indeed, that itindeed, that CEU eTD Collection auto 83 82 pleased with itself” (col.VI 42-3: heautou eil ( motivational make-up –thatshe“appropriates from animal the beginning” the the animal’s agency in Nature’s determining ametaphysical fact: foremost, delight in the impression that it has received of itself” (col. VI 28-9: VI (col. of itself” received has it that impression the in delight terminology, we may perhaps correlate this withthe formulation that the animal right at birth “takes of notion the 85), here (VII presented But the DL version suggests a different picture. adifferent suggests DLversion But the itself. of perception animal’s the to response emotive A couple of lines later Cato further specifies this as “self-love” ( “self-love” this furtheras specifies Cato linesA of later couple rep Stoic. the claim that basis“appropriation” fundamental inclination: animal’s the asthepsychological of the animal right at birth is “attached to itself” ( from birth “appropriated to itself” to ( birth “appropriated from is animal every that claim theStoic of rendition Latin as Cicero’s regarded generally differ of doctrine Stoic of the account in pointsin Cato’s account Similarly to of detail.a) As we have seen, Cato ( 81 oikeious In one of In manuscripts the (F; adopted by Arnimvon ( Assuming that Hierocles’ ΦΚ΍Ώ΅ΕϾΑΉΘ΅΍ȱΘΤȱΊХ΅ȱΎ΅ϠȱΌΣΏΏΉ΍ȱΘΤȱΚΙΘΣ ΅ЀΘχΑȱψȱΚϾΗ΍ΖȱπΔ΍Ί΋ΘφΗ΅Η΅ȱΘΤȱπΑ΅ΕΐϱΊΓΑΘ΅ȱΘϜȱΗΙΗΘΣΗΉ΍ȱΦΔΓΏΣΆϙ ΦΔΓΚ΅ϟΑΓΙΗ΍Α ο΅ΙΘϱ ΐφΘ ΦΏΏΓΘΕ΍ЗΗ΅΍ȱΉϢΎϲΖȱώΑȱ΅ЁΘϲ νΝȱΉΑ΍ ΅ΘȱΊУ χȱ΅ΘІ ϾΘΗΑ ΅ȱΘΑ ΅ΘΖ ΗΙΑΉϟΈ΋Η΍Α Θ΅ϾΘ΋Ζȱ ΘχΑȱ Ύ΅Ϡȱ ΗϾΗΘ΅Η΍Αȱ ΅ЀΘΓІȱ ΘχΑȱ ΊФУȱ Δ΅ΑΘϠȱ ΉϨΑ΅΍ȱ Ών·ΝΑȱ ΚϾΗΉΝΖȱΦΔ ̖χΑȱΈξȱΔΕЏΘ΋ΑȱϳΕΐφΑȱΚ΅Η΍ȱΘϲȱΊХΓΑȱϥΗΛΉ΍ΑȱπΔϠȱΘϲȱΘ΋ΕΉϧΑȱο΅ΙΘϱ ; accepting this modification we would get “…because nature from the very outsetcomes to be ' [ л̒ȱΈξȱΏν·ΓΙΗϟȱΘ΍ΑΉΖ ΓЁΎ · Ɲ ΓЂΘΝȱ·ΤΕȱΘΣȱΘΉȱΆΏΣΔΘΓΑΘ΅ȱΈ΍ΝΌΉϧΘ΅΍ȱΎ΅ϠȱΘΤȱΓϢΎΉϧ΅ȱΔΕΓΗϟΉΘ΅΍ . 1038B;Alexander, Ɲ s autot phen ] ΓϢΎΉ΍ЗΗ΅΍ ' ΦΕΛϛΖ ), whichonHierocles’ explanationis virtually the same as to say “itthat is well . Δ·Α΋΅ ΣȱΚ΅Η΍Α ·ΣΕȱ πΔ΍·νΑΑ΋ΐ΅ȱ Ɲ s phuse , Ύ΅ΌΣȱΚ΋Η΍Αȱϳȱ̙ΕϾΗ΍ΔΔΓΖȱπΑȱΘХȱΔΕЏΘУȱ̓ΉΕϠȱΘΉΏЗΑ . ΔΏϟΉ΅ȱΘϟΙȱΏ·΍ȱΗΗ΋΅ν΋ȱ΅ΘȱΓΎ΍Η΍ ΔΕϲΖ ΓϢΎΉ΍ЗΗ΅΍ȱ ΅ЁΘϲȱ ΗΙΗΘ΋Η΅ΐνΑ΋Αȱ Ών·Ή΍Αȱ ΘΓϟΑΙΑȱ ΦΔΓΏΉϟΔΉΘ΅΍ȱ Ɯ thik , ΔΕϲΖȱψΈΓΑχΑȱ·ϟ·ΑΉΗΌ΅΍ȱΘχΑȱΔΕЏΘ΋ΑȱϳΕΐχΑȱΘΓϧΖȱΊФΓ΍Ζ ǀ aresein heaut Ɲ < s ap’arkh Stoichei SVF ΅ЀΘХ De finibus oikei III 183, 185; Hierocles col. VI 52, VII 16, 48-50). VII 16, VI52, col. 183, 185;Hierocles III > ǀ oikeiousthai pros heauto ΘϲȱΊХΓΑ sis ǀ ǀ strictly draws on old and orthodox Stoic doctrines and Part II sis Ɲ (i) , 176 III, the DL passage commences with a brief a with commences passage DL the III, s . Ϣ ΕȱσΗΘ΍Α ΩΕ΅ȱ ΉϢȱ ). ). oikei . However, the two versions significantly versions two the However, . 83 , It is It on assumption,this Chrysippus SVF ΓЄΘΉȱΔΓ΍φΗ΅Η΅Αȱ΅ЁΘϱ ǀ sis III 17))we the find dativ emerged as denoting, first and emergedasdenoting, 81 82 , InChrysippus’ doctrine,as ΈΑΑ Ϩ΅ȱϵ΅ȱ΅ΘȱΎ΅Ό ΅ЁΘχȱ ϵΘ΅Αȱ ΉϨΑ΅΍ȱ ψΈΓΑχΑȱ De fin euarestei t ; cf. esp. Plutarch, ; cf. , ΓϢΎΉ΍ΓϾΗ΋Ζȱ΅ЁΘϲȱΘϛΖ . III 16) invokes. III16) . , µ , sibi conciliari Ɲ (i) phantasia(i) h se diligere , φΘ ΔΕЗΘΓΑȱΓϢΎΉϧΓΑ aut ' · ΦΏΏΓΘΕ΍ЗΗ΅΍ ǀ ϶ΑȱΘΕϱΔΓΑ · (i) ЄΉ ·ΤΕ ΓЄΘΉȱ instead of , ΜΉІΈΓΖ ), an ), ) is ) De Ɲ n ' CEU eTD Collection animal, which Nature then manifests by giving the animal this same disposition relative to itself. standard meaning of meaning standard am not sure,INWOOD however,OCT editionby H. (1964), the S.Long and that Long and Sedley (vol. I 351) are right in taking the statement, as the middle-passive form form middle-passive of cf. Plutarch, itself” to “is animal appropriated the that fact(saying metaphysical this consequence of to have used the notion to signify, in an unspecified way, the psychological return in return Chapter unless which hadself-awareness self-love and (anargumentto they thereby shall I find theoddargumentit could that happenliving not beingsthat would seek anything preserve forimpulsegrounds; example, different we themselves isestablished to on natural a have animals that thesis the Correspondingly, absent. entirely is notion the preservingis towards itself etc.).InCicero’s version metaphysicalthis dimension of impulse” “first animal’s the is that fact corresponding the level psychological specific that the arrangement of the animal’s motivations is due to Nature’s agency (on amore otherwise as being passive in force: Chrysippus, that is, never lost sight of the fact constitution (86: it( to are “appropriate” things that heauto Ɲ likely it not ( was exist andflourish, into the animal order created since Nature it animal”,and was Nature the “appropriated who thanpleasure): (rather preservation self- istowards impulse” animal of the “first the why we can argued, that understand nor alienated it; thus it remains that she appropriated it sheappropriated it that it;thus alienated nor remains haut pronoun reflexive the conjecture inturn editions modern ofthe Some animal]”. the [i.e. it to endeared n ) either that she “alienated it [from itself]” or that shemade that appropriated, it itneither [from she or itself]” “alienated that ) either ǀ (i) instead (authorised by Koraes, recommended by Arnim,von ), with the result that it repels what is harmful ( 1985: 311 I follown.30). andSedleyLong 57A) in(LS retaining standardthe MSS text. I ta enarmozontat III.3 oikeio De Stoic. Rep. De Stoic. ). ǀ ( tina oikeio ) would suggest, to refer to Nature’s “affectionate ownership” of the ownership” “affectionate to Nature’s refer to suggest, would ) ǀ he used in this connection bein connection hetaken hardly could this used Ɲ ta oikeia (i) sustasei 1038B( Chapter II.4.1 Loeb 177 ), i.e. the things that are appropriate for its for are appropriate that i.e. things the ), edition (1925 etc.) byR.Hicks; D. see further SVF ). In a secondary way Chrysippus seems III 179, II 742; LS 57E)). But the 179, II742;LS III 57E)). ta blaptonta SVF to itself III178;see ) and goes for the ( oikei apparatus ǀ sai pros in the eikos CEU eTD Collection will. Nature’s with fully coincide own reasonwill by our dictated andactivities actions at the same time act, on ouralways acting on ownthe reasons presented to us by our own commandingaccord, faculty, wewill in the way as Nature means us to act; the accords with accords with intentionsNature’s and in design creating us. its guidance we will nevertheless live the life weare that livethe nevertheless wewill its guidance guides us ( developed andfunctions well weattain –i.e. excellencethe which towards Nature fully usbecomes endowed Nature faculty which with if commanding that rational the 85 life guided by impulse ( for us comes to be the rational, reason-guided life ( reason-guided be rational, the to comes for us craftsman of impulse ( government( appropriate for caseanimalsshe superaddedimpulse theygoforis of what whereby are enabledto them, endowedNature’sset, this is due to design and arrangement. humans with motivational makesinour reason of emergence the whatever change that 86): reason(VII “as a more inpresentation Laertius’ passage Diogenes intheparallel emphasised apoint ignores complete formdevelopmentand its impact congenital on motivationalour make-up obviously of natural intellectual/moral dealing Again, passageinCicero’s account with the b) 84 Afaint echo of this passage is to be found at ȱΓЁΈνΑȱΘΉ Ύ΅ΘΤȱΚϾΗ΍Α ΉΉΓν΅ȱΔΓΘΗ΅ȱΈΉΈΓΐνΑΓΙ ΔΕΓΗΘ΅Ηϟ΅Αȱ ΘΉΏΉ΍ΓΘνΕ΅Αȱ ΐξΑȱΘϲȱΎ΅ΘΤȱΚϾΗ΍ΑȱΘХȱΎ΅ΘΤȱΘχΑȱϳΕΐχΑȱΈ΍Γ΍ΎΉϧΗΌ΅΍ ΘϛΖȱϳΕΐϛΖȱΘΓϧΖȱΊФΓ΍ΖȱπΔ΍·ΉΑΓΐνΑ΋Ζ Ύ΅Ϡȱ΅ϢΗΌφΗΉΝΖȱΎΦΎΉϧΑ΅ȱΓϢΎΓΑΓΐΉϧȱΎ΅ϠȱπΚ , agei Κ΅Ηϟ kata teleioteran prostasian · ΘΉΛΑϟΘ΋Ζȱ·ΤΕȱΓЈΘΓΖȱπΔ΍·ϟΑΉΘ΅΍ȱΘϛΖȱϳΕΐϛΖ , see 87)– it, see 87)– will full over ourtake conduct;command livingbut under , Έ΍φΏΏ΅ΒΉΑȱψȱΚϾΗ΍ΖȱπΔϠȱΘЗΑȱΚΙΘЗΑȱΎ΅ϠȱπΔϠȱΘЗΑȱΊФΝΑ technit to katahorm Ɲ s t Ɲ s horm Ɲ , n dioikeisthai , ϗȱΗΙ·ΛΕЏΐΉΑ΅ȱΔΓΕΉϾΉΘ΅΍ȱΔΕϲΖȱΘΤȱΓϢΎΉϧ΅ De fin ϲ ΅Τ ϱΓȱΊΑ ΕЗȱ·ϟΑΉΗΌ΅΍ ϴΕΌЗΖȱ ΊϛΑȱ Ώϱ·ΓΑȱ Ύ΅ΘΤȱ Θϲȱ )”, such that it supervenes ( Part II Ɲ 178 ' s ψΐЗΑȱΘ΍Α΅ȱΚΙΘΓΉ΍ΈЗΖȱ·ϟΑΉΘ΅΍ )”, and the natural life ( . III 23-4. ). The pointmade here seems beto 84 · to It was Nature who, while in the . ΘΓІȱΈξȱΏϱ·ΓΙȱΘΓϧΖȱΏΓ·΍ΎΓϧΖȱΎ΅ΘΤ kata logon z kata logon meant 85 Living a rational life, rational a Living to live; a life that fully to kata phusin z to kataphusin epiginetai Ɲ , n ϵΘ΍ȱΛΝΕϠΖȱϳΕΐϛΖ ), rather than a than rather ), . πΎȱΔΉΕ΍ΘΘΓІȱΈξ < ) as “the , ΘΓϾǁΘΓ΍Ζ ΘΓϾΘΓ΍Ζ Ɲ n ) CEU eTD Collection passage significantly differs from the one we have in seenpassage from onewe the significantly differs consists; for it is a souldisposition, its choice-worthy for own sake”, andthat “itis in this happiness that which has been preparedoccur at DL toVII make89 as well, the wherewhole bornidea conduct of seems Asimilar reason. perfectreason andvirtuous perfect to to we find course the argument of life that “virtue characteristic and consistency order denote internal the to seems “accordance” version is a consistent Stoic the of elucidation the that clear is it But obvious. the by signified inferences The modifications) guardian spirit with the will of the administrator of whole.the man’s ofeach concordance the with conformity in done is everything when this: just are life of flow who is this ruler of the administration of existing things. And the virtue of the happy man Zeus, and to his good identical and everything pervading reason right the is which law, common by the forbidden accordancein is, that end, withthe be to comes nature with bothagreement in living Therefore, whole. the ofthe nature the nature of oneself and thatwhat happens by asChrysippusnature, says ‘OnEnds’ inhis bookfor own I: our parts are natures of of the of whole,experience with accordance in to living equivalent is engagingvirtue with accordance in living …Further, in no activity wont to agreementbe with nature, whichis living inaccordance withvirtue. For nature leads us towards virtue. Therefore Zeno in shift: abrupt his rather a with in 87-8 book continues then argument The ‘On the Nature of Man’ wasc) the first to say that the end is living in 86 ȱ̇΍ϱΔΉΕȱΔΕЗΘΓΖȱϳȱ̉φΑΝΑȱπΑȱΘХȱ̓ΉΕϠȱΦΑΌΕЏΔΓΙȱΚϾΗΉΝΖȱΘνΏΓΖȱΉϨΔΉȱΘϲȱϳΐΓΏΓ·ΓΙΐνΑΝΖ Δ΅Ε ΉЁΈ΅ϟΐΓΑΓΖȱΦΕΉΘχΑȱΎ΅ϠȱΉЄΕΓ΍΅ΑȱΆϟΓΙ Ύ΅Ό΋·ΉΐϱΑ΍ȱΘΓϾΘУȱΘϛΖȱΘЗΑȱϷΑΘΝΑȱΈ΍Γ΍ΎφΗΉΝΖȱϷΑΘ΍ ΎΓ΍ΑϱΖ΅ЀΘΓІȱΎ΅ϠȱΎ΅ΘΤȱΘχΑȱΘЗΑȱϵΏΝΑ ΘΓІȱϵΏΓΙ ГΖȱΚ΋Η΍ȱ̙ΕϾΗ΍ΔΔΓΖȱπΑȱΘХȱΔΕЏΘУȱ̓ΉΕϠȱΘΉΏЗΑ ΔΣΏ΍ΑȱΈ ΈξȱΎ΅Ϡȱ̍ΏΉΣΑΌ΋ΖȱπΑȱΘХȱ̓ΉΕϠȱψΈΓΑϛΖȱΎ΅Ϡȱ̓ΓΗΉ΍ΈЏΑ΍ΓΖȱΎ΅ϠȱёΎΣΘΝΑȱπΑȱΘΓϧΖȱ̓ΉΕϠȱΘΉΏЗΑ ΘϜȱΚϾΗΉ΍ȱΊϛΑ ' οΎΣΗΘУȱΈ΅ϟΐΓΑΓΖȱΔΕϲΖȱΘχΑȱΘΓІȱΘЗΑȱϵΏΝΑȱΈ΍Γ΍Ύ΋ΘΓІȱΆΓϾΏ΋Η΍Α , ' ϵΗΔΉΕȱπΗΘϠΑȱϳȱϴΕΌϲΖȱΏϱ·ΓΖ ϥΗΓΑȱπΗΘϠȱΘϲȱΎ΅Θ . Έ΍ϱΔΉΕȱΘνΏΓΖȱ·ϟΑΉΘ΅΍ȱΘϲȱΦΎΓΏΓϾΌΝΖȱΘϜȱΚϾΗΉ΍ȱΊϛΑ , ϵΔΉΕȱπΗΘϠȱΎ΅Θ ' ΦΕΉΘχΑȱΊϛΑȱΘХȱΎ΅Θ ' ΦΕΉΘχΑȱΊϛΑ , ΓЁΈξΑȱπΑΉΕ·ΓІΑΘ΅ΖȱЙΑȱΦΔ΅·ΓΕΉϾΉ΍ΑȱΉϥΝΌΉΑȱϳȱΑϱΐΓΖȱϳ dioper Chapter II.4.1 , ϵΘ΅ΑȱΔΣΑΘ΅ȱΔΕΣΘΘ΋Θ΅΍ȱΎ΅ΘΤȱΘχΑȱΗΙΐΚΝΑϟ΅ΑȱΘΓІ , Έ΍ΤȱΔΣΑΘΝΑȱπΕΛϱΐΉΑΓΖ 179 and · Ω·Ή΍ȱ·ΤΕȱΔΕϲΖȱΘ΅ϾΘ΋ΑȱψΐκΖȱψȱΚϾΗ΍Ζ ' πΐΔΉ΍Εϟ΅ΑȱΘЗΑȱΚϾΗΉ΍ȱΗΙΐΆ΅΍ΑϱΑΘΝΑȱΊϛΑ · µ gar νΕ΋ȱ·ΣΕȱΉϢΗ΍Αȱ΅ϡȱψΐνΘΉΕ΅΍ȱΚϾΗΉ΍ΖȱΘϛΖ connectives are far from from being far are connectives 86 (transl. Long and Sedley,with minor · telos ΉϨΑ΅΍ȱΈ De finibus De -formula presented-formula in this , ϵΔΉΕȱπΗΘϠȱΎ΅ΘΣȱΘΉȱΘχΑ ' , ΅ЁΘϲȱΘΓІΘΓȱΘχΑȱΘΓІ . ϳȱ΅ЁΘϲΖȱЖΑȱΘХȱ̇΍ϟ III.In Cicero’s . ϳΐΓϟΝΖ , , . CEU eTD Collection presumably, our individualpresumably, our reason pervades all things, and is identical to Zeus, lord and ruler of all there is”. such that no one of them violates the “common law, that is the right reason which action manifests the overall theoverall harmony manifests ( action phusei zén…katatet accordance with both our own nature and that of the universe ( universe and ofthe that ourownnature both with accordance both ofwhom argue against JohnRist’s interpretation of the passage at RIST 1969: 262ff. ( III 31), precisely Stoic definition of virtue as “a consistent character” rather than “an agreeing character”. 89 “an agreeing than rather character” consistent “a as ofvirtue definition Stoic grammatical and conceptual incompleteness of the formula); accordingly, itis a mistake to translate the formula as“living consistently” rather than as“living in agreement with” (whichwould highlight the the traditional approachto these passages: on his view it is a mistake to translate Zeno’s short-hand 88 (LS 63A) 16ff 77, II Stob. also see reason”; concordant one with accordance in “living or agreement” in “living Cf. also Stob. also Cf. happens according to nature ( nature to according happens which is guidestowards alife us with Nature of what inaccordance experience However, according DLVII87-8Chrysippus to emphasised life” “virtuous thatthe “consistent”, and thus to confer to us happiness. lifemakefail of it whole the cannot to character”, a“consistent itself being because, 86, Stob. preliminary definition of which was “thethe goodhappiness, flowand life of one’s life”of conduct ( the of “consistency” the between connection consistent”. 87 mer On the meaning of the term Notably, bookrecent his Brennan(BRENNAN Tad in 138-141)hasforcefully 2005: against argued ΔΉΔΓ΍΋ΐνΑϙȱΔΕϲΖȱΘχΑȱϳΐΓΏΓ·ϟ΅ΑȱΔ΅ΑΘϲΖȱΘΓІȱΆϟΓΙ Θ΍Α΅ȱΚϱΆΓΑȱύȱπΏΔϟΈ΅ȱόȱΘ΍ȱΘЗΑȱσΒΝΌΉΑ ̖φΑȱΘ Ɲ gareisin haih ' ΦΕΉΘχΑȱΈ΍ΣΌΉΗ΍ΑȱΉϨΑ΅΍ȱϳΐΓΏΓ·ΓΙΐνΑ΋Α Ecl. 87 Ecl. The idea here seems to be that there is a more or lessbeis more thereobvious or that a Theideato here seems II77,16-27); (i.e. virtue thus perfect reason)hasus asingular appeal to II 75, 11ff (LSwhere we 63B), told are Zeno’s that original formula was simply because Ɲ Ɲ meterai phuseist n hautou kai katat n hautou daim our individual natures are parts of the nature of the whole kat’ empeiriant ǀ n in thiscontext see LS vol.II p. 391 and BETEGH 2003: 286-7, 89 ] and “him theorders universe”; the will whoof · πΑȱ΅ЁΘϜȱΘ Ɲ Part II 180 s touholou sumph Ɲ n t ǀ · ǀ n phusei sumbainont Ύ΅Ϡȱ΅ЁΘχΑȱΈ΍ 88 n hol n ǀ ' nia . ΉϨΑ΅΍ȱΘχΑȱΉЁΈ΅΍ΐΓΑϟ΅Α ) between ) between our ); therefore the ǀ n ), to live a life in which every in which life a live to ), ' ΅ЀΘχΑȱΉϨΑ΅΍ȱ΅ϡΕΉΘφΑ eurhoia biou to akolouth ǀ telos n z daim , Ɲ ΧΘ n is to live in live isto ; cf. DL VII ǀ ' –cf. n ΓЄΗϙȱΜΙΛϜ [that is, ǀ , De fin s t ΓЁȱΈ΍Σ Ɲ (i) . CEU eTD Collection and really to put Diogenes Laertius’ account into theforefront. account put Diogenes Laertius’ to and really Others, like Anthony Long, have attempted to diminish their reliance on Cicero’s text, understanding of man’s in place nature’s design. of and teleological universethe of andprovidential an by the cosmicordering nature, conclusion agreement/moralitythat is the only cruciallygood involves an appreciation is tolead the reasoningholdingthe account on one to Cato’s supposed that that Michael Frede. strategy inmostis prominent contributionsthe of and Gisela Striker, John Cooper in Stoicism is first and foremost a normative, evaluative, or if you that reinforces will, a moralhe openly subject on the article his to seminal postscript later In a here. influence Cicero’s of rid get is to impossible, virtually difficult, how of example is agood more appropriate, we have to we more appropriate, most valuable sources” ( sources” valuable most ethics owes to a consideration of Cicero’sin exposition,methodology” which“deductive he Stoics’ the praises and principles as “one primary the of of our conception very testimony for primary the But of his ethics”(1996a(=1971):153). principles Stoic to exposition, and then argue thatin order to reconstruct the Stoic theory proper we have indicated earlier, they often begin by focussing on the first section of Cato’s seriously misleading idea of what the Stoic conception of the gives usa account Cato’s “cosmic” of approach,then, the advocates the According to 92 1996a (=1971), 1996b (=1989); INWOOD 1985; BETEGH 2003; and most recently BOERI 2009. 1999 (=1996); FREDE 1999. Other representative scholars of of line this interpretation areLONG 91 90 LONG 1996a (=1971); see Annas’ remark at ANNAS 2007: 85, n.56. See especially STRIKER 1996a (=1983) and 1996b (=1991); WHITE 1979, 1985; COOPER 1995, For theidea of supplementing Cicero,see STRIKER 1996b (=1991): 226. supplement itin terms of the material presented by the DL passage if(or this seems 91 “ Their reconstructions differ in points of detail but they agree in agree they but detail of in points differ reconstructions Their Diogenes’ evidence is almost certainly our most authoritative our certainly evidence isalmost Diogenes’ ibid . 139). The aim of his article is to establish “that Nature “that establish is to article his of aim The 139). . combine Chapter II.4.1 the two account into one). 181 summum bonum 92 Buthis interpretation 90 This interpretive is; as I CEU eTD Collection from Gisela Striker and Anthony Long above has been severely criticised by Julia by criticised severely been has above Long Anthony and Striker Gisela from quoted onesthat I foundationalism bysuchclaims asthe Again, of suggested kind the decisive as itmay seem ANNAS(see 1993:164; 2007: 77-84). by presentedby isrepeatedly out Annas,as pointed evidence not Julia the this passage been has as However, approach. their itin substantiating routinely cite interpretation of of line “cosmic” proponents the isin formula and claim; this linewith with nature” in“living agreement the andexplains introduces DLpassage waythe the Apparently, reference for them that is better… is that them for reference theorythe For (…) world. of the administration the from and nature ofuniversal from then goodhappiness or virtues and bad thingsThere is no mustother orbe more attached appropriate waytoStoic self-contradictions ofthese, approaching since the theory there ofprominently, Most preserved Chrysippus’ wepossess ownwords, byPlutarch good is and nobad otherthings or starting-pointthe Admittedly, finds approach this some independentsupportin sources other as well. or ethics. Stoic Cicero’s presenting of way least atto partly owe seems to here “foundations” cosmology and theology”, STRIKER 1996:231).Butthe very idea about of speaking be foundationsStriker’s conclusion that sought…in “the areto ethics of Stoic sometimes presented in interpretations other belonging tothis family e.g. Gisela(see are claims “foundationalist” Similar (150). Nature” from divorced when unintelligible inferring that this is the property of Nature” (141); so “Stoic moral theory is principle” (137), and that “the Stoics sought to demonstrate andprinciple”“theto (137), the that sought Stoics 93 ΑΎΑ ϛȱΚΗΎΖ ΉΕ΅ȱΔΕΏΔϛȱΓΗΖ ȱΔϲȱΘΑ ΉϠ ·ΌΑ ȱΎ΅ΎЗΑ ύȱ Φ·΅ΌЗΑȱ ΔΉΕϠȱ Έ΍ΣΗΘ΅Η΍Α ΘχΑȱ ΔΕϲΖȱ ύȱ ΓЄΗ΋Ζȱ Δ΅Ε΅Ώ΋ΔΘϛΖȱ ΌΉΝΕϟ΅Ζȱ ΚΙΗ΍ΎϛΖȱ ΘϛΖȱ ρΑΉΎΉΑȱ Ώϱ·ΓΑ ΘΓІȱΎϱΗΐΓΙȱΈ΍Γ΍ΎφΗΉΝΖ ΓЁΈ ȇΓЁȱ·ΤΕȱσΗΘ΍ΑȱΩΏΏΝΖȱΓЁΈ ' πΔϠȱΘΤΖȱΦΕΉΘΤΖȱΓЁΈ , ΓЁΎȱΓЄΗ΋ΖȱΩΏΏ΋ΖȱΦΕΛϛΖȱ΅ЁΘЗΑȱΦΐΉϟΑΓΑΓΖȱΓЁΈ .' 1035C-D, quotedfrom Chrysippus’ ‘Physical Theses’): ' . (…) πΔ ' ΓϢΎΉ΍ϱΘΉΕΓΑȱπΔΉΏΌΉϧΑȱπΔϠȱΘϲΑȱΘЗΑȱΦ·΅ΌЗΑȱΎ΅ϠȱΎ΅ΎЗΑȱΏϱ·ΓΑ 93 ' (transl. Long and Sedley) and Long (transl. ΉЁΈ΅΍ΐΓΑϟ΅Α ΈΉϧȱ·ΤΕȱΘΓϾΘΓ΍ΖȱΗΙΑΣΜ΅΍ȱΘϲΑȱΔΉΕϠȱΦ·΅ΌЗΑȱΎ΅ϠȱΎ΅ΎЗΑ Part II 182 , ΦΏΏ ' < ύ > ΦΔϲȱΘϛΖȱΎΓ΍ΑϛΖȱΚϾΗΉΝΖȱΎ΅ϠȱΦΔϲȱΘϛΖ ' ΦΑ΅ΚΓΕκΖ summum bonum , ΓЁΈ ' ΩΏΏΓΙȱΘ΍ΑϲΖ ( by On CEU eTD Collection what might today mightwhatbe themajorinto fields introductory called today surveys of philosophy, doing As that? Gisela Striker (STRIKER 1995:58-9)has Cicero out, pointed wrote risk of seriously misleading hisreaders.What reasons could he havepossibly for for some reason that book, the writing in heintentions omits authorial Cicero’s given implausible, any rather seem explicit reference toitshould (ANNAS Besides, 1995: 606). byCooper cited with passages actual the such a crucial point, running I of butcosmic teleology; toagreewithtend Annasthat thissits poorly interpretation the notion Stoic the on tacitly rely infact does Cicero that he argued aswell: third option Actually, (COOPER1997:440andn.32, a cf. Cooper 1995:594)suggested John is neither plausible”. it. Fortunately, misrepresent to radically reason for some elsehechooses or ethics, Stoic understand fails totally to Cicero either conclusion: “weface anunwelcome this interpretive line to Cicero’s text. If this approach is correct, then, as Annas writes, has bearing adirect objection of that adequacy question the the on of of approach the has also been outbyAnnaspointed (ANNAS 606-7);foritis 1995: this particular For the time being, however, I would like to focus on a methodological objection that foundationalism which findI difficult detect into the criticisedinterpretations). seem to part of consideration great her objections deserves serious somethem (although of be off a 1995; 2007: 65ff); grounds AnnasANNAS 1993:159ff; and onvarious (see again the point, since they attack an extremely robust kind of understandable. conception ofStoic ethics seems contributeto to making the idea of cosmological ethics correspondingly he abandons foundationalist claims, but points out that, onthe other Stoic hand,of the the holistic parts different the system which are to interrelated in awayaccording excludesthat “holism”, the asymmetry suggested byfoundationalist philosophical of Stoic claims; notion the on based Marcello (BOERIBoeri 2009:174-6)gives heed to justifieda more objection(ANNAS 2007:69-70) unnecessarily harsh and unkind interpretationof the criticised position. –In his recent contribution distinguishable subject-matterof ethics is we have to go throughphysics to define it”, which is an ethics is meant to imply “priority content”,in this canonly meanthat “evento get right what the 94 For example, at ANNAS 2007: 67 Annas assumes that if the claim that physics is foundational for Chapter II.4.1 183 94 CEU eTD Collection order to see whether it was really accurate and complete? itwas really toseewhetheraccurate order in discuss itwith experts), availableto (or him for sources with other reconstruction he not able toreflect on how and why the argumentis deficient, and tocompare his forit what was?Was flawedargument recognise really such an unable to obviously Was Cicero philosophy. ofHellenistic asan and/or credentialsexpositor asathinker viewof Cicero’s favourable a moreif orless we adopt either, option plausible is a confusion”; and she opts for the worse alternative.On (226). herjudgement( nosuch thing to show asan thatargument theis end livinginagreementwith nature” itandis that living nature… itinwith agreement is clearthat hehas fairly produced is, highesthas good althoughthat the apparently shownwhat “Cicerothathe thinks finds of Stoic (225);butshe account ethics” influential source standard of most the passage(STRIKER 1996b).Striker the as“the Cicero presents Striker’s treatment misunderstands theStoic ethicaltheory. This is answerthe suggested by Gisela himselfCicero seriously remains, that then, It Stoic doctrine. the misrepresents he deliberately asideidea that the we canset his of account, accuracy and earnestness inAgain, viewindications intentions, of andhis Cicero’s authorial of the repeated explicit reference to what is taken to be a crucial philosophical point. any lack of complete is the it interpreters; the puzzling keeps detail that lack of seems tooweak dispelto doubts; our infor this caseitis notmere superficiality or assumption this charitable caseeven in this However, Greek authorities. relevantthe by of consulting pursue particularsimply detail be points ableto readers would easily and incomposing hisoutlines heof variousthe positions could assumethat his function of the reasoning misrepresented by Cicero. misrepresented reasoning of the function 95 Cf. also Cf.also STRIKER 1996: 290-291, togetherwith 230,where Striker attempts toexplain theoriginal ibid .), Cicero’s argument is “at best incomplete; at worst, it worst, at incomplete; is best “at argument .), Cicero’s Part II 184 95 But this is not a prima facie CEU eTD Collection Cicero’s text is deficient. question why theory and gives (165), he so apositive answerto this question (179), he does not explicitly muchaddress the of the orthodox theory remains untold in question, whether the doctrine presented at presented doctrine the whether question, was at reallythe so easy to forget about the significance of the point that living in agreementsame with human nature about thepositionthat beenhas given uncertain a slant we to are if by Panaetius accept to timeormisrepresented difficult is claim by both Antiochus. However, Was it redundant. as nature universal downplay living to Antiochus like interpreters for way the opened have may hand, other the on and ethics, Stoic to given have to seems Panaetius slant the in encouraged have may identification Chrysippus’ agreement explanation White’s with cosmic nature? Moreover, while White asks the misunderstanding of Stoicthe theory may have beenChrysippus’ Antiochean complex position the of (cf. source ultimate the that conjecture White’s spoils turn in This either. illuminating or address Cicero’s understanding of the theory he presents. the theory of understanding Cicero’s address systematically to have we remark: a side to question above the relegate we cannot so do to that think I but maintained; be plausibly cannot possibility this that conclusion with the result that hepresented following human nature as part of the identificationof following human nature and following universal asreported nature atDLVII88-9, and Zeno’s both of Cleanthes’ interpretation position).As a consequence descriptionhis of Chrysippus’questionable subsequent a development is –the this (notably, Zeno by established end the been had universe, without considering this as a means to living harmoniously without internal conflict, which adopting the view that the ultimate end is living in accordance withthe organised arrangement of the insufficiently Forexample, argued. White(174) from refrains on speculating Cleanthes’ for reasons of intellectual development, cf. 169) lacks in acuteness and in many points of detail is misleading or is because Chrysippanorbecauseit is apost-Chrysippanit is attemptgap inChrysippus’ tofilla account Chrysippan theory and interpretation;to but show ensuinghis attempt to reconstruct thehow development and contentthe of the orthodoxdoctrine presented in the Cicero passage fits in with it (either aspect of the Stoic theory of the of theory Stoic of the aspect acentral misrepresents blatantly Cicero that assumption butthe ethics; Stoic work on for scholarly indispensableis source virtually a account becauseCicero’s important case? the not was if this did, apparently he as of theory, Stoic the account he acomplete has given did that hebelieve grounds (rational) nature (rational) the and nature Panaetius’ workStoics look but and unoriginal inept; partly due to misunderstanding,genuine owing perhaps partly to on Stoic speculatingethics, that this neglect onAntiochus’ part may partly be due to guile and a desire to make the which may have laid stress on the idea of the uniqueness of human Antiochean theory presented in Book V ( Book in presented theory Antiochean harmony”of conduct. Then he rightly points out that Cicero’ critique in Book IV,which aligns with the perspective to the Stoic theory of the of theory Stoic tothe perspective The question, then, is why Cicero was unable to see the significance of the cosmic but ratherderives theory, the “self-realisationist” a represent to seem not does them, latter, the between unlike former, the that differences arguing and significant out by pointing counterpart, Antiochean its from off it marking emphasis onlocating the account of the Stoic 96 I think that Nicholas White is largely on the right track in WHITE 1979 when he lays considerable summum bonum desirability of perfecting it summum bonum from the crucial but obscure step of appreciating “order and “order appreciating of step obscure but crucial the from ibid Chapter II.4.1 De finibus summum bonum . 163-4), gives meagre attention to this crucial point, summum bonum I wouldnot like followto Annas ( 185 . I have greatly benefitted from this part of White’s III 20-22 was part oforthodox an Chrysippan casts a shadow on his presentation at within , if it was significant; on what De finibus telos De finibus 96 This is all the more the all is This – is not really informative III;thus his treatmentof as a whole, and on ibid ibid . 176). On .) in her CEU eTD Collection De finibus in accountwhose ethics of Stoic and expositor, he reliable whole isan are, accurate Chapter in argue, further shall I (indeed ethics Stoic on perspective Academics–Antiochean by presentation mayhave ethics of question: been distorted Stoic his Cicero’s plan and argument of would convince us that, whatever Cicero’s actual views whateverCicero’s would conveyedin actual us that, convince oikei some elements of Cicero’s distortion, such as his conflation of the Stoic notion of would largely neutralise the considerations that I have presented inChapter thatIhave presented considerations neutralise the would largely inthe indicated considerablyI shall devote more spacetoconsidering thispossibility;for asI understanding and approval? a firm into tenets Stoic the over dislike or bafflement initial the change to supposed is by theStoichow explainactually how Ciceroas presented theory itworks: In isto challenge this casethe largely correct. concludes, is, asAnnas presentation Cicero’s that possibility: alternative consider the like to Iwould however, this, In pointnot which on evidence? havewe doindependentand uncontroversial direct large: if he is wrong on this point, how can we assume that he is right on any other Part III Part ǀ sis with Antiochus’ with Aristotelian of“self-love”).conception Before turning to III.3, III can be legitimately studied independently its context. independently IIIcan of bestudied legitimately I shall argue that by re-considering the role of that withoutliableperpetuate thatappropriately weare this recognising to Introduction De finibus , if , line interpretation this of would besuccessful,it as a whole we can find a plausible answer to this Part II 186 De finibus De De finibus III within the II.3 as a : it : CEU eTD Collection and LONGand 1996: 154-5. 1986 (esp.149-50) and 1990 (esp. 40-2); forcritical remarks see ERSKINETIELEMAN 1992, 1995 presented in 97 advances far) that as a subject Stoic within philosophy as awhole. (p. 163-164) one (if later then and intuitions; our of sense make and explain which introduced are distinctions and concepts theoretical and articulation, and reflection to subjected are intuitions our which onwhich one studies ethics: first as asubjectits in ownright, with the properkind of methodology, in backing of forwhatsome kind had previously isolation.beenstudied in(…) there Thus are two levels a provide to taken were nature cosmic and God about principles that clear is it 'theology', with course Ethics was not just studied(…) theses. ethical for premises of‘plausible’ numbers huge collected and ethics, within as specifically a subject in its ownestablished by philosophical arguments. Chrysippus defendedright, theuse of dialectical reasoning however. Whenreasoning, the Stoicethics— about reasoning 'dialectical' thatby using and concepts, pupil ethical is, 'articulating' by proceeded finishedwhich begins his fromprocedures atthis stage do not appear to have whatvery been fromAristotle's.different Chrysippus is commonly [Inaccepted the rather Stoic than from school]…ethics theses following: is the previously argument Annas’ of hub The was taught firstII.4.2.1 as a branch of philosophy in its own right;(ANNAS 1995,esp.pp.603-4,and 2007,esp.pp. 61-2). and the Happiness propounded by Julia Annas,first in her muchdiscussed book interpretation is the This date. to interpretations “cosmic” the to challenge influential and forceful most the estimation in my is what detail in more consider now shall I II.4.2 Another regularly mentioned (but less frequently discussed) attempt tounderstand the account The “heterodox”view:Annas onStoicethics Julia Annas’ interpretation ofStoic ethics De finibus (1993), and –with significant modifications– inand subsequentarticles significant (1993), also –with III as a relatively autonomous theory is to be found in ENGBERG-PEDERSEN in found be to is theory autonomous a relatively as III Chapter II.4.2; Section 187 II.4.2.1 97 The Morality of CEU eTD Collection see 1993: 165-6; 1995: 606). The “nature” that plays a crucial role in the main that plays inthe crucial role see “nature” 606). The a 1995: 1993: 165-6; be fitted before we completely understand it (for this interpretation of isto into whichethics inas alargerpicture comes cosmic the perspective that namely, – physics and ethics between Stoicism, within relation, the indicates he explicitly III use only cosmic not reach does to inparagraph nature ethical conclusions; 73 of Book obviously doesnot cosmicthinkis that nature anywhere point.the Indeed, to he not relation debateon virtuethe setting tohappiness, Stoic–Peripatetic of Cicero upthe Stoic ideas about cosmic nature” cosmicStoic ideasabout 433), and,as some of his philosophical other works show, is“perfectly familiar with side” (1993: on is either arguments who the awareof and person intelligent educated Cicero’s 166). n.schools”between1993: 164 the20, (cf.different other schools has its place, since the Stoics are discussingmatters of controversy (1995: 604),itisdialectical atthefirst, ofdoing stage ethics that“argumentwith ( in interested needs theethical bestavailable theory beacquainteddiscovering with” to It is not introductory, theories. a rangeof andagainst for or ethical arguments of the treatment is “asystematic provisional; it presents the arguments that a serious person of Cicero’s presentation. is is Indeed, it reading on Annas’ interpretation partly that a thorough grounded clear also giving justice to the DL version of the theory, by locating it on the second level. as Annashas articleemphasisedrightly ina recent n. (ANNAS 2007:85and 56)–, De finibus presentation justicegives This toCicero’s interpretation of ethics in two-level Stoic extensively”. ethics which… is similar98 to mine in my book, for the good reason that in writing the book I used it ibid Cf.where Annas ANNAS1995: 606, readily that Cicero “givesadmits of usapresentation Stoic . 606;cf.605 n. 599, 13,608-9; cf. Moreover, 1993:433). Cicero also is “an III by locating it on the first stage of ethical theorising, at the same time – 98 AsAnnas in Johnexplains herreply Cooper’s to criticism (1995: 606 Part II 188 ). Yet in presenting the Stoic theory, and theory, Stoic the in presenting Yet De finibus De fin in turn . III73 CEU eTD Collection Annas that the passages cited as evidence do not actually show this (ANNAS show 1995: actually not do asevidence passages cited Annas thatthe idea (cf. of cosmic COOPER1995:439-40,esp.n. nature agree withI tend but 32); to It has been argued, for example, that Cicero’s argument doesin fact rely tacitly on the say on issuethis is that penetrating. to little have interpretation Annas’ of examinations critical and account; Cicero’s of “orthodox” picture. to the discussion, impetus and gave interest scholarly much have attracted arguments These criticisms. leading variousin viewtraditional in laterarticles and, (1995 andresponse to 2007), the to in opposition it substantiate to tohistorical, and theoretical both more arguments, refined statements of the implications of the Cicero’s way of presenting the theory in theory the way presenting Cicero’s of Annas’ thereis Of course, interpretation than moreto toappeal this two-level discussions” (1995:607). based metaphysically the from in kind different ethics, Stoic of presentation “giving support to” the ethical theses see esp. 136, 138, 217). Thus 217). 138, seeesp.136, to” ethicaltheses the “givingsupport “justifying” or nature as canbeviewed appeal to in this on question sense the what feature general ethicalof (cf.ancient 214ff see further 167ff, 135-141, 177; theories – a is analysis, Annas’ on that, nature” to “appeal non-reductive and foundational 601); thus Stoicthe theory eminentlypresented by Cicero kindthe represents non- of is argument tobeconstruedashuman of (cf. nature 1995: presentation Cicero’s e.g. is used in this connectionby Annas at ANNAS 1995: 601. COOPER 1995, 1999(=1996), BETEGH 2003, VOGT2008:94ff,BOERI 2009. The term “orthodox” 99 Stoic theory, we should accept that what we findin what we that accept weshould theory, Stoic that Cicero interpretation. “orthodox” the for challenge aserious presents Various aspects of Annas’ interpretation have beencritically examined by INWOOD 1995, would –either intentionally or unintentionally– crucially misrepresent the misrepresent crucially unintentionally– or intentionally –either would 99 My present concern, however, is the adequacy of Annas’view however, istheadequacy My concern, of present Chapter II.4.2; Section De finibus De 189 II.4.2.1 III. She has presented a battery of De finibus III is “a normal ancient Since it is not plausible not is it Since De finibus III CEU eTD Collection Plutarch at Plutarch show that Cicero indeed,does that show allot aprominentpassage seems role to physicsin for it be can ethics, hardly cited to evenimportant, if More the 79). 2007: irresistible (ANNAS passages apparently such away explain can she easily relatively how shown has Annas debate the to of IV–hehisof clearly the Stoic think response in not Book cosmic to theory that does actually play into comes thewithin Stoic theory.any At –andrate in especially view range of finibus role from plays important It an point. the is nowhereto nature cosmic concerned, andvirtue happiness; Annasand is in right outpointing that asfar as issuethis is between issue of relation the on the centres byCicero, aspresented theory, Stoic resembles the passages from theresembles passagesfrom Chrysippus’ However, as for practical patterns ethics. Boeri give with todeal some fieldofand to ethics, basic physics asanecessary knowledge himselfpresent it seems to ethics; canhave of we more mereunderstanding than the concerns ( Stoics the for physics show that to seems stresses, Boeri passage, This ethics. Stoic byAnnas inher very–the viewin quoted supportof role the on physics passage role”, namely plays nature animportant passage…where cosmic one in nature present viacosmic Stoic not ethics does failsee that Cicero“I Boeri to writes, in Annas’ occurs Boeri’s recent contributionMarcellopicture As (BOERI 2009:186). 606; A stronger also 1993:170n.versioncf. 46). kindof this of complaintagainst De finibus De III 62 onwards, where Cato turns to give a fuller account of the content and officia De Stoicorum repugnantiis , as Annas insists. In Cicero’s presentation of Stoic ethics there is at least is at there ethics Stoic of presentation Cicero’s In insists. Annas , as ; and Cicero himself seems to think that this is where cosmic nature cosmic is where this that think to seems himself Cicero ; and pace ibid Annas, present Stoic ethics .) points out, the passage in question closely 1035C-D, andin hermost recentcontribution Part II 190 On thegods and Physical tenets via cosmic nature. The nature. cosmic De finibus , quoted by , quoted III 73 De CEU eTD Collection schools on the place of virtue in asfar virtue place on and the asIcansee, modifications schools happiness, of the IV in whichAnnas’of Partbook, focuses onthedebates among the philosophical autonomous ethical discourse, asAnnasit. viewsprominence The question to comes positions ethical counter-intuitive their established actually Stoics the how question the concerns This discussions. insubsequent much received attention not focusfollows like In aspect ofAnnas’ interpretation to thaton what has Iwould an nature. cosmic inin (2007:85)that sayingasshe does consistsgood in living in agreement with nature. Thus Annas seems justified entirely does forknowing practical notsay ethics”.hereCato anything But about patterns basic some gives “it that in thinking is right) he believe (I be right also may todeal may physics be ethics”,and field of with knowledge well Boeri “anecessary in activity). sense this Indeed, virtue andvirtuous of contentthe of understanding livingwhat inagreementwith nature actuallymeans requires or of us (that is, toour if good”, the thismeans knowledge that of understandingphysics contributes toour of knowledgecontributes of toour “aknowledgethat physics as this passage presents in(BOERI 2009:190)that is out pointing of is right Boeri achievement goal. this the isis nature nowin with livingconsists what at stake inagreement already established; eius procuratione mundo atqueab proficiscendum est abomni ( whole universe isone who abouttolivein must inagreement from startnature governmentthe of the In fact, this is what Cato says at Cato iswhat this fact, In (and Old Academics) on (and OldAcademics) on the Peripatetics the and theStoics between argument figuresinthe significantly nature proptereaqui convenienternaturae victurussit,ei quod, summum bonum Chapter II.4.2; Section De finibus De finibus 191 III 73, as Boeri himself interprets it: that . II.4.2.1 III Stoic viapresented III ethics isnot ). That the That ). that within telos the CEU eTD Collection philosophy that can be studied on its own right, independently of the other parts of independently own right, parts be philosophy onits other the thatcan studied of of abranch as ofethics conceived Stoics the is that seen, wehave as Annas’ claim, II.4.2.2 ethics, but also Cicero’s presentation of itin andif thisI am right, result Annas’compromises notonly interpretation of Stoic implausible; is argue, shall I conclusion, This solution. satisfactory no has happiness and virtue between relation debateon Stoic–Peripatetic the ethics eudaemonist ancient framework of effect the within justify to that conceptual herconclusion the issue to the on Cicero’s perspective to see,sheappeals asweshall –indeed, “dogmatics” the of controversy the view of sceptical Cicero’s has affinity to astriking that conclusion after shearrives debate surveyingthe atadisappointing But systematic perspective. and theoretical more Annas’ from justifiable be may it issue, the of oversimplification life. from viewour Although is a historical of certainly point this an exclusively within onthe in the confines of virtue role Stoic–Peripateticthe debate of concerning did Stoics the how couldtenets question or central ethical establish their the Annas considers Cicero, to Similarly tothe text. approach rightthe represent cannot this ethics, Stoic of Cicero’s presentation itto gives justice that interpretation her of advantage itan considers Annas while effectthat the to argue I shall intact. leftthisher have partof argument original articles andhas Annas’in interpretation thatshe developments presented of subsequent and happiness Annas’ reconstruction theStoic ofthecoreargument for theses virtue on Part II 192 De finibus III. CEU eTD Collection distinctive andhighly controversial occupiedpositions anddefended philosophy 164 and 20;n. 1995: 604), cf. also BETEGH 2003: 275, 8.n. cf. 20),towhichAnnas ANNAS1993:164n. repeatedly admitsherdebt (ANNAS1993:163, n.14, ethical theses– hasbeensuggested by Jacques Brunschwig inaseminal article(BRUNSCHWIG 1991; 101 100 this does not change the fact that, on Annas’ interpretation, it is possible to “become it is to possible Annas’ interpretation, on factthat, change the not this does nature”, by cosmic “underwritten are judgements these that thought we acquirethe perspective cosmic the we acquire when because judgements”, basic ethical our about cosmic level.first learning may feel Though about nature enable us “to more secure does it furnish any extra thecontentof isalready cosmicnature ethics appealing established” to motive to consent to whatto time bythe weget wealready know… those itmodify changedoes or nor theses, we have already grasped “a“does notadd any understanding” ethical It the deepened or grasp”of tenets. new get from widerthe furnishedby Stoic perspective physics“an is increased reinforce them.or augment could significantly cosmic nature appeal to but also to manner, tentativeestablishor in views a provisional presentthese onlynot Stoics wereable, to themwith other developed positions, the theory that best answers ourethical intuitions– the completely debates isis,by from “what through toforge, commonly trying arguing agreed” and and conclusively, –that “dialectically” and so on).Proceeding only “the good; the genuine being fine” equivalent living to, virtuously,because is virtue sole the constituent of happiness, suchis or in, consists thathappily, living end, our that views the (including framework, no subsequent conditions for the final end etc.)–, but also in respect of its in also of but respect final etc.)–, the end for conditions with otherschoolsthe (including thenotion of happiness as finalthe formalend, form argues, on level inthis its notonly of ethicswasautonomous Stoic respect The The formerpossibility –that dialectical discussionprovided only a provisional delineationof the Cf. also ANNAS 1995: 600-601; 2007:61 –that is the general eudaemonist conceptual framework which the Stoics shared whichtheStoics framework conceptual eudaemonist is thegeneral –that 100 , and it is important to see how she understands this point. As Annas Chapter II.4.2; Section 193 II.4.2.2 specific content specific (p. 165-6). Nor (p. 101 within , that isthe that , What we generic on the on this CEU eTD Collection arguments against “cosmic”arguments the accounts). foundationalist her from in of inherseparation chapter book, itoccurs because another is partly her plausibility (perhaps this of tothe interpretation importance Stoicof ethics overall of obviously is it although literature, recent the in attention critical received not has of view.herinterestingargument Surprisingly,of part a philosophical from this point is hand, other the on and, account Cicero’s with interpretation her of intimacy the deepens considerably hand, one the on that, it to solution a offers book her of 19 Annas is fullyapparently of aware (cf. difficulty the 1993:388-391),andin chapter summum bonum purely “dialectical” modepersuadesay attemptto –not to convince– within themselvesandrationally others, the of discussing ethics, obviously a interpretation.Annas’ presents didserious problemforabout How the Stoics the truth of their viewsinterestingto groundthosenotoriously paradoxical attempt This tenets. situation on the seem of focussednot represent but they a ethics, discussing philosophicallyto and do bafflingly scarce and feeble; they may well be taken to belong to a “dialectical” level of are ethics Stoic heartliethe at that theses of in favour ethical the elsewhere) earlier (in Chapter earlier (in indicated AsI place. in thefirst other) (cosmic nature or to appeal Stoic the towards But thisback initial brings us tothe problem has turned scholarly that attention same view is alsoendorsed at2007:61, 65,69-71). knowing anything about Stoicknowingphysics (cf. again anything about “live by” without it, andindeedto ethical of theory”, Stoic of convinced truth the establish: that ancient ethics was largely independent from other branches of philosophy, such that the various different that theories “can besuch studied in a relatively ofphilosophy, autonomous way” (ANNAS, 1993:branches 15) other from independent largely was ethics ancient that establish: substantial part of her argument forthe more general thesis that bookher asawhole is meant to 102 Itis worthwhile to take notice at this point that Annas’ interpretationof Stoic ethics forms a ? II.1 ), such explicit arguments as can be found (in Cicero or Part II 194 ibid 102 . 