The British Army Review Number 148 Contents

03 Editorial 75 The Celebration of an Idea 119 Geoff Till William Barlow Maritime Dominion and the 78 Manning the Loop - The future Triumph of the Free World utility of the Formation Peter Padfield Articles Reconnaissance Soldier Maj A N B Foden 120 David Benest 06 At Last. Obama's Vision Offers The Children Who Fought Hitler - Hope for all Sides 82 The Peninsular War - An Allied A British Outpost in Europe Clare Lockhart Victory or a French Failure? Sue Elliott with James Fox Colonel Nick Lipscombe 08 Pointing The Way Out: The 121 Christopher Jary Utility of Force and The Basra 90 Boer IEDs Dambusters: A Landmark of Oral Narrative January - August 2007 Lieutenant Colonel IP Mills History Colonel Ian Thomas Max Arthur 96 Intelligence Lessons From 13 Talking To The “Enemy” - Hizballah's Ground Campaign 122 Gerry Long Informal Conflict Termination 2006 Australian Battalion Commanders In Iraq James Spencer in the Second World War Brigadier Sandy Storrie Garth Pratten

27 We Learn from History that We 122 James Spencer Learn Nothing from History BAR Thoughts Clinton's Secret Wars - the Brigadier J K Tanner Evolution of a Commander in 106 Recovering the Dead Chief 36 The Practice of Strategy John Wilson Richard Sale Professor Colin S Gray 108 A Fortunate Soldier 123 David Benest 39 After Action Report – Visit David Benest Oman's Insurgencies - The to Afghganistan and Kuwait – Sultanate's Struggle for 10–18 November 2009 110 FH 70 in a FOB Supremacy General Barry R McCaffrey USA John Wilson JE Peterson (Retd 111 How Myths Are Made 124 David Benest 46 The Great Game: The Role of John Wilson Danger Close - Commanding 3 Intelligence in the Failure of the PARA in Afghanistan 1st Afghan War 1839 - 1842 113 What Future for the TA? Stuart Tootal Major Brian Elliott Major Gerry Long 124 John Wilson 53 Governance and State Building Immediate Response Perspective Mark Hammond Clare Lockhart Books 126 Eric Morris 55 Achieving Unity of Purpose 117 Ian Robertson The Making of the British Army HQ ARRC A Young Gentleman at War Allan Mallinson Gareth Glover (Ed) 57 Winning Friends and Influencing 128 Iain Standen People 118 Geoff Till The Scientific Way of Warfare: Colonel Duncan Barley Galliopli - The End of the Myth Order and Chaos on the Robin Prior Battlefields of Modernity 63 A Chronology of the Higher Antoine Bousquet Control of Defence Gallipoli: Attack from the Sea Victor Rudenno 129 Bruce Pennell 69 Keep the Army in the Public Eye On Art and War and Terror John Wilson Alex Danchev

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130 John Wilson 18 Platoon – 6th Edition Sydney Jary

132 David Betz The Insurgent Archipelago John Mackinlay

134 David Benest Northern Ireland – The Politics of War and Peace Paul Dixon

134 Hugh Boscawen Cavalier and Roundhead Spies Julian Whitehead

Afghan Soldier (Alexander Allen)

THE BRITISH ARMY REVIEW NO 148 WINTER 2009/2010

We have all got a lot to learn and we have all got something, which, out of own experience and study, we can teach. This magazine is to enable us to share the results of that experience and that study.

From the Foreword to the first issue (as the British Army Journal), January 1949 by Field Marshal The Viscount Slim, Chief of the Imperial General Staff

2 The British Army Review Number 148 Editorial

operational training to those special stabilisation operations. We can see Afghanistan skills which are not part of our adaptive today that we have barely moved out foundation (general training). So, basic of the kinetic phase in Helmand Over the last few months there has been counter-IED skills, amongst others, will Province, but, at last, with the aid of the much comment on the nature and feature in recruit training. Such a move thoughts that guided 3-40, we can see a conduct of the campaign in Afghanistan. will allow time for more advanced way ahead. And that is what this major The criticism started with the collective training prior to deployment. shift in the British Army’s approach is advisability of intervening at all. about. We have built useful experience Although the advice on that decision More importantly, this programme from bitter battles, now we can expect was a matter for the chiefs of staff, we represents a major change in attitude. to put that experience more fully into will all have our views. We are helped to No longer are operations like HERRICK use. We should be demanding in every form those views by the Chilcot Enquiry and TELIC regarded as aberrations; they area: good equipment (well underway); into the Iraq war which is being are the norm. The implications for such a good training (post operational reports televised now, because it gives us the change are huge and are not without are largely complimentary in this area opportunity to see and hear those who risk. Quite properly the Army has taken with some exceptions which are being gave the advice on that occasion. Some the view that the morally correct thing addressed); good conditions of service witnesses, like Major General Tim Cross, to do is to get the current operation (see next section); good leadership – have written on the subject in BAR. right, if necessary at the expense of the improvements needed in strategic Others will be less known to BAR readers response to a future but unknown threat. thinking (see Chilcot testimony), sound but all are fascinating in their own way – Hence the understandable concern of the tactical leadership – probably never been revealing more about themselves than Royal Navy and the RAF. higher across the board; and brought they had, perhaps, realised. together by carefully planned and This is not the time to take counsel of coordinated operations – much Part of the significance of the Chilcot our fears; it is the time for controlled improvement needed in cross-agency Enquiry is that the decision-making boldness1. We have lost over 240 practice. process for Afghanistan was likely to servicemen, mainly soldiers and marines, have been very similar to that used to go in Afghanistan – but we cannot use the Rewarding the Goal-Scorers into Iraq, which gives us a good insight argument that their sacrifice would Junior soldiers, especially junior into the origins of Op HERRICK. The one otherwise be in vain. The big arguments infantrymen, bear the brunt of the clear similarity which we need to dwell are to do with stopping international casualties and hardship on operations. on is that we got off on the wrong foot terrorism from harming Britain, securing In 2008/9, 38% of soldiers who left the on both occasions. That we did so was Afghanistan for peace and NATO Army left between the ages of 20 and 25 due to over-optimistic assessments of credibility – the national interest (DASA - Table 9 - Outflow of Male Other the situation. In the last issue (147), we arguments. Our more down to earth Ranks from UK Regular Forces by Age and carried articles analysing Op TELIC and argument is that having been told to go Service). So, those that get hurt most we continue that exercise in this issue. there and do the best we can, we have are also those who receive the poorest This is not done as a theoretical educated ourselves in a way that we reward – a recent Parliamentary answer exercise; it is to help us get Op HERRICK have not previously done and are slowly showed that up to 20%2 of soldiers in right - indeed, on 6 and & 7 January, the getting it right. infantry battalions were unable to most senior officers in the Army deploy for various reasons. Now, of assembled at the Land Warfare Centre to There is a real desire to put right the course, like many organisations we analyse Op TELIC with that express aim. mistakes. And we can see that from JDP reward on a seniority scale – those that 3-40 – Security and Stabilisation – The stay longest are deemed to be the better We know, too, of the considerable Military Contribution. JDP 3-40 builds on ones and are better rewarded for their counter IED effort that is building up the good bits from past UK COIN loyalty. Yet, should we not find a way in theatre. That effort is part of a larger doctrine and the US Army’s FM 3-24. It of also better rewarding those 38% programme to put the Army onto a full also takes guidance from many current who do the difficult bit on operations war footing – Op ENTIRETY. For example, writers foremost amongst them General and do not stay to reap the reward of COs from HERRICK regularly comment on Sir Rupert Smith (The Utility of Force). It the higher pay of long service and the time that has to be devoted in pre- puts COIN doctrine into the context of pension?

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Not all organisations reward The sharp distinction between those officers, 6 to warrant officers, 1 to a hierarchically. City traders get more than who risk their lives in actual battle staff sergeant and 1 to a sergeant. To city bosses – they burn out earlier and with the enemy and those who do corporals and below – zero. The non- get the bonus to compensate. Their not must not be blurred3. operational awards system is broken bosses get lower but longer term reward, because it sees no merit in anyone below and status. Footballers get pay which is Now FM Montgomery meant something the rank of warrant officer. Yet the closely linked to performance. Club when he wrote those words. They were operational reporting from Afghanistan officials get much less - officials don’t to be acted upon. Life in Camp Bastion constantly praises in the highest terms score goals. Reliable goal scorers in the can be unpleasant but not as nasty as a the performance of junior ranks. Are they Premier Division can almost name their FOB, so operational pay for them will be so different in barracks that they are price. As an army we need goal scorers – much less – and less again for those in never worthy of an award? Surely not. those who give tactical success. Without Kandahar and Kabul. That’s what we For in the 1980 New Year’s Honour List, the players on the pitch (young mean by drawing a distinction. It may Her Majesty The Queen was graciously infantrymen) the officials (most officers) not be simple to find the rules to make pleased to approve the award of the would not get tactical success. We give this work – but we should be able as an British Empire Medal to 62 soldiers, of our lowest rewards to the players. Just army to agree the basic principles of this whom 14 were corporals or below. This like football clubs did 50 years ago when one. There will be unfairness – and we year she was asked to approve honours players arrived at the ground on the have to live with it. We need a culture to just 2 soldiers who would, under the same corporation bus as the fans. which sneers and jeers at those who old rules, have qualified for a BEM. try to obtain a reward that they should BAR has been commenting on this If we try to re-structure the pay system not get. oversight for years, it really is time that we are likely to create distortions and this was corrected. And we can correct meet our old chum – unintended The other part of the ‘However’ is it; it merely takes some interest and a consequence. Any conventional reform that we have still to find the money. little time by commanders to agree a would face so many challenges that it All soldiers get the ‘X-factor’ every day quota for ranks below warrant officer. If would never get beyond the first but we know that not everyone earns it we judge that expenditure as unworthy, circulation of the paper. There is one quite as harshly and justly as those in then let us abandon the system for it is remedy – operational pay. The scale of FOBs. A reduction in the ‘X-factor’ across wrong to honour officers only. Morally the danger and discomfort and general the board is the fair solution – the what is the difference between officers disruption to normal life of service in sharp distinction – to fund this decorating each other and those MPs Iraq, and even more so Afghanistan, operational pay. who granted themselves undeserved justify a re-think on our traditional allowances? opposition to an operational reward. Post operational reports and other On Herrick 11, battlegroups were commentaries invariably reflect on the significantly reduced by enemy action courage and commitment of young and injuries – a company from 3 PARA on soldiers – ‘humbling’ is the usual 1 The founder of this journal, FM Slim Herrick 1 was down to under 40 men at description of the effect that these gives, as ever, good advice: It Pays To Be one stage. £100 per day does not sound young soldiers have on the reporter. The Bold was reprinted in BAR 134. too much for these men, recalling that words are good to hear but they are still 2 11.5% were unable to deploy for various the FCO staff in Basra each received on only words – deeds matter more. Here is reasons (medical, discipline, pending average about £32,000 as extra reward an opportunity to put good thoughts discharge, welfare and under 18) and for the year. into practice. Over a career, officers are then a further 9% had limited deployability. likely to lose out; young soldiers will However, and it is a big however, the undoubtedly gain, which is the object of 3 Morale In Battle, BAOR, April 1946 – for nation cannot afford extra money – so the exercise: rewarding the goal-scorers. the full context see the reprint of this what we face is re-distribution. Not all pamphlet in BAR 145. soldiers go to Afghanistan, and of those Why Do Only Officers Get Honours? who do, not all face the rigours of the There were 53 awards to soldiers in the FOB. So, we have to draw some lines: New Year’s Honours List. 45 went to

New Editor Needed for BAR The current editor, Colonel John Wilson, will leave the job in Spring 2010 after 8 enjoyable years in post. The post will be formally advertised in time but anyone interested is welcome to contact him to discuss the nature of the job: 01985 223050; 94381 3050; [email protected]; CGS-BAR-Editor or Colonel Rupert Wieloch – Defence Studies (Army): [email protected]; 01793 314845.

4 The British Army Review Number 148

Christmas has been celebrated in some of the most remote, unlikely and inhospitable places on the planet. Away at Christmas draws on the journals, diaries, reminiscences and memoirs of many of the world’s best-known explorers, adventurers and travellers. In their own words, these brave people describe how they and their companions spent the festive season, whether they were seeking the North West Passage, attempting to reach the North or South Poles, canoeing down the Niger rapids or crossing the deserts of Australia. It is truly impressive that, however challenging the circumstances, Christmas was never forgotten. “This is a book for life, not just for Christmas.” Michael Palin

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5 Winter 2009/2010 Articles

set of organisations run by UN agencies, province; the National Army’s first unit At Last. NGOs and contractors that leach capacity graduated six months after the Service away from core Afghan frontline services was created; block grants of $20,000 or does not work. more were provided to each village, now Obama’s Vision in 28,000 villages; a public works In my years on the ground in programme provided jobs to young men, Offers Hope for Afghanistan, I witnessed the and a microfinance programme provided catastrophic under-resourcing of civilian small loans. These programmes should be rule. In 2001, there were 240,000 civil expanded and new ones established. all Sides servants in place in Afghanistan, staffing schools, clinics, irrigation departments The key conundrum now is that an and ministries across Afghanistan’s effective counter-insurgency strategy Clare Lockhart provinces. The decision taken in 2002 requires a legitimate government. In was to ignore these public servants and recent years, the Afghan Government has the services they ran, by putting only lost the trust of both the international This article first appeared in The Times $20 million in the Afghan Government’s community and its own citizens. December 3, 2009 and is reprinted here first-year budget. Requiring a set of strict accountability by kind permission of the Editor and Clare standards is an important way to restore Lockhart. This barely paid fuel costs for a month, integrity. Rather than proclaim the let alone salaries of $50 per month or existing Government as legitimate, a Now the emphasis is away from fighting, the costs of schools and clinics. Instead, better approach is to recognise that Afghanistan can start raising billions of billions went into a parallel aid system legitimacy is earned. Trust should be its own revenue and educating its youth. and into supporting warlords to run restored through deeds, not words. militias that daily undermined the rule President Obama has got it right. of law. The net result was to dismantle Change needs to come not only from the After taking his time to wrestle with functioning Afghan institutions; teachers Afghans, but the way that international the enormous challenge of defining and nurses left their jobs in droves to actors operate. The aid system requires a the US national interest in Afghanistan become drivers, assistants and thorough revamping, so that it no longer and its region, he has provided a translators. I had the privilege to work undermines the very institutions it credible vision of ending the war, inside the Afghan Government with a claims to support. This will require stabilising the country and handing group of dedicated Afghan ministers and measures such as limiting the wages paid over responsibility to Afghan self-rule. their teams; daily they struggled to build to Afghan staff working in the aid His move away from fighting, endorsing up services to provide for a population system to the same level they would General Stanley McChrystal’s analysis, traumatised by decades of war. earn in Afghan ministries. will protect the population and provide a security bridge while Afghan forces The key conundrum now is that an It will also require choices about which are trained. effective counter-insurgency Afghans the international actors choose strategy requires a legitimate to consort with. A senior Afghan official No country can be run by an army alone. government. described to me with dismay how, at an Lasting security in Afghanistan will be important national meeting, three provided when Afghans can govern In the 2001 to 2005 period, a broad significant figures walked straight past themselves. Mr Obama’s speech balances measure of trust was created between legitimate representatives who had been nurturing Afghan governance at all levels the Afghan citizens and their sent from their districts, and made a with a tough stance on accountability. Government. This initial stability was beeline for three warlords standing in created through a political framework the corner. This casual slight was deeply This provides a framework for restoring that consulted the people, and through symbolic; the representatives left the Afghan self-rule. It learns the lesson a series of national programmes: the meeting crestfallen. that bypassing Afghan institutions and health programme provided a basic spending billions of dollars on a parallel package of health services in every There are three steps that remain: first,

6 The British Army Review Number 148

Afghanistan needs a peace-building poor pre-teens make rich pickings for trade passing through as well as taxes on framework. There is already a madrassas, the Taleban and the opium business and land. Instead, this money is reconciliation effort under way, aimed economy. The most cost-effective way to being collected illegally, furnishing the at bringing insurgents back within the stabilise Afghanistan would be to invest insurgents’ and warlords’ coffers instead. political fold. A broader approach would in the secondary and advanced education seek to build on the broad consensus and training of the next generation and Yet the most inspiring aspect of within Afghan society already expressed find out how many medics, teachers, President Obama’s speech is his picture through the series of Loya Jirga (tribal engineers, accountants, lawyers, of America maintaining its moral councils) and the recent public construction workers and farming authority in the world through the way discussions on the need for a restoration specialists are needed. that it ends wars and prevents conflict. of rule of law and just governance. He speaks of an America seeking not to Third, Afghanistan can and should pay claim another nation’s resources or Second, the fastest and cheapest for its own nation-building. The rich target other peoples, but one that is heir way to create stability is to engage potential of the Afghan economy offers to a noble struggle for freedom. And this Afghanistan’s youth with the skills they not only the basis for millions of jobs for offers hope to American citizens, their need to manage their own futures. There Afghans, but the means for it to collect allies and the Afghan people. is a lost generation of Afghans, whose the revenue to pay its own bills. The education was sacrificed to 20 years of recent US Geological Survey report shows Clare Lockhart is director of the Institute jihad against the Soviet Union and civil that Afghanistan has hundreds of billions for State Effectiveness and co-author of war. The new generation — the 60 per of dollars of mineral wealth. It has Fixing Failed States. She served as an cent of Afghans under 25 — fare no significant agricultural potential and a adviser to the UN and the Afghan better. thriving textiles and construction Government from 2001 to 2005.  industry. It could also collect several Leaving school under-educated at 11, billion dollars a year in revenue from

Rhodesian Guerrillas holding AK 47s, December 1979 (RAF)

7 Winter 2009/2010

of action that kept within the tolerances the Coalition was to solve the security of each. problems, it could not always agree who Pointing The posed the problems. In the US AO, the Iraq in 2007 was still rebuilding itself security problem was clear: the after the destruction of its official organs existential threat was (Sunni) Al Qaeda Way Out: of state by Saddam and then the in Iraq (AQ-I). The problem in MND (SE) Coalition. It was re-building itself was that the Shia polity was not The Utility of bottom up, consistent with the Arab coherent enough to agree who the cultural dynamics of loyalty, whereby security problems were amongst the Shia loyalty is to blood not institutions; it militia; and even if authorisation for eg. Force and The goes from the inside out and a strike operation was gained in official/state allegiances attract the advance, whether the GoI stuck to this weakest loyalty. In this context, militias agreement after the event depended Basra Narrative were potentially a cohering force in upon the local political reaction. The society, being a primary source of GoI wanted the Coalition out of the Shia January – loyalty, a form of urban tribe, in an south as soon as it judged it could otherwise incoherent society. Every contain the situation on its own; and yet militia had its political party (more than nervousness about their ability to do this August 2007 vice versa) and also its violent wing, created an uneasy dependence they forming a three layered polity of the resented and which hampered everything state institutions (the official state), and the Division did in the south. Colonel I N A Thomas OBE the militias split between their social COS MND (SE) (Jan – Aug 07) organisations (the shadow state) and By January 2007, two provinces in Iraq their violent henchmen (the dark state). had achieved Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC),1 both in MND (SE). Al Muthanna “There is no period so remote as the and Dhi Qar represented polities recent past”. dominated by an alliance between the Alan Bennett, The History Boys. SCIRI militia, the rural tribes and the local ISF whose personnel came from The Narrative these tribes and militias. All of the inquiries into the conduct of, External/official/state loyalties were and lessons from, Operation TELIC (Op based on coherent internal/blood TELIC) will need to study the evolving loyalties. This accommodation dominated context during the campaign and then local power, worked to the intent of the the resulting narrative before coming to GoI and suppressed JAM activity. This judgements. The danger of the series of ‘deal’ with local militias, based on them articles begun in the last British Army Iraq Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki greets Col. acting in accord with GoI intent, was Review (BAR) is that they encourage Philip Battaglia, commander of the 4th BCT (US recognised and accepted at General Army) readers to leap to conclusions with Petraeus’ first Multinational Force Iraq neither the context nor the narrative The Shia-dominated Government of Iraq (MNF-I) conference in February 07. properly understood. This article sets the (GoI) was in permanent internal context, as understood by those present competition between factions, with in Basra at the time, and explains the Prime Minister Maliki at that time weak, narrative for a critical period of the constantly juggling allegiances and campaign, from Jan – Aug 07, a period cutting deals to stay in power, and hence characterised by just shy of a quarter of unable to stand up to the powerful the total UK campaign deaths, Op militias, the Jaiysh al Mehdi (JAM) and ZENITH (the reposturing from Basra), and the Supreme Council for the Islamic the so called “deal”. Republic of Iraq (SCIRI). This had particular relevance for Multinational In January 2007, Iraqi, UK and US Division (South East) (MND (SE)) with an narratives were running on divergent essentially Shia area of operations (AO); A QRL patrol heads towards one of the many border forts which are dotted along the Iraq Iran lines. Cohering them fell to the the internal GoI power politics were border (Cpl Ian Forsyth) divisional HQ in Basra. The major task played out on a daily basis here unlike facing the HQ was to understand these anywhere else in Iraq. In simple terms, This pragmatism was eventually extended narratives and drive a divisional course whilst the GoI was clear that the job of to Maysan in May 2007. Maysan was, as

8 The British Army Review Number 148

it had historically been, a sparsely Meanwhile, January 2007 saw MND(SE) was that by then, UK had already populated open flank that was out hand over primacy to the ISF; committed to Afghanistan, and UK of GoI/Coalition control. The troop henceforth, MND(SE) theoretically political opinion and resource requirement to seal the border and operated in support of the 10 Iraqi Army prioritisation increasingly favoured cut suspected supply lines of (IA) Div. Yet this same force was, by its Afghanistan. We understood that an explosively-formed projectile, own admission, riddled with increase in force levels in one theatre improvised explosive devices (EFP IEDs) sympathisers from every militia faction necessitated a reduction in the other; a and other warlike materiel from Iran was that might need to be confronted; some key consideration. Seen from Basra, it beyond the Coalition, even after the of the 10 IA Div ‘jundi’ were drawn from seemed that by 2007 there was a surge. The border had no relevance to the same communities as the militias national convergence between declining those who lived there, a 1920s British and were their kith and kin. Sharing of political support for the Iraq operation line on a map they did not recognise, intelligence was impossible, detention and rising political appetite for the cutting across their ancient tribal and operations were curtailed and the ISF Afghan operation. The UK could not do communication links to their fellow was reluctant, and sometimes refused, to both. In addition, as explained already, Arabs and co-religionists in what the have joint Coalition/ISF patrols on the it was not clear that increased Coalition rest of the world labelled SW Iran streets of Basra City. The Coalition troops were necessarily the answer to a (Arabistan). Without local Iraqi active presence drew fire onto the ISF; and the problem rooted deep within the Shia participation, Maysan would remain image of the ISF as the puppets of the polity. Furthermore, the UK had deployed untreatable. The pragmatic judgement ‘Occupying’ Coalition undermined their its reserve (the Theatre Reserve Battalion made by MNF-I about Maysan was that attempts to be seen as the legitimate from Cyprus) in support of Op SINBAD granting it PIC would still allow surgical expression of Iraqi/GoI nationalism. In (intended to be a “clear–hold-build” strike ops to take place as agreed by this context, the presence of the MNF on operation for Basra), and the sense was MNF-I and GoI but put the onus of the streets of Basra City was seen as that UK had showed the Iraqis how to do governance on GoI. PIC was granted working against the long term ISF goal it and now it was time for the Iraqis to in May 07 and the last UK BG withdrew. of gaining the loyalty of the people. (In show the will to do it for themselves. contrast, UK troops did embed Basra successfully with 10 IA Div battalions ...Op ZENITH was conceived with a Basra represented the major when they deployed to Baghdad: the moral forcing function, to leave a obstacle to progress in MND (SE). Sunni opposition clarified Shia loyalties security gap the ISF would have to Its shattered polity, reflecting the and allowed UK mentors to be seen as fill..... by forcing them to confront disparate sources of its population, welcome allies against a common foe.) their internal political and hence provided no leadership to its people Having said that, the evident popularity security issues. and the provincial council refused of the work of Operation SINBAD in official contact with MND (SE) HQ cleaning up areas and injecting money Accordingly, Op ZENITH was created following the destruction of the into Basra seemed to have earned some in November 2006 to execute the re- Jamee’at2 over Christmas 06 (agreement political credit with the politicians; but posturing from Basra to the Contingency to this destruction having been given the popular approval of Coalition activity Operating Base (COB) at the Basra Air by the Basra Provincial Council seen on the ground did not always Station. It must be noted that the security chiefs in advance but reneged translate into political support and operation was endorsed by headquarters on afterwards in the light of the progress. What it seemed to buy in early of the Multinational Corps- Iraq (HQ local, JAM-orchestrated, uproar). 2007 was a relative freedom to conduct MNC-I) and its execution was Every local Baswari source of influence strike ops at an unprecedented tempo substantially underwritten by Corps was represented in the GoI in Baghdad, and scale for 19 Brigade amid ever rising resources. In part, Op ZENITH was making every military strike conducted attacks by improvised explosive device conceived with a moral forcing by MND (SE) a political hazard, thus (IED), indirect fire (rockets/mortars) function, to leave a security gap the limiting what could be achieved by (IDF) and casualty rates on all sides. ISF would have to fill, so reducing Iraqi military means. This divided loyalty dependence by forcing them to confront characterised and permeated the Basra UK Support for Op Telic Reduces their internal political and hence Iraqi Security Forces (ISF); as General For the UK, domestic support for security issues. The UK necessity was Jalil, the Police chief, said in May 07, Operation TELIC had reduced rapidly to demonstrate sufficient success in Iraq “[the problem] is not about training since the 19 Sep 05 kidnap and rescue of to keep the domestic political support or equipment, it’s about loyalty – the two British Servicemen in Basra had sufficient to sustain the UK commitment and MNF can’t touch that”. Loyalty laid bare the extent of JAM and other to Op TELIC and the US Coalition. Op remained something only the militia infiltration of the ISF and Basra ZENITH was to be the metric of success; Shia polity, in Baghdad as much polity; and revealed the scant control of and it was imperative that it should as in Basra, could resolve. MND(SE) over Basra. The view from Basra succeed. It would have to be (and,

9 Winter 2009/2010

importantly, be portrayed as such in No ‘surge’ was on the cards for Military Goals information operations (IO) terms) a MND (SE). In January 2007, the HQ saw Basra relief in place with the ISF, not a as a fundamentally political challenge withdrawal in contact. The HQ was Reality. The violence in the (foreshadowing General Petraeus’ oft tasked to work within US tolerances but Shia Basra AO differed repeated comment that summer, “It’s all reduce to certain force levels by certain significantly from that in the about the politics!”) and influence was times, in accordance with Op ZENITH. sectarianly-divided US AO. US identified as the primary objective; with These orders remained extant throughout troops were a valid response to kinetics in a supporting role. Intelligence the build up in 2006 and into pre- a war between opposed peoples. efforts were re-tasked to prioritise deployment briefings in January 2007. The target of the violence there politics over target acquisition. The was largely the opposing application of force only had meaning in The Surge sectarian population; so there so far as it contributed to progress The US, meanwhile, had changed tack. was a population to protect. It towards the political end state – an Iraqi 2006 had been dominated by a rising was not clear from the evidence self-reliant polity in Basra; this became sectarian conflict in the US AO and in Basra that this logic applied the governing rationale for strike decreasing US political support for the there: 90% of the violence was operations. Military goals were set as: war. This culminated in the cross-party against MNF, with residual reducing the influence of forces (broadly Iraqi Study Group report (which included violence based on financial defined) working against the Basra consultation with Coalition, including motives; flares of violence political process, countering malign UK, allies) that recommended in autumn between competing Shia entities Iranian influence, training the ISF, 2006 an accelerated transition to Iraqi were centred on control of executing Op ZENITH; with force control across Iraq. Yet over Christmas resources, not motivated by protection recognised as being an 06/07, the President opted for a surge nihilism (the energy enabling function, necessary to create instead, to prevent the total collapse of infrastructure remained largely the freedom of action to carry out Iraq and the defeat of US hard power in undamaged through the period). activity essential to achieve the mission. The conclusion drawn was that its attempt to create political change in Notwithstanding the constraints of the inter-Shia violence was self- the Middle East. The US not only planned Shia polity, it was the absence of any limiting: fear of Sunni revival to inject more troops into Iraq, but also political process that gave 19 Light united all Shia leaders in limiting declared they would stay there until the Brigade (19 Lt Bde) such freedom to the amount of damage each job was done. strike during their tour; but that resulted faction would do to the other; in UK forces having the highest per the competing factions in Basra On arrival in January 2007, the HQ capita casualty rate in the Corps with wanted a bigger slice of the found itself trying to cohere what consequent rising political concerns economic cake, not to destroy appeared to be three diverging and domestically. UK troops were most the cake itself; the goal was incompatible strategies working to for an Iraqi end state, no matter certainly up for the fight; the challenge three different clocks (to use Gen that Iranian sponsorship was was to give it purpose. Petraeus’ memorable term); on each accepted pragmatically as a of the components of strategy, the means to an end in the short At one level, success was being GoI, US and UK were incoherent. term. Unlike further north, the achieved: Op ZENITH’s reliefs in place dynamics in the south appeared were proceeding well. 19 Lt Bde’s high Policy. US policy was to stay as fundamentally constructive, if intensity of strike operations paid long as it took; UK policy was to only the polity could be brought dividends and appeared to be achieving transition to the ISF as fast as to recognise it. Basra’s problems the desired effects of: disrupting JAM; could be agreed; GoI policy was appeared deeply culturally and demonstrating that MNF held the to get rid of the UK from the engrained and it did not seem initiative and was reposturing from Basra south - but only when it could clear that foreign, Christian at its own volition and not being survive without it. troops, with all the distorting “bombed out”. This effort was capped by influence these had on Iraqi the killing in May of the commander of Resources. UK had already loyalties, were the answer to JAM in Basra, Wissam Abu Qadir. This “surged”. US and GoI were Basra’s problems. In any case, spectacular success against a charismatic focussed on the intense sectarian as explained, a surge was not and extremely security-aware leader conflict centred around Baghdad an option; another way had to shocked and palpably hurt JAM, affecting with the ‘minor irritant’ of JAM be found to deliver a course of its morale and throwing the organisation (to quote a Corps’ operation action each country could into some turmoil, diminishing its ability order (OpO) low on the priorities validly claim was ‘success’. to launch coordinated attacks against for Corps, ISF or MNSTC-I3 assets. MNF. After a brief, but intense and

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Arab tribal customs. In this context, he recognised that the presence of MNF in Basra not only provoked violence but was used to justify it: it distorted local loyalties by allowing the militias to mobilise popular support under the banner of resistance to the MNF “occupation”. So Mohan endorsed Op ZENITH and was keen to see Basra Palace vacated. Yet he recognised the Coalition’s worth as the ultimate big stick, so necessary in the Iraqi political tradition to be called on in extremis, a big stick he knew the ISF at that time could not be trusted to supply. The move of MNF to the COB would retain this big stick but, equally importantly, it was expected to reduce the level of violence on the streets of Basra to levels Mohan felt the ISF could handle. His target date for his schemes was the promised but General Sir Richard Dannatt (then Chief of the General Staff) speaks to General Mohan a whilst on a unscheduled provincial elections. visit to Basra in 2008 (Cpl Martin Coleman RAF) The move of MNF to the COB would ultimately futile, spasm of retaliatory General Mohan was appointed in May 07 retain this big stick violence, which was absorbed and as Maliki’s security supremo in Basra, defeated by both the outgoing 19 Lt Bde taking charge of all agencies of the ISF. This gave a political context and purpose and the newly arrived 1 Mech Bde, JAM He was also charged with resolving the to the operations of the newly arrived 1 entered a month long period of mourning unhelpful status of Governor Wahili as a Mech Bde. MNF operations had to be and wrangling over who should succeed governor of marginal legitimacy, without consistent with this new-found political Wissam. This gave the movement much the support of the people or even that of process. Operations began to be cleared to think about, created room for his own council. Furthermore, the GoI through Mohan to ensure consistency. manoeuvre and contributed to the denied his legal status as Governor yet This remained subject to MNF judgement energisation of the political process set did nothing to remove him, thereby not Mohan’s veto; but the Iraqi political out below. Furthermore, lessons had creating a political impasse with an fall-out, and rebukes from the Corps, been learnt from the sacking of Camp embattled figure primarily concerned from previous contraventions of Iraqi Abu Naji in 2006 by JAM shortly after its with his own enrichment and political political sensitivities, gave weight to vacation by UK troops and its handover survival. He was thus emblematic of Shia Mohan’s preferences. Mohan recognised to the ISF. MND (SE) plans, underwritten political ineptitude and inability to that some sort of confrontation with and resourced by the US Corps and tackle its shadow and dark states, in JAM would be needed, and this would be closely integrated with the ISF, allowed which Wahili had considerable ‘wasta’. best done by the ISF rather than MNF, the transition to the ISF of the Shaat al General Mohan began a process of but he recognised the current Arab Hotel, the Old State Building and political engagement across the official shortcomings of the ISF. So he wished to Shaibah Logistic Base without a shot and shadow states, inevitably - but buy time and space to build up ISF being fired, a credit to 19 Lt Bde, 1 unadmittedly - dealing also with the dark capability; this provided the focus for Mechanised Brigade and 102 then 101 state. His goal, which was shared by the MND(SE) activity – training and Logistic Brigades. Meanwhile, Maysan Division HQ, was to cohere the factions mentoring the ISF. had been granted PIC in April 07 amid around the unifying draws of Basra’s much Iraqi fanfare and MNF sucking of latent wealth, its fear of Iran, its desire Dealing with JAM teeth but acceptance of reality. Progress for self-government and its fear of a Coincident upon Mohan’s arrival, an could be said to be taking place, apart Sunni revival. In the absence of clear interlocutor in JAM was found who from within the Basra polity. It was only political guidance from Maliki to the offered to contribute to GoI, UK and in May 07 that a Basra political process contrary, he chose to attempt to include hence US goals, by taking the majority of began and the means to assist it all parties in an accommodation, the the violent opposition to MNF out of the appeared: Mohan and the deal. classic ‘big tent’ approach common to fight. This created the possibility of

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buying Mohan’s political machinations and cleared through Her Majesty’s exporting the French Revolution, “If time and space. The interlocutor and Government (HMG). It was agreed in you want to create an Us, [first] create many of his followers were in the COB mid-August 07. a Them!” From afar, it appeared that the detention centre; that gave the Division CotKs succeeded due to a clear decision ‘hard power’ over him. More importantly by the GoI as to what Basra’s problems for the long term, and the Iraqi end- were, a firm commitment to resolve state, was the ‘soft power’ of attraction. them, and the support of the population He was a known anti-Iranian with a for the ISF who themselves were not strong following within JAM, who drawn from Basra and were therefore appeared to share the same aspirations not compromised by diffuse local for Basra as the MNF and GoI – increased loyalties. For Iraq and the Iraqi end development, prosperity, education, state, and indeed for the Coalition end religious moderation, and Iraqi control. state of a self-reliant Iraq, the results of His motivation for attacking the MNF was British Mastiff armoured vehicles on patrol CotKs were unequivocally good – a Basra during Operation Charge of the Knights-14 in that they were “the Occupiers”; the Basrah City with the UK Military Transition Team that appears to be flourishing and with counter argument was that the MNF (MITT) Group attached to 50 Brigade, Iraqi Army violence containable by its own security would leave when Maliki ordered them to in June 2008. apparatus. The GoI had finally addressed - the Iranians wouldn’t. The objective its own Shia demons, as only it could. was a cessation of violence between the Others must pick up the narrative from MNF and his members on the basis that then on. From UK, it appeared that the The complexity of factors depicted they undertook to support the political violence fell off, MNF were successfully in this narrative show that counter process and development in Basra, relieved in place in Basra Palace in insurgency (COIN) is not a discrete oppose Iranian influence – especially the September, development improved and military activity; it is a pan-, and Iranian backed JAM Special Groups PIC was granted to Basra in December inter-government, objective that (terrorist cells who accounted for a 2007, a US/GoI endorsement of requires the whole of government to significant number of lethal attacks improvements in conditions in Basra; as succeed. The inquiries will need to look against coalition forces) - and, on one Foreign and Commonwealth (FCO) beyond just the military tactical level if meeting those conditions, gain release. observer was heard to say, “At the start they are to understand and improve the of 2007, we couldn’t wait to get out; way UK does its business. The recent now we’re wondering how long we can criticisms by Professor Hew Strachan and stay.” Critically, the UK political support Sir Christopher Meyer and the precepts for Op TELIC was sustained and the of the earlier analysis of “War amongst Coalition continued. UK, US and GoI the People” by General Sir Rupert Smith narratives seemed to have been aligned. need to be seriously addressed. Similar Neither the radicalisation that took place comments were made after the Boer war in early 2008 in Basra, nor the Charge of 100 years ago, in fear of a future the Knights (CotKs) was foreseen in calamity nearer to home. Now, the August 2007. But both would have been lessons that must be learnt from Iraq considered within the likely parameters have immediate relevance to our current Major Hancock, The Royal Anglian Regiment commander of the UK MITT Group attached to 50 of any Iraqi resolution of internal Shia departmental main effort (ME), the Bde, Iraqi Army during Operation Charge of the divisions. Basra, of all places in Iraq, campaign in Afghanistan.  Knights-14 in Basrah City, 18-19th June, 2008. was never seen as having an extreme Op TELIC 12 (Cpl Rob Knight) religious bias; indeed, its fleshpot history from the 1950s suggested quite It is important to note that it was not otherwise. It seems possible, if not 1 Handing over responsibility for the the intent that MNF operations should in likely, that the taste of radicalisation security of a province to the Iraqis any way be circumscribed by, or lost the radicals the hearts and minds of with the MNF acting in support of beholden to, the interests of the JAM the population. This will undoubtedly the ISF. interlocutor. Any concessions made have been played into the Shia polity 2 The HQ of the Iraqi Serious Crimes were on the strict conditionality that within the GoI and it would be Unit (SCU) – ironically named since he delivered his side of the bargain; consistent with the 2007 analysis to some of its members were suspected otherwise, his group was subject to suggest that this provided Maliki with of committing, rather than solving, MNF action as before. The package was the unifying focus for Shia elements serious crimes. negotiated by MND (SE), agreed by GoI within the GoI to give him the mandate 3 The organisation responsible for representatives including Mohan, to identify what they were all against. As training, organising and equipping authorised by the US chain of command, Saint-Just said in 1791 in the context of the ISF.

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Introduction a separate deal between British In the wealth of literature on war commanders and the Sadrist Jaish Talking To in its various forms, surprisingly little al Mehdi (JAM) enabled UK to cut attention is given to the complex casualties, reposition its forces, and problems of conflict termination. transfer security responsibilities to the The “Enemy” – Counter-insurgency (COIN) in particular Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), in return for presents difficulties. With few exceptions a structured programme of detainee Informal COIN campaigns are drawn-out, confused releases. The first of these deals been and ambiguous; decisive military victory widely lauded, the second widely is elusive, and other means of conflict criticised. But both judgments may Conflict termination come into play. Military be incorrect, or at least premature. commanders can find themselves in unexpected roles, influencing and even This paper considers these informal Termination driving national strategy through their deals and their implications. It first actions at the operational and higher reviews some relevant academic In Iraq tactical levels. thinking, and then examines and compares the deals, assessing their (This piece was written as Brigadier This paper considers two such effectiveness as tools for conflict Storrie’s dissertation whilst at RCDS instances in Iraq. In 2006 a series termination and resolution in Iraq. It in 2009) of local agreements between US Marine concludes that current judgments are Corps (USMC) commanders and Sunni misleading: that the much-maligned Brigadier Sandy Storrie sheikhs produced the Anbar Awakening Basra deal has already proved to be a Commander 7 Armoured Brigade, (AA), a switch in tribal alignment which sound foundation for long-term conflict 2007-2009 turned the COIN campaign in the West resolution, while the tribal strategy decisively against al-Qa’eda in Iraq contains elements that may yet prove (AQI). Over the following year, this antithetical to Iraq’s future as a unitary “The single clenched fist lifted and ready model was extended to other parts of state. Finally, it suggests some generic /Or the open asking hand held out and Iraq as the Concerned Local Citizens guidelines for military officers engaged waiting / Choose: / For we meet by one (CLC) programme, with equally in informal conflict termination, and or the other.” 1 spectacular results.2 And in Basra, draws some wider conclusions on COIN from the Coalition experience in Iraq.

Conflict Resolution or Victory? Already two terms have been introduced which require definition. Michael Handel describes conflict termination as “the discontinuation of hostilities, which does not necessarily indicate positive progress to a lasting peace”3: which is his definition of conflict resolution. Chris Tuck emphasises the relationships between the two, considering that “effective conflict termination is wider, and is about ending conflicts in ways that best support the political end states set.”4 The distinction between termination and resolution is often taken to be that between the cessation of armed hostilities and the settlement of the underlying disputes, but Tuck views the true picture as non-sequential: conflict resolution is not a distinct phase that follows conflict termination, but an umbrella term: “…if conflict resolution describes the overall objectives sought, Map Iraq Provinces conflict termination is one of the ways in

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which these objectives may be achieved.”5 campaigns, “none of which is thrilling”: the Multi-National Force (MNF) for help. Conflict resolution objectives provide the first to insist on total military victory at But the Government of Iraq (GOI) end-states to which conflict termination the risk of discovering that even sound initially withheld its support, and by should be directed, and it is the battlefield performance leads nowhere September the tribes had been relationship between the two that politically (Algeria, Vietnam, Lebanon, overwhelmed. Co-operation resumed in defines the ultimate value of any military the second intifada); second, upon mid-2006, centred on Ramadi, and campaign.6 For the purposes of this realization that the military effort is Sheikh Sattar abu Risha of the Dulaimi paper, Tuck’s key point is that the politically unsustainable, cut losses and federation. Although himself a relatively conditions for a conflict’s long-term run (Somalia): and third, accept and minor sheikh, Sattar provided a focus for resolution are affected by the way in support the least unpleasant indigenous tribal opposition to AQI; MNF’s which it is terminated: a sub-optimal authority without expecting that it will enthusiasm prevailed over continuing termination can lead to difficulties obediently serve Western interests. “In GOI reluctance, and Sattar’s tribesmen downstream. essence, aim low, possibly lower.”12 were co-opted in large numbers into the Iraqi Police (IP). A blind eye was turned Jan Angstrom and Isabelle Duyvesteyn Finally, William Zartman has considered to his extra-legal streams of revenue have grappled inconclusively with the in depth how and when internal conflicts generation.16 Sattar’s success in problems of understanding victory and can be resolved. He suggests that parties resisting, surviving and making money defeat in modern wars – in particular in conflict decide to negotiate when they proved exemplary; more sheikhs brought wars between unequal opponents – and perceive a Mutually Hurting Stalemate more men, and by the end of 2007 the in defining the utility of force in these (MHS); a deadlocked position which forces ranged against AQI had doubled conflicts.7 Duyvesteyn is sceptical of the imposes significant but not necessarily in size. continued relevance of the Clausewitzian equally pain on both. Decisive victory idea of decisive victory,8 while Angstrom has proved unattainable, other The results were striking. In September concludes that there are now multiple possibilities have been exhausted and a 2006, a USMC intelligence officer understandings of victory and defeat, high level of intensity has been reached. assessed that “AQI is the dominant some of which are contradictory.9 The MHS prompts the parties to look for organisation of influence in Al Anbar, Johnson and Tierney use the examples of a better alternative: if they then sense surpassing the nationalist insurgents, the Mayaguez and Somalia to argue that the possibility of a negotiated solution Iraqi Government and MNF in its ability to popular judgments of success and failure or Way Out a “ripe moment” is created, control the day-to-day life of the average in war are not always informed in which talks can begin. In summary, Sunni.”17 A year later the situation had accurately by the objective outcome. negotiations occur when both parties been transformed. In December 2007, Rather, public perceptions are formed lose faith in their chances of winning the Commanding General (CG) of MNF instead by a number of psychological and see an opportunity for cutting losses West was able to report 10 straight and informational biases – a and achieving satisfaction through months of decreasing incidents and a fall phenomenon they term “match-fixing” – accommodation: they adjust their aims in attacks of some 90 per cent, and to whereby rather than weighing up and settle for “…an alternative claim credibly that “…we have kicked Al material gains and losses objectively, somewhere between unattainable triumph Qa’ida out of Anbar.” IP numbers had observers fix the results in their minds and unlikely annihilation…rather a more than doubled, from 10,600 to so that one side is seen to win or lose, muddy field to play on.13 25,800: with thousands more candidates irrespective of what actually happens on keen to join.18 AQI strength had fallen the ground.10 Victory and defeat, the This brief survey suggests that conflict from some 12,000 in mid 2007 to 3,500 authors argue, are essentially termination in COIN is not likely to be in early 2008.19 Sattar’s eventual perceptions. black and white, but grey, and with that background in mind, the paper will now In the same volume, Ivan Arreguin-Toft consider the deals. argues convincingly for the highly discriminate use of force in any counter- The Anbar Awakening (AA) insurgency,11 while Gil Merom considers The Anbar Awakening (AA) began in that intervention with ground forces early 2005, when Sunni tribes near the against markedly weaker protagonists Syrian border started to resent the influx has an inherent potential to regress into of AQI to their area, and the resultant protracted insurgency, and that even an competition in their lucrative smuggling effective military COIN campaign may operations, and decided to resist.14 not deliver the political outcomes Sensing the potential threat, AQI opened Governor Maamoon Sami Rasheed al-Awani met with local tribal sheikhs and city government sought. He posits three broad options for its own campaign of murder and coercion leaders at a U.S military outpost in Husaybah, Western powers engaged in such against them,15 and the tribes turned to Iraq, July 3, 2006.(US Marine Corps - Cpl Antonio Rosas).

