The Fragments of the Poem of Parmenides
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Matter and Minds: Examining Embodied Souls in Plato's Timaeus
Matter and Minds: Examining Embodied Souls in Plato’s Timaeus and Ancient Philosophy By Emily Claire Kotow A thesis submitted to the Graduate Program in Philosophy in conformity with the requirements for the Master of Arts Queen’s University Kingston, Ontario, Canada September, 2018 Copyright © Emily Claire Kotow, 2018 Abstract With the rise of Platonism influenced by Plotinus and Descartes, philosophers have largely overlooked the fact that Plato directly acknowledges that there is a practical and valuable role for the body. The Timaeus clearly demonstrates that Plato took the idea of embodied minds seriously, not just as an afterthought of the immortal soul. Ultimately this research demonstrates that Plato did not fundamentally have a problem with the mind-body relationship. In offering an argument for Plato’s positive ideas of embodied minds and the necessity thereof, I will also demonstrate, through a historical comparative, why I think the emphasis on mind rather than on embodied mind might have occurred. ii Acknowledgments I would like to thank Dr. Jon Miller and the Philosophy Department of Queen’s University for allowing me to pursue my interests freely -a great privilege that few are fortunate enough to experience. iii Table of Contents Abstract………………………………….………………………………….…………………………………. ii Acknowledgments………………………………….………………………………….………………….. iii Table of Contents………………………………….………………………………….…………………….iv Introduction………………………………….………………………………….……………………………5 Chapter One: Plato’s Embodied Soul.……………………………….……………………………12 i. Plato and -
'Pythagorean' Kingship Treatises
Meeting Different Needs The Implied Readers ofthe ‘Pythagorean’ Kingship Treatises Michael Trapp To cite this version: Michael Trapp. Meeting Different Needs The Implied Readers of the ‘Pythagorean’ Kingship Treatises. KTÈMA Civilisations de l’Orient, de la Grèce et de Rome antiques, Université de Strasbourg, 2020, Les traités néopythagoriciens Sur la royauté, 45, pp.143-160. halshs-03071732 HAL Id: halshs-03071732 https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-03071732 Submitted on 16 Dec 2020 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents entific research documents, whether they are pub- scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, lished or not. The documents may come from émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de teaching and research institutions in France or recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires abroad, or from public or private research centers. publics ou privés. KTÈMA KTÈMA KTÈMA CIVILISATIONS DE L’ORIENT, DE LA GRÈCE ET DE ROME ANTIQUES CIVILISATIONS DE L’ORIENT, DE LA GRÈCE ET DE ROME ANTIQUES KTÈMA est une revue annuelle de recherche consacrée à l’histoire, l’archéologie et la littérature de la Grèce, de Rome, de l’Égypte et du Les traités néopythagoriciens Sur la royauté Proche-Orient antiques. Fondée en 1976 par Edmond Frézouls et Anne Gangloff Introduction ..............................................................................................................................5 -
De Theognide Megarensi. Nietzsche on Theognis of Megara. a Bilingual Edition
FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE De Theognide Megarensi Nietzsche on Theognis of Megara – A Bilingual Edition – Translated by R. M. Kerr THE NIETZSCHE CHANNEL Friedrich Nietzsche De Theognide Megarensi Nietzsche on Theognis of Megara A bilingual edition Translated by R. M. Kerr ☙ editio electronica ❧ _________________________________________ THE N E T ! " # H E # H A N N E $ % MM&' Copyright © Proprietas interpretatoris Roberti Martini Kerrii anno 2015 Omnia proprietatis iura reservantur et vindicantur. Imitatio prohibita sine auctoris permissione. Non licet pecuniam expetere pro aliquo, quod partem horum verborum continet; liber pro omnibus semper gratuitus erat et manet. Sic rerum summa novatur semper, et inter se mortales mutua vivunt. augescunt aliae gentes, aliae invuntur, inque brevi spatio mutantur saecla animantum et quasi cursores vitai lampada tradiunt. - Lucretius - - de Rerum Natura, II 