165-6; as far as I can the can see, as farI . 165-6; CEU eTD Collection finds itcallabsurd person to happy a virtuous if she greatmisfortunes like suffers tends associateto happiness with worldly success, satisfaction or affluence, and hence intuition, ethical which deep-seated and widespreadanother pay heed to to necessary However, in the end Aristotlehe fights shy of fullyhehereintuitions iswilling than realize. Reflecting to onour nature of virtue on the embracing comes this andsense intuitionsonvirtue everydayin beliefsmore butour happiness, are tension idea, near because heto feels claiming it that virtue is self-sufficient for happiness. theory in the theory his In establishdevelopingview point. ownethical fails onthis asingle coherent to esp. 365and 85; 383-4; cf.Annas argues 423-4) thatthis isbecauseAristotle actually happinessvirtuous agent. Inher of 1993:364-84, issue(ANNAS the discussion of the what view in Aristotle’s so-calledthe wasontheroleprecise of externalgoods the To begin with the former (A), commentators notoriously find it difficult understand to action. for reasons non-moral and moral between essential difference the about sentiments modern familiar andmore virtue of value distinctive the of perception Stoic the between affinity) analogy (indeed latter; second, asa a purported understood the critical (B)she responseto appealsto against Aristotle’s backdrop the of suggesting formerthe ethics, is that best Annas’ strategy in moves. (A)she crucial consists Stoic First, putsthe two theory consists in virtuous activity alone (see esp. pp., 368-9, cf. p. 123). virtue is the only aim of the virtuous person, whichclearly draws Aristotle to the idea that happiness their own sakes deliberation;and she does what virtue requires just forthat reason, i.e.she does virtuous actions virtuous persondoes not sufferfrom suchmotivational conflicts. She is wholly unified inmotivation virtuous agent should but in order to do so she has to constantly repress her fears and desires. Thecontrasts fully the virtuous personwith the merely continent or“encratic” person: the latteris able to act asa do not really matterfor him:they are, as it were, eclipsed by the splendour of virtue. Again, Aristotle could be balanced against the value of virtue, which seems to suggest that the external goods and evils including suffering,disease orevendeath; thus he is not losing anything by virtuousher activity that (will enjoy acting virtuously), evenif it leads to serious disadvantages interms of conventional goods, 103 Forexample, he argues that the fully virtuous personwill take immense pleasure in being virtuous , without having to battle downcounter-motivations. There is thus a sense inwhich NE Aristotle attempts to make justice to our most important common important most our to justice make to attempts Aristotle Chapter II.4.2; Section 195 II.4.2.2 103 for CEU eTD Collection incommensurable degree”: not its “is ( value but valuable”, 34: thegood supremely in kind grasp fully: Aristotlethat fail the that value andhissuccessors ofvirtue to Cicero’s account of Stoic ethics in of ethics Stoic account Cicero’s AccordingAnnas this argumentative (392-4), to in “isseen most clearly” strategy competent to form our final end,without the additionof external goods. (p.392) notso in many words, producing an argument that virtue alone is complete and self-sufficient, and thus happiness is. The Stoics, in arguing that Aristotle's account of happiness is wrong, are in effect, though thinking that external goods are also necessary constitutes making afundamental mistake aboutsee that what we shall difference, ofthis nature the werecognize Once of things. kinds ofother value the and virtue of value the between of kind difference the to recognize fails it for flawed; fundamentally account of happiness, virtuousnamely as activity withadequate together an supply ofexternal goods, is Peripatetic) the later (and Aristotelian the that hold They attack. is here defence real Stoics' The happiness. by givingin the misguidedto intuition are externalthat necessarygoods for ANNAS The 1993:385-88). Stoics in reply turn Aristotle that runsdeep into trouble (cf. happy necessarily not is person virtuous the even that is conclusion inevitable the person, virtuous the of power in the entirely not are but life, happy the for alsonecessary are external goods since some that position “Peripatetic” standard the 12, 77, 85-6,12, 77, (esp. in Cicero see aswecan Theophrastus, intuitive. the puzzle resolve press thetensionsinhisview to andtotry even ledexplanation hissuccessors at Annas’ on which unstable, theinherently is position resulting the but sense, costcommon of upholding within tendencies combine two these Aristotle to tries torture. or poverty, disease views that at first sight seem counter- from be things from of goods (cf. value normally the other to considered Tusc genere, noncrescendo valet –not in –not us from a waystrongenoughtoprevent is that virtue saying . V 85, Acad. I 33, 35),waslater heldintroducing responsible for De finibus Part II 196 III. It consists in III.It anappeal apointto ), such that they are in a way aestimatio Tusc . V 24-5; cf. also ) is “a matter of kind, of matter “a is ) is different De fin De fin . III . . V CEU eTD Collection fin 170; 427-8, 431). The consequences of this importantinsight, as Cato points out at valuethe and ofvirtue everythingsee else 392-4, further(cf. pp. pp. 121ff; 162, 167, the claim that virtue is the only and “value”, have are“selected”); someindifferents andindifferents, correspondingly good simply marks the essential rational skill living between “preferred”of and involves “dispreferred” discrimination difference between for health, wealth,go to reason more no have we that familymean not does This “indifferent”. are etc. things valued than for their opposites (for “the Stoicsby the (or fine”) while expressis virtue good, claiming theonly that other the practice of virtue as a valuethe virtue of in itself. Itis essential this and incommensurabilitydifference that orlesser value agreater of such “operation” than amount willproduce goodness. No prevent strong enough us from subtractingto adding or them scaleon of a single (cf. goods conventional the than be valued to more always Aristotle: that happiness must be “complete” (cf.by ANNAS 1993: 393; cf.377-84). recognised intuition basic another compromise to seems ofhappiness view additive the because which Aristotle and Theophrastus felt so irresistible; but the second consequence should bewelcome, 104 Aristotle relied on. (ANNAS 1993: 394) that happiness about intuitions the reject we must that virtue, on we reflect when We see, happiness. of this, must be accepted, despite its giving what seems at first like a less satisfactory account accountbetter ofa gives which theory, Stoic the argument, the reverse so, to And things. valued other to relation its and of virtue account unsatisfactory an give to be seen can it on reflection, because, rejected appears at first to give a more intuitively satisfactory account of happiness, his account must be arguments to show that they give a true account of virtue, unlike the Aristotelians. by their of happiness While Aristotleaccount an as recommended is account their then, right, are Stoics the If happiness. person’s can goods conventional of noaddition Peripateticthe position) of version Academic” “Old revised Antiochus’ to (contrary that also but happiness, person’s virtuous the ruin can goods conventional of in terms loss no believed, The former of these consequences may seem to be a drawback, as it goes against the ethical intuition ethical the against goes it as drawback, a be to seem may consequences of these former The . III41ff,notonlyinclude contrary what to that, Theophrastus Aristotle and 104 As Annas concludes, Chapter II.4.2; Section 197 II.4.2.2 De fin increase . III 45), but in a way the virtuous the De CEU eTD Collection incidentally central incidentally the morecentral by to general Annasthesis endorsed inherbook: that ininherent be) to is (supposed perception that way, deep same in the adifferent articulating, infact are Stoics the tosay that wants Annas actually for analogy, amere than 401,451). Indeed,more171-2, 185,263,398, 407,431-2,448, is this 3, 169-170, essential difference between essential difference incommensurable value andvirtue of more familiar modern concerningsentiments the and distinct the of conception Stoic the between analogy an drawing in consists play.indicated this Asabove, into I (B)comes move strategic Annas’ second unequivocal is intuitions from support? which thisIt a theory claim that can point at and basic the among counts such as and person, reflective sufficiently every to is accessible virtue of value the of distinctiveness the that maintain simply Stoics can in the twist story. How the andimplausible may This strike strange usasa rather assumption we that all have happiness ultimateas endour (cf. 396). that it has to establish”aboutfact world… a the “deep (p. 169) –in this hasrespect a different kind of value. Touse Annas’ own words, for the Stoics thisis simply a it is treatedbut of things, kinds other be against assessed virtue cannot grasp” that to come fact “a willin rational they simply attitude developed isassume that (p. 169): possible” suggests, they indeed,produce an pointfor incommensurability asAnnas itself,argument the claim giving the content of ( happiness” of the giving content for candidate an acceptable andtherefore self-sufficient, is and virtue complete that is“ this emphasises, As Annas our cannot intuitive notion of a moral reason (cf. 121, n. 245) –a claim that is prove it (p. 432), because “no rational justification of “no prove it justification 432), becauseof rational point this (p. moral the nearest that the Stoics get to an argument to show an argumentto to get Stoics the that nearest the datum ibid and .). On the other hand, other the On .). for the theory to cope with, not a conclusion non-moral Part II 198 reasons (cf. Annas1993:115,121- the Stoics do not at any at not do Stoics the on apar with e.g. the e.g. with CEU eTD Collection the reasoning which leads us to grasp the peculiar value of leads reasoning value peculiar the us tograsp the which virtue”; as wecansee of at the Stoics do amuch less thorough job than Kant “of examining the formal features of theories as that of Kant of asthat theories moral modern such to compared meaningfully be can claim this on rely they way The non-moral moral (410). value” like between and insistence the to us difference an on it toseem is bound for their theory, of parts immediately accessible of mostseem one andvirtue of that kindsother of straightforwardly arenotthings commensurable may of value the that “insistence their move, alien and baffling a being from far Thus, uncompromising way when they thatthefinedeclare is theonly (122). good most in and clearest the this point Stoics make But the fine”). sakeof the the reason” (123: moral the virtuousa personfor does virtuous done actionsis “for their what own of sakes”, and “for characterizations modern other to close it bring which inand toactasvirtue impulses requires), “ order unified disposition, such that the virtuous person does nothave tofight down counter- person pleasure activity,virtuous invirtuous istakes andthatvirtue amotivationally the (he saysthat goods other the to in relation position virtue hasaspecial that actionsnot (121). The alone AristotleStoics argues in inthis:are ways too different Annas, “ancient theories think exactly the same way” about virtuous andvicious weighed against the and account into be taken to isit a consideration others merely tothink that deliberation; the is to misconceive a that given of iscourse immoral isaction ideally cowardly), this (e.g. reason stops what a moral reason I understand When them. merely “outweigh” than rather considerations, aside” other is. According to “sweep or “override” they in deliberations: have aspecial our place Moral reasons Mill’s theories are” (452; cf. esp.12, 14, 47-8, 120ff etc.). or Kant’s senseas in same the morality… of are“theories theories ethical ancient (cf. esp. 1993: 432; cf. also 169, 171, 448-450) 169, also (cf.cf. esp.1993:432; Chapter II.4.2; Section 199 II.4.2.2 describes virtuous virtuous describes action in ways . Admittedly, CEU eTD Collection 170, cf. 448-49). De fin provoked provoked by Cicero’s charge the that Stoic is theory buta disingenuous verbal variant the on controversy Academic) (Old Peripatetic aim of the presentation is to give a clear statement majorofa clearly it that comesand out Cato Cicero between the conversation introductory Stoic position in the Stoic– be viewed as“justifying” or“giving support to” the ethical theses see esp. 136,138, 217). theories (cf. see 169-172; further135-41, 214ff questionthe –on inwhatsense appealthis of to canancient nature feature general a was analysis Annas’ on that nature” to “appeal the represents eminently is the kindthe moral viewpoint, and tell a developmental story that culminates in this” (ANNAS 1993:of 169). This story105 that we find in the first section of Cicero’s account in “whole system” of Stoic ethics ( ethics Stoic of system” “whole in purpose official Cicero’s seen, already have we As presumably informed by)way Cicero’s lookingof at and positioning the Stoic theory. in of Stoic theory the with only not Aristotelian inCicero’s by the tradition– isaccountpassages supported a debate of within context bethe construed happiness isto to of virtue relation the worth noticing that Annas’ first strategic move (A) –the idea that the Stoic position on movingBefore add some like on I would to on First,isAnnas’ it remarks procedure. II.4 2.3 justify pointthis they developrather “accounts atheory that for” it(169, 171,432). (that is, grasp the “moral point of view”), and instead of developmentinevitably wemust rational of grasp this powers our difference come to trying to prove or rationally Instead, “they devote attention to a quite un-Kantian concern, the question of how we come to grasp . III 21, they speak merely of the distinctive appeal of rational consistency (169- Some remarks onAnnas’ solution 105 But similarly to Kant, they simply assume that as a matter as amatter of that the Kant,simply assume they to Butsimilarly De finibus III,butalso is in principally line with is (and De fin Part II 200 . III 14:. III summum bonum totam rationem De finibus III is to expound the expound is to III . Cato’s speech is De finibus ); but from the from but ); III; and it CEU eTD Collection proper ( proper ancient “ahistory ethics”not towrite intellectual ethics”,of structure of and ancient “systematic and thematic” concerns (p. 3): Annas’ declared purpose is findto “the out “a the contribution history to of itethics”,is nevertheless formed guidedby and This in aproblem; isnot itself Annas’is especiallysincealthough project meant tobe remarks in other works (cf. works esp. inother remarks De fin the dialogue between Cicero and Cato within of place the the by as structure well as IV, Book in of thetheory wholeStoic the of work (cf. refutation and also examination rationally justified in This so). doing focus isunderwritten also by Cicero’s critical are they differently, think Stoics the wherever that showing by (ideally system Academic–Peripatetic Old the to ispreferable theory Stoic the that show to second, casenot the substantial the in (bypointing positionsdifferences out upheld)and the on the Old Academic–Peripatetic system –thus Cato’s task is to show, first, that this is Plutarch’s further supportin sources other which Annas herself,for some ignores. reason, In It is also worth taking notice that, as far as I can see, Annas’ interpretation could find process improvementinof firethe of anddebate opposition” (cf. 2007:86). also along of “the end itrepresents this: just uswith present to is likely account Cicero’s to reconstruct anideally version developed it,of and as (1995: she later 607-8) argues, want sheto seems rather, theory; of the origins of the reconstruction historical strictly . II 33-38, where Cicero’s remark foreshadows and foreshadows . II33-38,where debate), byCicero’s the remark Cicero’s ibid De Stoicorum repugnantiis .). Her account of Stoic ethics inthe ethics of Stoic Her account .). Chapter II.4.2; Section Luc . 132-135, (1040D= 201 De leg SVF II.4.2.3 Morality III 157) we read: III . I38,54-5, is not purported to be a to purported not is Tusc . V 32 etc.). CEU eTD Collection ALGRA 1997. 107 justice’. pros Plat A coupleof earlier paragraphs (1040A) Plutarch justice, refers toawork ‘On Plato’ against ( dismantle virtue completely” virtue dismantle as counted you itself,good, destroy morality light virtue, and very the of you virtutem penituseverteris dixeris inbonisque numeraveris,ethonestum ipsumquasivirtutis lumenextinxeris et position: Peripatetic fin external) goods –notably, a very similar argument is presented at is presented –notably, argument very similar a goods external) the that Peripatetics: the with associated standardly one as the same is virtually the Plato hedonists. the with debate the on emphasis more Chrysippus against arguing Aristotelianthe minorwas of heposition concern; lay mayapply to inwhich context Chrysippus used suggestthat adialectical to report at Cicero’s Infact, of matter. the an oversimplification Aristotle iscertainly against Annas’ claim that “the Stoics” defended their view on the on view their defended Stoics” “the that claim Annas’ Republic be in presented attackingII of likely by Book the to division goods Socrates the of To be targetsure, the of Chrysippus’ criticismnotAristotle isPlato, is (Chrysippus admit either pleasure, or health, or any one of the other things that are not fine, as goods”. away not only with justice, but also with greatness of Insoul, the temperance, books andagainst all the other Plato, virtues, blaming if we him for apparently admitting health as a good, he says: “we make 106 Fora detailed discussionof the ., as part of Cato’s objection against Cicero’s identification of the Stoic and the Θ΍ȱΘЗΑȱΩΏΏΝΑ Ύ΅ϠȱΘχΑȱΗΝΚΕΓΗϾΑ΋ΑȱΎ΅ϠȱΘΤΖȱΩΏΏ΅ΖȱΦΕΉΘΤΖȱΥΔΣΗ΅Ζ Ѐ·ϟΉ΍΅Α πΑȱΈξȱΘΓϧΖȱΔΕϲΖȱ̓ΏΣΘΝΑ΅ȱΎ΅Θ΋·ΓΕЗΑȱ΅ЁΘΓІȱΈΓΎΓІΑΘΓΖȱΦ·΅ΌϲΑȱΦΔΓΏ΍ΔΉϧΑȱΘχΑ summum bonum ǀ ). This from passage should warn usagain historicalof that a view point na periDikaiosun Lucullus , ΓЁ µ , ϱΑΓΑȱΘχΑȱΈ΍Ύ΅΍ΓΗϾΑ΋ΑȱΚ΋ΗϠΑȱΦΏΏΤȱΎ΅ϠȱΘχΑ ϶ 138-40 of the µ consists in a combination of within minorvirtue consists acombination of other and (bodily χȱΎ΅ΏϱΑȱπΗΘ΍Α quicquid enimpraeterid,quodhonestumsit,expetendumesse Ɲ s ); whereas at 1038B, Dand1040B-Dof we hear Chrysippus’ (“In sayingthatanything(“In exceptvirtuebe is sought, to or ) . And in the quotation inAnd Plutarch Chrysippusseems . inthequotation to Chrysippea divisio divisio , Φ·΅ΌϲΑȱΦΔΓΏϟΔΝΐΉΑ of various positions on the Part II 202 and its place withinCicero’s thought see 107 But the position attributed here to , ΪΑȱύȱΘχΑȱψΈΓΑχΑȱύȱΘχΑȱЀ·ϟΉ΍΅Αȱό . summum bonum µ Ή · ΅ Ώ Γ Μ Ι Λ ϟ ΅ Α ȱ Φ Α ΅ ΍ Ε Ή ϧ Η Ό ΅ ΍ De finibus summum bonum 106 by arguing III10 En de tois sub ǥ On CEU eTD Collection find thefollowing argument: virtue withvirtue good wouldany other “destroy” ormorality, virtue at incompatible views with our virtue.on nature the of And as to viewsare these that idiosyncratic wayof expressing is do), Peripatetics Chrysippus’ merely useful (as the Epicureans do), or combine itwith other goods (as Plato and the ofitif as virtue we conceive “ruin” or away with” we “make that claim can see,the the above argument seems to represent Chrysippus’ reasons for thinking so. As we constituting the virtuefor and toChrysippusthat the between choice (ascandidates pleasure comments Cicero sentence previous in the that ground the on partly others, and 21) ( Arnim von by Chrysippus from quotation verbatim a as identified been has imitationor simulation of virtue. dispositiondriven to appropriate actionby pleasure as if forprofit isn’t avirtue, but rathera deceptive friendship, justice, and the rest of the virtues, none of whichcan exist unless itis disinterested. A If youfollow pleasure, muchof life is ruined, not least fellowship withthe human race, love, Epicureanargued against virtue the subordination topleasure:of This argument isThis by inargument presented the Cicero be arguing be 108 (iii) (ii) (i) mercede aliqua ad officium inpellitur, ea non est virtus sed fallax imitatio simulatioque virtutis iustitia reliquae virtutes,quarum esse nulla potest nisi erit gratuita; nam quae voluptate quasi alteram si sequare, multaruuntet maxime communitas cum hominumcaritas genere, amicitia that real bravery cannot exist. cannot bravery real that this being so, unless itis established that nothing besides what isimmoral is evil, itfollows a person; befall might that misfortunes the of “we also assume” ( of It “is a hypothesis that commands universal assent” ( that no one who counts x ; from the nature of virtue the nature of from summum bonum adsumitur 108 x as an evil can scorn or disregard ( Chapter II.4.2; Section Lucullus ) that“abrave lofty and spirit” respectno has for orregard any ) was “not much of a fight” ( fight” a of much “not was ) , in a similar vein as he is told elsewhere to have to elsewhere in heistold vein , as a similar 140; transl. Charles Brittain) 203 Lucullus II.4.2.3 positum omnium adsensuet adprobatum (cf. also x , and thus cannot fail to be afraid why De leg non magnacontentio De finibus the combination of . I 42, 48), but it48), but . I42, III 29 we SVF . III ); ) CEU eTD Collection Annas herself (1993: 424;cf.felicitously 432) summarises the situation, ethicalour intuitions; itis this dividegets and that keeps wholethe debate going. As (1993: 431). misfortunesmeetswhen someoneis but great dying virtuous, and onthewheel” widespread ethical intuition when they insistthat and another deep-rooted to appeal theirstandard-bearer, as Aristotle with Peripatetics, things.virtue the thethat value value isincommensurable Butthe other of of with implies reflection on which virtue, of value the of nature distinctive the concerning isvirtue the only genuine constituentof ishappiness a deepintuition an appeal to on Annas’ explanation the “nearest As account. adequacy herwehavecasts doubt the on seen,justof Cicero’s reading of that the Stoics get to an argumentNevertheless I think thatto Annas’show” reconstruction that raises a serious problem, and one that II.4.2.4 her point). illuminate to of example cowardice considerations,other stops and(indeed, deliberation thus the Annas herself uses the andsweeps aside which adistinctive,overrides reason uncompromising constitute if understood, rightly should, cowardly an ise.g. action factthat the that we realise havewe also samethe perception when that 1993: 121-122):asanappeal moral (at to interprettempting premise to alongsuggested byAnnas’(ii) interpretation the lines Moreover,wemay findit conception virtue. reflected of incompatible our with is things other of goodness the that claim the on variation a represents clearly it but needs andreconstruction, raises questions, several theargument Of course, A striking consequence of Annas’ interpretation A strikingconsequenceofAnnas’ Thus at the bottom Thus at thebottom wefindof wholethe debate acrucial within divide Part II 204 itis “absurd totalk of happiness CEU eTD Collection come to see that only the Stoic theory answered to their considered intuitions about virtue. uncritical weight to their intuitions about happiness, and that whenthey reflectedonvirtue they would theory moreThus, an ancient Stoic, faced by opinionan poll whichshowed thatmost people found Aristotle's convincing,virtue. about views our articulates properly which theory a before wouldancient are viewsindefinite how seen repeatedly simplyhave we For to. appeals Aristotle that happiness of about ones the happiness, than intuitions reply important more and deeper are these that claim to andbe able would they how see to easy the Stoicsthat may They claim reasonablythat onlythat their theory does justice to our intuitions about the nature of morality. And it is washave thoughtbecause that they(1993: 432-3): shouldmost give peopleway ancient gave tooethical much analysis thisisunderwritten of by feature framework general of a the conceptual theory which her On people. thoughtful more and reflective only to areaccessible virtue concerning seems to favourinAnnas theintuitions seeAs seems suggestthat the abovequotation,we can to the position them? between endorsed by the Stoics have anything further to offer, in of furtherhave terms tooffer, anything be discredited and abandoned asmisguided. But which one? Do the opposing theories to have intuition will other or theday one of end the at other; each with incompatible aredeeply for these ofintuitions, sets both fully satisfy notheory can Apparently, pull in different directions. lives. Thus, from the philosopher's point of view, the intuitions that must be satisfiedtheir are in mixed, and significance its and virtue on particular in and goals, their on reflect to chosen have who people who properneed a answerto the question,what final theirend consists in, namely thoughtfulthe majority of people, who happinessdo not even reflect if one loses all the onworldly their goods. livesThisbeing second set and a of moral thoughtsfinal may person notends. be found in theasBut we do this,they itseemsnowadays clearthat worldly success is arenot the point at all, that what foundmatters is beingsay, virtuous, inand the that people ifsatisfy people whothis have reflected onvirtue and whatis its significance what is in our lives. must And toproduce to thosematters,has theory who ethical an which ofhappiness account But the [sic.]. success and onegoods has all oneworldly of affluence, needs possession actual with and success with happiness forwe associate Unreflectively, …it seems as though our common views themselves, the basis of the whole project, are deeply divided. Chapter II.4.2; Section 205 rational reasons rational II.4.2.4 (…) , to facilitate the choice CEU eTD Collection in the Stoic–Peripatetic debate over the over debate in the Stoic–Peripatetic happinessintuitions didplayapart and virtue about our between alleged asymmetry As far as I can see, the only unstable.happiness happy on wheel,the his thereby position rendering on relationthe virtue and of Stoics, gaveheed common-senseintuition person tothe that be virtuous the cannot fully grasp the significance his real of own observation he,unlikewhen laterthe failedto Aristotle himself theory Aristotle’s of Annas’ interpretation on was. Indeed, itreally that is itunclear Aristotle. But over advantage had an Stoics the can seethat the ancient notion of notion ancient the of notion” shared schools Hellenistic the (INWOODAssumingthat this 1995:651). “no out, comparablehas rightly pointed eudaimonia 1095a17-26), which(I thateveryone agrees oncalling declares final the end conception ofhappiness is inAristotle’s passage well-known the forHowever, Annas’ the singleprincipal support thethin claim about general inmakes lives”our (129; cf.331, 410-11, 127, 426, 431,453). be, and can be, “modified when we understand the nature of the demands which virtue worldly notion itsuccess (1993:46).Nevertheless hasto a“flexible”remains which of results other andthe honour is, wealth, lives”; that their with satisfied people makemost that much, things the with before wehave be reflected associated, to tends lifeone’s towards attitude “itbecauseand of thisof suggestion positive satisfaction deep); it hardly implies “aanything more than positiveview life”, of and one’s is and which complex virtue of tothenotion one”(asopposed weak andunspecific of conception ancient the that Annasargues book In her but widely disagrees about whatwidely butconstitutes about disagrees eudaimonia indirect was indeed such a thin and unspecific concept, we indeed concept, andunspecific was suchathin evidence that Annas can adduce to show that the that show to adduce can Annas that evidence Part II 206 direct summum bonum evidence is adduced to show that any show that to is adduced evidence eudaimonia eudaimonia is Cicero’s treatment of Nicomachean Ethics ; as Brad Inwood is “an extremely CEU eTD Collection theory” (428; cf. ). But Cicero’s treatment of the subject certainly does not show this. not does certainly subject of the Cicero’s But treatment ). cf.theory” (428; success or achievement,happiness lies in something internal to agentthe and thus doesnot depend on actual is one intuitivethe level happiness is up obviously not to me); rather, which emerges in as extreme”, the beat “arbitrary giving (whichwould happiness prior to content” as a result of requirement that happiness isbeshould power “a inthe not agent’s formal demand the developments of happiness may outnottobeturn in power (cf.our esp. our that possibility the with threatens it because or virtue, of value distinctive is it intuitionsabhorrent: reflected concerning the because it our compromises is found actually position decide itis to why Cicero, Theophrastean difficult the in passages relevant the at look actually we when that however, noted, be should It debate. of the terms the shifting in succeeded they but everyone, convinced have not may Stoics The themselves. defend to counter-arguments commonsense, as Aristotle saw it, but as highly vulnerable. Aristotelian theories henceforward need forhappiness. The Stoic arguments are sufficiently powerful that this is now seen, not asrock-solid possible option, Theophrastus is widely berated fordefending the intuitionthat virtue is not sufficient they bring about aclimate of thought in which, while an Aristotelian kind of theory is still seen as a round:won firstleastthe have Stoics at the can seethat straightforwardly the valueof of kinds comparableother (387). with thing” forposition standardly the Stoicvirtue which isset against view, was valueof the not compelling. The reasonwidely andconsidered asoutrageous contemptible rather intuitivelythan or evident for this, as Annas was sufficient the happylife, to virtue isnot name, that with associated Theophrastus’ explains, was that “ time standardly by that claim, the heby wrote time that the show references contrast, cf. contrast, Acad see Theophrastus in esp.Cicero, hisethicalwritings 410-11, 412,424; (1993: 385-88; . I33; De fin Tusc . V 1-5)? In her book Annas argues that in Ancient ethics the . V12,77, 85-6; Chapter II.4.2; Section Tusc (1993: 411) . V 24-5, 85). As Annas points out, Cicero’s 207 II.4.2.4 De fin . II86,III11,V86-7;by by Cicero's time this time Cicero's by “the position that position “the Thuswe CEU eTD Collection entails various problematic consequences and corollaries that our opponents will not will opponents our that corollaries and consequences problematic various entails intuitions unrefined concerning place valuedthe of thingsother inthehappylife– our to than rather virtue of value distinctive the concerning intuitions reflected our original choice and commitment Every and complex. technical debatebecomesincreasingly the onwards this point –such as the decisiondecisive rational forground adopting the Stoic asAnnas position. For, explains,from that we should give creditHowever, this dialectical advantage over the Peripatetics does notseem to to constitute a seem not me useitdoes directlythe toattack to Peripatetics). to byCato1993: 421-3;the“additive” viewis at referred to Peripatetic viewat Peripatetic the of version Antiochean the against Cicero by Stoics, the to attributed being without Indeed, (see ANNASself-sufficientcf. 1993:393-5, 427-8; cf. 381ff, 423, 2007:86).– also Book I of the in gradations iswith atodds formalthe Aristotleconditions which haslaid in down happiness thuscomes viewthat the –but happier even happy person already makes the entail happiness, “additive” model the an on which addition of more of these goods to seems happiness of constituents necessary are goods andexternal bodily some happiness on intuitions reflected alsoour but virtue, on intuitions satisfy notonly reflected fails our to interpretation) a certain least on (at happiness of conception Aristotelian is thatthe their truth secure about feel more Stoicsto the to helped havemight Annas, to according that, consideration A further passageinlatter so(in theview is the thinking attributed to Theophrastus). life esp. us thehappy (see On hisview wholethe andimportance aim liesof philosophy in its confer to promise something like this objection this like something Nicomachean Ethics Nicomachean De finibus De fin. V 81 and at II 86, V 86-7); and I do not think that he was alone , namely that our final end should be complete and be complete should end final our that namely , Part II is raised, though inchoatelyis though somewhat raised, and 208 Tusculan s V 23 and 50 (cf. also ANNAS as our final end our final as De finibus III 43-44, but he . The ideathat . The CEU eTD Collection satisfactory answer. satisfactory reflection but happiness; for search our and lives, our of nature the on reflect Even one which is that is, in the later version of the “Peripatetic” theory preserved in theory Stobaeus’ preserved is,in version of “Peripatetic” that the later the assessment “wefindmoreinteresting andviableanswerinArius” a cf.(423; 415ff), Aristotle’s Antiochus” position, andcertainly to (424;cf. However,her 124). on Annas finds that “on theoreticalamongintuitions. the (Forthis conception see esp. 217, 424-5,431-2; 435). grounds”, the Stoicconstitutecan bea said to kind forrational ground assessing of choices theoriginal theory is “clearlysuch positions),of and canbecompared inrespect overall success. Inthissensethey preferable of sets cohering in the rather (or taken to positions in the inherent problems the resolve downand to track canbeviewed assystematic attempts resulting theories developed such objections each party will various anddevelop arguments counter-arguments; the variousmeetANNAS and1993: 395ff). problems further so on (cf. attempting to In of one; in response they can stress that virtue is a skillhaveface to the objectionof that on theirliving; theory itisrational pursueto two goals insteadbut this gives rise to which is at odds with the initial condition of “completeness”. The Stoics in turn will mentionednamely happiness, implies their additive model above, position an that of fail to point out. The Aristotelians will have to face, among others, the objection more intractable the division of sources deep reveals it sometimes But issue. an and organize to serves reflection Sometimes views. ethical people's to relation see… weclearly here intuitions; all of them make moves which have to be defended bothby original theory the by to and intuition. directly (…) answers theories the of none us… before alternatives these have we time the By competing theories (ANNASshe 1993:424), finds herself boundanswer: to the between a choice” make rationally we do “how question, the asks she challenge Stoic tothe Aristotelian responses thevarious surveyingall after when Nevertheless, consistent,well and defended, finds with arivalequal advantage. We are led to ( ibid the the limits of ethical theory, atleast of theory that aims to stand in a realistic . 424-5) appears. In the Chapter II.4.2; Section case of happiness, we find that find we happiness, of case 209 division, and the more thorough the reflection, the reflection, the thorough more the and division, II.4.2.4 no unify our thoughts about thoughts our unify theory is satisfactory. delivers no one no delivers Eclogae . CEU eTD Collection the form, intractable more in an even only reinstates, debate theoretical theday of end point choosing between someAt them standards. interms above of the success theirestimate relative to itappears ceases to be a sensibly become, lives:in harder themore the theories refined andcomplex our competing the rational procedure; thusthis approach unsuccessful inproves determining importance the (morality)of virtue at the moreindependent secure domain (1993: 217; 444).Butcf. in 177-8, finalthe analysis itisintuition”; morelike “a searching for reflective equilibrium” thanappealing to a and theory between interplay and adjustment holistic “overall of matter a is claims Annas, simply leadcannot toadecisive here. conclusion Onthis model basing ethical by as described proper, theory ethical of ancient internal structure the appears that It is still a Cicero is always aware that, howeverpersonally committed he may be at any giventime to a theory, it (…) considers to be convincing, and who finds it genuinely difficult to commit himself to eitherposition. person, intelligent and educated see an we can him in because ushere, to who interesting particularly is Cicero is aware of (…) the lies. truth the where unclear seem can it intuitions, argumentsour on make theories different the which demands different the and arguments the all with familiar on eitherout of irresponsibility, butside because he genuinely sees the difficulties on each side. Even to someone and ofin his philosophical works uses the Stoic theorythe to demolishCicero the Aristotelian discussion. of one and viceof centuries versa—notresult considerations indecisive the from just see this We can right. are Aristotelians or Stoics the whether clear not is it reflection of level the on even that is… problem real The which either side evidence: Cicero’s to this connection, To reinforce this striking conclusion Annas onceappeals again,for last the time in sooner or later rehearse the counter-arguments.(…) intuitions itappeals to, can neverbe the end of the story—at least, not to a reflective person, who will than to resolve it without rather sharper, further difference the make to is question. of reflection result the and Andthemselves, soagainst divided the be to state of being convinced by a theory, and by the both sides appeal to intuitions, and they seem to have equal force. For our unreflective views here seem aporia theory that originally prompted it. , with arguments for and against. Each side is convincing in its appeal to intuitions, but Part II 210 CEU eTD Collection credentials as an expositor of Hellenistic philosophical theories: he is an “intelligent”, is an he theories: philosophical Hellenistic of expositor an as credentials intellectual hasAnnasAs viewof Cicero’s a markedly seen,positive we have historical development. theory building plausibleaccountof anddiscussion theories’with any various the highlights difficulty the reconcilingAnnas’ of picture of naturethe of ancientethical Cicero’sappeal inof evidence support to backfires, becauseher it conclusion actually Annas’ me that to seems It precaution. general this than my worries to more is There been owingissue undesirable source’s influence. has toour distorted backsomehow possibility orotherour andconsider the understanding of that the astep ittake seems reasonableto such we are conclusions, find that tending towards if we contrary, the to theory; or doctrine that of evaluation and understanding person’s on a given doctrine or as historiansfind avaluablesource that we with someone Thecoincides fact Cicero’s. theory does not automatically entail that we must share that Prima facie by Cicero. represented position is that Academic Sceptic the is theview thateither position upheld inthe lacksdebate conclusive rational support – justified be rationally to proves analysis final the in that position only the concerned, is virtue as fartohappiness is the of debateon relation that asthe conclusion I find thisperplexing an utterly and uncomfortable Annas’ outcome. Practically, II.4.2.5 between. todecide arguments to make, still decisions with us end—leaves final ofour nature reflecting, we cannot go back. But reflection on the fundamental question of ethics—the determinate started we have Once theories. between decide to be used can that here bedrock no is So there Objections to Annas’conclusion , it is alarming to see that Annas’ ultimate assessment of the issue thus Chapter II.4.2; Section 211 II.4.2.5 (433-5) CEU eTD Collection seriously “reflective” and “educated” person; someone who is who person; familiarwith someone and“educated” “reflective” seriously we to buy all this? positions(cf. problems tothe pertaining they uphold esp.Cicero the of understanding athorough on than authority school on more rely they enterprise, standards of rationality ideallywhich informought to wholethe philosophical recogniseliveshortcomings oftheir intellectual views; the unable to uptothe to in position not the are they systems, dogmatic in respective their Cloistered tenets. their indefending anddoctrinaire short-sighted them: himself characterises such as Cicero, does not find conclusive or rationally compelling. They are, as Cicero considerations and which arguments asufficiently intelligentand person, reflective by the him.They areconvinced including areunlike Stoics, the criticises, heacknowledge “dogmatic” whom the it seems unavoidable that philosophers to more the view of Cicero, positive this weaccept more readily the However, theories. scholarlyour and philosophical for abetter quest understanding of ancient various the makeenough view within in ourapproach to Cicero asavaluableally common us We for mayfeel sodescribed; attitude the sympathy it indeed,may have seem to positions. conflicting the against and for arguments and considerations the of weighting and analysis in a careful itconsists since systems, philosophical the all of mastery any toone’s pre-established andsentiments, which the cost opinions presupposes at for the truth search is unprejudiced an scepticism him,Academic To late works. in his Sceptic Academic asan self-presentation Cicero’s with line isin picture This considers beto convincing” –thisismakes what him an especially witness.important side either which considerations “the with and side either on arguments relevant Part II 212 Lucullus 8-9). Are all the CEU eTD Collection counterintuitivefinal conclusionsendorsedby (2007:70and71).Buther Stoics the and ownis onits leadconclusions, ethics tooweak“to Stoic not the usto” accept” Stoic the to forces us epitome driest the issue, “even to the contribution recent ignorantitin of physics Stoic again 1993: shehas hermost 166); (cf.as 165 and put is even one when truthof the ethics, Stoic “become of to convinced” debate, ethical Annasbook ethicsit inis maintains her that purely within thecontextpossible, of Stoic of interpretations “cosmic” the against in arguing that by emphasising started I conclusions? own their awaited that its implications,justice to anddealing theoretical problems with objections and the them the more find outanythingbetter than “taking (cf.for granted” appearedto compelling what 1993:432) orStoics, important between the intuition,school’sbedrock, atfounding a leastsuch find to trying even without vein, to same in the their continue criticisingand nevertheless they 435), ownthe satisfaction?first century How those BC,plausibleis“therecan here no bedrock that be usedtodecide theories”between the (1993: did notwho iseven it infail particulartry to to it, asAnnasputs and aredeveloping, way that, the debates their unsatisfactory about dothat the is there although something becoming awarethat orthat, of facts, these ignorant that throughout “centuries positionscompeting worked-out hasconclusive support.Howplausible rational isit of discussion” none of here,and limitations the its it, reaches andcharacterises she understands as the building, theory ethical ancient participantsthat effect the to conclusion Annas’ further, accept, themselves adeepdividearound within intuitions virtue andour concerning happiness.us Let remain utterly byand revolving asprompted debate Stoic–Peripatetic Annas’ of the accept analysis that we should not: we should consider the Stoics “serious philosophers”. Then, let usIn herCooper’s reply criticisms 608) Annasto (ANNAS subscribes tothe 1995: view Chapter II.4.2; Section 213 II.4.2.5 CEU eTD Collection terms of the debate” and bringing about a “climate of inwhich bringing andtermsthe about thought” of debate” the they Stoicsin“shiftingthe Annas round; wonthefirst the as succeeded suggests, position is –that position the standardly toTheophrastusattributed in his time– show, as Cicero’s on Theophrastus’ remarks that mightperhaps object one this point At and thelatter misguided. be to correct, more canbe clearly) seen be(or seen can former the that judged, such atany understood attractive)and from they (or perspectivecan which be better rate, compelling intellectually and wider in a intuitions conflicting the set to try to them: require of to by Annasseems as of structure debate described the the This iswhat than commonto our viewssense on rôlethe of valuedother things inthe happy life. rather of virtue nature thedistinctive intuitions our concerning togiveought to credit try to show, at least beintuitions be can be shown Thus rationally Stoicsto to expected grounded. the can to their own incompatible competingsatisfaction, and betweenthedifferentwithin theirwhich choices framework develop atheoretical to effort makesconsiderable inparty thedebate is expect each that rather Whatwe would naturally provide? byAnnascan described building theory and discussion (dialectical) ethical purely of kind the that certainty or that theyviews – of conditions their ethical epistemic the on failed toreflect knowledge, certain did reflect inlikely thepossibility Is it theirof endorsed epistemology philosophers that who on this issue but endcan neverbethe story”. of the settled itappeals to, intuitions ofbeing andthe by theory… convinced theory, the state the for thea to time given any at be may he committed transientpersonally “however that see will person reflective a sufficiently shows, and example Cicero’s as qualification: without true not subjectivesuch claims are entail that seemsto debate Stoic–Peripatetic whole the of assessment Part II 214 why , on what , on rational grounds , we CEU eTD Collection revise and reinforce the Stoic system (cf. e.g. LS 59; see n. 31 above). 