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assassination by AQI caused a from Afghanistan – also inspired were possible in 2006 that would not temporary hiatus, but the overall deep resentment.24 Former USMC have been possible in 2004 or 2005.” AQI momentum of AA was maintained by his officer Gabriel Leeden gives credit also had exacted severe retribution on those brother, who inclined it further towards to MNF’s behaviour, seeing the AA not as Sunnis who participated in the 2005 mainstream politics. a spontaneous uprising against insurgent elections, and with continued coalition brutality, but a response to conditions commitment uncertain, many tribal One of AA’s first successes was to re- created by the USMC, by means of sheikhs were undecided over which horse establish the Anbar Provincial Council dynamic security operations, complex to back. This can be seen as a simple (PC), and since then it has progressively relationships with tribal leaders, and Hobbesian calculation of self- strengthened its links with mainstream consistent moral authority.25 British preservation, which deters the general politics and the GOI. In the PC elections Maj Gen Paul Newton supports this population from committing to either of February 2009, the AA’s candidates view, seeing the USMC’s operation side during a violent insurgency.29 Two won the most votes and the most seats, as an outstanding example of mission USMC officers have described how they and were the power-brokers for the command and risk-taking, on a scale countered this ambivalence by telling election of the Governor. “The Awakening unprecedented in Iraq.26 So while AQI the sheikhs “…that we would stay as is an economic and political entity now, brutality undoubtedly played a part,27 long as necessary to defeat the terrorists. and our strategy is financial and it was not the sole or even the That was the message they had been economic”,20 said its leader Abu Risha: prime driver. waiting to hear. As long as they perceived there are still occasional veiled threats us as mere interlopers, they dared not to “…transfer our entity from a political Lt Gen Graeme Lamb echoes these throw in their lot with ours. When they to a military one…”21 to counter analyses but adds other elements; the began to think of us as reliable partners, opponents, but essentially the AA now first being the increasingly precise use of their attitudes began to change.”30 The has an effective working relationship force.28 From insufficiently discriminate USMC thus persuaded influential sheikhs with the GOI. In fact, some of its main beginnings, MNF-I became increasingly that it intended to remain a significant recent difficulties have been with senior accurate in its operations against AQI, actor in the medium term, and that they Sunni elements of that Government, who changing the relative balance of should align themselves with “the see it now as a serious political strengths in Anbar, and emboldening strongest tribe.” The announcement in competitor.22 and empowering the tribes to risk the January 2007 of the intended US troop extreme coercive violence levelled by surge undoubtedly assisted this process, The AA was not simply an impromptu AQI at any that chose to resist its rule. though its military effect was not felt rejection by Sunnis of AQI’s brutal Adjusting Gallieni’s metaphor, Lamb until much later in the year. methods and radical rule. Austin Long introduces the idea of “reverse ink- suggests that the switch was based on spotting” – dismembering an initially But Lamb also cites a further reason for three incremental realizations by tribal coherent insurgency by killing or the tribes’ repositioning; the historic sheikhs: capturing its mid-tier facilitators and Sunni fear of Iranian influence, and co-ordinators to break it up into its distrust of the Shi’a dominated GOI. In ● first that the political process might constituent parts. similar vein, is the view of a prominent confer more benefit than continued imam who said that the people of fighting, Lamb is warm in his praise of the Fallujah were fighting a Persian USMC, recalling that their behaviour led occupation: in the form of the Shi’a- ● second that AQI’s transnational and influential Sunni imams to conclude that dominated Iraqi Army (IA).31 One Sunni fundamentalist goals were at odds MNF did not intend to threaten either sheikh saw it as “… just a way to get with their own local or national the tribes’ way of life or their religious arms, and to be a legalized security force objectives, freedom, and therefore to reject any to be able to stand against Shi’a militias ● and third and most importantly, that religious obligation to continue and to prevent the Iraqi Army and police AQI was competing for control of defensive jihad, and to co-operate with force from entering the areas.”32 This revenue sources, such as banditry CF to oust the interlopers of AQI. He demonstrates graphically the possible and smuggling, which had previously recalls the AA not as a negotiation but long-term weakness of a tribal strategy: been the exclusive province of the a dialogue: not a grand bargain but while it has proved an admirable vehicle tribes.23 as a discussion of a mutual problem in for the achievement of one strategic end, an attempt to find some common ground the defeat of AQI, it may well be Reasserting Tribal Authority and an alignment of interests. antithetical to another, the creation of a The tribes were thus essentially re- stable, unified and democratic Iraq.33 asserting their authority and business General Lamb stresses also the A comparison can be made with the US rights. AQI’s insistence on intermarrying importance in achieving a solution of Army’s training and equipping of with local tribes – an imported practice time and will; that, “…certain things Montagnard tribesmen in Vietnam, who

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and conducted static guards and their days are numbered.”39 It therefore “neighbourhood watch” type tasks, intends to incorporate only some 20% with similar success to the AA. In of CLCs into the ISF, and the future for Baghdad, 2007 saw a 90% reduction in the remainder is unclear. Violence, murders, an 80% fall in attacks on meanwhile, is trending upwards: from citizens, and a 70% decline in vehicle- 275 civilian deaths in January, to 343 borne explosive devices.36 But although in February, 408 in March and 485 in many CLC groups have termed themselves April.40 With CLCs funded only until the Awakening Councils, they are very end of 2009, the GOI seems ready to different in nature to the original AA. let them wither away: whether it will Where most AA volunteers were be able to do so peacefully remains progressively incorporated into the IP, to be seen. and thus employed by the Ministry of the Interior (MOI), the CLCs were US-funded Responses to the tribal strategy fall into until October 2008. And where the AA two broad camps: the sceptical and the has consistently had a relationship with pragmatic. The sceptics concede the the GOI – albeit initially a fractious one benefits of the deals in terms of fighting – many of the CLC groupings remain AQI, but highlight the tensions created, Montagnard Irregulars (US Army Center of ambivalent towards it, even hostile. and the potential longer-term problems Military History) In several areas, the refusal of CLC for the Iraqi state and its institutions. were enthusiastic in fighting the groups to recognize the legitimacy or The tribal strategy is a temporary insurgents, but only slightly less hostile authority of the GOI has prompted it to alignment of interests rather than a to the government of South Vietnam: a act against them. In March 2009, the resolving formula, and Coalition situation which came to a head in late Baghdad suburb of Rusafa saw two days drawdown, a resurgence of AQI and/or a 1964, when several groups of tribesmen of serious fighting, as the ISF and MNF government shift towards Shi’ite rose in open revolt.34 The tribal strategy pursued CLC leaders wanted by the GOI.37 theocracy could all lead the tribes to is similar, with the inherent tensions review their position, possibly even between the GOI and the Sunni tribes switching sides, like Dostum in containing the seeds of potential Afghanistan. This would be a particularly sectarian conflict or even the break-up bad outcome for the Coalition as it of the fledgling Iraqi state. This would then have helped to train, equip situation would actually be more and sustain forces that would work challenging than Vietnam: the Sunni counter to its interests, while for the GOI tribes of Anbar are not a small rural it would mean de facto partition, civil majority like the Montagnards, which war, or both. Using tribal power to secure makes it harder for MNF to exert leverage a modern state is at best a stop-gap over them. Whereas Saddam Hussein was measure, and at worst, a source of generally able to exert some central or An Iraqi soldier leads the way during a combined eventual state failure.41 co-confessional leverage over the tribes, cordon and search of the Rusafa area of Baghdad (US Army) the current GOI may soon face a The latter is hardly optimal, but situation where powerful sheikhs The transfer of funding responsibility optimal is no longer a luxury the carve up and control their fiefdoms from MNF to the GOI has added further United States can afford. like feudal lords.35 frictions, and bureaucratic inertia and governmental unease have meant that The pragmatists recognise many of these Concerned Local Citizens CLCs have been paid either late, or not objections but contend that the tribal This tension is still more apparent at all.38 A falling oil price has strategy was the only practical course of with the wider manifestation of the exacerbated the GOI’s difficulties, as has action at the time. The US had a choice: Awakening Councils, the CLC. The success its need to reintegrate detainees and either to continue to press for a national of the AA sparked an understandable refugees returning from abroad. There is and unified state, and risk allowing the desire to repeat the model in the other intense suspicion on both sides, and the insurgency to go unchallenged, or to Sunni provinces, and even to extend it GOI’s tolerance of all militias appears to relax ties to the state in order to counter to the Shi’a south, and led to a US-led be hardening. “The State cannot accept AQI with local police forces, at the cost programme which recruited, trained and the Awakening”, said one leading Shi’ite of formalising sectarian divisions and equipped some 103,000 Iraqis, over 80% MP. “When the Government attacked the weakening democratization. “The latter is Sunni, many of whom were former Mahdi Army it sent the message to all the hardly optimal, but optimal is no longer a insurgents. CLC manned checkpoints militias including the Awakening that luxury the United States can afford.”42

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Lamb is also a pragmatist: whilst has not resolved the conflict: at least 2007 recalls; “We walked into a war.”50 acutely conscious of the potential not yet. pitfalls “…given the difficulties we were These difficulties were partly due to facing, the absolute inability of the Iraqis The Basra “Accommodation” critical weaknesses in governance, both to cope themselves, and a violent national and local. Basra has a history of insurgency that was approaching the Senior officers including the Chief of detachment from Baghdad, based on its tipping point, we really didn’t feel we the General Staff had started to re- distinct economy, demography and had much choice.”43 The pragmatists define the Army's presence as part geography, and a record of autonomous therefore regard the tribal deals as the of the problem, not the solution. and even secessionist ambitions.51 The lesser of two strategic evils: an enforced results of the 2005 PC elections were reversion to an earlier social model in The deals in Anbar and Basra are unhelpful: the Sadrists declined to stand the interests of short-term stability. outwardly similar and there is no doubt (and thereby excluded themselves that events in Anbar opened the eyes of indefinitely from mainstream politics), This argument is compelling. If all CF leaders elsewhere in Iraq to the and the victorious Islamic coalition politics is local, then so is much possibilities of a less kinetic approach.47 failed to agree on a Governor, allowing insurgency, and MNF’s embrace of But the “accommodation” with JAM was the election by default of Muhammad al- bottom-up solutions should come as no born of very different demographics and Wa’ili, whose Fadhila party had gained surprise. The tribal strategy has been a strategic needs, and was substantially only 13 of the 41 seats. For the next four pragmatic stop-gap, ensuring the short- different in its aims. Some context is years, Wa’ili deftly circumvented all term survival of the Iraqi state in the therefore required. political and legal attempts to unseat face of a vicious insurgency, though it him, consolidating his position at the has in the process empowered forces heart of a black economy based on oil- which may yet threaten that state’s smuggling, overseen by his militia within existence in its current form. Its success the Facilities Protection Service.52 Other will be defined by where it goes from militias - notably the JAM - carved out here. The AA in particular has similar fiefdoms in electricity generation successfully redirected Sunni nationalist and the ports. A weak GOI could do little insurgents towards mainstream politics, to stop them: preoccupied with the and even the less well-structured CLCs plethora of more serious threats to its have provided an honourable means for existence, it showed little sustained former insurgents to realign their interest in Basra until early 2008. The loyalties without admitting defeat.44 Members of C company 1st Battalion The effect was to turn the deep south into a Their emerging relationships with the Yorkshire Regiment (1 Yorks) who are part the kleptocracy, where well-armed GOI could provide the foundation for the 2nd Battalion The Duke of Lancaster’s (2 political–criminal Mafiosi were able to longer-term stability; not least since Lancs) Battlegroup conducting a arrest and lock both the central government and search operation within the Al Jameat district of 53 Iraq’s central government relationships Basra (Cpl Russ Nolan) the people out of power. with its provinces have historically been fluid. In late 2006 there was an increasing None of the militias wanted to bring sense that British military presence in the South to the point of collapse: But this is not a guaranteed outcome. Southern Iraq had run its course. UK they simply wanted as large a slice Some feel that “…all the Americans did troops were fighting bravely and of the cake as possible. was buy the Iraqi government some innovatively but the situation was time…the fact that fewer people are deteriorating. Senior officers including The conflict in Basra was therefore dying now does not change the reality the Chief of the General Staff had started fundamentally different to that in Anbar. that this is a dysfunctional state that can to re-define the Army’s presence as part The AQI-inspired violence in the central easily slip back into civil war.”45 To of the problem, not the solution.48 A belt was essentially nihilistic: escalation paraphrase Rupert Smith, the tribal final, under-resourced effort to “win” was open-ended, with total collapse an strategy has thus created a conceptual Basra through conventional COIN acceptable, even desirable end-state for space for diplomacy, economic techniques had ended inconclusively: AQI. The Shi’a South, on the other hand, incentives, political pressure and other Basra did not want to be won.49 Instead, was absolutely not nihilistic. Even at the means to create a desired political from early 2007 on the Army became height of the violence in 2006/07 the oil outcome of stability and if possible increasingly embroiled in a self-fuelling and energy infrastructure remained democracy,46 and has given Iraqis an cycle of violence with the JAM. In the largely undisturbed, though its key opportunity to determine their internal first six months of the year, UK lost 29 nodes had long been identified as governance through discussion rather killed and nearly 160 injured. The critical vulnerabilities by MNF. None of than secession and/or civil war. But it incoming brigade commander in May the militias wanted to bring the South to

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the point of collapse: they simply felt that it could be productively reverting to an earlier social model, the wanted as large a slice of the cake as employed. This chimed with the views of Basra deal sought to promote a more possible. So the British Army the competent and determined new Iraqi inclusive politics at a supra-tribal level. increasingly found itself as a de facto security chief, Maj Gen Mohan, who had Shaw’s successor Graham Binns hoped to actor in an intra-Shi’a power-struggle: arrived to head up the Basra Operations “…get to the point where the main through its obligation to support a Command (BaOC). Mohan assessed that Sadrist strain will support the Iraqi legitimately-elected but corrupt and the UK presence in the city was security forces – that’s the goal.”57 No unpopular Governor, it was slowly but distorting normal politics and prompting political solution to Basra could ignore inexorably drawn into confrontation with nationalist Basrawis to fight simply to be the Sadrists, and the Northern Irish the JAM. free of occupation: early PIC would peace process had demonstrated the therefore help to clarify their loyalties value of an inclusive approach. Just as By early 2007 the Army's legitimacy and undercut public support for the JAM. the AA had countered AQI in the West, had expired. malign Iranian influence in Basra might perhaps be offset by the JAM. By early 2007 the Army’s legitimacy had expired. It faced MNF’s ubiquitous problem of “…finding a way to create a sustainable security architecture that does not require the ‘coalition in the loop’, thereby allowing Iraq to stabilise and the Coalition to withdraw in favourable strategic circumstances.”54 UK therefore sought to change the conditions of the campaign through early transition to Iraqi leadership: to hand off its Forward Operating Base (FOB) at Basra Palace (BP) to the ISF, consolidate forces at the airport Common Operating Base (COB), Quitting Basra Palace for the COB (Cpl Ian Fellows) transfer security responsibilities to the General Mohan (Cpl Martin Coleman RAF) ISF under Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC), Shaw therefore hit on a twin-track Shaw’s discussions with Fartusi led to a and then draw down and release approach: increasing the tempo of strike provisional “accommodation” between resources for Afghanistan. If this sounds operations to ramp up the pressure on the two parties.58 JAM would cease like an abrogation of responsibility, it JAM, whilst simultaneously beginning a attacks on the Army and facilitate its was not: more a recognition of lost and search for effective interlocutors; extraction from BP; the Army would irrecoverable legitimacy, and an active essential to both was a less monolithic suspend its strike operations and effort to empower the ISF as a more understanding of JAM. The first track led progressively release 120 internees, appropriate force. The General Officer to the killing or capture of several including, late in the process, Fartusi Commanding (GOC) charged with leading figures in Basra JAM, amongst himself. (All were likely to have been implementing this strategy was Maj Gen them Wissam Abu Qadir, its then leader. released anyway on the expiry of UNSCR Jonathan Shaw.55 The second led to a series of discussions 1723, then scheduled for the end of the with high-ranking JAM member Sheikh year). And although not explicitly stated, Shaw viewed Basra as “Palermo, Ahmed al-Fartusi, who had been in there appears to have been an rather than Beirut” detention since 2005. In these underlying understanding that UK forces, discussions, Shaw sought to re-channel once redeployed outside the city, would Shaw viewed Basra as “Palermo, rather Fartusi’s intense sense of Iraqi have little reason routinely to return: than Beirut”: a violent but essentially nationalism for productive ends, away security responsibilities within the city self-limiting competition for power and from attacks on MNF and towards would be discharged by the ISF. In this resources rather than an ideological countering malign Iranian influence in respect the deal was a conscious effort struggle. He saw the militias as a the city. Shaw felt that “…he and I to empower Mohan and the IA. potentially useful vehicle of social wanted the same things for Basra – The benefits of this deal were felt cohesion in a fragmented society where prosperity, self-rule, religious moderation, immediately, mainly by the British but central government authority was weak: education etc…” and sought to persuade not exclusively so. Indirect fire (IDF) a primary form of organising force, a sort him that “…he should co-operate with attacks dropped from a campaign peak in of urban tribe. Their power was not redevelopment instead of attacking it.”56 the preceding months to minimal levels, dangerous per se: it could be harmful if These were ambitious aims. Where the total attacks on UK forces fell by some misapplied, but if harnessed correctly, he AA sought to restore security by 90%, and there were no further UK

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deaths from IDF in 2007. The Army was able to hand BP to the ISF and relocate to the COB – potentially a highly complex and hazardous operation - without a shot being fired, and refocus its efforts on training the IA. With IDF attacks sharply down, re-development work at the airport was able to resume, paving the way for its handover to the Iraqi authorities, and local politicians were content to resume their visits to the COB to engage with British consular staff. The building of the Basra Children’s Hospital – suspended over access difficulties for Coalition staff and contractors – was able to resume, and with British forces no longer in the city, Baswaris were less likely to be caught up in any crossfire. As one sheikh told Binns in the autumn of 2007, “Things are bad – but they’re a lot better than they were.”59 Critically, the fall in violence in the city IA troops giving aid (UK rations) and Info Ops leaflets to Basrawi citizens at a VCP during Op COTK (HQ 4 Armd Bde) satisfied MNF that the conditions for transition had been met, and Basra went confidence and assurances of the future to PIC on 16 Dec 07: the last of capability of the ISF: despite its evident Multinational Division SE’s four provinces lack of effective units at that time. to do so. Others were less sanguine, but felt that the UK’s ability to influence had in any ...in the three months prior to PIC, case expired, and that the increasing air some 40 women were killed in Basra of Islamisation was a price worth paying for wearing make-up, not veiling, or for PIC. otherwise failing to observe the narrow rulings of the repressive The struggle for control of Basra local militias. persisted until March 2008, when Prime Minister (PM) Maliki chose to confront Yet the accommodation was not an Basra JAM, moved personally to BP, and unqualified boon. The ISF proved unable directed Mohan to begin CHARGE OF THE to impose itself on the city with any KNIGHTS (COTK), a British-drafted plan authority (although Mohan came to for the recapture of Basra due to be value the accommodation both as a implemented later in the summer. The means of buying time to build up his premature launch produced some initial combat power, and as a useful channel incoherence, but when reinforced by of communication with the JAM, which additional Iraqi units and US support – he was subsequently able to use to his both a first – the IA prevailed. Maliki’s 60 own advantage), and therefore the Militia activity during Op COTK (HQ 4 Armd Bde) personal investment was also highly unintended consequence was to significant: by taking such a public stand consolidate JAM control over much of remaining constraint. Basra IP chief Maj against the JAM he explicitly re-defined the city. The extent of their depredations Gen Jalil later claimed that in the three Basra’s turf wars as an insurgent is difficult to judge objectively, but there months prior to PIC, some 40 women challenge to the GOI, forcing Basrawis to is some anecdotal evidence that they were killed in Basra for wearing make-up, decide where their loyalties were going ranged from widespread dress not veiling, or otherwise failing to to lie. As COTK developed, UK forces were restrictions, through the forced closure observe the narrow rulings of the able to re-engage with their role of alcohol outlets and music shops, to repressive local militias.62 MND (SE) clarified, not as occupiers but as direct ethnic cleansing, brutality and murder.61 should perhaps have foreseen this, but supporters of the IA, and enjoyed a sea- All had featured pre-deal, of course, but many felt that JAM control was unlikely, change in public support as a result. A British withdrawal removed the one real and were satisfied by Mohan’s air of highly successful mentoring mission

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● throughout 2008 and early 2009 has First, by enabling PIC it transferred Even in Basra – traditionally a relatively restored at least some of the UK’s responsibility for resolving the secular and cosmopolitan port city, military reputation with the US and IA conflict to the Iraqis, since only inherently more liberal than JAM’s (though not perhaps with Maliki), and they could resolve it – and they did. heartlands of Maysan and east Baghdad has enabled final withdrawal, with some ● Secondly it restored UK appetite to – these Islamist and sociopathic sense of sufficiency in what was remain in force: and therefore to tendencies emerged fiercely. Some achieved.63 retain sufficient combat power to British officers are thus now sceptical of provide worthwhile support to the IA the extent of Fartusi’s enduring The accommodation is seen in some during and after COTK. influence,72 and although his power in quarters as a cynical sell-out to preserve mid 2007 was clear enough, his ● And finally, it gave JAM the rope to British lives: this was not its principal subsequent threats to the British, motive.64 The cessation of IDF in hang itself, since JAM’s complete delivered from Lebanon in 2008, elicited particular was viewed mainly as a metric inability to provide reconstruction or no response from his former colleagues- public services, and its air of of Fartusi’s ability to deliver: it was not in-arms.73 In retrospect, the British view oppressive Islamisation, resulted in the central objective but a very welcome of JAM appears rose-tinted: in seeing its strong popular support for PM Maliki by-product.65 The benefits of the deal for prime motivation as criminal and self- and the ISF during COTK. the British were threefold: interested, they neglected its religious leanings, and thus underestimated its ● First, it allowed the Army to This was maybe not quite what the deal’s potential antipathy towards those extract from a force-sapping architects intended, but it was necessary secular and progressive elements of tactical laydown, and to stem a nonetheless. As Shaw put it, “…they had Basra’s population that refused to flow of casualties which was eroding to go through this. Somehow we had to conform to its strictures.74 domestic support and reducing UK persuade the population that JAM was the political will to a mission- enemy and not us.” 67 Subsequently, the Those that were there find this harsh, threatening level. 2009 Provincial elections saw Maliki’s and point to the reality of JAM control, coalition gain 35% of the vote in Basra, and the lack of realistic alternatives. By ● Secondly, by dramatically cutting with independent Sadrists winning only 2007 the Army had Gil Merom’s choice: the level of violence, it created the two of the 41 seats, and Fadhila reduced escalate, get out, or lower your sights.75 breathing space in which PIC could to a humiliating 3%, and failing to win a It could have persevered: fought its way be credibly declared at the end of seat. 68 Shaw still contends that the out of BP, and continued to bear a the year. Without a reduction in IDF extremists showing their real hand and similar level of IDF casualties for the rest there could be no PIC – “…how can you declare PIC in the middle of a losing their legitimacy was the best of the year: perhaps another 50 UK dead. war?”66 - and without PIC there thing for Basra, albeit painful at the This view had some advocates within 69 could be no progress: in that sense time. Whitehall, who saw it as the blood-price the “by-product” of Shaw’s goals to be paid to sustain the transatlantic was more significant than the The “abandonment” of Basra to the JAM relationship, but it is doubtful that the goals themselves. is the aspect of the deal which has political appetite for this course existed: probably caused most unease, even and more doubtful still that PIC could ● Together, these gains – a within the Army,70 and this paper have been declared in such a visibly manageable casualty rate and suggests that the British consistently unstable environment. successful transition to PIC – were overestimated the legitimacy and public sufficient to preserve UK strategic support enjoyed by Basra JAM. Misled by A second alternative was simply to appetite to remain alongside the US Sadrist strength in Baghdad, and by the declare success – whatever suspension of in force throughout 2008 and well organisation’s roots as a social provider disbelief this might involve – and leave. into 2009. Pre-deal, the political (pace Hamas), some British officers That would have triggered a range of risks to the Brown government from compared the JAM to the Orange Order; a possible consequences, all involving staying in Iraq were coming to relatively unthreatening body with wide- some degree of national humiliation: outweigh the consequences for the ranging public support. In fact, as Juan opposition from a bemused US, the transatlantic relationship from Cole warned as early as 2003, the Sadrist probable replacement by a US Brigade, a unilateral withdrawal: post-deal movement is “…highly puritanical and contested withdrawal to Kuwait, looting the reverse was true. xenophobic, and characterised by an reminiscent of the withdrawal from Therefore, although the deal with exclusivism unusual in Iraqi Shi’ism. To Maysan, the complete loss of military the JAM did not resolve or even fully any extent that it emerges as a leading reputation, and the most severe hiatus terminate the conflict in Basra, it set social force in Iraq, it will prove in the transatlantic relationship since strong conditions for conflict resolution polarizing and destabilizing.”71 Suez. in three ways:

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A third and more palatable alternative was to reinforce: to mirror the US surge and to seek a decisive military victory over the JAM. But where would the forces have come from? Even had this been politically deliverable, UK was by 2007 operating well above Defence Planning Assumptions to sustain its burgeoning commitment to Afghanistan, and national forces simply were not there. There was also a marked national reluctance to request reinforcement from the Corps,76 and it is by no means certain that any such request would have been met: US forces were fully committed elsewhere and there was a widely-held US view that having carved out a discrete Divisional area, the UK owned the responsibility for resourcing it.77

In that sense the Basra deal also served US interests, since it enabled the Corps to concentrate its resources elsewhere. UK MiTTs supporting an IA search operation during Op COTK (note IA troops carrying sacks of Nor is it axiomatic that reinforcement ammunition) during Op COTK (HQ 4 Armd Bde) would have been useful. It is undeniable that UK never committed sufficient apparent in its Basra-based brigades. had hoped.86 It did not resolve the resources to defeat the JAM,78 but it is Embedding UK mentors – to prove so conflict because that was essentially also far from certain that more military successful in 2008 – was unattractive: 10 over resources: an intra-Shi’a power- resources could by 2007 have produced Div were unwilling to partner because UK struggle in which the British were no the desired outcome. Certain assets troops drew fire from the JAM where they longer prepared to take a stake. So as would undoubtedly have been helpful – did not, and there were several instances Zartman hypothesised, both sides saw helicopters and ISTAR for example – but where 10 Div units would not fight.80 At the potential for achieving their ground troops might not. There is a BP, effective co-operation had ceased,81 strategic aims (which in the British case critical distinction between mass and although some still feel that this was a had reduced significantly) by alternative legitimacy, and despite the overall missed opportunity; that the lack of means. Senior British officers were still success of the US surge, it is far from welcome went both ways.82 Overall there willing to fight it out, but few saw any clear that more troops can of themselves were few good options and the situation useful purpose in doing so.87 compensate for a lack of legitimacy, in was essentially Zartman’s MHS. the absence of a credible external threat. They chose instead a variant of Merom’s As John Nagl has pointed out, it is The Basra deal in fact exhibits many third way, and found an accommodation “…perhaps only a slight exaggeration to aspects of Zartman’s analysis.83 There was with a de facto indigenous authority suggest that, on their own, foreign forces palpably an MHS, and (for the British at without expecting that it would cannot defeat an insurgency: the best least) a perception of impending obediently serve their interests. they can hope for is to create the catastrophe: an opposed withdrawal from Admittedly this requires a fairly liberal conditions that will enable local forces to BP, which was likely to produce interpretation of Merom’s “least win it for them.”79 So it is by no means significant casualties and a public unpleasant indigenous authority” – since clear, given the Army’s travails in perception of failure. Neither side any such authority as JAM possessed came sustaining BP, that additional FOBs in longer possessed the ability to escalate; purely from its organisation, its arsenal, the city would have been helpful, or they “…were like two battered boxers: we and its illegal control of electricity and sustainable. Additional, capable ISF units could have kept slugging it out, but to the ports. Perhaps the UK should simply would have been both, but priorities lay what end?”84 And the deal also had many have thrown its military power behind elsewhere, and 2007 in any case was the of the effects that Zartman’s analysis the GOI and its representative in Basra - nadir in British relations with the IA. predicts: it did undercut the identity of the corrupt Wa’ili - and accepted the The locally-raised 10th Division was JAM,85 and did remove the confusion continuing cost in lives that this would weak, with JAM influence strongly over Shi’a nationalism, just as Mohan have entailed.88 But given the

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implausibility of this and other options, effort, or expand it across the city. had utility for both the GOI and the and the benefits that were gained, the As Bashall put it, “Your ways are tribes. In the South, by comparison, Basra deal does not look a bad one. defined by your means – and we didn’t the GOI had no such need of the MNF Those that struck it remain unanimous have enough!”89 The position in Anbar as go-betweens: it could talk to the JAM that, given the resources and political was better; the USMC could not force whenever it wished to, and did. Indeed support available, they took the best an outcome, but it was still it questioned the need, asking frequently course available to them; the “least demonstrably “the strongest tribe.” “Why would you take crocodiles worst” option. It could therefore make fewer as pets?”92 concessions, reflecting the US’ greater Restricted by a shortage of resources combat power and political will. This distinction is reflected in the key and an imminent failure of national will, issue of transparency. The key to the faced with an imperative to transition to A third distinction is that the Anbar deal USMC’s success in Anbar was their PIC, to enable both UK drawdown and was made with the tribes, that in Basra continuous engagement of the PM and Iraqi progress, they found a creative way with a militia. This is less significant his ministers: they linked the bottom forward, and cashed in their only than it may seem. The resettlement of and the top of the process in a highly remaining leverage on JAM while it still Marsh Arabs into Basra’s sink estates has structured fashion, with each proposed had value. Though the deal’s most far- dismembered previous tribal structures, recruitment of tribal militias into the IP reaching ambitions for Sadrist and seen them replaced by political- staffed in detail with the GOI. Frictions integration were never achieved, its religious Islamic groupings like the only arose with the less structured principal failing – the abandonment of JAM.90 Both deals were therefore made expansion of the AA into the CLC, in Basra to its fate – was also relatively with the de facto local non-state circumstances where the GOI felt it had quickly redeemed by the GOI and the ISF: authority, neither of which was an little influence or control.93 Similarly, who, as Nagl implies, were probably the “enemy” in the conventional sense, and Lamb ensured that his discussions with only people ever able to do it. both sought to mobilize Iraqi former regime elements were completely nationalism against external forces of transparent, even pulling out from one Comparative Analysis different kinds. In Anbar, AQI was potentially rewarding meeting because it Many points of comparison have emerged manifestly an interloper, but Basra’s links was considered by the GOI to be “beyond naturally in the above discussion, but it with SW Iran go back centuries, and the pale”.94 The Basra deal was a little is worth highlighting some key many of its tribes straddle the border. more opaque: while undoubtedly distinctions between the deals. The first Iranian influence was therefore more socialized with the key figures in the GOI is the strategic context. The US public’s widespread and less overtly hostile than (although there now seems to be some commitment to Iraq has occasionally that of AQI, and JAM was in a more selective amnesia on that count), it was wavered, but even in 2006 the ambiguous position, and less likely to not widely briefed beyond. There was Administration was resigned to staying make a dramatic shift. Arguably this perhaps an element of not pressing an into the medium term, and in 2007 this changed only when PM Maliki came to issue where Iraqi opposition would have hardened into a commitment not only to recognise the extent of malign Iranian left the UK with nowhere to go stay but to surge. UK strategic intent, on influence, and its hostility to his strategically. Thus Mohan learned the other hand, was to transition to PIC Government: too weak to act in 2007, he formally of the deal late in the day and as early as possible. There was therefore countered effectively only in 2008. But through Iraqi channels, and although he a strategic dissonance between Coalition Iranian influence never offered the same subsequently came to value many of its partners, which affected the negotiating existential threat to the locals as AQI, aspects, this unpleasant surprise was the position of each of the parties, and thus and the Basra deal was thus inevitably a start of a breakdown in his working the deal that each was able to strike. harder one to strike. relationship with the UK, and fuel on the fire of the PM’s mistrust.95 “Your ways are defined by your “Why would you take crocodiles means - and we didn't have as pets? The final distinction between the deals is enough!” the extent to which they supported the A fourth distinction is the relationship fledgling structures of the Iraqi state. A second distinction concerns the between the parties, which in each case The AA was the most successful in this relative strength of the parties. In Basra, was tripartite, with MNF and the GOI as respect, since its members were drawn UK forces no longer had a widespread two of the elements, and the tribe / progressively into the ISF and GOI. CLCs power to compel: they were capable of militia as the third.91 Arguably in Anbar, were not, but were to a degree achieving local tactical superiority in USMC commanders were easier “socialized” by routine operational time and space, and thus inflicting interlocutors for the Sunni tribes than contact with the ISF and CF. But the localized pain on the JAM, but they the Shi’a-led GOI: the USMC therefore Basra deal contained no such linkage,96 lacked the combat power to sustain the fostered an engagement by proxy which and even those Iraqi commanders well-

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disposed towards the British found their strategic opportunity, effects were Nagl conclude that counterinsurgents dialogue with the JAM difficult to bear: created first and explained to the GOI must demonstrate staying power if particularly when combined later with an later.99 Tribal and militia dynamics are they are to break the grip of initial (perceived) hesitancy in complex, and JAM in particular embraces militants over the population, since supporting COTK. Indeed, the most a wide range of nationalist, criminal and without the promise of protection, damaging legacy of the British deal is religious motivations, impossible to civilians will support the insurgency perhaps PM Maliki’s continuing hostility reflect fully in a paper of this length. All in order to survive. Premature to a long-term UK engagement, which is of the commanders interviewed felt that transition to indigenous forces can 103 likely to inhibit the benefits to UK they were improvising to some degree, thus be a “rush to failure” This is a business from the blood and treasure and in dissecting the deals for fair position, but it conflicts with which the nation has committed. examination, this paper rather over- another lesson from Iraq, which is tidies an intensely complex picture. that the legitimacy of an occupying The transatlantic relationship is probably force declines progressively – 104 less dented: the most senior US But with those caveats, the generic Petraeus speaks of a “half life” , commanders understood the thinking conclusions are as follows: and endures only for as long as that behind the Basra deal, and while they force is perceived as beneficial and non-oppressive. And since each may not all have liked it, they were ● Military commanders negotiating citizen makes that calculation prepared to make tactical concessions for towards conflict termination must individually, the loss of legitimacy the strategic gain of Coalition coherence. not overlook the pre-conditions for can be sudden, catastrophic and Conceptually the deal reflected Petraeus’ conflict resolution, though it may be irrecoverable. Balancing the own aims; “We’re not after Jeffersonian tempting to do so to solve commitment to stay with a democracy – we’re after conditions that immediate and pressing security corresponding commitment would let our soldiers disengage.”97 US problems. This is important, because eventually to leave is another fine staffs were less understanding, although it is the relationship between call: each case will be sui generis, their opposition was based on a more conflict termination and conflict even in different parts of the same resolution that determines the monolithic view of the JAM than Shaw’s theatre. This will be a key judgment ultimate value of any military nuanced approach. But the break has not in Afghanistan. been irreparable, and UK’s military campaign.100 In practice, this reputation was at least partly restored principle will inevitably be difficult ● Next, kinetic activity is important the following year by its vigorous to operationalize, and will require and a high level of intensity appears support for the later stages of COTK. UK some difficult judgment calls. to be required. Both deals support remains likely to be the USA’s first ● Informal deals are best negotiated Zartman’s analysis that “…to ripen a conflict one must raise the level of partner of choice for future from a position of strength: or at conflict until the stalemate is reached interventions, though perhaps with a least, not of weakness. This may be and then further until it begins to little more scepticism than of yore. self-evident, but then so is hurt…the ripe moment becomes the Clausewitz’ prescription that “the godchild of brinkmanship.”105 Pressure Generic Principles best strategy is always to be very on the Anbar tribes came from both strong…”101 In retrospect, neither sides – AQI and the USMC – and ...this paper has probably invested the US nor the UK committed forced them to choose; UK strikes all of the deals with a coherence sufficient resources to the campaign, against JAM had a similar effect; in they did not in fact possess. and this is reflected in the bargains fact they were one of the few real each was compelled to strike. The levers the Army still possessed. Finally, does this analysis reveal British Army has belatedly Thomas Schelling has written of the anything useful generically in terms of recognised the importance of bargaining power that comes from conflict resolution in intervention and persistent presence and mass in the capacity to hurt,106 and this COIN? It may, but with two important operations designed to secure the featured in both deals. Kinetic force caveats. First, all COIN campaigns are sui population, and the need for a more may not produce a decisive result, generis – of their own kind - making flexible approach to force levels but must at least generate the problematic the transfer of lessons from through the course of a campaign.102 perception of MHS: the necessary but one to another.98 Secondly, in packaging One hopes that this thinking will not sufficient condition for complexity for easy presentation, this inform the upcoming Defence negotiations to begin. paper has probably invested all of the Review, though mass of itself is of deals with a coherence they did not in little use without legitimacy. ● That said, this is not a fact possess. The proliferation of CLCs in ● Similarly, time and will are important carte-blanche for unselective particular was uncontrolled, even violence: CF behaviour is critical.107 in creating the conditions in which anarchic: in the prevailing mood of One of Lamb’s key lessons from Anbar such deals can be struck. Burton and

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was the highly discriminate use of of 2009. It did not work out quite as its embarrassment is both misplaced and force, and this accords with the architects intended but in war little unhelpful. There are legitimate reasons author’s own experience in Basra in does. Although the Sadrists remain for national unease over the performance 2008, when weapons had utility in largely excluded from mainstream Basra in Iraq, including the lack of resources direct relation to their precision. politics, the intra-Shi’a conflict has committed, the failure to apply COIN There is still a view that successful effectively been resolved: just as Shaw doctrine, the lack of continuity in key COIN demands a willingness to predicted it would be, once the British appointments, the occasional arrogance escalate violence to extreme levels, were removed. with Coalition partners, the inability to with the Philippines and now Sri meet the aspirations of the Iraqi people, Lanka cited as examples. There is The consequences of the tribal strategy the failure to regenerate and actively little evidence that this worked in Iraq, at all. On the contrary, Iraq are less certain. Having removed a mentor effective ISF, and the extreme suggests that successful COIN is “a Ba’athist regime at least declaredly dissonance between ends, ways and function of legitimacy first and inimical to sectarianism, racism and means, particularly since 2006. violence second.”108 Occupiers get no tribalism, the US has been forced to ally latitude: they have to get their itself with tribes which are largely If these mistakes had not been made, targeting right. xenophobic and sectarian, in order to perhaps a deal with JAM would not have avert strategic failure.109 Its Faustian been necessary, but they were, and it ● Relationships with the host bargain has delivered spectacular short- was. UK commanders found an government are critical, and any term success, but has set the conditions imaginative and pragmatic way of lack of transparency between the for a potentially problematic escaping a strategic cul-de-sac: COIN is parties, perceived or real, can lead confrontation downstream. The AA has no place for absolutist thinking, and the to a fundamental breach of trust. been the most successful element, and Basra deal looks much better now than it In the factional and conspiratorial its integration has reinforced the did in early 2008. Although its ambitious politics of Iraq, the most successful position of the Sunni bloc within the GOI goal of creating an inclusive politics in deals were also the best-socialized. as an effective counterbalance to the Basra did not work out as intended, it Since the host government will have Shi’a parties. But the success of the CLCs did set the conditions for effective to bear the consequences of is less clear, and the GOI still faces a conflict resolution, and thus perhaps for whatever is agreed, it seems serious challenge in terms of their some long-term strategic benefit. The only appropriate to cut it in disarmament and reintegration, with a tribal strategy cannot claim as much, at from the outset. falling oil price limiting the sweeteners least, not yet. ● Finally, a successful deal is likely it is able to offer. to draw reformed insurgents into some kind of relationship with Yet few in either the US or the UK indigenous security forces or would subscribe to such a view. Perhaps 1 Carl Sandburg’s poem “Choose”; taken as governmental structures. Ideally this notions of victory and defeat are indeed the informal motto of the Force Strategic Engagement Cell (FSEC) by Maj Gen Chris will see their formal inclusion (as in largely perceptive:110 the US has decided Hughes, who headed the cell from Nov that it “won” in Anbar, the UK that it Anbar): failing that some form of 07–Sep 08. Hughes, interview, 10 Jun 09. socialization through joint “lost” in Basra. In both cases the truth operations (as with the CLCs). Any is less clear-cut, but neither public is 2 CLC were later re-named Sons of Iraq deal which does not create such a interested in the detail. In Britain in (SOI) – this paper uses the earlier term to avoid confusion with other acronyms. linkage risks recidivism, as in Basra. particular, the Iraq war suffers from such a lack of popular legitimacy that 3 Michael Handel, War, Strategy and Conclusion the country is not yet prepared to Intelligence, p 456. The tribal strategy and the Basra entertain the view that it could have 4 Christopher Tuck, “Conflict Termination in “accommodation” were therefore not been anything other than a massive Iraq”, p 17. quite the resounding success or the mistake. 5 Ibid, p 18. craven sell-out they might initially have appeared. As has been shown, in a little And the Army remains locked in a 6 Ibid, p 18 & p 21. over 8 months the Basra deal achieved corporate cringe, preferring renewed 7 Jan Angstrom and Isabelle Duyvesteyn the desired end-state: allowing the action in Afghanistan to any rigorous (eds), Understanding Victory and Defeat in British to withdraw from the city, examination of what went wrong, or Contemporary War. removing any lingering confusion over indeed right. 8 Ibid, p 227. Shi’a nationalism, setting the conditions for COTK, and leading to a military This paper suggests that the true verdict 9 Ibid, p 109. victory over the JAM which has since on the Basra deal should be much less 10 Ibid, p 58. been ratified in the Provincial elections critical, and that the current 11 Ibid, p 153.

24 The British Army Review Number 148

12 Ibid, pp 183-184. 35 Long, op cit, pp 82-84. Thomas, 4 Jun 2009. 13 I William Zartman, Negotiation and 36 MG Joseph Fil, CG MND Baghdad, DOD 56 Shaw, op cit. Conflict Management, p 120 and p 234, News Briefing, 17 Dec 2007, available and Elusive Peace, pp 8-9 and p 18. online at 57 Richard Norton-Taylor, “British Officials http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/tr hold talks with Mahdi Army”, The 14 This paragraph draws on Austin Long’s anscript.aspx?transcriptid=4107 Guardian, 17 Nov 07. “The Anbar Awakening”, and on an interview with Lt Gen Sir Graeme Lamb, 37 “Awakening Group in Baghdad Battle”; 58 Toby Dodge, “If we move in, we have to Deputy Commanding General (DCG) MNF-I available online at stay committed” Independent on Sunday, Sep 06 - Sep 07, 11 Jun 09. http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middle 3 May 2009. east/2009/03/200932917620568226.htm 59 Binns, interview. 15 AQI’s violence towards the tribes has thus l mainly been an effect of shifts in 60 Col (now Brig) Andy Bristow, BaOC Mentor allegiance rather than a cause. Long, op 38 Charles Levinson, “Toll Rises as Iraq Slows Aug-Dec 2007, interview, 3 Jun 09. cit, p 78. Surge”, Wall Street Journal, 9 May 09. 61 As told to the author during his time in 16 Carter Malkasian, “A Thin Blue Line in the 39 Richard Oppel, “Iraq takes Aim at US-tied Basra, May to Dec 2008. Sand”, p 55. Sunni Groups’ Leaders”, New York Times, 21 Aug 08. 62 Charles Tripp, “Iraq, the politics of the 17 Ibid, p 51. local”, 25 Jan 08, available online at 40 http://www.iraqbodycount.org/database 18 Maj Gen Walter Gaskin, CG Multinational http://www.opendemocracy.net Force West, Department of Defense News 41 Long, op cit, pp 86-87. 63 See, for example, CGS’ letter to the Daily Briefing, 10 Dec 07, available online at Telegraph, 25 Jun 09. http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/tr 42 Malkasian, op cit, p 58. anscript.aspx?transcriptid=4103 43 Lamb, interview, 24 Jun 09. 64 Shaw, op cit. 19 Amit Paley, “Shift in Tactics Aims to 44 Emma Sky, “Iraq 2007 – Moving beyond 65 Thomas, interview. Revive Struggling Insurgency”, COIN doctrine”, p 32. 66 Bashall, interview. Washington Post, 8 Feb 08. 45 Dagher, op cit. 67 Shaw, conversation with the author, 24 20 Liz Sly, “In Iraq’s Anbar Province, the Jun 09. Awakening grapples with a new role”, LA 46 Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force, p 270. Times, 4 May 09. 47 That said, UK commanders were 68 Reidar Visser, “No Longer Supreme: After Local Elections, ISCI becomes a 10 Per 21 Ned Parker and others, “Absent election considering talking to Basra JAM well before the modalities of the Anbar deals Cent Party South of Baghdad”, 5 Feb results, Iraqi parties stake claims”, LA 2009, available online at Times, 4 Feb 2009. became known. Maj Gen Graham Binns, GOC MND (SE) Aug 07 – Feb 08, interview, www.historiae.org 22 Sam Dagher “Rift threatens US antidote 1 Jul 09. 69 Shaw, e-mail to the author, 15 Jul 09. to Al Qaeda in Iraq”, Christian Science Monitor, 13 Feb 08. 48 Sarah Sands, “Sir Richard Dannatt: a Very 70 James Hanning, “Deal with Shi’a prisoner Honest General”, Daily Mail, 13 Oct 06. left Basra at mercy of gangs, colonel 23 Long, op cit, p 77. 49 Op SINBAD: a classic “clear hold and admits”, Independent on Sunday, 3 Aug 24 Dick Couch, The Sherriff of Ramadi, p 44. build” operation, under-resourced and 08. 25 Gabriel Leeden, “(Re-) Creating Anbar’s eventually neutered by the GOI. 71 Juan Cole, “The United States and Shi’ite Awakening”, Huffington Post, 26 Mar 09. 50 Brig James Bashall, Comd 1 Mech Bde, Religious Factions in Post-Ba’athist Iraq”, p 554. 26 Maj Gen Paul Newton, Head of FSEC May- interview 22 May 09. Nov 07, interview, 12 Jun 09. 51 Michael Knights and Ed Williams, The 72 Bristow, Binns, interviews 27 Gaskin, op cit. Calm Before the Storm; The British 73 Hala Jaber, “We will spill British blood, Experience in Southern Iraq, p 1. warns Sheikh Ahmad Fartusi”, Sunday 28 Lamb, interview. 52 Ibid, p 23. Times, 14 Sep 2008. 29 Raymond A Millen, “The Hobbesian Notion 53 Ibid, p 33. 74 See also Reidar Visser, “Britain in Basra: of Self-Preservation Concerning Human Past Experiences and Current Challenges,” Behaviour during an Insurgency”, p 5. 54 David Kilcullen, “Anatomy of a Tribal 11 Jul 2006, available online 30 Niel Smith and Robert MacFarland, “Anbar Revolt”, Small Wars Journal blog, 29 Aug (www.historiae.org). Awakens: The Tipping Point”, p 43. 07, online at http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/0 75 See para 6. 31 Malkasian, op cit, p 53. 8/anatomy-of-a-tribal-revolt/ 76 David Betz and Andrew Cormack, “Iraq, 32 Ghaith Abdul-Ahad, “Meet Abu Abed, 55 Paragraphs 23-27 draw on Maj Gen Shaw’s Afghanistan and British Strategy”, p 324. America’s new ally against Al-Qaeda”, unpublished lecture “Basra 2007: the 77 A view frequently and robustly expressed Guardian, 10 Nov 07. Requirements of a Modern Major General” to the author in his time as CDS’ LO to delivered to All Souls’ College, Oxford, on the Joint Staff, Sep 06 – Feb 07. 33 Long, op cit, p 68. 12 Nov 08, and on a lengthy interview 34 Long, op cit, p 72. with Shaw’s Chief of Staff (COS), Col Ian 78 Gen Sir Richard Dannatt, speech to RUSI,

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23 Jun 09, available online at 88 Bristow points out that not all saw Wa’ili 98 Lt Gen Sir John Kiszely, “Learning about http://www.rusi.org. See also Betz and in that capacity, and that Mohan, as the Counter-Insurgency”, p 19. Cormack, ibid, p 328. PM’s man in Basra, certainly didn’t. 99 Newton, interview. 79 John A Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a 89 Bashall, interview. Knife, p xiv. 100 Christopher Tuck, “Conflict Termination in 90 Faleh Jabar, The Shi’ite Movement in Iraq, Iraq”, p 21. 80 Thomas, interview. pp 65-69. 101 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, p 240. 81 Colonel Patrick Sanders, CO 4 RIFLES, 91 Newton, interview. Sky, op cit, footnote interview, 4 Jun 09. 4. 102 Dannatt, op cit. 82 Bristow, interview. 92 Newton, interview. The usual response 103 Burton and Nagl, “Learning as we go”, was “Because then you know where they p 323. 83 In 2000 Zartman was sceptical that are.” hurting stalemates could apply in 104 Gen David Petraeus, “Learning situations of nationalist resistance 93 Newton, interview. Counterinsurgency”, p 4. “...since breaking down and agreeing to 94 Lamb, interview. 105 Zartman, Negotiation and Conflct negotiate are a denial of the very ideals Management, p 235. that inspired resistance in the first 95 Bristow, interview, though there are also place…” Basra seems to disprove that suggestions that Mohan was informally 106 Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence, view. “Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate briefed earlier. p 74. and Beyond”, p 240. 96 Cynics would say that there was little 107 Jeffrey Record, “Why the Strong Lose”, 84 Col Rob Rider, COS MND (SE) Aug – Nov need to incorporate the JAM into the p 24, and Arreguin-Toft, op cit p. 143. 2007, interview, 21 May 09. Basra Police: they were already there. 108 Ibid, p 161. 85 Zartman, Enduring Peace, p 5. 97 Testimony to the House Committee on 109 Original communiqué of the Ba'ath party, 86 Bristow, interview. Foreign Affairs, 8 Apr 08, quoted Thomas July 1968, quoted Long, op cit, p 70. Shanker, “Iraq’s Military Seen as 87 Rider, Bashall, interviews. Lagging”, New York Times, 10 Apr 08. 110 See para 5. 

Contribute to the Army’s New Capstone Doctrine: ADP Operations in the Land Environment Do you have an opinion about the British Army’s doctrine and the way that it is developed? Do you wish to contribute to the development of the Army’s new capstone doctrine?

An agile Army continually strives to capture experience and lessons from operations in order to assess and improve our understanding of both current and future operations. To ensure that the Army’s capstone doctrine remains accessible, timely and fit for purpose, your input is sought. Your view is sought by the Land Team at the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC), to inform the development of the Army’s new higher-level tactical doctrine.

Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) Land Operations, the Army’s capstone doctrine was published in 2005. This publication is being superseded by ADP Operations in the Land Environment produced by the Land Team at DCDC. The new doctrine explains the Army’s approach to operations and is the primary source of UK higher level tactical doctrine for forces operating in the land environment.

ADP Operations in the Land Environment builds on ADP Land Operations 2005, reflecting experience from recent operations, new joint doctrine and our understanding of the future character of conflict. It is aimed at Army sub-unit, unit and formation commanders and their staffs, however it also has utility for both the Royal Marines and the RAF Regiment. It also provides joint staffs and civilians working in the land environment with an understanding of how the British Army operates.

ADP Operations in the Land Environment is now being taught at ICSC(L) and is being used by the Land Warfare Centre to inform the development of lower-level tactical doctrine. The final version will be published in Jun 10; comment on the 2 Star Trial Draft will be accepted by the Writing Team up to 30 Mar 10. You can access the 2 Star Trial Draft electronically at the DCDC Teamsite (This can be accessed by searching for DCDC on the RLI Search Engine). along with links to further direction on how to comment, the Land Team’s contact details and Commander Force Development and Training’s direction on its development. Alternatively, you may comment directly to the Land Team at DCDC by sending an email to ‘DCDC-Land Ops in LE Comment.’