5-! - PR"#$CE %e &or' presente( here is a trans)ation o* #rie(rich Nietzsche-s aledi!tionsarbeit ./schoo) e0it-thesis12 *or the "andesschule #$orta in 3chu)p*orta .3axony-$nhalt) presente( on 3epte4ber th 15678 It has hitherto )arge)y gone unnotice(, especial)y in anglophone Nietzsche stu(- ies8 $t the ti4e though, the &or' he)pe( to estab)ish the reputation o* the then twenty year o)( Nietzsche and consi(erab)y *aci)itate( his )ater acade4ic career8 9y a)) accounts, it &as a consi(erab)e achie:e4ent, especial)y consi(ering &hen it &as &ri;en: it entai)e( an e0pert 'no&)e(ge, not =ust o* c)assical-phi)o)ogical )iterature, but also o* co(ico)ogy8 %e recent =u(ge4ent by >"+3"+ .2017<!!2< “It is a piece that, ha( Nietzsche ne:er &ri;en another &or(, &ou)( ha:e assure( his p)ace, albeit @uite a s4a)) one, in the history o* Ger4an phi)o)ogyB su4s the 4atter up quite e)o@uently8 +ietzsche )ater continue( his %eognis stu(ies, the sub=ect o* his Crst scho)ar)y artic)e, as a stu(ent at Leip,ig, in 156 D to so4e e0tent a su44ary o* the present &or' D a critical re:ie& in 156!, as &e)) as @uotes in se:eral )e;ers *ro4 1567 on. -
A History of Cynicism
A HISTORY OF CYNICISM Downloaded from https://www.holybooks.com Downloaded from https://www.holybooks.com A HISTORY OF CYNICISM From Diogenes to the 6th Century A.D. by DONALD R. DUDLEY F,llow of St. John's College, Cambrid1e Htmy Fellow at Yale University firl mll METHUEN & CO. LTD. LONDON 36 Essex Street, Strand, W.C.2 Downloaded from https://www.holybooks.com First published in 1937 PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN Downloaded from https://www.holybooks.com PREFACE THE research of which this book is the outcome was mainly carried out at St. John's College, Cambridge, Yale University, and Edinburgh University. In the help so generously given to my work I have been no less fortunate than in the scenes in which it was pursued. I am much indebted for criticism and advice to Professor M. Rostovtseff and Professor E. R. Goodonough of Yale, to Professor A. E. Taylor of Edinburgh, to Professor F. M. Cornford of Cambridge, to Professor J. L. Stocks of Liverpool, and to Dr. W. H. Semple of Reading. I should also like to thank the electors of the Henry Fund for enabling me to visit the United States, and the College Council of St. John's for electing me to a Research Fellowship. Finally, to• the unfailing interest, advice and encouragement of Mr. M. P. Charlesworth of St. John's I owe an especial debt which I can hardly hope to repay. These acknowledgements do not exhaust the list of my obligations ; but I hope that other kindnesses have been acknowledged either in the text or privately. -
The Nous: a Globe of Faces1
THE NOUS: A GLOBE OF FACES1 Theodore Sabo, North-West University, South Africa ([email protected]) Abstract: Plotinus inherited the concept of the Nous from the Middle Platonists and ultimately Plato. It was for him both the Demiurge and the abode of the Forms, and his attempts at describing it, often through the use of arresting metaphors, betray substantial eloquence. None of these metaphors is more unusual than that of the globe of faces which is evoked in the sixth Ennead and which is found to possess a notable corollary in the prophet Ezekiel’s vision of the four living creatures. Plotinus’ metaphor reveals that, as in the case of Ezekiel, he was probably granted such a vision, and indeed his encounters with the Nous were not phenomena he considered lightly. Defining the Nous Plotinus’ Nous was a uniquely living entity of which there is a parallel in the Hebrew prophet Ezekiel. The concept of the Nous originated with Anaxagoras. 2 Although Empedocles’ Sphere was similarly a mind,3 Anaxagoras’ idea would win the day, and it would be lavished with much attention by the Middle and Neoplatonists. For Xenocrates the Nous was the supreme God, but for the Middle Platonists it was often the second hypostasis after the One.4 Plotinus, who likewise made the Nous his second hypostasis, equated it with the Demiurge of Plato’s Timaeus.5 He followed Antiochus of Ascalon rather than Plato in regarding it as not only the Demiurge but the Paradigm, the abode of the Forms.6 1 I would like to thank Mark Edwards, Eyjólfur Emilsson, and Svetla Slaveva-Griffin for their help with this article. -