31 seen. 59; LS e.g. (cf. system Stoic the reinforce and revise Chios; Chrysippus’ efforts aimedpartly correctingat Aristo’s –onhis view– misguided attempts to 111 110 LYNCH 1971. its resurrection by Cratippus of Pergamon(Critolaus’ student successor and as scholarch) the school virtually disappearedinstitution, asan until in the first century BC. Forancient sources the succession regarding theof of school, under scholarchs the Diodorusand of Tyre history of the school see e.g.school’s activity;until upCritolaus (scholarchby 155 BC,died around 118BC) there isa gap in the polished works lack authorityand copious weight.and but his From this pointelegant”, and onwards we “refined was know virtuallyAristo nothing successor of his that the and content”; threadbare natural scientist than anethical thinker; that Strato’s successorLyco had an “opulent style but rather as translates Cicero Peripatos by all appearance witnessed a rapid decline. a rapid by witnessed appearance all Peripatos the 225/4) or (226/5 death Lyco’s reasons, after whatever for that, add tothis may We option. or attractive more evident anintuitively was no position Peripatetic 109 byArcesilaus’ criticisms. prompted was in part rep encourage judgment suspensionto of (cf. esp. inarguments on the dogmatic among either sideof issuesdebated the schools, order couldbe known, healso and applied thestrategy of presenting equallybalanced anything cognition, against that Zenonian of forceful denying doctrine the attack First Arcesilaus, whom Chrysippus inprobably heard Athens as launcheda youth, a of their theory, the Academic Sceptics certainly did this favour for them. upon could reflect epistemicchallengethe to theStoics that grounds have prompted their thought on the issue?left real them without which mayopponents, reasonably have impeded progress the of –By no means. For if the Stoics virtually from unreflective chargeof the these bysayingthat dogmatism events Peripatetics failed to present a towards the dialectical method of method dialectical the towards As we can see from brief Plutarch’ of Chrysippus’ discussion ambivalent attitude toStoic ethics. thechallengepresented this criticism reflect on Arcesilaus’ Cf. e.g. Malcolm Schofield’s discussion of Arcesilaus’ philosophy ALGRAin et al.1999: 324-331. main contemporary opponent in the Stoa was one of Chrysippus’ teachers Aristo of Cf. e.g. Cicero at . 1035F-1037C). De fin 110 in . V 13, who reports that already Strato (Theophrastus successor) was more a No doubt, Chrysippus’ large-scale reformulation of Stoicism of reformulation large-scale Chrysippus’ doubt, No utramque partem disputare Chapter II.4.2; Section pros ta enantia dialegesthaipros taenantia 215 Academica 111 II.4.2.5 So he hadevery to So opportunity ), hediscussing), arguedthat the 109 I 45-46, Plutarch, I45-46, Could we not rescue the rescue not we Could (this is perhaps what is perhaps (this De Stoic. CEU eTD Collection final assessment of the Stoic–Peripatetic debate on the of the dialectically developed ethical theory? heIf did, then, on Annas’ (and Cicero’s) cognition ( cognition ethical form tenets part of a building of solid knowledge ( when we are still novices. Third, process, didactic the of stages earlier atthe views, especially ofour truth the about it shows that he nevertheless rationality demand), andshake objectivity to seems islikely this ourconviction to upheld that the Stoic we give too Academicsmuch did, and thus of thespace limitations of dialectical as surveying of “contrarieties arguments” the aware of of potential the dangers reasoning:to he therealised thathe was that ifshows also it but contrary discussion; in philosophical arguments dialectical of sideThis Chrysippus further that passage provides evidence didrecognise the importance in a debate (asparaphrase). a commitment to tou hotipseud aut kathaper kaientoisdikast manner”positions “in sorequires, onlywhen the discussion acourtroom (1035F: and ( cognition from comprehended nottoconfuseinthem the doctrines, and order Stoic them prevent fully yet not have who pupils lecturing to are whenthey context, didactic the the quotation isfrom book Chrysippus’ ( knowledge ( pursue suspensionin judgment, butwhothose interested ascertaining of are contrary contrary in views an approving manner ( De Stoic. rep De Stoic. ǀ n topithanon katal epist . 1035F:… Ɲ Ɲ psis estiparatithesthai – ƝPƝ De Stoic. rep. De Stoic. ) and “to demonstrate demonstrate ) and“to by falsity their (1036D: proof” ). Did he believe that this was a matter of reaching full mastery full reaching of matter a was this that believe he Did ). ), and especially knowledge that pertains to the conduct of life kath’ h Ɲ riois ), so as to “ruin their plausibility” ( 1036D). Rather, they should address contrary the Ɲ n homologoumen Part II this latter formulation may bePlutarch’s may formulation latter this 216 Peri bi meta sun ǀ n ) should avoid this, at least in a ǀ Ɲ s bi gorias summum bonum ǀ epist sometha ) is useful to those who ƝPƝ ; cf.where 1036D, ) and are objects of ) andareobjects ibid , he was wrong met’ endeixe .: dialuontas ǀ s CEU eTD Collection we know from Cicero ( happiness. But virtue to relation the of on controversy Stoic–Peripatetic the debate: into accountfocuses Annas’that We account take facetof also should onasingle the elsewhere.were tobesought ethics (the foundationsa dialectically thatturn opinion intodeveloped solid certainty) to do so. If he did not, this means that to him the real epistemic foundations of Stoic 112 Hierocles and Seneca Laertius, lengthy “over ensuing cradle”,debate the asdocumented by Diogenes Cicero, the But motivated. hedonistically maintain, people of majority the and Epicureans the of Epicurean hedonism, that natural arguing animal infant)(and behaviour as is not, basis intuitive the challenged in return Stoics the know, also we As appealed. Stoics talkingnonsense –thatis, they radically theveryquestioned intuitions towhich the their view those who on that responded out, points Cicero as Epicureans, Butthe harp of virtue. nature real the on the immeasurableis, misrepresent seriously forits the Epicureans) (that merely usefulness choiceworthy intrinsic value ofwhoconsider importantbut virtue subordinate ittopleasureis something as that virtue are simply as candidates for constituting virtue pleasureand between issueisthechoice in ethics central the on consideration our final of more end.ethics Chrysippus weighton with debate put the arguing hedonists, the that In this connection he argued that those lies in morality is “a later development” (III (III isintellectual 21) in of lies inmorality “a later development” process the puts in asCato that, simple reason challenge against the hadnotthemselves initself thatthey won–,thiswould neutralise theEpicurean ethical intuitions andwhich even theyif thetook Stoic to be could so irresistible, be said to win –orfor ifthe at any point they could convince See Jacques Brunschwig’ seminal article on the cradle argument (BRUNSCHWIG 1986). Luc . 138-40, cf. Chapter II.4.2; Section 112 , does not seem to lead by itself to a decisive result; De finibus De De fin 217 . II 44) that in his dialectical discussions dialectical his in that 44) . II III,the discovery which“theof good” II.4.2.5 CEU eTD Collection and cultivated persons who are invirtue has whoare persons habit that and preeminent of the thinking cultivated Adeimantus are groups of and good-natured Glaucon intuitions people. of different the between divide a necessarily not is divide this that emphasises Plato Importantly, surface ethical intuitions. brings unreflected onto adeepdivide our within justiceplace of in happy so lifeI understandthe (or issue whichthe in raised I), Book the In Iam for thegeneral make here.illustration point to trying excellent in Plato’s find we what of reminiscent is evolve to likely more is debate philosophical the how of description tentative To theseadd some Ishould considerations like to further my remarks. First, above II.4.2.6 atwhatever views. totheir cost pre-established truth discovering the keen feelingwinningon argument or the their secureabout than convictions on morebeing for dogmatics the of Academic condemnation Cicero’s accept to willing centuries weare –unless,of of debate themselvescourse, throughout participants is,from Annas’ it and for whereas remainedCicero’s perspective), imperceptible the isindecisive–, recognisable from only view pointand analytic a retrospective of (that placethe virtue inhappiness,of as byAnnasdescribed itis–namely be bound that to To sum isitup, implausible thattheproblematicnature of dialecticalthe on debate needjustification. rational of in virtue are nature of on intuitions the their that realise Stoics to for the opportunity Thuswe maturation. can see Epicurean the havethat may challenge provided afurther Republic Further remarks andconclusion the discussion commences with an extensive conversation on the on conversation anextensive with commences discussion the Part II 218 Republic , and Plato’s , andPlato’s work provides an CEU eTD Collection and theological concepts, ideas and theories, as e.g. Plato’s explanatory framework in the in framework explanatory Plato’s e.g. as theories, and ideas concepts, theological and thesewith are misguided. Suppose furtherthat this explanatory framework incorporates metaphysical that the intuitions toshow convincingly can hope I which whichin framework I explanatory endorsecomplex a I develop ahead to debate must be the correct ones, and also intuitionsthat the whichintuitions lies beneath thethat ongoing are philosophicalat oddsas wellfail to lead controversy. to a decisive result. Suppose that I have Suppose recognised thedivide thatwithin inour order ethical to bring the 114 morality”. inancient ethics ingeneral the immoralist challenge is “met by the appeal to human nature to ground about morality”. Moreover, in the next footnote ( footnote next the in Moreover, morality”. about value in morality. Yet they clearly are not regarded as people withwhom “it is not profitable to argue the point of morality”: they are immoralists in the sense that they obviously fail to see the intrinsic from thepoint of view of the Stoics (Aristotelians, Platonists) this clearly does not amount to “seeing Epicureans, similarly to the Stoics, insist that virtue is bothnecessary sufficientand to happiness; but someone with whom it is not profitable to argue about morality.” Ifind this claim puzzling. The task of ethical theory to meet. The person who does not see the point of being moral is seen simply as bookfocuses radical this suggestionis not seen posing as athreatening challenge whichprimary itisa the fifthcentury BC than to Aristote and the Hellenistic philosophers: “in the authors onwhom this certain kinds of illusion”.of morality Annas first ( 48) summarises, this aschallenge consists in the centralsuggestion that “to the extent that we do intuitively think versionof immoralist the view). in AsAnnas painfullyher brief discussionin issueof (ANNASthe 1993: our lives, we are wrong to do so. Perhaps this is a naive view, resting on disturbing strain within intuitions their own onvirtue andhappiness. a sense still they say something: to seems still issue Thrasymachus of the treatment dialectical despite Socrates’ that recognise they because matter, obviously of the place in a life; andyetworthy is it they II) who (in request furtherinvestigationBook Republic something incommon with the kind of “immoralist” challenge represented by Plato both inthe 113 that they expectand that satisfies them. problem the conversation turn with the is this takes: thekindof approach and answer about and virtue justice truly can Andunfold. importantly, have interlocutors the no intuitions of our truth thatthe of reality perception revised of a drastically perspective itis the viewed from only when as that flawed. suggests are work a whole The intuitions contrary the andthat arecorrect, justice of role on intuitions the cultivated metaphysics, anthropology and psychology, decidedly in order to show that a revolutionary the of elements including framework, conceptual–theoretical complex hasthen, Socrates take Plato on challengethe justdevelop and, asIsuggested, a dialectics has only “sharpened issue”,the as Annas would say. In the rest of the work, Atthispoint one may reasonably object thatthe kind of theory building I have outlined would just Itis worthwhile to take notice that the Epicureanchallenge to the Stoic visionof virtue has (throughThrasymachus’ character) andinthe Chapter II.4.2; Section ibid. n. 3) suggests that this problem belongs more to Plato and Plato to more belongs problem this that suggests 3) n. 114 ibid 219 . n. 4) Annas. n. suggests, rather inconsequently,that Gorgias II.4.2.6 (where Callicles is mouthpiece of a of mouthpiece is Callicles (where 113 Socrates’ Republic CEU eTD Collection that our pre-philosophical intuitions concerning the role of bodily and external goods as presented in as presented (ANNAS his 1993:183-4)rightly natural human accountof development, observes, AsAnnas Stoics’ tothe story”. “developmental his “OldAcademic” counterpart developtry histo theory along the linesIhave suggestedabove, he when presented most powerful champion of the Aristotelian position to date. Antiochus the as presents apparently Cicero whom did himself, Antiochus is here example relevant Another perspective is irrelevant useless or its solution. to a into wider issue it placing that this follow does nor debate; and discussion dialectical intoplaybring a widerperspective,should but stay the boundarieswithin of inBut this does notentail resolvingclearly issueshould not a demandthat this we tension here within ourethical intuitions mightseem belessto intolerable orpressing. The issue. minor relatively be a to seem may happiness) to approximation possible any guarantees at for is closest happinessthe rate good predominant that sufficient(or is is isforvirtue happiness,that good single self-sufficient the only the or To be sure, in comparison with theissue at stake in the we are betteroff in thisway: are we now in abetterposition to view our ethical position own larger theory… systemThat is,clashes we will against arrive system complexat conflicting a explanatorysituation asframeworks, a conflictingwhole” worldviews or overallin conceptions (1995:which, of reality.efforts will simply608). asextend thesimultaneous front-lines our Annas day ofthe Theof end the the battle. at Thus Insteadquestionsays, of preferences. conflictingcontrary views their we willeach substantiate to have is,frameworks ethical whether theory “is trappedopponents are likely to follow my example: they willinside develop their own alternative explanatoryits obviously does. Even if my attempt can be said to be more or less successful, sooner or later my an ancient worry” (1995:609). is not ethics than objective or more ‘deeper’ something in ethics ground to need the about “worry that is nevertheless high and natural, and represents an obviouscounter-example toAnnas’ generalclaim contest for rationality. But Plato’s example shows that the initial appeal of kindthis of theory-building line of argumentsomething else, but the question will ultimatelyseems arise of what theirown standing is”). Admittedly,to this questionwhat Annas leadseems toraiseat ANNAS 2007: 73, “foundations obviously,are, what ground to the conclusionhave thatthreatening possibility that we may thebefatally wrong about the way we thinkend about the world? Do we of conceptionthe of reality;but does not the mere dayexistence of alternative the Skepticgrounded wins out in the rational orjustified? To be sure, our ethical position is now firmly rooted means to decide between the competing comprehensive visions of reality? –This is the De finibus Book V, focuses on, and is fairly successful in, showing in, successful fairly is and on, focuses V, Book Part II 220 Republic Weltanschauungen the question whether question the within our overall as rationally raise the CEU eTD Collection some ofitsincorporates, Ipointed outthatit constituents: among assumptions, other shall return to this point inshall tothis return pointChapter (I presuppositions metaphysical,etc. theological strong or any other cosmic nature, To besure,Antiochus our original intuitions about the value of the non-moral goods. developmental story is tocreate a compelling theoretical context which does justice to behindAntiochus’ motivation the main factthat change the not do complications liable to collapse into the Theophrastean view( is Theophrastean collapsethe into liable to it thus condition; formal important most its as completeness with end, final our happiness as shouldAristotelian) construe ideacompromises we theoriginal that (and the conflicting ethical intuitions that lie at the heart of the issue seriously reconcile to Antiochus’attempt happiness. itmisfortunes guarantee can among great even is virtue sogreat that succeed in value the of thatnevertheless not convincing In another respectAntiochus’ developmental account performs rather poorly: itdoes this puts some strain on theuse of nature. (1993: 185) other value.from He certainly putsof moral his finger on adifficult pointseparation in Stoic ethics,sharp a and at the on very least showsinsisting that and process natural continuously a as development nature as bothsmoother a and more intuitive.basis Antiochus is quite right to value, see this as the crucialnon-moral and point if moral you stress between distance the lessens which alternative, his forand awkward, is values ethics,unarguable beginning to rational self-conscious and in the this Stoic end,and gulfbetween of kinds and his theorywhy he had little patience with it. He starts from and stresses natural can be seen as a protest against both treating moral between his arguments against it, he shows little effort to appreciate what motivates the sharp Stoic cutoff Antiochus beenhas muchberated formisunderstanding Stoic theory, it and istrue that, especially in the of theory the for virtue of value distinctive the of implications radical the about claims in the happy life should be given due credit, and correspondingly, that the Stoic summum bonum virtue and other kinds of valuable things. From his own point of view, however, of view, point own his From things. of valuable kinds other and virtue lack in plausibility: lack ’ theory markedlyappeal notinvolve theory asignificant does to Chapter II.4.2; Section III.2 221 ). In Chapter II.4.2.6 ibid II.3 .: 186;But.: 422-423). these I have already mentioned development, from given and given from development, we can see we can CEU eTD Collection or corollaries. Or,itmight turn out that on closer consideration the opposing camps do consequences relevant theirgrasp ormisrepresents fails to debate sideinthe one that is partly)least (at the disagreement causeof the issue, that and to the indeed relevant well turn out, for example,to the matter.that Of course, itthe is easy to seeshared that this isirrelevant is an view overhastythis that show to cosmological,seem conclusion: might happiness it and might virtue between relation theological, the on disagree yet and world, the of government rational the etc.example, for on, views views are The facthold they same that the world-view. samephilosophical the otherwise share if the opponents assumethat may wellseem redundant we wider perspective settlehelpthe issue. However, the to cannot perspective case wider philosophical the distance between the Stoic and the Epicurean view–, does notentail that in the former between Socrates’ and Thrasymachus’ view in the and Thrasymachus’ between Socrates’ the distance less than be significant to seems virtue andhappiness position on Peripatetic the and Stoic the between distance the factthat the that out pointed I earlier. acouple of paragraphs upon I touched a pointback to This brings me should share) the same assumptions and principles. (or share actually tradition, Academic Old the to heirs unworthy being opponents, appealingattachments (without cosmic to nature),butalso claims thathis Stoic the of derivation plausible and attractive an not nature:only heinvolves alsoframework a quasi-historical claimspresents of needsindependently But given“natural” argumentative Antiochus’ anddesires. a for satisfying tool to practical rationality reduce itseems to in that reason, practical of conceptions modern familiar more with analogy hasanotable as Iargued, that, rationality practical viewof powerful view,a nature” of assistant asthe “reason the Part II 222 summum bonum Republic from natural primary from our –or, for –or, thatmatter, the CEU eTD Collection since studying Stoic ethics proper (the ethical part of Stoic philosophy alone) can alone) philosophy of Stoic (the ethical part proper ethics Stoic since studying ethics, of truth bythe “becomeStoic in wereneededconvinced” to these that order not deny cosmic the that perspective may have benefits. such What doesdenyis she philosophybe for afull not will adequate understanding even of ethics”). Annasdoes just“…studyingof ethical the alsopart 61: cf.ordering world”the (2007:71; of Providence rational the and about conclusions with physical integrated of context and in the but independently, not seen are they when strengthened “indeed are conclusions 166); or asshethat, it puts in hermost contribution recent ethical issue,to the our can nature” bycosmic “underwritten viewsare ethical our that andseeing nature cosmic special significance –andso doAnnas’ interpretive learning thatcomments about from than seems and nature of common etc. organisation universe” togain the way better of approaching of account the goodsthe and virtue evils, or orhappiness, or other is no “there that claim Chrysippus’ considerations above the of light the In and –Iwill IV11-12). return into this pointChapter conflates theOldAcademicandIII73 habitually Stoicthe e.g. views (compare also lawnature– he and rational of world inthe origins bydivine of government the believe study the naturethat has of a bearing of justice on ethics social –aspects life, have already seen (Chapters seen have already system system natural of (cf.philosophy on Antiochus’ view Stoicsthe with adopted, minor modifications, the Old Academic Stoic–Peripatetic debate on the on debate Stoic–Peripatetic I am Yet to thinktempted ishowAntiochus this that and thinkthe about Cicero in their widerdifference world-viewdo has withto theiron virtue disagreementand happiness. this and views, etc. theological cosmological, same the exactly hold not enable us “to feel more secure about our basic ethical judgments basicethical our feel about more “to secure enable us I.5 Chapter II.4.2; Section summum bonum and Acad 6 ) that in discussing subjects where Cicero does in Cicero subjectswhere ) that discussing . I 24-29 and. I 39, 223 . At. any rate, we know for certain that II.4.2.6 III.2 . De fin . IV 11-12); and we ” (1993:165and CEU eTD Collection seems warranted. 18-21ofher discussion this inchapters book kindof and conclusions scepticism upheldby 604; Stoicsthe (1995: 600-601, 2007: 69-71). Butin view of her own describes as she alone), it, ethical Stoic (the philosophy of see Stoicpart proper fail ethics that to has its own(cf. 1993:164n.20);andinherlater like articles criticises who, those John Cooper, resources importance Annasaccount greater of this forof kind the book argues her 5of chapter to lead usa “provisional”suggested in paper(BRUNSCHWIG1991), a seminal status. to the counterintuitiveseems tomeitjustifiably that cannot claim more than, asJacquesBrunschwig conclusions distinctively of is –and arespeaking herelive we by concerned accept andto this account us an account of basic of the us an account Stoicdoubt Idonot that proper,working 2007: 67-71): ethics dialectically,give can (1993:165-6, use a inthisconnection Annas repeatedly applies distinction To that underpinning any of kind to as opposed (cf.proper 1993: 165), again inethics have established views we the of full “understanding” as increasedor an bewhatadd shoulddescribed cosmic can the perspective Sowhyinsist that support. rational hasdecisive findin either debate side the that person cannot reflective debate on the debate on achieve this without fail. But as we have seen, her own survey of the Stoic–Peripatetic theof part as Stoicor way, theory independent the relatively in as a either whole”.ethics present to However, chosen have time any at could she revises Stoics the that seems it againChrysippus, in her approach view cosmic the of evidence in wehave ANNAS“since development: 2007: 67-68. Following (ANNASarticle 1995: 604 n. 13)she admits that itwasmistake a to suggest that this waslate a cosmic used nature principlefirst within asa ethics” (1993: cf. 175; and 160-162, inherlater 174); 116 115 Annas does not deny inthat the laterStoic moralists, Marcus Aurelius and Epictetus “we finddo Cf. alsoANNAS 1993: 164 n. 20,BETEGH 2003: 277-8. rational of them? summum bonum 116 reasons: the reasons to be convinced of itsbe convinced reasons of the to reasons: content leads to the Ciceronean conclusion that a sufficiently that conclusion Ciceronean the to leads of Stoic ethics. But as far as the Part II 224 rational justification truth or motivation rightness 115 –, it –, or In to CEU eTD Collection treatment in it, his which his about influence Antiochean foreshadows thinking way of on late of Stoic ethics may have been less anddirect thorough than his self-presentation in the old consensus on assessmentof the him used a maintain,as source to his knowledge to the effect that while Cicero was by nomeans a mere epitomist transcriber, or as the presentation, inmore than one ways. In view of Cicero’s have this to hope advanced I ofmy parts thesis two In thefirst might create a blind-spot in his perception of the Stoic theory. arguably suggestions, this these claims andaccepts Antiochean If principles. Cicero and points starting same the share Stoics the that asserts explicitly and presumptions; strong metaphysical, to etc. reference theological any decidedly avoids significant that all this escapes Cicero entirely? My closing remarks, and remarks, My entirely? closing all Cicero that escapes this concerning thesingularvalue of andvirtue for its sufficiency happiness,how come their theory of the Chapter (see “cosmic” interpretations the against bymethodological objection Annas’ posed my aremeantFinally,to envisage remarks closing challenge apossible tothe answer between ethical and physical claims”. physical and ethical between Christopher Gill she argues that what we find in Marcus or Epictetus “is more like mutual illumination Antiochus’ account of the that would be relevant to their disagreement in ethics. This is strongly underwritten by nodifferences are of reality inthere metaphysical conception impression their that the to raise give may view This Academics. Old the from philosophy natural their borrowed Stoics the that thinking in Antiochus with along goes Cicero that mightlie fact inthe neglect fatal for such reason possible one suggest that meant to philosophica II.4.1 De finibus above). If the Stoic conception of cosmic nature significantly figured in figured significantly nature cosmic of conception Stoic the If above). mightsuggest, andalso towardsastrong the evidence that points summum bonum . In summum bonum Part Chapter II.4.2; Section II Ifocussed on , and was pertinent, in particular, to their tenets Part 225 and hiscriticism of the Stoic theory, which I I offered some sceptical considerations sceptical some Ioffered De finibus II.4.2.6 Book Book III: I itsoverviewed Part II Part as a whole, are CEU eTD Collection indicated, the substantial identity of the Stoic and the Peripatetic view on virtue and virtue on view Peripatetic the and Stoic the of identity substantial the indicated, already have (asI theory Stoic the of criticism Carneades’ of tradition Academic particular,builtinto and he his perhapsthought, developed, further ethical the longthe marrow through membership decadesof his NewAcademy; of inthe constant view on longthe tradition anti-dogmaticof criticism whichhad enteredhis (Chapter Antiochus’ dogmatic has beenstronglyinformedsystem byhisAcademic past itvirtually conditions himfor going Antiochus, along for with goodreasonthe that Stoic say has from about indeed, muchAntiochus ethics; goingto with of what along finibus ethics in to of Academicthe approach his application and Academic scepticism In Academic theory? in me occupy will that question the focus finibus although it attempts to make the best out of Cicero’s presentation of Stoic ethics in insufficient attention to Cicero’s role as an expositor, Annas’ heterodox interpretation, Stoicwhilethe interpretation pays line and argued the theory, “cosmic” that of by projected in ethics controversy central the of picture overall the with resonates ethics But throughout one of my main concerns was to show how Cato’s exposition of Stoic scepticism affect his perception and portrayal of ethics Stoic of and portrayal his perception scepticism affect Finally, in Chapters the of account the interpretivemajor to andinproblems related the structure argumentative particular De finibus Part III (Chapter III,failspersuade. Thisappropriate also brings,Ibelieve,into lastresult to III.2 I shall first present an overview of Cicero’s understanding of his of understanding Cicero’s of an overview present first Ishall asawhole. ). To oversimplify a bit, Antiochus developed his system with a with system his developed Antiochus bit, a oversimplify To ). III.I summum bonum II.4.1 ). I shall argue that Cicero’s scepticism does not prevent him and 2 Iconsidered the twomain linesinterpretation of of presented in the first section of Cato’s exposition. Cato’s of section first in the presented Part II 226 Part III Part : how doesCicero’s Academics: how vis-à-vis Antiochus’ Old Antiochus’ De De CEU eTD Collection Finally Finally Chapter (in ethics.for Stoic rejecting reasons the on with Antiochus and the thesis that virtue is sufficient for happiness), this does notaffect his agreement establishfails afirmto linkbetween Oldthe Academicview on the it (for approval sceptical Cicero’s win to fails theory this even whole the on see, shall finds much more plausible than and well-grounded Stoicthe theory Although, aswe . Cicero sceptic Academic the that theory anethical produces Antiochus that surprising from far is it then, consideration, On idea). his been have to seems happiness Stoic and the Antiochean “Old Academic” theory. “Old andAcademic” Stoic Antiochean the the conflate to tendency Cicero’s of example an outstanding itrepresents presentation; the itin element alien an is actually 59), and 16 III at significantly (most ethics Stoic accountof init Cato’s as occurs of self-love, notion the argue that I shall influence. Cicero’s perception of Stoic ethics has undergone to this Academic–Antiochean III.3 ) Ishall adduce onefurther argumentshow how to thoroughly Chapter II.4.2; Section 227 II.4.2.6 summum bonum CEU eTD Collection THE DIFFERENCE THAT THE CONTEXT MAKES THATTHECONTEXT THE DIFFERENCE PART III CEU eTD Collection CEU eTD Collection but of revealing everyeverything, point whichcontradicting could not of be purpose madethe with on eitherArcesilaus, side than –however, constructively it more we used musthe but not forget that Piso claims that itwas actually Aristotle who began the practice of presenting both sides of every argument, 2 quemque philosophum diceretur, intellegi posset. bonorum malorum,et perpurgatus estis locus anobis quinque libris,ut, quid aquoque, etquid contra 1 his aim is to bring out the basic pointseach rather, other; to next them by one,placing one theories of different introduce the to debate between them simply not is intention His sceptic. Academic an as writes Cicero see, shall we as But philosophicalthe intohis tradition native culture. naturalisationdo the in contributing of thisto Latin,andindividually” thereby to (12), of of philosophical viewsschools the Iagree,butthose each the which with comprehensive discussion of and question the investigatinggoods of evils”,“not only should rightly acting and well living on bedeliberations our all which to goal, directed?”final and ultimate isis the end,what the “what in(I philosophy: considers central question the Cicero 11). Cicero’s respectively), theories Antiochean explicit aim is toAlthough give us a “moreIII. 1 or less presentation of the different theories. ofthe different presentation perfected byCarneades. perfected and has byArcesilaus, backbeen revived to Socrates, goes elsewhere, claims involve his scepticreaders into the methodof philosophical enquiry which, ashe is, the othersto incomparison –that to each weaknessestheory theof and advantages theory ( This is explicitly stated at ND I 11; onAntiochus’ revival of the Socratic method, see also Cicero’s sceptical approach De finibus De finibus I-II, III-IV and V, investigating the Epicurean, the Stoic and the consists of three dialogues, each dealing with a different ethical De div 2 This has important consequences to his interpretation and interpretation his to consequences Thishasimportant . II2: Cumque fundamentum essetphilosophiae posituminfinibus De finibus Chapter III.1 231 is a single integrated work on what on work integrated isasingle De fin . II 2. At 1 , and to examine the examine to and , De fin . V 10 Piso V 10 . CEU eTD Collection aspect of Cicero’s scepticism. Cicero’s aspect of survey of dogmatic philosophy in quest for the truth. I shall argue that forindeedis a starting-point it the truly appropriate only rational and open-minded isjudgement compatible with a more philosophical positive towards attitude enquiry; of suspension understanding inCicero’s But on Rome.scepticism Academic of the debate in the seeunclear,leaving As nothing hold from Cicero’s presentation uswith to. wecan to they that parrot: everything happy render wereto ofAcademic scepticism opponents sceptical equal weight, we should not embrace any one of them, butvulnerable should rather resort to theto objections, is since equally each theory that establishismerely conclusion the Cicero not to and in cases of debate the arguments on either side are of scepticism. only the first half of is that reworking thefour-book the of the first book– as a clear and straightforward statement of his preface of preface (7-9)and works of work the hisinlater tothe references in the claims general authorial by Cicero’s confirmed firmly is stance actual Cicero’s pretty inmuch are linewith in (64-146) interlocutor dialogue second half the this of second book of the first version of this work). That the views of Cicero as an 3 unfolds main in survivingCicero’s of discussion epistemology, the asit scepticism, Academic of conception Cicero’s of review by begin I shall a brief those of Antiocheanthe Lucullus in the as same the virtually are scepticism Academic on views his thus here; hat Antiochean an wearing is See ND I6,11-12, epoch 3 As we shall see, the purpose of by As purposeof asunderstood Academicmethod the weshallsee, the Ɲ , suspension of , suspensionjudgement. of This wasaprejudice thedogmatic De div Lucullus . II 1, . II Tusc , this charge seriously compromised the acceptance of acceptance the compromised seriously charge , this . II 4; see also Lucullus Lucullus De finibus Catullus Part III . cf. also 232 116-46, is 116-46, represent meant to this positive Ad Att and the as a whole, as opposed to the critical tothe opposed as a whole, as De orat . XIII.19.5: . III 80 and 107. Lucullus mea causa , of which wepossess which , of Academic . Lucullus books (the – CEU eTD Collection ( of 1929))rejects theof view criterion Carneadean the (COUISSIN by Couissin propounded Pierre scepticism (originally readingAcademic of “dialectical” developing fora on part themost that, interpretation lineradical of traditionbeen have forcefully decadescriticised by last in the of proponents a more Carneadean–Clitomachean of the interpretations such because important isThis side a rational method of approaching the truth; and I do not deny asfaras andIdonot that, side method of a approaching the truth; rational this interpretation lineof not consider didCarneades the method ofarguing oneither his inlate Academic interprets tradition the Cicerohow of Carneades’ Clitomachus’ scepticism.or What Iwouldlike contend to is thatthisis interpretation this istheright likeargue that to not would I vein).However, a critical in often (most “fallibilist” or “probabilist” termed is usually that scepticism Academic New of interpretation kind tothe of close israther Cicero actually to attribute I shall informs his presentation of Hellenistic ethics in ethics Hellenistic of presentation his informs methods of understanding aimsandof the mehereisCicero’ Whatconcerns discussion. my of present scope are beyond the few decades, last in the interest scholarly much attracted rightly have they although and knowledge of NewAcademic andunderstanding the tradition, our concern itspecificto (or perhaps misrepresents personalslant it). These outright questions gives a or correctly, Academic the tradition not herepresents askwhether Ido stance by Clitomachus. pupil Carneades’ Academic version of of scepticism, Carneades’ adherent she terms “the strong interpretation”. see 2 ofn. that article). Obdrzalek herself argues forcefully for afallibilist line of interpretation –which 5 the In 4 For an excellent recent discussion of this debate see OBDRZALEK 2006 (for the relevant literature relevant the (for 2006 OBDRZALEK see debate of this discussion recent excellent an For For his reliance on Clitomachus, see esp. Clitomachus, on reliance his For probabile Lucullus in Cicero’s translation) as having anything to do withhaving translation) inCicero’s do truth. as anything to objective (and presumably also in the 4 Luc Importantly, in characterising Cicero’s sceptical Importantly,in Cicero’s characterising Chapter III.1 . 98ff. . 233 his Academica scepticism, this andhow understanding De finibus De ) Cicero presents himself as an himself presents ) Cicero philosophica as . The version of scepticism this has been interpreted been has this . to pithanon 5 On CEU eTD Collection some sort, against such a reading. a such against sort, some crucial a provide should argument, writer in addition to the arguments presentedphilosophical Roman bya othersas forthe viewconcern of Cicero Cicero’s as a fallibilist about of point above differs from my reading in attributing to Cicero a non-fallibilist Clitomachean–Carneadean stance.The respect of reading the work as an expression of Cicero’s scepticism as it unfolds in the in Chapter thislineinterpretation seriously compromise thiswould point of to (I shall goal return and the conduct life;of and the level of by subjectivism represented nowdominantthe approach–appropriate foradistinguished Roman politician both Greek philosophy to most the not –if approach as anacceptable scepticism presentAcademic to is concern Cicero’s scepticism differently. hisClitomachean–Carneadean understands he that clear itrather find is I concerned, as Cicero as far But approach. correct the represent may interpretation of line this considered, is scepticism) of version original indeed Carneades’ interpretation Carneades’ scepticism of (or Clitomachus’ original Charles BrittainCharles presentedhas anapproachto Cicero’sreading “probabilist”Cicero’s or “fallibilist” and interpretationscepticism of it. Iunderstand Carneadean–Clitomachean that atthebetween distinction this of) favour in argue indeed 6 Most proponents of thedominant (non-fallibilist) line of interpretationactually agree with(and often III.1.2 ). 6 Part III 234 De finibus Symposium Hellenisticum that is similarto mine in Lucullus ; but it 2010 CEU eTD Collection 229-31). ( and action by reports thatthe according to Arcesilaus the‘reasonable’ suspension of assent is compatible with regulating our choice ( evidence suggests that Cicero’s term Cicero’s that suggests evidence fin would know neither what the present situation is, nor what to do, and since (b) action (b) since and do, to what nor is, situation present the what neither know would impossible no one would be against whichbe if accordingattack to theirapprehension would epistemology, able to act at all, or to act appropriately, since (a) one 10 charge of “inactivity” ( “inactivity” of charge majortwo raised objections it hisposition. against provides First, arespondthe to It is in terms of this additional argument. and enquiry claimin philosophical as well that Cicero’s Academic Sceptic can reject the 79-90; attack against the possibility of apprehension originated by Arcesilaus see “persuasive” most( adprobare also maintainsan thatAcademic Sceptic isallowed to“approve” ( impression see impression Arcesilaus. 9 8 p. 43K (p.85, 4-8 M); Eusebius, “cataleptic” or “cognitive” impression “cognitive” impression ( or “cataleptic” view on epistemological grounded against arguments Zenonian the conception of a akatal ( As an Academic Sceptic, Ciceroupholds the thesis nothingthat is III.1.1 7 ibid Zeno’s epistemological doctrine is set out in Cf. Cf. percipi posse Luc . V 76, and . 185,. 187); Luc. . 8,32-3,. 35, 36, 59, 66, 78, 98-99, 102-4, 108, 110,112-13; cf.32-3, 59;see also Ɲ Luc. Acad psia 59, 66-67, 78. 40-42, 59,68,83; cf.141.This ishow Cicero paraphrases Academicthe notionof ; see DL IX 61, Sextus, Cicero’s sceptical stance: anoutline Cicero’s sceptical stance: . I43-6, cf.also Sextus, ) in a loose sense, to “follow”in ( sense,) to a loose 9 Butfollowing Clitomachus’ interpretation of Carneades’ he scepticism Tusc Luc ) uti 7 , and therefore . 18,. 77,112-3, 144-5; cf.DL VII 46; Sextus, . II 6, 9; IV 7; V 11, 33; = khr probabile Ɲ apraxia sthai eulogon ( PE ibid PH ) or “truth-like” ( M XIV 4, 15. we shouldnotgive assent ), presented by the Stoics in respond to the Arcesilean the to in respond byStoics presented the ), VII 150-8, 402-10. . 175)and I1; see further Galen, probabile ). Secui Chapter III.1.1 Orat Acad. = renders the Greek the renders 235 paralambanein . 237;Sextus, sequi katakolouthein I40-42;Zeno’s for of definition a“cataleptic” katal 10 ) and to “use”) and to ( veri simile Ɲ Opt. Doctr Opt. ptik (185); M Ɲ (Sextus, ( phantasia . VII 435-8. Sextus’( adsensio M pithanon ), in ), hislifeconducing as . VII 244-5. For the Academic . 1p. 42 K (p. 83, 16 M) and 2 probare Luc. M uti VII185) and . At . 40-42, 45-58, 66,76-8, ) ) what he finds the finds he what ) to anything ) originated by = “apprehensible” M peithesthai VII158Sextus ND PH probare hepesthai I227-9) I12, 8 –a ( PH De I , CEU eTD Collection independent argument forindependentargument the possibility that apprehension may be theoretically possible (as we must do in to must order we do possible (as may betheoretically apprehension possibility that claim: even if we take aside the issue of cataleptic impressions. cognitive against of Stoic doctrine the attack impressionsclaim and leave that open apprehension the is impossible, which was the conclusion of the Academic cognitive impression]”. possibility of apprehension, and this is the Stoic’s definitionof the faculty [i.e. the definitionof a meant to ground meant to hold among the indogmatic theories field every of philosophy. it Presumably notis 13 the suspension of in suspension of a assent, on two levels. In the first stage, it serves justifyto and encourage the sceptical of investigatingmethod be can theories thedogmatic in modes implemented or two sceptical the believes that Cicero views, of setsceptical with this In accordance altogether. all assent falsehoods assenting(66-68, 77etc. to morenothingis since wearenotwise; than abhorrent apprehended so, 59,145), (57, also agree) never mere holds but opinions, assents only whatisto securely 12 is our only source for the distinction between these two points cf. STRIKER 1980: esp. 63 ff. dangerous” (68;cf.dangerous” and slippery is assent of habit very the apprehensible, is anything if “even that adding Academics apprehensible happy whichAntiochuswasalso useagainstthe objection –an to wouldbe overlyinconsistentto say thethat very claim nothingthat is apprehensible is requires impulse, and impulse dependson assent. 11 110; cf.“persuasive” (28, principle Cf. Luc. Luc. Academica 32-39, 61-2,99,103-104,107-9; cf. Plutarch, 28-29, 109-10;cf. Lactantius, also De fin 12 . V 76, where Cicero claims that “there is only one thing that makes me deny the , presses the argument against Arcesilaus inparticular. Arcesilaus against argument the , presses – the Academic can answer that he adopts this thesis itself as a merely epoch Acad Ɲ by theoretical further providing forunderpinning the stronger . I45, therapeutic epoch ND I 1). For although the wise person (as the Stoics Inst Acad Ɲ manner, by focussing manner, on the -corollary in accordance with lessthe with in radical accordance -corollary . 5. 10-15 which, probably drawing on a lost section of Acad Part III 236 . I45),aworkinghypothesis, asitwere, . I 45), for usit is better to restrain from Adv . Colot 11 Second, to the objection that it . 1108D, 1122-24;. 1108D, DL IX 104.Cicero 13 Rather, it serves as an dissensions epoch which Ɲ , CEU eTD Collection rhetorical charm of a philosophical teacher. of aphilosophical charm rhetorical simply yield to authority at ayoung age, influenced by frienda or being captivated by the personal and views not onthe basis of firm apprehension, but rather yielding to irrational external influences: they 15 330. from XIV 4, 15; Galen, dogmatic schools in the second part of his in dogmatic schools secondpartof the speech in the the among dissensions the surveys Cicero that vein same the in is obviously It ( everyone’s“by views” Arcesilaus: against wascharacteristicmethod to arguing focussing on physics inparticular–in theintroduction to same subject” foropposing of of cases werefound the “arguments sides equal strength the when his away interlocutors from theirviews; own andheparticular put stress on those embrace the sceptical embrace the that in order to escape the fatal error of assenting to false opinions they should As Cicero ( As Cicero choices commitments. our and ground rationally wise person iswise abletoapprehendit, person actually if any one of philosophicalis existing viewsthe in apprehensible,principle and the apprehension (otherwise could how they befail to in andoverall agreement); (b) even requiredbased objective criteria, arenot and thus their on genuine positions debeat apophaseis dogmatic schools provide a “strongdogmatic argument” (Cf. a schools provide the among debates and disagreements interminable the inconsistency), escape 14 contra omniadicere Cf. Cf. DL IV 28, according to which Arcesilaus was the first to suspend his assertions ( akatal Luc. ) that (a) no one of the existing philosophical schools isin the possession of the 8-9, where Cicero suggests that adherents of dogmatic theories commit themselves to their ) owing to the contrarieties of arguments ( Ɲ psia Acad. 14 and arguments from contrarieties of seearguments SCHOFFIELDe.g. 1999:324- Opt. doctr , because these cases are the most useful for persuading the audience the for persuading most useful are the , because these cases I44-5, cf. )” while refusing to give)” while refusing to voice to his viewsown he ledmostof epoch . 