Napoleon’s Shadow Facing Organizational Design Challenges in the U.S. Military
By John F. Price, Jr.
n the world of competitive triathlons, that impede flexibility, adaptability, and and creating more direct communications. there is a saying: “You might not win creativity and undermine the execution Our staff organization must be fixed.”3 the race in the swim, but you can cer- of its operations in an increasingly chal- Despite this acknowledgment of the Itainly lose it there.” The maxim empha- lenging environment. In 2001, Major Eric problems generated by outdated structure, sizes how initial actions lay the foundation Mellinger, USMC, wrote, “The modern the military has continued to resist change in for success or failure. For leaders, decisions military staff embodies the industrial age most sectors. This resistance is grounded in on organizational structure are similar to precepts of hierarchical, vertical flows of the daunting size of DOD, the natural inertia the triathlon swim; it may not be the key to work and supervision.”2 This critique echoed of the organization, and its accustomed use of organizational success, but failure to recog- the indictment leveled by General Anthony the “vertical flow of control, facilitating dis- nize the importance of structure selection Zinni, USMC, the former commander of semination of orders from top to bottom and and maintenance—and the impact it has on U.S. Central Command. He stated, “Napo- ensuring compliance from bottom to top in employee performance—could easily be the leon could reappear today and recognize my a rapid efficient manner.”4 Since this empha- source of downfall. Central Command staff organization: J-1, sis is unlikely to change, the key to getting Next to choosing the organization’s administrative stovepipe; J-2, intelligence leaders to adopt a new structure depends on strategy, the selection of organizational stovepipe—you get the idea. The antiquated showing the adverse impacts of the current structure is arguably the next most impor- organization is at odds with what everyone structure on organizational performance tant decision leaders make. In Designing else in the world is doing; flattening organi- and employee behavior and how both will Organizations, Jay Galbraith points out, zation structure, decentralizing operations, improve through structural change. As a “By choosing who decides and by designing processes influencing how things are decided, the executive shapes every decision made in the unit.”1 In today’s fast-paced, competitive environment, organizations can ill afford to neglect the advantages that come from U.S. Navy (Spike Call) organizational design. Despite this reality, large traditional organizations such as the Department of Defense (DOD) continue to maintain stifling, rigid bureaucracies that hamstring talent and place the organization at a disadvantage.
Defensive Structures While still the premier fighting force in the world, the U.S. military stub- bornly retains organizational structures
Army lieutenant colonel briefs commanding general Joint Task Colonel John F. Price, Jr., USAF, is Vice Wing Force–Haiti on internally displaced persons camps in Port-au- th Commander for 375 Air Mobility Wing and recently Prince during Operation Unified Response completed a tour on the Joint Staff.
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RAND study pointed out, “The challenge for navigational choices are addressed only by Napoleon’s shadow and improve organi- the U.S. military is to develop new organiza- the most entrenched in the organization. zational design. However, in most cases, tional structures that achieve the efficiencies Furthermore, the functional stovepipes that the structural adjustments were temporary and creativity businesses have gained in the comprise the central columns of the orga- fixtures stood up to address a specific con- virtual and reengineered environments, nizational structure only serve to fracture tingency operation, acquisition program, while at the same time retaining the elements teamwork, collaboration, and knowledge or other “hot topic.” Interestingly, in many of the traditional, hierarchical, command distribution. It is no surprise that then- cases, these ad hoc organizations are cross- and control system (for example, discipline, Brigadier General Zinni and others argued, functional or matrixed structures specifically morale, tradition) essential for operations in “In a crisis, the dusty wire diagram sitting designed to cut through the day-to-day the combat arena.”5 atop most of our desks does not spring into bureaucracy. Somehow, we have realized action as one amorphous mass.”8 these reliable structures are preferred for Beyond the Org Chart The current structure undermines the crisis scenarios when speed, accuracy, and To appreciate the impact of structural amazing talents of officer and enlisted Ser- creative thinking are at a premium, but when decisions, we must comprehend the multiple vicemembers by burying them under excess the crisis ends, we return to the sluggish, components of the structural dimension. layers of supervision and constructing stovepiped hierarchy. According to recent research by Joseph barriers to information exchange. Instead One aspect that makes