26 The British Army Review Number 148

(South East) is not the place to point We Learn from them. “It is easy to conquer any Arab country, but their natural inclination History that We to rebellion makes it difficult and expensive for the invader to Learn Nothing maintain his control.” South East Iraq from History Perhaps the overall outcome in South- East Iraq can be seen at best as ambiguous, and certainly persistent Brigadier J K Tanner OBE Iraq Medal (MoD) tactical successes did not a strategic Commanded LWCTG(G) and its victory make. But, given the conditions Field Training Group offspring success. Because, despite what might be from the outset, the UK should not have before and during TELIC 1. COS alluded from the introductory paragraph, expected anything different and, in not MND(SE) TELIC 3 and 4. ‘failure’, as far as the British military appreciating this, the British Army might effort within South East Iraq was be viewed as culpable as its political Currently SBA, Saudi Arabian concerned, is an altogether unfair and masters and other involved government National Guard. unwarranted conclusion given the departments. Once the Iraqi Army had circumstances of this six-year war. It been kicked into touch – as inevitable at George Bernard Shaw’s remark about would be like blaming the British Army the hands of the original warfighting history was not intended to highlight its for the loss of Aden in 1967 or for the members of the Coalition as night pointlessness; it was to highlight the political disaster of Suez in 1956. follows day – then, without a truly importance of learning from history. And Notwithstanding the impact of the so- massive, politically led, all-government for an Army that is, ostensibly at least, called ‘strategic corporal’, there are far department effort to secure Iraq’s future, imbued with a deep notion of its past, greater forces at play in counter- strategic failure was always going to be one might think that the British Army insurgency than any manner or number on the cards. Never mind that slowly and was good at learning from it. If this is a of soldiers can influence in the long with some horrendous violence still to truism and one accepts that the British term. come, security in Iraq has been said to Army is the main repository of have improved since the terrible days of knowledge in dealing with conflict of the Notwithstanding too the enduring 2005-2007, strategic failure has been a type faced in Iraq then it should, surely, principles of counter-insurgency; they much wider matter. The Arab and Muslim have done better. Well: yes and no. Yes, can be intimately understood, but world had been assaulted by an army of because the Army should have applying them is often unique to the foreigners and kufaar and Iraqis did not recognised what it would be facing prevailing circumstances. Ashley Jackson have to be in any way ‘extremists’ to be before it committed forces to the and Colonel Alex Alderson, while neither opposed to their occupation by foreign Coalition of the Willing. And no, are that specific about Iraq, have both infidels. Perhaps the first lesson from because, once into the inevitable gone some way to show how tactical past experience that might have been insurgency, the British Army was left to lessons cannot fit every situation1. It is borne in mind ahead of the invasion of carry the can (but perhaps this is the over-riding principles that prevail, 2003 was that provided by Glubb Pasha: something else the Army should have but these must not be taken at face learned from the past). Ultimately, amid value. A glib repetition of the principle “It is easy to conquer any Arab any debate about victory and defeat in that there must be ‘a clear and country, but their natural inclination Iraq (not military victory or military achievable political aim’ might be to rebellion makes it difficult and defeat), it was not only “no way to win a assessed as a principle too far in the expensive for the invader to war”, it was no way to start a war. case of Iraq. That it is ‘all about the maintain his control.”2 politics’, to quote General Petraeus, and Iraq is, of course, yesterday’s war as far that “Fighting insurgencies is a long-term But the point of this article is not to as the British Army and the UK in proposition”, to quote General Casey ramble on about learning from the past general are concerned. But before the Op before him, must put whatever any army in general; it is to try to learn something TELIC medal (with or without clasp) can achieve in a counter-insurgency specific to the British Army’s experience shifts too far along the chest, like that campaign into context. So, if fingers are in South-East Iraq in the early days of of Op BANNER, the tale might be told of to be pointed at the British Army the war against the insurgents in the the British Army’s struggle to achieve regarding Iraq, Multi-National Division hope that that experience is at least

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recorded and that something good might until the very start of the New Year, there were also divisional level come of it. despite it being blatantly obvious, given operations that were extremely rusty. the sabre rattling that had been going Divisional level transitional operations, 1 Armoured Division Planning on since the summer of 2002 that we such as forward passage of lines, had not It is a simple fact that, in training for were going to war. been practised in the field in years and the war in Iraq, the 1st Armoured movement in the combat zone had Division and its main constituent parts begun to assume the aura of an (7 Armoured Brigade, 16 Air Assault administrative task, so little had it been Brigade, 3 Commando Brigade) did not at done since the end of the Cold War5. any stage consider any post-war insurgency or how to deal with it; The point of all this is not to finger the indeed, in all the weeks before crossing Division for its weaknesses; they were the Iraqi border, the very broad area of known and understood and the brigade “post-conflict operations” was barely level and divisional level CPXs (not FTXs) discussed. It was not totally ignored and the small amount of integration with because ‘Phase IV’ was an obvious Royal Engineers hurry to deploy a bridge from an the US Marines that took place in late concern, but no Coalition plan was ever advanced ABLE bridgelayer vehicle (MOD) February and early March in the Kuwaiti issued during this period and well after. desert helped to iron out some creases. So it was in an entire vacuum that the Headquarters 1st Armoured Division had The point is to demonstrate that, given Divisional Headquarters – a tactical level enough to do in sorting out the force it what the Division faced (and, even if headquarters – conducted what planning was given – for that was also not anyone had read Glubb, the last thing to it could and under the general belief confirmed until the New Year – let alone be assumed was that the whole thing that, once the hurly-burly was done, in planning the actual operation. Up would be a walkover), there was simply divisions of civilian aid agents would until the week before Christmas not only no time to think very long about the quickly assume all responsibility for the was the make-up of the brigades vastly aftermath, about what to do with undefined but presumably considerable different from those committed Basrah, the Marsh Arabs, the rest of the tasks required. These tasks were, after eventually to operations, but the whole South East or whatever the Brits found all, not military ones and, while the decision-making process was predicated themselves in possession of. That it was invading military forces would clearly on an attack south out of Turkey3. The a walkover6 and that the truly have a lot to do in the business of successes and failures of the preparation complicated stuff of warfighting – stabilisation, it was also generally and conduct of the war – of Op TELIC 1 – getting things in the right place at the assumed that the very grateful people of have been examined in some detail and right time – was not overly tested, were Iraq, especially the Shi’a in the South, the findings published4. But some blessings. The Divisional Headquarters would be benign and happy in their information, which would help further had the chance to hold just one major attitude towards the foreigners now in explain the Division’s predicament, is planning session to consider the their midst. missing from that analysis. No full perceived aftermath before launching the explanation of what then transpired attack into Iraq and then, as we know, So – should 1st Armoured Division have post-war can be considered complete the very rapid collapse of Iraqi forces prepared itself better and, indeed, without this further context. meant that the aftermath descended all Headquarters 3rd Division, which too rapidly upon the Coalition. followed in the early summer of 2003? It was very fortunate that each allocated 1st Armoured Division could not. It is brigade was well up to the tasks Of course it was too late, even in very correct to be enormously impressed immediately ahead for no sooner had February 2003 and a month ahead of the by the Division’s preparation and move lower level training begun in earnest in attack, to be putting together a concrete to be ready for the ground war, for in early January 2003 than vehicles and plan for stabilisation and for securing just about seven weeks the whole force equipment had to be prepared for the Iraq’s future. But, late as it might have had been transported from the UK and long move. By the end of the month been, opportunities were then missed to Germany and was ready in its assembly commanders and their staffs were already use troops already in theatre and fully areas. But the very few weeks preceding moving too, removing the chance of any embedded in the Division to lead the the move had allowed for no more than Divisional integration. There were few planning and preparation for complete dedication to the task of concerns with operating at brigade level stabilisation operations while the main organising and preparing an army for and below but, while Headquarters 1st Divisional staff effort was focussed on warfighting operations. The holding back Armoured Division was a well worked-up the Iraqi Army7. of the political order until after the headquarters, the Air Assault and Christmas of 2002 prevented any Commando Brigades had never operated The bulk of Land Warfare Collective meaningful reorganisation and training within the Division’s framework and Training Group (Germany), including the

28 The British Army Review Number 148

Map - SE Iraq (MoD)

CAST team, had deployed with the Post Invasion Iraq and amidst shortages of all essential Divisional Headquarters to run the in- Jump forward about nine months to services, the Iraqis in the south-east still theatre training. Once this was December 2003. British troops were still seemed cautiously hopeful that the completed a number of its officers in Iraq but now as part of a coalition of temporary occupation by foreign soldiers augmented the Divisional Staff, such as forces in occupation of the south-east of would lead to better times. By late SO1 CAST, who set up the new and much the country. The situation had settled December Headquarters 3rd Division had needed Ops Support team. A number of down and was relatively quiet across all completed its handover to Headquarters officers took the GOC’s Tactical four of the Provinces of Basrah, Maysan, Multi-National Division (South East)9, led Headquarters into 1st US Marine Dhi Qar and Muthanna. 3rd (UK) Division by the British but now including another Division’s Forward Headquarters for the had replaced 1st Armoured that summer 12 nations’ officers, although the attack into the Ramaila Oilfields and the and, while the frustrations of the Americans always called MND(SE) “those remainder reorganised themselves in population had boiled over in the heat British guys” – a remark that was Kuwait ready to form the UK’s liaison invariably unhelpful when constantly team to the surrendered Iraqi Army, once surprised US officers in Baghdad got a that occurred8. Rather ignominiously, all Dane or a Rumanian or an Aussie on the of these troops were ordered home (not other end of the telephone. The greater by the GOC) at the beginning of April as impact of this will be described later. the Division sat on the edge of Basrah, Through the second half of 2003 the in order to train 1st Armoured Division’s Main Effort for the South-East had been reliefs which, subsequently, they were the improvement of essential services; to never asked to do. move the situation, in a phrase, from Rioters burn the Ice Factory, Nasiriyah – 2003 ‘Fragility to Stability’.

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Coalition ebbed”14 is to put it mildly. The ...the plan had established four situation noticeably worsened in South enduring, mutually supporting and East Iraq from the latter part of Op TELIC concurrent Lines of Operation: 3 onwards and the story is well known, Security, Essential Services, but as the dust has settled since the Economy, Governance. While just final withdrawal of British troops on 31 one of these - Security - was the July 2009 – the last of what was left of direct responsibility of the military, MND(SE) – there is arising a tendency to without the military lead across the point the finger of failure at the British board, the rest would have been military effort in Iraq. stillborn. Ammo everywhere General Jack Keane, former Vice- Subsequently, Main Effort would Chief of Staff of the US Army, shift within four months to enabling declared of the British in Iraq that transition of political authority to they were “a regular pain in the the Iraqis. All of this was within the ass”, and maybe he was right... campaign plan which, albeit focussed rather locally on the South-East, was in Winston Churchill said that “Coalition line with the overall Coalition aim and warfare is a tale of the reciprocal the aims of the UK. But it was at most complaints of allies”15 and the an operational level plan, worked up difficulties, especially between the main by Headquarters 3rd Division, as still components of the post-war Coalition, no clearly defined strategy existed. were certainly manifold. It was readily Nevertheless, the plan had established identified in MND(SE) that “Such Burning Cash four enduring, mutually supporting and multinationality has inherent frictions, This seemed to be working, if only concurrent Lines of Operation: Security, difficult enough in a purely military because the deteriorating security Essential Services, Economy, Governance. operation but conceivably greatly situation in the rest of Iraq was not While just one of these – Security – was exacerbated in the politico-military happening in the South East. The the direct responsibility of the military, environment of counter-insurgency.”16 attack on the Italians in An Nasariyah without the military lead across the They have barely been mentioned in the in November 2003, which left 19 Italian board, the rest would have been British Army’s literature, except in the soldiers and Carabinieri dead, seemed stillborn. case of the perceived difficulties created an aberration. So, while considerable by US military NOFORN procedures during military effort was still focussed on There is a good exposé of what went the war. But never mind the very fact essential services, about the same wrong and why between Op TELIC 2 and that the US leaders of the Coalition, time HQ MND(SE) stood up, Main 5 in the Army’s published analysis including those at CFLCC in Baghdad, did Effort shifted to Security Sector Reform, contained in ‘Stability Operations in not prepare for Phase IV. US attitudes the avowed aim being to establish: Iraq’11. Some of its language is perhaps towards ‘those British guys’ was somewhat guarded but it clearly invariably at odds with the situation in the plan had established four enduring, identifies the “failure to plan the military the South East and the way MND(SE) was mutually supporting and concurrent and non-military Phase IV tasks for Iraq dealing with it. General Jack Keane, Lines of Operation: Security, Essential in timely fashion and in sufficient breadth former Vice-Chief of Staff of the US Army, Services, Economy, Governance. While and depth”12 as the prime source of all declared of the British in Iraq that they just one of these – Security – was the the trouble that eventually followed. The were “a regular pain in the ass”17, and direct responsibility of the military, analysis also clearly absolves 1st maybe he was right, but next to no without the military lead across the Armoured Division of the responsibility attempt was made by CFLCC to properly board, the rest would have been for this failing.13 There was not only no understand the different conditions stillborn. time afforded for such planning but inherent in the southern Provinces. outside the military there was also very “A sufficiently credible and capable little effort; no concept that a national, The Insurgency Emerges Security Sector accountable to the cross-government approach was required Never mind the fact too that, initially, population and working to effective from the outset and through to the end. the Americans in the centre and north and representative provincial One has to ask why and, if time was the “wasted a year by using governments within the MND(SE) only problem, why no more time was counterproductive tactics … in AOR to allow Coalition Forces to allowed? To say that, as a result, “local unprofessional ignorance of the basic withdraw.”10 support for and confidence in the tenets of counter-insurgency warfare”18

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before they started to ‘get it’ (and get it they did). There was simply little dialogue. Until certainly into Op TELIC 5 not one single senior staff conference, such as for the collected Divisional chiefs of staff, was called by CJTF-7. Planned staff visits to Baghdad were invariably met by blank looks on arrival, with senior American staff absent at other meetings, and attempts to set up Centaur Tank Iraq (Italian Army) even a weekly conference call on secure Iraqi Boys - Nasiriyah telephones all failed.19 Passage of information from CJTF-7 was largely February/March 2004 to the US plan to confined to a tortuous daily conference seize the Shi’a cleric Moqtada Al Sadr call comprising lengthy summaries of because, with the Shi’a entirely that day’s activities from each Division20 dominating southern Iraq, his arrest and the daily FRAGO frenzy, requiring HQ could seriously destabilise the region. MND(SE) simply to “concur” or “non- His arrest might or might not have concur”.21 prevented the subsequent Shi’a insurgency, but the Americans just did “some Americans in Baghdad … not engage with MND(SE) (or with chafed at what they saw as Britain's MND(Central) for that matter – and their Japanese Self-Defence Forces Iraq (Australian failure to grasp the nettle.” problems were becoming acute). The Army) result was that “some Americans in It must be said that CJTF-7 was Baghdad … chafed at what they saw as the Dutch and Italians for instance – becoming entirely consumed by the Britain’s failure to grasp the nettle.”22 had made significant contributions to rising intensity of an insurgency at a MND(SE). The point is that all these time when it was still relatively quiet in This was bad enough but next to no differences had to be understood and the South. But MND(SE)’s whole point consideration was given by the US worked with if the Coalition was going was that there already appeared to be a towards Britain’s other Coalition to be held together, let alone if any minimum of consideration of the partners, and their presence also goes insurgency was going to be defeated. political context of the situation across almost entirely unmentioned in the The Italians, the lead nation in Dhi Qar Iraq and a poor understanding of the various British post-operational reports. very different conditions prevailing in It has already been alluded to, but the Province, came in for some particularly the South. A point was made to Baghdad reaction of CJTF-7 to finding a Rumanian hefty criticism, and some of it from in the late summer of 2003 that ‘One or Lithuanian staff officer on the end of within the MND(SE) military hierarchy. Size Does Not Fit All’ and that planning the telephone in Basrah was often to Rory Stewart, the CPA deputy considerations in other Provinces might hang up. This was not just a minor governorate coordinator at the time the not be appropriate to the South. This did inconvenience, for J3 Operations in ‘Sadr insurgency’ erupted in early April not make MND(SE) easy or particularly MND(SE) was a Danish lead, and J5 Plans 2004, has given a particularly critical compliant allies, especially when was an Italian lead. There were up to 13 account of this period.24 His immense concerns were voiced about the impact nations represented in MND(SE) in 200423 frustrations at apparent lack of Italian on the political scene in the South of US and each had, apart from the Danish will to engage with the enemy and with military operations elsewhere. A good battalion embedded in the British HQ MND(SE) for seemingly doing little to example was HQ MND(SE)’s resistance in brigade, a very different approach to support him must be well appreciated. operations. None of them, apart from the But what was never properly factored in British, had any experience of counter- was the enormous political pressure the insurgency operations and only the Italians were under not to have any more British and the Danes could operate fatalities. Great efforts had to be made outside specific, nationally defined, to keep the Coalition together at this areas of operation. None of them were stage,25 and with pressure from CJTF-7 inclined to accept direct orders from growing (CPA reports from Dhi Qar went what they saw as a British Headquarters, straight to Baghdad and, unhelpfully, not whether or not the order had originated to Basrah), MND(SE) pulled together a in Baghdad. This implies harsh criticism British battlegroup to move against the Rory Stewart - The Prince of the Marshes of other Coalition partners and some – insurgents in An Nasariyah. It was not

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required as the Italians, whose pragmatic lack of overall, let alone correct, One of the fundamental principles of agreements with local Iraqi leaders had strategy. It is difficult to understand counter-insurgency, re-learnt countless clearly broken down, went on to the why, given the knowledge and resources times, is unity of command at the offensive, and with their Centaur of the Coalition, that this could not be highest level. It is also outside the scope wheeled tanks cleared their way into the achieved. Professor Eliot Cohen’s of this article to comment on the mess city. It was the first time Italian troops conclusion is particularly damning: that was the higher leadership of the had fought a battle since the Second Coalition Provisional Authority and the World War and the judgement from HQ “From the outset of the Iraq war much of division between its Director and MND(SE) was that “The Italians kept us our difficulty has stemmed not so much Commander CJTF-7. But neither was informed of their intentions throughout from failures to find the right strategy, there any unity at the lower levels and, and in their own measured way appeared as from an astounding and depressing while locally, CPA heads and their to us to deal with the situation effectively inability to implement the strategic and military counterparts often did their … the Italian response, just like ours, operational choices we have nominally utmost to tie their activities together, must be measured by balancing risk and made.”28 without a fully integrated approach and effect.”26 Stewart acknowledged some unity of political and military command, time later that Dhi Qar Province did It might be all very well being critical or efforts will founder and fail. The genius actually settle down in the following otherwise of the tactics used by any who physically separated the British led year, although he ascribed this to Iraqi particular nation but this is as irrelevant CPA (South) from HQ MND(SE), the exasperation at Italian efforts rather as US tactical victories in Vietnam for, as former in Basrah Palace and the latter in than the effort itself.27 Colonel Bob Killebrew, a Vietnam Special Basrah Airport, should surely step And then there were the Japanese, Forces veteran, commented on Iraq: “If forward and explain his logic. So, too, massively disadvantaged by lack of any you get the strategy wrong and the tactics should the genius who established that relevant experience and the constraints right at the start, you can refine the each governorate would report directly of domestic politics, but nevertheless tactics forever but you will still lose the to Baghdad and not to the regional anxious to work on civil engineering and war.”29 military commanders, which further medical projects. The battalion from the hampered proper coordination of effort. Japanese Self-Defence Forces, deployed Troop levels in South East Iraq did When the CPA then folded in June 2004 within the Dutch area of operations in Al contain the insurgency and terrorism this effectively removed in-country Muthana Province, had over 80% of its that erupted in April 2004 and then political direction, contravening perhaps troops fixed to force protection and intensified over the following two years, the most fundamental of the counter- support tasks. But this was probably an but MND(SE)’s military leadership could insurgency principles – that civil primacy improvement on their original plan, not hope to reach its Centre of Gravity – reigns and the military role is which was to hire a private security defined as “The support of the majority of subordinate to it. Had Thompson and company to protect their soldiers! The the people within each Province of [the] Kitson and many others taught us Japanese might be considered naïve and AOR”30 – without a fully wound up effort nothing? were certainly, eventually, daunted by from other Government departments and the task they had taken on. But no agencies: “Cross-Government team efforts This was all very well understood within nation committed to MND(SE) refused to are vital to strategic success”.31 There is MND(SE) even in the first half of 2004 soldier, like the Ukrainians in Wasit no space here to delve into the lack of but, as this article has tried to portray Province, or simply turned tail for home, British cross-Government coordination in so far, understanding the situation was as the Spanish did during this period. the South East, and the added difficulty all very well; being able to do something This is no intended slur on the Spanish and confusion when other Coalition particularly coherent about it was military, forced home by domestic partner’s efforts were thrown into this another matter. Additionally, the politics after the appalling attacks by Al muddle must be imagined. Tom Rick’s situation did not seem all that bad and Qa’ida in Spain in March 2004, but their ‘Fiasco’ paints a graphic picture from the there was genuine confidence that, departure was preceded by serious US angle and Mark Etherington’s ‘Revolt certainly as far as the South East was planning at very short notice by MND(SE) on the Tigris’, albeit from MND(C), shines concerned (an attitude which might have to move British troops into the Spanish a light on this from the British been at least selfish), the delivery of the area. perspective, concluding that: Four Lines of Operation was still achievable. For Security this meant a No force in history has ever before “I believed that our leadership “Secure and stable environment countered an insurgency within such a structures were flawed on the British maintained by Iraqi security structures”33. disparate Coalition. And no counter- side, and that what we needed was The timeframe for the overall goal of an insurgency had ever been attempted someone capable of satisfactorily Iraq run by Iraqis by July 2004 now within the political chasm that prevailed combining diplomatic and military seems, but in hindsight, hopelessly in the Coalition in Iraq and the resultant strategies.”32 naïve.

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(‘surely the nation that put a man on the followed left a number of Iraqis dead, Moreover, it must be appreciated moon can give us electricity’) and the but local leaders were then convinced that dealing with the majority of Coalition had failed to meet the overall the Coalition would punish the town as these threats was not in the gift of need of ‘security’ – security in its very Saddam would have done, and we would the military alone, although the widest sense: “It had little to do with the have done in the 1920s, by bombing. In military alone was increasingly military situation but made us understand 1926 a British officer remarked that: being held responsible. that the vast majority of common men in Iraq, just like anywhere, are driven by “These people ... best understand a security of family and home and wished .303 bullet. The Turk beat them at It is another unfair judgment to accuse to lead their lives free of fear.”37 their own games [and] they are MND(SE) of not preparing for an rather apt to regard our leniency insurgency in the South East. In its As it was, the insurgency was not as was and straight dealing as a sign of CONPLAN, HQ MND(SE) had identified the feared – a large-scale rising of the weakness.”39 seven threats it faced and the nine people – but a minority, urban effects required to overcome them34 and, insurgency with a military flavour. Should MND(SE) therefore, in aside from measures to defeat terrorism Feeding off the frustrations of the Shi’a anticipation of an insurgency of some and what were somewhat ill-defined and the masses of unemployed young sort, have bombed the living daylights ‘non-compliant forces’, filled its time to men, many of whom had been soldiers, out of the place? Perhaps the rules of full measure and more with all its other Moqtadr Al Sadr had an easy audience. engagement used in the South East were tasks whilst maintaining the Coalition. But, despite the severity of the also seen as a sign of weakness and Moreover, it must be appreciated that subsequent violence, the insurgents were there is certainly a recognisable dilemma dealing with the majority of these relatively easy to defeat militarily and between employing “firm and timely threats was not in the gift of the tactical success for MND(SE) was always action”40 and using minimum force. A military alone, although the military achievable. It was achieved entirely very real concern arose when the alone was increasingly being held within the principles of countering an Norwegian contingent commander responsible. MND(SE) was not insurgency and force, when it was revealed his nation’s very tight RoE to complacent and in its planning had long applied (for military force is, of course, a the newspapers as it was feared these recognised that its Centre of Gravity key part of counter-insurgency) was could be very easily exploited by any meant – and this was unique to the applied under the principle of minimum ‘non-compliant’ group, as they probably South – maintaining the consent of the force. Hereby hung a further dilemma. were in the case of British troops later majority of the Shi’a; “we did not need There are lessons from the past that tell on. But MND(SE) was simply and rightly them all and could afford to lose the us that the Arab respects force and that not in the business of deterrence by small Sunni population in the South East, to show weakness is to invite a whole firepower, whatever the consequences but we had to have the majority of the heap of trouble: “Arabs … are were a month or so later. This led to Shi’a. We had long recognised that a accustomed to be ruled by the strong further battles with Baghdad. The UK general Shi’a insurgency directed against hand. Indeed, there is no denying that had often to argue to persuade CJTF-7 the occupying power – us – would make they respect force, and force alone.”38 that groups of Iraqis clad in black and our position rapidly untenable.”35 In This quotation from the British armed to the teeth did not necessarily providing fertile grounds for an commander in Iraq at the time of the constitute insurgents and could not be insurgency, the people are the threat. Shi’a uprising in 1920 is from another ‘taken out’ unless they engaged the age and its imperialist arrogance cannot Coalition first. This reached the limits of Within the paucity of military, political be denied. But the same lesson was absurdity when Baghdad sent a team to and economic resources available, it evident in Iraq in 2004. Basrah, led by a retired British officer, to could do no more and when the Sadr impose protection measures on the Insurgency bit MND(SE) on the backside, In trying to define the potential electricity power lines being cut down by it came as a shock. HQ MND(SE) was at insurgent, MND(SE) was facing myriad criminal gangs. The measures – that time planning for British troop groups amongst the Shi’a and even Shi’a helicopter gunships that would ‘whack’ reductions and a withdrawal from some tribes that had supported Saddam, anyone seen within five kilometres of of the Basrah city locations, including having placed their bets on the strongest the power lines – ignored the fact that Basrah Palace,36 and clearly did not see man. The town of Qal at Salih was the bulk of the population lived along the insurgency coming. Perhaps it should particularly notorious for its tribal them. The suggestion that local tribes have, but the point here is that MND(SE) lawlessness and an incident in February should be encouraged to protect the was doing its level best to forestall any 2004 rapidly escalated when local police power lines, perhaps being paid to do so, insurgency from developing and thought and members of the Badr Corps was met with derision. it was succeeding. In many ways it was, suspected the British were about to seize but Iraqi expectations ran very high their weapons. The day long battle that And finally, of course, good intelligence

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would give MND(SE) the answers it Lawrence, commenting on his Arab Insurgency: Learn and Adapt. Can We Do required. Intelligence drives operations comrades and their revolt against the Better?, BAR 142. and this is more important in counter- Turk, noted the relationship between 2 Lieutenant General Sir John Bagot Glubb, insurgency than in any other form of insurgent and regular soldier: A Soldier With the Arabs, London, 1957, p conflict, but quite how an efficient and 37. Anyone who has cause to work with universal intelligence service was going “… suppose we were (as we might Arab soldiers, especially Beduin, must to be established and in the time be) an influence, an idea, a thing read Glubb’s books. available is an unanswered question. intangible, invulnerable, without 3 When the ‘mother-of-all-training- Iraqi society, deeply suspicious of its front or back, drifting about like a conferences’ took place at Herford on 18 neighbour after decades of attention by gas? Armies were like plants, December 2002 it was attended by 7 Saddam’s own intelligence services, is immobile, firm-rooted, nourished Armd Bde, 20 Armd Bde and a ‘Rear Operations Group’, based on HQ LWCTG(G) virtually impenetrable by outsiders. The through long stems to the head. We and to comprise about three and a half might be a vapour, blowing where intense tribalism often encountered battalions. Three days later the actually helped to deter terrorist acts in we listed. Our kingdoms lay in each conference re-convened, now with 19 Bde the South East but it made the quest for man’s mind; and as we wanted in place of 20 Armd Bde. On Christmas intelligence almost impossible, certainly nothing material to live on, so we Eve planning was halted and by the New in the short term. might offer nothing material to the Year the ROG was stood down and 3 Cdo killing. It seemed a regular soldier Bde was in. Then 19 Bde was stood down and 16 Air Assault Bde was included. The No matter that the HUMINT teams were might be helpless without a target, owning only what he sat on, and Division went through more than 80 poorly resourced as well, if this very changes to the ORBAT before the force subjugating only what, by order, he closed society also views the occupier, finally departed for Kuwait. And, of 41 no matter how altruistic that occupier’s could poke his rifle at.” course, all planning had, until Boxing intentions might be, as merely Day, been focussed on an attack from temporarily in residence, then a foreign- Turkey. led counter-insurgency campaign is 4 AC71816: Operations in Iraq – An Analysis going to stumble and fail. The occupier From The Land Perspective. will eventually depart, so there is little 5 Exercise SAIF SARREA II in Oman in to be gained by supporting him. September/October 2001 had shown up these formation level weaknesses and The Strategic Perspective attempts were made, with limited Any criticism of MND(SE)’s effort in its success, to improve matters procedurally occupied territory misses the point on Exercise ARRCADE FUSION 2002 and entirely if it does not view the whole practically in Poland. strategic perspective: occupied Iraq was 6 Many British soldiers and marines faced just that. To occupy an Arab/Muslim fighting locally that was tough and state by western/infidel troops has bloody and some company groups and always and will always invite a shed-load even battlegroups conducted coordinated offensive operations in the couple of of trouble. Compound that occupation by weeks of battle that prevailed. But to not resourcing stabilisation and describe this as “significant Iraqi reconstruction in any way adequately TE Lawrence (IWM) resistance” is drawing the longbow too from the very beginning leaves the much. The quotation is taken from military, the very obvious representatives There can be tactical victories at every Operations in Iraq: First Reflections, DGCC of the occupier, increasingly vulnerable. stage and even partial strategic success. MoD, July 2003, p 11. It is then all too easy to dig into tactical The occupier might view this as victory, 7 AC71816, op cit. Much is made of what is ups and downs, but the solution does having created a semblance of order but perceived as the over-manning of British not and never will lie at this level. To ignoring the resulting greater ripples he headquarters, especially that of 1 Armd have any hope of defeating an insurgent has created. Ultimately, might we not Div. A fairer criticism might have been people the approach has to be very learn from history that there are times that some of the staff might have been better employed in planning for Phase IV. special and grounded in an underlying when there is no possible way to defeat political condition for eventual success. an insurgency, unless the occupier has 8 It is a now forgotten fact that on 16 In the British experience only Malaya annihilation in mind? February 2003 the GOC tasked Comd and Northern Ireland (it is still hoped), LWCTG(G) with forming a team to take on faction liaison post warfighting. This and perhaps Cyprus to some extent, have team, later called the Divisional Liaison seen insurgency completely overcome Group, had as its main task, liaison with because the politics worked. Left to the 1 Ashley Jackson, British Counter-insurgency the surrendered Iraqi Army and would military, the dilemma is unchanged. T E in History: A Useful Precedent?, BAR 139 comprise four pairs of Landrovers manned and Col Alex Alderson, Counter-

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entirely by officers and warrant officers 15 Quoted in Eliot A Cohen, Supreme 29 Quoted in Ricks, op cit, p 195. from LWCTG(G). Work with US Special Command: Soldiers, Statesmen and Forces had already begun before the entry Leadership in Wartime, New York, 2002, p 30 MND(SE) CONOPS, op cit. of 7 Armd Bde into Basrah, but the DLG 68. 31 AC71844, op cit, Para 17. was then stood down and sent home. 16 Col James Tanner, The British Counter- 32 Etherington, op cit, p 117. 9 It is hard to fathom Dr Daniel Marston’s Insurgency Experience in Iraq, remark in his article in BAR 147 that “the Counter-Insurgency Seminar, Johns 33 MND(SE) CONOPS, op cit, Annex E. The role of MND(SE) divisional HQ was not Hopkins School of Advanced International other three Lines of Operation and their fully established until TELIC 5” (Daniel Studies (SAIS), Baltimore, December goals were: Essential Services (“delivered Marston, “Smug and Complacent?” 2004. to acceptable standards”); Economy Operation TELIC: The Need for Critical (“Stable market economy established”); Analysis, BAR 147, p 18). Admittedly, the 17 SAIS Seminar, op cit. General Keane had Governance (“Democratic and founding of the Headquarters was entirely not realised a British officer was in the representative Iraqi national and ad hoc. It was ‘set up’ at PJHQ in audience. provincial government established”). September 2003 and its established staff 18 Ricks, op cit, p 4. 34 MND(SE) CONOPS, op cit. The threats in consisted of just three – the COS, GOC’s 19 This situation did improve markedly later February 2004, in no order of priority, ADC and a clerk – until staff officers from were: Terrorism, Criminality, all contributing nations started to trickle on and by the time of Op TELIC 8 was a mature and informative system. But by Environmental, Economic, Cultural, into Basrah from early December 2003. It Religious and Political. The effects had managed a three-day ‘training’ period this time British political intent – to pull out of Iraq – was also clear. required were: Defeat Terrorism, Force at PJHQ, attended by about half the Protection, Reduce Criminality to an nominated British officers and the 20 Except from the Brits! GOC 3rd Division Acceptable Level, Romanians, and the majority of the stipulated that the summary from HQ 3 Improve/Maintain/Secure Essential British officers attended the OPTAG Div/HQ MND(SE) was never to exceed two Services, Neutralise Non-Compliant package at Chilwell. During the course of minutes in length. Forces, Maintain and Improve Consent, December the HQ MND(SE) staff gradually Establish Effective New Iraqi Security took over from the HQ 3 Div staff, the 21 Poor passage of information reached an Forces, Secure Environment for Political bulk of British officers not arriving until early nadir on 13 December 2003, the day Progress and Maximise Iraqi Control. the very end of December, when the GOCs Saddam Hussein was captured by US handed over. Within the first month HQ Forces. HQ MND(SE) discovered the 35 Tanner, op cit. MND(SE) had produced, largely from capture that lunchtime when the Iraqis 36 Subsequently not handed over to the scratch and with no direction from working in the cookhouse got suddenly Iraqis until 3 September 2007. Baghdad, a full operational plan that, very excited as they saw Sky News over the highs and lows of the following broadcast the fact. The ‘celebratory firing’ 37 Tanner, op cit. couple of years, stood up to scrutiny. But of weapons across Basrah that morning, as a doctrinal basis for stabilisation which could so easily have turned to 38 Lt Gen Sir Aylmer Haldane, The Arab operations and then counter-insurgency, something else, was then explained. Rising in Mesopotamia, 1920, RUSI such an ad hoc approach is an absurdity. Journal, Vol LXVIII, Feb-Nov 1923, p 65. 22 Mark Etherington, Revolt on the Tigris – It was saved by the quality and The Al Sadr Uprising and the Governing of 39 Sqn Ldr CH Keith, quoted in Lawrence dedication of many of the officers and Iraq, London, 2005, p 96. James, Imperial Rearguard – Wars of soldiers (many of them ill-qualified) at Empire 1919-85, London, 1988, p 77. the time. 23 In February 2004 these were, in addition These were the years of RAF primacy and to the UK: Italy, the Netherlands, Japan, 10 MND(SE) CONOPS 01/04 dated 5 February the policy of ‘Air Control’ in Iraq and Romania, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, the 2004. Transjordan in an attempt to provide Czech Republic, Lithuania, New Zealand imperial policing on the cheap. 11 AC71844, Stability Operations in Iraq (Op and Iceland. Soon after, the Australians TELIC 2-5) – An Analysis From a Land arrived. 40 Maj Gen Sir Charles Gwynn, Imperial Perspective, July 2006. Policing, London, 1934, p 15. The 24 Rory Stewart, Occupational Hazards – My principles of ‘imperial policing’ that 12 AC71844, op cit, p 2, para 5. Time Governing in Iraq, London, 2006. General Gwynn identified would be recognisable today but his advocacy of 13 While AC71816 states, accurately, that HQ 25 The declared Coalition Strategic Centre of nipping any insurgency in the bud (he 1 Armd Div did not publish its Op Order Gravity was defined as “The maintenance never uses the word “insurgent”) must be for Phase IV until 21 April 2003, some 15 of international support.” taken in the context of the time. As days after Basrah fell, this apparent 26 COS MND(SE) to CPA Dhi Qar, quoted in understanding as British and Imperial slowness must be excused. The Stewart, op cit, p 384. forces were in the 1920s and 1930s of the requirement did not seem that urgent and use of minimum force, this was still the any adverse consequences were certainly 27 The Spectator/Intelligence Squared, The age of the punitive expedition. not apparent. And, of course, no plans Great Iraq Debate, 11 December 2007, at were being distributed from above. www.spectator.co.uk. 41 T E Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom, quoted in Malcolm Brown, T E Lawrence in 14 AC71844, op cit, p 4, para 10. 28 Cohen, op cit. War and Peace, London, 2005, p 265. 

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and means. Strategy is the bridge that practice strategy is done by tactics and should bind political goals coherently to as tactics, and everything that we rightly The Practice of military (et al) power. Strategy’s product consider tactical is, basically, strategic in is strategic effect, admittedly a rather addition (and effect for purpose). As opaque phenomenon.2 Strategic effect is Antulio Echevarria has written, ‘all events Strategy made manifest in the course of events in war have some weight’4 I translate and appears in the form of some measure those words of wisdom to mean that all Presentation at of control over the enemy. It may be tactical behaviour has strategic value, brute physical control or, much more and I would add that that weight can be often, it appears as a negative, given that our subject must the Conference controlling/influencing factor over have the nature of a net consequence. enemy thought and behaviour. Competition, rivalry, enmity, war and warfare, are duels. on – “The The Practice of Theory The only purpose of strategic theory is Complexity and Confusion Importance of for the education of the strategist. In minds that are competent and honest, Theory has no other value. It may be strategic theory can only be an elegant, even entertaining, and perhaps important source of assistance. But, Strategy” useful for those who are immersed in when deployed by the incompetent, the intellectual/cultural history. But, the careless, and the evil-intending, Norwegian Defence University College, justification for strategic theorizing is its strategic theory is a source of serious Oslo, 18 August, 2009 educational utility to the practising peril. T.E. Lawrence (of Arabia) famously strategist. So, what do we mean by the wrote in his war memoir, Seven Pillars of Professor Colin S Gray practice of strategy? Commonly it is Wisdom, about “the whole house of claimed, I believe misleadingly, that war”.5 He conceived of war as a building while one “has a strategy, one does comprising strategy, tactics, psychology, What is Strategy? Basics tactics”. Capt. Wayne Hughes, USN, and command. This is useful, but not If this were a sermon and I had a text as states that always readily explained to students. It a theme, it would be the following is tempting to present a PowerPointed quotation from the American strategist, At the most fundamental level, it is array of marvellous trinities: policy, Bernard Brodie. He said that: accepted that the strategist directs strategy, tactics; ends, ways, means; fire, the tactician. The mission of every manoeuvre, shock; fear, honour, interest Strategic thinking, or theory if one battle plan is passed from the (Thucydides); intellect, wealth, prefers, is nothing if not pragmatic. higher commander to the lower. psychology (Kautilya); passion, chance, Strategy is a “how to do it” study, a There is no more basic precept than reason (Clausewitz) – and so on. But, guide to accomplishing something that, and no principle of war is nothing in practice about our subject is and doing it efficiently… Above all, given greater status than the quite as simple as an elegant briefing strategy is a theory for action.1 primacy of the objective. This is not can make it appear. Yes, policy is the same as saying that strategy logically superior to strategy, as strategy My current definition asserts that determines tactics and the course of is to practice. But, each is meaningless strategy is the direction and use made of battle. Strategy and tactics are best without the others. They are truly force and the threat of force for the ends thought of as handmaidens, but if interdependent, and more. The German of policy. There cannot be a correct one must choose, it is probably more and French languages are wonderfully definition. But there can be definitions correct to say that tactics come indecisive about politics and policy. Our that do what they need to do by way of first, because they dictate the limits English usage, which distinguishes 3 specifying closely what it is that you are of strategy. clearly between the two, is actually talking about. My definition here refers misleading. In principle, politics narrowly to military strategy, hence the All of which is mainly correct, but, alas, produces policy, but the “policy process” specification of the instrumentality of misleading. It is a mistake of large is both continuous and inherently force. This definition easily can be dimension to take the formal hierarchy of political. It is a serious mistake to rendered more inclusive so that it covers policy, strategy, and tactics, too believe that policy begins when politics grand strategy. Put tersely, strategy seriously. In practice one does not just concludes. Similarly, if actually more connects ends purposefully with means. have a strategy, which is implemented by poignantly, surely nothing could be The classic explanation of the strategic tactics in pursuit of military objectives clearer than the distinctions between function states simply that strategy is that somehow miraculously should policy and strategy, and between about the relations among ends, ways, correspond to political goals. Instead, in strategy and tactics? Strategy is the

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agency for policy, while tactics is the Genius and Talent: The Strategist agency for strategy. QED: quod erat Although we refer casually to “the demonstrandum. But, but, just as policy strategist!”, in fact the label can, and cannot be viable without ongoing probably should, cover an inclusive job political enablers, so it cannot be made description. If you like the biblical sensibly except with the most careful admonition: “by their deeds shall ye know reference to strategic feasibility. Can them,” what are the deeds of the it be done by strategy? And, strategy strategist? Let me suggest what the cannot answer that vital question except strategist must do if he is to “do” by interrogating tactics. Can the troops, strategy. The strategist must: will the troops be willing to, do it? It is important to distinguish purpose from (a) conceptualize for the overall methods and means. However, the three matching of ends, ways, and means; ought to be a trinity, that is 1 in 3 and (b) plan how to translate the high 3 in 1. Clarity in a conceptual (vertical) overall concept into attainable hierarchy is prone to mislead the unwary. advantage; Eastern Island, then the site of Midway’s airfield, (c) command both the continuous Difficulty and Possibility is in the foreground. Sand Island, location of process of adaptive planning and the So many and varied are the most other base facilities, is across the entrance actual “doing” of the plan in action channel. (US Navy) impediments to good strategic by, and in support of, the troops; performance that it can be something (d) and both items (b) and (c) require a of a mystery why strategists sometimes command performance that needs succeed. I can suggest that there are leadership. at least three major reasons why the If you prefer a much narrower identity purposeful practice of strategy is for the strategist, that is your choice. possible, why sometimes it succeeds. But, I am taking my cue from the fact that strategy is a pragmatic endeavour First, the very complexity of the and that it has to be done, or it is strategist’s domain, the sheer variety nothing. of factors that interact to generate strategic performance, paradoxically An American classical scholar once is a great help, as well as a hindrance, observed that the Roman Republic to high quality strategic outcomes. Scene on board USS Yorktown (CV-5), shortly typically was blessed with generals who Why? Because complexity and variety after she was hit by three Japanese bombs on 4 were only talented.6 He noted that Julius tend to allow for fungibility, for June 1942. (US Navy) Caesar was a rare exception: he was a compensation, for substitution with genius who thought strategically. I work-arounds. And there is usually merit security that resides in the nature of should hasten to add that it is not in mass. One reason why navies have competition and warfare as a duel. The sufficient only to think strategically, been highly vulnerable in recent times enemy, who usually is the greatest unusual though that may be. Rather is it is because their major combatant units source of difficulty for the strategist, helpful if you are able to think both have been very few in number. You might also is the largest source of assistance. creatively and soundly, strategically. It have a 600-ship fleet, say, but how many His errors and the friction that must is, perhaps, a source of some relief to fleet aircraft carriers are there? It is hard afflict him provide my opportunity. recognize that few countries, and then to lose air superiority in an afternoon or to suffer irreversible defeat on land Third, to succeed as a strategist it is in a matter of hours. Of course, it can fortunate that I do not need to be be done, if you try hard enough. But, excellent, or even competent necessarily, air and land warfare in modern history though I do have to be lucky – Napoleon generally have been attritional, because was right, on this matter at least. Many of the resilience of numbers. Decisive an incompetent strategist has been victory has been difficult to achieve, rescued by a wise policymaker, good but by the same token decisive defeat enough subordinates, outstanding is not usually readily conceded. fighting power on the part of his troops, and – to repeat – by the follies of the Second, to the safety (imperfect, I enemy and the fall of the iron dice of admit) in complexity, I must add the war in his favour. Churchill (National Archives)

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hardly ever, truly have need of military competencies, tend also to have great theory of strategy, covering all periods strategic genius. Talent typically is good deficiencies. Genius can be hard to live and characters of conflict. But I believe enough. And talent can be helped by with, even if it may save the country. also that mastery of this general theory some formal education, whereas genius Military genius can even lead you to of strategy is a tool so to educate the is apt to be more damaged than assisted disaster. For a modest example of the practising strategist that he can cope by attempts at improving instruction.7 distinction, I could argue that whereas with the challenges for the strategy he Eisenhower and Montgomery certainly needs for today, whenever that is. had talent, Patton was a genius. Churchill too had genius, for good and ill. Professional military education can improve those with talent to fit them 1 Bernard Brodie, War and Politics (New better for high command, but there is a York: Macmillan, 1973), p.452. limit to what can be taught. To express 2 Strategic effect and the other it brutally, you cannot put in what God concepts employed in this paper are left out. It is useful to ask the question, developed in detail at length in my what makes a strategist? The answer, I book, The Strategy Bridge: Theory for suggest, is the following: the strategist Practice (Oxford: Oxford University is the product of Press, forthcoming). 3 Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., ‘The Strategy- (1) nature/biology; Tactics Relationship’, in Colin S. Gray (2) psychology/personality; and Roger W. Barnett, eds., Seapower General George Patton (USMA) (3) opportunity and experience; and Strategy (Annapolis, MD: Naval (4) education (formal). Institute Press, 1989), p. 47. 4 Antulio J. Echevarria II, “Dynamic I am sure that many an Alexander-the- Inter-Dimensionality: A Revolution in Great “might have been” lurks Military Affairs”, Joint Force Quarterly, under-tested and hence unrevealed in No. 15 (Spring 1997), p.36. the pages of history. Fabulous generals 5 T.E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom: whose skills in strategy their country did A Triumph (New York: Anchor Books, not need when they were ready and able 1991), pp. 191-2. to perform. Occasionally, I run across a 6 F.E. Adcock, The Roman Art of War Under true strategic talent that is wasted the Republic: Martin Classical Lectures, Vol. VIII (Cambridge, MA: Harvard because it is wearing the uniform of a General Dwight Eisenhower giving orders to University Press, 1940), p. 124. country that does not need that talent American paratroopers in England 1944 June. 7 I explore this subject at length in (Prints and Photographs Division, Library of to be exercised. Schools for Strategy: Educating Strategists Congress) for the 21st Century (Carlisle, PA: Conclusion Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army As a social scientist I am generically less War College, forthcoming). challenged by theory than are most of 8 Eliot A. Cohen, “The Historical Mind my historian friends, but I have my skill and Military Strategy”, Orbis, Vol. 49, biases, as do they. I subscribe to the No. 4 (Fall 2005), pp. 575-88. theory of “historical permanence”, to 9 For the leading example, Antulio J. 8 quote Eliot Cohen. This is to say that I Echevarria II, Clausewitz and believe the strategy function to be Contemporary War (Oxford: Oxford eternal and universal and inescapable. University Press, 2007), p.56. Both Also, I believe that there are no new HM King George VI visiting the headquarters of Echevarria and Clausewitz claim that the Commander of the 21st Army Group, Field important ideas about statecraft, war, war’s nature, as well as its character, Marshal Sir Bernard Montgomery. (IWM) and warfare. The details are always is dynamic. With no little changing. Some scholars whom I respect trepidation, I persist in believing For once, history (which is to say argue that a large change in war’s that they are unwise in their historians) is firm in the opinion that character can mean a change in war’s judgment.  genius has a downside as well as an nature.9 I do not subscribe to this belief. upside. People with great gifts and I think that there is but one general

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It was an honor to again assess the There is precious little support for the We are most grateful to General Barry current challenges in Afghanistan. This Afghan operation among the American McCaffrey for his permission and that of report is based on personal research, people. 66% say it is not worth fighting Colonel Michael Meese, Professor and data provided in-country during this trip, for. Only 45% of Americans and few Head of Department of Social Science, US and first-hand observations gained among his political party approve of military Academy West Point, to publish during my many field visits to Pakistan, President Obama’s handling of the war. this report. Editor Kuwait, and Afghanistan during the This was not a speech on military period 2003 forward to the current strategy. We are unlikely to achieve our situation. political and military goals in 18 months. After Action This will inevitably become a three to The conclusions are solely my own as ten year strategy to build a viable an Adjunct Professor of International Afghan state with their own security Report – Affairs at West Point and should be force that can allow us to withdraw. It viewed as an independent civilian may well cost us an additional $300 General Barry academic contribution to the national billion and we are likely to suffer security debate. No one in CENTCOM or thousands more US casualties. the ISAF Command in Afghanistan has R McCaffrey vetted this report. One of the most important concerns of American national security policy in the 1 short run is arguably the stability of USA (Retd) Pakistan. Pakistan is four nations under one weak federal government. Only the VISIT TO KUWAIT AND Pakistani Army is a load bearing AFGHANISTAN – 10-18 bureaucracy. The Pak Army is disciplined, November 2009 under-resourced, and courageous. The Pak Army is also the Frontier Corps, the December 5, 2009 Intelligence Service (ISI), and the most respected and trusted institution in the Memorandum For: country. They are also the guardians of Colonel Michael Meese, Professor and Pakistan’s 70-90 nuclear weapons. They Head Dept of Social Sciences have only tenuous control over much of the country. 1. Purpose: This memo provides a strategic and We are very vulnerable in our operational assessment of security Afghanistan operation. 90% of our operations in Afghanistan. Be glad to MG McCaffrey - Comd 24 Inf Div, Desert Storm Afghanistan logistics comes through conduct a Faculty Seminar and Cadet the Port of Karachi and runs a dangerous Class lectures based on this report These observations focus on Afghanistan thousand miles of wild country on during this spring semester. and the way forward. They do not center “jingle trucks” headed to the Bagram on Pakistan or the US domestic political or Kandahar Logistics Bases. Pakistani 2. Context: challenge. success in maintaining internal stability This report is based on a series of and economic growth is vital to our briefings at the United States Embassy in The President’s Afghanistan Strategy continued operations in Afghanistan. Kuwait, ARCENT HQS at Camp Arifjan, Speech at West Point was coherent, The present Zadari government and the Kuwait —-and then subsequent field logical, and sincere. It was the end economy are tottering on the edge. tactical observations in Afghanistan result of a very deliberative and The Pakistani Army is fighting their (ISAF, Afghan Government officials, thoughtful analytical review of the own Taliban for the future of the nation. UNAMA, USFOR-A, US Embassy Kabul, RC- situation in Afghanistan and our several It is not clear if Pakistan will regress South Kandahar, RC-East Bagram) at the unpalatable options. It was an to fundamentalism or become a modern, invitation of General David Petraeus, appropriate political statement which unified state. There is little question Commander, USCENTCOM and General delivered resources to his field that Pakistan offers de facto secure Stanley McChrystal, Commander, commander and explained why the sanctuary in both Baluchistan and the International Security Assistance Force Commander-in-Chief would not downsize FATA regions to the Quetta Shura and (ISAF) and US Forces – Afghanistan or withdraw—-and face the short term the Hekmatyar Taliban factions. (USFOR-A). political and military disaster that would immediately ensue.