1.p. 40 K (p. 82, 1-5 M). On the relation between Arcesilaus’ arguments Ɲ De fin . 15 . II 2) reports, this mode of practicing the sceptical the practicing mode thisof . II2)reports, Chapter III.1.1 237 dia tas enantiot we at least are not in the position to ND Lucullus I 1: De naturadeorum Ɲ tas t magno argumento esse magno ǀ n log (116-46), and (116-46), also – ǀ n ); cf. Eusebius, episkh (I 1-2). It ǀ n tas PE CEU eTD Collection is suggested that Socrates thought he knew nothing, but did “approve” many views. many “approve” did but nothing, knew he thought Socrates that suggested is elenchus investigating the truth”; cf. also against the Stoic conception of cosmic theology was to “rouse men of intelligence to a desire for 19 appearances. the and we won’t abandon our enthusiasm for investigation owing to exhaustion”. to owing 18 investigation for enthusiasm our abandon we won’t and here Cicero immediately adds at “still,occurs they [the earliestfirst and mostjudgements” learned our philosophers] of weakness the didn’t and give up, themselves things ofthe obscurity “the be dueto misleading Cicero’s pedagogical emphasis on theneed tosuspend judgement. The theme of without knowledge is the most shameful thing. But this descriptionof Arcesilaus’ scepticism seems to “everything so is hidden coulddeeply nothing that understood”, or be discerned and that to assent view” aimed solely at encouraging suspension of assent, inaccordance with his convictionthat itself– we may hit upon the truth (though without knowing this for certain), or at least 17 Sextus, “perspicuous” ( “perspicuous” we find( “persuasive” falsehoods, andassenting offers to by rational prospectthat usthe “following” what of fatal error savethe us from to promise does knowledge, certain andinfallible us to truth. of the search free-minded and philosophical pursuit sceptic the recommended Carneades, prominently and thus might bethat is, should notgive his assent toviewsfalse that are not really apprehended (i.e. known) opinions, hold not ( should man wise the that point the on stress extraordinary an put of ledhe discoverapprehension, by desire was a straightforward to he –only truth the maintain to happy were adversaries ashishold dogmatic nothing to, to leaving uswith unclear, render everything to not inwas investigations For Ciceroalsobelieves these thatArcesilaus’ pursuing purpose finibus in ethical he dogmatic theories the discusses that however, in is not manner, this 16 Cf. e.g. Cf. At Luc summum bonum Acad. De fin. . 16,26, 32,54, 59,61, 110; PH . in order to work out which is the most truth-like ( ND I1-4, 226-30. I 45 Cicero may seem to suggest that Arcesilaus’ practice of “arguing against everyone’s against of “arguing practice Arcesilaus’ that suggest to may seem Cicero I 45 III 31, where the Stoic Cato charges the Academics with holding the “absurd” view that “absurd” the holding with Academics the charges Cato Stoic the where 31, III I 2, where I2, Cicero suggests that Carneades’ purpose in advancing numerous arguments perspicuum and the supreme the and 18 , but rather as the appropriate starting point for a truly for atruly rational starting point astheappropriate , butrather probabile Luc. ), such that nothing contrary to its persuasiveness presents persuasiveness its to contrary nothing that such ), Tusc 66,76; Acad . I 8, where . I8, Cicero suggests already that Socrates used the ) or“truth-like” ( officium 16 . I44-45; 19 ; even when he was attacking Zeno’s conception Zeno’s attacking was he when ; even This pursuit, though it does not promiselead Thispursuit, not thoughit does to Part III Acad 238 of the wise person is to withhold assent to the ND . I 45). . I I6; cf. also Plutarch, veri simillimum veri simile 17 epoch He and his successors, most successors, his Heand Ɲ , not as the end of all ) view, and ) –or (in some cases) some (in ) –or De stoic. rep Luc. 74, where it Luc. . 1036A, 8,and De CEU eTD Collection translation (BRITTAIN 2006). Unless otherwise indicated, passages ofthe passages indicated, otherwise Unless 21 controversial. somewhat remains issue the Yet Carneades. to back go may practice Cicero’s that argued forcefully the practice was actually introduced by ofPhilo Larissa. John Glucker (GLUCKER 1995: 133-5) has (e.g.GOEDECKEMEYERothers 1905: 123-5, referred toby GLUCKER 1995: 134)have argued that 1995: 133). Some (suchas GÖRLER 1997) have thatit actually argued is Cicero’s invention, while dogmatic theoriessee GLUCKER 133).As 1995: to the Academic applicationthis on scepticalof the pro method of investigating the persuasiveness; to andrespect with good highest the conon views the to rank with reported are Academics this constructive aim, Cicero is our only source (Cf. GLUCKER in the conduct of life and in “finding the truth concerning beings” (cf. also (cf. beings” concerning truth the “finding in and of life conduct the in VII 435-8 according towhom the Academics thatheld criterion the of “persuasiveness” Luc reach a fair approximation of it. of reach afair approximation probabile 20 ( dialogue to the in introduction Academicthe Sceptic as an self-characterisation Cicero’s jointly with invitation I think readthis weshould collapse. famous must schools rather and bad –for,since their views are incompatible and at most one of them canbe true, a good numberof the leading thinkers, theobscurity of nature, andthe errorof so many philosophers about what isgood But next time we aboutthink these questions, let’s talk about theremarkable disagreements between following suggestion: with logic in and the controversies hissurvey concludes ethics of physics, dogmatic the philosophers whoclosest possibleby approximation of onmeans either arguing side. The only difference betweenus and think that they arguments have have our any do purpose Nor other thantodraw outso and, to speak,‘squeeze out’ the truth exhaustion. or its to knowledgeowing investigation for enthusiasm our abandon won’t we is thatenthusiastically… they have no doubtwe want to discover truth without any contention,that and we search for itconscientiously theand views theyIt is our practice to whatsay we againstthink every position. But our case is straightforward. Because the of end the by when indicated clearly is possibility This in canbefurther manner. theories pursued, a moreconstructive of dogmatic examination the the been appreciated, firmlyestablishedand have Cf. sit tottam nobiles disciplinas... contrariisque rebustantooperediscrepant ut,cumplus uno verum esse nonpossit, iacere necesse disseramus obscuritate naturae, dequeerrore totphilosophorum quide [in]bonis posthac tamen cumhaec [tamen]quaeremus, potius de dissensionibus tantissummorum virorum . 34 certainly renders certainly 34 . Luc. and 7-9, 32-4, 65-66, 76, 99ff, 127-28, 141, 146-147. Fora survey of Cicero’s usage of the terms veri simile in philosophicalin enquiry well the conduct in as as of supported bySextus,life is intheoreticalcontexts see GLUCKER 1995: 131-132. term The enarg Ɲ . Cicero’s claim ( 21 20 Thus, once the reasons for suspension of assent of suspension for reasons the once Thus, Chapter III.1.1 Lucullus 239 and Luc. Academica 32) about the Academics’ reliance on reliance Academics’ the about 32) Lucullus takenare from Charles Brittain’s pithan 7-8): Lucullus Ɲ phantasia PH I 226, where the (148)Cicero is useful both perspicua M at . CEU eTD Collection 23 dicendo etaudiendo accedat quam proxime lettingor “itsat possible closest approximation”( truth the separating weedfrom the chuffthan the suspensionat encouraging is, assent; of that more aiming dogmaticinvestigation theories at of the foreshadows a subsequent In the light of these, it seems reasonable to think that the closure of the dialogue discover the truth” and rejoicing infinding “truth-like” something ( to desire a “burning of manner, out a straightforward in theories dogmatic the against in character (II 65-66) heatedly dialogue,the thatheargues hisfriends who assures the Cicero by confirmed strongly is scepticism Academic of characterisation This affirm. scarcely but follow readily we can that ones i.e. be persuasive, to views many wehold whereas true, are defend 22 aggressively with other people orwaste their time and my ownas well? when it’s a question of the condition andplan of my entire life, would I really want to contend unimportant matters intransigence is criticised and misrepresentation is punished by law as well. So ostentation, Itake it that my characterand nature should be condemned, not just my stupidity. Evenin If I have applied myselfphilosophy is a matter of morality: to this philosophicalreinforces thisclaimby thatthis straightforward emphasising andpositive attitude to view in particular from a desire for contention or nosautem quoniam contra omnes qui dicere quae videntur solemus, nonpossumus quin alii a nobis totius vitae autcertare cum aliis pugnaciter aut frustrari cum aliostum etiam me ipsum velim? rebuspertinaciain minimis reprehenditur, calumnia coercetur, etiam egodeomnistatuconsilioque me adplicavi, nonmodostultitiam meam sed etiammores et naturam condemnandam puto. namsi Ego enim si autostentatione aliquaadductus autstudio certandi adhanc potissimum philosophiam adfirmare vix possumus. non dubitant quin ea vera sint quae defendunt,nos probabilia multa habemus, quae sequi facile, quam proxime accedat; nec noset inter qui eos sescirearbitrantur quicquam interest quod nisi illi partem dicendo etaudiendo eliciant ettamquam exprimant aliquidquodaut sit verum autadid defatigati relinquemus. nequenostrae disputationes quicquam aliudagunt nisi utinutramque contentione volumus idque summa cura studioque conquirimus. …nequenos studium exquirendi dissentiant recusare.Quamquam nostra quidem causa facilis est,qui veruminvenire sine ulla 22 (Charles Brittain transl. –slightly modified) ) and by eliminating those doctrines and theories which do not ) emergeby“arguing oneither side” ( Part III 240 23 ( aut verum sitautadid Lucullus in utramque partem in utramque 66) simile veri ). He ). CEU eTD Collection interpretationof Carneadean scepticism (66-67). thus have opinions (cf. opinions have thus presented by Metrodorus), on which thewise person may viewsapprove the persuasive, shefinds and the RomanBooks Philo upheld a more mitigated interpretationof Carneades’ view (originally 26 approximation. theirunceasing arguments and criticisms the Academics meanto extract from the subject the truthor its more likely to use the marks),verb whichseems to suggestsimply thatCicero is translating a technical term here,as I think that Ciceroa stronger is synonym for view cansuccessfully thewithhold unceasing toundermine attempts it, andthe when is the Academic sceptic criteria absence of firm the unvarying and any provisional,in need furtherof examination and fortification, and revision. open to In ( opinions holding without the opposing views both views opposing the contrary lines of arguments. For her the questfor the truth means an endless survey of and views alternative reconsider to and faceobjections, to readiness of constant state 25 views persuasive are see further GLUCKER 1978: 278 ff and GLUCKER 1995. 11; “truth-like” ( and do not think that they notand think they it–, do butholdonly that know “persuasive” it ( found is the truth or anaccedat approximation of the(7: truth; so says that their aimis to draw out or extract either the truth or its closest approximation Cicero method. Academic the of application outcome constructive of expected this againthe once clearlylike state dialogue,however, to I would tothat weturn Before stand the test of a thorough examination. a thorough of test the stand habitual/dispositional virtues “we the and will see some emotions otherof the time”. account Cf.further their in right were Peripatetics) (and Academics Old 24 ( of wefindexamination in that adfirmare Cf. again Afurther indication of such optimistic prospects is Pace Tusc eliciant ettamquamexprimant aliquid quodautverumsit aut adidquamproxime Charles Brittain (BRITTAIN 2006), who translates . I 8, II 9, V 11. –On the practice of ). 25 Luc ) or “assent to” ( However, they have no means no to have they However, . 7-9, 32-4,65-66, 76, 99ff, 127-28,141, 146-147. Note thatCicero is aware that before veri simile Luc ) or “conspicuous” ( . 59,78); but he rejects thisinterpretationinfavour of Clitomachus’ pro opinere adsentire and De finibus ). con 26 ) the result –they are not entirely convinced by it by convinced entirely not are –they result the ) Chapter III.1.1 arguing on either side The results reached in this way always remain always way in this reached results The . Even when time has shown that this or that or this that shown has time when Even . , written immediately after the 241 24 And to come to the point, this is the kind Luc. know perspicuum 135, where Cicero suggests that whether the for certain whether what they have they what whether certain for eliciant exprimant as a method for working out which ), and “follow” it ( ideally . The idea issimply throughthat Luc. as “formulate” (in quotation they do not “affirm” 60, 128; see also Lucullus probabile ideally sequere ND . in a ) or I4, ), CEU eTD Collection distinguishes his own way of thinking from that of the wise person who –on both the both –on who person wise the of that from thinking of way own his distinguishes reasons?) and erring, that is holding opinions. But it is rather clear that here Cicero ( as far as I can Not every see,point of this impressive simile is crystal-clear. Themost problematic move, is the connection drawn between “guiding one’s thought by” I yield to these impressions and can’t resist them. to them (althoughI don’t apprehend them, since I think that nothing is assent apprehensible). even sometimes and I’m them, not wise,accept I so sharply, senses or my mind strike impressions precise> ille vereor ne virtuti plus beatissimam".deus illequicensuit nihil deessevirtuti, homunciomulta hicquiputat praeter Luc . 134, in 62-1 BC) said that he is at a loss as to whether the Stoic or the De finibus summum bonum De finibus De The formeris agod tobelieve thatvirtue lacks nothing. The latter I-II, here as well there is an apparent discrepancy IVmightberegardedand readas reasonably Part III is correct: 256 46 Lucullus in mediasres . The Academic The . You’re right about , that he that , CEU eTD Collection Lucullus yearsinare they case, what But the later? happened some27 think to that about have to issupposed which in ascene III-IV, in Books it advocates hestill that study there) he got convinced of the truth of Antiochus’ system, and that it is therefore Academic when he inAthens arrived in laterbut 79 BC, on (perhaps as a resulthisof Cicerowas indeedan meantto think that make Arethey to of all this? supposed readers are the is, what The question (95). andconvincible appears sympathetic ispersuaded, he and Cicero not by although isobjection (86-95), Piso responded launches a criticism Antiochean Academichis from of the theory buthis position; the young Cicero was an adherent of the New Academy.At the end of the dialogue he inperiod his formative years: hisAthenian stay in 79BC.And asit turns soon out (4), dramatic setting has dramatically is Cicero changed. nowtelling aboutanimportant “troublesome” tribune at tribune “troublesome” rigidis a impractical Stoicism joking and –it to references possible even the that Cato’sreservedlya unified endorsed in Platonic–Aristotelian to opposition tradition speech in trial,inhave Murena’s in aswe which, seen earlier (Chapter before his exile (in 59-8)and shortlybefore after or his presentation of his famous BC; not long after the end of Cicero’ the for date fictional the Once again, glorious consulship in 63 BC, some two years hedonist and anti-Epicurean sentiments presented in presented sentiments anti-Epicurean and hedonist Cicero’s II refutation is inof Epicureanism in Book broadly line anti-with the above, out have Again, Ipointed supposed to place. 52 respectively) taken as are (Cato was tribune elect in 63 and tribune in 62). Moreover, the Moreover, in 62). tribune and in 63 elect tribune was (Cato and in which the fictional scenes depicted in depicted scenes fictional the in which and in yearsfinished period before and ten the which published Cicero ? Lucullus 63 and 97 are meant to evoke the Murena affair Chapter III.1.2 Lucullus 257 De finibus De , as we have seen, is 62 or perhaps61 is 62 or have seen, we , as De RePublica I-IIand III-IV (set in 50 and Lucullus De RePublica (Cicero even I.3.2 is set some isset ), Cicero , CEU eTD Collection Cicero’s intellectual in his in life intellectual Ipresented the firstdecades of careerthat political Cicero’s about contentions sceptical the of light in the school, another of member becoming while Cicero mayhave never officially while Cicero allegiance. Academic Cicero’s of continuity the debate concerning significant been therehas scholarship In recent probare? probare, quaesuntatedicta? quisenimpotestquae probabilia ea,videanturei, non approve what(76: seems persuasive” fail to can who all, After said. have you what on approval my bestow me to for legitimate emphasises at the end of compatible Academic Ashe underlying with a constant sceptical allegiance. himself endorse, dogmatic philosophical arguments, or arealldoctrines be taken beto to or lean towards be orevento appeared sympathetic to to, letter)– writing or a in court speech defence delivering a (e.g. person areal-life even as or perhaps his own works, in ascharacter or author –either as he when past inthe occasions several along. The had Academic all been akind sceptic Cicero of any appearance, despite that, contrary BC (as author of the in I think that the emergence of Cicero the Academicsceptic, firstin 79 BC (as character to 48 in Stoicism of criticism see the literature referred to in Chapter in to referred literature the see refers to Cicero decided to change the cast and setting of the setting and cast the change to decided Cicero 47 SeeChapter Ad Att Pro Murena De finibus . XIII.19.3-5 shows that the settings and cast for ). De RePublica I.2 V), then in 62 or 61 BC (as character in the ). , n.39. 47 Lucullus ), and his refutation of Stoic ethics is broadly in line with his with line in broadly is ethics Stoic of refutation his and ), Pro Murena De finibus 48 ) cannot but be understood as conveying the message as conveyingbut thebe understood ) cannot In this connection Iwouldlike pointto first, out, that I.1 , n. 2. V, answering to Piso: V,answeringto forget “don’t is itthat quite and in and Part III 258 deserted Academica De Oratore sed nonnemeministi licere mihi ista the New Academy in the sense of De finibus ; for our evidence for the composition the for evidence our for ; Book Book III (Ciceroeven refers Lucullus have been determined before determined been have ), and finally in45 finally and ), CEU eTD Collection Cicero’s other references at other references Cicero’s sceptics. upholdhad Academicthe ithestrong negative to presumptions against rather about itin inhis came 45; and that presenting to audience manifesto a surprise thisthat as is madeis in only the meansmeant tobe put openly on itdisplay; is atbest indirectly indicated. This move significant that, unlikeinsignificantthat, the rather impressive. But Cicero apparently never published never apparently impressive. ButCicero rather Görler’s (GÖRLERWoldemar I find rate, any at stance; philosophical his 1995) as scepticism Academic arguments for the of presenting possibility the was already contemplating presence fifties, late Cicero the of a sceptic ego in the Book recognised as siding withthe Platonic-Peripatetic tradition. At itmay be by Third, casethat the timewriting of the Cicero’s ongoing Academic leaningin either his works or in his letters. adherent of Antiochus’ school; but it certainly suggests that Cicero’s novam ( new” he with dealing is and Academy Old I failfind, to upuntil continue hislife scepticalofinvestigating practicing method (II9-10), the throughout he will that youth”) my of rather or boyhood my of notebooks the of out “slipped 50 avowal in avowal early the Second, in addition to this generalin decades. those caution, I would like to sect, philosophical anyother Academy,or New the to “adherence” his note or allegiance” that apart from the Part I 49 In the famous passage at On this see further ). I agree with Görler that this does not necessarily mean that formerly Cicero has been an we should perhaps be more cautious in speaking about Cicero’s “philosophical 50 Appendix B Appendix Lucullus De inventione De Acad De legibus . I 13 Varro. I13 refers tothe rumoursnew that Cicero“has abandoned the . Academica , and his treatment in the treatment his and , Lucullus (which, as Cicero describes it at Book I, any Book tolerably allusion unambiguous to Chapter III.1.2 , in , I 13 and Relictam a te veterem Academiam… tractari autem 259 De legibus De naturadeorum I this sceptical identity identity I sceptical by nothis is ND De legibus Lucullus I 6 and 11 Cicero mentions those De RePublica De legibus De (7 etc.), together with Book I, probably in probably I, Book I 6 and 11shows I 6and De oratore 49 ; and it is was widely was I, 5 CEU eTD Collection and the and heart” –that separation is,the of philosophical wisdom andeloquence-indeed source and the of scepticism in a positive light: Crassus presents Socrates as the originatorof the “rift between the tongue Plato’s Socrates, but Socrates, Plato’s same period in his life. At life. his in period same and letters. from virtue and is Cicero’s works absent earlier to dedicated conspicuously morality lifeof, a befortification can seenas andindeed with, rational the compatible is In general, power. as a approach that view of Academic scepticism the constructive Academic asadestructive bow of scepticism to thecommon seems to perception inhe indeed, famouspassage at I39 the if views; even endorse, positive tentatively, possibility for him speakfrom to an Academic sceptic pedestal and at the to time find at find in Cicero legibus of to Cicero the asopposed life. example, For intellectual ofhisearlier works, latethe approval find (cf. again approval persuasive” I on whatever this in issue, even anapproving manner,as“it legitimateisme for quite my bestow to stay about freely course speak and I, can of Academicsceptic, andthe innature, laws tokeepawayare requested from wearediscussingwhile us foundations life of social toAcademichis scepticism about adherence lifelong pains to indicate that he has always been a member of the school. However, his claims move, makethis hetakes decidedhas to eventually aswecan Cicero Fourth, see, once 51 work. Academica patrociniumrelictae necopinatum anobis esse susceptum quae lucemeriperetquasi noctem et quandam rebus offunderet, desertaeque disciplinaeiam pridemet left behind ” I that hadunexpectedly( undertaken the defence of schoola of which thought quitted men had and long philosophy which in their view dousedcritiques ofthe hisphilosophical light writings whoand “found it surprising plunged that I approved particularly the of the issues, so to say, in the darkness, and Cf. De orat. De leg I 39 the Cicero of philosophica , suggesting that his reasons, as well as his respond to the charge, is to be found in that De legibus 51 . I 39, and assuming that Cicero wrote I 43, 84; cf. also esp. multis etiam sensi mirabile videri nobis eam potissimum probatam esse philosophiam, pace arenotfully justified by in evidence,the andhis letters previous –evenifhe is ismuch less really there– the confident about De oratore GÖRLER 1995:99-100, by this he does not seem to present Academic De finibus Ad Att III67Crassus traces of theorigins scepticismArcesilaus’ back to . VII.2.4, written in 50 BC, which closely parallels what we V could simply “whilesay Epicureans the that Part III 260 De Leg ). Cicero directs these critiques to the to critiques these directs Cicero ). . I before going to Asia, belongs to the De fin as presented and presented explained in . V 76). The Academic De CEU eTD Collection Theophrastus; or they have to abandon the view that there are some minor non-moral minor some are there that view the abandon to have they or Theophrastus; happiness,in whichcase their into the position position collapses to attributed unwelcome dilemma: either they have to abandonan face the Antiocheans viewthe so that virtueinconsistent, is is position sufficient Antiochean the for out, points As Cicero of Stoic theory. in mightsuggest areversal the V seem direction the to At first glance, Cicero’s sceptic criticism of the Antiochean theory at the end of Book picture. clue,providesit animportant requires toget but further some overall the work approve whatever seems“persuasive” sceptic Academic to the 76 tothe “freedom” of Lucullus from a fact, andthat notthe widely known was scepticism Academic Cicero’s former intellectual But this is my anticipating life,conclusions; inand anycase whatever wethink of Cicero’s for the time being the important point is that before 45 BC Cicero’s treatment of Socrates in of Socrates treatment Cicero’s the fragmentationof true wisdom into quarrelling sects ( underlying scepticism and inclined dogmatically arguments? hintat The Cicero’s between connection the understand are we to how is, now emerges Academic scepticism absent from these dialogues?finibus life. So what asufficiently reflective readeris supposed to understand at the end of his throughout The one been has but now, sceptic Academic is an only not he that dates) question that naturally reading the first four books, if reading read he firstfour books, the hadalready the havefelt naturally mightat reader the answer puzzlement the seemsto This discovery end of V.Book Cicero is well aware of the flaw of the Old Academic theory that he points out by the Vis in thatall presented conversations the through onwards Cicero takes conveypainstakes onwards Cicero (principally to dramaticthe through Deoratore Chapter III.1.2 see FANTHAM 2004: 249-50. See further 261 De orat . III60-61). Fora discussion of De finibus Lucullus before: whyis I-IIand III-IV De finibus Appendix B Appendix De V . CEU eTD Collection 47, V11). references to Cicero’s scepticism in the Cicero’s scepticism to references liberi itaque solisumus id dicimus, probabilitate percussit, nostros animos mind with its sowealone probability; arefree” (33: for our day; argument: “westrikes the live responsiblenot that we say for whatever in he from position arguedagainstCato which his(21ff).(32) points this outthat When interlocutor inis with viewaccord not the virtueaccept isgood that nothing except happiness, haveto suffices virtue that for we bonum finibus againstraised point the Pisorepeats first He again. issue same the on returns work) at the throughout the end of what we find in book V of the Vof book in find we what by Theconnection him, tobesupported persuasive to thelatter. seems sometimes more seems former the sometimes right”: is them of one unless collapse utterly will Stoic and the Antiocheanissue at of the view aporetic view on the It mightseem align to tempting reversal apparent this descriptionwith his Cicero’s of admits that he finds the cohesion of the Stoic position remarkable (cf. 79, 83). favour; but he indicates that the Theophrastean view is nothis cup of tea (75, 77), and and morality alone. Cicero is reluctant here to tell which ofoptions two tellwhich herethe to is reluctant Cicero alone. morality and see and adopttheStoicgoods, whole the position that 52 Indeed, the Ad Att. Ad leads to the Theophrastean conclusion, and that in order to uphold thesis the to in order that and conclusion, Theophrastean leads the to 52 ) where Cicero (who has repeatedly indicated his sceptic allegiance his sceptic indicated has repeatedly (who ) whereCicero XIII. 12.3, 22.2. Tusculans were already in planning stages when Cicero was still working on De finibus Lucullus Tusculans 134, where he says that he is “torn” between the V: that Antiochus’ account of the of account Antiochus’ that V: Part III summum bonum Tusculans 262 (the next work on ethics he wrote after wrote he ethics on work next (the De finibus see 23; I 17, II 4-6, 9,15; IV 6-7, summum bonum nos indiem vivimus; quodcumque , since he “virtue thatthinks IV, Cicero replies that heis replies that IV,Cicero consists in virtue consists –for other he De finibus summum would De , CEU eTD Collection settled and do not seem to waver or dissolve when he surveys the arguments the surveys he when dissolve or waver to seem not do and settled be rather to seem areconcerned, they itscounterpart– Antiochean of preferability deficiencypositions entailed bythoseargumentsand views Asfar theories. as Cicero’s on the of the Stoic views towards differenthis or and towards attitude arguments andtheories, attitude theory Cicero’s between difference crucial the recognise have to we avoid suspicion this To of the long of period time has anybearing. a over them of one of prevalence the nor succession, their nor in themselves, mind of Tusculan in ofonAntiochus’his attack position mind, state one but in Stoicon ethics attack His control. rational persuasiveness are temporary, and passive of mind subjective states his beyond reasonable of truth.prospect getting closer judgements tothe On of viewCicero’s this rationalitytruth. and Forobjectivity it seemssearchingto the andcommitment constructive astraightforward scepticism represents to entail that But this Cicero’s valuehis view seriously the Academic avowals compromises of that that would his “method” be necessary does,and consistent well argued. after for all, regarding lack the element it as of offering a prevent from him his mind changing laterat any and time the finding have notmuch it because doesnot does too andsupport lacking weight, inconsistent the of IVfinds theory in Stoic the Book fact Cicero the that the e.g. Thus enduring results. or both for oneitherand side considering methodof arguments whichCicero’s sceptical according to against suggest aviewof scepticism Cicero’s may firstseem passages to glanceAt these a given position cannot lead to more or less stable and summum bonum represents another –but as far –but as another represents (as opposed to its Antiochean counterpart) internally Chapter III.1.2 summum bonum 263 the De finibus truth is concerned, neither these states neither these is concerned, IV may accurately represent IVmayaccurately –and correspondingly –and correspondingly the De finibus V and the fifth same theory against CEU eTD Collection of Antiochus’ account of the In short: his objections against positioncompromise Antiochus’ donot theplausibility thesis. sufficiency the entail does conclusion that that insisting in right are Stoics the that only itadmits atlarge; good) only is the virtue (that conclusion its and consistent isindeed is theory not Stoic the that claim his meant hand, other the On happiness. for assufficient an assessmentis virtue that thesis the of with conclusion that the of conjunction the Stoicethics, Antiochus’ theory of thein move final the with do to has it itself; in goods) external and bodily minor epitomised at epitomised Thus the elements of Cicero’s aporia as it unfolds at the end of and the and the that conclusion (the conclusion its and De finibus Antiochus’ hisbecause Thisis position. Antiochus’ of criticism end atthe position of the s happiness] are manifestly self-consistent”. manifestly are happiness] good] is true; but I state that his statements [that virtue is the only good andthat it is sufficient for 53 of fifth view of from the point the However, fixed. arerather preference the of theories conflicting My point is that as far as the left column of the above diagram –the column of the a) c) Cicero emphasises this at V 79: “I’m not asking whether this [i.e. the thesis that virtue is the only and the and goods.minor of the Antiochus’ well established and plausible account The deficient Stoic account of the account Stoic deficient The the ummum bonum s. b. précis summum bonum consists in virtue and morality alone. V does not have to do with the Antiochean theory of the of theory Antiochean the with do to have not does V of the aporia at aporia of the Luc . 134),are following:the asaviable option, inthe annulling IV. refutation presented Book : the s. b summum bonum summum bonum . comprises virtue Lucullus summum bonum 134– we can see that as far as the right column Part III 264 summum bonum – is concerned, Cicero’s judgements– isconcerned, Cicero’s and , and do not reinstate the Stoic theory of : b) d) the insufficiency thesis. account: Antiochus’ of consequence The unwelcome (Theophrastean) unwelcome The account: the sufficiency thesis. Stoic of the consequence desirable The comprises and virtue the De finibus De summum bonum summum bonum 53 Tusculan V (and is V (and – CEU eTD Collection not correctly entail the sufficiency thesis. sufficiency the entail correctly not probabilius Old Academic conception of the of conception Academic Old 139 adds “thusthat far find Idon’t anything elsemore persuasive” thanAntiochus’ Lucullus at who Cicero Academic same very the fact the by fortified is strongly reading This summum bonum conception recognises theoreticalthe underpinnings theof the of deficiency of that summum bonum Theophrastean conclusion; at this point he admits that only the Stoic conception of the theory fails in sufficiency establishing the and thesis, avoid thuscannot theirksome theory, heAntiochus; leans towards it butthen comes his to mind Antiochus’that recognising the advantages of Antiochus’ theory ofAntiochus’ of theory the recognising advantages the – – whenhe is (a) (b)–(d) (c): along revolution as aclockwise above diagram the within interpreted be can thought his of “motion” wavering the Antiochus, and at when Thus he considers the sufficiency thesis (d) a strong a conciliatione naturae of nature”: recommendation the from derived is which honourably, criticism of Stoic ethics when hesays that the Stoic positionon the makes clear both at both makes clear hebecause alternativeback(as but from this he shrinks conclusion; Theophrastean accept the him (b)would (a)and to between compel link the recognition of the plus column, left the by represented grounds theoretical The column. left the in judgementsrecorded against the commitments, andthesego also has ratherstrong Cicero concerned, are theories) two the of corollaries the (containing my diagram in 54 Note that at 134 being between Antiochus’complained about “torn” and view, Zeno’s at ) –at this point he clearly sets aside the question whether it does question he asideor thisdoes sets clearly whether the ) –at point Lucullus Lucullus , and the advantages of Antiochus’ theory; and so on and so forth. so and on so and theory; Antiochus’ of advantages the and , does seem correctly to entail the sufficiency thesis; but then he then but thesis; sufficiency the entail to correctly seem does . Cf. the reference to the same passage in Chapter in passage same the to the reference . Cf. 131 the Academic Cicero seems to envisage the Antiochean interpretation and interpretation Antiochean the envisage to seems Cicero Academic the 131 Lucullus 134 Cicero says that he constantly wavers between the Stoics the between wavers constantly he that says Cicero 134 134and in Chapter III.1.2 summum bonum 265 Tusculans desideratum V ( praef summum bonum nec quicquamhabeoadhuc honeste autem quodvivere, ducatur in philosophical ethics. ., 19; cf.., II.3 summum bonum . De finibus over the Stoic is “to live II86) 54 CEU eTD Collection format that we find in the holds.thishas On succeeded thesis inshowing that eventheory, Antiochus’ not theory, nophilosophical as far see, But ashecan below). motivesbehind theideafollow-up of writing a to Tusculan fifth in the and asymmetry, this of aware well was himself Cicero me that to seems It theory. Theophrastus’ approve whoforcefully insisted on pointthis (cf. cf. V86-7, 86and II desideratum is towards handheasa On the committed thesufficiency strongly thesis other thesis. insufficiency the entails theory this that out in pointing is right Theophrastus bonum the of theory Antiochean is the it grounds, theoretical On asymmetry. grave suffers in a or is actually unbalanced Cicero’s aporia that object reasonably might I wouldlikeBefore concluding, adducefurther one to Atthis consideration. pointone relation, as he does it at the end of in he does as relation, –in (a)–(c) the position Antiochus’ champion hecanboth of circuitthought, closed of this awareness whatever strikes his mind meansas persuasive, what he is that, the Again, at when thesis– isdownplayed17 (cf. IV Antiochean theory of the 55 with their conception thesis sufficiency ofof the the conjunction to the respect exclusive with theory, Stoic the of consistency the of Book V –namely Antiochus’ attempt to connect is theory of the It is also notable in this connectionthat when itcomes to the comparisonbetween the Stoic and the summum bonum that stays standing. Further, Cicero is aware that, on theoretical grounds, he did his best to remedy it; indeed, this may have been one of the main the of one been have may this indeed, it; remedy to best his hedid in In philosophy. this he is influencedpartly by Antiochus’ treatment, Tusculans is found inconsistent in Book IV. Book in inconsistent found is summum bonum summum bonum Tusculans V 33 he says that as an Academic sceptic he is free to say freeisto he Academic sceptic he asan that V33says sub fin. De finibus and 20). Similarly, at the end of Book V Cicero emphasises in Book IV the point that will cause the problem at the end . , ignoring the various ways in which the Stoic theory of Part III De finibus De 266 V. 55 IV– and attack it, IV–and in attack (b)the –(d) rational De finibus summum bonum grounds, then, he should then, grounds, Tusc , and to do this in the . V19; see further given with the sufficiency his aporetic his summum CEU eTD Collection display in the fifth happiness. It is precisely this concern that comes to prominence in Cicero’s oratorical philosophical manage prove couldtheory virtue to isto date: for that sufficient no that establish point the to in attempt an skills, his oratorical of resources But this genre alsoat the same time attemptallows to plant the seeds of philosophy in their souls. him tohe did people these hiswith of profession in treasures show the that sharing desire to argue morethe writing behind motive major freely,another that think and to fullycompromised a hisposition butunbendingas statesman;retired to I tend optimate and deploy learn were5, III3,etc.)– all(II eagerto from him. oratory activity arguably This the in onthedecline laments the of oratory Cicero’s who–despite Caesarians, presented avital fraterniseopportunity to givewith, and favours to,influential young 32-3) onwards.Heuses philosophical whatever hehandhas atarguments –including actually took placeinactually villa the hisTusculan time. around took lecture: a part of the kind of oratorical training that, as we knowfrom Cicero’s letters, a declamation rather but time, leisure their in statesmen Roman distinguished between finibus This is further accompanied peculiarities. to choice unique byseveral In contrast disputationes, represent the genreof the represent They writings. extant Cicero’s of rest the all form content, in and form in both apart, As A. Douglashas (DOUGLAS the E. rightly 1995) pointed out, influential in the state”. the in influential very more once was he standing, and birth highest the of were they since these, with intimacy devotedalso Plutarch’s unfriendly comment at himself56 to those of the youth who were eager to learn philosophy, and mainly from his Esp. Ad fam. , what we see in the see we , what IX. 16.7-9; see furtherVII.28.2, IX.20.2-3, 26.1-4. Cf.e.g. LINTOTT 2008: 312; see cf. esp. Tusculan Tusc scholae . I 7, II 26): rhetorical exercises on philosophical topics. from the famous appeal to his Academic freedom V freedom (at his Academic appeal to famous the from Tusculans (=Greek Cicero Chapter III.1.2 60.1, thatduring theyears of dictatorshipCaesar’s “he is not a isconversation philosophical serious not 267 scholai , also rendered as , also Tusculans 56 ToCicero, these lessons may have been the been have may Tusculans declamationes Tusculans stand De , CEU eTD Collection can blame forRoman lending expert an orator ahand andemploying hisskill with the nophilosopher convince since philosophical has failedto point, this on every theory paradoxes inparadoxes todefendthe Stoic attempts thanhis moreis successful rhetorical no success (it bebe a saidto cannot view, attempt rhetorical of Cicero’s point From a philosophical for thehappy is itthat life). sufficient maintain consistently argued that they cannot see30,where Cicero contrast, life (by alsonot supremelyhappybutvirtue is tothe only to happy that the concede sufficient should evils, minor poverty or pain consider if they even Academics, Old the that this reversal of the argument too has a Carneadean provenance, cf. 83), and argues on the on Stoic–Peripateticthe disagreement Stoics:the that inand against arguing developed have adopted seemsto Antiochus that point Carneadean the of reversal unexpected an introduces he Finally, origin). Antiochean an has point the that suggest may which champion sufficiency the 85ff,however(31, thesis 114;cf. ethics) about wrong completely are otherwise (who Epicureans the even and that consensus among philosophers and his (Theophrastus apart) on followers this point, broad the emphasises and out he points things, other Among life. happy supremely other rhetorical flourishes, to produce a defence theof view that virtue suffices for the De fin or the Antiochean arguments he had found insufficient in Book V ( V in Book insufficient found had he arguments Antiochean the or e.g. the Stoic syllogisms ridiculed at ridiculed syllogisms Stoic the e.g. 57 Cf. DOUGLAS 1995: 213. . V86-95and summum bonum De paradoxaStoicorum Tusc is merely verbal (V 120; cf. 120; (V verbal merely is . V 22)–, together with a battery of historical exempla and exempla historical of a battery with together 22)–, V . De finibus ). Part III 57 268 But Cicero might reasonably respond that IV( Tusc De fin . V43-4; cf. . III 41;itis. III possible that De finibus Tusc De fin V74 and 93, . V 85-7; . V85-7; cf. . IV48ff), CEU eTD Collection that while Theophrastus’ response to the problem is unfaithful to the latter, the Stoic the latter, is the problem the to unfaithful to whileresponse that Theophrastus’ and the Stoics were rightin recognising a tension between these two; but he alsofinds but both be thinkforitselfTheophrastus that sure,hecannot happiness. sufficient To bonum the Antiochus’of Academic” “Oldtheory bulk of thegreat persuasiveness, ofits overwhelming ground the on “approves”, on hand one the who sceptic Academic same the as viewed is plausibly Cicero roles, different these in all along, resurrect the possibility that Epicurus’ hedonism may turn out to be closer to truth. All theory of the Stoic whether question the the we should reconsider suggest that want not to does Cicero theory Academic Old Antiochus’ of flaw the out pointing By play. into back theories discarded the bring and enquiry, whole the of point starting the to back reader To conclude, nothing that Cicero says at the end of end the at says Cicero that nothing conclude, To view of ethics. sceptical my account of Cicero’s find in people liable to betray their infaiththink removalcommitment would render theordinary sufficiency that the thesis the of to virtue. In any case,unexpressed be suggestion seems thatfrom to his personal butexperience he cannot I think that what we and sorrows) for the kind of comfort that the sufficiency thesis might provide. might thesis sufficiency the that comfort of kind the for sorrows) and an unusual and calculated stress on his personal need (owing tohis personal distresses 59 Moreover, in Moreover, nature. rhetorical a were of conclusion Theophrastean againstthe arguments straightforward intention to help out philosophy.help intentionstraightforward out to Tusculans first 58 On this see DOUGLAS 1995:209ff. This is in line with Cicero’s claim to be challenging the Greeks in philosophy in the preface of the Tusculan , while on the other hand he is also strongly inclined to the view that virtue is in Tusculans V at , rightly out by pointed (DOUGLASDouglas 1995:205ff). Cf.also the reference to De div Tusculans summum bonum V is in agreementwith, Visindeed overall and lends further to support . II 2. . II VCiceroseems towant tofurther reinforce his casebylaying is more persuasive –not any more than he wants to Chapter III.1.2 269 De finibus 58 Actually, already Antiochus’ already Actually, V is meant to push the summum 59 His CEU eTD Collection Antiochus’ theory fails beto sufficiently persuasive. To be sure, these judgements are, as far his is that sufficiencythesis concerned, persuasive, or judgement asthe that as far that asthe affect judgement thepermanencehissympathy doesnot of with Stoics. the Butthis thinking of needprove to the virtuethat isfor sufficient happiness hefinds more the Rather, whenthinkingabout depicts himself himself depicts at ashe Academics, and waver Old does Stoics the the between Cicero boundaries assentinghe opining, describes ashis and at disposition of error the into time slip to time from he may in cases these views(indeed, settled shrinking from is possibility the for virtue that happiness insufficient are rather hisare momentary First, anti-hedonism andhis anti-Theophrastean episodes. himas towhat“strikes” “approvals” persuasive) of (his judgements persuasiveness Cicero’s that view either approve the not does interpretation this importantly, BC, didradically change not his philosophical affiliation hislife.during But On this interpretation Cicero, at and by, abide their aporia. least according to his admit, readily can them. They toreconcile own resources lack the they because just views self-representation incompatible highlyhave butapparently betweenchose they not persuasive to two do in 45 liberty with which the lies ultimate the herein itappears, whole. As coherent into one fitseem together not to philosophy of the New preventfinds he views most do himfrom persuasive, the upholding eventhough they Academy endows her followers: that Antiochus’ theory tout court, he could perhaps retain his formal sceptic distance from it. neither of the actually available theories canbeembraced theories available actually neither of the see, he can faras as a loss; heisat Thus former. the to less unfaithful isno respond 60 Notably, however, as I indicated already in the in already indicated I as however, Notably, Lucullus summum bonum 60 134; but it is not between entire systems that he is thorn. he that systems entire between isnot it but 134; summum bonum is concerned, Antiochus’ theory is the most isthe theory Antiochus’ concerned, is Part III 270 Introduction , he leans towards Antiochus; when Antiochus; towards leans he , , even if Cicero would embrace would Cicero if even , Lucullus in toto 66). Within these 66). . But this does not does . Butthis CEU eTD Collection complex sceptic conception of the problem of ethics. problem of the scepticconception complex of his morepart areactually all views but these of Stoictheory); the criticism explicit theory (and Antiochus’ Antiochean the of perception and appreciation assessment of Stoic ethics has beenalways closely linked with, and informed by,his Academic sceptic approach. The message conveyed in ThemessageAcademic approach. conveyed sceptic can be viewedas being compatible, andindeed on, aconsistent grounded underlying view in ethics. This rather andestablished) definite many in respects nevertheless (but aporetic Cicero’s result is in line with the fact that, as we have seen in Stoic theory of the the of inwriting of period Cicero’s Asconcerns the one above, IhaveAcademy. argued with other expressionsin conjunction if viewed which, in ways it, of critical been always has He life. his of his views, may seemCicero’s views on Stoic ethics do not show considerableto changes or developmentreveal over a leaning towards the Old the the Stoicof theory andassesses perceives whichCicero framework within conceptual overall concerns is that, if it is largely correct, we can more clearly see the general and arguments the of considerations and in debates testing constant through (ideally strengthened and confirmed been have they years the through But chapter). next the more on in consideredhave words they (Istandards arenot afew these are grounded inand remain, asense, provisional always tentative;or since onwhich standards the The significance of this overview of Cicero’s sceptical approach in approach sceptical Cicero’s of overview this of significance The truth, even if they cannot securely grasp it. summum bonum Lucullus contra ); thus Cicero is andthey Cicero ); thus optimistictowards, bring the that point nearer, and De finibus . We can more clearly see, in particular, that the refutation of the of refutation the that in particular, see, clearly We canmore . summum bonum was to show how such apparently dogmatic sentiments Chapter III.1.2 in 271 De finibus IV represents a firm afirm facet of IVrepresents De finibus is that his critical his is that De finibus Part I to my pro , CEU eTD Collection justify in justify chargeslevelled the shiftsother in in seem reasoning the blatantly unsupported, a way which to seems backgroundAcademics. assumptions astheOld Butonsuch interpretation an some and starting-points same largely the adopt theStoics that III-IV, Books of character Cicero the with if weassume, sense makebetter seems to 17-18 III at knowledge cognitiontheory): natural e.g.apuzzling thus aboutour to attraction passage and by set“Old a certain (namely Academic” the pattern the pattern conforming to his material seems to portrayalbe drawnmeant in Book IV. In some cases, asto I pointed facilitateout, Cicero’s arrangement of finibus an understanding whenits viewed argument, reconstructing in by widerpresented of the context the Stoic theory as assuming as a hypothesis that there is something in the “cosmic” interpretations of inis interpretations “cosmic” hypothesisthe there something that assuming a as flourishing happier) isforceful person andappealing, even how, also (ii) and but is virtuous person the happy from virtuous the that (apart its conclusion withcould theBook V,questionsbut aview find (i)to not why Cicero thistheory in as elaborated theory Antiochus’ reconsider like to Ishould however, misrepresentation of notion Stoic the with interchangeably “self-love” of that those interpreters who, influenced by Cicero’s presentation, tend touse the notion of inChapter “original”: Academic Old alleged the to Stoic theory the the assimilate Stoicto attempt “devious” more even an uncover shall I mythesis of part this In theory, probably originated by Antiochus. First, read the Stoic account of the of account Stoic read the we when emerge naturally which interpretive problems effect the the that argued to influence on Cicero’s understanding of Stoic ethics in ethics of Stoic understanding Cicero’s on influence of Antiochus’ probable and its features theory I have discussed some already as a whole, tend to merge into a specific profile, which fits the critical the fits a which mergeinto asawhole, profile, specific to tend De finibus summum bonum Part III IV. 272 in De finibus Part II Part III with the intention of oikei (Chapter ǀ sis III.3 , perpetuate a , perpetuate I shall argue I shall 3 De finibus ), where I De CEU eTD Collection considered in considered inconsistent with of your theory) you claim a part (as If consistency. internal is theories different the refuting in on relies Cicero in of debates the overview superficial constantia judged onthebasis their consistency of ( without intransigence which view is the most consistent ( consistent most the is view which intransigence without Stoic ethics (discussed inchapter (discussed Stoic ethics III.1.3 of perception ethics. Stoic Cicero’s of history the of Greek philosophy after may Plato, have createdablind-spotin At persuasivenessthe of philosophical is theories beto tested. view, of invirtue which, on sceptical Cicero’s information standards specific on the persuasiveness–is toapply. supposed words, In other they substantialprovide aiming atgetting by closer tothe truth eliminatingphilosophicallack positions that in the methodology that, on Cicero’s own view, a constructive sceptical investigation – different theories in Books II, IV and V provide valuable information on the details of the of criticisms Cicero’s interpretation Onthis myinterpretation. of consequence important another out point to worthwhile be will it however, these, Before Tusculans The standards forassessing dogmatictheories ); andat V 31 Cicero declares V31Cicero thatphilosophical ortheories positions be must De finibus De A , your, theory as a whole is ruled out. Actually all the three theories Lucullus are found inconsistent in this sense; the only theory that theory only the sense; this in inconsistent found are A , andyou also claim 9he describes scepticthe approach “workingas out II. 4 II. Chapter III.1.2 ), Antiochus’ theory, jointly with his narrative his with jointly theory, Antiochus’ ), De finibus 273 spectandi sunt… ex spectandi perpetuitate atque B , which on refection turns out to be to out turns refection on which , reveals that one of the standards the of one that reveals in De finibus in De constantissime )”. Even a CEU eTD Collection project collapses (cf. V 86-7, cf. II 86 and virtue to happiness is the greatest “promise” of philosophy, without and it the whole philosophical theory can be seen tobe inconsistent, if we believe, as Cicero and Antiochus do, that the sufficiency of 48, 78; of48, 78; seeAntiochus, 83,V 77ff,esp.79-80, cf. at view aspresented Sceptic the on that I guess sceptic; Academic ( ( consistent being from far insistingthat, by on this point Antipater countered Carneades learn that 28, wherewe denied their that wasapprehensible (cf. that ofinapprehensibility central thesis he when principle same this on relied have to seems interpretation) Clitomachus’ Moreover, Carneadesbe true). (115; cf.147: atbestone viewcan (on e.g. also true” [jointly] be can’t views incompatible “several that maintaining in contradiction of principle the on rely obviously arguments of contrarieties the from arguments follows so evidently ( evidently so follows Thus when the Cicero of Book IV says that a logical truth, such as the ( A that the thesis or (95), as it, latter, Ciceropresents “undermines”the principleof the excludedmiddle the achievementby focussing on well-known the paradoxes: sorites and the liar –where invalidity validity undermineSecond,or inferencesof heattempts to (91). eventhis the about certainties logical is that competence: its under belong that certainties the above and over certainties further any to us lead to is unable dialectic that out points First, he 44). at presented Antiochean conception the to logic respond (in against the in be sure, To theory. Theophrastus’ is conclusion final to points starting from consistent completely seems 61 rationem maxia repugnaret For the Forinconsistencythe see of Epicurus ff, cf.II 32;70,86 61 ) (IV 55), this does not contradict the assumption that he is actually an contradict that heisactually 55),thisnot assumption ) (IV the does ) to say so). Lucullus perspicua ĺ consentaneum esse consentaneum (91ff) the Academic sceptic Cicero launches an attack launches an Cicero sceptic Academic the (91ff) A is a logical truth (98). Nevertheless the sceptic the Nevertheless (98). truth logical is A a ) that the logicians do not deem it in need of proof Tusc . V 19). Part III 274 Tusc ), it would be “grossly inconsistent” Tusc . V 24-6. In a sense V 24-6.Inasense . evenTheophrastus’ . V 26; of the Stoics, IV26 ff, esp. 39, Lucullus modus tollens 99 (cf. Luc. , CEU eTD Collection world is” ( atque comprehensam ( pleasure” grasp of sensumque perspexerit, vacuitas doloris et voluptas idem esse videatur naturam est quisuam sit, hoc ipse sibinotus efficere non possitutcuiquam,qui freedom andnature from senses–believethatis the pain same aspleasure”(16: have own their perceived clearly is, who –that self-knowledge whohave make those in Plato’s discussed issues metaphysical definition.bitlater he topic a this Indeed, argues that isnot definition (8; cf. 7), emphasising that everyone is compelled to agree with this (15: public” the to familiar widely straightforward, “clearand butrather mathematics), in example, For notion. is impliedinagiven content a certain cognitive that agreement, general compels that certainty intuitive an of basis the on maintains, he often andfor suitable assessing standards assuch Rather intheseenquiries. persuasiveness But it is not only the rules of elementary logic that Cicero finds in this way evident, ( “follows” hesimply says that Cicero where 98, also (see “approval” sceptic’s the for allow they unintelligible), or inconceivable seem principles such of contraries the itself (indeed them presents to contrary since nothing “perspicuity”, and or persuasiveness their mind with the logical “strike” simply principles with etc.) 32-34, sequor De finibus de illustri et facili et iam in vulgus prevagata loquitur etiam de illustriin vulgusprevagata etfacili ) the dialectical he dialectical ) the Antiochus). hadlearned from rules id estquaeres huic vocisubiciatur II Cicero confidently claims that he has a “pretty firm conception he hasand that IICicerofirm claims a“pretty confidently conception habere benecognitamvoluptatem conceptamet satis animo firme ), and understands well “what the substance underlying the underlying substance the “what well understands and ), Chapter III.1.3 Timaeus 275 ) or “technical”, ( ). He expresses this grasp in the grasp this He expresses ). ); thus Epicurus “cannot ); thusEpicurus obscurus artificiosus ). (as the deep , such as cum CEU eTD Collection (in this case these arguments can be viewed as representing a subspecies of his of asubspecies canbeviewed asrepresenting arguments (in this casethese opponents respectively,actually without committinghimself toany intuitive evidence his actual as aweapon against epistemology Antiochean (Stoic) Epicurean or arguing in a purely dialectical and dialectical purely in a arguing quaerendo etdisserendo ( impressions aswhatcanbea unimpeded” “perspicuous” usedas guiding rule and 32-4)“persuasive andCarneades “persuasive”, of at spoke “truth-like”, that in is thiscontext) in line also findinwith what we the your first premise?”). first your evident to appealing of This practice some goodor possible evil). tranquil (i.e. free from any desire of some good that is missing fearor from the loss of must be implies happyperson the happiness that which of presents aquasi-definition that the premises of them do not fit our conceptions ( the syllogistic arguments criticizes whichCicero serve that vein to groundsimilar the a thesis in that also is It morality claims. is the only paradox good,these pointing accept out would one no that suggests foundations of theory theirdeny than is evidentrather whatcf. (67-8); where also 21 and61, Cicero by it, if from the central Stoic tenets it follows that every vice is equal, the Stoics should think again the again at is stated samepoint happy”. than The happier what is sufficient is too much; no one has too much happiness, therefore no one is clarify ( ( implausible ishighly happy sufficiently being similar conceptual when heanalysis agues(82)that“theidea being of happy without ( “so false that the premises from which they spring cannot be true” (54). To Cicero it isjust “evident” the impossibility of being persuaded” thatthings are as the Stoics indeed, claim; these paradoxes are finibus Considerations of kindthis figure alsoin Cicero’s refutation of ethicsStoic in cuiusque ( reflection mature on persuasive less are 62 perspicuum regula At IV 55 Cicero argues that although the Stoic paradoxes may sound wonderful at first glance, “they aperire IV. ) both ) both for conducing one’slife andin investigation and argument ( ), the facts of nature (or rather the nature of things: ), for example, that some vices are worse than others; thus, since the evident ought to ought evident the since thus, others; than worse are vices some that example, for ), 62 Mostimportant, however, the Cicero of Book V seems to rely on a ) orilluminate ( ). One may perhaps argue that in every such case Cicero is illustrare ) the ) the doubtful ( considerateminus probabantur phenomena ad hominem Part III 276 ibid dubium . 48-9:“what arusty sword! Who wouldadmit minus probandum (if I may use the Aristotelian phrase natura rerum manner, adopting assumptions of ) rather thanbeing) rather annihilated ( Lucullus Tusculans ) and truth herself proclaimed herself truth ) and , where we learn learn (first we , where ): common sense ( V29, where Cicero ); anything addedto tollere sensus De in ) CEU eTD Collection sometimes interpreted. sometimes arguments from inconsistency). Indeed, this ishow Carneadean scepticism is the dialectical interpretationof Academic scepticism is COUISSIN 1929. 63 the “dialectical” interpretation does not seem underwrite suchaprospect. “dialectical”interpretation the does to providing (though of certainty); neighbourhood the intonottruth any strict whereas bringing arational of phenomena–offers prospect us “conspicuous” with consistency maintain thatcannot theunderstand joint his ownapplication scepticism as merely dialecticalof these in thistwo sense. criteria He has to –logical consistency and Cf. SCHOFIELD 335ff; BRITTAIN1999: 325ff and 2006: 40.The classicxxiv n. statementand of 63 But on the interpretation that I am Butontheinterpretation I am that Cicero propounding Chapter III.1.3 277 CEU eTD Collection fin engaging into an epistemological debate with Zeno ( with Zeno debate an epistemological into engaging initiated pupil by Polemo’s the who Arcesilaus, other movement Academic sceptic thesis that only virtue is good ( thesis is virtue only that good by theory dissented from radical championing ethical Old Academic the orthodox the V 12,77; emphasising the role of fortune in the happy life (cf. life happy in the fortune of role the emphasising from Academic inby Old orthodoxy hisethics rejecting sufficiency the thesis and diverged who pupil Aristotle’sTheophrastus, in generation, with occurred next the 40; IV 15;V12,14; Old Academy (the other one is Polemo; cf.fin school school but (cf. retained philosophical thesame system Luc. 136 by virtually all of Plato’s immediate successors, including Aristotle, who set up a new shared theory the with insubstance be identical be to taken to was theory His ethical by Plato. established tradition philosophical the of and developmentfragmentation the of his about presented narrative a quasi-historical within ethical framework theory the As is well known, of the Stoicand theory. theory his informs way perception the this and as wecan Antiochus’ Now to perception Cicero’s of questions concerningturn the I have alreadyIII. 2 indicated in Chapter 64 As regards physics, the first rift came withAristotle himself, who undermined the Forms: . V94). . IV 3, V 7), and in ethics in particular counts as one of the chief authorities of the The theorythatstays standing: Antiochus’ accountofthe Tusc . V 24), and with Polemo’s pupil Zeno, who founded the Stoa and Tusc . V30,39,87).The firstrifts in ethical this tradition Acad . I 35, . I Part III 278 De fin Luc . 131, 137; . 131, . IV 3, 14 etc., V23). 3,14etc., . IV Luc Luc . 16 etc.; . 134, Acad Acad Acad summum bonum . I 22, . I Acad . I 33, 35; . I . I 16-18, 22; 16-18, . I II.3 . I 34, 43ff;. I34, 64 De fin , Antiochus , Next came Acad . II 34, II . De fin . I 33. De De . CEU eTD Collection criticism is found, as we have seen, in seen, have we as found, is criticism the thesis that virtuefails is to establishthe theonly very point good. where they wantThe to surpass actually but theory their uncompromising; moreand radical and are happiness virtue most the Old Academicelaborate theory: statementmake believetheir on thatmanner, as to andpositions pretentious others so deceptive of this line of 143-4); and he is aware of is where 143-4); andhe OldAcademicsand awareof thepoints real early Peripatetics epistemology,heavily authority on relying Chrysippus as ( Academiche criticises perspective himfor and uncritically wholesale adopting Stoic Importantly, this is not to say that he agrees with Antiochus on every point. Academiae potius quam aliquam Fromnovam disciplinam putandam an esseautem arbitror,nostro placebat, familiari utAntiocho correctionemveteris 43: (I system” new a than rather Academy Old the of a correction considered it’s as true, friendour Antiochus believed, the that latter [theStoic system] should be Academica Heexpresslyframework. by declares this endof the survivingthe his partof is seepurposes islargelyCicero present this thatWhat to for adopts our crucial represent, or to be largely in line with,Antiochus’s view. the Old Academic system (for this he is criticised by Cicero in the Cicero by is criticised he this (for system Academic Old the innovations, appropriatingfield Antiochusthat is ingenuitywilling to admitZeno’s and his welcomes Stoic epistemology as a contribution to the perfection of changing the doctrines (cf. doctrines the changing ethics, however, the Stoics did, for the most part, simply change the terms without made were the most considerable in the field of inlogic ( theof field made themost considerable were ( system Academic Old original of the “correction” a represent to meant is it derivative: largely is then, system, philosophical Stoic The : Cicero, as adherent of the New Academy in the dialogue, says “I think Acad . I 37; Chapter III.2 279 De fin De De finibus . V 22, 74); and they did this in did. V22,74);anda they this Acad whichis generally agreed to Acad . I 35). The alterations Zeno alterations The 35). I . Luc . I 40ff); it is only in this in only is it 40ff); I . ). . II 67, 69, 97-98, 113, 67, . II Lucullus ). In their In ). horum CEU eTD Collection De fin particularlyhis endorsed Aristotle’s writings) orat exoterice.g. dialogues to (referred writings the with acquaintance personal on based was it far how and writings and instruction of Polemo toAntiochus’how much Cicero’s owed of As ethics Old Academic knowledge to (referredtheir doctrines). tobased more on authority the of Philo Antiochus than and hisindependent on study of at Hellenisticschoolsthe things,other Cicero’s knowledge was of philosophical that in life intellectual former Cicero’s of discussion my ofhistorical in (I hopefindsdoubt; they thatthis support are simplymatters fact point sceptical and enquiry of theoretical not matters him, areclearly To these radicalism. flawed) attemptdissentto from OldAcademicsthe and surpass inthem moral ethical theory, and together with it his description of the Stoic theory as an (inherently Peripatetic Academic–early the Old of account general Antiochus’ he accepts apart also (cf. mean-states as virtues moral the of conception Aristotelian the with agreed all Academics Oldthe Antiochean Varro seems to think otherwise; cf. also Tusc (cf. Stoics the with agree to bound also are Peripatetics the but format, different a in Peripatetics the theories are nearlyethical two the identical that in substance; Antiochus, by so not onlyadopted and is itthat the Stoics Carneades by actually introduced also say the same argument, thingsof the as reversal the wise man is beautiful, free, king, rich, etc. But it is possible that he simply uses a Carneadean at and elsewhere attested not is Antiochus of tenet this although of doctrine theStoic embracing with Antiochus hecharges Antiochus between discrepancies and tradition: Old the original Academic–Peripatetic wisethe hold man not does Even opinions (113; 143-4). in ethicshe recognises haveAntiochus’wouldincluding to subscribed Stoicising not doctrine,that the point 65 At . V . 83 and 120).In thiscase, the previous objections in 135 may actually follow a similar pattern. Luc . V 12), or Aristotle’12), . V or . 136 Cicero may seem tosuggest thatAntiochus also adopted the Stoic paradoxes that only Tusc . IIIand IV, esp. IV43-6). Nicomachean Ethics Luc. Part III 280 131, Antiochuswhere welearn that (referred to at De fin 65 Part I But such critical observations such critical But . V32, 95), and claims that , where I argued, among, whereIargued, apatheia De fin Acad. I Acad. ( . V12-13, Luc 38the . 135; CEU eTD Collection governing principle of this). in asstudied divine of (and the teleological universe, the organisation physics large, at the nature and (c) directions); developdefinite incertain to tendencies its and constitution human the simplicity, of sake the for (including, nature human given inbuiltof our motivational inevitable make-up; and nature as (bi) specific as figures nature mere understood the senses in “nature” inthistheory: (a) which different distinguish three have to we thetheory graspof an get to appropriate order systematic way, and to draw source motivations.ultimate I wouldit Now likeof in presentmore a somewhat out some important features from the separated instrumental reason, as mere view of reason practical (“Humean”) of it. I shall arguemodern prefigures the that reason practical of a conception presume andrely on that in ofAntiochus’major thatit points andseems OldAcademictheory, suggested to prefaceof Chapter In the in happy and being happy– supremely may be as a reading viewed owing to of passages with the thesis that virtueif the Antiochean solution to the puzzle isas to how to reconcilesufficient the plurality of goods isfor aware of the Aristotelian endorsement of the contemplativehappiness life (12; cf.57, 73), and –the distinctionas we know it. This remains true even if Piso, the mouthpiece for Antiochus’ betweentheory, beingThe theory, as itis presented in under Antiochus’ guidance orwearingAntiochean glasses. e.g. read himself Cicero much whether itnotmatters thinkdo for theensuing I that source exposition, apparently as themain 66 Cf.ANNAS 2001: 122 18.n. NE I8and 10. 66 II.3 I already gave a brief and incomplete outline of the outline of incomplete abrief Ialready gave and De finibus De Chapter III.2 NE 281 V, clearly does notdraw closely on the or not. If he read it,he certainly itread NE CEU eTD Collection Aristotle. we canfindfrom But in andvirtue). details what honour differentthe arerather happiness: pleasure, constitutes differentviews what on andcontrasts happiness, with it identifies self-sufficiency, and completeness including criteria, formal its analyses hisintroducing (introduces conception of good basicthe concept of a final end, in chapters of those function possible Their isfunction ethical assuch similar(15-17). the remotely theories to shape of general the asdetermining Carneades) which are presented to attributed (also presuppositions of a set from starts it is that however, it, about interesting most already occurred in Books II and IV (and will occur in 1996: 261-270 and 302-315; ALGRA 1997; ANNAS 2001: xxiii ff; ANNAS 2007b. name comes from Piso, V16), adding that Antiochus was happy useto it. as the to referred usually preamble, “meta-ethical” kind of a with endowed is it isthat theory this of characteristics outstanding most the of One 67 aswell ( bepropounded allpossibly could which those on the positions of in aclassification ii) i) On the It is evident ( The theory of the (16) wants to attain( ( via ( 23). cf. divisio, the on based within the account of presented the assumptions the of one officially not is –this (16 it to be referred can actions our propositum sit arti ipsa a se proficisceretur Carneadea divisio ), a“modelfor allappropriate actions” ( est enim assequi vellet summum bonum ) that is external to it ( see also MADVIGe.g. 1839: 828-838; LÉVY 1992: 353-360; STRIKER perspicuum Carneadea divisio / in se versatur ) –examples:medicine – health; and navigationsteering – aship. NE ) that no art or expertise is based on, or concerned with, itself with, or concerned on, based is expertise or art no ) that I in I which Aristotle prepares groundsthe for must provide a single complete “path through life” ( life” through “path complete single a provide must summum bonum Part III 282 conformatioque omnium officium extra est extra ), but each of them has a distinct object or aim , but is clearly a key assumption inthe elimination ), that itcomprehends ( that have been propounded and propounded been have that ibid Tusculans .), versions of which have which of versions .), Carneadea divisio V). What I find coprehenditur ), such that each of 67 It consists , (the , ) and vitae CEU eTD Collection This standard is “morality” is “morality” ( standard This the only aspect of the Stoic view emphasised is that as a standard it is it as astandard is that view emphasised of Stoic the only the aspect consists in an overall rational in “consistency” itsorder, activity.But hereorganising actions towards the attainment of the things that are in accordance with nature, with are in that things of accordance the attainment the towards actions the attainment of the basic objects of pursuit: morality consists in “aiming all one’s The Stoics, however, introduce a further complication (19-20): they emphasise that The natural conclusion drawn from these assumptions is that assumptions these from drawn conclusion natural The ix) viii) vii) v) vi) iv) iii) one of these objects, or perhaps a combination of these, constitutes the constitutes of these, combination a perhaps or objects, these of one Thus “every appropriate action of either pursuit or avoidance must have reference to some or some to reference have must avoidance or pursuit of either action appropriate “every Thus This is the natural object of desire from birth ( This object This “It is almost universally agreed that what prudence is concerned with and wants to attain must “Similarly, prudence is the art of living, and it is necessary that it too has as its basis and doing its job well. attainment of the object(s) atwhichit is directed prudence, praeter haec tria possit esse triapossit haec praeter ( three these outside be anything cannot It virtues). ofthe sparks the are functioning senses, strength, beauty, andthe mental attributes that arewell- analogoushealth, good with body, these ofthe parts and of the preservation sound (i.e. nature” with accordance referri ( of these” other ϳΕΐχΑ naturae esse oportere et tale, ut ipsum per se invitaret et alliceret appetitum animi, quem inter omnesid, quo in prudentia versaretur et quodassequi vellet,aptum etaccommodatum and is capable of arousing the soul’s desire –which the Greeks call Greeks the –which desire soul’s the arousing of capable is and be something that is well suited andadapted to our nature, and such that isattractiveitself in profectam starting point something external” ( ). (18) Graeci vocant… ). (16) qua must be the excellence of reason, establishes for itself a standard that is distinct from the from distinct is that standard a itself for establishes of reason, excellence the necesse estomnino officium aut fugiendisequendi aut adeorumaliquid either (a) pleasure, or (b) the absence of pain or (c) the “primary things in ). (17; cf. 23) ). (18) honestum necesse esteamquoquealiqua constitutam reesse ab et Chapter III.2 ); as we have seen in 283 a natura in primo ortu appetatur qua anart; namely, astandard pertaining to horm De finibus summum bonum nec quicquam omnino nec Ɲ ( constitit autem fere autem constitit ). (17) distinct III(21), it . from CEU eTD Collection primary natural objects) intelligible and convincing. and intelligible objects) natural primary that is tomakethat Oldsupposed the Academic hisis (24ff). proper “Old to of It presentation Academic” this theory the elaboration turn now he can that so on, later presented be will and/or books earlier from familiar elimination of all options hints other (21-23),through the toarguments thatmay be toaprecursory resorts Piso elucidation. later Presently Piso’s But this isanticipating constitute our constitute Thatis, is morality includedactually among the natural of objects desire that things” (21).As itgradually later,turns out is this because summum bonum morality is that conclusion, accept latter (20). Importantly,however, Antiochus’ Old Academics, though they do notaccept the The Stoics also claim that this is held). thebeen morality is to aim all one’s actions on pleasure/absence from pain…etc. has never view that the emphasises, from (asCicero category (vi) above (c) denote nature” with whether or wenot actuallyobtainthem (3) (2) (1) 60, 64, 69; cf. e.g. IV 18). 41, 48, 59-60); and indeed, it is the most important part, as the rational soul is ourmost valuable constituent (cf. 38, (24, 34, 36, 37 etc.); thus constituent parts (whichconstitute class (c) in (vi) above in general), including the rational soul morality virtue, qua the perfection of the rational soul, is a part of our of part a is soul, rational the of perfection the qua virtue, they believe that our natural objects of desire include the preservation denotes the practical aspect of virtue at large as it is manifested or fulfilled in action (58, summum bonum consists in consists a combination morality of natural and “the primary (and far surpasses them in worth). only ” (cf. 19, 20). Here “the20). things” (cf. inaccordance 19, Part III 284 thing desirable and good in its thing desirable good and own right a good: they endorse the view that the that view the endorse they good: summum bonum summum bonum and perfection (morality plus the (36,37etc.)– of our all CEU eTD Collection plausible. more much something that isclear substantialit evident, and basic are above (i)–(vii) assumptions that AntiochusandCicero, with if assume, we thishere, isamereclaim; presented wouldinoutsideit”. view rather But of framework or (i) (ii),whole and the conceptual be sought not art, the neededwithin is contained art, the of performance the namely end, “the from medicinenavigation, or is claims and that acting more similar to anddancing,where the Stoic to make their dissent even has intrinsic value, which simply means that as a practical object it is –to use an use is –to it object a practical as that means simply which value, intrinsic has that object atan aim ultimately must an art qua prudence is that place in thefirst here add outsideWhatPiso to seems by factors and competence. control their determined branches attain ofinstrumental devisedandemployed thatare to knowledge ends are arts The self-explanatory. is almost partof claim the The latter soul’s desire”. the nature”, and and iscapableof initself toour “attractive arousing suited and adapted must quaanartis towhich bean objects issubordinated “thatprudence well object Now I would like to focus on thedesire? move presented in (iv)IV 26(cf. howand have 19): yourestof abandonedthe where natural the of objects above: the claim Book that has raised at question Cicero theAntiochean provokes moveStoics’ reasonably the the Stoic position on the the Stoic position. Stoic the divisio the with in connection noticed is often what out point to like would I First, chapter. that to references bibliographical the with together LS, in 64 Ch. cf. criticisms; Carneades’ counter 69 6. 68 Itis widely thought that the comparisonwith acting and dancing indeed reflects alater attempt to Cf.ALGRA 1997: 122-3 and 41,n. with reference to Carlos Lévy’s suggestionat LÉVY 1992: 355- as presented here: that it is apparently constructed withitisundermining ashere: apparently thatpresented constructed a viewto 69 Within by presented framework interpretive the the 68 For example, at example, For summum bonum De finibus Chapter III.2 285 , contrasts wisdom with the arts like arts the with wisdom , contrasts III 24 Cato, in an attempt to elucidateinto attempt 24 Cato, an III Carneadea divisio Carneadea the CEU eTD Collection similar to similarfor Chrysippanthe to argument without nottheory) ingenuity.30) is argument of and (28, structure core the The ethical explicit on sources ancient surviving in the argument similar no of know rate This “demonstration” seems to me to be both peculiar needs,to and desires (24). conduct Antiochus’ theoryits determines (I that at emotion anyfundamental this is it and birth, from itself loves creature “demonstration” Antiochus’ thatof startingevery the accountproper: point of living a is It account. Antiochus’ of thrust argumentative main the conveys section this seems Is that 24-34. at passage, rather clearlyina later out heremind comes Piso’s repeated at 23, cf. 24) is concerned, Itend to think that the notion of “nature” that is in Now as for the former condition allreason at inform could influence that it). or ( present impulsetobe is desire or the implication: inquestion a“natural” supposed desire bring itthis with to (v) seems assumption next the Moreover, one. “rational” called a rightly is in impulse therefore desirequestion the or itssuch that direction determine reason that would have the power or authority to control this desire or impulse, i.e. to of application practical possible canbeno there prudence andabove over assume that independently from assuch inrationality follow general. Butthis seemsto if we arises impulse or desire this that explicitly (iv) in said not is It impulse. or desire motivating is fact, this a usbyarousing because, asamatter of of object capable “impulse”. Prudence has or determines thisend:“thesoul’s this object desire” else ( Aristotelian indistinction– pursued NE from birth from I7,1097a25ff: (which means that this desire is present already before we have we before already is present desire this that means (which kath’ hauto its own right own its aptum accomodatumquenaturae ). But he also names the mental factor which Part III 286 oikei ǀ sis rather than for the sake ofsomething from from atDiogenes nature cosmic , an phraseodd , an CEU eTD Collection Chapter motivation. motivation fundamental: not but it derivesfrom it, every derive from does any other as (d), IunderstandPoint thatour self-loveit, basic isabsolutely establishes and intuitive level in the reasoning: the claim that self-love is the ultimate source for every for source is self-love ultimate the claim the that level in thereasoning: intuitive haut ( 71 interest. own their misjudged having for themselves two of them. it in firstLaertius thateliminates andthen poses VII85, possibilities, exclusive three ( arbitrantur what theycases, people Piso awayargues, carried are by grief,orrage; without passion but exception they do do 70 in the belief they are acting in their own best interest ( philei mihi sic usus est,opus est mihi sic facto, fac ut tibi c) d) b) a) This point is a close echo of what Aristotle says at In28-29 Piso deals with apparent empirical counter-examples like suicide or self-torment. Insuch ǀ (i) agathon around”. (30) around”. “it is for the sake of ourselves ( from them. But inthe case of self-love this would be just “unintelligible”: it is just obvious that account inbook I,esp.42ff) thatthese cherishedare only for thesake of pleasures the that result duty and virtue; it is at least intelligible to assume (as the Epicurean actually does, cf. Torquatus’ friendship, as such objects, ofother case the in sense make least at would suggests, Piso This, quampiam the soul were abolished” ( abolished” were soul the with respect of the state it itself is in (be it in need of something, painetc.), “then all impulses of ( indifference” But neithercan it be the case that the animal “finds its owncondition to be a matterof emotion (“love-power”, emotion Finally, itwould also be “the height of absurdity” to think that we do love ourselves but this (28) self-hating being–, and so would love itself and hate itself at the same time, which isimpossible. sake” ( whichaims atsomething harmful to it ( concurrent contrariae oderit But we cannot even consistently conceive ( Every living being either loves itself or hates itself or isindifferent to itself. ) the good or pleasure, one loves it not it loves one pleasure, or good ) the III.3 70 ); they would declare unhesitatingly “this is right forme; whateveryou need to do, do” ). The very notion of such a creature, Piso points out, is self-contradictory ( self-contradictory is out, points Piso creature, a of such notion very The ). sua causafaciet . 71 This point also makes it clear that we are still at a very elemental and referatur ) (cf. 1166a19-20: quo modosesua censet habeat,nihil interesse ), suchas pleasure, “not and towards the personmaintaining the self-love”. ): acting out of self-hatred –that is motivated by an impulse ( ) –thatis perhaps, vis diligendi tolletur enim appetitus animi propter nos hekastosheaut de ) is “essentially referred to some other object” ( object” other some to referred “essentially ) is Chapter III.2 simpliciter sibi inimicus ), and retrospectively they feel regret, reproaching regret, feel they retrospectively and ), respecting 287 ) that we love ( intellegi aut cogitari NE , but ǀ (i) bouletai tagatha VIII2,1155b21-26: thatwhetherone loves )–, this creature would still act “forits own its ownperceived interest ordesire ). (30) rather the rather the good orpleasant diligimus ); if animalan would be indifferent ) animalan that hated itself ( ) pleasure, not the other way se optimesibiconsulere ); cf. my discussionin for oneself for ad aliam rem appetitus res enim qua ( se a to ) CEU eTD Collection being mere poetry. But on the other hand it also shows that as far as the basic the as far as that shows also it hand other the on But poetry. mere being 59; his speech(e.g.42-43,cf.II45-46, IV12),and e.g. from showsthat this isfar that of the Ciceros of Books I-II and III-IV, to impersonate nature at certain points of On the one hand, this passage explains whythemselves. is it that love people makes that Piso attraction natural ofthe consequence a haseveryone, in innate is nature a tendency, similarseek to theto right quite been have foundationauthorities greatest our Hence self. very one’s lose can one than interest own of the one’s to conducive is what for desire supreme one’s lose more canno one way, Either difference. no makes It good in nature,they will. Whenever and I speak toof human “nature”hold they thatmayby, take sheme to herself be referringthe wouldto thedesire human be person.unable to to foragree survive.with the view that the whole systemwhat is regulated But by nature, on I the groundsam that, happy if natureis stood suitedfor those distributionof an opposingto of the sense-organsview to thinkand the asarrangementthat of grows the limbs from thedoes ground for animals.is kept secure On this by issuebark andI tendroots,by some which performgreat theand same divine function thatcause. the Orvirtually maybe it isthe justsame have plants and fortuitous. Trees nature.world? animal the of whole the even or Somerace human the of Atspeak just distinguished Why any rate we can thinkers see how haveeverything held that this power is bestowed on them This last point is made explicit and strongly reinforced a bit later, at 33: analyzenatural concepts. one’sown or reflect on hasto onesimply teleology; belong). In order to accept this conclusion one does not have to assume e.g. cosmic the backgroundthe of assumptions the which to certainty intuitive and opinion common of ground firm relatively same the motivation is one that even the hedonist is supposed to accept. We are, that is, still on 72 naturae, qua se ipsi diligunt. naturam accommodatarum ingeneratum putaverunt omnibus, quiacontinentur ea commendatione igitur gravissimi philosophi summi initium boni anatura petiverunt etillumappetitum rerumad poterita se quisque discedere quamappetitum earum rerum, quaesibi conducant, amittere. iure intellegant,si quando naturamhominis dicam, hominemdicere hocdiffert. me;nihilenim namprius ipsa esse non possit, tamen concedo, ut, quide hocdissentiunt, existiment, quod velint, acvel hoc quidem de requamquam assentior iis, quihaecomnia regi naturaputant, quaesi natura neglegat, servari,quod contingit animalibus sensuum distributione et quadam compactione membrorum.Qua ingenuit, sivehocitafit fortuito, videmusea,quae terra gignit, corticibusradicibus et valida natura sit? sive enim,ut doctissimis viris visum est,maior aliqua causa atque divinior hanc vim De hominumgenereomninoanimalium aut de loquor, cum arborum eadem etstirpium paene 72 Carneadea divisio Part III 288 also belong (or are thought to thought are (or belong also CEU eTD Collection think that the basic desires springing from self-love are just as constant and unvarying from may it as necessarily spring seemnatural self-love unvarying source, their to to be meant to facilitate the appreciation of this point (if the natural desires all inevitable of source self-lovenecessary the as from our spring motivations these that his argument Moreover, desires. (“natural”) bonum we do: we all agree that the weallour the agreethat we do: “natural”, i.e.we have them “natural”, simply taken to be a deep fact about us that we have some motivations that are as we intuitively agree as weintuitively Why desideret desires”, nature that things the desires are satisfiedalso (cf.IV57: happylifeis the one “iswhich filled up with all bonum happiness outat23, pointed impliesdeclaresAs Piso tranquillity. at44,the asit is from factthat, alsothe may beunderstood This of these. satisfaction seek the and practical reason (on assumptions (i)-(vii)) has no other functionsaying that or role it is thanmore than imply any not does nature”, to accommodated and “suitedto or “natural” In the light of the irrelevant. deliberately are quite nature above passage, to say that a desire (or need or “impulse”) is conception of our conception of 19. 73 The significance of the passage has been rightly pointed out by David Sedley,SEDLEY 2002: 50, n. things are in this way is thingsarein this atthisitway is butunclear point; very not aslong important that consistsin satisfaction of basic overall the true, our inevitable and is located at the “stopping point”, where “nature rests” whenis where at rests” “nature natural “stoppingthe all located point”, our ; see further IV 32). IV ; see further an inevitable given an inevitable summum bonum that they are in this way; and Antiochus seems to assume that assume to seems Antiochus and way; in this are they ab ovo happiness depends on the acquisition of the of acquisition the on depends happiness quae expleta sit omnibus iis rebus quas natura quas sit omnibusiisrebus quae expleta is concerned, his metaphysical views on universal on views metaphysical his concerned, is and they and they cannot bedoneaway eliminated, with or that the ethical theory must accommodate. It is It accommodate. must ethical theory the that Chapter III.2 73 289 any kind of motivation any kindof whatever seems whatever summum summum CEU eTD Collection children); anothersuch characteristics is that friends are eagerto spend theirtime with theirfriends. to friendship that can be derived from the characteristics of characteristics the from be derived can that friendship intrinsic value means that we desire to enjoy the enjoy to we desire that means value intrinsic us foreverwith considered(206eff). evidentanis here truththatto It love desire something that and has compelling. indeed intelligible, intuitively fulfilpreserve becomes to ourselves and to ideawe aremotivated that the by act self-love to we aremotivated that recognized oncewehave motivation; words– that this is actually entailed by the notion of self-love as the ultimate source of manystate inso this not hedoes –although tothinkreaction But Piso seems (31). developed conceptionfearin infants situations which threaten and lackandwith animals death; a who beby supported considerations:empirical for example, we all experience inevitable of death (either in Thisare in conclusion can (c) with primary nature). that (vi): the accordance things true or false) show pretty much the same More self. importantly, precious accordingof my to Aristotle preservation the ( for care a entail to seem reasonably may turn in this and forever, analysis, ifthe primary objectof my love is me myself, this entails that Iwant to be with myself constitute that components the of perfection and preservation the i.e. andself-perfection, motivations atself-preservation primary aim our insight that ofmotivationsource is indubitable, virtually on rightthe analysisit the supports for Antiochus seems tothese natural motivationsthink consistin. But the answer to this latter question is very thatnear: while the of objects the yetit been establishedwhat has not this however, point importantly, at assumption self-love; from of derive all desires self-love “natural” our then, analysis, Antiochus’ On as the ultimate is weareconstituted. how really that this accepting for necessary not is it point, the of understanding our enrich may nature universal as self-love itself). Thus, while a complex theory of the teleological working of the reasonably think that may there Antiochus is an intuitive37. at link betweenelucidated turn in self-loveis self-preservation.and self-perfection and Forexample, self-preservation in between link conceptual 74 The conceptual link between self-love and self-preservation is clearly assumed at V 31; the V 31; at assumed clearly is self-preservation and self-love between link conceptual The exist Symposium and live Plato presents an analysis of analysis an presents Plato for the friends’ own sake (this, as Aristotle adds, is how mothers feel towards their 74 NE er IX 4, 1166a1-2) of one defining the characteristics of ǀ Part III s 290 , according to which it is the desire to have the good enduring presence philia to oneself is thatone wishes the friend of that thing. Accepting this us (that is(that category CEU eTD Collection Antiochus’ case the self-realisationist answer to the question concerning the concerning thequestion answer to self-realisationist the Antiochus’ case broadly the thatis,etc.), 146-7 theend in self-perfection atheory specifying or asself-realization way Aristotle’s1979: in(cf. theory content its WHITE a“self-realisationist” iscalled alsorightly theoryJulia Annas(ANNAS 1993:Ch. 6)rightly called it,it is an“intuitive theory”; which does. We have to add here, however, that in largely theory of the I think that bynowwehave viewa pretty Antiochus’good of overallstrategy. His (44; cf. IV 11-12); so universal nature too does have a relevance to ethics, after all. (24, 42)–which asitdoes, later, turns out involve aninquiry intonature as a whole inquiry and reflection rational of matter a as gradually, is acquired it that emphasises supposed to flesh out the outline of our basic concept of the (cf. 34ff). isthe 24-27, rich and This instructivehuman nature notion is that of are naturally inclined tofindit our most precious component; and soon forthand so we dominate behaviour,that ideally is our it to comes that such rational part naturally faculty; soul hasarational or of aresuch andsuch; our thatthat our part which consistin components, soul two and body, excellent the or perfectly developed state ashumans, knowledgespecific nature fact includes the graspingthe we of that which makeup, whichis found foundational).