this more dif- Krasman, a comprehensive look at structure of creating opportunities, the oppressive ficult is the challenge of transitioning the requires consideration of routinization, stan- structure stifles initiative and slowly drains entire military structure. Instead of reform- dardization, span of control, formalization, talent from the organization. As Arno ing one or even a set of organizational and centralization.6 Taken together, these Penzia, Bell Laboratory’s chief scientist, charts, adaptation for DOD would require components provide a significantly expanded states, “The problem with hierarchies is that the near simultaneous transition of thou- concept of organizational structure, and it people at every level have the power to say sands of organizational charts. The reality becomes easier to see how structure deci- sions have so much influence on employee behavior. despite the problems generated by outdated structure, the Leaders must also contend with the military has continued to resist change in most sectors fact that organizational design is a continual process. As Galbraith points out, “Leaders must learn to think of organize as a verb, no.”9 The unfortunate reality in the military of this obstacle was seen in the recent efforts an active verb. Organizing is a continuous is that most of those people telling you “no” of U.S. Southern Command to reform its management task, like budgeting, scheduling do not have the authority to tell you “yes,” organizational structure. In a progressive or communicating.”7 Unfortunately, some but are still able to clog the arteries of the attempt to depart from the Napoleonic organizations, especially large ones, continue organization. stovepipes, Admiral James Stavridis created to view organizational structure as a one- In a terrible irony, the effort by senior a matrixed organization focused on its time, foundational decision that they are military leaders to smooth decisionmaking primary mission areas. However, as soon as reluctant to revisit because of the extensive and improve control only results in slowing the Haitian earthquake crisis hit and exten- repercussions of organizational structure down the organization and stifling its ability sive coordination was required with external changes. However, the dangers of failing to to react to opportunities and threats. Instead agencies, the command reverted to the adapt are much more significant than the of helping the organization, the structure traditional J-structure mid-crisis primar- inconveniences of structural change, even in fosters dependence and a greater need for ily because of the structural misalignment a large hierarchical bureaucracy. direction from senior leadership. As Martin with other DOD organizations. While some van Creveld states, “An organization with would use this example to derail future Impact of Inaction a high decision threshold—that is, one in restructuring efforts, the real lesson lies in While effective in the dissemination which only senior officials are authorized the need for a coordinated overhaul of the of top-down direction, the current military to make decisions of any importance—will entire system, and that overhaul needs to structure has numerous adverse impacts on require a larger and more continuous infor- start now. the military members currently serving. At mation flow than one in which the threshold Radical steps are required by defense the individual level, the military’s hierarchi- is low.”10 It is time for senior defense leaders to leaders. In Leading the Revolution, Gary cal bureaucratic structure undermines cre- recognize the impediment that the organiza- Hamel points out that “Nonlinear innova- ativity, hinders empowerment and sense of tional structure has become and consider the tion requires a company to escape the shack- ownership, and fosters cynicism. The same consequences of failing to change in the face les of precedent and imagine entirely novel organization that rapidly responds around of difficult economic pressures and myriad solutions.”11 For DOD, the novel solution is the globe to the directions of senior officers military threats. an adaptive organizational structure that provides almost no voice to the hundreds of flattens the hierarchy, empowers the mem- thousands in the lower ranks. As a result, Leaving Napoleon Behind bership, and fosters flexibility and creativity. the organization’s adaptability and flex- Over the last decade, the military has This organizational design should consist ibility are significantly impaired because made a few feeble attempts to step out of of the following characteristics identified by