Contradiction and Aporia in Early Greek Philosophy John Palmer
Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-11015-1 — The Aporetic Tradition in Ancient Philosophy Edited by George Karamanolis , Vasilis Politis Excerpt More Information chapter 1 Contradiction and Aporia in Early Greek Philosophy John Palmer An aporia is, essentially, a point of impasse where there is puzzlement or perplexity about how to proceed. Aporetic reasoning is reasoning that leads to this sort of impasse, and an aporia-based method would be one that centrally employs such reasoning. One might describe aporia, more basically, as a point where one does not know how to respond to what is said. In the Platonic dialogues dubbed ‘aporetic’, for instance, Socrates brings his interlocutors to the point where they no longer know what to say. Now, it should be obvious that there was a good deal of aporetic reasoning prior to Socrates. It should also be obvious that the form of such reasoning is immaterial so long as it leads to aporia. In particular, the reasoning that leads to an aporia need not take the form of a dilemma. Instances of reasoning generating genuine dilemmas – with two equally unpalatable alternatives presented as exhausting the possibilities – are actually rather rare in early Greek philosophy. Moreover, there need not in fact be any reasoning or argumentation as such to lead an auditor to a point where it is unclear how to proceed or what to say. Logical paradoxes such as Eubulides’ liar do not rely on argumentation at all but on the exploitation of certain logical problems to generate an aporia. All that is required in this instance is the simple question: ‘Is what a man says true or false when he says he is lying?’ It is hard to know how to answer this question because any simple response snares one in contradiction. -
Plato: Influences and Context1
Θεαίτητος | Theaetetus 1 1. Plato: Influences and Context1 1. Socrates. Plato is a member of his inner circle (Apology 34a, Phaedo 59b). Like others, he began to write ‘Socratic discourses’ (Aristotle) after Socrates’s death, continuing for forty years. Philosophy is a dialectical inquiry. Lifelong engagement with sophists. 2. Politics in Athens. The trial and execution of Socrates in 399 BCE shatters Plato’s political confidence. His aristocratic origin contributes to scepticism about democracy and the philosopher’s role in the city (cf. Tht. 172c). Yet: philosophy flourished in late 5th-century Athens. 3. Italy, Sicily. Plato visits Syracuse three times (see next page). He aimed to meet Pythagoreans, in particular Archytas (Tarentum), whose ideas are discernible in his work: immortality of the soul, mathematics, philosophical community. Consequence: founding of Academy in c. 387 BCE (dissolved in 527 CE). 4. Isokrates. The highly influential rhetor (orator) was a life-long foe. Tyranny at home: political rhetoric does (even) more harm than the Sophists (cf. the confusing logic-chopping in Euthydemus; cf. Tht. 164 c, 197a). Rivalry shapes Plato’s mature philosophy. 5. Parmenides, Heraclitus. Before joining Socrates, Plato studied with Cratylus and thus knew Heraclitean views (flux theory). Parmenides of Elea (Italy, early 5th century): only what is could be an intelligible object of thought—the forms. 6. Academy. Plato’s late work depends increasingly less on Socrates. His own views develop in the academy, in conversation with fellow ‘academics’, such as Aristotle. In 347, there are about 20 ‘disciples’, including two women.2 Leaves no dogmatic canon. Successors: Speusippus, Xenocrates, and Polemo (i.e. -
DIOGENES of SINOPE Diogenes of Sinope (C