“Nature” in this third senseis commonour redundant, andnature deepfact quathe about orientation our psychological or (over andPiso’s account nature,which above universal farthus has been found in “nature” use notion the this itAt of brings of a third any conclusion with rate, ethical thought see my discussionbelow and Chapter takes rejoice inone’s own company. For the relevance of Aristotle’s conception of From these it obviously follows that one who is a friend of oneself wishes oneself to live and exist, and autonomous summum bonum way; that is, independently from Antiochus’ theory of nature. As nature. of theory Antiochus’ from independently is, that way; is one that is consciously developed and presented in a in presented and developed is consciously that one is Chapter III.2 291 III.3 . summum bonum philia to Aristotle’s , and Piso telos of CEU eTD Collection shall to inreturn this point Chapter –I provenance Aristotelian an have does which self-love, of notion the with operates what wefindin Aristotle (although itiswithout not significance that this reasoning from different is rather that reasoning a through this does but life, human of end the about conclusion is Aristotelian reaches a broadly a bycontrast, that theory theory, teleologistlike Epicurus would not accept a word of that argument. Antiochus’ seems to be rather different from Aristotle’s conception, and closely resembles the resembles closely and conception, Aristotle’s from different be rather seems to nature of structure teleological of the Academic” conception “Old Antiochus’ that addition to this we mayalsoadd firmly (In has been established. outline theory of the general after the later stage, a enter thepicture only at nature notionsof these but requires this human ustodelvenature nature teleological the into atlarge;working of end as the overall fulfilment final our heof nature; describes human conception a Aristotelian or broadly appeal to this nature, and he indicates that the proper grasp of hisfirst outline question ownanswertothe concerning of the the in advancing presents himself Aristotle argument is the this that clear is quite it controversial issue (though the majority view seems to be that itdoes). be that view to seems majority the issue (though controversial implicit) appeal Aristotle’swithin ethics to “function argument” in argument” “function famous the whether question The adherence. claims Antiochus which to theory Aristotelian with the in theory respect this Antiochus’ compare is to It worthwhile work. in to in order of particular nature human large or any life of human views doesnot presuppose about at the nature structure teleological responses by John Cooper’s (COOPER 1999 (=1996): 432-3) andBrad Inwood (INWOOD 1995: 652). 76 75 Julia Annas (ANNAS 1993: Ch. 4, esp. n. 3 onp. 142) represents an important minority view; cf. Cf. STRIKER the 1996: 284-289, who speaks of an “argument from perfection”. Nicomachean Ethics III.3 Part III 292 ). To frequently ). does beAntiochus sure, his I 7 does involve a substantial (though conception of natural teleology is a 75 telos , and that an anti- an that and , 76 At any rate, CEU eTD Collection For every practical purpose, this may have actually meant that Antiochus eventually meantthat have thisactually may every purpose, For practical Stoichecriticism, virtuallyadopted 97; epistemology (67, 69, 113, 130,132,143-4). hostile (70);on was possible Cicero’s and assent apprehension dogmatic view that majority the to succumbed he simply (69) havestudents hisown to heafter started intimates that Cicero (cf. had longer” one no 63). them studied that acknowledged 69, he “studied with Philo the very views I am defending for so long that it was at outpoints As Cicero sceptic. Academic aleading himself was Antiochus sentiments he him broughtwith from Academy.the intoBefore turning adogmatic and views to debt in been have may phenomena, ethical evident on focussing by way, Importantly, Antiochus’ self-conscious attempt to ground ethics in an autonomous issue” in philosophy. regard itas a“principal not he but did happy); and actuallybecome wise is(that to project ethical accomplish the to knowledge fieldof ithe a necessary found namely, ethics – to large relevant at nature of study the considered Antiochus seen, we have secure about the starting points from which we derive the end in ethics ( ethics in the end wederive from which points starting the secure about the “governing ( the rule” subordinated in importance to the latter: it comes first for the reason that it provides end, thatAntiochus passage the and suggests actually formerregarded the question as principal and criterion ethical the issuesin are truth philosophy29) that thetwo of This view isfurther fortified byAntiochus’ own by claim (reported Cicero at my discussion below). see agency; nature” rational “cosmicas adivine with operates that Stoic conception for no other purpose than for the differentiation of good and evil (Plutarch, evil and of good differentiation the for than purpose other no for transformed by Hellenisticthe schools (cf. e.g. Chrysippus’ claim that the study of physics is taken up centrality of ethics within philosophy was part of the Socratic legacy, variously adapted and 77 OnAntiochus’conceptionof philosophy see BARNES81ff. 1989: Notably, primacy The or regula ) to all ) to enquiry, philosophical and thusit neededis be to Chapter III.2 293 De Stoic. rep. 1035D). ibid. Lucullus Lucullus ). 77 As CEU eTD Collection positions. to them,but only for the sake of argument, in an attempt toundermine other dogmatic divisio widely shared ideas,and himself who often argued –presumably hisalso starting form as it is presented in 80 79 awife”. has bachelor “no kind of the truths analytic example for then “apprehensible”, “persuasive”, though“unimpeded”and therefore “conspicuous”.And if suchare truths texts) mayjointly with anextensive reading of experience, Plato’sthis Aristotle’sand have unintelligible; writings or (as wellinconceivable asother often is view Old Academic contrary the where truths, mathematical persuadedpromising examples that may Antiochus inspired have in making this move of are courselogical and Antiochus that it was wrong to insist that such evident truths are only withCharles Brittain’s notes apprehensibility ona distinguishingdepends mark isrecurrentthe in STRIKER 1997. The interpretationof the Stoic epistemological position according to which “perspicuity”. widely shared –orthathis could opponents beaccept forced to in virtue of their infoundnatural it tobe that successfulorder he startfrom hadto thatwere principles have may he position ethical own his endorse and establish to wanted he when Thus or refutation. argument of pointisan starting asthe agreedupon” “what always takes dialectical a to accustomed had been Antiochus NewAcademy of the asamember Moreover, of inapprehensibility. thesis their to stick to reason sufficient no have jut Academics the and apprehensible, impressions such is, that impressions; false from distinguished certainty with be can they that such possibility, opposite aconceivable of absence the namely, (cf. unimpeded” “persuasive and or impressionsthe called“perspicuous” decided Academics that themselves the that unfolds in Cicero’sunfolds in 78 Cf. Cf.again For this point see esp. Luc – in favour of certain ethical positions –not because he actually was committed because heactually –not inof – favourcertain positions ethical . 131; 139; 80 Luc approach to philosophical debates in general; that is, ingeneral; philosophical an that that approach to debates . 44. 79 Todo so he only had to follow Carneades’ procedure, whose Lucullus De fin mutatis mutandis Luc De finibus 78 . V 50. . 44. For aconcise but instructive account of Antiochus’ epistemology as it and ad loc Academica V, laid great stress on starting from V,laid starting greatstress on perspicuous and from . (esp.BRITTAIN 47). 2006: 22,most n. The evident and many other impressions can also be regarded as apprehensible, as beregarded also can impressions other many Luc . 33-4) do, afterall,have adistinguishing mark, . 33-4)do, see BARNES 1995:83-5;see furtherTARRANT 1985, Part III 294 Lucullus : cf. esp. 33-36, together: cf. 33-36, esp. divisio are , CEU eTD Collection relevant tothe part of the ethical theory where the Stoics and the Peripatetics agree, as be may physics while that, thought have may Antiochus Thus nature”. and intellect “on the he central the question universe byadivine agreedthat the wasgoverned conception of the fifth element and insisted on the corporeal nature of the soul; but on at physics the Stoics did for the most part adopt the “Old Academic” theory as presented in inpartly thathis lies this questiontheir conviction answerto issue? Ithink that the metaphysical dowith hadnothing views he this that to wasapparently persuaded Whyis itthat issuewithin ethics? central the considered apparently which Antiochus What about the Stoic–Peripatetic debate on the composition of the of thecomposition on debate Stoic–Peripatetic the about What puts on physical in views better. his ethics, the (metaphysical) esp. (cf. life good the to irrelevant be would still they knowable, were matters such if even that, ground the on physics of study of the rejection famous Socrates’ on were keen (especially when philosophical arguingforthey were own stance); indeed, their they fond werethis of humanreason. for sceptics impenetrable emphasising The Academic “hidden”and wereespecially in physics discussed subjects the commonplace that philosophical old the by influenced been have also may he however, this, to addition accept metaphysical those viewshavebeen refuted not on some In grounds. other ethical viewsof (such as opponents possible those Epicureans)the whonot would introducing asubstantial appeal to anymetaphysical viewsin histheory as long asthe Arguably, theory-buildingAntiochussuch from couldapproach prevent a general to Academica Luc . 122-3; I24-29(cf. 39and Acad . I 15). Thus Antiochus may have thought that the less weight he weight less the that thought have may Antiochus Thus I 15). . Chapter III.2 De finibus 295 IV12):Zenorejected Aristotle’s summum bonum , CEU eTD Collection happiness, does away with the basic demand that an ethical theory ought to provide to ought theory an ethical demandthat basic the away with happiness, does withvirtue beyond andviceisindifferentseriously everything to that respect either their into positionthe theory collapses toAristo, attributed which, takingit too dilemma: unwelcome an face Stoics the that means actually charge this IV), Book fin Carneades (cf. again back to goes actually theory– Academic) (Old Peripatetic the Antiochus applied against the Stoics which argument core the Cicero to according that seen have–that repeatedly Again, we the Stoic theory was a verbal variation on (LS 64C)). predominating with things which nature” (cf.accord Plutarch, obtainingview the a to continuously andundeviatingly inwith power one’s whichthe according76.9-15), to StobaeusII, (at Antipater we actually obtain them” is reminiscent of the specification of of the specification of the is them” reminiscent obtain we actually one’s actions on attaining the things that are in accordance with nature, whether or not 20 that the Stoics identify the identify Stoics the that 20 and I have pointed out that this that out pointed have I and we inhave seen, his Antiochusethics apply” “washappy to the As andDiogenes. Antipater his with contemporaries Stoic ethical debates Carneades’ concerning Academictradition in by particular the Academic and upbringing, Moreover, Antiochus’ perception of Stoic may ethics havetoo been influenced byhis undermining the Stoic position. To this we can add that the claim the at that add can this we To position. Stoic the undermining thisintouched point Section (the point debated far asthe seminal article, SEDLEY 2002. 81 On the possible origins of Antiochus’ Stoic-like physics in the Old Academy see David Sedley’s . III41; Tusc . V83ff,On 120). Antiochus’interpretation (as reflected in II.4.2.6 summum bonum summum bonum divisio ). 81 seems to be devised with a specific view to Part III 296 ) is concerned, it must be irrelevant, (I irrelevant, be must it concerned, is) with “morality”, with defined as“aiming all telos Comm. not is“to doeverything Carneadea divisio telos De finibus attributed attributed to . 1070Fff De finibus V19- De , CEU eTD Collection demand that the theory of the the away with do theStoics that of charge the another version represent seems to ends instead 22).This of two Stoics(III one objection introduce objection the that archer simile) evokes doeverything “toDiogenes’ in one’s power”formula. Indeed, is,it(that may be Carneadean); andresponse to Cato’s charge(involvingthe afamous of good reputation is merely instrumental. Chrysippus and Diogenes were led by Carneades’ attacks to abandon theorthodox view the valuethat 57, togetherwith Diogenes, and at 67). At 57 Cato reports that some unnamed successors of of Stoic ethics in of ethics Stoic presentation in Cato’s reflected areapparently developments andrelated these In fact, indifferents. the with dealing in guidance provides position Stoic the whether about doubts dissolve to meant were pro (III 33,49 57)and –by contrast, herefers to Zeno only once (at 51-52,asoriginatorof term the 83 translation of Chrysippus’ 2.6.9; at (Stobaeus areand“reasoning in in that well things nature” selecting the with accordance things contrary to nature” (Antipater, Stobaeus, (Antipater, nature” to things contrary as “to live and within selecting continuously nature the things accordance deselecting in the“livingin interpreting with nature”agreement formula) specified they the Stoic (presumably have when ethics, given to appearto Antipater andDiogenes slant sitsecondwell with isviable.But thisthe of specific seemsto kind option criticism satisfy the hasbeen longprovidingof guidance) only discarded, demand practical the Academic) view; andclaim since that the only view virtue of inradical to reconcile the or, attemptan (i) above); assumption (cf. guidance practical Aristois good with(and thatany demand,other theory collapses that into does the notPeripatetic (Old orthodoxy. The notionof selectionoccurred already Chrysippus’in ethical treatises; cf. Epictetus, 82 The notionof selectionfirst occurs atIII 20. Notably, Catorefers to Diogenes three times by name It is now widely Itis Diogenes that agreed andAntipaterdid notdiversion a represent from Chrysippan Ɲ gmenon De fin ; forthe same attributioncf. Stob. ibid . III 31 the notionof selectionis closely juxtaposed withwhat seems to be the Latin ., c.f. also II,83.10-84.2; DL VII 88). De finibus telos -formula; see further the discussionLS Ch. in 64. III. 83 summum bonum Of particular significance is Cato’s awareness of the Chapter III.2 Ecl. 297 II 84,18-85,11), and only twice to Chrysippus (at ought to provide ought to practical guidance ibid 82 .; also invoked.; also at Apparently, these specifications these Apparently, De fin . III 31) . III telos Diss . CEU eTD Collection interpretationincan see Antiochus mayhave that for his writings furtherPanaetius’ found support and criticismfrom Antiochus’ point of view, into the direction of the Old Academic theory. So we of dedomenas h Stoic ethics; and it is not unlikely that Panaetius’ be “living in accordance with the tendencies bestowed on ( us bynature” on bestowed tendencies the with in beaccordance “living (Clement betweenCarneades and Antipater. put in the forefront: in the put 79), and did not claim that pain was not an evil (at least in the work that Antiochus Panaetius frequently referred to Plato, Aristotle, and other Old Academics ( Old Aristotle, andother Plato, to frequently referred Panaetius theory. Stoic of the hisof criticism of rightness the admission itas anindirect present and view he could because Antiochus to significance specific of been have may Further, we have already seen (in seen we have(in Chapter already Further, cosmic in appeal nature connection. this to any significant of knew nothing goes, this tradition meagre evidence And as farour were rooted. version Academic Old preferable the and on Stoicflaws theory of concerning the certainly importantan partof intellectual the background in Antiochus’which views was of this debate Academic tradition the see that be,wecan may howeverBut this attack. Carneades’ to rejoinder Antipater’s part of with simile, was the together definition, other Antipater’ and that selection-formulae, the attack to itused Carneades, who to back goes objection ends” “two the that italthough is aredifficult detailsthe to reconstruct, debate of the nowwidely agreed 84 Cf.LS 64; e.g. Miscellanies Ɲ min ek phuse min ek De fin. De fin III22iscited there togetherwith 2.21.129.4-5) we also know that Panaetius end that the wealsoknow declared to 2.21.129.4-5) . IV 23; cf.however ǀ s aphormas Part III ). This may also seem to suggest a reversal, suggest to seem also may This ). 298 I.5 ) that Panaetius’ version ofStoic ethics version Panaetius’ ) that De off 84 De fin De . II 51). But from another source . V 16-20 as evidence on the debate to z De fin Ɲ n katata . IV CEU eTD Collection position on the on position treatises (e.g.byChrysippus) laid which particular stress, in establishing Stoicthe ethical Stoic ifhe some earlier even read that tounderstand Antiochus’ of approach picture enough good a have we now by that think I been, have may this however But theme at theme leading for therecurrence a of background (cf. Roman e.g. intellectual statesman this Murena Before everything else we should take notice that Cicero has always (i.e. from the inblind-spot his perception Stoicof ethics as regards the relevance of cosmic nature. hisand may have a of ethics, why simply this created Stoic interpretation adopted have may he why attractive, singularly ethics Academic Old Antiochus’ found have Moreover, Ithink that we are now in the right position understandto why Cicero may happiness, the role of prudence in the happy life, and so on. pertainphenomena is tothe subject; ordinary ethical intuitions about that that basis the perspicuous in isolation,the on of debate Stoic-Peripatetic the consider happinessfor isself-sufficient virtue that theses Stoic controversial the to considerations becauseand assumptions such of relevance possible the recognise, alone let theconsider, to even fine is theVII 85ff inand by quotations Chrysippus preservedby hewasPlutarch), prepared not only goodin by DL evidence the underwritten ethics, Stoic of interpretations by “cosmic” the etc. Rather, he was conditioned to on the on hisethical also writings underwrote as far opinion theStoic–Peripatetic that as debate doctrines. the leading Stoics inAthens inAntiochus’ time, (cf. 85 Relevant to pointthis is discussionthe by WHITE1979: 70-71. AsforMnesarchus and Dardanus, summum bonum onwards) held that the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition offered a more suitable a offered tradition Platonic-Aristotelian the heldthat onwards) De fin telos . IV 61). For one thing, these schools represented and taught a much a and taught one For schools represented these 61).thing, . IV and happiness, on cosmic nature (which is the assumption shared (which is cosmic assumption nature happiness, the on and was concerned, physics was quite irrelevant. Chapter III.2 299 Luc . 69), we know near to nothing of their 85 Pro CEU eTD Collection philosophy philosophy fashionable.was rather them. to givejustice to seemed whole the indeedon competing), were elite of this members the favour whose for public general the of and elite governing the of (both sentiments Roman traditional with conflicts such avoided that a way in system ethical his present favour win hardly could which etc. itself for superiority Roman of idea them the and nationalism in Rome. authority, wealth,luxury, power, citizenship, Roman andpolitical legalinstitutions, prestige, honour, to responses Roman normal of unsatisfactoriness the say about to proem Antiochean Piso says, in an Aristotelian spirit, that the wise seek the virtues with nature’s guidance, nature’s with virtues the seek wise the that spirit, Aristotelian an in says, Piso Antiochean also made considerable progress in the field of political theory. political of field in the progress considerable made also inparticular Peripatetics Butthe training). oratorical best offeredthe and Peripatetics 88 patriotism. Cf. further e.g. POWELL 1995: 23ff; GRIFFIN 1989: 7. approval of his audience: magnanimity, self-control, death, the aspects of virtue, the immortal godsproblematic and Stoic tenets in his public speeches, but rather resorted himself to topics that met the again again e.g. Roman values, institutions, norms beliefsconstituted and that the “commonmostvenerable of the considered namelythetraditional stock opinions”, to what Cicero as by Antiochus) wascloser (as championed ethical tradition Academic–early Peripatetic politician and orator, but perhaps also as a true Roman patriot, Roman audience. Even Cato, as Cicero intimates at intimates Cicero as Cato, Even audience. Roman and Posidonius’ attempts to give a slant to Stoic ethics that renders it more tolerable inthe eyes of their 87 dismissive view of Stoic political theory, see further Chapter cultural other wastraditions itself apart of the e.g. cf. threadbare, was rather style Stoic holds the constantly that (Cicero of eloquence tradition more agreeable 86 Cf. forexample the bow towards ordinary aristocratic sentiments at The unfavourable Roman perception of Stoicism is reflected also in our information of Panaetius’ information our in also reflected is of Stoicism perception Roman unfavourable The Cf. e.g. 88 .). As it clearly comes out from Cicero’s various remarks, the Stoics had much had Stoics the remarks, various Cicero’s from out comes clearly it As .). It is far from being surprising that at the time Cicero wrote Antiochus’ wrote at thetimeisfrom beingsurprising that Cicero far It De leg Parad . III16; Cicero was not satisfiedwith Plato’s approachto political theory, and had a . proem ; the conviction that the Roman thatthe ; the conviction 87 On the other hand, Antiochus apparently was able to able was apparently Antiochus hand, other Onthe Parad 89 . proem Part III 300 ., Parad De fin mos maiorum . I.5 proem , . IV 78, and that the Academics the 78,andthat . IV esp. n.164. mos maiorum . 3,avoidedopenly endorsing the De fin. , cf. e.g. 86 mos maiorum Further, the Old was superior to V 69, where the Tusculans (cf. I CEU eTD Collection disclose the non-evident starting from “perception and perspicuous premises”. perspicuous and “perception from starting non-evident the disclose 90 pupil and friend of Antiochus’ brother and successor Aristus, and even wrote a work on philosophy in philosophy on late work the a wrote wrote Cicero before even Latin and Aristus, successor and brother Antiochus’ of friend and pupil 19.3; Ad more intuitive and persuasive alternative to the Stoic theory. In developing it developing Stoic In the theory. to alternative andintuitive persuasive more informed by his Academic of wasfartheory-testing from past. being Antiochus’ incidental. entire approach was His theory method sceptical Cicero’s was and building theory of devisedmethod Antiochus’ between match so as to stay standingthis We that seenow canalso theory. from a persuasive expected sceptic principally as a “unimpeded” data ( “unimpeded” data relevant the with, contact close in keep and on, rely openly and methodically beginning very hisconsciously“intuitive” presented as ethics theory: an from one which does the self- seen, just have we as Antiochus, level. theoretical more a on also appealing ethics found Antiochus’ approach to mayhave Academicsceptic the CiceroFurther, theories. testing the from selecting, humanity among at large, mostdistinguished“focus for the group” exempla 89 agreed commonly with consistency the to conforms theory ethical an extent what to and whether on focus constant Cicero’s in a philosophical theory. assessingthepersuasivenessof presents itself) asastandard Chapter sentiments was underwritten by his Academic scepticism. As we have seen (in Roman traditional to commitment his that thought have may Cicero Importantly, Cf. also e.g. V 74; IV 61; while those who are imperfect but endowedwith outstanding abilities are oftenmotivated by honour. Cf. also Antiochus’ most famous followers at the time were Varro ( mos maiorum fam. – is probably meant to represent the sceptical approach, only perfected by perfected only represent sceptical isapproach, the meantto probably – III.1.3 phenomena Luc IX.8) and Brutus ( . 44, where the Antiochean Lucullus says that an argument in general is supposed to supposed is general in argument an says that Lucullus Antiochean the where 44, . ), Cicero’s sceptic method involved extensive usage of the criterion of criterion the of usage extensive involved method sceptic Cicero’s ), –conveyed mostly his mostly –conveyed frequentappeals through historical to Luc , what the Academics would have called “perspicuous” or Parad . 33-4). . Acad proem philosophica . I12; 90 . That is, he offered just what Cicero as Academic what Cicero just is, heoffered That phenomena Tusc Chapter III.2 . See. further BARNES 1989:59-62. . V 21; 301 De fin. (ideally such (ideally no opinion contrary that Acad V 8; Ad Att . I 12; cf.. . XIII.25.3) –the latter was a Ad Att. XIII.12.3; 16.1; CEU eTD Collection (or at least the version of it presented by Piso at 84-5) argues: ( deeply Cicero divided. and areobscure because themselves the phenomena phenomena, loosesitswith perspicuous easy the conformity theory Antiochus’ neverthelessfor sufficient happiness notfor completethough happiness. Here followisinfers Antiochus where he isnotit virtue is although the that only good, cannot sceptic Academic the Thepointwhere Cicero not. or stance sceptic Academic winwas meant his to approval whetherwas Cicero willing abandon foritsto sake his a greatAntiochus’ ethics that partof Antiochus himself. camefrom this knowledge had been filtered through in particular Stoictheory of the his knowledge as Antiochus; sametradition the on this same tradition –indeed,nurtured As Philo’s pupilCicerowas sceptical scrutiny. standing athorough stood on for all we know it that one itwas the alternatives available is the among sufficiency thesis, the came to possible found andadmit sceptic, was ready Antiochus’ up untilattractive theory that to it Thus we can understand why Cicero, both as a Roman politician and as an Academic criticism the at presents Piso Antiochean the ishow this precisely fact, facts–in very those perspicuously more reflects uselanguage a that do;butwe Peripatetics) and “we” Academics (Old we must develop which from “facts” evident the and theory an their between appropriate connection the retain to want ethicalif they Stoics, the was: nutshell a in conclusion His lines. theoryCarneadean followed also cannot but mean thethe ground forsame the refutation of thethings Stoic theory. And his criticism as of the Stoic theory share in establishing the intuitive foundations ofhis theory, at samethe time preparing usedthe even He theory. Stoic the of criticism of tradition (Carneadean) Academic the on, relied extensively and from, benefitted Antiochus De finibus V88-90. Part III 302 De finibus Carneadea divisio V16-23)had thelion’s De fin , which . V CEU eTD Collection benefitted, already contained the rudiments (if (if afully rudiments not the of version) fetched already this line contained benefitted, which Antiochusfrom but his dissented, which neverthelessphilosophy greatly Academic from Forthe Stoic view ethics. traditions of Antiochus’ and understanding it of with an acceptance brought complete but all schooling sceptical Cicero’s Finally, we can or“unimpeded”a “conspicuous” one. now readily see that the way Antiochus’ theory resonated with ‘ conception intuitive happiness of is ideathathappiness comethe in could gradations Cicero can counter this intuition with another no less plausible one: that given our willing “judgeto alifeon basisthe itsof part”(91-92; cf. largest nameheapsare normally main their after of andto so are willing component, things we intuition: ordinary further a to things, other among appeals, Piso objections these and that, as I have argued, is an integral part of Cicero’s scepticism. In response to ordinary but well educated) people that permeates the debates presented in debatespresented the permeates but well people that ordinary educated) about the conformity concern of kindof itisthe example an excellent because the passage I have quoted of ethical theories with the contradictory. ethical intuitionsSecondly, they will be assured that the Stoic system is self-consistent, whereas yours is self- of ordinaryis so powerful(and me before experts, and they will perhaps have thatdoubts ontwo scores. Firstly, they will doubt that virtue thoseaudience of ordinary youpeople, will neverconvince them thatapersonso afflicted isevenhappy. Put endowed an before case your meplead have you If credible? view own your is then: Well happiness. withcomplete it wouldneedy, and being torturedbe on the rack forgood measure.happy (…) You find it incredible that this is a state of evenNow imagine a wise personwho is blind, disabled, suffering the gravestwhen illness, inexile, childless, inside the bull of Phalaris. 91 minus probendum et Stoici convenientia sibi dicant et vos repugnantia. sitne tantum invirtute,ut ea praediti velinPhalaridis tauro beati sint, alterumnon dubitabunt,quin qui itasit affectus,beatum esse numquam probabis; si ad prudentes, alterum fortasse dubitabunt, Tibi hocincredibile,quod beatissimum.quid? tuumcredibile? ad populum sienim me vocas,eum, sit enim idem caecus, debilis, morbo gravissimo affectus, exul,orbus, egens, torqueatur eculeo 91 ’ (V 81; cf. also Tusc Chapter III.2 . V22-23, 29). That is, Piso’s pointis no more 303 Tusc . V 22). But De finibus (…) , CEU eTD Collection idealisingin this respect. strongly is authorities, school any by restrained being than rather example his follow comparing to others andcriticising andadvises philosophical claims theories, and self-presentation as a model sceptic whorelies on his mind own in studying, His dogmatism. Antiochean or scepticism Academic either of his acceptance facilitate To cut it short, the Stoicism he knew was a version carefully pre-digested so as to probably evenhimprobably or to authorised by advised (cf.Antiochus Chapter were that –readings by Posidonius works physical andsome by treatises Panaetius someethical with acquainted intimately hemost was literature Stoic array of great the but comprehensive acquaintance with Stoic authors. As afar as I can see, from among changes with the context). Indeed, Ifeel some doubts about his boastinghint his to all samethrough the Academic–Antiochean glasses(onlyhisfocus and emphasis Cicero’s oeuvre, from the in up comes ethics of Stoic topic Whenever the preconceptions. these have countered see influence sign any (probablyanother by of Posidonius orDiodotus) wouldthat by his Academic upbringing and by strongly confirmed Antiochus’ I lectures. do not Stoic texts with freedfrom eyes preconceptionsthe inhim and perspectiveingrained andStoiceverCicero reading studied ethics independently, think encountered that intellectual inbackground Ipresented that Cicero’s here about torecall sceptical the important It isconsiderations again especially implausible. of criticisma pupil of Stoicthe Philo theory; to thus itof unfamiliarnorwas neither ProMurena onwards, Cicero views alwaysit unvaryingly onwards, Part III 304 Part I . I do not see any reason to I.6 ). CEU eTD Collection successful: he does not seem to see any significant difference between differenceStoic between see significant any seem to he not does successful: seems attempt the is concerned, far asCicero as because is crucial This point respect to happiness (they are definitely not “indifferent” as the Stoics claim). fundamental itinevitablyurge, follows and bodily that externalgoods “us”, andconstitutes that part every for care that and love to us impels it that and motivation, happinessevery depends of basis inevitable is self-love the idea that general the that wehave accepted once on be clear or should it For good. consiststhe of composition the about conclusion Aristotelian an in the overall satisfaction of this indeed to conflate the Stoic notion of notion Stoic the conflate indeed to Chapter self-love in creating an Aristotelian counterpart for theStoic Aristotelian counterpart conception of an self-love increating argue that what we find in Antiochus is shall I an attemptfollows what In to utilise provenance. the Aristotelian Aristotelianan has self-love of notionnotion of Antiochus’ ethics, Aristotle’s in isfound argument similar no while that indicated also I is at37). and self-perfection between elucidated self-preservation 31; link is at the assumed clearly and self-preservation between self-love connection birthfrom motivation have for self-preservation and a (theconceptual self-perfection to assume that by pointingof motivation whateverthis (V 24; the “proof” is presented at 28-30). Moreover,out he seems he has done the crucial“analytic” argument toprove that self-love is the necessary emotive basis forstep any kind to show that we all assumptions included inhis accountof the starting the down laid having after move next Antiochus’ seen, have we As III.3 Coda: self-love III.2 ) is to introduce the notion of self-love and presenting an “aprioristic” or oikei Chapter III.3 305 ǀ sis with that notion,in a way that supports Carneadea divisio (points (i)-(ix) in (i)-(ix) (points do matter with oikei oikei ǀ ǀ sis sis , CEU eTD Collection 353, 356; STRIKER 1996: 226ff. 93 diligamur commendatione naturae,qua cari sunt, seseque diligunt term The itself”. preserve standard formulation of the doctrine throughout (see 27: (see throughout doctrine of the formulation standard expositionof Antiochus’ doctrine the language of self-love is clearly more dominant: this remains the est nobis commendatione naturae,qua se ipsidiligunt and all its parts. It cherishes ( keep themselves( themselves love to nature… by moved safe and sound.II andV, introduce thesis the this in rephrasedEvery version. AtII33we told are young “…the that are… living creature,substitute for as soondiligendum as it is born, loves ( the thesis is that “every living being loves itself ( thesis interms of self-love (IV 32: Epicurus autem cum prima commendatione voluptatem dixisset natura profectae throughout (IV25: the verb the commendatum ( itself to commended is animal every itself… topreserve tends nature “every that declares but emphasising the unity of the Stoic theand “Old Academic” doctrine on animal motivations, terminology of love are love are not outnumbered by whichphrases canbe takenas echoing terminologythe of 21: nosmetipsos loves themselves” (59: nature by “everyone that doctrine the as doctrine whole the to back refers he Later phrase. former the paragraphCato switches tospeaking about language of self-love is uneven: it comes to prominence only as the Antiochean the as only prominence to comes it uneven: is self-love of language First, it is important to take notice that even notice inCicero’s is it totake that First, important to theStoicunjust theory. is conflation this correct, is theory Antiochus’ in plays notion the that role the of by modern commentators. isadopted several notions that hispractice elaborated by Piso in Bookfind V (III 16). Ciceroa rudimentaryis so successful in conflating the two version of the same argument from self-love that will be seem to be meant to render the Stoic terminology. Stoic render the meant to be seem to III–he in interchangeably with theory uses that Book self-love thelanguageof terms Stoic the of account the –including work the Throughout self-love. Antiochean and standard Stoic terminology: 92 of the of Greek phrasethe Cf. forexample ENGBERG-PEDERSEN 1986; WRIGHTLONG 1995; 1996: 254,261; 2006: 28, The initial statement of the Stoic thesis at III 16 is couched in terms apparently chosento reflect the prima conciliatio ; cf. ; commendare … ), and the pattern issimilar to what itwas inbook III: self-love comesview in as obviousan ; 70: ipsi homines sibisint per se et sua sponte cari commendatio II 35: ) and so wishes for its safety and security in the species” (IV 19), and he frequently uses oikei , 40: eaque caram esse sapientirationem amici acsuam ǀ nosmetipsos commendatos essenobis oikeiousthai Epicurus autemEpicurus cumprimacommendatione voluptatem dixisset , III22 sis a prima commendatione naturae and the related nominal term nominal related the and se is more widespread in book IV, in which Cicero, wearing an Antiochean hat, Antiochean an wearing Cicero, which in bookIV, in widespread more is ipsi omnes natura diligant . The other two accounts of the original “Old Academic” doctrine, in Books commendatio ipsum ; 30: ; amplectitur in primisnaturae conciliationibus se ipsi diligunt or sibi conciliari et commendarisibi conciliariet sibi quemque esse carum ǀ omnis enim est natura diligenssui (i)kei ) above all its two majorcomponents…etc.”. Similarly at V 24 natura moveat infantem… ut is not absent from Piso’s vocabulary in Book V (V, 33: se diligere ǀ sthai ; 41: ; 34: ; Part III 306 se ipsum diligit prima illa commendatio, quae anatura nostri facta pros heuto sibi quemque natura essecarum ; cf. 64: cf. ; commendatio , which heapparently regards as equivalent with , 46: , omne animal se ipsum diligere ; 46: prima commendatio naturae ); cf. also 26: deceat cariorem nobis esse patriam quam or 92 ; 31: nos diligamus Indeed, as I shall point out, we ). ButIV 32he ). at too reformulates the may well be Cicero’s Latin translation ; 23 heaut ) and as soon as it is born strives to De finibus (presumably translating carum sibi quemque …), and these occurrences of self- of occurrences these and …), commendatus, commendari ǀ seipse diligat (i) , 34: . However, still inthe same tantae ). the presence of the of presence the applicatum seesse ad 93 commendationes a ; 37: ; If my analysis my If diligit ), and to wishto ), But inPiso’s ; comp.II 35: , 29: , oikei ... ipsi anobis ) both itself ipsum sibi oikei esse ǀ qui sibi qui sis ). The ; 33: ; ǀ (III sis ) CEU eTD Collection a) we, as attempt I argue, that findin Antiochus. to present an Aristotelian equivalent for the Stoic theory of theory Stoic for the equivalent an Aristotelian present to Stoic” doctrines stemming from the 1st century BC, which seem to represent attempts “para- on rather but doctrine, notearly on Stoic arereports with self-love equated The other two well-known testimonies in which in testimonies well-known two other The conformity with this picture. Plutarch, th “first impulse” ( impulse” “first is by factthatfollows from thepsychological nature”; “appropriated this thatthe point orientation of living beingsis nature’s intelligentpart of design.Living beings are psychological the factthat themetaphysical itdenotes rather, fact; psychological theory comes into focus, in Book V. focus, in into Book comes theory 173); INWOOD 1984: 168. 124, 135;GÖRGEMANNS 1983(who ofprovides a translation wholethe theory, Peripatetic 168- pp. 95 94 of notion the Chrysippus, on directly II.4.1 in Chapter out AsIpointed doctrine. Stoic earlier on sources paralleled inother not is it idiosyncratic: is III rather in actually Book theory theStoic love incharacterising Thisaccount long has been recognised being as debtinto Antiochus’ theory:see PEMBROKE1971: above. 92 note in survey my Cf. Ɲ rein heauto Didymus’ ( Stobaeus in found doctrine “Peripatetic” of istheaccount One testimonies of these because we are by nature attached to ourselves (118.12 (W): (118.12 toourselves attached by nature because weare , on the version of the doctrine of De Stoic. Rep. De Stoic. ). And our other evidence on the orthodox Chrysippan doctrine (esp. doctrine Chrysippan orthodox the on evidence other our And ). Ecl Epitom pr . II 116-26 (Wachsmuth)probably Arius. II116-26 =II copied from 7.13-14), ǀWƝ horm Ɲ . 95 1038B( On doctrine,this “the first thing we desire is exist,to Ɲ ) of livingbeing ) of self-preservation istowards the ( SVF 94 Chapter III.3 Second, Cicero’s usage of the language of self- oikei oikei III 179, II 742; LS 57E) seem to be in to 742;LS57E)seem 179, II III 307 ǀ ǀ sis sis presented at DL VII 85, which draws does not seem directly to denote a oikei ǀ sis to oneself issimilarly to oikei ǀ sis , similar to the pr ǀ ton men epi to CEU eTD Collection b) goods to oneself for one’s own sake; that is, one is a friend ofoneself. afriend is one is, that sake; own one’s for oneself to goods goods to his friend ( friend his to goods IX 4(1166a3), that abasic condition of friendship ( 97 96 Xenarchus and Boethus might also appeal to the further thesis, occurring in occurring thesis, further the to appeal also might Boethus and Xenarchus The The terminology of that the that phil ( of desire isanobject love of object the that claim the through vaguely, thesis that the between claims these and alleged the connection In Alexander’stestimony the haut 4, 1168a35-b10) apersonmostthat of is all afriendhimself of ( else), rather than the good without qualification qualification ( without good than the rather else), or at least what appears ( appears what least at or loves what is good Aristotle’s observation ( observation Aristotle’s grounded thisgrounded interpretation passageson inthe two oneself ( according to Aristotlemantissa ( The in such Aphrodisias’ isAlexanderother of testimony report oun, h evoked as the claim that “love of oneself comes first” (II7.22.11: first” “love comes of oneself claim asthe evoked that Vǀ (W):us” (118.20-119.1 are“dearto parts, respective entail main our that components, soul the body, the and aswell as their oregesthai toueinai,phusei gar ma, phil Ɲ ǀ ton orekton esti (i) ǀ s proeph ), and should love himself most of all ( einai pr (151.3) that the Peripatetics Xenarchus and Boethus of Sidon held ofSidon that Boethus the Peripatetics Xenarchus that and (151.3) pr Ɲ ǀ n det ho philos ton oikeion oikei pr Ɲ ǀ ǀ n, einait ǀ Ɲ ton oikeionh ton oikeion sis n psuch ). Thus inso far as one loves “goods foroneself”, it seems that one wishes for oneself for repeatedly recurs again later, see GÖRGEMANNS 1983: 165. 