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3. General: their past oppression. Currently 42 nations provide 35,000 Non- Afghanistan and her 28 million people US NATO troops (many with severe ROE are trying to build the basic elements of The Taliban now have a serious presence constraints or military competence a civil and Islamic society while in 160 Districts of 364—- up from 30 issues). The current US force level of traumatized by 35 years of cruel violence Districts in 2003. They have a Shadow 68,000 troops will increase per order of and chaos. The country is a giant and Government at Province level and most President Obama on 2 December by as beautiful land of great contrasts. The Districts throughout the country. many as 33,000 additional troops. The natural leadership of the tribes has been Insurgent attacks have increased 60% in Allies may well provide an additional slaughtered (one million murdered) or less than a year. In July alone they 7000+ reinforcements. However, only the driven into exile (three million) first by employed 828 IED attacks against courageous Brits will have both robust the Soviets during their terrible invasion friendly forces. We should expect 5,700 ROE and an aggressive ground-air- and repression of the people—-then by IED attacks in total by year’s end 2009. logistics-SOF combat capability. The the Taliban as an antidote to clan We must guard against tactical arrogance Canadians and the Dutch will withdraw. resistance to their unwelcome and by US and Allied ground combat forces. The political support in Germany for their poisonous rule. Bundeswehr (extremely weak capabilities Twice in recent months we have seen because of very restrictive ROE) is on the The Afghans are such impressive, devout, battalion sized units of Taliban fighters verge of collapse. The French are generous, and energetic people. They conduct highly successful (not- extremely capable but in the field in have an acute sense of humor in the face withstanding catastrophic losses by the small numbers. of relentless misery and adversity. They attacking insurgents) complex attacks are superb, courageous soldiers and employing surprise, reconnaissance, fire The Afghan National Army is a growing energetic, creative businessmen. They support, maneuver, and enormous success story. All five Maneuver Corps have deep respect for learning and courage in an attempt to over run Headquarters have been fielded along teachers—-and a thirst and gratitude for isolated US units. This is not Iraq. These with 14 of 19 Brigade Headquarters, and education and knowledge even at the Taliban have a political objective to 82 of the 132 authorized ground combat most elemental level. They are intensely knock NATO out of the war —-backed up battalions. (Kandaks). 46 of these focused as students at any age and quick by ferocious combat capabilities. We battalions are rated as capable of to learn and adapt. must ensure that ISAF forces follow the independent operations. Plans are to tactical basics of: fire support to always take the ANA from 90,000 to 240,000 by 4. The Military Situation — The include supporting artillery, intelligence 2013. Bottom Line: oversight, OP/LPs for early warning, The Taliban believe they are winning. adequate reserves, and operate with One of our most capable combat leaders The Afghan people do not know who will appropriate tactical mass against these US Army LTG Bill Caldwell has been prevail—-their government or the very clever enemy fighters. Only the recently given the task of building the Taliban. The populations particularly the incredible small unit leadership, fighting ANA and ANP Afghan security force. He Pashtun are hedging their bets. Most skill, and valor of these two small US has already been assigned two US Afghans are also dismayed at the Army units —-which suffered very high brigade training teams from the 82nd injustice and corruption of the casualties at Wanat and COP Keating —- Abn Division and the 48th BCT of the GA government (in particular the ANP) prevented a humiliating disaster. NG. He will now command all NATO compared to the more disciplined and Training establishment forces. As the Islamic Taliban. Taliban open internet US, Allied and ANA (Army)/ANP (Police) units graduate from institutional training communications among themselves and casualties have gone up dramatically. and deploy to the Regional Commands to their propaganda to the Afghan people (The ANP take the overwhelming operate—they will then fall under ISAF take into account their slogan that “the preponderance of the losses. Apparently operational command. More trainers will West has the clocks…but the Taliban the Taliban take them very seriously as a soon follow from elite US and NATO have the time.” potential threat to their night control of units. villages.) As of 25 November US The Taliban think they have the moral casualties are 922 killed and 4565 The Afghan National Police ANP (now high ground. They are richly funded with wounded. (Eight + battalions killed or 92,000 officers) are a work in progress. drug money. They are well equipped and wounded). During the expected Taliban They are six years behind the ANA in heavily armed. They have perfected and ISAF simultaneous spring development. The police are badly massive anti-armor IEDs. They are good offensives—- we may well encounter equipped, corrupt (7,300 fired in last at rapid and effective information ISAF casualty rates of 300-500 a month. two years), and untrained (64 of 365 operations. They deal in recent months Police Districts have gone through with the Afghan people in a careful ISAF is reinforcing just in time to rescue training.) The US Department of Defense manner to avoid the cruel images of the deteriorating tactical situation. will now take total charge of this

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attack (22,931CAS sorties year to date); (Shura) to hear their views. The 18th UAV, ISR, medevac, re-fueling (15,438 Airborne Corps Military Police Brigade tanker sorties year to date), and Commander who has oversight command transport assets (11,984 C17 sorties and of the facility talks to each detainee as 31,871 C130 sorties year to date). Nearly they are released. He is a hard nosed 100% of troop personnel, ammunition, combat soldier. Invariably he tells me – sensitive items, and armored vehicles the detainees thank him and hug him moved by air. (We flew 2830 MRAP light goodbye. General McCaffrey - Aghanistan, Nov 2009 armor vehicles into Afghanistan in less than a year. Now flying 7,000 MATVs). All three of our superb senior US-NATO program from State Department. It will Casualties move in and out of the battle dual-hatted combat leaders – General take a decade to create an Afghan zone by air—three days time to return Stan McChrystal, LTG Dave Rodriquez, National Police Force with adequate wounded soldiers to US with a 95% and LTG Bill Caldwell have called upon integrity which can operate at village survival rate. Isolated Army, Marine, and the best and the brightest of the military level in a competent manner. It will also SOF units are resupplied with food, services and the inter-agency operators require 1000 trained and protected water, fuel, building materials, and (FBI, DEA, AID, Border Patrol, etc.) to judges—- and a competent force of humanitarian aid by precision airdrop rally to this Afghanistan campaign. We prosecutors and defense lawyers. Finally, from altitudes in excess of 15,000 feet now have the absolute best leaders in we must create a correction system so which land inside a 100 foot circle with uniform, the CIA, law enforcement, and that convicted prisoners can be 95% precision. Air power is the glue that State/US AID headed into Afghanistan to incarcerated in a humane manner. holds together the war effort. run this operation.

We have now mostly fixed the Afghanistan and Iraq are an immensely 5. The Problems Facing 40,000 Afghan disorganized NATO/US/Afghan military costly war running in excess of $377 Villages: command and control system. Thankfully, million a day in FY10 Constant dollars. Afghanistan is still in the 14th Century. Secretary Gates, Generals Dave Petraeus (WWII was $622 million per day.). US It is the fifth poorest nation on the face at CENTCOM and General Stan McChrystal Defense outlays for 2009 are $657 billion of the earth. Basic services are the ISAF Commander (with the deft (or 4.6% of GDP…the highest since rudimentary or non-existent. The political-military support of US Admiral 1992.) In FY 2009 the war in Afghans lack infrastructure, justice, Jim Stavridis the NATO Supreme Allied Afghanistan cost $55.9 billion in regular resources and the most basic forms of Commander in Europe) have unscrewed appropriations with an additional local and national governance. Only 12 % this mess. We now have a unifying supplemental of $80.73 billion. Clearly of the land is arable and they face theater strategic ISAF headquarters Afghanistan will run with a burn rate in grossly inadequate potable water, soil commanded by General McChrystal. The excess of $9 billion per month by the degradation, massive deforestation, and next level of control is the tactical- summer of 2010. severe overgrazing. operational direction and coordination of all allied and Afghan forces in all four American military values which were Afghanistan is the second most corrupt Regional Commands which is now in the put at such risk during the Rumsfeld nation in the world after Somalia. Their hands of the very experienced US combat leadership era of Abu Ghraib have now adherence to tribal and Islamic values leader LTG Dave Rodriguez with the NATO been restored by our senior military and has been shattered by endless civil war (IJC) Intermediate Joint Command. civilian leadership. My visit to the new and foreign oppression. There is almost Petraeus and McChrystal are the most Bagram Detention Facility was no civil or criminal justice. Court trials effective counter-insurgency strategists enormously moving. 500+ detainees. last only minutes in many cases and lack and counter-terrorist fighters we have Most are released after 24 months. They juries. Human rights violations are produced in nine years of war. gain 46 lbs in confinement. They learn endemic: extrajudicial killings, official to read in their native tongue at the 4th impunity, restrictions on freedom of the We now have finally rationalized and grade level. They are given the option of press and religion, and severe and made coherent US and NATO airpower in also learning English and almost all do. widespread child abuse. The nation’s 34 Afghanistan. This war would be They receive vocational training and provincial prisons and 203 detention immediately unsustainable without the have access to a distinguished Afghan centers are appalling. Prisoners are massive employment of US Air Force, Islamic scholar. The US prison consistently subject to torture and police Navy (Carrier Battle Group dedicated on commander is a Texas National Guard frequently rape female and male station in the Indian Ocean), Marine, female Lt Colonel who is a lawyer, an MP, detainees. and Army aviation power: a mother and a grandmother. She meets unguarded each day with the senior Five million children live in desperate The air power numbers are huge: ground detainees, sitting cross-legged in a circle poverty. 70% of the country is illiterate.

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Unemployment is widespread. 40% of the part because of the ineffectiveness would grind to an immediate and total country literally does not know where of his government. collapse. their next meal will come from. People starve or freeze to death in the winter. Karzai is also a national leader in a The recent Afghan Presidential election deeply divided nation who has the in this fragile, violent nation (with no The lot of women is dismal…87% legitimacy that comes from being part history of democracy or the rule of law) complain of violence… half of it of the dominant ethnic group (42% of was deeply flawed. The 30,000+ Taliban sexual….60% of marriages are forced. the nation is probably Pashtun) and the are mostly Pashtun. They terrorized the The education level is at four years. From most prestigious tribe. President Karzai Pashtun plurality into not voting. a Western perspective —-in the is also committed to earning his place Karzai’s dishonest campaign electoral conservative rural areas (80% of the in history as a transformer of his nation machine then manufactured three million nation) —- women are in many cases to a peaceful place in the civilized ballots to make up for the missing merely abused property with less world. He is under enormous personally voters. However, given the realities of opportunity than a donkey. destructive and contradictory pressure this troubled nation no one else could from his Allies, the Afghan people, possibly have won. The US and the UN General life expectancy is under 45 and US representatives. (Underweight, proposed a runoff Presidential election years. Tuberculosis and drug addiction sick, nervous facial tic.) He is clearly with the number two runner-up Mr. are widespread. The country is infested imperfect. However, there is no Abdullah (seen as the Tajik candidate). with 5-7 million land mines which have evidence I have seen that he is This course-of-action would have disabled more than 200,000 Afghans. personally corrupt in any way. Like produced another delayed, murderous, President Grant following the US Civil freezing, expensive, and equally Terrorism and lack of basic physical War, he has a collection of ruffians in unconvincing political charade. security is widespread. The Taliban his inner circle. Some of the Provincial enforce a parallel system of justice Governors are murderous felons. We We (the US, UN, and EU) forced on involving hangings, torture, beheadings in the international community this primitive country a constitution and beatings. Criminality and extortion have handled him very stupidly that has some form of national election on the nation’s road network is and arrogantly at times. EVERY YEAR EXCEPT THREE until the year omnipresent. Decades of warfare have 2023. Could Florida handle this surfeit left property issues in great disorder. Hamid Karzai is trying to govern of democracy? We do not find many the transition of Afghanistan with a examples of operative democracy The land is mired in endless bloody civil leadership cadre which is a mixture of within 5000 miles of Kabul. war among the Pashtun (42%), the Tajiks world class expatriates (to include the (27%), the Uzbeks (9%), the Hazaras current MOD and MOI and several other Afghanistan has an elected bi-cameral (9%), and the many others who speak cabinet level officials), many political legislature, a constitution, a growing Dari, Pashto, and a polyglot of disparate and bureaucratic and military leaders road network (90% of the Ring Road is languages. The frontiers with who are courageous and devout but complete), and the rudiments of a Afghanistan’s six neighbor states are illiterate; and a collection of warlords, disciplined and courageous Army. uncertain and divide intensely felt tribal thugs, and rascals —-which include (90,000 troops.) When we entered and ethnic affiliations. some of his own family (brother Ahmed Afghanistan on a punitive military Wali Karzai is reputed to be the straw expedition following the murder of nearly 6. Afghanistan Now Has Hope: boss of Kandahar and a de facto drug 3000 Americans on “911” —the Afghan The Afghan nation has an elected king pin.) —-and also a smattering of nation was in a shattered condition. President —Hamid Karzai —who is: dishonest international contractors. People were living in caves in the rubble brilliant, well educated, non-violent, a of Kabul. There were nearly no politically astute deal maker in a nation The overwhelming percentage of institutions left standing except the where murder not compromise is the 124,000+ US and Allied NGO’s and Taliban. Five million refugees have now normal political tool; a man who deeply contractors in Afghanistan (to include returned since 2002 demonstrating with cares for his people; and who is a DynCorp whose Board of Directors I am their presence hope for the future... personally courageous Afghan patriot proud to be with) are men and women who is constantly at risk of assassination of integrity, energy, and talent who are The Taliban are politically rejected by (several near successful there at great personal sacrifice and nearly the entire non-Pashtun attempts…probably from the Gulbuddin peril. They care deeply about population. Even among the Pashtun Hekmatyar insurgents in the FATA region Afghanistan, they want an adventure, they command polling support of less of Pakistan.). His popularity with his and they need a paycheck. Without than 6%. The Taliban were the spiritually own people has fallen dramatically as the them the entire war effort —-and most pure, they held the moral high ground, Taliban have surged to greater power in economic and political development they dispensed immediate dispute

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resolution, they normally were rudimentary. The legal economy is may be as many as two million drug disciplined and anti-crime. They growing at 10% per year. The Afghans users. were also a malignant virus in this have rapidly created effective businesses sick society. They were the uneducated, that do: light manufacturing, crafts, Afghanistan is the world’s largest murderous, rural hicks who destroyed construction, trucking, and road grower of opium which is banned under the culture and invented a cruel form building. The agricultural system is the 1988 UN Drug Convention to which of Islam not normal to this devout but painfully trying to repair the damage it is a signatory. Drug money is a fifth of tolerant society. They were anti-history. of 30 years of war and the competition the national GNP. Afghanistan produces They turned Afghanistan into a of opium planting for scarce arable land. 93% of the global supply of heroin. This nightmare for women, for other The Afghan goal is to feed the criminal trade funnels $200-400 million ethnic minorities, and for the Shia population and again become a into the Taliban and the warlords. Hazaras. They were senselessly cruel breadbasket for SW Asia. Educational Increasingly the Afghan criminal and destructive. Only the Soviets institutions to include universities enterprises process a larger and larger were worse. and vocational training programs are percentage of the opium into exportable appearing across the country. Large morphine or heroin. Production has The Afghan’s are generally extremely deposits of iron, copper, gold, gas, overwhelmed global demand. As much grateful for US and international and gemstones are in the initial ten thousand tons of stable opium have presence. US/NATO forces have a 60%+ stages of exploration and exploitation. been stockpiled—-enough to provide favorability rating in the polls. (US poll Hydroelectric power is coming on line. two years of the global demand for numbers are lower in the UK, South heroin. (900,000+ US addicts). Korea, Germany and Japan.) All four Violence against the people has recent Afghan Presidential candidates been dramatically reduced as the Afghan heroin primarily is consumed publicly endorsed and supported the Taliban learned both in Afghanistan in neighboring SW Asia nations, Russia, US presence. However, the Afghans and the Pakistani tribal areas that they and Western Europe. It causes enormous are extremely apprehensive that we will have a fatal kinetic encounter with suffering and bloodshed. Afghan heroin will leave again…sinking them back ISAF ground combat units if they mass in is estimated to kill more than 10,000 to the chaos of endless civil war. sizable numbers in daylight or dark – OR people a year in NATO countries…more if discovered by US airpower to include than five times the NATO troop losses Social indicators have dramatically Predator/Reaper armed UAV’s. The death from combat. increased for the better since the end rate among Afghan civilians is way down of the Taliban’s cruel era. Access to basic since the new ISAF Commander General Only in the last 18 months have we health care has rocketed from 8% in McChrystal instituted extremely sound begun to seriously address the problem. 2001 to 79%. 83% of the children are restrictive ROE on the employment of Secretary Rumsfeld spoke of the issue immunized. Child mortality has been firepower in populated areas. Fareed as one pertaining only to the Europeans. reduced by 25%. TB deaths are down Zakaria notes that the Afghan death rate The current notion that we can ignore by 50%. Seven million children are in is less than a tenth that of Iraqis during the growers as simple farmers trying to school to include three million girls — the terrible civil war violence of 2006. survive — and focus our counter-drug up from one million students and zero strategy only on law enforcement against girls during the Taliban rule. 7. THE DRUG ISSUE – OPIUM: the cartels — is painfully naïve. These The $3.4 billion opium crop of 7,700 huge criminal Afghan heroin operations The repression of human communication metric tons (2008) produces weapons if not defeated will corrupt legal and thought during the Taliban has been and supplies for the Taliban and al governance, addict the population, reduced dramatically. Eight million Qaeda, corrupts the police and civil distort the economy, and funnel people have phones. There are 650 active authorities, diverts land from food (two immense resources to the Taliban print publications reflecting differing million drug workers) and has addicted a and terrorist groups. political views. There are 15 television significant percentage of the population. networks and 55 private radio stations. Left unaddressed — the heroin menace The solution is three pronged. First, work There are also 150+ private printing will defeat our strategic goals in this on alternative livelihood agricultural houses and 145 media and film campaign. crops. Second, have the Afghan political production companies. People and leadership confront the opium issue as commerce now move constantly day and Afghanistan is now the most damaged un-Islamic and one that destroys their night (albeit at frequent risk of criminal narco-state on the face of the earth. culture. Third, destroy the crops. Without or Taliban attack) across the Afghan There are at least 920,000 drug users the last — nothing will work. Other frontiers with their six neighbor states. causing abject misery among widows, nations have successfully addressed the orphans, the unemployed, the poor. A drug issue: Thailand, Pakistan, Bolivia The economy is climbing from zero to new UN study will soon suggest there (until Morales), Peru, and to some extent

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Colombia (the traffic moved south to My judgment is that we can achieve our non-government controlled areas.). objectives in the coming five years: SOURCES: A. SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIALS: 8. SUMMARY: 1st: Create an Afghan security force The time for rhetoric and analysis is that will operate in defense of 1.) General David Petraeus, Commander, done. This operation is now in the hands their people and reduce our own United States Central Command of the ISAF battalions and SOF elements active combat role. (USCENTCOM). on the ground. The American people will 2.) General Stanley McChrystal, Commanding judge this on outcomes —-not political 2nd: Create governance from the General, International Security Assistance spin. bottom up at District and Force (ISAF) and US Forces – Afghanistan Province level that makes the lot (USFOR-A). There is no inevitability to history. We of the Afghan people better (and 3.) LTG William Caldwell, Commanding are neither the Brits nor the Soviets. This worth supporting the government General, NATO Training Mission- is an effort to secure our own national against the Taliban). Afghanistan. safety and build a stable Afghan state. 4.) LTG Jim Dutton (UK), Deputy Commanding We can achieve our strategic purpose 3rd: Mitigate the corruption of the General, NATO ISAF Headquarters, Kabul. with determined leadership and Afghan transition by having a 5.) MG Mike Scaparotti, Commanding General, American treasure and blood. parallel chain of financial custody and approval of ISAF Regional Command (East), Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)-82. The international civilian agency surge resources — until the Afghan will essentially not happen —-although government is operating unlike 6.) MG Dick Formica, Commanding General, an active criminal enterprise. Combined Security Transition Command State Department officers, US AID, CIA, (CSTC)-A. DEA, and the FBI will make vital contributions. Afghanistan over the next We now have the most effective and 7.) MG Peter Vangjel, Deputy Commanding 2-3 years will be simply too dangerous courageous military forces in our nation’s General, Third Army/United States Army Central. for most civil agencies. history committed to this campaign. The superb leadership from Secretary 8.) MG John Macdonald, Deputy Commanding NATO forces are central to our success. Gates, Admiral Mike Mullen, General Dave General, USFOR-A. They bring resources, political Petraeus, and General Stan McChrystal is 9.) RADM Greg Smith, Director of Strategic legitimacy, and brainpower. With few objective, experienced, non-political, Communications, ISAF/USFOR-A. exceptions, however, they will not and determined. 10.) MG Mike Flynn, Director of Intelligence, conduct aggressive counter-insurgency CJ2, ISAF. operations. They will be a huge help with Our focus must now not be on an exit training and monitoring the growth and strategy — but effective execution of 11.) MG Bill Mayville, ISAF Director of Strategic Plans and Assessment (CJ3). mentoring of the ANA and ANP. the political, economic, and military measures required to achieve our 12.) MG Nick Carter, (UK), Commander, ISAF purpose. Regional Command-South (RC-S). 13.) MG Stephen Mueller, USAF, Director, Air Barry R McCaffrey Component Coordination Element (ACCE), General USA (Retired) HQ ISAF. Adjunct professor of International Affairs 14.) BG Mark Martins, Interim Commander, Department of Social Sciences Task Force 435, US Theater Internment West Point, New York Facility-Afghanistan. 15.)BG Anne Macdonald, Afghan National Police Development. 16.)BG Ben Hodges, Director of Operations, RC-SOUTH, Kandahar. 17.)BG Guy Walsh, Commander, 451st Wing. 18.)BG John Nicholson, Commander, RC- SOUTH, Camp Leatherneck. 19.)BG Kurt Fuller, Deputy Commanding General – Operations, CJTF-82. 20.)BG Gregory Touhill, USAF, Chief, Office of Military Cooperation – Kuwait.

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21.)BG Thomas Murray, USMC, Deputy 8.) COL Marty Schweitzer, XO to the 11.) Mr. Mike Spangler, Economic Counselor, Commander, International Security Commander. US Embassy, Kabul. Assistance Force, RC-SOUTH. C. ISAF Strategic Advisory Group: F. LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS: 22.)COL (P) KK Chinn, Deputy Commanding DEA/FBI/Treasury Briefing – US Embassy, General – Support, CJTF-82. 1.) COL Kevin Owens, Director. Kabul: 23.)COL Brian Drinkwine, Commander, 4th 2.) COL Chris Kolenda. 1.) Mr. Jay Fitzpatrick, Assistant Regional Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne 3.) COL Hal Douquet. Director, DEA. Division. 4.) CDR Jeff Eggers. 2.) Mr. Bob Jones, FBI Legal Attaché. 24.)COL Harry Tunnell, Brigade Commander, 5th Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 2nd 5.) Mr. Greg Ryckman. 3.) Mr. Keith Weiss, DEA. Infantry Division. D. Afghan Officials: 4.) Mr. Jeff Silk, DEA. 25.)COL Michael Howard, Brigade Commander, 5.) Mr. Kirk Meyer, Afghan Threat Finance Cell. 4th Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry 1.) Abdul Rahim Wardak, Minister of Defense. Division. 2.) Mohamad Hanif Atmar, Minister of Interior. 6.) LTC Joe Myers, USFOR-A LNO. 26.)COL Eric Kurilla, Commander, Ranger 3.) General Bismillah Khan Mohammadi, Chief Regiment, Camp Alpha, Bagram. of Staff of Afghan National Army. 1 General Barry McCaffery was until 27.)COL Randy Copeland, Task Force-714 J3, 4.) MG Muhammad Raheem Wardak, recently the Director of the White Camp Alpha, Bagram. Commanding General, 201st Corps, House Office of National Drug Control 28.)COL Kimberly Rapacz, Deputy Chief of Afghan National Army. Policy. He has also co-chaired the Staff, G-3, 335th Signal Command, Camp 5.) Dr. Ashraf Ghani, Co-Director, Institute for Atlantic Council of the United States Arifjan, Kuwait. State Effectiveness; former Afghan NATO Counterterrorism Working 29.)COL Dennis Cahill, Chief, Development Minister of Finance. Group. Prior to confirmation as the Information Operations (LOO), CJTF-82, 6.) Shahmahmood Miakhel, former Deputy National Drug Policy Director, General CJ7. Interior Minister of Afghanistan. McCaffrey served as the Commander- in-Chief of the U.S. Armed Forces 30.)COL Kevin Palgutt, Military Police, Senior E. Diplomatic Officials: Advisor to the Minister of Interior. Southern Command coordinating 1.) Ambassador Karl Eikenberry, US national security operations in Latin 31.)COL Tom Umberg, CSTC-A (Anti-Corruption Ambassador to Afghanistan. America. During his military career, Strategy). 2.) Ambassador Deborah Jones, US he served overseas for thirteen years 32.)LTC Amy Cook, Commander, Joint Task Ambassador to Kuwait. and completed four combat tours. He Force Lone Star, (Bagram Detention commanded the 24th Infantry Center). 3.) Ambassador Frank Ricciardonne, Deputy Division (Mech) during the Desert Chief of Mission. 33.)LTC James Coote (UK), Distinguished Storm 400-kilometer left hook attack Service Order (DSO), Military Assistant to 4.) Ambassador Tony Wayne, Coordinating into Iraq. At retirement from active COM RC-SOUTH, ISAF. Director for Development and Economic duty, he was the most highly Affairs. decorated four-star general in the B. Intermediate Joint Command U.S. Army. He twice received the Briefing: 5.) Ambassador Mark Sedwill, UK Ambassador to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Distinguished Service Cross, the 1.) MG Jacques DeChevallier (FR), Deputy nation’s second highest medal for Commanding General. 6.) Ambassador (Ret.) William Taylor, Vice President, Peace & Stability Operations, valour. He was also awarded two 2.) MG Colin Boag (UK), Chief of Staff. US Institute of Peace. Silver Stars and received three Purple Heart medals for wounds sustained in 3.) MG Mike Regner, USMC, Chief of 7.) Core Country Team Brief. combat. General McCaffrey served as Operations. 8.) Mr. Robert Watkins, Deputy Special the assistant to General Colin Powell 4.) BG Alberto Corres (SP), Chief of Staff, Representative of the Secretary General, and supported the Chairman as the Stability Operations. UN Advisory Mission-Afghanistan. JCS advisor to the Secretary of State 5.) BG Stephen Bowes (UK), Chief of Staff, 9.) Mr. William Frej, Mission Director, US and the U.S. Ambassador to the Plans and Programs. Agency for International Development United Nations.  (USAID). 6.) RDML (S) Paul Becker, CJ2. 10.) Ms. Annie Pforzheimer, Political 7.) COL Wayne Grigsby, Deputy Chief of Staff. Counselor, US Embassy, Kabul.

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had their own method of communication. He goes on to cite the differences The Great between merchants, religious officials and periodic migrants. As a result, the intelligence effort of spies and news- Game: The Role writers focused on gathering together as much of this fragmented and disparate information and passing it on for of Intelligence analysis and exploitation. in the Failure At the same time the East India Company Wall painting from the head offices of the British was continuing to extend its influence East India Company, 1778 (British Library) over the sub-continent, furthering of the 1st Governor General Wellesley’s forward The need for intelligence in India had policies. To support this process there Afghan War become apparent early on in the British developed an efficient system of news- conquest of India. The Mughal Empire writers and intelligence agents around had had a long tradition of political each of the major residencies at Indian 1839 – 1842 intelligence which can be traced back to courts. In addition, the need to fill the Hindu texts which outline the positions of Resident (the official importance of spies and informers to representative of the Colonial power) and Major Brian Elliott states. This tradition was identified by their supporting Political Agents the British with both the military and increased. The posts of Political Agent the East India Company recruiting local were filled by Company men and officers If a power…can command an staff to support their information of the British Army. The Political Service entrance into India, our tenure of gathering efforts. The Indian system had been formed in 1820 and was this great empire is indeed a feeble revolved around the exploitation of the administered initially by the Company’s one…The country of Afghanistan social and business networks in India’s Foreign Department. Its early recruits, rather than the fort of Herat is our information rich society. Large numbers Morgan suggests, were a very mixed bag. first defence.’ of the population travelled extensively The post of Political Officer appealed to (Canning) because of marriage, pilgrimage or those bored with life in Indian business all of which required continued cantonments, with a taste for adventure The development of intelligence communication between distant towns and an aptitude for languages. networks in India influenced the and villages. Whether this travel was via structuring and processing of wheeled transport, horse or boat, There were a number of different information (and intelligence) collected whether business or social, there existed locations where an ‘intelligence officer’ in Afghanistan. The British intelligence a robust means of getting information might learn his trade; key locations in systems that formed the basis of those over long distances. The challenge for India were at the Residencies of Bombay, the British was identifying the deployed in Central Asia were developed Kutch and Ludhiana. These were appropriate information network in the Peninsula and Napoleonic Wars. perceived as rival schools as the trainee because, for example, the various sectors Throughout this period the use of agents political agents came under the influence in disguise behind enemy lines became of the respective Resident of that common place, along with the location. The outlook from Bombay interception of enemy dispatches. These concerned the Indus Valley and Persia; systems were allowed to atrophy in the those schooled in Bombay generally European theatre once Napoleon had favoured Persia as a buffer against been defeated; amongst other things, in interference from Europe. The Residency England there was the perception, at Kutch, under Henry Pottinger, focused highlighted by Ferris, that gentlemen did on the western approaches to India; not read other gentlemen’s’ mail: ‘British Alexander Burnes, who emerged as a key intelligence was hampered by a belief Political Officer of the period, initially that gentlemen could not be spies.’ In learned his trade under Pottinger. Such India, the system was in its infancy as early influence on these political officers the British tried to develop the systems This chromolithograph is taken from plate 48 of was key in shaping the information they William Simpson's 'India: Ancient and Modern'. they had used in Europe while exploiting Lord Wellesley was Governor-General of Bengal collected and the decisions that were existing local intelligence networks. during the period 1797 to 1805. (British Library). based on it.

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To deliver intelligence, a structured sequence is required to gather the information, process it, convert into the appropriate product and pass it on to the user. Those running the intelligence networks in India might have been able to recognise this type of process as the product of the extensive networks being used across the country. The same could not have been said for Afghanistan, despite the number of expeditions and experience the British had in the region. For that reason the terms information and intelligence are used inter- changeably here because there is little evidence of a discrete analysis process; ‘interpretation’ might be a more appropriate term.

Mountstuart Elphinstone had made a diplomatic visit to Afghanistan in 1808 during which he was to discover all he could about the territories west of the Dost Mohammed, this lithograph is taken from plate 3 of ‘Afghanistan’ by Lieutenant James Rattray. (British Library) Indus. British Army officers were also engaged in intelligence work. Captain identify possible invasion routes. Ellenborough asking the Foreign Office Grant was sent to conduct a military for military, political and commercial assessment of Persia in 1809; Lieutenant Burnes could not have done this without information about Afghanistan and the Henry Pottinger and Captain Charles local, in-country support; in this case Central Asia states. The perception of Christie followed in 1810, also focusing Mohan Lal, a Kashmiri who was fluent in Russia’s role in the region was the key on Persia, but travelling through several languages and experienced with influence in the developments of British Afghanistan. The information from these working with the British. He had thought on how best to defend northern expeditions was collated in order to supported Elphinstone’s 1808 visit to India. There were a number of schools of support the plans for the defence of Afghanistan and a previous Burnes thought which were to play an India. In 1812, Macdonald-Kinneir expedition - the ‘eyes and ears’ of influential role in the way intelligence produced a consolidated report of all Burnes’ mission to Bokhara. There were was used in the campaign in such data collected in ‘A Geographical other expeditions to Afghanistan - for Afghanistan. The ‘Metcalfe’ school of Memoir of the Persian Empire’. Further example Leech (Bombay Engineers) and thought, which had existed since the expeditions followed throughout the Wood (Royal Navy) explored the passes time of Wellesley, proposed that any 1820s, most notably that of William of Hindu Kush for routes practicable for threat from the Russians should be faced Moorcroft who kept meticulous records of Russian troops. Thus prior to the 1st on the North West Frontier (on the River his journeys including his view on which Anglo-Afghan War, the British had Sutlej which had been the boundary of the Afghan leaders would be most experience of operating in Afghanistan between British India and the Sikhs compliant to British interests. and had had the opportunity to gather since 1809). In 1833 Metcalfe is intelligence and develop the concept of reported to have stated that any One of the more notable Political using local networks and contacts for use extension beyond the Indus would lead Officers, Alexander Burnes, was in the future. to ‘embarrassments and wars, expensive dispatched on a mission to Kabul and and unprofitable at least, without any Bokhara in 1832. The aim of this mission The need for further information on equivalent benefit, if not ruinous and was to establish contact with Kabul and Afghanistan arose out of a request by destructive.’ A development on this the Afghan ruler Dost Mohammed. He Lord Ellenborough, at this stage theme was the position of John Malcolm, was also tasked with an assessment of President of the Board of Control, in who set out the ‘forward policy’ arguing Kabul’s defences and local forces, and to 1829. With Britain deciding not to go to that it was necessary to pre-empt the make observations on the Kilzilkum the aid of Persia in the Russo-Persian advance of Russian influence by Desert en route to Bokhara. War of 1826, there was a growing expanding British interest in the Underpinning all this was the perception concern over the extent of Russian intervening areas. This might involve of the Russian threat and the need to influence in the region. This led to alliances with Afghanistan, Persia,

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between London and India. The internal were supporting the Shah of Persia’s enemy in India (the tribes and various expedition to Herat, where they hoped ‘princely states’) was not well understood to encourage Kamran Khan (the ruler by those in London, yet the external of Herat) to make a bid for the throne enemy (Russia and Persia) took up at Kabul. almost as much time as their deliberations on the threats within The second incident is the Russian Europe. Palmerston, as Foreign Secretary, expedition to Khiva in 1839. This failed saw control of Afghanistan as providing due to ‘cold, pestilence and famine’ a check on the Persians from the East without reaching its destination, and the Russians from the North. however, it confirmed the views of the Russophobes in London and India that The British government in London was the Russians were prepared to march concerned by two key events in Central through Central Asia to threaten India. Asia in the late 1830s, one Persian, one Operations in Afghanistan were not, Russian. In 1837 the Persians attacked therefore, a foregone conclusion, despite the city of Herat; the Shah hoped that the gathering belief that the threat from Lord Palmerston (GAC) the Heratis would unite with him and he Russia was imminent; evidence was Iraq or the states in Turkestan for would lead them against the British in carefully selected (and edited) in London example. A third school of thought India, whose riches they would share to put before Cabinet to ensure that the recommended achieving the security between them. There was also Russian position of the Russophobes was carried. of India by investing military effort intrigue linked to this incident, as a into the sub-continent itself; winning Russian officer – Vitkevich – had been The decision to take military action in the hearts and minds of the country, discovered on the border with Persia by Afghanistan arose out of this continued in modern parlance. Rawlinson, the political officer in Tehran. fear of Russian activity which convinced Views of these strategies differed The British believed the Russians Auckland (the Governor General of India)

Country round Cabul 1839 (India Office Records)

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of the need to move from a passive to considered, yet failed to. Abbott records more active policy and one of direct that on the initial march to Kandahar in intervention. It is in these earliest days March 1839, there was no forage in the that some of the concerns over the role Bolan Pass for the horses and camels, of intelligence, or perhaps more correctly water was scarce in the desert and that at this stage, information, can be due to the effect of the environment on identified. The first of these was the the animals, much of the baggage of the political decision to back Shah Shujah infantry and cavalry had to be rather than Dost Mohammed as the ruler abandoned. The experience of political in Kabul. This arose out of a number of officers in Afghanistan and those factors. Firstly it was testament to the working in the northwest frontier influence of Wade at Ludhiana in his recorded the environmental conditions support of Ranjit Singh (the ruler of the on their travels and could have been Sikhs) and their subsequent recognition referred to by military planners. of Shah Shujah as the rightful ruler in Similarly, Abbott notes that by the end Fighting in the Passes Kabul. Burnes, on the other hand, with of March supplies were running short and and comments on the ‘shameful considerable first hand experience of rations were reduced for soldiers and inefficiency of the Commissariat’ which Afghanistan, proposed that Dost animals and that by the time they forced men on to half or quarter rations Mohammed, the current ruler in Kabul, reached Kandahar the cavalry were nearly for many days. The same officer reflects was the most appropriate leader for unfit for service; he concludes the entry that since leaving India ‘we have scarce Afghanistan and could be trusted to side with ‘fortunately no enemy appeared’. met with a dozen cultivated fields’. with the British against the Russians. These examples highlight the fact that Further lack of appreciation of the the British were not using the terrain, particularly the passes - the The results of this debate were in part, information that the political officers Bolan and Khyber – which the Army was the Simla Treaty and subsequent Simla would have gathered and reported to experience, is borne out by the diaries Declaration which set out the reasons throughout their expeditions or of the officers on the march from India for the British campaign: to depose exploiting the local knowledge of Ranjit into Afghanistan which note that a ‘few Dost Mohammed, replace him with Singh, Shah Shujah or Burnes who was hundred men judiciously placed on the Shujah and withdraw British troops once deployed with the Army of the Indus as heights, could have prevented our forcing this had been achieved. This is the first MacNaghten’s deputy. the Pass’. Captain Sir Richmond failure of intelligence linked to the war Shakespear, a Political Officer of the because Auckland, Wade and MacNaghten period, noted during his journey from (Secretary to the Secret and Political Herat to Orenburg in 1840 the key Department in Calcutta and due to be influence that religion played in the the Resident in Kabul) believed that lives of the Afghan peoples and related the majority of the populations of the differences with Turkomen peoples; Kabul and Kandahar would welcome this type of evidence should have been Shujah. This belief may well have known to the chain of command in Kabul arisen, Johnson suggests, because and applied appropriately. The lack of Burnes’ correspondence, that had to be support for Shah Shujah amongst the passed via Wade at Ludhiana, was being Afghan people is a further example of a doctored as Wade, an ally of the Sikhs, failure of intelligence by the British. wished to see Dost Mohammed ousted. Burnes, with all his experience of the country had consistently suggested that The Army of the Indus which marched Dost Mohammed would have been a more on Afghanistan was successful in terms appropriate ruler. Abbott notes in his of achieving a military victory. Early diary that everyone is ’surprised at the intelligence reports suggested there The Army of the Indus forcing the Bolan Pass, mis-information given us regarding the 1839. NAM 1971-02-33-481-6 would be a force of 26,000 Baluch roads and the resources of this country opposing the expedition as it came These environmental, logistic and and the dispositions of its inhabitants through the Bolan Pass; this appears subsequently cultural issues are a towards Shah Soojah’. to have been erroneous as most accounts frequent theme in correspondence of the suggest the move was largely unopposed. time; an officer of the Queen’s writes There were nonetheless, some The diaries of Captain Augustus Abbott when on the march from Kandahar to intelligence successes during the initial suggest that there was other information Kabul, ‘the first thirty miles across a invasion of Afghanistan. Having that the campaign planners might have desert, nearly famished for want of water’ occupied Kandahar, the Army moved on

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to show itself through a series of disturbances from 1839 to 1841.

In addition it appears that the British showed little regard for the effect that Shujah’s policies were having on the local population, economy and political structures. Garrisoning Afghanistan for example, was expensive and MacNaghten and his officers had to finance the Army and their operation. The demands of the Army had an impact on the Afghan economy, pushing up prices; Yapp cites one estimate as five hundred percent. Storming the fort of Ghazni, July 1839 (NAM 1971-02-33-480-4) If this caused resistance and attacks on government forces, Shujah enacted Ghazni and were able to successfully take information and intelligence was reprisals, which often needed British the city due to information from an interpreted. Letters from those in support. The deterioration of the informer. This episode is recounted by a Afghanistan betray the attitude of the situation across Afghanistan saw an number of publications on the period Army to the local people. ‘Truly they are expansion of British influence and including Hopkirk who notes that Mohan a villainous-looking set’ an officer of the control of government structures Lal made contact with a deserter from Queen’s writes. ‘Any man of whom would through the Army and the Political the fortress, informing the British that whiz you a ball from his matchlock, or Officer system, almost a complete the Kabul Gate to the city was the least stick into your midriff the long knife he shadow government. This led to further well defended. Abbott recounts a similar wears at his girdle, for the value of your examples of the failures of the tale in his diaries suggesting that jacket, if he caught you a mile from the intelligence process in Afghanistan. information was received from Abdul town unarmed’. Bayly contends that Reshed Khan, a deserter from the fortress intelligence from Kabul had, since the The political officers were remote from at Ghazni. This was a fortunate turn of time of Elphinstone’s first expedition, Kabul, responsible for their own regions events for the British as General Sir John been precarious and not to be relied (Jalalabad, Kandahar, Quetta and Ghazni Keane had left the Army’s siege train at upon. Despite this the British continued for example) and developed their own Kandahar assuming they would not be to believe their perceptions of local intelligence networks and needed – the Army had received reports Afghanistan rather than the reports they administrative structures. As a result that Ghazni was of no great strength and were receiving. Rawlinson noted in they had considerable influence and the Afghans would not defend it. August 1841 from Kandahar that, importantly, a monopoly of information Through the use of locally sourced which they were able to use to further contacts and Mohan Lal, the Army was ‘The feeling against us is daily on their own policies, uncontested by exploiting the same type of system that the increase and I apprehend a MacNaghten in Kabul. The culmination of existed in India and the methods that succession of disturbances in this this lack of cultural awareness and the Burnes had utilised during his travels. part of the country till the winter. effect of the independence and influence Equally, it was clear that by the time the The moolahs [sic] are preaching of the Political Officers came as a result Army was planning its retreat in 1842 against us from one end of the of the uprisings occurring across that better use was being made of the country to the other, and we may Afghanistan. The British tried to reform intelligence that had been gathered. now be said to hold our position by Shujah’s Army by disbanding the Afghan Mackeson writing to Pollack about the military strength’ feudal cavalry. This traditional Afghan route to Jalalabad suggests that ‘yr army enabled the tribal chiefs to communications between those places wd This was in part due to the humiliation maintain patronage over their tribesmen; be anything but safe esp along the meted out to the Afghans by the British the creation of the Janbaz (a more Khaibar – because our inactivity has given garrisons in Afghanistan. It was also due disciplined, readily deployable cavalry confidence to the numerous friends of the to the failure to grasp how unpopular formation officered by the British) struck Barakhzyais’ the government of Shah Shujah was with at the heart of traditional Afghan society Throughout the period of this first the majority of the Afghan people. Much by destroying the existing patron-client British expedition into Afghanistan there of the opposition manifested itself in system and fostered further resentment. was a fundamental lack of understanding religious terms and Shujah was accused In essence, the intelligence process in of the people and the culture of of heading an infidel government. This Afghanistan was outward-looking, Afghanistan, which influenced the way undercurrent of bad feeling would begin focusing on Russia and Persia, not the

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enemy within in Afghanistan. There were for instance was prone to prevarication. Following the retreat from Kabul in not the networks that had been long This was largely driven by London 1842, Britain abandoned its earlier established in India but the British politics because as foreign secretary, if attempts to implement the ‘forward established local information networks a war was fought in Persia, costs would policy’ through alliances with Persia and and were able to gather intelligence fall to London (and greater scrutiny in Afghanistan; Afghanistan would prove once they were established in country. Parliament). Any action in Afghanistan too troublesome and too expensive to Lack of cultural awareness and typically would fall to the East India Company and hold. The focus became the ‘internal colonial attitudes to the local population attract less Parliamentary attention; enemy’ in India and a period of masterly meant that invariably either the hence the prolonged debate over the inactivity (providing influence without intelligence was ignored, or because any extent to which a ‘forward policy’ should commitment) prevailed. From an analysis was being done by the decision be employed. For Palmerston the intelligence perspective, the right makers, wrong deductions were made. retention of Afghanistan benefited information and intelligence was The intricate politics of the tribal groups Britain in Europe. Of course the available to the Army and the were a closed book. continued debate over which course government structures in Afghanistan. of action the British should take to The networks had been established by Intelligence, or the failure of it was secure the northern frontier of India the Political Officers but the users failed however, not the only factor leading to was influenced by the information and to understand what the right intelligence British failings in the first Anglo-Afghan intelligence that was being received in was. This was probably the result of the war. There were other military failings, London and Bombay and how it was decision-makers also being the analysts particularly in logistics. Abbott’s diaries being interpreted by the various factions of the information they were receiving, frequently comment on the logistic involved in the debate. MacNaghten and together with the personalities involved problems brought about by campaigning Auckland were also key figures that and their associated personal agendas. in Afghanistan. One entry notes, eventually came to disagree with the ‘Sir John (Keane) declares that he will intervention in Afghanistan but failed to In India the British continued to use not move one mile from Kandahar to the do anything about it. Both were due to the existing traditional systems – the westwards without four and a half months move to new posts either out of news writers and spies from their local supplies and we have not camels to carry Afghanistan or away from the Afghan networks. This begins to change in the half that quantity’ issue and therefore failed to confront the 1840s and 1850s as this useful human difficulties the Army was facing. For Yapp intelligence is replaced by statistical The scarcity of transport made it the ‘responsibility therefore, for the surveys, court reports and the local impossible for the whole force to move Afghan disaster rests squarely with press. As a result, the successful at once; the 1st Battalion, the 9th Jat Auckland and MacNaughten.’ intelligence systems operating in India Regiment recorded on their advance to prior to the 1st Afghan War atrophy as Quetta, the shortage of rations (which Burnes should also bear some a new generation of officers regard the was to last for 3 and a half months) responsibility for the ‘Night of the Long traditional systems with suspicion. In would have a severe impact on horses Knives’ in November 1841 when the terms of the development of intelligence and camels. The 2nd Battalion at Kabul uprising begins. Burnes’ servants structures, very little is learned from the Kandahar also highlighted that rations and Mohan Lal had warned him that war in Afghanistan. In India the were scarce and that they had to wait for there was a plot against him yet he intelligence process continues to be crops to ripen. This would of course also failed to heed their advice., Burnes still degraded and the British fail to spot the have an impact on the local economy as believed he had the ability to quell any warnings that might have averted the the crops would have been part of the disturbance; his relationship with 1857 Mutiny. There are a number of subsistence needs of the local MacNaghten however, had been strained wider developments in intelligence in the community, perhaps adding to the for some time, perhaps because of the 1840s, but it is not clear whether they friction. The Army was equally debate over Dost Mohammed or Shah are attributable to the lessons from the unprepared for the environment of Shujah for the Afghan leadership and he 1st Afghan War. The introduction of Afghanistan, some of which has already had begun to refer to himself as ‘a highly military attachés is one example, the been discussed. The winter of 1839 paid idler’ whose advice was never closure of the Deciphering Branch of the proved particularly challenging when listened to by his chief. Davis suggests Foreign Office another (although the both logistic failings and a harsh winter that Burnes had continued to believe any Foreign Office does increase its caused the loss of horses and severe danger to the British in Afghanistan intelligence handling and processing privation amongst the soldiers. would come from the North and that he capability) and the establishing of the A further cause of the failure of the first had ‘overlooked what was taking place Corps of Guides in 1846, dual roled as expedition to Afghanistan might also be under his eyes and at his feet’. cavalry screen and intelligence gatherers specifically attributed to some of the Lessons Learned From The are others. key personalities involved. Palmerston 1st Anglo-Afghan War

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Herat Problem, 1830 – 1863, Part II, Middle Despite the experience of the first war, the undercurrents of discontent that Eastern Studies, Vol 10, 1974, pp 287 – 311. Britain continued to underestimate the would culminate in the 1857 Mutiny. The local Afghan population and neglect result is perhaps appropriately Bayly, CA, Knowing the Country: Empire and cultural awareness issues. Morison notes summarised by Templar who reflected on Information in India, Modern Asian Studies, Vol 27, No.1, 1993, pp 3-43. that the British failed to appreciate the ‘the impossibility of controlling, by force anarchical strength of Pathan fanaticism, of arms alone, a country in which the Biddulph, M, The March from the Indus to the a factor that would play a part in the mass of the people are against the Helmand and Back, 1878, 1879, RUSI Journal next adventure into Afghanistan. ‘if there “foreigner.”’ Vol 24, 1881. is a single lesson to be learned from the Davis, HWC, The Great Game in Asia (1800 – Afghan war it was that Afghanistan is a 1844), Raleigh Lecture on History, 10 land not only of rocks but of men – November 1926. natural fighters all but unconquerable in BIBLIOGRAPHY Ferris, JR, Tradition and System, British their own valleys’. He goes on to suggest Books intelligence and the old world order, 1715 – that Afghanistan and Persia were both 1956. phenomenally difficult campaigning Bayly, CA, Empire & Information. Fisher, MH, Indirect Rule in the British grounds amidst hostile populations at Intelligence gathering and social Empire: The Foundations of the Residency the end of long supply lines. Both were communication in India, 1780 – 1870 System in India (1764-1858). Modern Asian considerable barriers to Russian (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Studies, Vol 18, No.3, 1984, pp 393 – 428. 1999). influence in India, particularly if they Ingram, E, The Defence of British India II, A were strong, independent nations. Going Ewans, M, Afghanistan. A Short History of its Further Examination of the Mission of to war would only weaken them as buffer People and Politics (New York: HarperCollins, Mountstuart Elphinstone to Kabul, Journal of states and provide an opportunity for the 2002). Indian History. Russians. This was a lesson the British Ferris, J, Lord Salisbury, Secret Intelligence Morgan, G, Myth and Reality in the Great failed to learn as they would be at war and British Policy toward Russia and Central Game, Asian Affairs, Vol 60, 1973, pp 55 – 63. again in Afghanistan within fifty years. Asia 1874 – 1878 in Neilson & McKercher (Eds), Go Spy the Land: Military Intelligence in Morison, JL, From Alexander Burnes to History. (Westport: Praeger Publishing, 1992). Frederick Roberts, A Survey of Imperial Summary Frontier Policy, Raleigh Lecture on History, Intelligence was a factor in the outcome Hailes, WL, War Services of the 9th Jat 15 July 1936. of the campaign but it was not key nor Regiment 1803 – 1937. (Uckfield: Naval & was it the only factor. The Army and the Military Press, 1938) From the Letter of an Officer in the Army of the Indus, Assault of Ghuznee, United Services Political Officers had access to Hopkirk, P, The Great Game. On Secret Service Journal, Part I, 1840, pp 145 – 148. intelligence; it was the way that in High Asia (London: John Murray, 2006). intelligence was used (or not) that led to In a Series of Letters, by an Officer of the Johnson, R, Spying for Empire. The Great Game failures. Equally influential were logistic Queen’s, The Campaign in Afghanistan, Letters in Central and South Asia, 1757 – 1947 I – III, United Services Journal, Part II, 1840, failings and a lack of cultural awareness, (London: Greenhill Books, 2006). pp 163 – 174. which could have been addressed by referring to the reports and utilising the Macrory, P, Signal Catastrophe. The Story of the In a Series of Letters, by an Officer of the Disastrous Retreat from Kabul 1842 (London: previous experience of earlier Political Queen’s, The Campaign in Afghanistan, Letters Hodder & Stoughton, 1966). IV – VIII, United Services Journal, Part II, Officers. Prevarication by politicians in 1840, pp 326 – 336. London over the merits of a ‘forward Lowe, C, The Afghan War 1838 – 1842: From policy’, the personalities of the the Journal and Correspondence of Major- Shakespear, R, A Personal Narrative of a General Augustus Abbott (London: Bentley & individuals involved and their respective Journey from Herat to Orenburg, on the Son, 1879). Caspian in 1840, Blackwood’s Edinburgh influence in India and Afghanistan, Magazine, Vol 51, No 320, June 1842. particularly Auckland and MacNaghten, Wade, S, Spies in the Empire. Victorian Military were to also figure heavily. In this light Intelligence (London: Anthem Press, 2007). Taylor, PJO (Ed), The Army of Retribution: Letters from Peshawar 1842, Journal of the the outcome of the first Anglo-Afghan Yapp, ME, Strategies of British India: Britain, Society for Army Historical Research, Vol 81, Iran and Afghanistan, 1798 – 1850 (Oxford, war is perhaps not surprising; from an 2003, pp 114 – 131. intelligence perspective the British did 1980). Joint Warfare Publication 2-00, Intelligence not learn from their mistakes, which Articles, Periodicals & Other Documents ultimately lead to them failing to spot Support to Joint Operations, 2nd Edition, Alder, GJ, The Key to India? Britain and the March 2003. 