DIOGENES OF SINOPE Diogenes of Sinope (c. 412‐323 BC), a contemporary of Plato and Aristotle, is considered the founder of the philosophical school of Cynicism. Concerned more with action than with words, he left no writings. What we know of his thought is what has been related to us by contempo‐ raries and later scholars. The most extensive account is from Diogenes Laertes, writing almost 500 years after Diogenes lived. LIFE OF DIOGENES OF SINOPE, THE CYNIC (404‐323 BC) RD BY DIOGENES LAERTIUS (3 CENTURY AD) Diogenes was a native of Sinope, son of Hicesius, a banker. Diocles relates that he went into exile because his father was entrusted with the money of the state and adulterated the coin‐ age. But Eubulides in his book on Diogenes says that Diogenes himself did this and was forced to leave home along with his father. Moreover Diogenes himself actually confesses in his Porde‐ lus that he adulterated the coinage. Some say that having been appointed to superintend the workmen he was persuaded by them, and that he went to Delphi or to the Delian oracle in his own city and inquired of Apollo whether he should do what he was urged to do. When the god gave him permission to alter the political currency, not understanding what this meant, he adulterated the state coinage, and when he was detected, according to some he was banished, while according to others he voluntarily quitted the city for fear of consequences. One version is that his father entrusted him with the money and that he debased it, in consequence of which the father was imprisoned and died, while the son fled, came to Delphi, and inquired, not whether he should falsify the coinage, but what he should do to gain the greatest reputation; and that then it was that he received the oracle. -
Anaximander and the Problem of the Earth's Immobility
Binghamton University The Open Repository @ Binghamton (The ORB) The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter 12-28-1953 Anaximander and the Problem of the Earth's Immobility John Robinson Windham College Follow this and additional works at: https://orb.binghamton.edu/sagp Recommended Citation Robinson, John, "Anaximander and the Problem of the Earth's Immobility" (1953). The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter. 263. https://orb.binghamton.edu/sagp/263 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by The Open Repository @ Binghamton (The ORB). It has been accepted for inclusion in The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter by an authorized administrator of The Open Repository @ Binghamton (The ORB). For more information, please contact [email protected]. JOHN ROBINSON Windham College Anaximander and the Problem of the Earth’s Immobility* N the course of his review of the reasons given by his predecessors for the earth’s immobility, Aristotle states that “some” attribute it I neither to the action of the whirl nor to the air beneath’s hindering its falling : These are the causes with which most thinkers busy themselves. But there are some who say, like Anaximander among the ancients, that it stays where it is because of its “indifference” (όμοιότητα). For what is stationed at the center, and is equably related to the extremes, has no reason to go one way rather than another—either up or down or sideways. And since it is impossible for it to move simultaneously in opposite directions, it necessarily stays where it is.1 The ascription of this curious view to Anaximander appears to have occasioned little uneasiness among modern commentators. -
Parmenides B6.1–2 Without a Modal Fallacy
Aporia vol. 21 no. 1—2011 Parmenides B6.1–2 without a Modal Fallacy MICHAEL J. HANSEN n all accounts, Parmenides makes a marvelous argument in the Way of Truth. However, there is no clear consensus among inter- Opreters about how to read it. The only noncontroversial point in interpreting the work seems to be that in it, Parmenides did something pro- found to philosophy. Despite this collective obligation to acknowledge Par- menides’ unique innovation (whatever it may be), it has become popular to read Parmenides as relying on a modal fallacy to make his argument. This would be an embarrassing mistake for such an influential work, especially given the argument’s deductive appearance. In this paper, I will outline the modal fallacy that Parmenides is accused of and argue for an interpretation that is free of the fallacy. I. The Alleged Modal Fallacy The critical fragment we must examine to decide the question is B6.1–2, in which the fallacy is supposed to occur: crhV toV levgein te noei`n t' ejoVn e!mmenai e!sti gaVr ei^nai, mhdeVn d' oujk e!otin . (Graham 214) Michael J. Hansen is a senior majoring in philosophy at Brigham Young University. He is interested in ancient philosophy, the philosophy of mind, epistemology, and metaphysics. In the fall, he will be pursuing a PhD in philosophy at the University of California–Los Angeles. This essay placed first in the 2011 David H. Yarn Philosophical Essay Contest. 2 MICHAEL J. HANSEN As usual, Parmenides’ language admits of many permissible translations for interpreters to quibble over, but this fragment is exceptionally difficult to render. -