1983: see GÖRGEMANNS later, again recurs repeatedly ) –and Alexander) –and previously (150.20-25)hasmaintained is the same isas the thesame kata deAristotel NE to phainomenon Ɲ Ɲ n pros heautou philian n, phila de ta tout deta n, phila VIII 2, 1155b21-26) that “as1155b21-26) it VIII2,that seems, everyone for each is himselfperson is somewhat established, ” ( Ɲ min h dokei detohaut ǀ Part III (i)keiusthai pros heauton 308 Ɲ mas autous philia Ɲ ) to be such (be it pleasure or anythingbeit such(be or pleasure ) to ) the ) ) is that the friend ( pr ǀ ǀ n mer pr ton orekton ton phil hapl …). ǀ ǀ ). As Alexander explains, they explains, As Alexander ). (i) agathonphileinhekastos ton oikeion Ɲ teon demalista heauton Ɲ ǀ philon gar einaih philon gar ...); and later the thesis is s Nicomachean Ethics ); and (ii)his remark (IX NE –; thus, in far –; as so thus, philos ). VIII2(1155b31) and for each of us is 96 This is said to ) wishes and does and wishes ) malista philos Pr De anima De ǀWƝ Ɲ min to min n men : (i) : ). to 97 ), CEU eTD Collection “complies with it in everything”; thus, since a person, like a city,or any other organisation ( most controlling] element in himself ( finest and best goods”, that is i.e. virtue and virtuous action, “gratifies ( rational partofsoul the (1168b18ff),virtuous person“awards the himself ( 11168a29ff)); while butvulgar self-lovers gratify ( everything “forhis ownsake” ( specifically sake ( forthe of thinking his part ( sake” own his “for only not everything does he ofhimself: friend true (1166a10ff),from virtuous the person’s friendship towards himself,because good only the person isa virtuous person is a is person virtuous seems tobe”(1166a20). InIX8, then, Aristotle goesfurther suggests, and ratherprovokingly, the that nature of friendship towards oneself” ( oneself” towards friendship of nature neighbours, jointly with the other characteristics enumerated there (1166a1ff), is “derived from the friend’s sake. AtIX41166a1-2Aristotle adds that thischaracteristics offriendship towards one’s heneka characteristics offriendship is that the friend ( 99 “parents, then, love their children as themselves” ( genn maker regards his product more his ownthan from someone “belongs to” the one from whom it comes ( comes it whom from one the to” “belongs someone from the a coherent theory of theory a coherent of theory oftheStoic counterpart “Aristotelian” this of origins the on information valuable us provide they time same the at These testimonies have anunmistakeable what affinity to wefindin something of themselves” ( where Aristotle (1161b18ff)“parents that says arefond ofchildren their because they themregard as heauton 98 Furtherpassages relevant include Xenarchus and Boethus (as well as Antiochus) may also have felt encouraged to identify “ Ɲ Nicomachean Ethics thenti seems virtually identical with Arius’ “Peripatetic” thesis above in (a). in above thesis “Peripatetic” Arius’ with identical virtually seems simply our own existence” ( own our simply it that“wedesire asimplying from weshould separated understand ourselves, the apparent absurdity that we love our very selves as a discrete object of desire, that the ǀ else more than to ourselves” ( ourselves” to more than else anyone) (or toanything appropriated “we not are that isit true also anyone else”, inAristotle is right thinking that to “wearefriends ourselves more than to ),and IX41166a3: friend the wishesis good what friend for his ( ikei ” and “ ǀ Ɲ metha pros allotihout togenomenon t oikeiousthai pros pr ǀ ton oikeion philautos philia sterousi ǀ . (i) poi , “self-lover” , 99 heautou charin from from remarks the foundand ideas VIII and in Books IXof for each of us is oneself is “vague”, and in order toescape in and for eachof is“vague”, order us isoneself As to the precise relation between these“para-Stoic” between relation Astotheprecise heauton … Ɲ NE santi Kǀ tou einaiautouh eoiken ekt eoiken VIII 2 1155b31, according towhichone of the recognised heautou t s heaut ” by Aristotle’s discussionof parental ǀ ). Acouple of lines later(27) goeshe onand concludes that s philoumen de oudenas proh de oudenas philoumen ). Chapter III.3 par 98 tou diano ), and nothing “apart from himself” ( himself” from “apart nothing and ), As Alexander further comments, the claim the comments, further Alexander As ǀ philon 309 philousi… h n ti ontan ti excellence vice versa ǀ charizontai (i) kuri ǀ n pros elheautou ) wishes goods for his friend’s sake ( Ɲ tikou charin to garexautou oikeion t oikei ); and than further reasons that what comes ǀ ( ( tat(i) ǀ Ɲ malista mallon sun ) their appetites, emotions and the non- the and emotions appetites, ) their s heautous mas oregometha hapl ǀ sis ), that is the intellect ( intellect the is that ), in to reconstructan attempt ). The virtuous person too does too person virtuous The ). ), “and that is what each person Ɲ luthenai ). ǀ charizetai heautou heneka aponemeiheaut kei ekein ǀ thai to aph’ hou t ƝPǀ ǀ philia De finibus ) –more specifically (i) agathou ǀ (i) aph’ hou aph’ heautou ) the ) the supreme [or n aut n in ǀ NE ǀ ), but more but ), s nous sust ǀ i ); which ); ) with the n, oude ), for the for ), VIII12, V,and ekeinou ), and a and ), Ɲ philein ), and ma ), (cf. ), ǀ ) is (i) CEU eTD Collection work he finds the most authoritative. That this is probably a reference to our to reference a probably is this That authoritative. most the finds he work the mentions thedialogue– of dramatic date relationship withXenarchus and Boethus see also DUECK 2000: 10-11. relationship of andBoethus Xenarchus isuncertain; on this see BARNES 1997:23.Strabo’s For washe probably a discipleof Andronicus of Rhodes (cf. howeverTARÁN 2001: 495ff). The see BARNES 1997 21-22: he was born eitherto have been acompanion in the of Boethusmiddle in his Aristotelian 60s studiesor some (XVI p. 757). thirty On Boethus’ chronology“Peripatetic” doctrine preserved(or by more)Stobaeus), and afterwards of Augustus years (XIVp.670); and professes earlier; taughtbeginning of ofthe reign Tiberius (64-3BC24 –ca. AD), reports thatyears inhiselder Xenarchus in Rome,than Antiochus, but still enjoyingin the100 themselves. first preserve to inclined are themselves, century they love as so far in animals, that follow BC; Strabo, who livedthe during the reignfriendship of August and the of Arius Didymus (who is the probable source of the (as some passages in the in some passages (as heteroi autoi parents love their offspring as themselvesonly humansamong but alsoamong most kinds of animals; laterand on (1161b27-29) suggests he ( that 1116b25ff). Moreover, atVIII1155a18-19 Aristotle admits naturalparentalthat friendship existsnot between the kinds of pleasures animals enjoy and the activities that constitute their function1153a27ff X1172a20ff,). (cf. and furtherHowever, 1118a16ff III X 1176a3-9and seem to establisha close link alike are hedonistically motivated ( 22; identified; is andesp.15, whereXenocrates’ ethics Aristotle’s on their case there in can thus be and no soul, question rational no of innerhave they agreement). (since If themselves to one wants friends as to derive be considered from could Aristotle’sanimals that remarks another”for (1166b2ff; 1169a13ff). cf. sameFor the reason Aristotle ( einai Academy (seeChapter Academy considered, Antiochus regarded Aristotle as one of the principal authorities of asfar ethics was as the report, Cicero’s on have seen, Aswe Old ethics. Aristotle’s studied In fact,I do notfind itin unlikely that developing his theory Antiochus directly relied on Antiochus, orall the three relied on some earlier tradition. either Boethus and oneistrue: indifferent present Xenarchus is it which our purposes Peripatetic theories and Antiochus’ theory, there are two viable possibilities, and for so far as they approve of themselves ( themselves of approve they as far so whole soul” (1166a13-4), while base people cannot be real friends to themselves,friendship or they to himselfcan beimplies only that he “isin ofone mind withhimself desiresand the same things in his psychic (1166a34-1166b1); parts inaccordance with suggeststhis he that virtuous the person’s that the notion of friendship to oneself requires us to think of the agent as(1168b28ff). consisting of more than one most of all its supreme element (cf. also 1066a18ff), thevirtuous person isaself-lovermost of all We know little of Xenarchus and Boethus, but we canat least tell that bothof them flourished later philia ), for otherwise “they are at odds with themselves, and have an appetite for one thing and a wish Tusc to oneself a oneself to Again, in the in Again, To be sure, Aristotle’s conceptionof . V 30, 39, 87). Further, In ). If, then, Aristotle believes that parental love entails care forthe offspring’s preservation general NE Aristotle seems to commit himself to the view childrenthat and animals Eudemian Ethics III.2 theory of motivation, these passages seem to present a genuine problem. genuine a present to seem passages these motivation, of theory ; cf. esp. NE areskousin heautois II 1104b34-5, 1105a2,1119a8; 1119b5-7; VII1152b19, Kǀ (1241b2-4, 1235a34)suggest does), he it seems then to De fin s heautous philia De finibus Part III 310 to oneself is complicated by Aristotle’s insistence . V 8, 14; Cf. also II 34, 40; IV 3 ff and IV 3 34, 40; also II . V8,14;Cf. Nicomachean Ethic ), for the offspring are like another self ( V Piso –Antiochus’ pupil at the at pupil –Antiochus’ Piso V ) and suppose they are decent ( decent are they suppose and ) EE 1240b31-2) finds doubtfulit Luc s in particular as the as s inparticular . 131, 137; . 131, 100 Acad epieikeis hoion . I CEU eTD Collection theories as the other two first century BC Peripatetic theories I mentioned above. Imentioned theories century firstBC Peripatetic two asthe other theories theory in theory But however this may be, it seems evident theory. Aristotle’s that Cicero’s presentation key the passages on which Xenarchus basedBoethus interpretation and their of of Antiochus’ assumption V 30 may seem to contain a close echo of the same of IX and VIII Books used extensively have may work,Antiochus self-love of conception as later face here at indications value. Xenarchus meant toreflectand Antiochus’ influence; and Ido not see any reason not to take Cicero’s BoethusNicomachean Ethics apparentlyfollowed the Theophrastean tradition (75). Thus Piso’s suggestion of the did –notablyhow Staseas and other contemporary Peripatetics presented their system:on they this not indicate thatthisis takes andCicero pains to philosophy (V5,85); Staseas with tohappinesssufficiency virtue studied hadof previously Peripatetic(V 12).Piso believes that the that believes Theophrastus’ over work Aristotle’s 1096a1;I 7, 1098a19,7 13, 1153b16-22. was known already in 79BC, and wasstudied inAntiochus’ school. other passages in the 45 BC, isnow widely agreed. Nicomachean Ethics 102 101 his two-level conception of happiness by an interpretation of passages in passages of interpretation an by of happiness conception two-level his 103 account. that and theory Antiochus’ between intermediary rediscovered recently then the to Stobaeus] in theory “Peripatetic” the [i.e. ethics of Peripatetic account ofArius’ parts of… relation close “the and writings”, esoteric Cf. esp. BARNES 1997: 44-5 and 57ff. Indeed, as JuliaAnnas Indeed, (ANNAS 2001:122 n.18) pointedhas Antiochus out, could support perhaps Pace e.g. Pembroke 1971: 135, according to whom Antiochus was “still unable to gain access to the De finibus Nicomachean Ethics Nicomachean NE , and that it shows that the work was already known to Cicero in Cicero to wasalready known work it the that shows , andthat as the source of the authentic Aristotelian position seems to be V (and II and IV) belongs to the same stock of of Aristotelian samestock to the belongsand V(andII IV) seem to problemspresent interpretation;an forsuch see esp. I4,1095b31- 101 103 But Cicero’s indication seems to be that the work So it is not implausible that in developing his in developing that implausible isnot it So , unlike Theophrastus’ the endorse does treatise, , unlikeTheophrastus’ Chapter III.3 On theHappyLife 311 NE Nicomachean Ethics VIII 2, 1155b21-26, one of 2, 1155b21-26,one VIII , apparently hebecause NE I8-10, althoughsome 102 Piso favours ” indicates an ” indicates CEU eTD Collection language”. According to Inwood is“no this doubt influence dueto of the opponents inthethe debate and their terminology usedof the by Piso reminiscent in is which language”, perceptual the to addition in language “intellectual an uses Inwood pointed out has indiscussing that theStoic notion of self-perceptionat Seneca’s ‘eclecticism’ seeINWOOD e.g. an 2005:23ff. earlierarticle In (INWOOD 1984:169n19) argument at motivation to “take basic care the of oneself” from ( springs and self-referential actually is pain, avoiding and pleasure seeking even action, synonym for synonym equivalent with self-love ( ( term success and influence of the philosophical strategies represented by our strategies represented philosophical the influence of and term success doctrine. Stoic and orthodox oikei Stoic ethicsas undermine unoriginal and to by conflating it the Stoic conception of strategic intentions behind the development of such theories was certainly to deflate of original the one (i),case, as wecanseeinAntiochus’ First doctrines. philosophical different the between differentiate to philosophers, professional for even difficult, increasingly itbecame BC century first in the theories para-Stoic these emergence of have beenmay self-love of notion and language the presentwhether assessing to relevance much has in the earlierFinally,not thinkwhat Ido we find thatin later Stoic first-century (post BC) authors Stoic tradition; for it seems to me that after the 105 Imperial period, are foreshadowed already in the work of Panaetius and Posidonius (see esp. p. 785). revival of Platonism and Aristotelianism, aswell asthe eclecticism of philosophy the in Roman 104 findSeneca ( we that Thus when e.g. syncretistic tendencies. more philosophersto becamemore andsusceptible wrote) Cicero time the philosophy (around Greek erainAncient Hellenistic we cancall the Stoic conclusions about virtue and happiness. Second (ii), by and after the end of what conciliatio sui The term ‘ Cf. esp. the ‘Epilogue’ by Michael Frede in ALGRA et al. 1999, who rightly point out that the ǀ sis with a conception of self-love that can be shown not to support the radical the support to not shown be can that self-love of aconception with De fin De se caritas sui ( ipsum , cf. 14: . V 30 . and,throughpassage,that Aristotle’s at remark ) diligere ’ is reminiscent of Cicero’s reminiscent ’ is sibi ipsumconciliatur caritas sui caritas De fin in 105 De finibus sui curamagein Rather, such examples seem to me to show the long- Vin discussing Antiochus’ conceptionof self-knowledge. ), it is far from clear that he is drawing on old , cf. note 92 above. At 17 Seneca further argues that every that argues further Seneca 17 At above. 92 note cf. , Part III Ep 312 . 121, 24)considers. ), which is closely reminiscent of the Antiochean of the reminiscent closely is which ), carum sibi esse sibi carum and 18: and sibi quisque estcommissus , which, as we have seen, is a NE VIII2, 1155b21-26. On oikei Ep .121 11-13Seneca ǀ sis to oneself ) as 104 CEU eTD Collection 1, 6; haut objectionat also presentPlutarch, in used as a synonim for virtuous person is“most of alla self-lover” ( Hierocles goes back onAristotle’s analysis in philautia 1155b33ff, 1157b18, 1158a7, 1166b30ff). distinction The between excessive and misguided self-love, “benevolent”, a further phrase that may encourage one to paraphrase the doctrine of doctrine the paraphrase to one may encourage that phrase further a “benevolent”, apparently relying onstandard Stoic terminology, characterises the former. On thesubsequent (and andmore fragmentary)more pages(col.VIII 1b, IX 3, 8-9)Hierocles, of self-love (Cf. Plutarch, the source ( source the and laterand (VII 18ff) that argues emotive response (“being well pleased with”, pleasedoneself” with (cf. VI42-3: identification makesidentification an difference:enormous “for wherever the ‘I’ and ‘mine’is sumpheron considered equivalentwith “loving interest” one’s own attached to one’s own interest”, own toone’s attached ( ( oneself” to “attend includingliving being, even person, wiseandvirtuous the and that this impels one to ( that thesis the ( Epictetus Thus radicalism. their ethical to presented (ii) Hierocles, who virtually equates is not therefore an egoist ( the danger that the conflation of their notion of notion their of conflation the that danger the neutralise to in attempting themes Aristotelian even or Platonic use could themselves Stoics the “eclectic”context or newin “syncretistic” how, this of examples On the other hand, theories. Stoic” our later“para- ofAntiochus’ on Peripatetic and ethics) Cicero’s report (includingtestimonies Stoic sources can sometimes provide us interesting 106 sage, though as every living being he does “everything for his own sake” ( panta hautou heneka poiein panta hautouheneka apostazeintou hautousumpherontos hautoukai Further relevant sources are (i) Epictetus, (i) are sources relevant Further ǀ De fraterno amore (i) ), and that it is right that he should be such”); cf. also and the the and virtuous person’s sound concernfor herself, which occurs inboth Epictetus and katarch Laws ). However, as he further18-21) explains, ashe ). However, the (II22, focusone’s of 731d-732b to the saying that “every man is by nature a lover of himself ( 106 oikei Ɲ ) of this flaw, and thus the existence of the latter can be viewed as a proof of the philautia 492C5; see furtherStobaeus IV 27, 20, 29ff. heauton therapeuein ǀ Quomodo adulatoab amico internoscatur sis Quomodo adulato abamico internoscatur philautos to oneself is the common starting point ( point starting common is the oneself to ; cf. furtherthe role oikei ), such that no one can ever disregard one’s own interest own one’s disregard ever can one no that such ), ǀ ),cf. further II22,1-15 and 18-21,see my below;discussion and aresein heaut sis oikei to oneself ( ǀ sis oikeiousthai pros t philautos malista Chapter III.3 to oneself (cf. VI 52: Diss euarestein NE ) andto“doforeverything one’s ownsake” 313 ǀ . I19,11-15, where Epictetus argues the Stoic that IX8 1168a28ff;Aristotle’s conclusion is that the (i) eunoia pros oikeiheautous ), a feeling that he further analyses as a positive ) to one’s impressionof oneself (VI 28-29); plays in Aristotle’s discussion of friendship: ) (cf. also II 22, 1-15, where“being 22,1-15, ) (cf. II also oikei ComparatioThesei et Romuli ) ina non-derogative sense. Thetheme is Diss ǀ sis ǀ 48E1ff (with reference to Plato’s to reference (with 48E1ff ǀ oikei (i) idi with Aristotelian self-love Aristotelian with kei 49A5, where . I 19. 11-15) subscribes19. 11-15) to . I ǀ sis ǀ th ǀ hautou heneka panta poiei ), though is not is though ), sis Ɲ pros heauto ǀ philein touhautou to oneself as (i) sumpheronti arch eunoia heaut oikei Ɲ ) for every ) for ) with “being ǀ 2, 5; philautia sis euno in terms Aratus philos ǀ Ɲ (i) , is , tik , is is Ɲ ), , CEU eTD Collection properly “indifferent”. properly called good than any other good we component of have,our constitution, and therefore its perfection (i.e. thevirtue) is a far superior minor goods stillmostand outstanding is thedominant soul rational the (v) that does) (as Antiochus do matter; they cannot only the andis genuine good, for therefore happiness. self-sufficient if Even one adds be is virtue that theses the hardly uphold than can one of arch-desires, these satisfaction one’s and mainhappiness components, that (iv) consistsin depends on or the of perfection and soundness the for concern a entails turn in this (iii) that condition, perfect and in a sound of oneself preservation the for aconcern entails self-love (ii) that inevitable fundamental self-love, from and springs motivation whatever every compromised the integrity of the Stoic theory. If one subscribesStoic conception of to the claims that (i) such solutions and responses theory, Peripatetic Academic–Early Old original the from ethics Stoic of development were clearly not yet whenfirst(as Itend the AntiochusBut hisnarrative to think)about presented available; so his conflation of the by supported some Aristotelian passages. be to seem even may explanation the examination closer on And good. single his he soul virtue considers withhis healone, identifies rational “self-lover”, since makefor idea the room beingqua livingis thatalthough wiseperson the a natural guidance), there, if in external things, there”. things, if inexternal there, guidance), must be there, if in one’s volition ( volition in one’s if be there, must flesh, authority the in the are inclines:ifthey inevitably creature therethe placed, to genuine genuine and self-love of the virtuous person in 108 of conception Epictetus’ and Aristotle’s between connection 107 I mean Aristotle’s elaboration of the distinction between vulgar and excessive self-love and the and self-love excessive and vulgar between distinction of the elaboration Aristotle’s mean I On the interpretation of the passage see esp. LONG 2002: 199; see further Long’s discussion of the oikei ǀ sis with his with Aristotelian seriously of self-love conception proairesis NE Part III 108 314 IX8; cf. note 106above. 107 –to simplify the matter, one’s rational ThisPlatonizing seemsto explanation proairesis , ibid . 212ff. CEU eTD Collection provides the primary motivation. which self-love is it that realize must So one self-love. thereby and self-awareness had they unless constitution andfeared destruction. But neither could it happen that they would seek anything at all opposite before they everfeel pleasure orpain. This would happen not unless they valuedown their In support of this thesis, the Stoics care itself andtakes to preserveitself”. with “concerned birth from point out that babiesis The ominous argument presented aspartof proof every Cato’s living beingis that seek what is good for themfinibus and avoid the at by Cato presented argument the considerations in these view of I think that 110 109 literature. in scholarly “theargument” cradle The first half of the passage presents the Stoic version of what is now widely called conclusion of the argument is then spelled out in the next clause: “from this ( rejoice initrejoice as the I( book in point of Epicurus’ theory, often evoked as the Epicurean “cradle argument”, presented De finibus argument, but for my present purposes it suffices to notice that within the context of consequence of this ( if they did not possess a “perception of themselves” ( counterfactual infantscounterfactual couldclaim nothave animpulsethat towards is the This passage. of above the part is second the here my concern But view. to in motivations hedonistthe Stoicopposition view ofneo-natal the reinforce wholeincludingbe section,seems 17andpresent tomeantto arguments 18, which See Jacques Brunschwig’s seminal article, BRUNSCHWIG 1986. BRUNSCHWIG article, seminal Brunschwig’s SeeJacques intellegi debet principium ductum esse ase diligendo. autem non possetut appeterent aliquid, nisi sensum haberent sui eoque se diligerent. ex quo aspernenturquequod contraria, nonfieret,nisi statum suum interitumdiligerent, timerent. fieri id itaesse sicprobant, quodante, quam voluptas aut dolorattigerit, salutaria appetant parvi III 16 should be bracketed as potentially spurious evidence of bracketed evidence III16should as be spurious of doctrine. potentially Stoic as a whole it seems to be meant to represent a rejoinder to the starting- De fin . I 30): “every animal as soon as it isit . I30):“every andtakes as assoon born seekspleasure animal summum bonum eoque 109 ), they would not “love themselves” ( themselves” “love not would they ), and shuns pain as the highest evil”. Actually the Actually evil”. highest the as pain shuns and Chapter III.3 315 110 Much could be said about this about said be could Much sensumsui se diligerent anything ) and, as a ex quo ( aliquid ). The ). De ) it ) ) CEU eTD Collection (INWOOD 1984:169and 171). it –anymore than byAntiochus was byAristotle” of self-love necessary condition in the self-love neo-natal of theory Antiochus’ of all accounts out, pointed has correctly as BradInwood indeed, theory; inAntiochus’ paralleled not is oneself of perception immediate toone’s response Cato and Piso V(esp. 28-30).Tobe Antiochus’sought inPiso’s in Book sure, of theory exposition arebe to are argument the unpack to clues the not that obvious fairly be should it now By in complete care animal from itself.birth takes to preserve agreement.does heevident.how Nor wouldStoic explainthe points these that support thesis the The analysisif be as self- them for granted, would they takes hesimply these claims; holding of “self-love”oneselfCato inself-perception.does not But spell out reasonsthe grounds for or feltfor oneself an attraction self-perception: to response affective as a positive into a be analysed is to in turn self-love (b) and condition; necessary a as Atticae attributed to the Stoics by the Platonist Calvenus Taurus, as reported by pupilhis Aulus Gellius ( Verginius Rufus, author Sosicrates,andthe himself, finally and para-Stoic account(3) the of Alexanderof Aphrodisias’ for andis necessary the condition of moment birth from the which exists self-perception to “bereftof references V, are oneself”, to attached “being asequivalentwith understood (apparently very the do fact animal the atall is anything that to self-love motivated presupposes to interpret this extremely concise argument.( It seems to involve two claims: ( bemust realized that (a) preserved by Stobaeus (II 118ff W); (2)the Peripatetic theories of the down to (1)the “Peripatetic”us, including theory, apparently compiled by DidymusArius and perception ischaracteristic to most later “para-Stoic” versions of the theory of 111 principium Inwood also points out that this divergence from theStoics on the vital role played by self- XII15),which also has beenrecognised as having some affinity to Antiochus’ theory (see ductum essease diligendo intellegi debet intellegi De anima mantissa ) thatitis self-love which theprovides starting point 111 oikei De finibus To Antiochus, self-love is fundamental; self- ǀ )”. Commentators notoriously find it difficult Part III (150-3), including the views ofXenarchus, Boethus, sis 316 . (…) . (…) …. self-perception isgiven not as a , including Piso’s account of itin book pr ǀ oikei ton oikeion qua ǀ sis represented to represented sibi conciliari that have come reported in oikei Noctes ǀ sis ) CEU eTD Collection nothing as far asIcan see requires us to think so. self-love is the necessary condition for any motivation in it for and as such general; any motivation condition is self-love necessary the argument itV 28-30)that (omittingadduced by argument: states at the Piso elaborate Piso’s with line in is argument Cato’s self-perception of role the from Apart cares about how to fitit properly intohis account of the Stoic theory. nor knows neither he theory, Academic” “Old inthe function no has or downplayed if Soeven noticeis in a point he takes of Stoic theory that the insignificant. are theories two the between differences the perspective Antiochean Cicero’s from myinterpretation: in line negligencewith isperfectly This role inthe account. its precise to, pay attention or clearly recognise, seem to not he does But Panaetius). e.g. sources, someStoic original havemay read deniedhe not have that condition (I as anecessary self-perception to reference involve motivations of animal accounts standard Stoic is that aware Cicero Apparently, argument. present the to behaviour or neo-natal from observable argument preceding the to either of self-perception significance indicate the to failure Cato’s again notice once take to have we However, 121 5ff col.37ff).and Hierocles, I lost thereof: to Cicero’s Cicero directly relied inwriting with the Stoic notion of self perception lies with Antiochus himself,whom, on on thisassumption, 112 1995: 188). ofEudorus Alexandria (DILLON the assumption1977: 122-6; has beenchallenged by GÖRANSSON that the more reminiscent in this respect of what wefind at DL VII 85 (where Chrysippus says II 33).Cato’sversionisfrom satisfy self-love V24,41, whichspring desires the (cf. as meansthe tolearnhow to presented rather are self-knowledge perception and copied from Didymus’ Arius DILLON 1977:240-1). The only exception istheothertheory preserved by Stobaeus, presumably Alternatively, itispossible that the responsibility for the coupling withthe Antiocheanargument Peri tel Peri pr KƝ philosophica ǀ ǀ hautou sustasis kaih hautousustasis n ton oikeion ; cf. the preface of Chapter oftenargued thatinwriting for every living being is its own constitution and its awareness Epitom De finibus Ɲ Ɲ (II 47ff W), who in turn perhaps took it from the Platonist taut II.3 III (practitioners of the outmoded source-critical approach source-critical outmoded of the (practitioners III Chapter III.3 ). Butthis assumption is rather hostile toAntiochus, and Ɲ s suneid 317 De finibus Ɲ sis ) and elsewhere (esp.Seneca, ) andelsewhere Cicero extensively drew on Antiochus’ on drew extensively Cicero 112 Ep . CEU eTD Collection excessive tendency to present the Stoic theory in a way that sits well with, and lends and with, well sits that a way in theory Stoic the present to tendency excessive Cicero’s an instancemerepresentinsum of 16seemsto to To III argument up: the much difference. Afteractually all, thatthisargued. learnedfrom hehas Antiochus make doesnot this point he neitherVII 85, where, however, the point seems presupposeto the cosmic perspective); but at knows norany hedonistic impulse know from we at all (as also happen to elsewhere, DL cf. esp. is interestedhe has him say this. He knows that thein Stoics argue against the idea that an learninganimal has whymy conjecture is that Cicero does not have a clear idea Cato’sof meaningand either when how the Stoics actions”. ideaseekingisfind awkwardthe But among that “appropriate pleasure the At this point Ihave no clear idea what Cato may have in mind here. Perhaps he would follow. would consequences of loathsome host a then desire, of objects primary the amongst pleasure included to have thought were nature if otherwise, were it If agree. Most Stoics do not believe that pleasure should be ranked among the natural principles –I passionately when at III 17 he feels the need to press further the point: beseemsthis awareof tooto ButCato atV18). natural objects” “primary among the structure of the included amongnatural the not “primary hasor objects” no bearing real onthe“basic is pleasure whether question the that argues and point, this on hesitance some hedonistic motivations (V 30); indeed, Piso (or Antiochus himself) seems to show AntiochusBook V, doesnot thinkhis that notion of self-love doesbyitself exclude in seen have aswe be sure, To ourselves. preserve to motivated we are entails that assumes (just as Piso does at V 31) that the claim that we are motivated by self-love 113 videatur, quae primae appetuntur, multa turpia sequantur. ponendam. quibus ego vehementer adsentior,ne,si voluptatem natura posuisse iniis rebus principiisin autem naturalibus [diligendipleriquesui] Stoicinon putant voluptatem esse summum bonum ” (V 45; cf. II 34; freedom ” (V45;cf.34; freedom from II pain isincluded Part III 318 113 CEU eTD Collection (even if he is not closely following his Stoic authorities on this point). this on authorities Stoic his following closely is not he if (even “perspicuous” itandnot surprisingifisfinds “unimpeded”; Cato points these evident highly are motivated toself-preservation) animals arebynature thesis that the (for self-love from and self-love fundamental for argument Antiochus’ both mind) which win and Cicero’s theory, Academic” “Old in Antiochus’ out spelled amply are which assumptions favour with their his their view,grounded largely ethics on samethe principlesperspicuity and background and plausibility;not occur to him that this is a misrepresentation of the Stoic doctrine. The Stoics, on and (toabout the tradition of AcademicCicero’s criticism of Stoic ethics as a pupil of learned Philo), had he it what does by is underwritten it because partly (presumably reconstruction theoretical and narrative historical Antiochus’ by convinced rather is actually he Since it. for argument Antiochean the also but self-love fundamental of notion Antiochean hissupport to, Antiochean intoperspective.puts Cato’smouth Cicero not only the Chapter III.3 319 CEU eTD Collection life in Part I, and by my consideration, inI, andin half by mythesecond life Part of consideration, intellectual former Cicero’s of survey my by is reinforced my argument that hope I Chapter recent lines of interpreting Stoic ethics. But instead of recapitulating the whole the instead interpretinglinesof Stoic ethics.recapitulating But recent of and refutation of the Stoic theory in IVBook (Chapter ininterpretive exploitedare in criticism the turn that problems sharpens some other closelyin resembles II). But a passage inCicero’s thisargument Book readingonly in the aspresented stance, Cicero’s inAcademic scepticissue andaugments expresses philosophy, ethical of place passage at III 17-18 that, as I pointed out in Chapter out asIpointed that, 17-18 atIII of passage place out puzzlingly e.g.the reading (see encourage such a indirectly to seem presentation Cato’s in gaps the cases in some indeed, context; wider the by conveyed framework viewedintheinterpretive findwhen solution an easy attention reader’s attentive may Someinterpretive arguably of inreasoningan catch the problems that Cato’s direction. same in the and way, similar in a bent be slightly to seems presentation in Chapter Further, Chapter in myaccount, with in line this does Cicero IV. inBook theory the of criticism Antiochean the facilitates way that ina doctrine Stoic the misrepresent liable to the notion of “self-love” (as Antiochus understood and used this notion), he is actually Stoic conception of conception Stoic As we haveseenin Chapter III.2 III.1 , of , of Cicero’s Antiochus’ towards attitude theory and doctrines. , of how II.3 oikei De finibus I attempted to show that at some other points as well Cato’s aswell some points other thatat show to attempted I ǀ sis as identical in substance, and thus interchangeable with, interchangeable thus and substance, in identical as Lucullus III.3 , as Cicero’s essay on what he perceives as the central CONCLUSION , when in when , , and in line with my consequent analysis, in analysis, consequent my with line in and , 321 De finibus II.3.2 Book III Cicero presents the ). Part II, Part II.3.1 , subsection , of the main a) , CEU eTD Collection more to say in defence of the Stoic position, if he had been given a second hearing. had have would actually thecase;Cato closes where Cicero point at the end actually not did Peripatetics) (and Academics andtheOld between debate the Stoics that the cognitivist conception humanof motivation, then this lendsvital support hope to our sucha Stoicsin the didendorse indeed. believing that point right important we are If documented in sources other on our Stoicand moral ethics This is psychology. an unitary the conception “cognitivist” human of isand developed the soul well that interpretation, as noted I by the end of that chapter, does notseem to take intoaccount This theory. Stoic the distorts strongly actually reading Antiochean the that largely correct, it offers feasiblea way of explaining how and why, Admittedly, inChapter conditional. decidedly is conclusion this ignore this.But mayCicero havecome to nature, of cosmic conception Stoic the of view their for argument of his theory of the outlines way, thebasic “autonomous” is,inestablishing his theory in that adecidedly towards Antiochus’build on an Academic –Carneadean– tradition). if So, my analysis Cicero’s attitudeof theoryattempt to dissentfrom his own “Old Academic” theory (and that in doing so he could of the andunder-provided anill-guided as theory Antiochus described Stoic the strategy hisas a argumentative part of that have We alsoseen metaphysical presuppositions. inI have Chapter argued, Moreover, interpretation. theory. In Chapter In theory. interpreting Stoic the line of “cosmic” directly the not support mydoes that argument dissertation I would like to re-emphasise, as I indicated already in the already indicated I as re-emphasise, like to I would dissertation II.4.2 summum bonum II.3.2 I presented my reasons not to accept the “heterodox” lineof “heterodox” accept the not to my reasons Ipresented I also pointed out that there is a rather strong indication is strong arather there that out Ialsopointed summum bonum summum bonum he consciously avoided relying on controversial on relying avoided he consciously Conclusion 322 involved a substantial appeal to the appeal involvedto asubstantial and other related doctrines is III.2 , that Antiochus developed Antiochus that , if the central Stoic Introduction , CEU eTD Collection legacy; but unfortunately we know well-nigh nothing about how, if unfortunatelylegacy; nothing knowwell-nigh but about at all, they we Socratic the resurrect true to attempt beviewed asan may soul rightly human rational in herevise, does the as felt to compelled Plato that by held Socrates views of itthe was one heritage, Socratic of Plato’s part actually was view such if some that show dialogues Platonic the but voluntarily; wrong does dialogues, underlying is the Socratic paradoxes virtue knowledge, that noone and that introspectively beingor is intuitively farfrom all, after of soul, the The conception unitary evident. A similar foundations. itsthan a partof theoretical psychology rather theory Stoic the of more aconsequence it byconsidering thisignored doctrine is often detected StoicI wouldlike the about make doctrine.is point The here to that in Plato’s Socratic demonstrandum the of part claims, are unwarranted neglected thus what hehas that believe Chapter (in out, pointed have I as but 17); note demonstrated atdemonstrated whose doctrines Cicero’s treatment in treatment Cicero’s whose doctrines Antiochus, unawareof on beingadisagreement onthis But rather there question. Posidonius in the field of moral psychology; as far as Cicero is concerned, he seems shows no knowledge of the problems that seem to have concerned his Stoic teacher Cato’s speech that seem to anticipate his criticism in Book IV(seeChapter in Book his anticipate seem criticism to speech that Cato’s in points neglect to seems Cicero cases in some seen, have also As we he? Or would similarnot thinkvein?In that heactually Ido Chapter did. couldCicero have dismissed unitary the and cognitivist psychology Stoicsthe of in a argue that not we could But and dancing. likeacting performative arts similar to the virtues) is unlike typical arts, such as medicine or navigation, and is in a sense , rather than the De finibus III22-25,that asencompassing wisdom (understood all demonstrans Conclusion De finibus De 323 . Such is the idea, presented but. Suchisnot idea, the presented Republic extensively draws, may have known have may draws, extensively II.3.2 , subsection , . The Stoic conception of the of conception Stoic The . I.2 I argued that Cicero a) end), he may he end), he may have I.1, esp. CEU eTD Collection doctrine of sounjustandinCicero arenot Stoic the Antiochus perhaps conflating argue that In a similar notindependently from way (and could abovelineof the one reasoning) by presented Aristotle in the model soul different somewhatand the of as thePlatonic tripartite the doctrine itas more models,psychological tosubstantiate such prominentattempted opposed to Chapter But westill have in ourcontrary evidence, LaertiusDiogenes and in Plutarch (cf. central Stoic ethical claims were underprovided. the that out pointing in valid as theory Stoic the of criticism Antiochus’ accepting in theory of Stoic the reading Antiochean amoreIn this Cicero’s charitable propound of reading way we mayperhaps motivation? source of ultimate asthe self-love for argument “analytic” forceful Antiochus’ neutralise to which with disposal their at argument any have they do But for. account cannot self-love of notion Antiochean the that such change, a crucial it with brings reason human of development later the that but self-love, of manifestation neo-natal isthe account Antiochus’ on what to similar orientation an has nature from animal every that argue turn in Stoics hisrefute the obviously ethical theory.helps himto The Stoic theory and supports that argument –an such as motivation any of condition necessary a as motivation of analysis conceptual correct the from emerges self-love of notion the that argues seen, the cosmic perspective, if it was there, but the cosmic perspective indeed wasthere. if but cosmic perspective it the was there, cosmic the perspective, of significance dismiss the to was conditioned Cicero that isnot case itthe only that this evidence I may perhaps modify my conclusion: for this evidence seems to show II.4.1 oikei ), that might seem to support a less conditional conclusion. In view of ǀ sis with Antiochus’ conception of self-love. Antiochus, as we have we as Antiochus, self-love. of conception Antiochus’ with NE . Conclusion 324 De finibus . But this would amount to CEU eTD Collection by the fact that the doxographer (be it Diogenes or an earlier doxographer from whom Chrysippus’ is Thesituation interpreted worsenedactually certainly further doctrine. he “creatively” for how tell evidence certain wecannot anddirect independent relied on Chrysippus’ authority in developing hisaccount,in absencethe of moreany extensively its originator although But ethics. Stoic of the “foundations” reconstruct itit was, was apparently inlinedeveloped with modern the cosmic attempts to part) to counter the kind of criticism of the Stoic theory that Antiochus championed. If Antiochean development. post- later, in DLpassagemaybea the emerging version of the ethics Stoic We cannot excludeis that for point My whole outline. the Stoicsummary later account havemay useda that it was actually or of other these for onChrysippus’authorities his report doctrine; healternatively, meant (at one least drawn have may doxography the of author The BC. incentury first in the flourished 87, 82,103,128),Hecaton(91,181)and(VII Athenodorus (121); all whom of Posidonius large) are at philosophy of Stoic account of the (and Stoic ethics account notuse Chrysippus directly. Significantly, thelatest Stoic authorities mentioned in the But it seemsme to probable that Diogenes (or the doxographer on whom he drew) did doxographical account that seems to extensively rely on Chrysippus’ work Chrysippus’ on rely extensively to seems that account doxographical As to the DL passage, I am afraid that its importance is overrated. True, it is a (cf. theory in Stoic the play into comes perspective cosmic andthe where how of account Cicero’s with be; they should they as farIcansee, are compatible as specific best from Chrysippus preserved byPlutarch,in Chrysippuswhich calls nature cosmic the as adamantisas itAlas, this not is evidence traditionally quotations considered. The De fin arkh Ɲ . III 62ff and 73). and anaphora for the theory of good and bad things and virtue, are not as arenot andvirtue, bad thingsandfor theory the good of Conclusion 325 Peri tel ǀ n . CEU eTD Collection be conducive to “extracting” the truth from our material. than falsehoods; assenting to anda well-defined that aporia andwell-grounded may aporetic result. But similarly Ciceroto I tend to think that a recognised aporia isbetter hasan still my dissertation is theory concerned, Stoic ethical earlier Thus, asfar stake in argumentthe vaguely in outlined 85-9. DL he copied) apparently does notreally have a clue as whatto is going on and what is at Conclusion 326 CEU eTD Collection fam. marked novelty (cf. however (cf. novelty marked Re P. Re to has nowabandoned commitmentphilosopher active his life former the (cf. e.g. earlier Cicero’s to comparison V 86-87 (Piso speaking, the thesis is toTheophrastus); attributed V 86-87(Piso thesis speaking,the 87 –Piso speaking–, II86; precise: to guarantee happiness to the wise and virtuous person: happiness wiseguarantee virtuous and tothe to precise: raison d’être is because wholethe rationale of philosophy consists in its promise to confer happiness ( good andevil, I exhaustively treated that subjectfive in volumes”); and he sometimes suggests that this particular”, in work nothing inlife ismore worth investigating than philosophy general,in question andthe raised inthis 1 cf. life (seeesp. evils the of asaremedy to philosophy mind, recommends of and state and his experience own he generalises Partly, 1) explanations.notbut independent different three fellow citizens? Cicero offers philosophical wouldenlightenment servetheinterests of commonwealththe hisand expounding Greek in philosophy Latin. is, The question in what ways Cicero believes keep up serving the commonwealth, and benefitting hisfellow citizens,by As I pointed out in Chapter Cicero is consistent about regarding ethics as the central part of philosophy (cf. esp. (cf. of philosophy part central the as ethics regarding about consistent is Cicero De div IX.6.4-5 might IX.6.4-5 suggest). Philosophy asrefuge andconsolation I 1-12) in favour of the tranquillity offered by the by offered tranquillity the of favour in 1-12) I Cicero’s declared andsuggested aims in writing the late . II 3and as. II 5);indeed,he whole farthe goes sometimes that assuggesting of philosophy lies initsguarantee promise tohappiness (tobe more De div Tusc . II2: “since the foundationof philosophy rests on the distinction between . V 1). I.1 De legibus At , Cicero’s declared aim in his late his in aim declared Cicero’s , philosophica Lucullus APPENDIX A I 59-60); but it mean butnot does the Cicero that I59-60); 327 6, apparently referring to the position he this emphasis on personal ethics is a is ethics personal on emphasis this Tusc vita contemplativa . II 1ff, III 1ff, V 1ff, V 121; De fin philosophica philosophica Tusc . II86;III11; De fin . V1). De fin (as e.g. . I 11: “for I 11: . . V86- is to 1 In De Ad CEU eTD Collection encourages others to follow his example; he consoles distressed friends darling studies and philosophy (as well as in hisremembering pastachievements), and political isin allies:hefrequently findingcomfortavows his hereturningthat to former his friends and to letters in contemporary Cicero’s also isrecurrent The theme (actually made rather explicit at madeexplicit rather (actually “from every ( side” every “from taking refuge from inphilosophy “the afflictions” various andacute surrounding one of talk pessimistic the dictatorship Caesar’s under climate in political the In fact, further e.g.I2, II 30-32). FREDE1989: 79. notably the latter, if read in isolation, may reasonably seem to give priority to the contemplative life; cf. (cf. so on home-land, and for one’s life one’s sacrifice to readiness excellence“helping, (including aiding to commitment and people”, preserving centre moralby lives incorporates usto teaching our whichinturn onvirtue, 10); and work the isit throughout constantly made clearphilosophy that us comforts praestantius V 72: 3 ( itsinof height the state administering glory wisdom the philosophical reaches view expresses Cicero that the philosophical consolation rhetoric– to devoted that it that notdetractdoes from their public work. man”,but for highly any“important the only andeminent proviso appropriate with has in endorsed the 2 meaningful political activity. Even in Book V of the when one is,like time atthe himself of writing, of deprived possibility the of only situation philosophy when becomecan legitimately main one’s is preoccupation Actually there is aclear affinity between Cf. also e.g. transeat idemiste sapiens ad respublicamtuendam.Quideopossit esse Ad fam. ?... etc. –a clear of echo etc. ?... IX.6.3 (to Varro in June 45). Tusc Hortensius . V 121) conveyed a scantily concealed political message political concealed ascantily . V121)conveyed Brutus , he confirms that engagementhe that confirms , with is philosophy Tusc De Re P. Re De Appendix A 10ff,328-333, 266, . V 57-72 and the eulogy of wisdom at 328 III 5-6a 2 Thus Cicero makes it clear that the 3 ; furthercf. I109-10,IV 1ff, V Tusculans Orat . 