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those citizens, and through responsible thinking into practice. That said, international behaviour according analysis of British experience from a A Governance to agreed rules. A large number of range of contexts indicates a number states are now failing to meet this of useful lessons. 'double compact' to their citizens and and State neighbours, representing a significant First, stabilisation operations must threat to global security. The ultimate recognise that state functions are Building aim of international engagement in interdependent, and that security is these contexts must be a coherent only one aspect of state functionality and integrated process of state-building, across the spectrum of tasks a national Perspective through which international and national government must perform. This does not actors seek to enhance state legitimacy mean that British troops should perform An extract from Joint Doctrine and functionality over a long-term more tasks across a wider variety of Publication 3-40 Security and timeframe. It is only through such sectors; rather, they should understand Stabilisation: The Military Contribution a process of co-production that a that developing security forces also vicious cycle of destructive politics requires understanding the spectrum Clare Lockhart can be transformed into peace and of functions that underpin and constructive change. complement those services, including Clare Lockhart is a senior Adviser a judiciary system, a legal framework, on Governance and state building The counter-insurgency literature, a public finance system and health and for the United Nations (UN), North from Galula and Thompson, to the recent education services. All functions cannot Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) U.S. COIN manual (FM 3-24) emphasises be performed simultaneously: the issue and International Security Assistance that the use of force must be part of a is rather to determine which functions Force (ISAF). She is co-founder and process of movement towards political are appropriate to context, at what level Director of the Institute for State objectives, as part of a coherent multi- of governance (from village to capital) Effectiveness, advising a number of dimensional effort. A state-building they should be performed, and how their countries on their approaches to state- approach, which creates support from performance should be prioritised and building. Together with Ashraf Ghani, the population for positive change sequenced over time. They must be able she has written the book: through a reframing of the relations to design an appropriate response to the between state, market and citizen, problems, understanding which tasks 'Fixing Failed States: a framework for must be central. It is often illegitimate they, and which others, will be rebuilding a fractured world'. leadership, abuse of power and misuse responsible for, and which tools the of resources that results in alienation different actors will bring to the table. of segments of the population. Efforts Lastly, they must have the ability to be to expand networks of rights and able to supervise tasks which they are obligations give citizens a stake in directly responsible for. the system, rather than outside it, and create widening spheres of As the goal of a stabilisation operation opportunities to underpin peace and is ultimately to return the control of the stability. territory to a legitimate government, stabilisation operations should be carried Stabilisation doctrine must provide a out in such a way as to create and clear roadmap for soldiers to understand empower legitimate national actors the tasks they should be performing, wherever possible, rather than substitute across what timeframes and in what for those actors. While it is understood Saving Failed States, 2009, OUP, Pbk ways, with what resources, and in that the skills base can often be low in concert with which other actors. These fragile contexts, it is critical to build The Character and Context of Failed States are not easy challenges, nor are there capacity within national institutions to and the Impact of Military Intervention; 'generalisable' answers - indeed, a failure ensure that stability becomes Maximising the Positives and Minimising to date has been the propensity of sustainable. This requires a long-term the Negatives. international actors to use off-the-shelf approach - state-building is a 10 to 20 solutions. Furthermore, while year endeavour at a minimum - with a A stable, sovereign state requires understanding of these issues has now comprehensive mapping of assets at the legitimacy, won and sustained by the evolved at the strategic level, the outset, and with clear timelines and trust of its own citizens in return for international community often lacks the benchmarks for the handover of fulfilling the legitimate aspirations of tools at the operational level to translate responsibilities to the national

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government. All local actors are not 2005, for example, a National Programme and among the larger international necessarily legitimate in the eyes of the for the Afghan National Army ensured an community, is significant. This does population, and so care must be taken institutional foundation within a law and not mean, however, that our efforts not to empower illegitimate actors, order framework, with fair and have always been appropriate or without bringing them within a transparent recruitment processes; and successful, and it is critical that our framework of rule of law and the National Solidarity Programme thinking evolves as quickly as the threats accountability for use of power. transferred decision-rights over funding and issues that our soldiers face in the to locally elected bodies which could field. This means a movement towards Finally, stabilisation operations should then identify reconstruction and long-term, coherent, people-centred recognise that in the past, aid has not development priorities. Support for this approaches, with a clear division of always been appropriately designed for type of programming can enhance labour with other stakeholders. It also context, and that mere spending of stabilisation in such contexts. necessitates support for nascent state money on thousands of uncoordinated, Ultimately, the key instrument of change institutions and capacity building unsustainable small projects will not win and accountability is the national budget wherever possible, and a holistic, the population or create stability in the process, and thus the key counterparts programmatic approach that marshals longer term. Learning is currently taking are not western aid agencies, but the relevant resources and actors behind place among development actors on how national representatives of government, national, partner-country objectives. It to improve their behaviour and civil society, business and media. is only through thinking of this type instruments, including through use of that the UK will be able to withdraw its trust funds, programmatic instruments As the result of past experience and troops from these places and leave and private sector financing tools. forward-thinking, the UK has been better behind sustainable state institutions than most at developing and that provide for security and stability, National programmes which execute implementing stabilisation processes in which should be the ultimate objective critical tasks across state territory are difficult contexts. The confidence that a at the outset. a key component of stabilisation British military presence can generate, processes. In Afghanistan between 2001- both within the countries in question,

Beyond the Wire, Sangin (Arabella Dorman)

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Information Activity capacity; and the The ARRC’s approach to Influence has Training (G7) Branch widened its role to drawn on the model in the UK’s recent Achieving include Security Force Assistance. In Joint Doctrine Publication 3-40 (see addition, a civilian-manned Commander’s Figure 1) which shows the military Initiative Group (CIG) was formed as influence tools available to COMARRC Unity of intimate command support for COMARRC. in 4 broad areas and assigns one star These initiatives were developed proponents for each. Given that not all Purpose in throughout 2009, tested on Ex ARRCADE influence tools are under COMARRC’s FUSION 2009 in November and debated immediate control, some influence may during COMARRC’s annual Land need to be achieved indirectly; this Hybrid Conflict Componency seminar in December 2009; emphasises the importance of an its conclusions will be reported in the integrated civil-military effort and next issue. strategic communication. The HQ’s – HQ ARRC planning process and battle rhythm Influence at the Heart of the Thinking. are the gearing to ensure COMARRC’s Capability Experimentation: Part 1 Achieving Influence is a contest and is direction and guidance achieves the everyone’s business; all military action intended influence. Analysis of superior Brigadier Iain Harrison – Chief should be seen for its Influence on key commander’s orders and the operational Joint Fires and Influence Branch conflict causes and in shaping the environment identifies the intended HQ ARRC eventual (political) settlement – message(s), potential levers of influence everything a military force does or says and the best combination of military has an Influence. We aim to achieve an actions and words to achieve desired This is the first of 2 articles about HQ orchestrated combination of coercion, outcomes. ARRC’s operational experimentation persuasion and/or reassurance through 2009. This short article underpinned by communication designed At the heart of the battle rhythm describes the underpinning ideas; the to get targets/target audiences to do are four boards designed to ensure the subsequent one – in the next edition of something or believe something or to Influence effort is effectively planned BAR – will analyse the experiment and restore their confidence or sense of and coordinated: seek to draw relevant conclusions for HQ wellbeing. It is all about the message we ARRC’s involvement in operations in ISAF want our actions, words and images to ● The Influence Synchronisation in 2011 and, more widely, for higher convey; to/through whom we seek to Board (ISB) – chaired by COS or level multinational HQs of the future. convey it (using the levers of influence) DCOS Ops – synchronises all aspects and how we think it will be interpreted. of operations, focusing in particular Based on lessons from current operations and recent UK and US doctrine, COMARRC directed that the HQ would experiment with a number of capability initiatives Military Influence Tools through 2009 – under the banner of “Achieving Unity of Purpose in Hybrid Ch JFI Ch Engr/Civ Sp

PSYOPS [Ch Trg/SFA] Conflict”. It sought to ensure the HQ’s Deception Information Other PPP Activities Activities structures and processes were optimised KLE SPECAP/CNO SSR Information CIMIC to meet the complex challenges of Operations Infrastructur Media Ops e Projects Command Information Influence contemporary stabilisation operations Community Relations Public Support to which need to be conducted in a manner Affairs Governance STRATCOM Support to that integrates, at worst, unity of provision of OPSEC basic needs understanding and, at best, unity of Targeting Target Influence Audiences action with civilian partners and the Physical Destruction Placing strength host nation. To achieve this required 5 against identified key changes to the HQ’s thinking and Counter Influencevulnerabilities in Command Activity time and space structure: Influence was placed at the to gain Electronic advantage heart of HQ ARRC’s thinking; civilian Warfare planners were embedded across the HQ; Ch JFI Fires Manoeuvre the Engineer Branch expanded its remit DCOS Ops to incorporate the planning requirements 1 of Civil Support; the Joint Fires and Influence Branch increased its Military Influence Tools

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with the HQ’s assessment staff is essential. Information agility and achieving influence are key and led to new staff capabilities being exercised, including: a Strategic Communication Cell, a Counter-Propaganda and Rebuttal focus, a focus for the military influence aspects of Reconciliation/Reintegration, and a Key Leader Engagement Support Cell. Chief JFIB chaired the Integrated Targeting Board (Lethal and Non-Lethal targets) and Information Effects Board.

Training and Security Force Assistance (Trg/SFA) Branch. The branch is the focus for the HQ’s effort on planning the development of indigenous security capacity through partnering, training and mentoring. Recognising some aspects require external assistance and reach back, the ARRC Planning Staff HQ is prepared to define the strategy and on ensuring there is no gap between integrated in other branches in the HQ – develop the SFA plan which includes what is being said and what is being specifically, within the Engineer and Civil policy guidance on manning, training done. Support Branch and within the STRATCOM and equipping indigenous forces as well ● The Civil Support Board (CSB) is cell within the Joint Fires and Influence as synchronising and integrating Branch. With an influence based operations at lower levels within the the principal body for planning and approach, the message that COMARRC command. coordinating the civil support effort. wants military operations to convey is The Integrated Targeting Board (ITB) at the core of planning. Planning is Commander’s Initiative Group. plans and coordinates the lethal (kill synchronised through the COS/DCOS Ops- The civilian academic initiative group and capture) and non-lethal (focused chaired Influence Synchronisation Board. provide the commander and HQ with influence) targeting effort. And the advice on a broad range of civil-military Information Effects Board (IEB) Engineer and Civil Support (E&CS) issues and, more specifically, cultural plans, coordinates and directs discrete Branch. and historic context. They can look information operations and coordinates With an expanded remit to provide both and influence beyond tactical and the communication and engagement military engineer and civil support operational boundaries and also consider agenda. planning in support of essential services, the broader second and third order governance and economic development, effects over time. A virtual commander’s Integrated Planning the Branch included teams covering initiative group – comprising home- The HQ’s Plans Branches (G5 and G3/5) Governance, Economic Development, based individuals – expands this network included an embedded Civilian Planning Essential Services, Infrastructure and considerably. Element of 12 specialist civilian planning Civil Liaison with NGOs, IOs and staff drawn from the Foreign and Humanitarian Organisations. The Branch Analysis and Conclusions. Commonwealth Office, Department for was reinforced by reserve personnel and More considered analysis is underway International Development, Stabilisation contractors with the requisite specialist following the Land Componency seminar Unit and US State Department. Working skills. Chief E&CS chaired the Civil to determine how the momentum within the Integrated Planning Teams, Support Board. established through this programme of they brought civilian expertise experimentation is sustained – immediately to bear on military plans Joint Fires and Influence (JFI) Branch. particularly given HQ ARRC’s year-long and also ensured, where possible, that As the HQ’s proponent for Joint Fires, commitment to HQ ISAF Jointry and military planning was synchronised with Targeting and Information Activity, JFIB February prior to being circulated the wider civil planning effort. Other focuses on the lethal and non-lethal fires formally in March. The conclusions will specialist civilian planners were also aspect of influence; close coordination also be published in this journal. 

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variations on such a theme. You might oversimplification. We need to frame ask why? I would argue, with others, this subject by viewing the information Winning that it is the psychological dimension environment as just as much a part of these operations that is important of the battlespace as the physical although less understood in terms of environment and commanders at all Friends and our preparations. If the population is levels need to plan to operate in both the prize, then the question is not how simultaneously. Isolating an adversary Influencing many insurgents have been killed but psychologically is a skill we and our how many civilians died in the process? allies have found difficult to master Perhaps it has taken us too long to think against a highly savvy irregular. People about the population - their perceptions on what constitutes security and development - rather than effects on Colonel Duncan Barley the opposition. Furthermore, our words and actions are scrutinized and then publicised in a 24 hour globalised news Experience of contemporary campaigning network empowered by the Internet. has caused more than a degree of flux in In the case of Afghanistan, the Taliban the minds the UK military establishment spokesman has equal access to a as it has struggled to understand the global population as the UK Helmand fight it has been in. Now several years spokesman but is less fettered. Critical An Afghan Child smiles at Members of the OMLT into a COIN campaign credible doctrine audiences will judge our performance on patrol with the Afghanistan National Army (ANA) around Musa Qaleh in Helmand (Cpl Steven has been issued to guide education and on these sources of information, Peacock) training but its introduction begins to disinformation and outright propaganda question mindsets and structures forged that aims to brainwash the vulnerable. Two articles in recent copies of the in less turbulent times. British Army Review reflect on this Our attempts to frame the idea of subject of ‘influence’: Captain Emile A Battle for Minds – Psychology First, influencing a population including Simpson’s ‘Gaining the Influence Ballistics Second those who support us, are hostile or Initiative: Why Kinetic Operations are simply ambivalent have led to taking Central to Influence in Southern our kinetic capability and providing an Afghanistan’ and Lt Col Mark Wenham’s antonym. In this binary way, with terms ‘Information Operations – Main Effort or such as ‘hard and soft’, ‘kinetic and non- Supporting Effect?’ These articles kinetic’, ‘lethal and non-lethal’ or even highlight the growing pains of the ‘fires and influence’, we encourage British Army as it adjusts to meet the

Photo by Maj Ewan Cameron

Photo by Maj Ewan Cameron

The title of this article might be a better mantra for the operations that we are conducting now than ‘clear-hold-build’ or Local people seek to influence 52 Bde’s BRF

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demands of COIN or any variation on a subtle change in mindset that seeks the nature of our military education, that theme such as ‘hybrid warfare’ or to view force through a psychological careers and mindset. However, at the even contested state-building. The lens. This requires an altogether coalface of operations, it is a matter of struggle to penetrate the complexity and sophisticated approach by relatively getting the balance right, as Emile ambiguity of COIN, that is essentially a junior and inexperienced officers who Simpson is indicating, between using psychological contest, a battle of ideas, are confronted with combat and the lethal force and other measures in is reflected in the late arrival of management of violence. unison to influence a situation to our doctrine. Doctrine is obviously not an advantage or at least ‘do no harm’. This end in itself but rather the beginning of Military Influence (that applied in is a view now institutionalised in ISAF by an intellectual journey for the Army and a theatre of operations rather than its new commander. At sub-unit level, a change in mindset that must start with strategic measures from Whitehall) is however, the junior commander has few education; whether it is the young therefore at the core of the COIN tools in the box other than massing officer at Sandhurst or soldier at business and must be led by the lethal force quickly and that will Harrogate. And, as it will be argued later, commander using whatever ‘levers’ inevitably affect his mindset. it has to be investment in life-long he can pull or ‘tools’ at his disposal. education. Moreover, as the proof is in Communicating intent and arguing the action and not just words and teaching, counter insurgent’s case, states Kilcullen, we need to be structured and resourced must be supported by kinetic and non- to deliver ‘Influence’ on operations. kinetic activity such as ‘money as a weapon’ rather than vice versa. This What Exactly Do We Mean implies that we are savvy at operating in By Influence? the information environment whether We know and have been told by many this is traditional word of mouth, a local practitioner-theorists that COIN is a radio, regional TV or simply through contest of perceptions played out in leaders meeting. Because this the minds of the many of actors and environment defies hard boundaries what bystanders. Of course such minds can we say in the UK will influence audiences be influenced by propaganda, images, in theatre. 52 Brigade Crest money and favouritism and by reinforcing prejudice. In terms of a Taking this idea further, if commanders The Current Understanding and body of knowledge, our latest doctrine and their civilian colleagues are to be Application of Influence captures the idea of ‘Influence’ placing it convincing communicators they need to In UK military circles it was probably the at the very core of our thinking. Such understand the society in which they experience of 52 Infantry Brigade in thinking has been generated by operate in order to shape both what they Helmand and the thinking and language commanders in the field where there say and also what they do in this battle used by its commander, Brigadier has been much experimentation and for the support of the people. The Mackay, which captured the idea of innovation. Essentially, ‘Influence’ is a insurgent has the advantage of Influence. In essence this is the use of catch-all term implying that whatever understanding, access and continuity but psychological pressure in a politically activity we perform the aim is to also he can, unrestricted by clearances charged environment with many influence a situation in which the and legalities, get his story out first. So ‘stakeholders’ who have alternative views attitudes and behaviour of a myriad of Influence, in doctrinal terms, implies and perhaps conflicting agendas. The use actors are the objective. At campaign that commanders need to communicate of psychological pressure is not new. level it is an activity that shapes key to ‘target audiences’ and synchronise British forces in Sierra Leone applied conflict relationships moving them their ‘words and deeds’ but also be ‘first Information Operations to great effect towards a political settlement. It takes with the truth’. If there is a disconnect during the early period of our the focus off the enemy and on to the between what we say, what we stand for, intervention. Furthermore we always populations and communities in or our ‘narrative’, and the way we act, or knew that the fundamental character of question: ones in the affected country, are perceived to act, then we lose the manoeuvrist approach was to out- its regional neighbours and those of our credibility in the battle of perceptions. manoeuvre opponents mentally and not own and partner populations. Such a We lose credibility, and then we lose just physically. While theory and practice mental approach implies ‘we partner and authority. ranging from T E Lawrence to Galula have protect the population in order to harm pointed to information as a weapon, we the enemy rather than do harm to the The language of Influence draws more have been slow to integrate this idea enemy and protect the population’. Of from the social sciences and commercial into our operational design. Increasingly course such preferred action implies marketing than from bandwidth and US and British military commanders have sufficient forces: that is ‘mass’, but ballistics and that has implications for sought to integrate information effect

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and wider military influence (the British the action of these ‘chiefs’ needs understanding of the relevance or utility term) into their operations although the a multi-disciplinary team of experts, of force in the contemporary operating bureaucratic processes that previously a ‘prism cell’ rather than just a Red environment cannot be left to theatre controlled the release of information Team, that views activity through the specific training. It is a matter of tend to remain unwieldy and hence eyes of others. education and this must be engrained untimely. further in their psyche in Hybrid It is on the ground, where our troops Foundation Training. Arguably, education Recent Helmand Task Force commanders reach out to the community, that most provides understanding for fine have considered themselves as ‘Chief decisions on the use of force are judgement and certainly the imagination Influence’ and have applied, given their executed by relatively junior officers. In needed today on operations at all levels. unique circumstances, the general idea another article in this issue of BAR, a Such a sophisticated approach also during their six month tour with some commanding officer reflecting on his requires company commanders and more enthusiasm. This declaration has experience suggests that we prepare well senior officers to set the conditions for implications: it raises the profile of the for kinetic operations but do not think the use of force. previously niche area of Psychological psychologically in terms of their impact Operations and the slightly broader on the minds of the population. We are Having learned through bitter notion of Information Operations and judged by these contacts, essentially experience and drawn heavily on US associated Media Operations in terms of what the locals see and hear, and in that military thinking, how can we get the managing the ‘word’. It also brings into order. Consulting a recent Junior Officers’ ideas on Influence entrenched into the core thinking non-kinetic levers such as Tactics Course at the Land Warfare institutional army therefore into the ‘money as a weapon’ and amnesty. Centre, they believed our training is Army’s DNA? overly kinetic. Sometimes on operations Sometimes such non-kinetic initiatives we win the fire-fight rather than the Where We Need To Go run counter intuitive to the military perception battle. Perhaps there is still Influencing a population requires: mind. Moreover, it creates a further an attitude of mind that views dilemma, since ‘Influence’ measures may operations as an enemy-focused testing ● An understanding of the not yield results within a commander’s ground for the warrior ethos. Moreover, affected society – the origins of six month tenure. Apart from the issue of junior commanders now have direct conflict that will be political and campaign continuity, it means that the access to substantial firepower and the social. Understand the role played by way we organise our formation responsibilities that it attracts. I suspect needs, motivations, attitudes, beliefs headquarters and design their internal that Ross Kemp’s series exemplifies the and aspirations in influencing social processes must reflect the new status idea that Afghanistan is a military groups. And this includes the given to activities previous designated playground where junior ranks might grievances of the opposition. ‘operations support’. prove themselves in a fire-fight. One ● Educated and trained military might speculate that military kudos is and civilian practitioners who Experimentation on operations appears measured in how many scrapes a young understand the ways and means to have achieved a good balance of staff officer gets into rather than avoids, and to influence individuals and effort with formations organised with a that the weapons he uses indicates the social groupings unconstrained Chief Fires, Chief Influence, Chief ISTAR seriousness of the contact. by conventional thinking. This and no doubt a Chief Military Assistance opens up a new military lexicon to Civil Effect (formally CIMIC). Process- Undoubtedly, no one wants front line and command ‘style’. wise J2/ISTAR provides the situational infantry to be incapable of aggression understanding that shapes the when necessary. The warrior ethos ● A capability to influence in commander’s synchronisation of remains valid but as General Kiszley the information and physical activities; whether the use of force or warns in his paper on the ‘post modern environments: a means to another incentive. Important, however, warrior’ that ‘controlling the warrior communicate and act with is the ability to deliver the effect on the ethos and achieving the right balance in kinetic and non-kinetic ‘levers’. ground and that requires capability. An the right circumstances is one of the ● An institutional army that is Influence capability requires cultural most important responsibilities and able to deliver the education and experts, educated staff officers, some duties of any military commander at any training that enables an ‘Influence’ specialists and equipment for example level’. With the emphasis on ‘survival mindset and creates real experts in combat camera and ‘radio in a box’. I skills’ in mission specific training it must the areas of military assistance to would ask readers to contrast the also be remembered that junior officers civil effect and ‘information effect’ lifelong training of CO ‘Guns’ as Chief need to hone judgemental skills and amongst others. Fires with that given to a more complex understand the context in which they area dealt to Chief Influence. To shape use lethal force. However, this deeper ● I will focus on three areas that

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are currently topical, restraining research but seems to lack new areas need to be resourced and comment to the Army although clear ownership and coherence. professionalised. It is not an equipment accepting that information effects Previously understanding the local centric area, nor entirely a structural demand coherence from strategic people would have been in the issue, but more a mindset. Perhaps we to tactical levels. After all these domain of Psychological Operations view COIN or hybrid threats through the conflicts are by nature ones of and target audience analysis drawing lens of the past. In other words, what political competition that affect on intelligence expertise but now this does such a change to the operating a whole population and regional is core business and a key skill that environment mean for the gunners, neighbours. demands greater institutionalisation. infantry and sappers rather than have we got our Information Operations ● Cultural Understanding and the Who is the Army proponent for and Media Operations – essentially Role of Intelligence. understanding the environment; ‘information effect’ – right? Is it that the society in which we operate? Is our institutional change mechanisms There is no question that ISTAR is critical it a wider intelligence function, a are overly evolutionary and over-loaded? in avoiding the blind delivery of kinetic simple matter of language training and New capabilities have been effects and associated collateral damage. therefore the domain of our professional acknowledged, such as Military ISTAR has, not surprisingly, gained a 1* educators or does it demand more lateral Assistance to Civil Effect, but others seat at HQLF’s top table and will be thought? It needs a champion and such as Information Operations, Media nurtured as a capability that seeks to probably a Joint/Defence one. Operations and cultural understanding deliver situational understanding. While Operationally the traditional divisions (not just awareness) need to be reviewed ISTAR allows us to view the situation between psychological operations, and resourced better; as core business through our eyes, cultural CIMIC, J2 and surveillance become this means professionalised. In terms understanding, drawing from the social indistinct. All information needs to of delivering capability now, we cannot sciences and expertise whether academic be fused and exploited in a more afford to view ‘information effects’ as or from Diaspora, is not as militarily sophisticated way. Moreover HUMINT peripheral activity, the domain of tangible but will provide a perception depends on a supportive population, reservists (although granted they bring of deeper motives and attitudes. General so these capabilities are mutually necessary niche skills) and the individual Lamb summed it up well as ‘wars supporting. augmentee. I do not imply little has amongst the people, watched by the been done; within the LWC there is a people, fought for the people, judged by Mindset, Education and Training strong bottom-up approach particularly the people’. There is obviously a limit on Of course the Army is adapting. in the training line of development. how much cultural immersion can be Physically Thetford becomes Sangin, achieved before a deployment. and Land Warfare School courses have To change the institutional mindset been progressive in introducing the requires education supported by training. Undoubtedly the advent of Cultural subtle approach demanded by current This means education and training Advisers and cultural awareness short operations ‘amongst the people, and informed and guided by doctrine. Senior courses will help but must not be for the people’. The issue appears to officers must use such doctrine as a viewed by the Army as good enough. The be one of speed and mindset or maybe chances are this is the tip of the iceberg: the depth at which change takes place. it is not just a matter of understanding Crucially, is this new way of campaigning what motivates a given population but now firmly in the Army’s DNA? I would rather how to exert influence as a result say the direction is right but the of that knowledge. This can only be apportionment of effort is out of gained by interaction with an affected balance. For example, the Army’s plan to community in which ‘partnering’ with place itself on a campaign footing makes their fledgling security forces must offer little mention of how we need to operate a ‘force multiplier’. in the information environment, less for small enhancements to a single TA unit. In a similar vein, we know that Future Army structures work in HQLF that intelligence-led operations (as if aims to give form and resources to new one would do otherwise) are at the capability areas will undoubtedly focus nub of COIN yet our transition from the on the larger capabilities that deliver Intelligence Preparation of the mainly kinetic effects. Battlefield to one of ‘the Environment’ has been slow. Our understanding of the Of course, modern warfare needs gunners ‘human terrain’ is subject to much but there requires to be recognition that

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catalyst for change. This is not just would include history and economics Media Operations and Information the pamphlet but the wider debate in here. While potentially a rich source of Operations. Terms developed, like CIMIC, professional journals, on-line in various understanding the underlying psychology in the Balkan campaigns and used more intellectual forums and fed by analysis of operations amongst the people, these traditionally (through Psychological from various ‘think tanks’. Wider formal liberal sciences are less applicable to Operations) during the invasion of Iraq and informal doctrine should shape conflict and many theories impenetrable; in 2003 are not necessarily helpful. junior officer thinking within units and being far too abstract compared to the While it is necessary to make clear the formations. More time needs to be spent hard sciences that feed more difference between certain Psychological educating officers in thinking rather conventional military capability. More Operations initiatives and the activities than simply perfecting procedures and accessible social psychology typified by of Media Operations, such a literal processes. The change at ISCS (L), and Robert Cialdini in his ‘Yes – 50 Secrets division is not useful. Contemporary its director’s emphasis on reading the from the Science of Persuasion’ appears operations require the delivery of seminal works of COIN, is greatly to have some utility along with ideas ‘information effect’ that allows us to welcomed but why has it taken so long? that underpin social marketing and operate in a contested information We need to understand ourselves better, civilian Public Relations. But social environment. An environment where be reflective and more self-critical. Such science alone is not the answer; it the services offered by Media and development skills that are readily requires analysis and research to make Information Operations, with the civilian accepted in academic circles might, it useable for the practitioner and component’s activities to build and I suspect, be less attractive to an applicable to the society in question. strengthen local media, operates army officer judged on exuding self This idea underpins DGLW’s overhaul together, holistically. Activities in confidence and charisma. We might of the LWC. Afghanistan in Regional Command look more closely at how the US Army (South) provide the example to follow adapted so quickly and is now viewed Ensuring that Influence is understood using the banner ‘information effect’ universally as on the cutting edge of and resourced, within a wider change delivered in partnership with the thinking and operating in the management programme, as General Afghans that offer a ‘narrative’ to Contemporary Operating Environment. Kiszley argues, requires ‘buy-in counter that of the Taliban’s armed throughout the hierarchy and leadership propaganda. from the top’. As COIN is irregular, unconventional, dynamic and calls for So What? imagination, then it would follow that There is no question that the Army is less conventional voices get a mention. adapting and has to make choices with We must take risk on this and allow the Defence on capability priorities. My plea dissenters in too. in this article has been for those previously peripheral capabilities – to Information Effect deliver ‘information effect’ - to be Raising the profile of our Information modernised and not overshadowed by Operations, essentially Psychological more powerful proponents. ‘Close battle’ Operations, capability has been slow and change is taking place but shaping the does not reflect the urgency indicated by Army’s DNA will require a mindset shift doctrine. Compare this to the significant in terms of the way in which amount of thinking and writing that commanders balance force with other takes place in the US. The book ‘Ideas as tools at their disposal. Weapons – Influence and Perception in Modern Warfare’ edited by two serving We might start by looking at the officers has over 20 contributions from competencies of an officer with an officers ranking from general to captain. eye on the future. He or she must be a My argument here is one of creating the mentor, negotiator, mediator, more than Reading Mao Zedong, Sun Zu and right balance of investment and focus for just aware of social sciences, be media Machiavelli along with Bernard Fall might change. COIN requires different skills savvy, have something of the be too much but General Sir Rupert that need to be provided even if their criminologist, academic but be able to Smith’s aptly named ‘Utility of Force’ and proponents do not have much internal fight too but understanding the utility David Kilcullen’s ‘The Accidental Guerrilla’ influence themselves in the battle for of lethal force. Then we can do cerebral are surely a must. General Kiszley limited resources. soldiering based on education that is emphasises cultural change in the officer through military life, with a degree of corps through education, but drawing Delivering information effect has been self-education, which is positively more from the social sciences and I constrained by the military disciplines of encouraged. Indeed, recognised and

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rewarded too. But this must be aligned understanding and ‘strategic initiatives need to be resourced to build with career paths and new communication’. After all winning the credible institutions - virtual or physical specialisations as well. Life is too war of ideas has often been the decisive - to support both commanders and complex to be less than totally line of operations in successful COIN. specialist alike. We need a centre of professional in these new skill sets. The Last year Cranfield University started a excellence for operating in the military practitioner needs to operate at post graduate certificate in Information information environment. If the ‘post graduate’ level and this must not Operations, which is a beginning. The opposition use information as a weapon be for a few and limited to technical Land Warfare Centre has established an system, then we should too.  disciplines. We need more think tanks, Afghan Centre as a centre for excellence institutes of excellence in cultural and community of practice. These Arabella Dorman

Over the past few years, Arabella Dorman has gained a wide reputation for her portrait paintings, landscapes and, more recently, her studies behind the scenes with the British military in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Arabella’s paintings are an unusual blend of contemporary perception and classical technique. Though in every way an expression of the modern day, her work demonstrates a rare adherence to classical values, which owes much to both an MA in History of Art as well as four rigorous years of training in the old master techniques in Italy, at one of the few remaining schools in Europe in which traditional methods are still taught.

Based in London, Arabella works on portraits commissioned from around the world, and increasingly on paintings for the British military. She has also travelled extensively in Europe, North Africa and the Middle East producing portraits and landscapes for several successful exhibitions in London and Oman. These painting journeys have added further depth to her work, clearly discernable in her recent work from Iraq and Afghanistan.

Drawn from her first hand observations whilst living and travelling with the British army in Southern Iraq (Dec 2006) and Sangin, Helmund Province (Sep – Oct 2009) as well as time spent with wounded soldiers upon their return to the UK, Arabella’s work explores the realities of soldiering today, from the courage and complexities involved in day to day duties in theatre, to the psychological experiences of conflict and its aftermath.

Arabella Dorman has signed limited edition prints available, with 10 % of proceeds going to ABF or Combat Stress.

They can be seen at her website: Arabella Dorman – Portrait Commissions www.arabelladorman.com

5 Chelsea Farm House Studios, Milmans Street, London, SW10 0BY

Studio Tel: 0207 376 3925  Arabella Dorman sketching in Helmand Province

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Organization and the Direction 55,000 while 100,000 troops of Aerial Operations - August were still stationed in the 1917. Middle and Far East. Chronology of 1918 January – Air Ministry created. 1959 Aircraft production moves to 1918 Royal Air Force formed. Ministry of Aviation. the Higher 1924 The Chiefs of Staff Committee 1963 Peter Thorneycroft as was created. (conservative) minister of Control of 1933 The Defence Requirements defence proposes a unified Committee was established to MOD. advise on the deficiencies of 1964 MOD unified: the Admiralty, the Defence the Armed Forces relative to War Office, the Air Ministry and their intended roles, and on the Ministry of Defence itself. Using, in part, House of how these might be corrected. 1965 HEALEY REVIEW - The newly Commons Defence Committee 1940 Ministry of Aircraft Production elected Labour government material formed. launched a defence review in 1940 Winston Churchill becomes first 1965 under the Secretary of This chronology is a reminder of the minister of defence (and prime State for Defence, Denis Healey. evolution of the arrangements to oversee minister). The Healey Review was, in the defence of the United Kingdom. A 1946 Ministry of Defence was essence, a series of separate little bit of history may be helpful as we created. studies undertaken by different bodies using different methods. approach another SDR - it is prepared in 1946 Min of AP becomes the Ministry It initially reported to conjunction with the next article on the of Supply. role of the MoD. Editor. Parliament in a White Paper of 1957 SANDYS REVIEW. It was to some February 1966, but was not extent a response to the Suez completed until mid-1967. The 1546 Henry VIII creates the Navy debacle of the previous year Board, operational control process did involve a review of which was a diplomatic disaster foreign commitments, but that remains with the Lord High and had revealed the poor state Admiral. followed after the decisions to of readiness of British forces make substantial savings by 1643 Formation of the New Model and the obsolescence of much cancelling major equipment Army – Cromwell. of their equipment. The orders and reorganising and 1666 Secretary at War’s Office resulting review (conducted reducing the Territorial Army. formed. over a two month period) Its numbers were halved to 1815 Fifteen government placed the priorities on nuclear 45,000, and the dissolved units departments oversee the army. deterrence and missiles. It were ‘cadreised’ into nuclei 1832 Navy Board abolished, bringing proposed the phased ending of from which they could its functions under the national service with the last supposedly be rebuilt—which superintendence of “Their call-up in 1960 (reducing in practice meant that they Lordships” - the Board of service manpower from around were reduced to an almost Admiralty. 700,000 to around 400,000 by notional existence. Although 1854 War Office set up. the early 1960s. Overseas the 1967 White Paper garrisons were to be 1895 The Defence Committee of the announced continued reduced/replaced to an extent Cabinet was established. commitments East of Suez by aircraft carriers. One of its 1904 Elgin Committee and then the (though with 40,000, at half proposals—’that fighter aircraft Esher committee set up the the previous manpower levels), will in due course be replaced by Committee on Imperial Defence it warned— Defence policy can a ground-to-air guided missile (CID) – abolition of the never be static ... This system’ —shows the danger of Commander in Chief and reform Statement ... describes the making premature predictions. of the War Office – S of S chairs framework of policy within It was an error which had some the Army Council. which further decisions will be serious consequences for the taken in the years ahead. 1908 Haldane Committee sets up a UK aerospace industry. By 1968 a further White Paper, national army of a regular However, the rebalancing of in an attempt to stay within a expeditionary force and the forces away from East of Suez £2 billion cash limit, proposed Territorial Army for Home and toward Europe was accelerated withdrawal from Defence. frustrated by events. By 1960, Singapore and Malaysia as well 1917 Second Smuts Report - Report British Army of the Rhine as from the Persian Gulf (all to by General Smuts on Air numbers had been cut to

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be completed by 1971). The ● the UK’s contribution to January to June 1981. It was review also signalled the NATO’s front-line forces in conducted in the international abandonment of further aircraft Germany; context of a Soviet military carrier construction. build-up and the domestic ● the anti-submarine forces 1967 TA and County Associations context of a severe economic in the eastern Atlantic; merged into the Territorial downturn and the introduction Auxiliary Volunteer Reserve ● and home defence. of cash planning to control Associations (TAVRAs). public spending. In the report The three other major 1967 Aircraft production moves to on the 1981 Statement on the commitments examined were Ministry of Technology. Defence Estimates (SDE): The the nuclear deterrent, Secretary of State in his 1970 Aircraft production moves to reinforcements earmarked for the Ministry of Aviation Supply. introduction says that the right defence of NATO’s northern balance must be re-established 1971 Aircraft production moves to flank and naval forces in the “between inevitable resource the newly created Procurement Mediterranean. It was decided constraints and ... necessary Executive – part of the MOD. to withdraw all British forces defence requirements”. In other 1974 THE MASON REVIEW - The cuts from the Mediterranean theatre words, the Government’s proposed in the Healey Review with the exception of Cyprus. commitments to spend money were slowed only slightly by the The overall defence budget was on defence have outstripped Conservative government projected to fall by 12% over the availability of funds … between 1970 and 1974, ten years, with manpower The Nott review confirmed the although the Prime Minister’s falling by 11% over the same decision to proceed with the undertaking to rebuild the period. The Army’s strategic purchase of the Trident system Territorial Army was put in to reserve division was broken up, from the USA to replace Polaris effect—it took some six to the RAF’s transport fleet cut by as the UK’s strategic nuclear eight years to return its half and amphibious forces deterrent. The Territorial Army establishment to the new reduced. The commitment to and the other reserve forces effective levels. In March 1974, airdrop two parachute were to be merged and rebuilt the Secretary of State for battalions and supporting to meet the requirement for Defence of the newly-elected services was scrapped, and the home defence, which was also Labour government, Roy Mason, ‘airportable’ capability was to to be reinforced by a new ordered a defence review on his be reduced from three brigades fighter aircraft (eventually the first day in office. It was to to one. The Expenditure Eurofighter programme). The begin first with a Committee commented— British Army of the Rhine was reconsideration of the UK’s The period following the 1967- to be held at the level of defence commitments, but pre- 68 defence review and the 55,000 but to be re-equipped. empting this was a government adoption of the strategy of The main cuts under the Nott decision that defence spending flexible response by the Alliance review were to fall on the Navy should drop from around 5% of has seen considerably more which, although it took on the GDP to around 4.5% over ten emphasis on mobile forces and Trident submarines, was to lose years, a decision founded on reinforcement capabilities in around one fifth of their 60 the presumption that the UK’s NATO. In this field, the United destroyers and frigates. Despite spending should move towards Kingdom has hitherto given a the supposed abandonment of the NATO average. The lead amongst the European the carrier programme, three Expenditure Committee partners. The review proposals so-called ‘through deck cruisers’ commented in its preliminary will tend to reverse this trend had been built, designated as report on the review that— ... and therefore reduce the options the Invincible Class. One of the Ministry’s analysis quickly open to NATO Ministers at the these three carriers and the two established that our lower levels of strategic amphibious ships Fearless and commitments outside the NATO escalation. While the Intrepid were also to be cut. area were of lowest priority in commitment to the Central Front Out-of-area, or expeditionary, strictly military terms ... NATO is to be maintained, the cuts warfare capacity was therefore would remain the first charge affecting mobility, support and to be further significantly on resources available for reinforcement capability will reduced. With Trident, greater defence ... We endorse this have a weakening effect on both reliance was once again to be approach. the Northern and Southern placed on the strategic nuclear Three major commitments were flanks. deterrent as the counter to the deemed essential: 1981 The NOTT REVIEW ran from Soviet threat (together with an

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increased submarine fleet), and about 40; a submarine Although the 1993 Statement the overall force structure flotilla of 12 SSNs (nuclear on the Defence Estimates did, emphasised the UK’s increasing powered submarines) and for the first time, deliver a expectation of acting only as four SSKs (conventionally welcome analysis of the part of NATO for overseas powered submarines); defence programme and strove expeditionary operations. to make clear how the force ● to re-establish a strategic These proposals were rapidly structure related to the military reserve division; scotched by the experience of tasks that flowed from the the Falklands conflict in the ● to reduce service three roles, in its report on the Spring of 1982. In the White manpower by 18% over 1993 Statement on the Defence Paper on the lessons of that about five years to an Estimates the Committee conflict, published in December Army of around 120,000, a commented— 1982, it was announced that Navy of around 60,000 and Careful reading of SDE 93, which the 5th Infantry Brigade was to the RAF of around 75,000. is subtitled ‘Defending Our become an airborne force Future’, produces very little idea 3 Defence Roles: including an all-arms assault of which national interests are ● parachute capability of two To ensure the protection to be defended and where, in battalion groups (withdrawn and security of the United what order of priorities, and in under the Mason Review); Kingdom and our the face of which anticipated Fearless and Intrepid were to be dependent territories, even threats or dangers ... In the retained in service. The third where there is no major absence of explicit governmental aircraft carrier (HMS Invincible) external threat. arrangements for formulating a was to be retained, and the ● To insure against any major national security policy, it would number of destroyers and external threat to the be idle to expect the frigates held at around 55. The United Kingdom and our presentation of even the bare White Paper concluded by allies. bones of such a policy to signalling a return to ‘flexibility Parliament ... But experience in and mobility’, but as an extra ● To contribute to promoting this Parliament, particularly but rather than a central feature of the United Kingdom’s wider not exclusively in relation to the force structure. security interests through former Yugoslavia, has already 1990 OPTIONS FOR CHANGE – The the maintenance of heightened the interdependence main proposals: international peace and of foreign and defence policy, ● to retain four Trident stability. and the inappropriateness in many circumstances of the submarines; 1993 a further ‘mini-review’ took conventional division between place. The Secretary of State ● to reduce the air defence them ... some means should be said in his introduction to the capability by withdrawing found of providing Parliament 1993 Statement on the Defence two Phantom squadrons; with an opportunity to debate a Estimates that— rounded statement of the ● to halve the forces ... changes over the last 12 Government’s security policy stationed in Germany so months led me to conclude that goals, as well as the resources it that their reinforced a number of further is proposed to devote to strength would be two adjustments, both enhancement attaining those goals. divisions rather than four; and reductions to the force 1994 Front Line First: The Defence levels and capabilities of the ● to reduce RAF bases in Costs Studies – Main armed forces, are now Germany from four to two, proposals: appropriate. These adjustments and to end the UK’s ● ... include an increase in Army the establishment of a new contribution to German air manpower, improvements to our Central Staff to replace the defence; amphibious capability and the Defence Staff and Office of ● to maintain the UK’s Army’s anti-armour capability, Management and Budget amphibious capability and and further investment in set up by Michael air defence contribution to transport aircraft and support Heseltine in the mid ‘80s; NATO’s northern region; helicopters; as well as reductions ● a reduction in the single in our anti-submarine warfare ● to maintain three carriers; service HQ staff and a capability and the number of reduction in MoD HQ to reduce the aircraft provided for the air frigate/destroyer force to personnel from 5,200 to defence of the United Kingdom. around half that number;

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● the formation of a ● the downgrading of the ● two Landing Platform Dock Permanent Joint Rosyth naval base; amphibious assault ships Headquarters (PJHQ) at (LPDs) to replace Fearless ● the establishment of a new Northwood; and Intrepid; tri-Service Joint Staff ● the restructuring of Land College; ● 259 additional Challenger Command; 2 tanks; ● reorganisation of the ● the merging of all research recruitment services; ● a mid-life update of 142 and development and most Tornado GR1 aircraft to ● reorganisation of defence testing functions into a GR4 standard; new Defence Evaluation medical services with ● procurement of submarine- and Research Agency further integration into the (DERA) National Health Service; launched conventionally armed Tomahawk cruise ● reorganisation of MoD ● the collocation of missiles, and a possible Procurement Executive (PE) Police and guarding conventionally armed staff at Abbey Wood; services with further stand-off missile (CASOM) civilianisation. for the RAF. ● reorganisation of financial Defence Cost Studies: Major management; 1997/98 Strategic Defence Review – Procurement Decisions: initiated by incoming Labour ● ● reorganisation of new nuclear attack government. management of the MoD submarines (Trafalgar The main changes in force estate, maintenance Batch 2), further Type 23 structure are summarised in the functions and stores and frigates and seven following table: spares; Sandown minehunters;

Additions Cuts andReorganisation Confirmation and Enhancement

Army * 3330 more troops to be recruited. * Airborne Brigade and airmobile brigade to be * Territorial Army cut from 57,000 to amalgamated to form new air manoeuvre brigade 40,000: * Re-role 2 of the armoured regiments to armoured reconnaissance and NBC roles respectively, and enlarge the 6 remaining tank regiments to full 58-tank units; * Additional Mechanised Brigade to be created: Re-roled and strengthened from 5 Airborne Brigade which will be dissolved Navy * 2 Aircraft Carriers: Decision to plan * Cruise missiles: All Trafalgar class for 2 medium aircraft carriers, for submarines to be made capable of deployment after 2012 replacing firing Tomahawk land attack the present 3 smaller carriers; missiles. * Royal Navy Reserve: To increase by 350; * 4 ro-ro ships to be acquired; * 3 escort vessels cut: Frigate and destroyer force to be reduced from 35 to 32; * 3 Mine Counter Measure Vessels cut: Planned MCMV force to increase from 18 to 22 instead of 18 to 25; * 2 Attack submarines cut: Attack submarines to be cut from 12 to 10 Air Force * 4 C17 transports to be acquired: * Confirmation of EF2000: The number of Eurofighters to C17 large transport aircraft, ‘or be brought into service remains unchanged at 232; their equivalent’ to be acquired * Air-Launched missiles enhanced: * RTAF Reserve: To increase by 270 * Tornado GR4: Deployability to be enhanced and some * 36 combat aircraft cut: 23 offensive improvements to operations; support and 13 air defence aircraft * Nimrod-R: Improvement in on-board processing cut, number of squadrons to be cut systems for long range reconnaissance aircraft; by two to 18. * Air transport: Confirmation of the need for a successor. to portions of the ageing C-130 fleet.

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Land Forces - The concurrency high readiness for warfighting; two European sense and how should we requirements for the Armed Forces distil brigades to meet an indefinite non- try to deal with terrorists, in their to the following requirement for the warfighting commitment such as SFOR; bases or in transit? iii) In the UK, how far should the Armed Army: in addition to meeting its and two brigades able to ‘train Forces play an increased role in permanent commitments in the United coherently’. Each division will have its security? If so, what sort of forces Kingdom, Cyprus and elsewhere, it must three brigades at graduated readiness. are best suited for these tasks? be able to – Changes in Equipment Requirements Should the Reserve Forces have a under the SDR: different or enhanced role? ● maintain a brigade employed iv) In the military dimension, is there a indefinitely on a peace keeping The SDR proposes the decommissioning role for pre-emption? What is the mission such as SFOR, and at the of some existing equipment, in particular role of Armed Forces in dealing with same time deploy an armoured or problems upstream, what capabilities mechanised brigade for warfighting ● reducing the flotilla of attack do we need? What is clear already is for a period up to six months; or submarines from 12 to 10; that we need fast, integrated ● be capable of deploying a ● reducing the flotilla of operations, involving high levels of warfighting division. destroyers/frigates from 35 to 32, by military skill, improved intelligence- gathering capability and a deeper The Review has concluded that ‘the paying off three more Type 22 frigates; understanding of potential Army’s current structure will not meet opponents. post-SDR requirements without ● increasing the flotilla of mine v) How do we engage the causes of overstretch’. counter-measures vessels to 22, terrorism as well as the terrorists instead of to 25 as originally themselves? How do we do so on a Consequently, in order to meet these planned, by paying off more older cross-governmental and coalition requirements, the structure of the Army vessels; basis and what is the role of the has been significantly revamped in the military, if any, in this? How do we ● removing 36 RAF fast jet aircraft SDR. The stated overall purpose of the avoid the use of force becoming our from the front-line. changes made is to ‘make existing forces opponent’s own recruiting sergeant? more usable and to address overstretch’ Some previously intended procurements vi) How do we deter or dissuade states while retaining ‘a balanced, combined will also be reduced in number or from support or complicity with arms, high capability structure of two cancelled – terrorism, especially in the chemical, deployable divisions’. At present the biological, radiological and nuclear Army has three armoured brigades, two ● a second batch of 22 Merlin anti- activities? What if the state has mechanised brigades, an airborne submarine warfare (ASW) helicopters failed…? brigade and an airmobile brigade. Post- will not be ordered; vii) …what is the nature of asymmetric SDR, the airborne brigade will be re-roled threats? How does this impact on our ● as a mechanised brigade, with its the medium range TRIGAT and the approach to operations? airborne role transferred, along with the Next Light Anti-Armour Weapon The Select Committee commented: The airmobile brigade, to a new air projects will proceed, but with fewer discussion paper did not, however, clarify manoeuvre brigade. numbers to be ordered. the MoD’s understanding of asymmetry and specifically how it related to existing A new formation readiness cycle has February 2002 doctrine. Similarly it left unclear how been designed for the two deployable SDR New Chapter: operations against asymmetric tactics divisions. Under the new training cycle, Secretary of State came before the H of C might, in practice, be conducted. each of the six brigades (excluding the Defence select Committee on 28 air manouevre brigade) will adhere to a November 2001, and set out a list of March 2008 three year activity cycle with a year of questions which the New Chapter work The Government published The National in-role training, followed by a year at would need to address: Security Strategy of the United high readiness (mostly at thirty days’ Kingdom: Security in an interdependent notice to move) as part of the JRRF pool i) …can we base our policy on getting world (NSS). Although the publication and a year preparing for, deployed on, or intelligence of specific threats, with was coordinated by the Cabinet Office, recovering from, a six-month tour of occasional misses, or do we have to the Strategy’s stated aim was “to set out peace support or “operations other than assess our vulnerabilities to potential how we will address and manage this war” such as Northern Ireland or training terrorist capabilities and counter diverse though interconnected set of support in Canada. This cycle is designed these? security challenges and underlying specifically to provide at any one time ii) How far do we try to defend the drivers”. an armoured and mechanised brigade at homeland in a collective NATO and

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The NSS lays out the fundamental attacks by other states. Over recent continue as close to normal as possible security architecture for its approach decades, our view of national security (‘resilience’). to threats to UK security and resilience, has broadened to include threats to acknowledging that the traditional individual citizens and to our way of life, March 2009 boundaries between Government as well as to the integrity and interests A central plank of the Government’s departments, and between concepts of the state.” approach to national security is its of foreign and domestic policy, no Counter-Terrorism Strategy (CONTEST), longer apply. Equally, the concept The definition of national security and an updated version of which was of ‘threat’ has changed with the resilience now, therefore, encompasses a published on 24 March 2009. It aims development of non-state actors wide range of threats, from traditional “to reduce the risk to the UK from such as international terrorist state-on-state aggression through international terrorism so that people can organisations. terrorist groups to civil emergencies such go about their business freely and with as flooding or pandemics. It also confidence”. The strategy is built around “In the past, the state was the traditional encompasses a spectrum of capabilities what are described as the 4 ‘P’s, Prevent, focus of foreign, defence and security and responses—not merely preventing or Pursue, Protect and Prepare. The MoD policies, and national security was dealing with attacks or natural disasters notes that it “provide[s] a range of understood as dealing with the protection (‘security’), but also ensuring that vital support in each of these areas to a of the state and its vital interests from services are maintained and life can greater or lesser extent”.? 