Lucan's Natural Questions: Landscape and Geography in the Bellum Civile Laura Zientek a Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulf
Lucan’s Natural Questions: Landscape and Geography in the Bellum Civile Laura Zientek A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy University of Washington 2014 Reading Committee: Catherine Connors, Chair Alain Gowing Stephen Hinds Program Authorized to Offer Degree: Classics © Copyright 2014 Laura Zientek University of Washington Abstract Lucan’s Natural Questions: Landscape and Geography in the Bellum Civile Laura Zientek Chair of the Supervisory Committee: Professor Catherine Connors Department of Classics This dissertation is an analysis of the role of landscape and the natural world in Lucan’s Bellum Civile. I investigate digressions and excurses on mountains, rivers, and certain myths associated aetiologically with the land, and demonstrate how Stoic physics and cosmology – in particular the concepts of cosmic (dis)order, collapse, and conflagration – play a role in the way Lucan writes about the landscape in the context of a civil war poem. Building on previous analyses of the Bellum Civile that provide background on its literary context (Ahl, 1976), on Lucan’s poetic technique (Masters, 1992), and on landscape in Roman literature (Spencer, 2010), I approach Lucan’s depiction of the natural world by focusing on the mutual effect of humanity and landscape on each other. Thus, hardships posed by the land against characters like Caesar and Cato, gloomy and threatening atmospheres, and dangerous or unusual weather phenomena all have places in my study. I also explore how Lucan’s landscapes engage with the tropes of the locus amoenus or horridus (Schiesaro, 2006) and elements of the sublime (Day, 2013). -
Parmenides' Theistic Metaphysics
Parmenides’ Theistic Metaphysics BY ©2016 Jeremy C. DeLong Submitted to the graduate degree program in Philosophy and the Graduate Faculty of the University of Kansas in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. ________________________________ Chairperson: Tom Tuozzo ________________________________ Eileen Nutting ________________________________ Scott Jenkins ________________________________ John Symons ________________________________ John Younger Date Defended: May 6th, 2016 ii The Dissertation Committee for Jeremy C. DeLong certifies that this is the approved version of the following thesis: Parmenides’ Theistic Metaphysics ________________________________ Chairperson: Thomas Tuozzo Date Defended: May 6th, 2016 iii Abstract: The primary interpretative challenge for understanding Parmenides’ poem revolves around explaining both the meaning of, and the relationship between, its two primary sections: a) the positively endorsed metaphysical arguments which describe some unified, unchanging, motionless, and eternal “reality” (Aletheia), and b) the ensuing cosmology (Doxa), which incorporates the very principles explicitly denied in Aletheia. I will refer to this problem as the “A-D Paradox.” I advocate resolving this paradoxical relationship by reading Parmenides’ poem as a ring-composition, and incorporating a modified version of Palmer’s modal interpretation of Aletheia. On my interpretation, Parmenides’ thesis in Aletheia is not a counter-intuitive description of how all the world (or its fundamental, genuine entities) must truly be, but rather a radical rethinking of divine nature. Understanding Aletheia in this way, the ensuing “cosmology” (Doxa) can be straightforwardly rejected as an exposition of how traditional, mythopoetic accounts have misled mortals in their understanding of divinity. Not only does this interpretative view provide a resolution to the A-D Paradox, it offers a more holistic account of the poem by making the opening lines of introduction (Proem) integral to understanding Parmenides’ message.