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William Fulmer in his Shaping the Adaptive organizations and promote a DOD-wide the combatant commands occupy the execu- Organization: shift driven by the natural tendency of mili- tion role as they employ today’s force, while tary organizations to seek alignment. the Services are charged with the preparation ■■ decentralization If we know it is time to restructure— role of generating tomorrow’s force while ■■ high spans of control and it appears the logical starting point is sustaining today’s. However, when we look ■■ extensive use of temporary structures the Joint Staff—the question remains: what at each organization’s staff arrangement, we ■■ powerful information systems should the new structure look like? By fol- typically see execution centered on the J3 ■■ constantly evolving structure.12 lowing Louis Sullivan’s maxim “form ever but also distributed across the staff, while follows function,” we find our structural preparation roles are scattered across the Decentralization removes the barriers answer by looking at the core purpose of functional stovepipes. to creativity and freedom of action, while our military enterprise.14 If we filter through The temporal dividing line must be the wide spans of control reduce the layers of all of the creative language in the national driving force in the staff reorganization effort bureaucracy and keep senior officials more in strategy documents and observe how the instead of attempting to organize around touch with operations.13 Increasing the use of organization is resourced, it is apparent that the competing demands of geography and temporary structures enables adaptation and DOD is focused on two desired outcomes: functional capabilities. The current system flexibility and indirectly provides a forum win the current fight (in whatever form that disperses parts of execution and preparation for structural experimentation within the may be), and prevent/ prepare to win the next throughout the organization and desynchro- organization. Information systems enable conflict—in order to secure America’s global nizes the efforts. Even worse, because the networking and collaboration in virtual position. This description of the military’s system has aspects of execution laced across structures and allow members to escape core purpose can be condensed down to two the organization, it results in every functional geographical or functional barriers. Finally, foundational concepts that form the basis area gravitating to current operations, which the establishment of structure as a variable for a new military structure: execution and causes the entire organization to dive to the instead of a fixed entity fosters a learning preparation. tactical level. To avoid this reality, temporal organization culture, which is vital in today’s These two pillars are the major separation, instead of functional “cylinders of environment. operating lanes on every staff and in every excellence,” must be the basis for staff design. functional area. They represent the tempo- This simple bifurcation would significantly Act Now ral separation we see between operational compress the staff structure to reflect priority While some would have us wait for planning and execution, between procur- of effort—again, execution and preparation. the elusive “time of peace” to implement ing capabilities and employing them, and It would also reduce the problems of duplica- change, now is the perfect time to execute between recruiting and training personnel tion of effort and information fratricide by needed structural change in DOD. Budgetary and deploying and employing personnel. If eliminating the artificial barriers formed by contractions and impending personnel draw- we look at DOD on a grand scale, it becomes the functional arrangement. downs demand increased efficiency and place clear that this preparation/execution divide is The implementation of this construct a great deal of stress on the existing structure. the primary separation between the Services would result in the elimination of functional Congressional pressure to reduce the bloat of and combatant commands. For the most part, hierarchies on the military staffs. Instead the general/flag officer corps creates oppor- tunities to eliminate excess structural layers. Decentralized, Cross-functional Staff Concept It is time to stop renting extra office space in Northern Virginia because the Pentagon Director of Staff Synchronization manages work flow and staffs long ago outgrew one of the world’s spans current-future transition largest office buildings and start organizing st for 21 -century operations. Director of Staff Synchronization ✯✯✯✯ While a comprehensive reform effort will involve all of DOD, the proper starting Operational Processes point for the process must be with the Joint (Plans, Programs, Budgets, Posture, Risk/Readiness) Staff. As an extension of the Chairman, this Directors of Execution staff serves as the interface with both the Operational Enablers Service staffs collocated in Washington and and Preparation (Intelligence, Logistics, C4ISR, Personnel, Legal, Medical) the combatant command staffs distributed integrate all
aspects of EXECUTION
around the world. The Joint Staff helps to PREPARATION current and future Operational Areas (Africa, Europe, Asia, Americas, Pacific, Space) facilitate the interchange between the Ser- operations vices’ organize, train, and equip missions; ✯✯✯ the combatant command’s regional engage- Operational Domains / Capabilities ✯✯✯ (Land, Naval, Air, Space, Cyber, Nuclear, SOF) ment operations; and the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s guidance and policy. Organizational change efforts at this critical Cross-functional Teams juncture will cascade into the partnering (Crisis Action, Operational Planning, Working Groups, etc.)