On the edge of the Green Zone (Alexander Allan).

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logical even if the Army wants lance but that is hardly a policy, just a corporals, where the other two services series of exceptions. In other words, Keep the Army have less need for that rank. Similarly, whilst some broad guidelines are a do we really need 3 sets of lawyers? good idea, for example, standardised We can have specialist maritime lawyers rents and building design, the Army in the Public without requiring 3 distinct and separate should set the quartering requirement organisations. Yet for all the objections for itself without having to conform Eye we might raise about centralisation/ with another Service’s needs. jointery, this common-sense approach has not materialised. A common medical Doing What You Promise John Wilson service makes sense – it even partially The Army has to provide what its people exists in practice, medical teams from need. As do the Royal Navy and the RAF. all 3 Services do wonderful work in It is partly a matter of expectation. Afghanistan, yet each Service keeps Soldiers join the Army, they don’t join its own. But MOD centralisation has the Services. They look up to the Army not gone down this path, as you and they hold the Army to account not might have expected. Just to be clear, the MoD/Defence. I would suggest that, for example, the Royal Navy runs the medical services – Identity ie all doctors, nurses and dentists wear “It is with sadness that the Ministry RN uniform. of Defence must announce that a soldier from 2nd Battalion The Rifles We see centralisation in other areas. (2 RIFLES) was killed in We have a separate and centralised Afghanistan”. procurement agency absurdly headed up by someone who out-ranks the man who The announcement on the MoD gives him his orders: the operational website (November 2009) was FM Jan Smuts (HMSO) requirements man. You would expect to accompanied by this image: see commonality in such areas as fuel, In the Smuts Report1 of 1917, it says: rations, clothing, general stores, and How shall the relations of the new air accommodation. service to the Navy and the Army be determined? There is no mention of its To take an example, a closer look relation to the Ministry of Defence at accommodation. We have a joint because there wasn’t one. None of us quartering system but do we have a would argue for the abolition of the MoD common need? The Navy has a few but we might argue that things have main bases: Portsmouth, Devonport, centralised too far towards the MoD and Faslane and Culdrose and their people away from the 3 fighting Services. And are encouraged and choose to buy their MoD crest the basic logic is that what the MoD own house. The restricted number of No-one in the Rifles or the rest of gets, it can only get at the expense of bases makes the decision easier and the Army identifies with that crest - one or more of the single Services. The most sailors with a few years service in this sad case, would not this current arrangement is beyond the point weekly commute from home. So, SFA and image have been more appropriate? of justifiable and proper synergy. even SLA is less important to the Navy. There are two issues: centralisation and The RAF is a bit different having a fair jointery. Both are an essential and spread of air bases across UK – but with proper culture and like any culture it can more specialisation and fewer moves the grow malignant organs. It is the extent requirement is less demanding than the of these two cultures that needs soldier’s. We don’t need to go through all examining. the Army’s needs but we can say that they are greater and more complex than Centralisation the other Services’. Creating a common Centralisation should attack two dangers: accommodation policy for all 3 Services RIFLES Cap badge inefficiency and anomalies. A joint pay is not really possible. Although you This is not carping on my part; it system makes sense: why have 3 pay might be able to create arrangements was a deliberate decision to use the corps? And a common rank structure is that suit all, given enough flexibility – MoD crest. Why?

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Operationally, we can take the case of be run to conform to that ethos: told their bosses that this was not a Sergeant Roberts RTR. You will recall that good idea. So, was it cowardice, idleness Sergeant Roberts was killed in Iraq but “UK Training Estate. There will be little or poor judgement? Take your pick, there was a shortage of body armour and scope to reduce the existing UK training because I have no other explanation to Sergeant Roberts went without. The estate in the near term, as it will offer. Had the Army mounted a strong simple point of this tragic story is that continue to be required to support the challenge, what would have happened? I no-one was responsible. Centralisation delivery of military capability, despite the don’t know, but I would have liked to had enabled those who made the increasing use of synthetic have seen the effort. I guess that decision not to buy sufficient body environments2.” someone (not a soldier) got a nice big armour to avoid accountability. When we bonus for thinking up this scheme, and had a Quarter-Master General (a 4* So, this, the first idea in the Defence so it would probably have gone ahead man), he would have answered to CGS Estates Development Plan 2009, is to anyway with a few modifications as a and the Army Board. Direct seek reductions; how inconvenient that sop. accountability concentrates the mind. the UK Training Estate.... will continue to If a quarter is sub-standard, a soldier be required to support the delivery of Jointery should get satisfaction from the chain of military capability. You might have hoped Jointery is a good word – a word of command and ultimately CGS should be that the first thought would have been hope: positive and benign. You cannot able to answer that soldier’s grievance. to recognise the urgent requirement for go wrong by bunging in words like But he can’t. It is a matter for a defence changes to our training demanded by the balance and joint (but not in the same agency – “Vice Admiral Tim Laurence has fiercest fighting since the Falklands War sentence as ‘Mick Jagger’); they are what been in post as Chief Executive of Defence – only this fighting is lasting for years Jamie Whyte3 calls ‘Hooray Words’. He Estates, the UK military’s property not weeks. In the 26 pages of the DEDP suggests – ‘justice’ – and points out that department” – (MoD Defence Estates the words ‘Afghanistan’ and ‘Iraq’ do not we are all in favour of justice, although website). Vice Admiral Laurence doesn’t appear. A soldier writing this paper as an we disagree about what is just and what answer to the Army Board, he answers army plan who did not make direct unjust. You cannot fail by suggesting to? A good question, but not one that reference to the fighting in Afghanistan, jointery as a solution. How could it not the Defence Estates website answers. and deductions from that, would have be helpful to have more understanding of The Army’s training estate is no longer been invited to acquaint himself with each other’s service? controlled by the Army; it was taken over life in Sangin without the benefit of by an agency: the Defence Training body armour or colleagues. And staff college is a good place to Estate. Which in turn has been taken start. When we – (a digression, who was over by Defence Estates – “the UK How can the Army promise to provide ‘we’? who were the people who thought military’s property department”. And that the right training under this regime, and jointery was a good idea and who are is how they describe themselves. So, not honour that promise? Now, before you they now? – a thought to keep in the only does the Army not control its own shovel all the blame onto the politicians mind during this article) – when we training estate but those who do are and mandarins for this, I have to tell you decided we wanted a joint staff college, exactly what they say they are: estate that the Army let this happen. Was it there was the inevitable study to agents; it takes no imagination at all to ignorance? No, because good men determine where it should be. understand that the training estate will working inside the Army Training Estate

The Weekly Dinner (Alexander Allan)

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Jointerising the Staff Colleges Now an early factor (or driver as factors are now called) was that the junior divisions should be co-located with the senior version. Young officers learn about their own arm on the YOs course at their arms school - because at this stage of their career that is what they need to know. No-one disputes that it would be good thing for them to know all about the army, but not at this point. That comes later - we had the Junior Division - JDSC. It was at Warminster; indeed I can see the hut I occupied on that course 33 years ago from the window as I write. Warminster was (is) a good location: non-academic, soldiers all over the place, easy access to military kit and training areas. At JDSC, captains learnt about the rest of the army. An excellent solution for all, only mildly inconvenient for the Commandant at Camberley who had responsibilities for JDSC - ie the SRO.

The chosen few subsequently went onto Camberley where they continued to learn about the army, war, the nation and other nations and the other Services. Now you can argue about what more joint education was needed at the Camberley level. But the need to co-locate the junior divisions with the senior divisions was weak, yet it drove the choice of Shrivenham as the site for JSCSC simply because it was a big enough greenfield site, and none of the existing sites - Greenwich, Camberley and Bracknell could hold a new joint college and the juniors.

It will be so good for all the juniors to be together, they cooed. Today, we have ICSC(L) at Shrivenham on a 30 week course, whilst the RAF and RN have an 8 week course. The junior courses are run separately by their respective Services. No need then for them to be on the same site as the advanced course, no requirement to be together as juniors.

You might wonder why the Army's course is 30 weeks and the others are just 8 weeks. The RN and the RAF see a staff college as somewhere that teaches 'secretarial' matters - ie equips the officer for employment in the MoD or some other major HQ. They run their warfare courses elsewhere: principal warfare officers are trained at HMS Collingwood, and the RAF run battle management courses at the Air Warfare Centre. Whereas the Army sees staff work at the heart of warfare and how it does business, combining the 'secretarial' and the operational. Jointery compared a light blue pear and a dark blue peach with a russet brown apple - and produced a lemon.

The lesson here is that the only and the theatre; uneasy, because it is do some jobs irrespective of their parent argument was – ‘jointery’. It was neither in Whitehall nor in the theatre - service. You can call it ‘Buggins turn’. For ideological and therefore not susceptible where the real decisions are being made. example, it is not reasonable to expect to rational discussion. So we have spent (note that in the first three articles in an RAF officer to write the enemy forces hundreds of millions of pounds to this issue - all of which deal with paragraph when the enemy is a shadowy sustain an ideological point – which in decision making in Iraq - there is no set of Arab insurgents. Nothing in his practice has yielded no measurable mention of the PJHQ). training will have prepared him for it. benefit. You can expect him to give you an Is it at the operational level or the analysis of the 2003 Iraqi air force; even strategic? It should be at the strategic if s/he was unaware of the actual details, level but it cannot behave strategically he would be able to research and is really a national provider – yet intelligently and produce the answer – a provider is the description we give to soldier shouldn’t be asked to brief on HQs Navy, Land and Air. It tries to Iran’s submarine capability. More command from a distance, yet usually UK education and training is not the real forces are in a coalition which adds more answer – people have areas of links and complications: and we can see competence and expertise, stick to them. those complications played out in MOD Main Building Helmand, which we treat as a national 3 PJHQs Operational Jointery operation. PJHQ is an annex to the MoD. Three rather than one PJHQ seems to be I am in favour of operational jointery The real reason why PJHQ stutters is asking for trouble x 3. The logic follows and I was an early supporter of PJHQ – because there should be 3 of them. from the first point about expertise and in my time I was one of only 21/2 joint The PJHQ tries to do too much. In it applies to the establishment level as warfare staff officers in the MoD. But it consequence it overloads the capacity of well as to the individual. Jointery is a hasn’t quite worked out as we had its staff and expects those without necessary quality when we want to hoped. The idea of a single operational sufficient experience to understand more conduct joint operations – GBO. And all HQ for expeditionary operations seemed than is reasonable. In part this is operations beyond our shores will be to make sense. In practice it has at because of the purple approach which joint. Maritime always has an air times sat uneasily between Whitehall assumes that any serviceman/woman can component; any land operation has to

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economy of force (and logistics) is a guideline of war) – and it most certainly should be effective. The British Army has an enviable record of staying out of domestic politics:

...the English hatred of war and militarism ... is rooted deep in history, and it is strong in the lower-middle class as well as the working class. Successive wars have shaken it but not destroyed it. Well within living memory it was common for ‘the redcoats’ to be booed at in the streets and for the landlords of respectable public houses to refuse to allow soldiers on the premises. In peace time, even when there are two million unemployed, it is difficult to fill the ranks of the tiny standing army, which is officered by the country gentry and a specialized stratum of the middle class, and manned by farm labourers and slum Parliament proletarians. The mass of the people are get there and will almost certainly have This is not my original thought. It is the without military knowledge or tradition, an air component. Possibly a UK air view of General Sir Rupert Smith (ACDS and their attitude towards war is contribution to a coalition operation (Ops) MoD 1992-94; Commander invariably defensive. No politician could might be purely air, for example the UNPROFOR; DSACEUR) and I hope we rise to power by promising them bombing programme of Iraq during Op might see an expansion of this idea in conquests or military ‘glory’, no Hymn of Desert Fox. But environments demand a BAR in the future. But for the purposes Hate has ever made any appeal to them. minimum level of expertise. of this article it is relevant because of In the last war [WW1] the songs which the associated actions and effect. Which the soldiers made up and sang of their Basing a PJHQ on an environment would is that Navy Command Headquarters, own accord were not vengeful but bring us back to where we were when we Headquarters Air and Headquarters Land humorous and mock-defeatist. The only had the three JHQs – and that logic Forces should all disappear. Sorting out enemy they ever named was the sergeant- doesn’t quite stand up to analysis. Our our force requirements would be the major. need is to think in 3 areas – partly preserve of the 3 PJHQs with the COSs. geographical, partly functional: And here is the real point: more power to And of the last war, the four names the chiefs. Make them responsible for which have really engraved ● Home Front. Home is the air and their individual Services’ contributions to themselves on the popular memory coastal defence of UK and its operations. Authority is aligned with are Mons, Ypres, Gallipoli and internal security. Which might responsibility. Passchendaele, every time a disaster. include terrorism, public disorder, The names of the great battles disaster relief, CBRN – MACA and And the apportioning between those that finally broke the German MACP tasks. commands, which is where the chiefs will armies are simply unknown to the exercise much of their power is done general public. ● Distant Front. The HQ which collegiately with the CDS. conducts operations beyond Europe. In England all the boasting and flag- ● Near or Europe. Ignoring Europe is The Services as Institutions wagging, the ‘Rule Britannia’ stuff, is not a sensible option, and linking The Army (these arguments apply equally done by small minorities. The patriotism ourselves closely to European forces to all 3 Services) is not a business; it is of the common people is not vocal or need not cause any distress to our an institution which handles violence on even conscious. They do not retain among Atlantic partners – Canada and the behalf of the people of this country as their historical memories the name of a USA. regulated by Parliament and owes its single military victory. English literature, No one of these Fronts is obviously a allegiance to the Crown. That it is not a like other literatures, is full of battle- preserve of land, sea or air and that is a business is no excuse to be inefficient or poems, but it is worth noticing that the useful characteristic. to ignore economy (recalling that ones that have won for themselves a kind

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of popularity are always a tale of Casualties are an emotive issue and when difficulties. This is a hard point to make disasters and retreats. There is no popular linked with perceived neglect – ie in the forensic atmosphere of a court - poem about Trafalgar or Waterloo, for equipment shortages for ‘our boys’ – the but since that court also operates in instance. Sir John Moore’s army at issue can get out of control. I suggest tandem with the court of public opinion Corunna, fighting a desperate rearguard that we are close to that point. Contrast it makes it all the more important that action before escaping overseas (just like today with Summer 1972 – the Army was the military argument is heard and Dunkirk!) has more appeal than a brilliant losing a soldier every other day, media understood. You cannot conduct war victory. The most stirring battle-poem in coverage of NI was intense and although without public support; you must take English is about a brigade of cavalry there was some sympathy for the ‘let the the people with you. The current which charged in the wrong direction. And Irish get on with it’ call, and ‘Troops out’ centralised arrangements in the MoD are of the last war, the four names which was a marginal campaign, the broad unhelpful in this respect. have really engraved themselves on the British consensus was that this was a popular memory are Mons, Ypres, Gallipoli messy conflict and our soldiers (and the Reform and Passchendaele, every time a disaster. Army) were doing a good job and should Part of the malaise is the budgetary The names of the great battles that see it through. Soldiers’ bodies were system: it has gone too far. I am not finally broke the German armies are returned to the United Kingdom talking about accountability, it is utterly simply unknown to the general public4. discreetly, no ceremonies. Neither the right that the civil service should be government nor the Army was under demanding in this aspect; it is public Orwell’s essay, written in 1941, attack for its handling of the military money. continues to strike chords – some things operation; nor was there any real have changed and it is worth a short campaign for the lot of the individual A Small Example examination of public attitudes today. soldier. The Army's operational and tactical publications budget (which includes The public – and here it is impossible to So, there is a paradox: defence/MoD is BAR and ABN) is about £800,000 distinguish between media slant or spin regularly excoriated for its failings – pa. Unknown to the spenders of that and the views of the public – support the fairly and unfairly. Failings which should money, MoD decided to make the soldiers as people. Public affection for be jointly shared with the Services it BFPO an agency which will in future the ‘soldier’ has probably never been serves. It is not healthy for the common charge postage to all users. So, out higher. Affection and support for the good for the Services to hide behind the of the blue the tactical publications Army is less, particularly where the army MoD. But this is a situation largely of budget has taken a hit of £37,000 appears to be acting against the the MoD’s making. In the desire to create for postage, with no compensating interests of the ‘soldier’. But there is a a separate identity for ‘Defence’, power increase in its budget. What is the change from Orwell’s day at this level: has been taken from the Services to the point of this exercise? The only public support for the Army as an Centre, which now takes the brickbats. effect is to reduce the flow of institution is relatively strong. The armed It is not well-equipped to defend itself. tactical doctrinal information to the forces generally and the Army especially By definition the ‘suits’ (and not all the Army. We now have an extra layer of rank comparatively highly in the public ‘suits’ are civilian) look silly if they stand bureaucracy to price, charge and esteem as a trusted and worthwhile up to defend themselves because that account for this money for no institution – esteem for the Army is would expose their naked power and obvious benefit. It is time for the probably higher than at any time. bring down yet more derision on NAO to estimate the costs of the Support for ‘Help the Heroes’ shows the themselves. So they are obliged to MoD's accounting system - what is extent, as do the many occasions when respond with proxy spokesmen who range the value of this charging regime? the Army is in the Public Eye (hardly a from ‘talking heads’ to real soldiers on Is it worth it? major sporting event goes by without occasions; plus the use of the usual press some combat-95’d blokes and blokesses office tricks. It does not go down well. The one major point here is that money leaping around, even if some are rather is power. To find the power, follow the less soldierly than we might like) – the Over the long run the Services need money. The COSs do not have money. recruiting programme of the 1970s – public support based on good practice Give them the money for their Service so Keep the Army in the Public Eye (KAPE) – for which they are themselves that power goes with their responsibility. could only have dreamt of such levels of responsible. The coroners’ courts are an The really extraordinary part of this publicly approved exposure. example – militarily educated and discussion is why the COSs were by- experienced soldiers know that military passed in the first place. And it is Yet that only serves, too, to demonstrate operations are a series of interlinked difficult to avoid the conclusion that it the fickleness of such affection. It is a actions and reactions. Concentrating on suited (no pun intended) one high risk phenomenon which is one issue creates vulnerabilities: war is constituency, indeed they (whoever they vulnerable to a change in mood. not just a risky business; it an option of are) designed it that way.

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Another example is the removal of the ... Nor does it sufficiently criticise the the nation, thoughtful, responsible, single Service public relations one star convoluted dissipation of airworthiness prudent and which looks after its own. directors. Consequently, the single responsibility in the new tri-service An Army that the people can respect as Services no longer have control over logistic organisation so that the heavy one of the important institutions of the their media image – a vital function for weight of this task is not clearly laid on State, which is not subject to the any institution. The clear message from specific individuals. The public should immediate whims of government because this measure is that Defence/MoD is the demand the immediate restoration of it has continuity of purpose. Yet places institution and the single Services are airworthiness responsibility to those who itself unequivocally at the service of the minor pillars supporting Defence/MoD, are qualified and trained to handle it. people through its loyalty to the Crown. not the other way round. In 1946, when These are images which evoke powerful the MoD was first formed, such an idea The report showed the extent of the emotions. The Army largely meets these would have been thought preposterous – organisational failures. Now, I suggest democratic expectations of itself, but is that is the extent of the reversal of that the plea to the British public is having increasing difficulty in achieving authority. I do not argue for a return to wrongly aimed – the people who should them as its ability to determine its the position in 1946, it is the extent of demand the change to this culture are performance declines. the change that needs discussion. those in the Services. It is our job to Clearly, I am suggesting that it has gone sort these things out, not to leave it to Taking power away from the Services and too far and needs correcting. someone else. A crash is an obvious placing it in the Centre has not helped catastrophe, difficult to ignore; the the Centre to gain public support. A current example is the recent report organisational arrangements I criticise Instead, criticism is aimed at the Centre. into the Nimrod XV230 crash (fuel lines are less obviously dramatic but are even Reduction of status from the Three has explosion over Afghanistan). Air Vice- more serious than the Nimrod crash. not increased the status of the One – Marshal K A Campbell RAF (Ret’d), a They are easier to ignore. This is not the status has not followed power and senior RAF engineer, wrote to The Times time for good men to do nothing. Power money. on 10 November 2009. An extract: and responsibility go together, if one From the formation of RAF Strike gets ahead of the other, trouble follows. To re-phrase the Smuts Report of 1917... Command in the early Sixties the We are at that point. how shall the relations of the Navy, Army engineering branch of the RAF met these and Air Force to the Centre be challenges by co-locating all the specialist The Power of the National Institution determined? By a re-distribution of power engineering staff for each aircraft in a Defence/The MoD is no more a national single office — the Role Office — and institution than is the Department for required each office to prepare an annual Children, Schools and Families, which review of its long-term airworthiness was formerly known as the Department 1 Report by General Smuts on Air plans. By the late 1990s these reviews for Education and Skills and before that Organization and the Direction of Aerial were heard by the Chief Engineer himself the Department of Education and Science Operations August 1917 : so that he could satisfy the responsibility and before that (with a few other name Shall there be instituted a real air that all RAF aircraft were airworthy. changes in between) the Ministry of ministry responsible for all air Education. Government departments organization and operations? Shall there The XV230 report details that early this change at the behest of - the be constituted a unified air service embracing both the present RNAS and century the post of Chief Engineer was government; they are ephemeral, RFC? And if this second question is discontinued, that the chain of delegation national institutions are not. They can answered in the affirmative, the third now no longer passes through the hands lose their status or can decline – the question arises: How shall the relations of of properly qualified and experienced aristocracy may have some influence but the new air service to the Navy and the engineers. Instead, it seems to follow the few outside of them would regard them Army be determined so that the functions chain of command, which could and did as a national institution; 70 years ago at present discharged for them by the include not just non-engineers but also they wielded power, influence and had RNAS and RFC respectively shall continue to be efficiently performed by the new air personnel who had no experience of real status, no longer. There is no merit service? military aircraft operation. In addition, a in trying to give Defence/MoD this sort whole management layer was removed of status; it’s like having a dredger as 2 The Defence Estate Development Plan and with it the capability to supervise the the flag-ship. 2009 (DEDP 09) dated 9 July 09. Role Offices — now expanded and re- 3 Bad Thoughts – A Guide to Clear Thinking, titled integrated project teams. This was a The Services can use this status, indeed Jamie Whyte, Corvo Books, ISBN: 0 recipe for disaster. It was akin to giving a they need it. The image (and reality) 95432553 2. GP responsibility for the quality and that the Army wants is that of an 4 The Lion and The Unicorn, George Orwell, extent of cancer care — or even giving organization which is professional and 1941.  the task to a non-medical person. focused in its approach to the defence of

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were, thinking this was the key Margot Fonteyn will know that the to knowing what was happening. demands made on their bodies also The Celebration involve the mind and this determines It was obvious they came to be how they see their art. They would never entertained as though the Guards were use the word ‘theatre’ lightly. Perhaps of an Idea into show business. Who could blame this is why an experienced theatre them? I recall hearing that a meeting producer, who saw the Parade, came had been convened at which show away saying “That is not theatre.” William Barlow business professionals were given their say. They wanted to have the Guard The spectators also made comparisons, Changing Ceremony twice a day because especially between bands, the Guards not The Queen’s Birthday Parade increasingly of its appeal to tourists. They did not thought to be up to much. This is of interests me. I have been on it twice and see the Guardsmen as real soldiers. I also interest given the appeal of musical will never forget the impression the heard the then Garrison Sergeant Major displays, including military ones, seen Queen made as she inspected us. say, to his great credit, that he wasn’t elsewhere, not least on TV. What seems Magnificent in uniform, with a composed going to stand for the Drum Majors never to have occurred to anyone is that yet obvious pride, she seemed to be performing like prancing horses. This, it they were seeing something different. looking at us, both collectively and seemed, was suggested as being much individually, as if to say, “You are my more with it than their customary style. The word ‘different’ is useful here. Once Guards.” It caught me unawares and my That was seen as dull and unresponsive its importance is recognised, it will be response was immediate and true. I felt to the audience. seen that it is more to the point than a pride which was without sin and saying that standards have got higher or nothing will ever erase the memory. Margot Fonteyn remembered the lower. A Drum Major with pre-WWII Secretary of State for War consulting service said he thought the standard had Frederick Ashton about re- gone up. He was thinking of the dressing choreographing of the Parade and being during the march past which had indeed told to leave it alone because it could been attracting comment. Photographs not be improved upon. This would seem had appeared in the Press which were to confirm what an American professor embarrassing certainly, and there had of cultural studies, who liked the been an improvement. Did that mean the military, said when he described the standard had gone up necessarily? What Parade, admiringly, as theatre. It is the test? Suppose the dressing was depends what is meant by theatre. perfect. Is there a price to be paid for Anyone who attains to the standards of a that? Perhaps. What is really instructive,

Her Majesty The Queen Elizabeth riding to the QBP for the last time in July 1986. Her Majesty rode the same horse, ‘Burmese’, originally presented by Canadian government, from 1969 to 1986. (Wikipedia Commons – Sandpiper)

I have also seen the Parade many times and noted the reaction of those watching. It was obvious that most were unprepared for what they saw and had no idea how to interpret it. Nearly all remarked on what they regarded as the casualness of the participants. They could not see this was a relaxed style which came from being natural. What they were expecting was derived from popular images of sentries at Buckingham Palace not batting an eyelid, something they could not possibly have known for themselves since the sentries no longer stand outside the Palace gates. Yet here they Household Cavalry at the Queen’s Birthday Parade (Sgt Mike Harvey)

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however, is how the Guardsmen recover those hearing them? A lot more is befitting their golden, vestment-like their dressing. That is where training involved than what words mean in uniform. No wonder that former Irish comes in and it can say a lot more about themselves. That is the reason the Drill Guardsman Patrick O’Donovan could the meaning of the parade than keeping Book should not be allowed to have the imagine he had attended “a most the lines straight since, if that’s all that last word. It is the human element, the beautiful ceremony in which 1,500 men matters, why not call in Riverdance? actual physical embodiment of the words and one woman become actors in a Much more telling than whether the lines which decides the standard. Where this is solemn masque.” are straight or not is how the arms are denied, the fulcrum of drill shifts to a swung. Whereas once they were swung to more peripheral and less human role Besides their Colonel in Chief, the waistbelt level, now they are swung affecting discipline which becomes Queen, the other focal point is the almost shoulder high. This constitutes a externalised, making it more overt. Colour being trooped and displayed, as definite change, discernible for some Hence, the extrovert style. This makes it O’Donovan says, like a relic of the True years. Now it is obvious and deliberate. possible for orders to be so totally Cross. Indeed, it would not be difficult This marks a fundamental shift towards objective as to change their function, to accept that the Colour solemnly an extrovert style which is at variance with possibly sinister implications. The paraded by the Irish Guards this year had with the Parade as a whole. It has an swinging of the arms shoulder high, been presented, only weeks before, at immediate visual impact which makes no therefore, may not be as innocent as it Windsor, by the Emperor Constantine’s demands on an audience which has no looks. It could indicate a complete break mother, Helena, recently returned from difficulty in identifying with what it from traditional standards and style. Jerusalem with her historic Find. Who sees. But at what level? It may matter. However, both standards may seem to could be blamed for thinking that? The co-exist comfortably at present but all fact is, it is deeply impressive and There is a marvellous shot in the film that the Queen’s Birthday Parade has moving. A Queen Is Crowned of the Foot Guards stood for could eventually come under emerging from Admiralty Arch. It is like threat, firstly from within, but then from This may seem to set the Parade apart as a revelation. They are swinging their outside the military. being self-centred and having, perhaps, arms barely waistbelt high, a style questionable military significance. The contrasting strongly with other Meanwhile, it is the Massed Bands which opposite is true. Certainly it celebrates contingents on the Procession. It set the standard and tone of the Parade the Queen’s Birthday but Patrick suggests they know something we as a whole. The contribution they make O’Donovan went further. He called it the don’t, or else have forgotten. What would be irrelevant were it musical only. “celebration of an idea.” There is, may occur to some observers is that It isn’t. A keen observer, not British, however, nothing vague about this. It they are a challenge to think again remarked with admiration that the music can be seen in the sobriety, steadiness, as to what drill is about. is not militaristic. This is not accidental. self-confidence and certainty which here combine to testify to a tradition of The Queen’s Birthday Parade has a What one is here witness to, beginning soldiering originating in, and refined by, lot to say about this. It is a parade of with the Slow Troop which finds its a tried and true image of man. Perhaps great iconographic significance, as perfect musical expression in Les this explains another observer’s remark indeed it should be. Like any real icon, Huguenots, is a credal exposition of that “something happened here today.” however, it is in the business of what the Parade symbolises and must be What he saw was evidence of a definite iconoclasm, the smashing of false faithfully adhered to in what follows. It attitude to Society involving an images. What it demonstrates superbly is is also a statement of identity, by unwavering commitment to values both that where such an event is concerned, Household Troops who are determined to civilised and human. A celebration the Drill Book cannot be allowed to have be true to themselves, made without indeed and an adornment befitting the the last word. The reason is simple and arrogance and with self-confidence. Monarchy and an Army with standards should be obvious. The Drill Book can which come from living in earnest and tell you how to do a drill movement. It The Drum Majors are superb, showing the knowing its true place in Society. This cannot show you. Only a person drilling same unerring purpose in moving the makes it also a reproach wherever that can do that. This does not deprive the huge phalanx of musicians in their vision is not shared or honoured. Drill Book of its almost biblical status. It charge as enables the later, awesome simply confirms its role in serving Spin Wheel manoeuvre to be carried out Having begun by remarking on the greater ends. in the absence of any written failure of spectators to understand instructions. The economy of movement what’s happening on the Birthday This raises the question, a necessary one, with which the Drum Majors inform the Parade, perhaps I should say that Patrick of the relationship between the written Bands is aesthetically perfect, seeming O’Donovan had the same problem. His is and spoken word. How are words that are also to empower them as though they an apophatic response, however, one shouted meant to be assimilated by were performing a liturgical function where, having made a stab by choosing

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the “celebration of an idea”, he says, “I social atmosphere of a country is the army. ... In the British army the drill is don’t know, but I know that this is a parade-step of its army. A military parade rigid and complicated, full of memories of moon’s length away from the May Day is really a kind of ritual dance, something the eighteenth century, but without performance in Moscow. This is innocent. like a ballet, expressing a certain definite swagger; the march is merely a It is not arrogant. And, it is beautiful.” philosophy of life. The goose-step, for formalized walk. It belongs to a society One thing he did know, however, was instance, is one of the most horrible which is ruled by the sword, no doubt, that of all the regiments on parade, sights in the world, far more terrifying but a sword which must never be taken “There was not the slightest doubt that than a dive-bomber. It is simply an out of the scabbard. the ranks of the Irish Guards were the affirmation of naked power; contained in straightest.” But, then, he was himself a it, quite consciously and intentionally, is An extract from England My England (The Mick. Case explained. the vision of a boot crashing down on a Lion and The Unicorn) George Orwell face. ...Beyond a certain point, military 1941. Ed.  display is only possible in countries where “One rapid but fairly sure guide to the the common people dare not laugh at the

A woman returning from Windsor with shopping walks through the ranks of Coldstream Guardsmen seemingly without a care in the world. The soldiers were rehearsing for the Queen’s Birthday Parade in Windsor

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reconnaissance troops are optimised to increments such as a COP – Ed.); do this? I submit that they are not and understandably they are comfortable Manning the that we should therefore debate what we conducting company attacks. The wide wish them to achieve. ranging use of the current force says more about the lack of a dedicated TFH Loop – The The recent history of reconnaissance reserve than it does about operations and structures has been reconnaissance operations. However, that future utility of hindered by the reverse engineering of there was a debate at all justifies my ad hoc structures, to wit the BSC/DSC3 in purpose in writing this paper – that Iraq, the BRF in Afghanistan, and the there is a perception that FR may not be the Formation creation of 2 squadron FR regiments in the first choice to deliver a Brigade level armoured brigades which prove that reconnaissance capability in the COE. small is not necessarily beautiful. Setting Perhaps rather than debating who should Reconnaissance aside the equipment debate, do we have create this bespoke ‘Force’ for operations what we need in terms of reconnaissance in Afghanistan we could take the view soldier specialists in ground manoeuvre that FAS has structured manoeuvre brigades, and if we do are we employing brigades to provide brigade them effectively? Looking at examples reconnaissance regiments, and even Maj A N B Foden QRL from another army, and from a historical accepting the current force generation perspective, the purpose of this paper is norm of collapsing sub-units to ‘thicken’ to pose some questions as to the future those deploying it should be possible to “Bear in mind that your telegrams utility of FR Regiments. This is by no provide a two squadron FR capability to may make the whole Army strike means about criticising the structures deploying brigades. Recent operational tents, and night or day, rain or and training that is in place now, rather evidence, such as the performance of the shine, take up the line of march. adding to the discussion on how we Light Dragoons Battlegroup on Op Endeavour therefore to secure might optimise for the future. PANCHAI PALANG, more than serves to accurate information… Above all, demonstrate the utility of the vigilance! vigilance! vigilance!”1 Optimisation reconnaissance soldier in the COE. As for Maj J.E.B Stuart Whilst Future Army Structures (Next the future, whilst the nature of conflict Steps) will set the baseline for SDR may be uncertain, its key characteristics Introduction settlement on the future structure and are beginning to come into relief. The Whilst telegrams and tents may have orbat of FR regiments, their concept of complexities faced on future operations been replaced by full motion video and employment in the battlespace must be will certainly be no less than are faced forward operating bases, the purpose of the critical factor. FR is still optimised to now. the reconnaissance soldier does not conduct linear mobile surveillance and appear too different 150 years later. yet operates in the Contemporary “The challenge of identifying an With a defence review imminent, it Operating Environment (COE) in an adversary’s future intentions is more seems an appropriate time to consider if increasingly non contiguous battlespace. complex in MASD than in LSDI. In we are making full use of our Whilst training focuses in the enemy and the Future Operating Environment reconnaissance capability, both in the terrain from the ADP Land Ops the find challenge will revolve more short term for success on current definition, the importance of the human around people than it will operations and in the longer term for population is now recognised, now often platforms.”4 future, hybrid operations2. ADP Land Ops referred to as ‘mapping the human defines Reconnaissance as “to obtain, by terrain’. visual observation or other detection methods, information about the enemy, I am not seeking to go back over the terrain or indigenous population of a debate about the composition of the particular area”, now often termed as Brigade Reconnaissance Force. I would ‘understanding’. We can see the direction just make the observation that we are in which ISTAR is moving, and the role attempting to reverse engineer a that reconnaissance regiments are being solution. The model upon which we are required to fill within manoeuvre building is 3 Cdo and 16 AA Bdes’ BRFs brigades. All the pieces are theoretically which are made up of infantrymen (not in place for manned reconnaissance to quite – 3 Cdo Bde’s BRF was based on deliver what is required, both now and in 148 (FO) Bty and 52 Bde’s was based on the future. I would question if our 4/73 Special OP Bty, both with CVR(T) Commander Afghanistan

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In other words we must focus on the commanders with…actionable we might accept that “patience, nerve individual soldier and the skills which we intelligence … in this complex, and cunning are the essential give him to future-proof reconnaissance asymmetric and unpredictable characteristics of the reconnaissance as a combat arm, given the increasing environment”5. Manned surveillance soldier”7, it may be worthwhile looking importance of the FIND function. gives you the persistence to understand at the skills that we give to our soldiers why the insurgent places IEDs in certain to prepare them for operations. As an The Loop locations; a non-manned sensor may only RAC Soldier Class 3 the FR soldier will This paper does not set out to debate confirm the presence of an IED. have completed Basic Close Combat the relative merits of manned versus un- Skills, and as a Class 1 soldier he may manned reconnaissance, but it may help The natural culmination of these two attend SCBC.8 Of note the RAC have 10 to consider why we want the ‘man in the points is that FR regiments should be (to be 15) spaces annually on SCBC loop’? Put simply, the man in the loop capable of operating those equipments equating to 2 per FR regiment; 4 Troop provides twenty four hour all weather which can contribute to the understand Leaders can attend the Live Fire Tactical loiter, has the ability to understand function, for example an organic UAV Training phase of PCD9 across 5 FR rather than to simply find, can take capability. FR soldiers would be well Regiments per year. SCBC is rightly held decisions knowing the commander’s placed to both employ its sensors and as a gold standard of training by the intent, and is therefore rapidly self- manage the information they gather. Infantry - should this be the case across taskable in order to provide the highest They could conduct pattern of life UAV the ground combat arms? The answer to quality understanding for the patrols, and coordinate the appearance this depends on what you require from commander. of the UAV over the tactical battle, that soldier – again recent operations in noting that its appearance is often a Afghanistan have highlighted that he is Much has been made of the size and double edged sword, conduct screening, capable in the COE, but has he been structure of the modern brigade acting as a covering force, pursuit and given all the training that he could have headquarters. One only needs to stand in exploitation tasks as well as had? the ops room of Task Force Helmand in reconnaissance. This model has proved Lashkar Gah to understand the potential successful in the surveillance section of for the overloading of Bde HQ with both a US RSTA squadron, see below. In information and intelligence. It is addition, German reconnaissance units possible that placing the man in the have a UAV capability, in the form of loop before this would reduce this Aladin. In May 2006, The Netherlands burden, but we must consider if this is bought 10 Aladins for use in Uruzgan,6 advisable? Lots of organisations and thereby setting a precedent for the sort equipment can find but only the human of operations that the British Army is can decide what and who to find - facing today. finding something without understanding it or putting it into The move to embracing equipments that context can deliver a false picture to the were not traditionally the preserve of FR commander. regiments began with MSTAR – the UAV Mounted/ Dismounted Cooperation in example is clearly more relevant to the Afghanistan One feature of our COIN campaigns in COE. Such equipments have traditionally Iraq and Afghanistan has been not been the preserve of the cavalry, so This is not a question of mounted versus battlegroup areas of operations that are there would undoubtedly be some dismounted close combat – ideally you far larger than we might otherwise wish naysayers. However, this is an want someone who can do both, for. This has necessitated a more opportunity to corral multiple although the training bill to achieve this technical solution, having fewer, more capabilities in order to best deliver the will be high. Work is ongoing to specialised men in the loop at a higher understand function to the commander – rationalise all surveillance and headquarters – for example relying on and is something that FR regiments reconnaissance training in LWC under a image analysts studying multiple ISTAR should be optimised to do. single chain of command, I would assert feeds in Bde HQ rather than that this does not go far enough. The reconnaissance soldiers always being Focus On The Man Or The Platform? reconnaissance corporal (of whatever cap able to use an OP overlooking the If we accept the validity of having the badge) will not be considered by many to objective – which will be an increasing man in the loop, especially given the be the equal of the Section Commanders’ likelihood as we continue to prosecute increasing complexities that we face in Battle Course qualified Infantry corporal economy of force operations. However, the land environment, the obvious until their training is on a par. A Combat “reconnaissance capabilities such as FR concern is to ensure that we have the Reconnaissance Course (in line with the have great utility in both providing right sort of person for the job. Whilst Combat Infantryman’s Course) should

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form part of Phase 2 training. night patrol reports that the situation Additionally the creation of a had indeed changed, and at ten o’clock Reconnaissance School, qualifying in the morning permitted the regiment reconnaissance soldiers of all capbadges to forsake its infantry role and become a to a standard perceived as the equal of mechanised reconnaissance regiment the Infantry Battle School would be a again”14. Whilst their famous motto ‘only step in the right direction. Achieving the enemy in front, every other beggar this in the short term would be a behind’ might not suit the 360° challenge; why not a Reconnaissance battlespace, the idea of a Unit with an Battle School collocated in Brecon, or enhanced baseline of Infantry training else a single Combat Battle School which that is able to rapidly alter its role would covers delivers all Combat Arm Training surely be appealing to modern and therefore increases rationalisation? MCOE badge commanders? It would need to be challenging, but there are plenty of high quality make up a far larger proportion of the instructors across ARTD who could form BCT than dedicated recce troops (of all the cadre of a significantly enhanced capbadges) do in a UK brigade. One of school. the reasons for reducing the number of combat sub units in the BCTs was the US Influence fact that the US had proved that their Is this possible? The US Army is emphasis on FIND and the resourcing of corralling the training for all Combat the RSTA Bn enabled them to Arms together. The Armor School has consistently win. moved from Ft Knox to Fort Benning to sniper join the Infantry School under the Precedence umbrella of the Maneuver Center of In our own fairly recent history we also As precision attack becomes all the more Excellence. The Maneuver Center reached saw the operational imperative driving important (given increasing engagement IOC on 1 Oct 09, with more than $3.5 interoperability between the combat ranges and the importance of the billion earmarked for the programme. The arms. After the disastrous defeat in avoidance of collateral damage) we raison d’être of this new centre is to France in 1940 (at the hands of German might see a shift in emphasis across the train ready, adaptive soldiers for an army forces with strong recce units mounted land environment from Strike to Find (or at war. As the US Army Chief of Staff said in light armoured vehicles) the more importantly in the COE to on 20 Oct 09 “We call that full-spectrum Bartholomew Committee called for the ‘understand’ as we seek to succeed in operations (and) all Army maneuver formation of a British equivalent. This what Gen McChrystal has recently called formations will operate like that… from was achieved by forming the new a ‘population centric approach’). Whilst conventional war all the way to Reconnaissance Corps, which took the the future cannot be certain it seems peacetime operations. This will help us place of the Divisional Cavalry Regiments that in order to maximise utility we come together and it will be much (themselves removed in 1940 to create could do worse than adopting the better, because all of our maneuver Armoured Reconnaissance Brigades). flexible approach we saw in the forces are going to maneuver similarly, They were initially formed from Infantry Reconnaissance Corps of WW2. When particularly in the kinds of operations Brigade Reconnaissance Groups; with considering the utility of the FR soldier that we’re conducting in Iraq and each Company (later Squadron) now and in the future we cannot get Afghanistan.”10 Indeed evidence suggests comprised of three Troops of light recce away from the principal purpose of that the US National Guard are able to cars and an Assault Troop of lorry borne reconnaissance. In a recent think piece conduct a 19D (Cavalry Scout) to 11B Infantry. on the utility of the find battlegroup (Infantryman) Military Occupation from HQ 12 Mechanized Brigade, the role Specialty conversion for a National Guard The concept of employment was to of the FR battlegroup in initiating enemy unit in two weeks11. Whilst this unit may probe ahead and locate the enemy, and activity was discussed. It concluded that not have been ready for operations, to screen the flanks and rearguard when “the presence of manned ground there are clearly benefits to grasping the under attack. Troopers fought both from reconnaissance operating in concert with initiative and taking a unified approach their armoured vehicles and on foot13. other ISTAR assets encourages the to training across the Combat Arms. Indeed, contemporary accounts point to unmasking of the enemy and serves to the benefit of rapidly converting from delineate combatants from civilians as The US have further seen the utility of the infantry to the reconnaissance roles, well as providing the most productive the RSTA battalions12 within the Brigade such as at Eindhoven where “Brigade ISTAR to the point of battle – Combat Teams, proportionately they Headquarters…decided from a study of themselves.”15 Combat operations in

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5 Royal Armoured Corps Tactics Volume 2: Afghanistan are still seen as light role continuing to make full use of the The Formation Reconnaissance Regiment. company business, despite the increasing lessons from the past. mechanisation of the force. It is 6 Abbildende Luftgestützte important to retain the ability to “We must remember that one man is Aufklärungsdrohne im Nächstbereich. Typical missions are 45 minutes and are battlegroup, but FR needs to deliver the much the same as another, and that flown over a 5 km range, at an altitude of ‘understand’ function to the brigade he is best who is trained in the 30 – 200 meter above ground. commander. severest school.18” Thucydides 7 http://www.army.mod.uk/armoured/ role/2044.aspx Conclusion “…Skilfully reconnoitring defiles There is little doubt that things will 8 Section Commanders’ Battle Course - and fords, providing himself with change to reflect the needs of current Annex A to Royal Armoured Corps trusty guides, interrogating the operations. However, the Cavalry has not, Employment Structure 09 dated 4 Feb 09. Clearly he will have to wait for village priest, quickly establishing in the past, been swift to accept promotion. relations with the inhabitants”16. unglamorous roles and so a move into Napoleon the UAV world would be viewed with 9 Platoon Commanders’ Division. suspicion and not a little scepticism by 10 http://www.army.mil/- Whilst Napoleon was talking of the the Royal Artillery (and others) which news/2009/10/21/29069-casey-infantry- duties of a chief of reconnaissance has done the donkey work of armor-merger-boosts-armys-full-spectrum- during the Peninsular Campaign, his development in this area. Just having operations/accessed on 2 Nov 09. comments have equal utility in the COE. the rights over them would not do. As to 11 http://www.nationalguard.com/forums US COIN doctrine reaffirms the utility of armoured recce soldiers operating on accessed on 26 Oct 09. “overt reconnaissance by patrols their feet – in the days of Saladin and 12 A dedicated ISTAR battalion containing allow(ing) commanders to fill Saracen in the 1960s and 1970s, the RAC all organic ISTAR assets - Scouts, UAV, EW intelligence gaps and develop armoured recce squadrons had support etc. relationships with local leaders, whilst troop which carried 5 or so RAC troops in simultaneously providing security to the the back of the Saracen for dismounted 13 Doherty, R The British Reconnaissance Corps in World War II (London, 2007). populace”17. It will be difficult to really tasks. Ed. optimise for this role any further until 14 Kemsley, W The Scottish Lion on Patrol - we decide on the focus for the man in 15th Scottish Reconnaissance Regiment the loop, either on the skill sets required 1943 – 46 (Michigan, 1950). for current and future hybrid operations, 1 Freeman, D.S Lee’s Lieutenants: Gettysburg 15 HQ 12 Mech Bde, The Find Battlegroup in or on a specific platform. The future for to Appomattox (Indiana, 1944) a FAS Brigade G3-314 dated 29 May 08. FR Regiments is probably somewhere in 2 As given in HQLF FragO 001/09 Op 16 http://modern- the middle, rapidly adapting from ENTIRETY dated 6 Apr 09. warfare.org/philosophy/napoleon/napoleo technical to close combat specialist. The n_04.htm accessed on 12 Nov 09. 3 Brigade and Divisional Surveillance army and the wider reconnaissance Company. 17 Dept of the Army, FM 3-24 community needs to focus on the Counterinsurgency (Dec 2006) Para 3-139. development of the ‘understand’ function 4 Future Land Operational Concept to ensure its utility in the future, whilst Deductions paper dated Jul 2009. 18 Foster Smith, C. Thucydides - The History of the Peloponnesian War 

The first squadron of the Federation Armoured Corps in Malaya became operational in 1951 after its passing out parade before His Excellency the High Commissioner, General Sir Gerald Templer at Resah camp, near Seremban. The Squadron, the first Malayan squadron to go into operation against the Communist terrorists, has been highly trained in convoy work, communications, maintenance of vehicles and weapon handling. (IWM).

