Conclusion

VALUE HIERARCHIES AND VALUE AUTONOMY

The topic of this concluding section will include a summing up of the theory of creative actualization, but with an eye to its place in philosophy. The question for us is the place of values in philosophic structures: their origin and justification as a reflection of the structure of hierarchy in Plato’s theory of the Form of the Good. Hierarchies of value, the model in previous philosophy, are based on the evaluation of knowledge as first in value in Platonic idealism. Knowledge of value was considered the condition of value, and thereby valued above other categories of value. Plato’s structure was adopted by subsequent theories that were quite different in many respects from Plato’s, from Aristotle’s teleological pros hen relation, in which inherent value is treated as instrumental; to atomic foundationalisms and reductionisms in value theory. Value emanated from a summum bonum, a one of value, whether the content of the summum bonum was intellectualistic, voluntaristic, hedonistic, or what not, in a hierarchical, top down structure. How far does creative actualization escape this specific structure? I will argue that creative actualization results in a very different relation of values: in accord with reciprocal relations of inherently valuable goods, and intrinsically valuable agents, good in themselves, a horizontal differentiation results in pluralism of values, not a monistic summum bonum.1 Again, the relation of goods and values is to an inherently different “other,” not a pros hen, a referring back of instrumental values to intrinsic values, from which their value derives. Above all, pluralism of value is a rejection of the reduction of value, whether to human good, subjective good or any other narrowly defined good considered as a summum bonum. In the last section I will argue that the hierarchy of Plato’s theory dominates not only value theory, but metaphysics as well. Not only value theory, but all philosophical systems contain such hierarchical relations, whether idealist (emanation from the “One”), participation in “degrees of “being”” (as the pros hen back to a justifying first), or atomistic, foundational models (in which the higher is built up out of the lower: a reverse hierarchy). Philosophy is indeed a “history of footnotes to Plato.” The question then arises whether creative actualization can provide an alternative ultimate justification, an alternative to hierarchy. What is the relation of creative actualization to previous value structures as well as paradigms of philosophy 310 CREATIVE ACTUALIZATION that incorporated the Platonic structure, including “being,” the subject, and language?

1.

Most value theories in Western thought have the structure of a value hierarchy, in the form of some summum bonum. It could even be claimed that value theory confuses all values with hierarchical structure, and that little or no distinction has been made between values and hierarchy. The central place that “standards” of value, a summum bonum, have taken in the literature of value is a reflection of hierarchical structure. A standard of value subordinates other values in a value relation of dependence. The worth of the subordinated value is not inherent in it, or intrinsic to it, but derives from the standard or the summum bonum. The direction of valuation is downward as in all hierarchies. Value is derivative from the standard downward so that inferior grades of value derive worth only from their place or rank. The further down they are in relation to the standard of value, the less worth they derive from it. Higher ranks derive greater value than lower, as they more nearly reflect or partake of the supreme standard. If appeal to a “higher standard” carries weight in value considerations, it is not the only organizing principle of hierarchies. We can show fairly easily that not all hierarchies have value standards as their organizing principle. Thus value and hierarchy are not co-extensive, for some hierarchies are not organized around supreme values, a summum bonum, but around another first. Value hierarchies are but a “species” of hierarchy. Alternatively, hierarchies are the attempt to use the value model as a model for other fields. Another hierarchy is formed by logical terms. An instance is subordinated under a kind or species, a species under a genus, one genus under another of greater scope, and so on. The “higher” terms have greater generality of scope, but not necessarily greater value. Term logic involves subordination under unifying generals, and thus exhibits the same structure. In turn, intellectualist hierarchies are created, and subsequently by systematic extension, hierarchies in other areas of philosophy. Indeed the importance of logic to philosophy might be evidence for the origin and pervasiveness of hierarchical models in philosophy as due to logical hierarchies. I will argue below, their origin is even earlier. It could still be argued that language has such hierarchies and these have influenced earlier thought, however. Military, religious, political, and bureaucratic hierarchies are based on degree and extent of power. A general officer may issue commands to several aides of high rank, who in turn instruct junior officers, who carry out the orders with lower grade regulars. Power is proportional to rank within the hierarchy, for it extends to more subordinates the higher the rank. An analysis of a power hierarchy may be broached in terms of a logical hierarchy such that greater generality of scope roughly corresponds to greater power. A regional