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or collectively in crisis. While this structure may seem foreign on initial review, there are numerous examples of it already residing in our staffs. The Pakistan-Afghanistan Coor-
U.S. Navy (Spike Call) dination Cell is a perfect example of a highly effective cross-functional team that existed independently on the staff before recently being absorbed by the J5. Another example common to many staffs is the commander’s action group. These multifunctional minia- ture think tanks, designed to tackle issues for senior commanders, are perfect examples of how a standing, matrixed team concept could be employed. Senior functional area experts would still be resident in the staff to assist with developmental and assignment issues, but the elimination of the functional direc- torates would remove barriers to collabora- tion and improve staff integration. Transitioning the Joint Staff and com- batant command staffs to this model would not be easy because it would remove numer- ous layers of the hierarchy and deal a serious blow to the functional stovepipes. However, the improvements in agility, collaboration, and end-to-end process management would be significant. Shifting our major staffs to focus on operational execution and prepara- tion helps ensure unity of effort and continu- ity in plans, programs, and budgets. While significant detail would need to be added to make this concept a reality, it is clear that this approach could provide several key benefits. First, it ensures the entire staff is focused on the core DOD mission and not divided by functional allegiances. Secondly, it ensures the return of a strategically focused staff by devoting a large portion of the staff Army colonel briefs commander of United to focus on future strategic development. Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti The intentional temporal separation would be complemented by the consolidation of of having directorates focused on person- tions would be the present out to 6 months, the staff, which would ensure sufficient nel, intelligence, logistics, and so forth, the where future operations would take the lead. connections to current operations to enable revised staff would matrix each of these The word operations in this construct has continuity of thought in concepts, planning, functions into the core areas of execution a greatly expanded meaning to include all and lessons learned. Third, the consolidation and preparation depending on its role. While aspects of military operations from budget- of the staff into a single current and future functional leadership would still exist, the ary planning and platform procurement to operations group would enable the elimina- overall coordination of effort across the staff kinetic operations in a combat zone. tion of numerous general/flag officer posi- would be greatly simplified. The combatant This staff is not intended to operate tions that were previously required to lead commander or Chairman would be able to in functional areas. Instead, it is designed the numerous directorates. Instead of serving focus attention on two primary channels: to operate like a joint task force or a cross- as stovepipe chieftains, the remaining senior current operations and future operations. functional team that pulls together the officers would be true generalists charged The dividing line between current and future desired expertise to address specific issues as with facilitating the efforts of the cross- operations in this construct would differ they arise. Instead of continuing the current functional teams. Fourth, the removal of significantly from present models. While process of creating ad hoc groups every time bureaucratic layers and duplication of effort some fluctuation would be needed to balance an issue arises, team members are aligned combined with improved coordination would workloads, the baseline for current opera- in cells capable of working independently provide increased staff efficiency in the face
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of impending personnel cuts. Finally, and 4 Arthur Huber et al., The Virtual Combat most importantly, the “practice like you play” Air Staff: The Promise of Information Technologies NEW maxim would finally be realized in the head- (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996), 2. 5 Ibid., xiii. quarters staffs as the agility, creativity, and from NDU Press 6 Joseph Krasman, “Taking Feedback-Seeking expertise of the cross-functional teams seen for the to the Next ‘Level’: Organizational Structure and during crisis response become the normal Center for Technology and National Feedback-Seeking Behavior,” Journal of Manage- mode of operations. Security Policy rial Issues 23, no. 1 (April 2001), 10. 7 Institute for National Strategic Studies Galbraith, 154. Closing Thoughts 8 Anthony C. Zinni, Jack W. Ellertson, and As this article is being written, the most Robert Allardice, “Scrapping the Napoleonic Staff substantial cuts in military spending in the Model,” Military Review 72, no. 7 (1992), 84. last several decades are being considered, 9 William Fulmer, Shaping the Adaptive Orga- and the recent Quadrennial Defense Review nization (New York: AMACOM, 2000), 184. 10 stated that one of its two goals was “to further Martin van Creveld, Command in War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), 236. reform the Department’s institutions and 11 Gary Hamel, Leading the Revolution processes to better support the urgent needs (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2000), 14. 15 of the warfighter.” The need for structural 12 Fulmer, 179. reform combined with the fiscal demand 13 Mellinger, 25. for efficiencies, taken together, should 14 Steven Bradley, “Does Form Follow Func- provide sufficient motivation for leadership tion?” Smashing Magazine, March 23, 2010, avail- to consider resuming their responsibilities able at
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