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strength exhausted and your campaign in 1805-6 and subsequently in treasure spent, other chieftains will Poland and eastern Prussia in 1807, spring to take advantage of your Napoleon concluded the Treaty of Tilsit, The Peninsular extremity. Then no man, however thereby establishing peace with Russia, wise, will be able to avert the dismembering Prussia and releasing his consequences that must ensue.’ War – An Allied mind to matters of a semi-domestic Sun Tsu, 5th Century BC nature, namely Spain. The disaster at Victory or a Trafalgar in 1805 had removed a vital In 1782 a French Jesuit translated Sun component of his allied foundation, Tsu’s Art of War into French. Father specifically the Spanish navy; deemed French Failure? Amiot’s painstaking work was to have far essential to the defeat the Royal Navy reaching and rapid consequences. It and the ultimate invasion and struck a chord with a young and subjugation of Britain. It was this latter Colonel Nick Lipscombe ambitious French artillery officer who obsession, which eventually led Chairman of Peninsular War 200 was quick to comprehend the value of Napoleon to involve himself in the General Tsu’s enduring regulations. Iberian Peninsula. Since 1806, he had Within a few years Napoleon Bonaparte applied renewed impetus to the ‘When you engage in actual fighting, had conquered most of Europe, in 1807 Continental System, designed to boycott if victory is long in coming, the the Fourth Coalition was dead and at the trade with Britain and thereby force men’s weapons will grow dull and zenith of his power, he turned his defeat on the nation through economic, their ardour will be dampened. …. attention to the Iberian Peninsula. rather than military means. This fixation, Now, when your weapons are dulled, coupled with the open proclamation in your ardour dampened, your Following French success in the Prussian October 1806 by Manuel de Godoy, the

Map depicting the main British events of the Map depicting the main British events of the Peninsular War (author’s collection - Nick Lipscombe)

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first minister of the Spanish Bourbon Charles IV was left with scant room tired of the pretence, yet more troops King, Charles IV, which rallied the to manoeuvre and publicly vilified the entered Spain and the frontier fortresses Spanish people against an undeclared unfortunate Ferdinand. Napoleon was, were seized. Godoy was cornered and at foe, so obviously France, was enough to of course, delighted at this public a loss as to how best to proceed. With put the two countries on a collision stately melodrama by the Spanish no little difficulty he sent word to the course. Despite Napoleonic impatience house of Bourbon. Spanish troops under Junot’s command this impact was to be circumlocutory. in Portugal to return to Spain. ‘The A few days before Junot entered Lisbon mistrust of Junot demanded a The French Foreign Minister, Count a second Corps, consisting of another reservation and a pretence very difficult Talleyrand was instructed to deal with twenty five thousand men under General in its execution of the order…to avoid one of the principal evaders of the Dupont, had crossed the Pyrenees being translated in movements that Continental System and a defaulter disguised as support to Junot should would get the attention of the French on her indemnity from the War of the the British choose to defend Portugal. general, which would make him Oranges, namely Portugal. Using Spain This caused considerable concern to the suspicious and provoke contrary as a base for offensive operations would Spanish authorities; but concern was to providence’1. Most got away but those pose few problems as Godoy had been turn to fear some six weeks later when in Lisbon were disarmed and interned; suggesting such a move for some time. yet another fourteen thousand men, Napoleon accused Spain of bad faith, Thus Napoleon, by soliciting a public half French half Italian, flowed into declaring that he no longer felt bound demonstration from his principal ally, Catalonia, under Marshal Moncey and by Fontainebleau. He did, however, could extend the blockade, satisfy his two further corps assembled on the promise Spain the whole of Portugal, but principal obsession and get more than Franco-Spanish border. Dupont and in exchange she would have to surrender a foot in the Spanish door. A combined Moncey marched south but clearly not all territory between the River Ebro and Franco-Spanish army would descend on to the aid of their colleague in Portugal. Pyrenees and sign a permanent and the ill-prepared state, and once Godoy and the King, realising that a unlimited alliance with France2. subjugated, it would be divided up military response was not an option, as secretly agreed at the Treaty of ironically suggested a union between By early March Murat had been placed in Fontainebleau in September 1807. a Bonaparte princess and the heir to command of the French forces in Spain However, the terms of the Treaty were Spanish house of Bourbon. Napoleon and had established his headquarters in merely a means to a Napoleonic end; took his time in sending a reply, which Vitoria. ‘The populations of the transited two months later, General Junot entered when finally conveyed, questioned the cities and towns received Murat with the Lisbon unopposed and, almost advantage of a liaison to Fernando who, greatest cordiality and possible immediately, Napoleon began planning by his father’s own declaration, was indulgence, going out to meet him and his next move against an unsuspecting tainted. By mid February 1808, Napoleon hailing him as a liberator’3. To the people Spain.

Unconnected, but remarkably timely for Napoleon, was the arrest by Charles IV of his son and heir, Ferdinand, Prince of Asturias on the charge of plotting to overthrow his aged father. This development resulted from Ferdinand’s disapproval since childhood of Godoy’s manipulative prominence; a sentiment shared by a good number of his fellow countrymen. Lacking the conviction to tackle Godoy head-on, Ferdinand elected to solicit the support of the French Emperor via proposals of marriage to a spouse of Napoleon’s choice. A ploy he felt sure would cement his claim to the throne, in due course, at Godoy’s expense. It was to backfire when one of the many spies of the first minister intercepted correspondence on the matter, which was subsequently dressed up as a plot to oust the aged King. Rédition de Madrid 1808 Antoine-Jean Gros (Wikipedia Commons)

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the presence of the French reinforced contemptuous failure to appreciate of certain irony in this misjudgement; this their view that it was Napoleon’s the determination of the Spanish people, was the first instance since the French intention to install Fernando on the the demands of the Iberian topography revolution where an entire nation took throne and the invaders encouraged the and the tenacity of the small British up arms against an oppressor. His deception. Godoy lingered over the best expeditionary force sent to the aid of the contempt is best illustrated by the fact way to proceed and despite having Iberian nations. that he personally only spent two ordered the Spanish garrisons in French months in theatre of the seventy-eight occupied zones not to resist, war looked The allied forces consisted of the regular month campaign. As time passed, and inevitable. Direct conflict was not in the armies of Britain, Portugal and Spain and the months turned into years, the interest of the fernandinos and they now the irregular Spanish guerrilleros5 and Iberian campaign became a second front plotted an uprising to provide Napoleon Portuguese ordenança6. From 1808, draining vital resources and distracting the excuse for regime change. On the Britain and Portugal combined their the Emperor’s focus from his grande 18th March, with rumours that the King regular forces in an Anglo Portuguese stratégie. and Queen were evacuating the royal army but cooperation and coordination palaces at Aranjuez, the royal guard with the Spanish regular and irregular Napoleon’s failure to maintain what rebelled and the mob took to the streets. forces was, at best sporadic and at can be described as a questionable The next day Carlos abdicated in favour worst, non-existent and in some cases strategic aim had far reaching of his son. counterproductive to the greater cause. operational consequences. He executed The relationship between the Spanish a deliberate policy of fragmented army Meanwhile, Napoleon’s brother in law armies and the local guerrilleros was command and control, which fuelled the Marshal Murat had entered Madrid and, convoluted and troublesome, the latter ambitions of many of his army by the end of April, had a considerable were seen (by the military establishment commanders and crippled the overall force within the city limits. He refused if not the people themselves) as denying effectiveness of the fighting force as a to acknowledge Fernando and the army of badly needed recruits, horses whole. This was all the more incredible encouraged Carlos to protest against the and supplies. Unfortunately, the Spanish as Napoleon considered centralisation of circumstances of his abdication. This regular forces having been poorly supreme authority another sine qua non provided Napoleon the pretext to lure resourced, trained and prepared in the of successful campaigning. ‘In war, men Carlos and Fernando to Bayonne in order years running up to French occupation are nothing; one man is everything,’ or to consider the issue. However, on were no match for the more developed again, ‘Better one bad general than two arrival, far from discussing the European armies of the day. Their failures good ones.’7 By refusing to install a implications of his recent accession, the on the field of battle inevitably evoked single commander-in-chief he fuelled the hapless young King was presented with criticism; with the previous regime simmering rivalries that existed amongst an ultimatum to abdicate and confronted removed, the army commanders his Peninsular lieutenants. For most they with confessions from the former king themselves took the blame. The were experiencing independent command claiming that he had vacated the throne guerrilleros conversely, were elevated to for the first time and, with the Emperor’s through coercion. Napoleon settled the the status of national heroes. In reality, guiding hand well over the horizon, matter by claiming the throne for neither group earned the condemnation some revelled in the experience whilst himself. In Madrid, restless at the or respect thrust upon them. others floundered, rudderless. proximity of this French force and with Cooperation between the separate news of the unravelling treachery at The Grande Armée, by contrast, was fresh district armies became the exception, Bayonne, the mood turned vicious and from legendary victories over Austria, flexibility was lost and sustainability on the 2nd May (El Dos de Mayo) the city Prussia and Russia; it was arguably the complicated but most significantly, erupted; the Spanish guerre de la best-equipped European army of the concentration of force was rarely independencia4 had officially begun. time. ‘La Glorie’ and honour were alive achieved. In March 1812, with his and well, and this seemingly invincible Russian campaign looming, Napoleon Napoleon, and the majority of his force was poised to perform the next finally accepted that the autonomous imperial advisors, predicted a swift coup de théâtre. It was not to be. commands needed to be focussed under conclusion to events in much the same Strategically Napoleon’s plans were a single leader. Surprisingly he decided manner as Portugal. This was not to be. flawed; had he chosen to manipulate the not to appoint a military man as primus The war was to ebb and flow throughout young Bourbon King, rather than replace inter pares, instead King Joseph was the Peninsula over the next six years, him, his long term ambitions may well given the charge, much to the chagrin of culminating in the allied army invading have been realised. By installing his own the numerous Peninsular marshals who France itself, the final humiliation. The brother Joseph, he demonstrated an considered Bonaparte’s dithering brother reasons leading to ultimate failure were uncharacteristic misunderstanding of the incapable of the task. Inevitably, the numerous and largely interlinked, being Spanish populace and, in so doing, lost majority refused to submit themselves to underpinned by Napoleon’s sight of his strategic aims. There was a Joseph’s direct control, electing instead

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to play both sides off against the operational reserve even more remote. Logistically the Peninsula was a middle by going unswervingly to Paris, The third significant operational blunder nightmare. In central Europe and Italy questioning the military orders and was the failure to appreciate the the Grande Armée had lived off the land directives they received from Madrid. complexities of the Iberian topography in cantonments or on the move; in Consequently, other than the period in on military operations and logistics. simple Napoleonic terms, operations 1808 and early 1809 when Napoleon Iberia is an extensively mountainous were to be self sufficient and self- took personal charge of events in Spain, region except in the central plateau and financing. However, in Spain this was no single commander ever exercised the narrow coastal plains; the rivers are simply not possible as the majority of effective command and control over in deep ravines, generally not navigable the land was infertile and barely able to the French armies in the Peninsula. and, depending on the season, either sustain the indigenous population of just raging torrents or trickling streams. Both over twelve million people. Furthermore, Of equal significance was the lack of a mountains and rivers run at right angles the country was almost devoid suitable dedicated operational reserve. Initially to the French lines of communication livestock; carts and carriages were a small reserve of about eight thousand from the Pyrenees and much of the land quickly damaged beyond repair. The bulk men under General Dorsenne was located is infertile. In the early nineteenth of military supplies had to be brought in Madrid where their primary Century, these numerous rivers did into the country, moved and responsibilities lay in protecting not support the major lines of concentrated in advance of operations, King Joseph (in support of the imperial communication; roads were which was both time consuming and guards); however, the impetuousness of underdeveloped and inevitably circuitous expensive. The logistical challenges of the Madrileños inevitably removed the in their nature. Junot’s invasion of the region are often cited in official likelihood of nationwide deployment in Portugal in 1807, Blake’s retreat over the French dispatches but were underplayed their secondary reserve role. An mountains in the Asturias in 1808, by Napoleon himself. Conversely, his operational reserve did exist for a short Moore’s retreat to La Coruña in 1808-9, Peninsular commanders were quick to period during the time of Napoleon’s Soult’s retreat from Oporto in 1809, grasp the Iberian dilemma: that large personal involvement in theatre but Massena’s retreat from the Lines of Torres armies starved whilst small armies were quickly dissolved once the Emperor left Vedras in 1811 and Wellington’s retreat defeated8. Wellington too, quickly in early 1809. By mid 1811 the from Burgos in 1812 all bear testament appreciated the problems associated with reorganisation of the French Army of to the rigours of soldiering in the supplying his army and the French Spain into six separate armies increased Peninsula. Movement of anything other dilemma. ‘Bonaparte cannot carry on his operational isolation, counter to than lightly equipped soldiers was operations in Spain, excepting by means strategic aims. The Army of the Centre in problematic, the movement of artillery of large armies; and I doubt whether the Madrid was de facto the only military and baggage trains was at times country will afford the subsistence for a organisation directly controlled by King impossible and the ‘rapid’ movement and large army, or if he will be able to supply Joseph and its utilisation as the concentration of armies a desperately his magazines from France, the roads slow and frustrating affair. Furthermore, being so bad and the communication so deep defiles enabled small forces to hold difficult. The more ground the French off entire armies and provided the hold down, the weaker will they be at perfect surroundings for the Spanish any given point’9. The British commander guerrilleros and Portuguese militia and on the other hand, paid considerable ordenança who roamed the hills in attention to the logistic implications of unison with their environs. In turn, (most) operations early in the planning French commanders were forced to and in minute detail. In so doing, he penny-packet their forces to maintain was often frustrated by the lack of control of their vast areas and, more Spanish and Portuguese support. importantly, their principal lines of However, to be fair to the host nations, communication. These small detachments they had a finite amount of available were vulnerable to the more resolute resources, and what little they had was guerrilla operations and immediately often provisioned for their own armies lost their localised control when and starving populations in the first withdrawn or concentrated. As a direct instance. consequence economy of effort was rarely achieved, it was impossible to With one thousand five hundred miles of be strong everywhere and exploits coastline, there was, of course, another were often wasted for little or no option available, namely sea transport. Arthur Wellesley, Duke of Wellington (Sir Thomas Lawrence)( Wikipedia Commons) positive effect. The want of a French naval presence

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provided Wellington a significant and their network very fragile. The there were no army corps, only operational advantage, which he was early codes and ciphers used to try and independent field armies and as such, adept at exploiting. Only the French protect the contents of dispatches were no corps troops, no major units in operations in Catalonia and Navarre easily broken and it was not until late reserve and the divisions were not ever received succour of any 1811 that a more sophisticated system further broken down into brigades. significance; conversely, allied of cipher, known as the grand chiffre, Consequently the armies moved and operations throughout the war relied on was introduced12. operated as one, normally on the fringes sea transport for supplies, ammunition of the country and at the speed of its and the movement and evacuation of Tactically the French had mixed success. slowest arm, the artillery, that was men, horses and guns. The war is The oft-held view that Spanish armies chronically short of suitable draught peppered with examples of joint army were uncooperative and ineffectual has animals. This lack of mounts was to and navy cooperation, albeit sometimes pervaded British historical accounts. have a momentous effect on the frosty in nature, from the evacuation at ‘The Duke of Wellington in his organisation and efficiency of the La Coruña in 1809, succour at Cadiz, dispatches, and still more in his private Spanish cavalry. Centuries of inter Gibraltar and behind the Lines of Torres letters and his table-talk, was always breeding horses and mules across Vedras in 1810-11, to operations on the enlarging on the folly and arrogance Iberia had reduced the quality of eastern and northern coasts in 1813. The of the Spanish generals with whom he suitable mounts and at the start of the absence of this luxury to the French had to cooperate, and on the campaign, the cavalry only had about cannot be overstated and was another untrustworthiness of their troops’13. nine thousand horses, half the number noteworthy aspect ultimately General Napier, Lord Londonderry and they needed. ‘No matter whether it was contributing to French defeat. the many Peninsular diaries echo similar classified as light or heavy cavalry, as sentiments. Modern, more subjective dragoons or chasseurs, or as line or elite, Operational security and surprise studies do not support this poor opinion. Spain’s cavalry was unlikely to be able were two additional areas where the ‘The enemy confronting the Duke of to make much of an impact on the allies enjoyed significant advantages. Wellington would never thereafter be battlefield’15. ‘The few cavalry divisions Wellington noted in his dispatch of of the same high standard as the one were reduced to a handful of precious 21st July 1812, ‘the French armies in which destroyed the Spanish armies in squadrons, without any organisational Spain have never had any secure the winter campaign of 1808’.14 Those link between regiments. Badly mounted, communication beyond the ground armies, without doubt, endured they were even less well trained, and which they occupy.’ To deter partisan numerous defects at the start of the consequently they lacked the morale. As intervention, the movement of French war. They were suffering from a lack of a result they were completely ineffective troops and supplies had to be supported funding and an antiquated organisation: in the face of the French cavalry, which by large military escorts but the movement of communiqués and dispatches was a far more dangerous affair, as speed was critical. Small groups were often intercepted en-route and dealt with mercilessly by their captors who then passed the contents of captured documents to British exploring officers10. This provided the allies with an immense advantage, as they often received timely and accurate information on the bona fide and planned movements of the French forces and, from this intelligence, the allied command were able to piece together their plans and objectives with remarkable exactness. Operational surprise was almost impossible for the French as any movement, large or small, was reported through the network of partisan units, allied spies and reconnaissance or intelligence officers. The French too had their own network of informants, Salamanca - A view of the Grand Arapil (left) and the Lesser Arapil providing scale to a Napoleonic 11 the Afrancesados ; numbers were limited battlefield. (Nick Lipscombe)

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Map depicting the initial positions at Busaco. From a collection of maps to be published in a Peninsular War Atlas in 2010 by the author (By kind permission of Osprey Publishing) was united and superior in every Wellington. For example, the great the enemy’s attention from the main respect’16. Time and time again, battle at Salamanca would not have body of attacking troops moving into battles between the Spanish and been possible if the Spanish 6th and their attacking positions and formations, French lay in the balance until the 7th armies were not containing forty secondly to probe the enemy lines for decisive employment of the French thousand French troops to the north. weaknesses following the initial artillery cavalry. Of course, there is a fine barrage and finally to exploit those dividing line between quitting the The Grand Armée, at the commencement weaknesses if the opportunity presented battlefield to save your skin and of the Peninsular campaign, was itself. Indeed, a number of engagements extracting yourself to save your force invincible having swept aside Austrian, prior to the Peninsular War had ended to be able to fight another day and this Prussian and Russian armies in the with the opponent’s lines being is perhaps where many (mainly British) preceding years. The basic tactical penetrated before the main body was historians have been harshly critical of formation in the attack having been brought to bear. The main body itself the Spanish military achievement and worked during the Revolutionary Wars consisted of Ordre Mixte with the lines contribution. To dismiss, out of hand the some fifteen years previously, and then supporting a central core of troops in collective Spanish military performance honed by Napoleon himself during the deep columns who literally battered is missing the point; the sheer presence northern Italian and Austerlitz their way through the lines by sheer of numerous formed bodies of Spanish campaigns. Fundamentally, it consisted weight of numbers. Artillery was a regular troops required the French to of a numerically strong screen of significant supporting element to this allocate troops to take on or contain tirailleurs17 who manoeuvred in small tactic, as Napoleon himself observed these formations, rendering many tens groups or individually in front of the ‘columns do not break through lines, of thousands of French troops main body of advancing troops. Their unless they are supported by superior unavailable for operations against tasks was threefold, firstly to distract artillery fire’18.

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These tactics were to fail in the Peninsula and there were a number of reasons for this. Firstly, the French were unable to put into the field the amount of artillery that they had traditionally enjoyed in central Europe19, due to the difficult terrain and conflicting demands for both guns and gunners. Secondly, Napoleon’s commanders generally opted to attack in column alone and not Ordre Mixte20, partly because this was an easier manoeuvre for the less experienced troops who tended to be sent to the Peninsula but it also perhaps demonstrated a lack of confidence on the part of the commanders themselves. By attacking in column alone, a division of five thousand men would assault on a front of one hundred and seventy individuals, twenty-four ranks deep. Only the two front ranks of the column could fire with any effect. Out of the Grand Kitchen of Europe - The Spanish Ulcer placed Napoleon in a stew, Ney in a pickle and Massena on five thousand advancing men only three the spit. (Reproduced by kind permission of the Bibiloteca Nacional de Portugal.) hundred could shoot at the enemy.21 The rate of fire of these two bodies is also advance but force the opposing establishment. These skirmishers were significant: advancing infantry take commander to send out ever increasing largely resourced from the integral light much longer to re-load than static well numbers of skirmishers….22. companies or from the newly formed drilled and highly disciplined soldiers. Perhaps Wellington’s greatest tactical British23 rifle and Portuguese24 light Conversely, attacking infantry in column strength was his ability to select ground battalions. This protective line prevented provided an easier and bulkier target for for both defence and attack. His the tirailleurs from penetrating the allied both artillery gun and infantry musket. appreciation of the tactical significance ranks but often suffered heavy casualties However, the matter of column versus of the terrain north of Lisbon is perhaps as a result. At Barrosa the tactic worked line is only part of the reason for the best example. In so doing he but at Fuentes de Oñoro the infantry continued tactical success. selected positions that afforded dead were returned to skirmish order ground, masked considerable numbers of prematurely and were cut to pieces by One notable modern Napoleonic tactician his force, provided mutual support, the French cavalry. considers that Wellington generally covered lines of withdrawal and employed three additional and quite facilitated good communication for the Off the battlefield the French were separate precautions. He anchored his lateral movement of reserves. Busaco is ravaged by the guerrilleros, hated by the flanks, ‘to prevent the enemy working his undoubtedly the best example. This population, exhausted by the climate way around and attacking the weakest tactical genius of utilising dead ground and terrain, overwhelmed by starvation part of the line…by extending the line was, at that time, ground breaking; it and disease and unable to produce the to some natural obstacle or strong point. prevented the attacker knowing the decisive blow to thwart allied intentions. Wellington also took steps to ensure that defender’s dispositions and de facto They died in their thousands, the high the men along the line were never strengths and weaknesses, but it also morale which they exuded at the outset needlessly exposed to either small arms prevented him employing his main body, of the campaign quickly faded. In or artillery fire before it was time for reserves, artillery and skirmishers to best contrast to the campaigns in central them to enter the action. However, it effect, thereby undermining the shock Europe, opportunities for personal was not enough to anchor the line and and manoeuvre of the attack in column. ambition and advancement were few and initially hide most of the defenders far between. One by one the best of behind protective or covering terrain. Wellington countered the mass of Napoleon’s subordinates tried and failed, Adequate countermeasures had to be tirailleurs and guns deployed in advance and with their reputations tarnished taken to neutralise the French of the main body by throwing out a their despair and lethargy bred skirmishers. Wellington’s solution was to correspondingly strong line of throughout the French ranks. Even when send out skirmishers of his own, who skirmishers, a tactic that had been fighting on French soil at the twilight of would not only contest their opponent’s hitherto ridiculed by the British military the conflict, the dogged determination

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Número 7, 1995, p. 103. 18 Gates, The Spanish Ulcer, a History of the and esprit de corps of the early days was Peninsular War, p. 21 (from Girod de l’Ain, long gone. 10 These were officers in uniform who moved p. 107). and operated independently, providing It is difficult to tie down one particular intelligence on French movements, 19 Napoleonic doctrine stipulated 5 guns per concentrations and troops strengths. They thousand infantry. In the Peninsula, the aspect of these failures by Napoleon and also liased with the guerrilleros and figure average about 5 guns for two his Peninsular commanders that therefore had to speak good Spanish. thousand men. ultimately led to the French failure in Iberia. It was a cocktail of misjudgement 11 Spaniard loyal to Joseph Bonaparte – 20 Though not exclusively and it would be literally “frenchified one”. wrong to assume that the entire and mismanagement and, following his campaign was fought on this basis: at disastrous Russian campaign, Napoleon 12 Major George Scovell, one of Wellington’s Fuentes de Oñoro the central battalions must have rued the day he ever cast his staff officers, ultimately broke this code. that attacked the village of Pozo Bello eye over his southern neighbour. Not 13 Oman, A History of the Peninsular War, were in line, those on the flanks were in that it was a flawless performance by the vol. I, p. 89. column and at Albuera the mixed order allies. Co-operation between Wellington attack so nearly broke the allied line. 14 Griffith, A History of the Peninsular War, and the Spanish central junta (or vol. IX, Sañudo, Oman’s view of the 21 Glover, The Peninsular War 1807-1814 a Regency) and subsequent Cortes25 was Spanish Army in the Peninsular War concise military history, p.32. riddled with mutual suspicion and with Reassessed, ch. 6, p. 159. 22 Griffith, A History of the Peninsular War, the Portuguese authorities matters were 15 Esdaile, The Peninsular War, A New History, vol. IX: Nosworthy, Sir Charles Oman on often little better. Despite this, the p. 45. Line verses Column, ch. 10, p. 232-233. combined allied aims, adherence to the 23 The 95th Regiment wore green jackets principles of war and the determination 16 Griffith, A History of the Peninsular War, and were known by the French as and tenacity of the Spanish and vol. IX, Sañudo, Oman’s view of the Spanish Army in the Peninsular War santerelles or grasshoppers. Portuguese people were sufficiently Reassessed, ch. 6, p. 148. harmonised to bring about the defeat of 24 Known as caçadores. Initially there were 6 the greatest military force of the period 17 French term for skirmishing troops or caçadores battalions and by 1812, the number had risen to 12. and shatter the Napoleonic dream. sharpshooters, who were positioned in front of the main body of forces. 25 Spanish parliament. 

1 Arteche, Guerra de la Independencia, vol. I, p. 209. 2 Esdaile, The Peninsular War A New History, p. 31. 3 Arteche, Guerra de la Independencia, vol. I, p.p. 202-203. 4 The Spanish term for the Peninsular War, it is worth noting that the French called it the Campaign in Spain, while the Portuguese term was the war of Liberation. 5 The Peninsular conflict was to spawn this term, guerrilla meaning “little war”. The fighters were correctly called guerrilleros and they collectively fought la guerrilla the irregular struggle. 6 Portuguese Home Guard; quite distinct from the guerrilleros as they were in fact uniformed but they, nevertheless, fought unconventionally. 7 Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon, p. xxxix. 8 Gates, The Spanish Ulcer, a History of the Peninsular War, p. 32. Rifleman Broom A Company The 9Reid, Tracing the Biscuit: The British Rifles, Helmand, Commissariat in the Peninsular War, 2009 (Arabella Militaria, Revista de Cultura Militar, Dorman)

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reference material and the results of a and colonial force mobility2. All of this field trial, the paper examines the meant that the British were forced to use Boer IEDs tactical and technical aspects of how the rail network for the movement of IEDs were used against British trains on troops, materiel and combat supplies. the Pretoria to Delagoa Bay railway line Lieutenant Colonel IP Mills between September 1900 and July 1901. Between 2003 and 2009, coalition forces SO1 PSO Logistic Plans The paper draws comparisons with in Iraq were also limited in choice of British Peace Support Team current and recent British military MSRs, using the established network of (South Africa) operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. major hard-top roads and highways for the transportation and distribution of The Boer insurgency took root because of supplies. Conditions off these highways What can the actions of a Scottish a limitation on the number of Main were too soft and unpredictable and the renegade Improvised Explosive Device Supply Routes (MSRs), the vastness of majority of military logistic vehicles were (IED) expert in the Anglo-Boer War tell the terrain and the nature of the too heavy to handle off-road terrain. In us about techniques, tactics and insurgent forces who fought in small Afghanistan, the ability to travel off the procedures in Iraq and Afghanistan fractured cells. MSR varies, with conditions generally today? At a time when most of the US, better in the southern desert. Careful coalition and ISAF lives that are lost in During the Anglo-Boer war, the key reconnaissance and planning such as these theatres are a result of IED means of communication for British that carried out prior to the repair of the attacks, the answer is a great deal and forces was the railway network. Other Kajaki Dam hydro-electric turbines in that although technology may have supply routes i.e. roads, paths and August 2008 demonstrated that moved on, the lessons to be drawn from tracks, were unpredictable due to alternative routes could be used, making the British counter-measure experience weather conditions and reliant upon the troop movement less predictable. are as relevant today as they were all supply of dependable oxen and horses. Nevertheless not all minor roads and those years ago...... The British also experienced a great deal tracks in Afghanistan are suitable for the of difficulty in maintaining healthy many varieties of lightly and heavily This paper studies the use of innovative livestock1; the general shortage of armoured ISAF vehicles. The result being IEDs against British and colonial forces horses, particularly in the war’s earlier that there is a strong tendency to use during the Anglo-Boer war in South stages and the poor condition of troop the Highway 1 circular road that Africa (1899 – 1902). Using existing horses in South Africa, hindered British traverses through most of the country’s regions.

By 24th September 1900, the Orange Free State and the majority of the Transvaal south of the Delagoa Bay railway line were under British control. The northern Transvaal Republic could only be controlled where it was physically occupied by their military columns3; the vast expanse of land making it impracticable for the 250,000 British and colonial troops to control the rest of territory effectively. Furthermore, these distances allowed the Boer commandos considerable freedom of movement and suited the strategy of guerrilla warfare; commandos were sent off to their own districts with orders to act against the British whenever an opportunity presented itself. Their aim was to do as much damage as possible, and then move off quickly, disappearing into the veldt prior to the arrival of British reinforcements.

Map Southern Africa 1899 In South Africa the British won the

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The Transvaal (Australian War Memorial) conventional war against the Orange Free in Action, or died of wounds, was 319 in independently. A degree of control was State and Transvaal Boer forces 2003 – but rose to 713 in 2004. The exercised by senior leaders however convincingly, but they were unprepared situation in Afghanistan is more commanders, such as Smuts and De la for the insurgency that followed and complex, where the counter-insurgency Rey, were allowed to formulate and could not fully comprehend the freedom dimension is mixed in with the execute their own operations provided and succour afforded by the terrain. traditional war-fighting and peace they complied with strategic guidelines. support aspects of ISAF’s mission. In this This was perhaps a true example of In a similar vein, the US Coalition in Iraq case, Taliban havens extend as far as the mission command. Moreover Boer units was surprised by the speed at which the semi-independent tribal regions situated were small and fractured, making it insurgency followed the fall of Baghdad along the frontier with Pakistan. This difficult for the British to dislocate and on 9th April 2003. Even the unreachable geographical factor, similar frustrate the overall structure. The same apprehension of Saddam Hussein on 14th to that encountered by the British in the is true of many of the insurgent forces December 2003 did nothing to quell the northern Transvaal, means that despite which emerged during the twentieth number of attacks by various groups the establishment of a formal Afghan century and is particularly pertinent to against coalition forces throughout the government on 7 December 2004, the Iraq and Afghanistan where the enemy country. Indeed, British forces operating insurgency has flourished and even today make-up was and is multifarious, in Basra experienced one of their busiest some areas still remain “ungovernable”. disjointed and deliberately difficult to years in 2004. The trend was country- disrupt through a central point of access. wide; US DoD statistics show that the During the Anglo-Boer war, the Boer total number of service personnel Killed commandos operated semi- With regard to IEDs, Boer attacks became

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increasingly sophisticated. The British his group of commandos. point. At which stage the British had response took time to formulate and very little time in which to choose required the use of armoured trains Hindon would take time to survey the between two courses of action - fighting followed by the construction of block ground in order to ensure that once a or surrendering. houses plus other obstacles to combat train had been derailed, his unit would the threat. have the advantage of surprise and the Those who positioned the IED and bucket ability to withdraw from the scene of dynamite were very careful not to Early on in the war, the Boers recognised rapidly. During a reconnaissance on 16th leave any footprints which could be that British reliance upon the railway January 1901, Hindon noticed that three traced by British foot patrols. To avoid was a significant weakness and by late trains were successively sent out of leaving any sign of their presence, the 1900, attacks against British trains had Balmoral at short intervals; he realised perpetrators would walk for quite a become increasingly complex and well that by derailing the first at a particular distance along the rails. Then the ballast executed. One of the stretches of railway point on a slight rise they would have would be painstakingly removed from that received a great deal of attention by the opportunity to ambush the second beneath the rails and then replaced after Boer Commandos between late 1900 and and third in the same way before the the device had been positioned correctly. mid 1901 was the line that linked the British understood what was happening The trigger, placed in intimate contact Mozambique coastal port of Delagoa Bay and able to react according. As a result with the underside of the track, was with Pretoria, the capital city of the of this raid, Hindon’s unit was able to designed to operate by the weight of the Transvaal. One Boer unit that employed resupply itself sufficiently well to locomotive as it passed over. Lastly, all particularly sophisticated tactics and continue to operate for several more remaining excess stones were taken away technology in this regard was months. in a bag; at every stage, great care was commanded by a renegade named taken to conceal all traces of the device. Captain Jack Hindon. Considering the technology available at the time, perhaps more impressive than Insurgent tactics, techniques and Captain Oliver Jack Hindon, aka the tactics employed by Hindon and his procedures (TTPs) have been no less ‘Dynamite Jack’, was Scottish by birth. men, was the relatively sophistication of cunning in recent times. The use of He joined the British Army as a boy the IED used to derail British trains. This surveillance to determine and therefore soldier but deserted claiming to have was a victim operated device, based on predict allied and coalition TTPs is a well been physically assaulted by a senior the firing mechanism of a Martini Henry practised and executed procedure in both member of his unit. After this, Hindon rifle. Research suggests that this Iraqi and Afghan theatres. Both groups travelled north to the Transvaal Republic particular type of device was unique to of insurgents have become adept at where he became a stonemason and later this unit and that the IED was designed pinpointing likely incident control point a police officer. In 1895/6 he assisted to operate when a locomotive passed positions, cordon locations and the the Boers during the infamous Jameson over the rail track directly above it. The make-up of vehicle convoys and patrols. raid where British supporters tried to designer of this device was a man named In Afghanistan, just as Hindon’s take the Transvaal Republic and its gold Carl Cremer. Not much is known about commando took painstaking precautions deposits by force. For his loyalty, Hindon Cremer other than he was an associate of to conceal their signature, so the Taliban was awarded citizenship by the Transvaal Hindon and, one assumes, was a member have become expert at burying devices government; an honour normally not of his unit. The payload was sometimes in footpaths and tracks without visible bestowed upon an uitlander at the time. up to fifty dynamite cartridges contained disruption to the ground. Indeed, a At the outbreak of the war he was sent in a bucket, although it is probable that degree of weatherproofing now takes to the Middelburg commando where he the size of main charge was at least half place in order to prolong the life of fought with distinction throughout the as large as this. The bucket was buried Taliban pressure plate IEDs. first year of the campaign, particularly at underneath the ballast (stone aggregate) Spion Kop. Between February and April surrounding the track and sleepers. The 1900, he formed the Hindon Scouts; the great advantage was that it did not bring unit proved so successful that Lord about destruction on a great scale, since Kitchener publicly stated that Hindon normally the only the locomotive was had caused more difficulties for British derailed from the track and made and colonial forces than any other Boer unserviceable. Damage to the track was Commander. The Hindon Scouts became relatively superficial, but for British notorious train-wreckers, particularly railway engineers, replacing twisted and along the Pretoria - Delagoa Bay railway damaged tracks was a time consuming line where they operated under the business. In most cases the train was South Africa. C 1900. The Wreck Of An Armoured command of General Ben Viljoen brought to a standstill at a distance of Train Lies Beside A Railway Line. In The alongside Captain Henri Slegtkamp and about thirty yards beyond the contact Background, Centre Left, Is The Headstone Commemorating The Dead (AWM)

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October 1900. However, during the amount of manpower for patrol and period between September 1900 and July defensive purposes. Between 1st and 7th 1901, a number of bridges and culverts October 1900, Boer units launched a were destroyed as well as tracks damaged series of successful attacks against four and trains derailed.4 Throughout the first locations on the Pretoria to Delagoa Bay half of 1901, the number of train railway line derailing and destroying derailments along the railway line three trains and a culvert at Brugspruit. gathered momentum, happening daily with the line often damaged at some On 26 October, and acting on an Glen, South Africa. The Glen Railway Bridge point. These attacks were so successful intelligence tip-off, British troops Showing Damage after an Attack by the Boers that from the beginning of October attacked what they believed to be the AWM) 1900, the IMR suspended the running of headquarters of the Boer railway The amount of destruction Hindon and trains at night on the line between attackers located at Witkloof, some 30 his men created was considerable and Pretoria and Waterval. Troop trains kilometres south of Belfast. However, the immediate British reaction was to returning to Pretoria were routinely despite these actions, Boer attacks up-armour more of its military trains. The ambushed and it became clear that against the railway became more insurgents realised that they could not suitable defensive measures needed to frequent and more destructive. In defeat this additional protection head be put in place if the British were going response, British troops began to on, so they focused their attacks against to continue to use the railway.5 implement a programme of raiding and a softer target (the railway line) instead. burning farms in the vicinity of the And so a contest of measure versus railway in an attempt to prevent further counter-measure ensued throughout the attacks from occurring.6 guerrilla phase of the Anglo-Boer war. A similar pattern can be observed in both From about September 1901 onwards Iraq and Afghanistan. The gradual up- however, Hindon’s attacks were curtailed. armouring of the HUMVEE in Iraq for Prior to the beginning of the war, four example led to the burial of IEDs armoured trains had been constructed in designed to destroy the vehicle’s less Cape Town. In addition, an armoured well protected underbelly. Very large HE train was deployed in support of Lord devices with payloads around the 750 - South Africa, C. 1900. Fourteen Streams Bridge, Methuen throughout the advance of his 1000 kg mark were sometimes dug in Blown Up By Boer Soldiers in 1899, Showing Division west from the Cape Province under tarred roads at night; such devices Damaged Sections of The Bridge (AWM) towards the Orange Free State border; were responsible for seriously damaging another three were positioned at or destroying a number of Bradley APCs. Stormberg, Mafeking and Kimberley. Two In Afghanistan the migration in 20006/7 more were deployed in support of British from WMIK vehicles to the MASTIFF and forces in Natal and Southern Rhodesia.7 other new armoured vehicles currently in The frequency of attacks meant that the theatre is as a direct response to the British had to equip themselves with increase in IED payload encountered in many more trains, some of which were recent years. One can expect to see the built as far away as Bulawayo, Southern payloads of IEDs increase in future and Rhodesia. the positioning of devices altered to maximize effect against vulnerable parts Three Australian Bushmen pose in front of a With armoured trains in use during the of these vehicles. wooden-sided railway freight wagon. They are day, Hindon’s men began to set up their holding either Lee-Enfield or Lee-Metford .303 calibre rifles (AWM) IEDs at night with the ambush site kept Between June and mid September 1900, under close observation the following construction engineers of the Imperial After assuming command of the British day. Initially, Hindon was perplexed Military Railways (IMR) made repairs to and Imperial forces in South Africa, one because so many of his IEDs were being the Pretoria to Delagoa Bay line. The IMR of Lord Kitchener’s first decisions was to detected by British troops and rendered began to move troops and materiel along implement a number of defensive safe. It seemed as though British foot the line once the Komatipoort Station measures such as the digging of patrols were capable of following his was finally occupied by British forces on camouflaged open trenches at railway tracks for distances up to 600 metres 25th September 1900. A total of 102 stations, culverts and bridges in order to through the veld. By observing British trains were used to transport troops from protect personnel against artillery fire. early morning clearance patrols however, the eastern part of the Transvaal back to These long trench systems proved largely Hindon saw that the trackers simply Pretoria from 26th September to 10th ineffective however, absorbing a large followed the marks that he and his men

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had left in the dew. Henceforth Hindon initiated the device by simply pulling on involved in train wrecking.10 As a result, made sure that his IEDs were positioned the wire, operating the trigger and Hindon and his men decided that further early in the evening before the air had setting off the firing mechanism. attacks on the line would be pointless; cooled down sufficiently for dew to form Although this attack brought the train to they moved their operations to the on the grass. The British had little a standstill, Hindon and his men did not Northern Transvaal in the vicinity of success in tracing Hindon’s tracks after manage to plunder much in the way of Naboomspruit on the Pretoria- this discovery was made. supplies due to the steady rate of fire Pietersburg railway line.11 that was brought to bear upon them by Having initiated a programme British troops who had survived the of protecting military trains with initial explosion.8 armour, British commanders instituted a procedure whereby an armoured train, By July 1901, the Pretoria-Delagoa Bay which had the locomotive located Railway Line was defended by a system between a few reinforced trucks, of blockhouses joined by a network of would travel ahead of each scheduled barbed wire entanglements. The number passenger/goods train. The front truck, of armoured trains on the line was designed to be sacrificial, would usually increased and deep trenches were dug contain a section of soldiers. It would along both sides of the track to provide appear that the task of those that positions from which the line could be survived the blast of the IED strike was defended as well a creating an obstacle to provide the locomotive and its crew to those wishing to attack. Furthermore, with protection. After such an attack, the British implemented a system of the locomotive would simply be frequent patrols by locally stationed uncoupled from the damaged truck, troops, the aim being to search for signs allowing it to return safely up the of the presence of enemy activity whilst railway with the undamaged trucks in denying freedom of movement to would- tow. Hindon soon identified this tactic be attackers. The blockhouses were built and began to allow the first armoured in lines at great expense with the idea of Blockhouse at Modder River, Northern Cape (Lt train with its soldiers to pass safely organising ‘drives’ against small mobile Col IP Mills) before detonating a device directly under groups of Boer horsemen. Such ‘drives’ the locomotive of the second train. It is were meant to corner the Boers against The measure versus counter-measure assumed that the first train passed over the lines of blockhouses although in cycle feeds off itself. By adding and a partially constructed IED and that the practice this rarely occurred. combining a series of defensive measures firing mechanism was swiftly placed Nevertheless the combination of however, the British managed to preserve under the rail and connected up in the blockhouses, barbed wire entanglements the integrity of the line and thus the time window prior to the arrival of and covering patrols proved effective in sustainment of their forces. Whilst no- the second. protecting the railway line. In addition, one is advocating the sacrificing of the British had begun to execute those soldiers in a front railway car equivalent By May 1901, the British changed tactics that they had captured who had been today, the fact remains that manpower again, this time using two locomotives needs to be dedicated to the protection rather than one positioned between a of key supply routes in order to counter number of trucks and carriages. The idea a significant insurgency, and particularly behind this countermeasure was that in an IED threat. As the Anglo-Boer War the event of one of the locomotives experience shows, it is the combination being disabled, the other might be able of countermeasures that are important; to carry on with the journey. On 20th block houses on their own are May 1901, such a supply train was insufficient as is simply up-armouring observed near Godwan Station by one’s means of transport. Moreover, Hindon’s men. On this occasion Hindon manpower needs to be allocated to departed from his usual use of a victim defensive tasks. Between 2008 and operated IED, instead opting for a 2009 there has been a 37% increase command initiated variant. He attached in ISAF force strength. The increase in a length of wire (presumably to the South Africa, c. 1901. A two storey fortified ANSF strength has increased by 28% trigger of the IED) and concealed himself house at Middelburg during the South African over the same period. It may be Boer War. The ground floor veranda has been approximately forty metres away from fortified with sandbags and corrugated iron. possible to use these increases to the track. At the optimum moment he firing slits in the corrugated iron (AWM) bolster security on key routes.

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and Empire ‘To Shoot and Ride’: Mobility The lesson for us is to anticipate order to operate, thus ensuring that and Firepower in Mounted Warfare. such changes in direction before the victim (the locomotive) was directly http://www.defence.gov.au/army/ahu/ they occur. over the main charge when it detonated. docs/The_Boer_War_Spence.pdf. 3E Lee, To The Bitter End. ISBN-10: As Hindon discovered, successful IED The British did not find a technical 0670801437 ISBN-13: 978-0670801435. attacks must be tailored to the solution to counter the effect of such pg 125. opportunity presented. He switched from IEDs; rather they came up with a tactical a victim operated attack to one initiated methodology which relied upon a 4 D Aitken, The South African Military History Society, Military History Journal – by command means because British TTPs combination of obstacles (such as Vol 12 No 1, Oliver ‘Jack’ Hindon, Boer had changed. He also switched from ditches, trenches and barbed wire), key Hero and Train Wrecker. http://samilitary operating during the day to setting up point defence (e.g. blockhouses) and a history.org/vol121da.html. his ambushes at night. In both Iraq and large number of troops (to patrol, react 5 E P C Girouard, History of the Railways Afghanistan there is ample evidence of and defend) in order to frustrate during the War in South Africa (London, such flexibility and technological Hindon’s operations to such a degree 1903), pg 46. advancement amongst insurgent groups. that he was forced to move away from Simple roadside bombs in mid to late the area. 6 G S Preller, Kaptein Hindon: Oorlogsavonture van ‘n Verbaas Verkenner. 2003 against British forces in Basra were Pretoria, 1916. pgs 161 – 163. relatively small command initiated A number of lessons have been drawn devices which, in the majority of cases, from this experience, many of which are 7 D Hall, The Hall Handbook of the Anglo had limited impact against British still pertinent to operations today: Boer War 1899 – 1902, University of Natal Press – 1999. ISBN 0869809490. pgs 241 vehicles. By 2004/5, these devices had & 244. increased in size, were far better ● The deconstructed nature of disguised and used fragmentation and insurgent forces makes it difficult to 8 Viljoen, My reminiscences of the Anglo- plate charge technology in order to counter the threat through a Boer War, pgs 380 & 381. defeat vehicle protection measures and centralised destruction strategy. 9 N Gomm, The South African Military compromise British TTPS. The lesson for History Society, Military History Journal - ● As measure is met with counter- us is to anticipate such changes in Vol 1 No 7 Commandant P.H. Kritzinger in measure and so on, attacks become direction before they occur. the Cape. http://samilitaryhistory.org/ increasingly sophisticated and more vol017ng.html. technologically advanced. Where the Conclusion 10 R Sibbald. The War Correspondents counter measure is robust however, Jack Hindon and some of his men finally The Boer War. Bramley Books 1993. the insurgent may revert to simple surrendered to the British in May 1902, ISBN 1-85883-733-X. pg 208. opportunistic attacks. just prior to the conclusion of the Peace 11 D Aitken, The South African Military at Vereeniging agreement. After some ● Single counter measures are History Society, Military History Journal – deliberation, they were cleared of all insufficient to create lasting change. Vol 11 No 6, Guerrilla Warfare, October infractions of the laws of war.12 Success rests upon the combination 1900 – May 1902: Boer attacks on the of multiple, coherent defensive Pretoria-Delagoa Bay Railway Line. http://samilitaryhistory.org/vol116da. measures which preserve lines of When one considers the effectiveness html. of the type of IED used, it is easy to communications. see why the Hindon Scouts were so 12 D Aitken, The South African Military successful against British and colonial History Society, Military History Journal – Vol 11 No 6, Guerrilla Warfare, October forces, which relied heavily upon the 1900 – May 1902: Boer attacks on the 1 D Hall, The Hall Handbook of the Anglo South African rail network for Pretoria-Delagoa Bay Railway Line. Boer War 1899 – 1902. University of Natal sustainment. Placed in historical http://samilitaryhistory.org/vol116da. Press – 1999. ISBN 0869809490. page  context, this was an innovative device 240. html and extremely difficult to detect; it simply required track displacement in 2 I G Spence, The Boer War: Army, Nation

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Intelligence Lessons From Hizballah’s Ground Campaign 2006

James Spencer

This paper examines technologically advanced elements of Hizballah’s operation against Israel’s Lebanon Campaign of summer 2006 in order to derive lessons applicable to HM Forces’ operations elsewhere in the MENA region. It does not examine the relatively competent conduct of Hizballah ground operations.

The paper addresses Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) experiences only where these have a bearing on Hizballah’s capability – other papers1 have covered the issues. In summary, however, Israel’s mistakes seem to have been:

Map of the Lebanon (CIA) ● inaccurate Intelligence preparation of the environment (IPE)2; Only unclassified material has been used predominately Christian (“Phoenician”) in the preparation of this paper. Unless Beirut was coalesced with substantial ● unrealistic political aims; otherwise qualified, the terms “Shi’i” and Sunni and Shi’a Muslim, and Druze Arab ● poor intelligence; “Shi’a” (pl) are used to describe the 12er populations whose focus had always Shi’a found mostly in Lebanon, S Iraq been Damascus. ● “air arrogance”; and Iran. ● a failure to integrate all arms and On independence in 1943, the two sides services; BLUF agreed to support the idea of an Hizballah’s CSTAP understanding and independent Lebanon, and not to invite ● and inadequate training and ISTAR capabilities are much better than foreign patrons to intervene in Lebanon’s equipment (this latter an issue in previously thought – as will be other affairs. The unwritten National Pact of common with the UK for Op TELIC Iranian clients and proxies in the region. 1943 was based on the last, 1932 census 1.)3 (in which the Maronite Christians were a Political & Demographic Background marginal majority), and allocated the Hizballah exploited these tactical In 1920, for colonial reasons, the French Presidency to the Christians, the Prime weaknesses caused by IDF “Victory formed Lebanon out of the city-state of Ministership to the Sunnis, and the Disease”, greatly multiplying Hizballah’s Beirut, and parts of Greater Syria west of Parliamentary Speakership to the Shi’a. limited ground effect. the Lebanon Mountains. This led to Since then, a combination of Christian political complications as the emigration, low Christian and high Shi’a

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and Sunni birth-rates, and rural to urban and torture of their opponents, soldiers were seized, is a black spot, migration has left Muslims in a majority, suspected or otherwise, in the notorious out of sight and communication from and the Shi’a probably the largest Kiyam Prison. Hizballah gained much surrounding IDF OPs. As a result, it demographic element, but the poorest kudos from its “resistance” to the hated was formally out of bounds, except and least politically represented of the IDF / SLA presence, and took credit for for transit, to IDF personnel. But 18 sects and ethnicities of which the IDF withdrawal in 2000. since Hizballah identified an Lebanon is comprised. exploitable pattern, it seems to After Israel’s 2000 withdrawal, as so have been frequented nonetheless – In 1974, Imam Musa al-Sadr (a relative often, the client was left vulnerable to probably for the traditional of Muqtada’ al-Sadr) founded Harakat al- vengeance by their ethnic counterparts. cigarette break. Mahrumin, a Shi’a empowerment / civil In the case of South Lebanon, many SLA rights group, from which grew the Shi’a members fled to Israel, although some “Hezbollah’s ability to harass the Lebanese Resistance Detachments militia have returned. However, the Christian Israelis and study their flaws, like a (Afwaj al-Muqawmat al-Lubnaniyya), population reduced dramatically, leaving tendency for regular patrols and for better known by its acronym AMaL –the a more homogenous, more hard-line, troop convoys on the eve of the Arabic for “Hope”. predominately Shi’a society, dominated Sabbath, gave Hezbollah confidence by Hizballah. It was into this polarised that the Israeli Army “is a normal political environment, and rugged human army, with normal physical environment, that the IDF re- vulnerabilities and follies,” he entered in summer 2006. [Timur Goksel] added.”5

Hizballah Intelligence Preparation of While a diversionary rocket attack drew the Environment & OPSEC IDF attention, the Hizballah raiding The 12 Jul 06 Hizballah raid was by no party engaged the patrol vehicles with means unusual4; Hizballah had been RPGs and small arms fire, killing three trying to capture IDF personnel to use as and capturing two IDF personnel. They bargaining chips for a prisoner exchange then withdrew into Lebanon. A MERKAVA with the Israelis; a previous attempt in II AFV attempted an immediate follow- Nov 05 had failed. This raid did, up but was then struck by a secondary however, show some interesting features Command Wire IED, killing its crew of which suggest good surveillance at the four. Hizballah has a Modus Operandi of least. The site, Shtula - from which the such initial contact, followed by secondary incident.

