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chapter 10 ’ Reception of

Carl S. O’Brien*

I Introduction

It is clear now that the author of the Didaskalikos was indeed Alcinous, and the attribution to should be regarded as an error, resulting from a mis- guided conjecture by Freudenthal.1 Alcinous’ use of Plato can be characterized in terms of three central features. Firstly, his work is a handbook or instruction manual, although the level of instruction at certain points can seem relatively advanced. This suggests that it is not a handbook intended for beginners, but rather those who have already received some instruction in (pos- sibly as a refresher manual for teachers of Platonism).2 Secondly, Alcinous composed the Didaskalikos during the phase of Platonism identified as Mid- dle Platonic and, as is typical of the period, Aristotelian and Stoic strands and terminology are combined with his Platonic heritage (although one must also note that many of the Aristotelian and Stoic elements which find their way into often had a Platonic inspiration to begin with). In light of the lack of a distinctive “orthodox” Platonism, a range of opinions was toler- ated and regarded as philosophically acceptable. This is undertaken from the dual perspective of modernizing or updating Plato, as well as claiming sub- sequent Aristotelian and Stoic advances for Plato himself; a good example is logic at Did. 5, which can be claimed to owe its origin to Platonic dialectic, although Plato himself never identified logic as a subdivision of . Thirdly, Plato is reduced by Alcinous to a series of dogmata or doctrines; he is stripped of his literary character and, although it is clear that Plato’s philoso- phy permeates the Didaskalikos, we do not get the sense of Alcinous drawing upon any dialogue in its entirety. Passages from different works of Plato are

* I am deeply grateful to the Fritz Thyssen Foundation in Cologne for the award of a fellowship at Heidelberg under the supervision of Prof. Jens Halfwassen, which made this article possible. I would also like to thank Professor John Dillon (Trinity College, Dublin) for his insightful comments on an earlier draft. 1 On whom see Whittaker (1990), vii. 2 Dillon (1993), xiv.

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2018 | doi 10.1163/9789004355385_012 172 O’Brien meshed together based on thematic lines.3 It is not clear whether this inter- weaving was accomplished by Alcinous himself or an intermediate source, or indeed whether he draws upon several sources. Alcinous’ textual usage follows in the long tradition of systematizing Plato, which began with the Old Academy. A stylistic feature related to this graft- ing together of texts is Alcinous’ employment of what Dillon terms “mirror” quotation:4 frequently a pair of words used by Plato are simply inverted by Alcinous. Dillon suggests that Alcinous consciously adopts this technique in order to avoid directly quoting Plato. It must be noted that while Alcinous is sometimes inconsistent in his claims, this is something of which he himself was aware (outlined in his apology at the end of the work, 36.189.28–32), and in many cases, this inconsistency can be traced to Plato. A good example is Alcinous’ treatment of the soul as tripartite (although he structures it in a bi- partite manner) at chapter 17 and in chapters 23–24, as found in the and Phaedrus, and the representation of the soul as unitary at Did. 14.169.16– 170.20 and Did. 25.177.21–32, based upon Phd. 80b where it is indicated that the soul is monoeidēs (uniform). Individual passages from Plato’s dialogues are rarely referred to directly (or indeed cited), though this does not apply to 27.180.41–28.181.41 where numerous citations and close references to the dialogues are made.5 When Alcinous actually quotes passages, he sometimes only cites the opening of the relevant section, without mentioning which dialogue he is drawing from, as he does when referring to Leg. IV 715e (28.181.37–39) and Phdr. 248a (28.181.39–41). This reinforces Dillon’s impression6 that the Didaskalikos is intended for teachers of philosophy, rather than elementary students, since it presupposes considerable familiarity with the texts under discussion. Alcinous, in general, does not comment on Plato as a philosopher, with the exception of Did. 6.159.45–160.3, where his praise seems somewhat over- done: “In general, the man [Plato] was supremely competent in, and a con- noisseur of, the procedures of definition, division , all of which

3 See Dillon’s Introduction (1993), xxix to his Alcinous translation. 4 Dillon (1993), xxx. 5 Dillon (1993), 37 and Göransson (1995), 108 provide detailed accounts: References are made to Euthd. 281d–2 (27.181.5) and Rep. as a whole (27.181.8–9), Leg. I 631b is quoted at Did. 27.180.43–181.2 (the first book is mentioned explicitly), Tht. 176a–b at 28.181.22–26 and Rep. X 613a at 28.181.26–30, where the passage is explicitly noted to come from the final book, so Alcinous, or at least his source, was familiar with the original text of Rep. This contrasts with the use made of Phd. 82a–b (28.181.30–36), discussed below. 6 At Dillon (1993), xiv.