128and –a work entirely Tusc De Re P . I 31-32; see . I Acad . I26-9; . I2). Tusc more . CEU eTD Collection in retrospect: in (see e.g., (see going as far as suggesting that the victoryfrequently expressed hisdisillusionmentof either about themotives purposes side and ofthePompeians, would sometimes be a catastrophe for the commonwealth I.20.2-3; II.1.6-7, II.9.1; cf. further my discussion in Chapter selfishness and unreliability as political allies, aswell asby their hauteur ( and Cato): inthe years following his consulship he became increasingly exasperated by their always beenan unqualified admirerof optimatesthe (including, among others, Hortensius, Lucullus that Latin But this notseem justify does in explainor itself to ideaof writingthe philosophy 2) their defeat. shared culture and values that justify their claim to political eminence and dignify cultivated and high-minded (in fact, flatteringly idealised) optimate élite optimate idealised) flatteringly fact, (in high-minded and cultivated self-sufficiencyway to andhappiness, personal is presented here asthe privilege of a qua taught by her how to be virtuous and happy, and the people at large, i.e. those whoCicero are benefitted seems to bydraw a distinctionher between those who are benefitted by philosophy directly,by being philosophical works philosophical( works inincreased his for his comfort” writing by“finding readers” who enthusiasm in 5 Fora discussion of Cicero’s attitude towards philosophical consolation see WHITE1995. VII.30;VII.3.4; IX.2.5, 6.3, 16. 5,21.1; XII.23.4; XIII.28.2; XV.16.3; XVI.23.2. see also in messages return. similarconsolatory receives involving commitmenttotraditional happiness, values)to republican occasionally and philosophico resistance (cf. esp. (cf. resistance up spiritshis republican political among circles of intellectual and apossible source In connection,this Cicero then, cultivates asasuitablephilosophy for keeping vehicle 4 That is, the optimate narrowly understood, in contrast to the totalising (re)definitionof true optimates Cf. esp. Pro Sestio Romanised philosophy asa Romanised philosophy vehicle Romansupremacy for the force of human reason and the source of civilisation, and ofcivilisation, source the and reason human of force the philosophia paucis contenta iudicibus multitudibus consulto ipsa fugiens (Cicero’s friendsoptimate surely could havein found comfort by philosophy Ad Att. Ad fam. 97-99 (on whichsee e.g. CONNOLLY 2007: 89; KASTER 2006. Cf. Ad fam. , preaching the self-sufficiency virtue as (implicitlyself-sufficiency , preachingof the understood VIII.1.3-4, 11.2-4;10.2 IX.6.7, and 6, X.4.3; 11.3-4; IV.3; IV.4;IV.5; IV.13;V.13.1-2; V.15.3;V.16; V.19; V.21.2; VI.1-4;VI.12; VI.6.6, VII.3.2, IX.3.4). De divinatione De in nostris librisadquiescunt II 5, where Cicero vaguely refers to those “elder those to refers vaguely Cicero where 5, II Appendix A 329 4 I.4 )). Philosophy, understood asthe Philosophy,)). understood ); and during and afterthe Civil War he Tusc . II 4, where he presents the view Ad fam. . –Notably, Cicero had not had Cicero –Notably, . Ad Att. XVI.11.2, 12.2;IV.1.1; Tusc I.18.6-7; I.19.6; 5 ; a part of the . V 5, where Brutus 11. in CEU eTD Collection and impracticality into which ithad into Greeks. among the sunk and which impracticality with politics and oratory, which would release philosophy from the dull abstraction articulates, in different ways, his conception of a new, Roman synthesis of philosophy hisThroughout himself. as such orator-statesmen Roman proficient and venerable by cultivated 5; ( thought of abstract expression for the languageasamedium of Latin I 8).Philosophy, as Cicero patriotically believes, may alsofrom profit potentialsthe Greeks’ intellectual achievements (cf. esp. Latinisation of Hellenic thoughtwould bemore than a mereappropriation of the superiority. Roman of be with feeling wasoftenof atodds to obligatory the adoption –a thought that thought indeed are philosophers by Greek covered the subjects the that presupposes project justification Cicero’s of kindof Notably, this II 5). civitatis res tamgravis tamquepraeclarasetiam litteriscontineri Latinis and reputation of Rome ( studies would the glory adoption the that magnificent” of enhance “weighty these and embellishmenthisto homeland andamatter national/imperial of suggestingpride, intellectual inhisnative naturalisation advocates the asan of culture philosophy philosophy and rhetoric as a distinctly Roman contribution” (50).For Cicero’s thought onthe writerin integrating philosophy with politics and rhetoric” (38-9) “offersand his ideal combination of 7 JOCELYN 1976: esp. 359f; BERRY 2004: 302-3. sentiments of theRomanupper-class typical citizens the who reflects for the most certainly partconstituted subjects Romanintellectual juries other –seeand philosophy towards speeches inhis Cicero Greek learningCicero’s in timesee WISSE 2002:334and GRIFFIN attitude 1995;the adopted by reading classic Greek texts; cf. e.g. Greektexts; classic reading 6 AsAntony (LONGLong 1995)expresses it,Cicero “remains consistent about… interest his asa Cf. e.g. ND I 8); more important, itimportant, more I 8); wouldfrom being greatly benefit assimilated and Luc . 5, De fin oeuvre . I1-2, 6 –inhis rhetorical and philosophical alike–works Cicero However, Cicero escapes the trap by stressing that the by that stressing trap escapes the Cicero However, ND Tusc I 7: . V 6-7. Foruseful discussions of the varying Romanattitudes to magni existimans interesse ad decus et ad laudem interessead decuset magni existimans Appendix A Acad 330 De fin . II 4, gravis . I 10, . I De fin and Tusc praeclara . I1, 4). At times Cicero . I1-7,II5-6. 1ff; IV 7 The fragmentation of , and thus worthy thus , and De fin ; cf. . I10, III De div ND . CEU eTD Collection 9 FANTHAM 2004: 24, 247; WISSE 2002: 392-394; GAINES 2002: 445ff. interest inthe contributionof philosophy to the art of rhetoric as such(that is, the art of persuasion); cf. 8 correspondingly stated in the preface of IIof in Book of stated preface the correspondingly his writingphilosophical isof andforgreat benefit the his state is fellow-citizens, reconciliation of andphilosophy eloquence, and third Cicero’s reasonfor thinking that society (cf. to threat wisdommoralityeloquence apositive and ispowerless, without presents eloquence However, Cicero is no less consistent in stressing that while wisdom without De div studies. Would that afew may! Though few, their activity may yet have widea influence in the state. way. Of course, I have no assurance — it could not evenmoral belaxity that expectedthe utmost effort will be needed— that to hold them inthey check and direct will them in the rightall turn to these — especially view of in factourthe young that men have gone so farastray because of presentthe youth the train and instruct to than commonwealth the to I render can service better or greater what For 3) also see 58ff; II 21-22; III 4-7; see also. summum bonum role of an play the it, to likesof think to –asCicero toremedy situation this statesman orator symptomaticits of isdecline; it taskof andthe cultured the distinguished Roman philosophyamongscholastic is into adisarray sects of debates quarrelling of the of the ideal (Roman) orator-statesman see esp. inferiority of detached philosophical theorising to the philosophically enlightened political leadership Inthe context of Cicero’s work on rhetorical theory this point is obscured by Cicero’s pragmatic patere poterit industria ut omnesadulescentes studia se adhaec convertant.Pauci quorum utinam! tamen republica in late refrenanda atque coercenda sit.Nec veroid effici posse confido,quod ne postulandum quidem est, iuventutem? his praesertim moribusatque temporibus, quibusitaprolapsautest, omniumopibus Quod enim munusrei publicae adferre maius meliusve possumus,quam si docemus atque erudimus Romanised philosophy . II 4 (W. A. Falconer transl.) arbiter De leg is most intolerable (cf. the Greek cultural history in history cultural Greek the (cf. intolerable most is –, especially in ethics, where the clash of the different theories on the . I 52ff). De inv De . De inv De as substrate anew for ethos political . I1-4, . I 1-4, . I Orat De or . 11-19, 62-4; Appendix A De orat. 331 . III55(cf.30-34)). I I 56-57; III 53ff; Tusc De divinatione . I1-7; De fato De Re P 8 The other aim of the of aim other The 3; : . I2-13, 30-33, 35-37; De off De oratore . I2-4. III 9 CEU eTD Collection appropriate for leading (optimate) statesmen leading(cf. for esp. appropriate (optimate) inBC), henotonlyhadwhich theview endorsed philosophisingthat highly was his former on definitivepolitical work philosophy, recall his would most of readers that assumed may havereasonably Cicero Moreover, statesman. areal optimate tocharacterise view ought Cicero’s much philosophy dowith has to values high-flown the and political ideals on that phrasingBut the involved need argument appeal the Cicero’s for there philosophy force. amoral to as whether totell for certain itseems impossible lost, has been substantially dialogue depicted in the dialogues: engagement in serious, technical and systematic philosophical conversation. philosophical systematic and technical serious, in engagement dialogues: the in depicted the author(i.e. systematic treatment of philosophical topics inwriting), but ratherto the activity GÖRLER 1995: 109-10, cf. e.g. 43, cf. 191,266; cf. also FLOWER 2004: 91ff, 105-6.ForCicero’s usage of term ( the De Re P optimates refer to his profecto eiustractatio dignissima optimoatqueamplissimo est quoque ( man” eminent the effect engaging that is“highly appropriate for anyimportant with philosophy or at First, De divinatione (BRINGMANN 1971: esp.not 189ff) Ido think thatby init presenting prefacethe of but out; spelled not is project Cicero’s of justification this youngAdmittedly,in statesmen. before thesurviving workswritten the Ides March of the commonwealth throughholdsCicero viewthatthe philosophy he–as understands and it– teaches maybenefit its positive effect on the outlook and morals of aspiring 11 1958. 10 The phrase RUTH see sources other and fragments extant the from Hortensius the reconstruct to attempt an For . I 3).. I On Cicero’s usage of seethese terms e.g. MORSTEIN-MARX–ROSENSTEIN 2006: (the “bestof men”) or simply Lucullus optimus…quisque Hortensius II Cicero distorts his real motives for for earlierwritings. his distorts motives the IICiceroreal Luc 6Cicero inremarks his one hehasarguedto that previous of works 11 . 6: may seem to suggest the view that serious engagement with etenim siquodaminlibro vere est anobis philosophia laudata, (cf. , “a man of best standing”, refers to those whom he elsewhere calls elsewhere he whom those to refers standing”, of best man “a , ND ibid I 9; –in the context of . 61, boni –thatis, members of the conservative senatorial élite (cf. Appendix A De fin 332 . I 2, Luc Tusc De RePublica De . 6, itrefers not to Cicero’s activity as De Re P . II 4, III 6), and since that pace . III5-7),but–judging Klaus Bringmann Klaus (written in (written 54-50 ). He seems to He seems ). per ) tractare see 10 CEU eTD Collection 265-6. aristocrats in all the three dialogues that make upthework, in that three dialogues the all aristocrats disposed Epicureanism towards ( young“a Triarius, to encouragement gives speech his this, in man succeed not does he although and ofEpicureanism; exceptional seriousness”, who is also presentinconcern is thatquestions theacceptability this dialogue Cicero his now professed of for the conversation, the of One overtones. moral strong has debate the Scepticism, Academic for case his and is already ill- the in Similarly successful hold Roman politician to (cf. esp.IV 21-22,61,65-6, 73,74, 77). butalsoistheoretically itdefective, because an philosophy for inappropriate a andTorquatus. Triarius interlocutors his and optimate byCicero with valuesidealsshared andthe implausible,inconsistent or butalsofoundis because it abhorrent andincompatible is it that ground the on simply not rejected, is theory Epicurean the example, For underpinnings political consciousness of Roman and a principled (optimate) practice. focus perform onhow intellectual corresponding examinedasparts the of theories the is already indirectly insuggested Again, in importance the of education philosophical trainingthe of statesmen aspiring 13 stances philosophical (V6-8, 78, 86, 95). respective their to over him winning for contest playful of a form the takes and development, Lucius’ young promote to forces join to agreement an from start its takes Piso and Cicero and make him the matchof his illustrious relatives (III 8-9). Similarly, inBook Vthedebate between inwhose library the conversationLucullus, takes young the place, that gets ensure theto education forces join to that will equip agreement mutual him for their the from adult world springs Cato and Cicero moral at decadence contemporary his of description clear echoof decline (notably, a Republic the of crisis and lawhistory, institutions and with schoolingphilosophical ashis idealist solution to the also have urged mergingof the practical the wisdom and valuesconveyed byRoman from the surviving opening passage of Book V(1-2; cf.also Book from survivingopeningpassage the of 12 On these two deceased friends of Cicero (both of whomwere killed in the Civil war) see also In De finibus I-II Cicero does best his topersuade youngthe politician Torquatus to abandon his 13 Lucullus The Stoic theory too is rejected, not only on the ground that it is , in which Cicero presents, in response to Lucullus’ criticism, Lucullus’ to in response presents, Cicero in which , De fin . I13,II21, 119). bookIn conversation III-IVthe between De Re P De finibus Appendix A 333 . V 1-2 is found at , by the roles played by young Roman Tusc De leg . III 2ff). III . . III 29)– he may 29)–he . III 12 and by the by and Brutus CEU eTD Collection want todo something great ( men evenintellectual brings some good-willing aboutthat who decadence –which moral and thecontemporary III(2ff) describes Cicero inBook of this, preface the pride (incorporating livesvirtue centre To on,andtotake our in, civicvirtues). the by us to teaching console it philosophy gives that makes clear constantly Cicero earlier, in promoting philosophy as a remedy to the evils of life throughout the work 26-28, 36-7;III4-6a;VI 1-12, 8a(= civilisation (V 5); those who have read andforcealso virtue tranquillity, but asthe of inhuman of reason Cicero’sand engenderer former great works, to guide hispersonal only not as Ciceropraises philosophy, book prefacethe of the esp. the praise of philosophy at consummate oratory, itisworks the enlightened statesman philosophically can usingwho, the medium of effectively transmitDe RePublica the benefits of wisdom to society (cf. of manifestation glorious most the as a picture of includes wisdom philosophical political that selfless andrighteous activity schola “ the Academics casethat itis the not that again once Again, as we have seen, in Book V of the also 62, 99;cf.37-9, guidance (24-5, rectitude ( rectitude commitment is,show among things, other the Academic that to such valuesScepticismin aRoman contextcultural/political esp. (cf. as duty ( 14 On the genre of the speeches presented in the in presented speeches ofthe genre the On on the thesis that virtue is sufficient tomake the wise man happy rectum , are probably supposed to recall that on the views endorsed in these ) and friendship27, 39), ) and (23-4, praeclara De leg Ad Att Appendix A . I58-62;seefurther ) end up“ruining (4: theirstate” own ND sapientia Tusculans officium 334 I 12, where Cicero feels the need to stress need to feels the Cicero I12,where . VIII.11.1). Indeed, as I pointed out a bit out Indeed,. VIII.11.1). asIpointed Tusculans (V 68-72; see also 57ff). Already in see DOUGLAS 1995. ), equity ( or deprive one entirely from practical epoch nihil habeantquodsecuantur , in presents a , Cicerowhich Ɲ Luc does notundermine does one’s De Orat aequitas . 61, 65); what he has to . III 55ff; ), fidelity ( De oratore 14 , he presents everterunt De Re P fides and ”). ), . CEU eTD Collection character and way of life is in contradictionwith one’s professed philosophical principles. of the life” (cf. where adds that“thehe 132, order structuring and of one’s life by is implied one’s definition takes it forgranted that philosophical debates are pertinent to “the condition and planof one’s entire see GRIFFIN 1989:11. At consistent as I can ( speaking): “I adopt formyself the pursuit of and philosophyspoken”, or done in its well entirety, is that of all both to mother make “the my life philosophy as calls Cicero where philosophical learning and learning philosophical onthe other hand analysis by (exemplified character the and hand, one the on wisdom practical Roman of combination ideal his that show Publica the letters to Atticus inwhich Cicero implies that he considers the ideal established in his eum, quicumque sum,effecit subject to which I am devoted and which has made me who I am” ( by his former work on political theory, political on work former his by by his philosophical outlook informed thoroughly been always has politics to approach own his that implies Cicero 17 Again, in rolethe hecasts for himself in is dialogues the of perceptibly that a moral educator. philosophy as the remedy to this and other diseases of the soul (6). Correspondingly, suas civitates 16 a strong political subtext” (ibid. 4). of the 15 by andreason learning. recommended precepts the practice into put Ihave spheres private and public in both that believe I live, we how on bearing a have all of philosophy injunctions the if Moreover, (…) so. bedoing to appeared attention and enthusiasm to studying it; and I was the most ardently philosophising whenI least …my interest in philosophy is no sudden impulse, forfrom my early youth Ihave devoted no little inguidance, both andprivate publiclife: of practical source asa also but life, of misfortunes the amidst port ashissafe or leisure, of time his for relaxation intellectual an as merely not himself, for philosophy Forsimilar claims see also GILDENHARD 2007 offers an impressive (though at some points slightly forced) “political” reading Nos autemsubito nec coepimus philosophari necmediocrem aprimotempore aetatis in eostudio rebus ea praestitisse quae ratio et doctrina praescripserit. doctrina et quaeratio praestitisse ea rebus si omniaet philosophiaepraecepta referuntur ad vitam, arbitramur nos publiciset etprivatis in operam curamque consumpsimus, etcumminime videbamur tum maximephilosophabamur… summum Tusculans as the standard he set himself ( himself set he standard the as De natura deorum De natura bonum , on which the whole work can be characterised as a “Roman drama in education with ) owing to their false and corruptive education–, and recommends ad vitae constantiam quantum possum ”). At ”). 16 ( ND Luc ); Tusc I 7-8; P.G. Walsh transl., with modification) Ad fam. Orat . 65 . Cicero,speaking as the character in thedialogue (set in62-1 BC), . II 11-12 exclaims. he most thatthe hefinds abhorrentit whenone’s Cicero makes it clear that he has embraced the pursuit of pursuit the hashe embraced that clear makes it Cicero 17 –a claim that Cicero certainly saw as amply warranted . 11; XV. 4. 16 (to Cato in December 51 or January 50 BC); cf. also Ad Att. Q.Fr. Appendix A I 27, I and VII.3.2, VIII.11.1-2, X.4.4-5). Cf. further De RePublica 335 De leg. De ), and as recreation for the mind”, on which , in which he had attempted to I63(Cicero speaking): “this isthe quoius studio teneor quaeque me Acad . I7(Varro Brutus De Re De 322, 15 CEU eTD Collection learned men”, “evenif and who, hold they not office, a did performed publicfunction fame among authority and “have greatest the who speaks of those where Cicero The reference to the “great thinkersShuckburgh transl.,with modifications) of old” is a close echo of great of thinkers old to investigate used ethicsdo, and to laws. and and if we cannot guide the state in the senate-house and forum, at least to do so in letters and books, as the task; and if, onthe other hand, no one will employ us, atany rate to compose and read "Republics", as workmento rebuild the commonwealth- not to refuse assist, to but ratherhasten with enthusiasm to Only let us abide by our resolve… if anyone wishes forour services -not merely as architects, but also Varro: Marcus Terentius scholar celebrated written to the letter sameBut the philosophical in already approach to isadumbrated inwriting May a 46, permanently exchanged the administration of permanently for philosophy” state theadministration of exchanged ( I had that I for thought harangues; forensic my and speeches senatorial I my made augmentsby in “itthis that explaining Caesar’s thatunder point was mybooks reign ( „especially consistent” ( It is perhaps in sensethat Cicero’s this activity as is philosophical educator governing élite,hence and thevalue of his presentefforts to advance thisoutcome. integration of general intophilosophy the andculture mind-set of Rome’s traditional par excellence policy since words,Cicero offers hisconsulship. In his pastother career as own the his –whichhad declared been by Senate) (dominated Republican the government Scipioin entailscommitment grounded thea rationally dialogue) to the traditional 18 Acad nemo utetur opera, tamen et scribere et legere architectos verum etiamut fabros, ad aedificandam rem publicam,potius libenteret accurrere; si modo petebamus, nuncvero etiamsalutem; nondeesse si adhiberemodo ut quis volet, non sed haecmelius, modo tu nobisstetillud, unaviverein studiis nostris,aquibus antea delectationem quaerere. litteris et libris, utdoctissimi veteres fecerunt, navarerem publicam et demoribus ac legibus . I 11; cf. example by which judge bywhich beneficialofthe potential example to the effects Ad fam. IX. 2. 5). In the preface to Book II of in primis consentaneum Appendix A 336 ΔΓΏ΍ΘΉϟ΅Η ) with his former praiseworthy actions , et, siminusincuriaatque inforo,in at 18 ( De divinatione De Ad fam. De Re Publica De Re IX.2.4-5; E. E. De div. De Cicero I12, II 7). CEU eTD Collection reasonably as Cicero’sread “political testament”, cf.LONG 2006 (=1995): 308. apart from the rest by being decidedly more directly political; 20 conduct of life and to the administration of the state. the questions of divination andfate– are selected with aview to their pertinence to both the individual’s finibus 23-7, 29, 61-2, 65; see furtherLINTOTT 2008: 327-8), and immediately continues withethics ( He begins withepistemology ( except thatunlike Antiochus he completely ignores logic properin his treatment of Hellenistic ‘logics’. philosophy see BARNES 1989:81ff). Cicero’s ownprogramme reflects these Antiochean views, philosophical enquiry, and in this sense is prior (cf. chief chief topicsphilosophy within groundthe on that itprovides the “governing ( rule” clearthat his ‘logic’ ingeneral was also subordinated to ethics; he posited epistemology as the other solutionof problemthis affects humanbehaviour (cf. the Antiocheanmaterial inthe proper; cf. subject played aminor role in his system. Moreover, ( although to ethics Antiochus relevant physics taught considered dialectics Antiochus end. (that ethical is, the logic at learn (Plutatch, evil and Stoic. of good rep. differentiation the for than purpose other no for up taken is physics of variously and transformedadapted by Hellenisticthe schools (cf.Chrysippus’ e.g. claim that thestudy Sceptical method; cf. method; Sceptical Socrates figures as the initiatorof theethical turn inphilosophy, ratherthan as originatorof the topics treated in the treated topics particular the than rather general in writing of programme his about speak to seems he and Socrates”, Cicero says that he intends to elucidate inLatin “the old system of philosophy that starts from distinctionbetween good evil, and I exhaustively treated that subjectfive in volumes”. In Re Publica to directsequels beviewedas in hardly 45-44can written be works sure,To the essescripserint, aliquorei functos publicae munere et re publicamultaquaesierint de tamen, quoniam publicam nongesserint, ( government” about andwriting much research did they because philosophy 19 conveyed. and remedyRome’s pastand recenthistory (as wellashis aspropagation philosophy of arefuge to the from andillustrations examples andhis frequent andcastings, settings dramatic the evils of life), that his political views and sympathies are life and creating a better society. His grand political manifesto, society. grandpolitical His abetter life creating and conviction about the potential in for learning philosophical improving Rome’s public Cicero’s latest philosophical works, Cf. esp. , Tuculans Luc The primacy or centrality of ethics within philosophy was part of the Socratic legacy, 1035D). Cicero’s viewspoint werethis on probably directly influenced by As Antiochus. we Luc . 29, Antiochus held that the two principal issues inphilosophy are the criterionof truth and De fin 20 19 of part asthecentral ethics regarding about is consistent Although Cicero . But as we have seen, Cicero shows sufficient signs of his constant . 98), the emphasis he laid on the question of the criterion and on the question how the , he puts , heforefront;personal ethics puts in is the it mostly indirectly,through ). Again, the topics covered in his ensuing physical treatises –the nature of the divine, ofthe nature –the treatises physical ensuing his in covered topics the Again, ). . I 11, IV 14,and I 11, . Academica Acad . I 15; Academica (his defence of the scepticism of the New Academy); in this connection this in NewAcademy); of the scepticism the of defence (his De fin De div De . V 88; De gloria ), stressing the ethical significance of the issue (cf. esp. (cf. issue the of significance ethical the stressing ), Appendix A . II2:“since the foundationof philosophy onrests the Tusc 337 (lost), . II 7, V 10; cf. also Luc De amicitia . 29again; onAntiochus’ conceptionof ). De fin De officiis De and especially and De Re P. De Re . V . 44); but apparently the etiamsi quiipsirem De Re Publica De Re I 15, III 5; inparticular may be Lucullus De officiis regula Brutus ) makes it Acad ) to all , stand , had 31. . I 3 Luc De De De . CEU eTD Collection ideals he endorsed. political tothe and attuned moremake soas receptive them to supporters) and their learning transform mind-setof could the leaders countrymen aspiringhis fellow (both “popularising” surveys –a reasonable move ifhe took it seriously philosophical that by ofhistheoretical was and “introductory” framework political work writing rooted, the in which tradition intellectual the of dissemination the to push a crucial give to decided Rather, he vein. same in writing the thinknot of could Cicero circumstances already been in circulation for years, several and,arguably, in thechanged political Appendix A 338 CEU eTD Collection referring to the Academics if Cicero would consider himself a member of school. himselfamemberof would the if Academics the Cicero consider referring to “we”, of instead flown Roman ideals. However, Cicero speaks of “them”, of speaks Cicero However, ideals. Roman flown compatible with a responsible practical attitude, and even with a commitment tohigh- in years later, his latephilosophical histhat works: Academicscepticism is ΦΕνΗΎΓΙΗ΅Α do, the one which pleases” ( pleases” which one the do, hisreasoning finallyabout “but policy,then presenting], or usedto [adopting asthey method of windows of Cicero’s newserious villa– business. to By applying the Academic narrowness aboutthe –Atticus’ the maters complains of domestic from trifling own philosophical leaning would be in here,place especially as is there a marked shift to have made a joke at the expense of Atticus’ Epicureanism, so an allusion to his by Pace evidence of this. of lifelong promise a strong makes here Cicero my Though rather adolescence”. or my childhood adherence,De oratore from the next pupil least atof Philohis(or andfresh strong under influence), and inhis dismissed thirty-five or so years we have no positive found in his is Academy sceptic the to adherence of Cicero’s declaration first the As wehaveseen, Remarks on the debate about the continuity Academicscepticism of Cicero’s the continuity about debate Remarks on the Ad Griffin (GRIFFIN1995:335)Ifailsee to suchthat positive evidenceis provided Att . II.3.3 (written in 60 BC). Admittedly, in the previous passage Cicero seems asanimmature and“slipped unfinished effort of that out note-books the of in De inventione De ), utramuqe partem utramuqe he might seem to display the view that he will openly endorse fifteen endorse openly he will that view the display to seem might he nos , or “our people” “our or (II 9-10), an early work that he probably wrote when still a sed adextremum, utillisolebant,tamen (referred to as APPENDIX B nostri illi 339 , which would be the natural , which would natural be way of the ΝΕΘΎΖ ϢȱοΎΣΘΉΕΓΑ ΉϢΖȱ ̕ΝΎΕ΅Θ΍ΎЗΖȱ illi –that is “the isSocratics”– “the –that ΘχΑ ) in CEU eTD Collection but “to revealbut “to which every point be made sidecould ofanyquestion”; on either that contradict everything ( everything contradict by in originated method Peripatetic Aristotle, whosepurpose introducingit was not to disserendi finibus at However, side”. either from assent “withholding of basis the discovering“arguments of equal weightfor the opposite sides on the same subject” as Academica 45, contra omniumsentencias disserendi Tusculans At “the Socratics”. of he speaks letter Inthe Academicsceptics. the peculiar to viewthe Cicero’s add thaton We also should Epicureanism maybethis dueto his usual tactfulness Atticus.and courtesy towards philosophical in butallegiance, view of openly hostilehis towards attitude Atticus’ be explicit to asimilarshows about Ciceroin reluctance letters the Notably, heif call is Academic sceptic, why privately himselfan to this reluctance one? 18. ( learning” liberal all in degree, that Atticus cannot be said to be a memberof the sect, ashe is, unlike them, “cultivated to the highest Memmius Cicero, who apparently is aware of Memmius’ dislike towards Epicureanism, emphasises amicinovitui un-Epicureanopen-mindedness and wide isconstantly learning seeindicated: politissimus Epicurean an as that explicit it Atticus making too is bound avoid to to share enough their viewscourteous on is death (c.f.Cicero however, here, Even ruin.” so true ( a patriotpeople that it your seemsand as thoughSaufeius a mercifulas providence reason same had snatchedthe for him from not his country'shim: for fiery grieve not referring to Lentulus’ death, says: “Still Ifind consolation, thoughpoorone, a in the thought thatI need unifiedthe Platonic-Aristotelian tradition (cf. e.g. III 1;see also 21 use He does ‘ phrasethe The clearest allusion to Atticus’ Epicureanism is De orat V 10 and ). Atticus’ allegiance is more frequently and openly referred to in Cicero’s works, but his works, Cicero’s in to referred openly and frequently more is allegiance Atticus’ ). I 7 and I 45-46 he connects this Socratic-Arcesilean dialectic method with ). Note that evenina letter written from Athens (en route to Cilicia) in51 BC to Gaius or Acad . III67), andperfected by (cf. Carneades utramque partemdicendi . I14, etc.; Tusculans De naturadeorum ut noncontaomniasemper…diceret nostri illi De fin Ad fam II 9 the method of . V.3.OnAtticus’ Epicureanism seeGRIFFIN further 1989:17- . XIII.1.5: ’ at Pro Murena , later byArcesilaus adopted (cf., Appendix B I 11 he attributes to Socrates the method of the Socrates to 11 heattributes I 340 is non quo sit ex istis; est enim omni liberali doctrina is presented as a common Academic- asa common ispresented Ad Att. Ad fam. Ad in de omnibus rebus incontrariaspartis de omnibus utramque partem 63, where he professes adherence to De leg IV.6.1 (56 BC) Cicero, where mournfully XV.16, to Cassius in 45January: . III1, Tusculans ), as Arcesilaus later did, Arcesilaus ), as et vestri Luc. De oratore Delegibus methodology is not ), but because he was 7, V11);and at Acad Academica I21,54and III 80, III . I44). So dicunt De 21 I CEU eTD Collection during his stay in Athens in July 50 ( What about the other letters? In a letter to Memmius (the patron of Lucretius) written IX.22.1, written to Paetus in July 45: the letters to his friends, before the manifesto of the of manifesto the before his friends, to letters the ismostwriting.in have toCicero’s allusion this Academicleaning direct we the Yet atthe time of sceptic say is he anAcademic to still not that sceptic, an Academic he became follow that not itdoes Epicureanism; for a distaste acquired Cicero student rock-solid evidence. Strictly speaking, sentence reveals the onlythatasPhilo’s allusion Cicero’sto conversion to Academic scepticism. But we can hardly take it as a shiftin Cicero’s philosophical attitude. It is natural to take the reference toPhiloas an any agood,agreeable,andkindly man”. at rate, and before I knew Philo, was highly valued by me as a philosopher, and afterwards as, was him introduced andPatro “when byPhaedrus to recommended who, I wasaboy at allusion likely Aristotle’s that dialoguespopular such toofollowed a pattern, cf. Cicero’s seems (it Academics the to reference definite beme asufficiently seem to notto does at addition vague reference to Cicero’s sceptical stance. sceptical Cicero’s to reference vague 25 24 23 on Socrates. back all after goes occasions) different at (perhaps 15ff; (cf. from Socrates all deriving denote schools the to “Socratics” uses term the philosophical and rhetorical pursuits (cf. in use both putto could be devicethat adialectic/analytic itas is,he presented 22 Cicero’s letter For thebackground of the lettersee GRIFFIN 1989: 16-17, POWELLand 1995: 28.to his protégé On theissuesee further LONG 1995: 52ff. Trebatius in 53 ( At De orat De fin Ad Att. . III61Cicero seems suggest to the custom that of onvariousarguing sides of a question Ad Att . V 88; . II.3.3, XIII.19). Tusc. sed ut illisolebant,tamen ad extremum, V 10; cf. also Academiae nostrae Appendix B Ad fam. De RePublica Orat 341 Ad fam. . 46). XIII.1) Cicero says that the Epicurean the says that Cicero XIII.1) VII.13) may perhaps be taken to involve a 24 22 The sentence clearly indicates a Thesentence clearly Academica Tothis, at I 15, III 5; III I15, ). 25 in 45 (cf. e.g. Tusculans ΘχΑȱΦΕνΗΎΓΙΗ΅Α Brutus II7Cicero 31). Ad fam. Acad 23 The . I , CEU eTD Collection Again, itisAgain, by Arcesilaus is“praised” questionable whether Crassus when (at his, rather than philosophical sympathy Cicero’s, allegiance.or sohisdeclaration at 59, 113); 13; but cf. also quarrellinginto ( sects wisdom and eloquence- andindeed the sourceof fragmentation the wisdomof true heart” –thatis, “rift and of separation between the of philosophical the the tongue the GÖRLER 1995:99-100);for in his speechpresents Socrates Crassus as originatorthe III 67) the latter traces the origins of his sceptical method back Plato’sto Socrates (cf. Academyof listened Philo’sin the Athens to during lectured (he hisexile: 27 ( “truly Socratic” Arcesilaus’ 1995: 98-99).However,in GÖRLER Academy(cf. tothe himover haswon secondspeech Crassus’ declarethat in Cicero’s late period (cf. esp. (cf. late period in Cicero’s 77 Arcesilaus’ scepticism, whichwillemergeagain at animo percipi possi apprehensibility ( or universal denialof certainty with the less dogmatic explanation of his motivation presented at presented motivation his of explanation dogmatic less the with 26 in At fifties. late the allegiance Academic sceptic of writingto time atthe me in adherence Cicero’s them of evidence alleged the in succeed to discrediting seem arguments toGörler’s Antiochus’composition, Cicero’s of period “middle” the to As school. But they fail to entirely convince of Cicero’s For this point see BRITTAIN 2006: 106, 61.n. For a discussion of Cicero’s treatment of Socrates in of Socrates treatment of Cicero’s Foradiscussion 27 ; the more constructive aspect of Academic scepticism so vehemently emphasised vehemently so scepticism Academic of aspect more constructive ; the De inv t)– seems to represent a destructive power. Crassus’ account of account Crassus’ power. represent adestructive to seems t)– . II 4, 9-10) is completely absent here. De orat De naturadeorum De oratore Lucullus . III 60-61).. III Socraticum maxime Appendix B 7-9,65-67, 141,146,seefurther e.g. III 145 can simply be taken as an allusion to 342 26 we learn that Cotta wasafirm Cotta adherent learn that we De oratore Within the context of this narrative nihil esse certiquodautsensbusnihil aut De oratore Academica ) scepticism –grounded on ) scepticism on a –grounded see FANTHAM 2004: 249-50. III 145 Cicero has Cotta I 45, seems to conflict Lucullus 66-7and ND De orat De fin I17, . I . CEU eTD Collection (GÖRLER 1995:86ff, 97and103-4)has argued, more are less or directly indicative in the passages course of are significant The most sceptical Cicero’s approach. in dialogues utramque partem implausible that Cicero’s repeated attribution to Aristotle of thenot is methodology It himself). for of discussion in the part principal the casting in also model oratore finibus ( BC in45 Atticus to letter Aristotelian manner”, thatis, in imitation of Aristotle’s popular dialogues; and in a In a letter from 54 BC ( atGÖRLER(pointed out as “indicative” 1995:98)areperhaps not assuggests. Görler “is most palpable” in Book III ( oratore between structural analogies Again,the asamostpresented useful exercise). where the I 158, (cf. also orators for prospective placed are Carneades and Rather, Aristotle 1995:100). (cf. GÖRLER Academics” sceptical Academy” (GÖRLER 1995:100).Again, it may be right that in doubtof author’sthe epistemological stance” (GÖRLER 1995:98) –cf. forexample Again, it is unclear that at is thatit Again, unclear 29 of Philo”. teachings by the influenced Aristotelian our on account book dialogues took form; this rather, he suggests that Cicero’s sourceon thispoint may beenhave “a hand- 28 method of and Crassus later allusion(I 263) to the possibility that Antonius himself may perhaps be practicing the discussed below–;that or the reference to the scepticism of Antonius’ former teacherCharmadas (I 84), Again, it is perhaps too strong that the formulation of a sentence at Cf. however LONG 1995: 55, who argues that we do not have evidence that the lost Aristotelian De oratore on apar and and late philosophical andlate philosophical suchas treatises similarly in the(although latterpassage hishe contrasts recentworks with in utramque partem 28 ; admitting this possibility we also admitthat the similar procedure applied De RePublica De and the later dialogues may owe to Aristotle’s influence rather than than to rather influence Aristotle’s may oweto dialogues later andthe as representing the two schools that offer the best dialectical training dialectical best schools offer that the two the representing as was partly grounded on his Aristotle’s exoteric with acquaintance on waspartly grounded Ad Fam ibid , are indications that Cicero “is in strong sympathy with the sceptical De oratore 29 on the ground that in them he follows the Aristotelian the follows he in them that ground the on Topics Ad Att . 101), but this is certainly not aproof of Cicero’s scepticism. . I.9.23) Cicero says that the work is written “in an and . XIII.19.4) he his . XIII.19.4) describes III 71-72 and III 80Aristotle tothe is“assimilated Appendix B Rhetoric 343 mediated via the rhetorical schools and further and schools rhetorical the via mediated in utramque partem De finibus De legibus De De Re Publica De orat and I which, as Görler . I . 262 “should leave no Academica De naturadeorum Academic scepticism Academic methodology is De leg. and I28, De De De in CEU eTD Collection there isthere more nothing understand worthwhileclearly than to ( and28 he declares“of at that areasubjectof things all philosophical which debate the are born for justice and that justice is established not by by butnot justiceby nature”. are born for andisestablished opinion that seeking” ( judgewe arenohow ofjusticeto about what willbe there doubtsource innature] Indeed,reason found at20Marcusestablishes“onceit(22-27). have that we [the commences with a grandiose and utterly un-sceptic praise of the powers of human corruption mindsof our customs, by badupbringingdistorted and our own proneness variety the that of doctrine Platonic-Stoic the embracesat 29and47Cicero but controversies; opinions of theexistence philosophical notice of sentencetakes latter bethe sure, and general discord, especially in moral matters, is due to Plato as originator of the sceptical approach, cf. approach, sceptical of the as originator Plato hewill regard Academic sceptic (as an his scepticism with compatible is course of which Plato; find? Marcus greatly AtI 15welearn admires does reader Whatthe that dialogue,the which was notprobably against his own intention). widely recognised holdingas actually he has theviews Scipio Laelius and in endorse in Chater in generalandthedifferentinphilosophical sects particular (notably, Ipointed as out Ciceroinhardly this work avoid can toGreekphilosophy indicating his own attitude contemporary, and Cicero casts himself in the role of main speaker in the dialogue. So III-IV). Incontrast to 2004, 30 in which, asInoticed Chapter of Cicero’s sceptical stance: I19,36, 39 and 47(to this listmay we also add54-6 Idismiss16because to Powell’sagree with Itend Dyck’s and of reading passage the (cf. DYCK ad loc. ad III.1.2 Quo inuento non erit dubium, quo sinthaecreferenda quaequaerimus Quo inuentononeritdubium, ) as opposed tothe reading adopted by ZETZELe.g. 1999:110. (esp.n.after publishing 50), De Re Publica De Re I.5 , adumbrates Cicero’s main argument in argument main Cicero’s adumbrates , Appendix B 344 , in , De Re Publica De De legibus Acad the dramatic setting is setting dramatic the . I 46).. I Buthis speech plane intellegi Cicero was apparently Cicero De finibus ) that we ) that 30 To ”); CEU eTD Collection identified by in alaterGörler paper(GÖRLER1997: 53f; cf. 45and 50)as an intellectual “freedom” as an Academic sceptic inthelate asanAcademic sceptic “freedom” intellectual Cicero’s of theme recurrent the But personality. Cicero’s of characteristics familiar div scepticism advocated in late works(cf. the advocated scepticism yielding to pointing out that pointing out non tuum iudicium sequaris, sed auctoritati aliorumpareas! sed non tuumiudiciumsequaris,auctoritati speech ( Cicero’s of vein dogmatic unusually the notice to seems Atticus 36 that I at is only It without taking painstoindicate his sceptical from distance viewsthe he isupholding. similarly dogmatic manneragainst Epicureanthe II 15and36-7), theory (cf. e.g. indecisivelater, “postulated”. Butthis isnot either: haswhatCicero fellow enableshim temporarily Epicurean students grant to any of absence the 22, that at beginning, at the right makes aconcession Atticus contrast, –by fact well-known is a allegiance sceptical his that assuming content, and at I 36, or that his interlocutors show no sign of taking notice of the oddity of this tone when Cicero had made his sceptic allegiance publicinhis madesceptic allegiance when Cicerohadhis he “begs pardon” for it for from pardon” he (as Görler Academy “begs the Itis that odd also rather throughout”). isit Academic dogmatic scepticism: far from Academicsceptic (cf. GÖRLER 1995: 86:“…itis clear that what Cicero has sayto is if heis an is deceptive, quite speech of Cicero’s and content is, general tone That the comprehension. firm of matter a is discussion to pleasure; and at any rate the formulation seems to imply that the doctrine under . II 150 etc.), and Atticus’ remark seems to suggest that these are well-known and arewell-known suggest these that seems to remark andAtticus’ 150etc.), . II Et scilicettualibertas disserendiest, auttu amissais es qui in disputando auctoritas libertas disserendi imposed from imposed from are outside hallmarksbrand ofAcademicof the and insistence on personal Appendix B 345 Luc . 8-9, 60; ibid De finibus Tusc . puts it) only at alater point, Academica ). Görler ( . V32f, 83; philosophica iudicium –written at a time – he argues in a ibid as opposed to asopposed ND .) is rightin has been I17; De CEU eTD Collection (as indicated at (as understood requirementsofAcademicrelaxed to the so attitude somewhat scepticism Cicero’s with together truth, the advancing for quest positive and straightforward in further Chapter Academic stance Cicero will assume in will Cicero assume the Academic stance becauseleast –the stance this not probably Academic stance; of Cicero’s indication the time of writing On the whole, then, whole, the On “cause damage” ( reasoning, they excessive would them ( them speak, they “invade” would “confute all things”( these which he will defendattempt to the school in the in characterisation I 39is at of Academicsceptics inline the characterisation Cicero’s with Crassus’ But indicatestance. anAcademic beto taken might considerations These Carneades. II.3 in (first Chapter indicated repeatedly from (54); as Ihave Antiochus andhis distance argument in argument the Stoic-Peripatetic debate on the on debate Stoic-Peripatetic the and discussion, the from away stay to Academics the requests Cicero where assess we haveI39, to that is light inthis It tradition. Academic gives the to Cicero slant specific of the motif; a part Ciceronean” “entirely , n. 47), is, n.47), point disagreementthe the verbal mayactually back that merely to go De finibus Lucullus De oratore De legibus III.1.2 De legibus . At the same time, as we have seen in Chapter 66,cf. Chapter perturbatricem …harumomniumrerum , the later conception of Academic scepticism asa scepticism Academic of conception later , the . As I indicated at the end of end atthe Chapter of Asindicated I . III, andcuriously III, prejudicesresembles the against I does not seem to represent a Cicero a clear-cut a Cicero notrepresent Idoes seem to inuaserit De legibus Appendix B summum bonum III.1.1 346 ) his well his line) andarranged composed of Lucullus end), is notyet clearly conceived. I 53-56, where he endorses a view on nimias edet ruinas Academic – has not yet been articulated at beenyet – hasnot articulated thatclosely hisprefigures books:theAcademics ), so if he would let ). I.5 I.5 , heindicates , andargue CEU eTD Collection 1985 BARNES 1903-5 (= ARNIM 1991 ATKINS 2007b 2007 2001 (ed.) 1995 1999 1993 ANNAS 1999 ALGRA 1997 ALGRA 2003 ADAMS 1989 ADAMIETZ , Julia , von Hans F. A. , Keimpe etal. , Keimpe , Keimpe , James Noel E. Margaret – Margaret E. SVF , Jonathan , Joachim ) structure. À la mémoire de Victor Goldschmidt ‘Cicero’s Leipzig: Teubner Stoicorum Veterum fragmenta Cicero: On Duties. (Napoli: Bibliopolis). 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