The commander of a Ferret scout car of the Queen’s Dragoon Guards takes a photograph of an East Beirut street scene whilst his vehicle is on patrol 1983 (IWM)

In 1982 after Op PEACE FOR GALILEE, Israel occupied South Lebanon as far as the River Litani. Partly as a result of the occupation, Amal split, and the more militant Hizballah (“Party of God”) Shtula; the far hill is in Lebanon, up which formed, initially following a terrorist Hizballah took the captured IDF soldiers. The strategy and Modus Operandi. During banner marks the capture site. (Photo © S Negus 2007) that period, the Israelis allied with and sponsored the renegade “South While not expecting the onslaught Lebanon Army” officered predominately that followed the specific operation, by Christians from the Maronite Hizballah appears to have carried out community interlaced with Shi’a, and an intelligence preparation of the operated formally against the PLO in Forces of the United Nations Interim Force in battlespace (IPB) of the border areas, South Lebanon. The SLA pressed many Lebanon (UNIFIL) are pictured in action along and from that, worked out assembly the Blue Line on the Lebanese-Israeli border. Shi’i and Maronite youths into their Merkava tanks of the IDF are in the foreground areas, avenues of approach, and ranks, and engaged in disappearances (UN) killing areas.

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It is known that Hizballah study IDF IPB, and taking advantage of the highly IDF, or UNFIL subsequently. Hizballah doctrine: Sh Hassan Nasrallah, the leader complex terrain, Hizballah built also had numerous OPs overlooking the of Hizballah, even commented openly on extensive fortifications in the Blue Line (border with Israel), which the first draft of the Winograd Report. intervening 6 years. This work went were known (possibly deliberately During 18 years of IDF occupation of S undetected, by both UNFIL and the revealed) to the IDF, and shelled heavily Lebanon, Hizballah carried out a Israelis/US: on 29 May 06. thorough assessment of IDF tactics, techniques and procedures, and were “When Israeli troops discovered and In anticipation of IMINT collection able to integrate their understanding of dynamited the [Labboune] bunker efforts, Hizballah had also prepared, IDF doctrine into their IPB; Iranian IRGC days after the cease-fire, they found protected and camouflaged much of its advisors are likely to have assisted in a structure consisting of firing rocket artillery, often employing reverse this doctrinal analysis. Together with the positions, operations rooms, medical slope positions8: IDF customary use of reserves (likely to facilities, lighting and ventilation be trained in predictable drills, and rusty systems, kitchens and bathrooms “multiple rocket assemblies […] from lack of practice), it is unsurprising with hot water - sufficient for were placed in small, superbly that Hizballah were able partly to dozens of fighters to live camouflaged concrete bunkers, dug anticipate IDF courses of action. underground for weeks. inside thick natural groves or agricultural plantations, making The bunker was built within view of them virtually invisible to air a UN observation post and an Israeli surveillance. […] To fire the military position, respectively 100 rockets, the bunkers were opened, yards and 300 yards away. Neither the rocket assembly was the UN nor the Israeli army knew hydraulically or manually tilted from the bunker existed. “We never saw its horizontal position to the them build anything. They must required angle, and the salvo was have brought the cement in by the fired by means of a remote control spoonful,” says a UN officer.”7 box located in a nearby house. Each individual launcher was pre-targeted A United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) observation tower near the Blue Line While in Labboune OPSEC had been at an individual Israeli destination, on the border between Lebanon and Israel. (UN) assisted by Hizballah’s 2002 declaration yet enough such launchers were dug of the area as a “security zone” (in other into the ground of Southern areas “nature reserves” were similarly Lebanon so as to hit most Israeli 9 declared off-limits) the stealthy nature towns and villages” of the operation and the more homogenous nature of the population is It is probable that Hizballah’s IPB had likely to have assisted discretion. With identified likely IDF concentration areas. HUMINT reduced, the IDF will have had In this Hizballah may have been assisted to rely on IMINT, vulnerable to by previous UAV flights over northern camouflage and deception, and mostly Israel10. negated by sub-surface activity. “Curiously enough, on various UNIFIL patrol base in El-Khiam, southern occasions, the Hizbullah fired Lebanon. On 25 July 2006, the base was destroyed by an Israeli air strike, killing four Chinese-made Type-81 cluster unarmed UN military observer. (UN) munitions rockets into Israel, containing anti-armor bomblets. Bazzi records that “Even before the war, Since such ordnance is designed to the group had dozens of translators destroy military equipment and is working in its southern Beirut offices to relatively ineffective against monitor Israeli media and phone buildings or persons, the reason for intercepts.”6 An increase in its use by the Hizbullah is unclear. transmissions, in particular within a Perhaps the Hizbullah was trying to specific mobile phone cell, would have Bunkers uncovered in Southern Lebanon (IDF) retaliate against Israel’s own use of provided a combat indicator, and a cluster munitions. Another likely relatively accurate location (to 100m2), Hizballah are estimated to have had at explanation is that the Hizbullah quite apart from the usual ELINT harvest. least 40 such bunkers, of which 33 were was aiming at Israel’s armored corps Around the framework generated by the discovered and destroyed by either the massing for the land offensive in Southern Lebanon,”11

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Hizballah may also have attempted to SIGINT to monitor Israeli communications, interdict Israeli operational assets: Of all the aspects to Hizballah’s conduct and we used this information to adjust during the conflict, their SIGINT our planning”19 Although this statement “The brunt of the rocket attacks fell capability is the most worrying: may have elements of Information on civilian targets, although some Operations (IO) in it, as one veteran evidence exists of attempts to hit “Apparently using techniques learnt analyst notes, this shows an unparalleled military targets. The heavy fire on from their paymasters in Iran, they degree of communication between up Safed can be attributed to the were even able to crack the codes to three different nations, and a fourth location of the IDF’s Northern and follow the fast-changing non-state actor. Command headquarters within the frequencies of Israeli radio city’s limits. Attacks on Mount Meron communications, intercepting One crumb of comfort is that [a might have been aimed at the well- reports of the casualties they had Hezbollah commander] “acknowledged known IAF installation on its top. inflicted again and again. This that guerrillas were not able to hack […] The 2006 attacks [on Migdal enabled them to dominate the into Israeli communications around Ha’emek] could thus be interpreted media war by announcing Israeli the clock.”20 Unless there were physical as the Hizbullah’s attempt to foil fatalities first.”15 (likely temperature) complications, operations from that air base.”12 this may imply a human factor. It is unlikely that techniques alone would have allowed Hizballah to crack Bazzi also quotes “a senior Lebanese (probably US-sourced) encryption and security official” as stating that frequency hopping capabilities. Hizballah “Hezbollah also monitored cell phone must have had some SIGINT capability. calls among Israeli troops”, which has An earlier Jane’s Defence Weekly Report been corroborated in part21. When using stated: “ a digital (but not analogue) mobile telephone, the communication from the “Following the signature and telephone to the talk-through is ratification of a joint strategic encrypted, but thereafter goes down the defence co-operation accord in same, vulnerable fibre/copper as normal Some of the unexploded devices that a United November 2005, Syria and Iran have Nations Chinese battalion involved in the telephony. However, Bazzi’s statement demining of the town of Hiniyah in Lebanon, moved to consolidate their above that Hizballah was able to 2006. (UN) collaborative strategic signals intercept IDF mobile telephones before intelligence SIGINT capabilities in D-Day suggests that the interception What is quite certain is that Hizballah the region” 16 (and decryption) was done between had also prepared the likely manoeuvre telephone and tower. Reservists in corridors, digging in blast explosives to While the main SIGINT station was sited particular are likely to have been less attack the MERKAVAs’ belly armour, as in the (Syrian) Golan17, this would have intercept-aware when talking to their well as IEDs on the sides of the roads.13 been insufficient to intercept tactical families at home. level (strength) communications, Since the end of the conflict, and UNSCR suggesting that at least some traps were Hizballah also used intercept product in 1701 (which both provided for more within Lebanon. Bazzi18 uses the slightly their IO campaign, regularly pre-empting robust terms of reference, and larger odd phrase “hack into Israeli radio IDF announcements of casualties: numbers of more confrontational Blue communications”, which may imply a Helmets), it is understood that Hizballah physical interception of landline, as “When we lose a man, the fighting has made extensive preparations north of happened to IDF infantry landline in unit immediately gives the location the Litani River, out of UNFIL’s AO.14 their assault on Beirut in 1982. and the number back to headquarters. What Hezbollah did ● Hizballah demonstrated relatively However the interception was effected, was to monitor our radio and sophisticated predictive intelligence not only were Russia / Iran / Syria / immediately send it to their Al- based on historical knowledge and Hizballah able to track the frequency- Manar TV, which broadcast it almost immediate analysis, around which hops, and to break the encryption, but live, long before the official Israeli they prepared their defences: strong they were also able to have the Hebrew radio.”22 points, killing areas etc. transmissions translated into Arabic (allegedly in the basement of the Iranian Some analysts have pointed out that IDF ● Hizballah maintained excellent OPSEC Embassy in Beirut) and passed back to raiding parties etc continued to achieve in these preparations, countering the front line within a tactically surprise, and have used this to suggest both HUMINT and IMINT-based significant space of time: “We were able that Hizballah therefore did not have the collection plans.

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ability to intercept signals traffic, merely telephones. This, however, ignores the routine use of Tactical Satellite communication – nearly impossible to intercept – by direct action / strategic recce assets, a capability not available to the Field Army.

Hizballah also showed an understanding of Emission Control: according to Col Pat Lang23 much of the decrypted SIGINT was passed via buried cables (elsewhere fibre 24 optics ) to the strong points; a Soviet HARPY UAV Paris Air Show (Jastrow) (Wikipedia Commons) SOP adopted by many Arab states. (This does not explain how Hizballah’s mobile ● anti-tank teams were informed.) There is what is done is according to With the aid of Syrian & Iranian also suggestion that Hizballah had some previously agreed tactics; this makes SIGINT assets, Hizballah were able to secure communications themselves: it very difficult for the Israelis to follow, intercept, decrypt, translate disrupt communications because it and disseminate IDF tactical and “But Iran and Syria also used is simply not very important for operational transmissions within those six years to provide satellite units to coordinate with each other tactically significant time frames! or with a notional “centre”.27 communications and some of the ● Extensive use of insecure mobile world’s best infantry weapons, telephones by IDF Reservists including modern, Russian-made In addition to the SIGINT capability, live undermined IDF OPSEC / EMCON. antitank weapons and Semtex satellite TV reports were broadcast from ● plastic explosives, as well as the the seat of missile explosions inside Hizballah’s doctrinal use of mission training required to use them Israel, and television crews also command reinforced their own effectively against Israeli armor.”25 “counted them all out” as IDF units OPSEC. crossed the start line into Lebanon. As in ● Hizballah were able to use SIGINT Given that the Israelis seem to have other theatres, a free press is a double- intercept for Information Operations been unable to act similarly, there is edged sword. purposes, achieving success at the also the possibility that Hizballah had strategic level. their own encrypted communications, Hizballah also harnessed their SIGINT although there have been no reports capability at the geo-strategic level: UAV Recce of this. Blanford describes a use of despite the best efforts of the IAF, al- Iran has had UAVs since the late 1980s, “veiled speech” at the tactical level: Manar (“The Lighthouse”) never went off both indigenous and purchased air, demonstrating the importance which (including, ironically, a Chinese version “Each fighter had a code number Hizballah attach to IO – as did the IDF. of the Israeli HARPY.) It appears to have and one of the Hizbs told me that Al-Manar allowed Hizballah to project supplied several to Hizballah, with the a conversation could go like ‘42, 42, their military success against Israel IRGC having trained Hizballah ground this 83. Meet me by the house of (which had unwisely declared unfeasible controllers28. the woman who broke your heart 20 campaign aims) to the Arab World whose years ago’. ‘How would the Israelis (mostly Sunni) rulers had been initially Hizballah used their UAV assets for both be able to understand where that critical of Hizballah. Not only were reconnaissance, and to attack Israeli meant?’ he asked.”26 Hizballah first with the news – targets. They carried out several flights establishing credibility – but they were over Northern Israel in the months At the operational level, OPSEC was likely also accurate, consolidating it. The leading up to the conflict29, videoing the enhanced by effective use of mission success of an Arab force against the ground. This appears to have been command: hated Israelis, who had previously integrated within the targeting humbled the Arab armies in the 1948, 67 information: “Goksel highlights the remarkably and 73 wars, caused a popular ground dispersed nature of the Hizbollah swell across the Arab World – “The long-range Iranian-made guerrilla forces, which operate in precipitating a retrenchment of the missiles which later exploded on small units with very little criticism by the rulers, worried by the Haifa had been preceded only a few communication through to any seeming rise of Shi’i Iran. weeks ago by a pilotless Hizbollah overall chain of command. Much of drone aircraft which surveyed

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northern Israel and then returned to sufficient for day and night video sites with fake heat signatures were land in eastern Lebanon after taking reconnaissance of tactical and targeted during the course of the photographs during its flight. These operational targets, and of crude campaign.”35 pictures not only suggested a flight explosive “cruise missile” operations. and: path for Hizbollah’s rockets to Haifa; they also identified Israel’s top- TI & AWARENESS “The two-by-three-meter positions secret military air traffic control Another possible first in the Middle East consisted of a hydraulic launch pad centre in Miron.30 [How secret this was Hizballah’s possession, and use of in a lined pit. The pad could be IAF location was is debatable – Thermal Imaging (TI). Concern was raised to fire the 122-mm rockets Blanford points out that it is just raised over the requested provision of from a launcher at its center, and visible from Lebanon, clearly via then lowered and camouflaged with Google Earth, and had been Image Intensifying NVGs to Syria (that vegetation. The farmers received attacked by Hizballah in May 2006.] they should fall into Hizballah’s hands). Hizballah’s possession of TI, on ATGMs instructions by cell phone regarding sold by Russia to Syria33, both confirms the number of rockets to launch and Hizballah also flew UAVs during the the fear and makes the PNVG issue in what direction and range. They conflict, possibly for reconnaissance, irrelevant, as Russia is also likely to have were often provided with thermal possibly for BDA. In this they were less supplied them. blankets to cover the position in successful: in early September 06, an order to keep IAF aircraft from ABABIL-3 was shot down by an IAF F-16 In his First Look, Dr Cordesman reports detecting the post-shooting heat 36 from Ramat David Air Base before it Hizballah (and thus likely Iranian) signature.” could penetrate Israeli airspace. Of more possession of the Russian-made AT-14 interest was its payload: KORNET-E: ● Hizballah showed a clear understanding of both how to exploit “The Ababil-T in its standard “The AT-14 is a particularly good the thermal spectrum, and how to configuration carries a daylight example of the kind of high minimise its exploitation by the IDF. television camera as well as a technology weapon the US may face medium-sized, high-explosive in future asymmetric wars. It can be ADVANCED ANTI-TANK CAPABILITY warhead. The UAV was flying at fitted to vehicles or used as a crew- Most of the IDF armoured losses took night, indicating its sensor package portable system. It has thermal place during the attempts to exit the has been modified to include an sights for night warfare and tracking steep-sided Wadi Saluki during the final infrared system.”31 heat signatures, and the missile has stages of the campaign. Tactical semi-automatic command-to-line-of- commanders, possibly for political Hizballah also launched 4 UAVs against sight laser beam-riding guidance.”34 (casualty avoidance) reasons, failed to Israel on the nights of 07 August and 13 commit an infantry screen or adequate August 2006. The UAVs were ABABIL-Ts, Since TI usually requires a means of indirect fire support to clear the anti- recce UAVs modified for “suicide” cooling the active element of the tank teams. Hizballah had identified this missions to carry a small payload of detection system, its continued use by as a “slow-go area” and fully exploited 40kgs of explosive in place of the ISTAR Hizballah over 34 days implies either the terrain. fit. The pre-programmed, explosive- extensive pre-dumping, or a competent carrying UAVs were thus primitive logistics chain for in-place sustainment. While not strictly an intelligence issue, it cruise-missiles. is worth considering various aspects of Iranian etc possession of TI is likely to Hizballah’s anti-armour campaign. There “Since those attacks occurred when cause NATO forces less of a problem, are two issues of importance: the ceasefire was already in the since their tank engines are at the rear. offing, it is reasonable to assume TI’s continued presence in the ME, “Israeli military observers remarked that they were meant to strike Israel however, may cause the Israelis more that Hezbollah seemingly had “south of the south of Haifa,” so as problems, as the MERKAVAs have their accurate intelligence about the to fulfill Nasrallah’s vow. The UAVs (heat emitting) engine at the front - capabilities of Mark III and Mark IV were probably programmed to hit partly to increase crew survivability. and they targetted the Mark III the Tel Aviv metropolitan area selectively.”37 instead of the Zelzal rockets that Hizballah were also aware that IAF had been destroyed by Israel (or aircraft and UAVs would be searching for Such granularity shows not just good vetoed by Iran).”32 launchers, and took steps to conceal recognition training, but excellent fire their physical and thermal signatures: discipline. Of more interest is the ● While Hizballah’s UAV assets may be description of the means of attack. comparatively rudimentary, they are “...numerous dummy missile firing Hizballah seems to have adopted a

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mobile “swarming” defence: small, Human Intelligence & undercover officer for the agency’s National Clandestine Service, the nimble anti-tanks teams using the Counter-Intelligence espionage division, working on local terrain (and in some cases tunnels) Neither HUMINT nor CI are new Middle East–related cases. The to excellent effect. Hizballah were concepts; Sun Tzu devotes a chapter agent was reassigned to a less assisted by their possession of the on it, and Moses sent spies into the sensitive position about a year ago, KORNET and METIS-M ATGMs, and RPG- land of Canaan (Numbers Ch 13.) The after first coming under suspicion, 29s. Some of these missiles had tandem general assumption, however, is that officials said.”43 warheads, capable of defeating IDF states conduct organised HUMINT Stand-Off Cages and Explosive Reactive collection. The IDF is aware of On the CI side, the legendary capability Armour. It has been widely suggested Hizballah’s attempts to: of Israel’s MOSSAD (coupled with the that Israeli Intelligence – civil and sure knowledge of some remaining SLA military – was unaware of Hizballah’s “...locate and recruit Israeli Arabs— members with a burning need for possession or competence with these including Israeli Arab political revenge and a knowledge of interested weapons38. figures—for the purpose of using parties) have made Hizballah members them for intelligence missions by the discreet: However, it is the use of the missiles organization, and its attempts to that is most interesting: “the weapons establish contacts even with Jews in “Hezbollah commanders travel in old were fired in massive volleys.”39 The Israel. An example of such tactics cars without bodyguards or escorts anti-tank teams were small (3 - 6), yet was Hezbollah’s handling (up until and wear no visible insignia, Mr. many shooters seem to have engaged September 2002) of about 10 Israeli Goksel said, to keep their identities the same target simultaneously. Arabs from the villages of Beit Zarzir hidden.”44 Although there is no confirmed and Shfaram—including a reporting, given the intelligence required lieutenant colonel on active IDF Given the lack of tactical and operational for recognition of MERKAVA variants, this service and others who had formerly knowledge available to even IDF may have been an effort by Hizballah to served in the IDF and in the Israeli Strategic recce – the MAGLAN platoon – overload the IDF Defensive Aides Suite - police. […] they delivered their it appears that any Israeli HUMINT asset to beat its re-cycle time, or exhaust its Hezbollah handlers details on the in South Lebanon was unsighted, or under-armour ammunition. movements and formation of IDF neutralised by Hizballah CI – or unable forces in northern Israel, to communicate with his/her handler The result was impressive: “Forty-five information on IDF’s intelligence over 6 years: per cent of the Israel Defence Force’s gathering technologies such as (IDF’s) MBTs hit by Hizbullah ATGMs stationary cameras and cameras “Evidently they had never heard mounted on hot air balloons, and during the fighting were penetrated.”40 that an Arab soldier is supposed to operational intelligence on former No MERKAVA IVs were included in this run away after a short engagement Northern Command Chief Gabi figure, which may suggest that the IDF with the Israelis,” said Gad. Ashkenazi. Furthermore, some of DAS was adequate: those involved were asked to deliver “We expected a tent and three to Lebanon maps, unique “An Israeli-invented radar defence Kalashnikovs — that was the communication devices used by the shield codenamed Flying Jacket and intelligence we were given. Instead, IDF, etc.”42 costing £200,000 was installed on we found a hydraulic steel door only four tanks. None of them was There is also a suggestion that Hizballah leading to a well-equipped network struck by anti-tank missiles.”41 may have run a penetration agent within of tunnels.”45 [“four tanks” may be a the FBI – who was then re-assigned to mistranslation for (MERKAVA) CIA clandestine operations: The two raids by Israeli SOF into tank IVs.] Baalbek, the first seeking Hassan “A U.S. official familiar with the Nasrallah, and the second46 Sh ● Hizballah’s Recognition of IDF case said Tuesday that the Muhammad Yazbik (a senior Hizballah IFVs was excellent, to the extent of government’s investigation has figure) were both “dry holes”. Unless being able to distinguish between uncovered no evidence so far that queued by SIGINT47, this suggests MERKAVA III and MERKAVA IV. the agent, who was employed by the information from a deep asset, and the CIA until last week, had failure implies that the Israeli HUMINT ● Hizballah may be aware of DAS compromised any undercover asset has been identified, and either limitations and attempt to overload operations or passed along sensitive turned or supplied disinformation – a the system’s recycle time / exhaust intelligence information to Hizbullah Counter-Intelligence coup: its ammunition leaving it vulnerable. operatives. After joining the CIA in June 2003, the agent was an “On Aug. 2, Israeli commandos

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targeted the Iranian-funded, photocell detonator — like the Hizbullah-run Dar al-Hikma Hospital. beam that opens an automatic The commando assault and Israeli door.”50 strikes throughout the region around the ancient town killed 16 people, It is, however, at the operational level according to Lebanese police. that there is more concern, both Baalbek residents said four people defensively, and offensively: were taken away and none were Hizballah fighters.”48 “Israeli EW [electronic warfare] and systems were unable to jam the “The commandos, dropped with two systems at the Iranian Embassy in Hummer vehicles by helicopter, were Beirut, they proved unable to jam engaged in a firefight in which three Hezbollah’s command and control Hizballah were killed, before they links from Lebanon to Iranian were evacuated by helicopter. facilities in Syria.”51 The Navy rocket ship Hanit after its rehabilitation and return to continuous “DEBKAfile’s military sources report The IDF-linked DEBKAfile was even operations this week at the Navy Ashdod base. the Israeli commando raid probably starker, writing that: “In combat against (IDF) targeted newly filled weapons Hizballah, both [complementary US and than expected, and together with stores. Also located at Bodai is the Israeli devices and methods] were not duplication, prevented IDF disruption office of senior Hizballah official only found wanting, but had been of C2 by kinetic of EW means. Sheikh Mohammed Yazbek, where actively neutralized, so that none the raiders apparently hoped to find performed the functions for which they ● Hizballah demonstrated a reasonable information leading to the two were designed.”52 understanding of IDF ECM, and were kidnapped Israeli soldiers Ehud able to hit the INS’s best ship Goldwasser and Eldad Regev.”49 Hizballah (possibly with IRGC assistance) successfully. was able to hit the INS HANIT with a C- ● Hizballah demonstrated an enduring, 802 SILKWORM. IDF-linked sources have Conclusion geo-strategic HUMINT capability and sought to play down ECM problems, Hizballah showed excellent morale, a Counter-Intelligence mentality and suggesting that HANIT’s crew had sound intelligence & counter- capability. forgotten to turn on their BARAK ECM, intelligence, competent tactics (albeit in allowing the SILKWORM to hit. While a highly specific, carefully prepared human error is always possible (and environment), mission command, good Israeli Intelligence’s lack of knowledge of logistics, sound planning and political / Hizballah’s arsenal might have added to military integration, good training, the sense of complacency) it seems excellent civil military affairs, and unlikely. Other reports suggest: creative (and enduring) IO. This was not the performance of the historical Arab “Iranian technicians and Iranian Army, with political commanders, poor supplied equipment allowed morale and lack of initiative, but the Hizbullah to jam the actions of a disciplined, competent IDF destroy Hizbollah post (IDF) countermeasures on the Israeli ship, cadre. allowing the upgraded Iranian Electronic Warfare (EW) Silkworm missile to severely damage It is unlikely that all Hizballah’s The failure of the IDF’s EW campaign, it.”53 capability at the time was demonstrated. and the great strides made by Hizballah Iran (and Syria) are reported to have re- (doubtless with extensive Iranian and The SILKWORM struck the HANIT just supplied Hizballah with more modern Syria backing) is another aspect of great above the waterline, but failed to weaponry since then54. This is likely to concern. Hizballah showed the usual initiate, possibly because the ship was concentrate on the anti-air campaign – ability to react to IDF tactical ECM: within the missile’s arming range. Given in 2006 Hizballah managed to down a the presence of SILKWORMs in the CH-54 heavy lift helicopter using an “Then Hezbollah used radio Persian Gulf, especially on Larak Island ATGM, but had little success against IAF detonators, which the Israelis also in the Straits of Hormuz, such counter- strategic aircraft destroying Hizballah defeated, and then cellphone ECM is a worrying development. long-range missiles or Lebanese detonators, and then a double infrastructure. system of cellphones, and then a ● Hizballah’s EW hardening was better Hizballah had six years to plan, prepare

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Newsday 18 Sep 06 and rehearse for an operation in a invincibility formerly surrounding the http://www.newsday.com/news/nationwo relatively small area, with strategic IDF; efforts to refurbish this, such as the rld/world/ny- support of Iran and Syria, and a broadly air-strike on Dayr al-Zawr, have been wocode184896831sep18,0,3091818.story supportive population. They faced a unsuccessful. ?coll=ny-worldnews-print casualty-averse enemy, using armour in 7 Blanford, N After The War, Hizbullah complex terrain. Nevertheless, Hizballah While HM Forces remain committed to Op Reevaluates Christian Science Monitor 25 was able to contain Israel through a well HERRICK, they will remain within striking Sep 06 (http://www.csmonitor.com/2006 co-ordinated defence including many distance of Iran, and its proxies. /0925/p07s02-wome.html) cf also sophisticated aspects, and using assets Although HMF retain a technological http://www.time.com/time/world unknown to Israel. edge, the gap has narrowed significantly, /article/0,8599,1604529,00.html and and many of the areas in which HMF http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0511/p 01s02-wome.html believed themselves to be supreme, they find their absolute capability 8 Blanford, N personal communication 19 compromised. Should Iran and the UK Jan 08 find themselves in direct or proxy 9 Rubin, U The Rocket Campaign against conflict, many of the UK’s casualty Israel op cit reducing advantages are likely to be 10 Cook, Jonathan The Second Lebanon War, neutralised. A Year Later in Counterpunch dated 16 Aug 07 (http://www.counterpunch.org/cook0816 A south Beirut suburb ruined in the recent 2007.html) conflict between Israel and Hizbollah 1 Such as Cordesman, A Preliminary 11 Rubin, U The Rocket Campaign against “Lessons” of the Israeli-Hezbollah War, Israel during the 2006 Lebanon War (http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/06 While the relationship between Hizballah Mideast Security and Policy Studies No. 0911_isr_hez_lessons.pdf) and McGregor and Iran is more complex than client – 71, Jun 07 G Hezbollah’s tactics and capabilities in http://www.biu.ac.il/Besa/MSPS71.pdf patron (and Hizballah is far from being Southern Lebanon Jamestown Foundation merely a proxy of Iran) the close Terrorism Focus 01 Aug 06 12 Rubin, U The Rocket Campaign against relationship is likely to mean passage of (http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/ne Israel op cit tactics, training and information will ws/article.php?articleid=2370089) 13 Erlanger, S and Opel, R.A Disciplined flow both ways. 2 Seymour Hersch claims Hezbollah Surprises Israel op cit; Blanford (http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2006 N personal communication 19 Jan 08 Hizballah capability has already made /08/21/060821fa_fact) that the ex-pilot the IDF modify its operational profile Gen Halutz planned to emulate the aerial 14 Geopolitical Diary: The Winograd Report bombardment campaign on Serbia that and Olmert’s Fate STRATFOR Morning greatly – the use of piloted close air Intelligence Brief 30 Apr 07 support and rotary aircraft was notably NATO used to open up Kosovo unopposed. This was possible in Serbia due to the (http://www.stratfor.com/products/premi less than one might have expected, due homogenous ethnicity, and strong central um/read_article.php?id=287873 ) to IDF assessment of Hizballah’s control of armed force; there are 18 sects 15 Mahnaimi U, Humbling of the supertroops possession of advanced SAMs; IDF naval / ethnicities in Lebanon, many of which op cit assets stood off much further from land have militia. There was also a credible than in previous conflicts. ground element ready to force entry to 16 Iran and Syria advance SIGINT co- Kosovo, if the air campaign had failed. operation Jane’s Defence Weekly 13 Jul 06 (http://jdw.janes.com) It is likely that Iran, and its regional 3 Vide Mahnaimi, Uzi Humbling of the clients and subordinates, will have supertroops shatters Israeli army morale 17 Schiff, Z Hezbollah received intel from access to the same capacity to degrade Sunday Times 27 August 2006 Russian-Syrian listening post during war and defeat the high-technology (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/ Haaretz 03 Oct 06 world/article620874.ece) (http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/ capability on which much of the West’s 769512.html) (and Allied) “edge” is predicated. 4 Blanford, N Hizbullah-Israeli border exchanges intensify Jane’s Intelligence 18 Bazzi M, Hezbollah cracked the code op cit On the regional level, Hizballah’s Review – 01 Mar 05 19 Bazzi M, Hezbollah cracked the code op cit capability has increased the already 5 Erlanger, S and Opel, R.A Disciplined 20 Bazzi M, Hezbollah cracked the code op cit considerable concern over Iran felt by Hezbollah Surprises Israel with its Sunni Arab rulers, epitomised by the Training, Tactics and Weapons New York 21 R Sale, private communication 29 Aug 06 Times 07 Aug 06 evocation of a “Shi’a Crescent” by King 22 Mahnaimi U, Humbling of the supertroops

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er_tyrannis/2006/09/an_interesting_. 35 Moores, B A military assessment of the 45 Mahnaimi U, Humbling of the supertroops html Lebanon Conflict Winds of Change 24 Aug op cit 06 24 Debka-Net-Weekly 266 23 Aug 06 (http://www.windsofchange.net/archives/ 46 The second raid was after the ceasefire, 008970.php) and thus was nominally to interdict 25 Erlanger, S and Opel, R.A Disciplined Hizballah weapons re-supply. However, Hezbollah Surprises Israel op cit 36 Schiff, Z How the IDF blew chance to the rank of one of the casualties (Lt Col), 26 Blanford, N personal communication 19 destroy short-range rockets Haaretz 05 Sep the presence of two HMMWVs, and the Jan 07 06 fact that the IDF SOF broke cover to (http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/ engage in a lengthy gun-battle suggests a 27 Goksel, T Hizbollah’s lack of structure its 757743.html) more offensive purpose. strength Asia Times, 10 Aug 06 37 AN Other private communication 14 Sep 47 Given the COMSEC Hizballah otherwise 28 Sale, R private communication 13 Sep 06 06 showed, this is moot. If the queue was SIGINT, given the two failures, this may 29 Hezbollah Mirsad-1 UAV Penetrates Israeli 38 Sale, R private communication 13 Sep 06 Air Defenses Defense Industry Daily 20 have been a Hizballah deception Apr 05 39 Sale, R private communication 13 Sep 06; operation. http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/hez Franke, S private communication 12 Sep 48 Greenberg, H IDF officer killed in Baalbek bollah-mirsad1-uav-penetrates-israeli-air- 06 operation 20 Aug 06 Ynet News defenses-0386/ 40 Israeli armour fails to protect MBTs from (http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,73 30 “zx8” Hizbollah disables Israel’s top-secret ATGMs Jane’s Defence Weekly 25 Aug 06 40,L-3292974,00.html) military air traffic control centre using (http://jdw.janes.com) 49 An Israeli special operations officer was drone aircraft. 08 Aug 06 41 Mahnaimi U, Humbling of the supertroops killed, two were injured – one seriously – (http://www.truthbox.org/index.php?opti op cit in a pre-dawn commando raid at Bodai, on=com_content&task=view&id=55&Itemi 30km NW of Baalbek Debkafile 19 Aug 06 d=2) 42 Intelligence and Terrorism Information http://www.debka.com/ Center at the Center for Special Studies 31 La Franchi, P Iranian-made Ababil-T Hezbollah’s use of Israeli Arabs as a tool 50 Erlanger, S and Opel, R.A Disciplined Hezbollah UAV shot down by Israeli fighter for furthering its efforts to increase anti- Hezbollah Surprises Israel op cit in Lebanon crisis Flight International 15 Israeli terrorism and gather intelligence on Aug 06 51 Athanasiadis, I How hi-tech Hezbollah Israel Special Information Bulletin August called the shots Asia Times 09 Sep 06 http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/200 2004 6/08/15/208400/iranian-made-ababil-t- (http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_E http://www.intelligence.org.il/eng/sib/8_ ast/HI09Ak01.html) hezbollah-uav-shot-down-by-israeli-fighte 04/hezb.htm r-in-lebanon.html 52 DEBKA-Net-Weekly 266 11 Aug 06 43 Isikoff, M & Hosenball, M A Hizbullah 32 Rubin, U The Rocket Campaign against Mole? Case against CIA spy shocks 53 Sale, R private communication 29 Aug 06 Israel op cit counterintelligence community. Newsweek 54 Blanford, N Hizballah's reaction depends 33 Simon, S private communication 13 Jan 13 Nov 07 (http://newsweek.com/id/70309) on its constituency Bitterlemons 07 http://www.bitterlemons- 34 Cordesman, A Preliminary “Lessons” op cit 44 Erlanger, S and Opel, R.A Disciplined international.org/inside.php?id=812 11 Hezbollah Surprises Israel op cit Oct 07 

The Armour forces assemble in the field before entering combat in Lebanon (IDF)

105 BAR Thoughts

echelons were able to recover and ambush by police mutineers on 20 June Recovering the identify bodies and inter them. It was 1967 were temporarily abandoned. All not a matter for front line troops. those soldiers were buried in Silent Dead Valley Cemetery in Aden. There is also a different emotion – bodies from NI were returned to Great John Wilson Britain discreetly, there were no repatriation ceremonies, no respectful crowds lining the route at Wootton On Radio 4 on 24 November 2009, Basset, no Elizabeth Cross. There were no Michael Buerk (The Choice) talked to websites to carry the eulogies for the Cathy O’Dowd about the choice she had dead by their comrades. The military to make when she saw a dying climber HMS Manchester’s Commanding Officer lays a funerals were quiet traditional on Everest. O’Dowd encountered the wreath at the San Carlos Cemetery (RN) ceremonies. It would be wrong to woman, whom she had met briefly a few imagine that they were ‘hole in the days before, just below the summit. She corner’ affairs – it was how it was done was dying, she begged not to be left and accorded with the wishes of the alone, although the repetition of these families. What we see now is the public words with just two other phrases – why display of grief post-Diana style. And are you doing this to me and I am an part of that more public open American showed that she was, in bereavement is a stronger emotion for practice, incoherent – they could have the recovery of bodies. no conversation with her. There was no question of carrying her off the mountain – she could not support her weight at all. They could give her no medical assistance and they were themselves becoming hypothermic. They eventually left her and Cathy O’Dowd returned to her base camp.

In my view there was no other possible course of action. Yet, clearly, it still Pte Nicholas Wilson, 19, from Preston, (Queen’s The Radfan Campaign A mine searching team Lancashire Regiment) examines one of the from the Assault Pioneer Platoon of the 1st troubles her, although she knew then graves at Basrah. His great-grandfather died in and knows now that it was the right Battalion, The Royal Sussex Regiment in an up Iraq during the First World War while serving country track in the South Arabian Federation. thing to do. with the predecessors of the Queen’s Lancashire (IWM) Regiment, the Loyal North Lancashire Regiment, and is believed buried either in this cemetery or There have been several instances in a similar cemetery at Nasiriyah. recent years when soldiers have been killed whilst recovering the bodies of In subsequent campaigns the nature of soldiers killed in action. There is the conflict permitted the relatively easy understandably huge emotional recovery of bodies although there were significance in recovering the bodies of exceptions. It is only since the Falklands those who have fallen. It is different War that bodies have been repatriated to today from the past. In the First War the UK – and not all were, hence the sheer scale of the task prevented any cemetery at San Carlos Bay. In Aden, such attempts and dulled the Malaya, Cyprus et al bodies were buried The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders searching suspects in Aden in 1967. (IWM) sensitivities. In the Second War the more in military cemeteries in theatre. Indeed, mobile nature of battle permitted the in Aden the bodies of some of the 22 There is, too, the huge worry that bodies recovery of bodies: from 1942 onwards soldiers of the RCT and Royal that cannot be recovered will be defiled we were on the offensive and follow on Northumberland Fusiliers killed in an by the enemy. It is a genuine concern:

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Captain RC Edwards and Trooper J Warburton from 22 SAS were killed in an action in the Radfan in May 1964, the patrol was unable to recover the bodies and fought fiercely just to extract themselves. The tribesmen decapitated the dead and displayed their heads on poles in a town in South Yemen. Before the Second War on the North West Frontier, John Mastersi tells of the savage death and mutilation of a British officer, skinned and castrated alive. The local British commander ordered ‘no prisoners’, and when, to his fury, a wounded tribesman was taken, he ordered that the man should be pegged out, face up in the sun. His body was left where the officer’s skin had been found.

No one of us doubts the emotional need to recover the body of a dead comrade. And we can understand the deep distress of the unit should a body be left. We understand, too, the effect it will have on the family. Not just to lose their loved one, but not to be able to mourn fully – and having to live with the knowledge that his body is out there somewhere. And yet ... is it right to lose another life to recover a body? The soldier is dead we cannot bring him back, and his body is not him; in Cathy O’Dowd’s words it is a suit-case, the Shaibah War Memorial - On 4 September 2003, British troops from 19 Mechanised Brigade began work spirit, the man has gone. to restore a Commonwealth War Graves Commission cemetery in Basrah, which had suffered years of neglect and deliberate desecration under Saddam Hussein's regime. Hundreds of headstones have been Of course things are not always so clear destroyed and many others damaged. The soldiers, including troops from the 1st Battalion The Queen's cut. Is he dead? Can we be sure he is Lancashire Regiment, based only a few hundred yards away, began the task of salvaging the surviving dead? If we are not sure then it is a headstones for safe storage until the Commonwealth War Graves Commission can undertake a comprehensive reconstruction. rescue not a recovery, and we expect our people to do their utmost to rescue the torso and head of one soldier – his possibly defiled by others. wounded. There are plenty of occasions face unmarked. Of the second soldier, over the last 6 years when soldiers have we found nothing. In the immediate So, I leave the question unanswered. risked and given their lives to rescue aftermath of the attack we could search, I say only that circumstances may not their comrades – the Army has shown but not freely. Once the area was permit the immediate recovery of the that is a true fighting force and a secured, we could search systematically. body. The risk may be too high and we courageous force time and time again. There was nothing, he had been laying should not judge those who have to take on the buried IED (estimated at 100kgs). that decision to leave him temporarily. When it is the recovery of the dead, The big difference was that we could All situations are different and it is should we not apply a higher standard of eventually secure the area – this is not better to think about these things and risk? All effort short of likely further always possible in Afghanistan. discuss them in advance. death? I do not have an answer; I do Nevertheless it was a bad feeling to know the empty feeling of leaving a come away, having failed to find any of Cathy O’Dowd discovered that there were soldier behind. The circumstances were his body. Not as bad as knowing that he some who believed that she could have different. The IED killed two soldiers and was out there somewhere and that we done more: but they are never able to say wounded slightly others. I found the were leaving him to be found and what it is that I should have done.? 

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that the armed forces were for him, a ‘Adoo’ (ie enemy) supply line form the natural soldier and a natural leader who Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen A Fortunate had no time for notions that leadership (PDRY) was secured on 14 October. Cross was a skill that could be taught: you border raids by SOAF Hunters had struck either had it or you didn’t and there was at PFLOAG command elements. The Soldier nothing further to be said on the matter. Iranians were now able to exploit to the Social background had absolutely west. PDRY troops withdrew across the David Benest nothing to do with it either. Not border. The main munitions stores of the surprisingly, he gained a reputation as Sherishitti caves were cleared in late an ‘angry young man’ prepared to speak October. The village of Dhalqut was his mind regardless of the consequences. retaken on 1 December. A link up was Fortunately, his leadership ability was made on the Darra Ridge on 2 December. recognised for its true worth and he SON had been cleverly positioned to commanded both 1st RHA and 24 ensure logistic support was well forward. Infantry Brigade, which deployed to Civil development was taking place Northern Ireland in 1972. throughout as soon as the Adoo were cleared, including the drilling of 50 wells As Commander SAF (CSAF) Perkins was and laying of 250 km of roads. Sultan directly responsible for all aspects of Qaboos was thus able to declare the 10 military decision making in SAF, year insurgency over on 11 December reporting to his Commander-in-Chief, 1975. Dhofar was now secure for Sultan Qaboos and sitting as a member development. of the National Development Council (NDC). Below him were just two Perkins views on leadership3 bear out the brigadiers, his deputy, Colin Maxwell and simplicity of his operational art, reducing John Akehurst, in command of the the morass of ‘qualities’ required of Dhofar Brigade. An RAF Group Captain leaders to just three: moral and physical Ken Perkins (Courtesy of The Sun) commanded five operational squadrons of courage; the ability to communicate; and eight different types of aircraft and a vision of the end state. He might have It is not often that tributes to the dead Royal Navy Captain operated six patrol added that leadership of a multi-national appear in BAR but Major General craft. Command of a force of 14,1001 was force in Dhofar was as much about (retired) Ken Perkins, who died on 23 exercised from his headquarters in persuasion as direction. Most telling was October 2009, aged 83, is one of those Muscat. It was a multi-national his clarity of thought: ‘What a exceptions. I was fortunate to have command, comprising: British seconded commander needs is a clear notion of his interviewed him in 2007 at the Defence and contract officers and NCOs; a US own intentions, reliable communications Academy about his time in command of trained Iranian infantry brigade; a and good subordinates. [In Brigadier the Sultan’s Armed Forces (SAF) in Oman. Special Forces battalion and engineers John Akehurst] I certainly had the latter.’4 He arrived in a somewhat battered car from Jordan; Baluchi mercenaries; both He typically spent no more than a few and I asked him whether he needed a Dhofar jebeli Firqats and Omanis; and by hours a week at his desk. Towards the hand. He stared back at me and said, no means least, the SAS in the guise of end of the campaign he ordered a ‘Young man, I cycled 15 miles yesterday!’ ‘BATTs’. India, Egypt and Pakistan complete change in plan without issuing We sat in the sun on the veranda at provided medics and Saudi Arabia lent a a single piece of paper. JSCSC on what was the last day of the gunner colonel. staff course. To his delight, the Red He summarised the reasons for success: Arrows suddenly appeared overhead and Ken had jumped at the opportunity to identification of the threat, the isolation we had a grandstand view. He had command such a force, reflecting upon of that threat from the civil population, himself been a pilot, flying Beavers in the alternative in British Army of the its neutralisation and then how to Malaya during the Emergency and also Rhine with ‘its peacetime, same as last negotiate the enemy to come over to the spotting for the artillery from the air in year exercises on the North German Plain Government side. The impossibility of the Korean War. In Dhofar he was known [as] hardly a preparation for war’.2 The doctrinaire ‘solutions’ such as simply to take the controls whenever he could counterinsurgency against the Marxist copying the civilian resettlement as he flew around his command. Peoples Front for the Liberation of the programme so successfully enacted in Occupied Gulf States (PFLOAG) had Malaya, were of no use. Given the Ken was born in Sussex in what were reached a critical phase in Perkins’ time Dhofari nomadic culture and complete modest surroundings, the only son of a of command. Fortune was with Perkins. dependence upon the cattle economy, gardener. It was clear from the outset The CAPSTAN feature overlooking the the provision of Government centres

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where medical and veterinary treatment supply chain was essential and hence the was freely available was decisive in HAMMER, HORNBEAM, DAMAVAND and 1 International Institute for Strategic winning ‘hearts and minds’. Development SIMBA ‘lines’. ‘Better communications, Studies, ‘The Military Balance1975-6’ in the form of roads, wells, cattle mobility and logistics and superior 2 Perkins, Ken, ‘A Fortunate Soldier’, troughs, a mosque and education quickly firepower’5 won the day. But most Brasseys, London, 1988, pp 119 - followed – all this under the direction of importantly, counterinsurgency warfare 139 the Wali of Dhofar, not some non- was, is, and always will be, about 3 Interview with author, Defence governmental organisation imported politics and the development of a cross Academy, 19 July 2007 from afar. Psychological warfare was also government strategy, not armed forces 4 Perkins correspondence with author 9 key, the surrendered enemy recruited alone. February 2009  into the Firqat as local intelligence advisers under SAS guidance. It was also Well done Ken! realised that interdiction of the adoo

Radio Masts over Sangin (Arabella Dorman)

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slung a Chinook. They fire the same engaged every target fired by Light Gun ammo as AS 90 – it is the same barrel. during the war without moving. FH 70 in a FOB The L15 HE round is particularly good with a lethality of about 10 times the US And, FH 70 has a burst fire capability; it equivalent (M107 HE round). has a flick rammer. Some years ago I had John Wilson The Light Gun has a range of 17,500m. 30 rounds left at the end of the firing So, FH 70 has a 40% increase in range camp – we were about to convert to over Light Gun – but: light gun for an emergency tour and I FH 70 is a towed 155mm gun/howitzer knew that I would not see those rounds weighting about 9,000kg. It has a range Area covered by Light Gun fire: again if we did not fire them. So, rather of 24,700m and has a small auxiliary 962 sq km. than blasting off we did a small trial. engine (1700cc, VW Beetle petrol One gun was nominated, all ammo was engine) which will move it around the Area covered by FH 70 fire 1916 sq km. prepared and I ordered “One Gun, 30 gun position without needing its gun- rounds continuous fire”. The detachment tractor. It was in service with the British In both cases I am ignoring the stumbled over the first couple of rounds Army from about 1980 to 1992, and with minimum range. but then got into the swing of it. They the TA until 1999. re-laid between rounds and achieved a So, for a 40% increase in range FH 70 smooth rate of a round every 4 seconds. We have 10 in storage according to the doubles the coverage. A pair of FH 70s can cheerfully put 30 DASA website. And since we bother to rounds of 155mm HE onto the target in keep them at all, we trust that they are 137 (Java) Bty found itself at Fitzroy at one minute – 1320kg of ammo. in good condition. The barrel wear will the end of Op Corporate (Falklands). An Just a thought.?  be negligible. And they can be under- FH 70 firing from Fitzroy could have

FH 70 on Trial Firings Sardinia.

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overnight someone had constructed a in NI and only a handful were there in brick wall with firing ports in front of the 1970s when so many of these myths How Myths Are the caravan. Ten minutes later shots were made. So we need to nail them fired from the firing ports and from when they appear. PIRA were not daft – two trenches beside the main road. remember the bleak statistics: Made ‘All hell broke out. Six Brownings on the Saracens, the Ferrets and the ● The Army killed 301 people of whom troop leader’s Saladin [heavy just 121 were republican terrorists. John Wilson armoured car]were firing, plus the ● Republican terrorists killed 694 three GPMGs. Sgt H tried to grip the soldiers (Loyalists killed 6). fire discipline but they couldn’t hear On page 421 of The Making of the British him; I watched transfixed at the ● Republican terrorists killed 162 other Army by Allan Mallinson (reviewed in impact of this weight of fire on a republican terrorists. this issue on p.?)he states that ‘In hurriedly constructed brick wall. February 1972 a staff-serjeant platoon Within seconds it was gone and the In other words they killed more of their commander of the King’s Own Royal poor sods who had taken us on’. own than the Army did, and they killed Border Regiment (KORBR) was killed in an us at nearly 6 times the rate that we exchange of fire with an IRA active service killed them. Curiously the figures reflect unit (ASU) near Strabane’ He then goes well on the Army: we understood the on to describe the subsequent operation nature of the campaign and were - ‘Soon afterwards the battalion received prepared to accept the casualties in intelligence that the ASU was based in a order to protect the people – ie what farmhouse close by and the KORBR’s General McChrystal demands of ISAF now. commanding officer ...... ordered one of Of course our force protection got better his platoons to set up an OP ready to take – as did our campaign design and we offensive action if the ASU showed fought PIRA to a stand-still. themselves’. 2nd Lieutenant David Brough, 1st Battalion, The Parachute Regiment and Lance Corporal Bernard Consider again the vignette above. Was He quotes from the platoon commander’s Winter of the 2nd Battalion, The Queen’s it a pub or a farm house – not usually Regiment, patrol a Belfast street with a Saracen diary, I paraphrase: armoured personnel carrier. (IWM) too difficult to distinguish between them. Why would PIRA advertise their ● 2 Feb – receive orders for OP task. Allan Mallinson comments, “At least 4 of ambush point by building a brick wall – the seven-man ASU had been killed.” bearing in mind that it was compromised ● 6 Feb – Pl comd plus two snipers and The staff-serjeant was Colour Sergeant by the firing on 6th Feb. PIRA could not a GPMG dropped off covertly to set Boardley and he was killed at a VCP in have been unaware of the AFVs – that up OP. Strabane on 1 Feb 1973, not 1972. There excellent (in its day) family of vehicles ● 7 Feb – Deception plan unfolds – is no record of any PIRA gunmen killed made a most distinctive road/engine army helicopter wakes up ASU, on 8 February 1973 in the Strabane area, noise that carried for miles – and those platoon plus 3 Saracens (APC) and or around that date – certainly not 4. AFVs had been present the day before, so two Ferrets (Armoured Car) in There were only two occasions when why provoke an open engagement which position to North; two men appear at PIRA lost 4 men or more in one go – so they could not hope to win? By 1973 the door of a lone house and it would have been a memorable event; PIRA experience was quite good enough adjacent caravan – unarmed; later and in keeping with PIRA’s usual stance to know that a single brick wall was one shot fired – platoon returns fire there would have been a strident never going to survive multiple GPMG then withdraws as arranged. campaign on ‘shoot to kill’ lines. Also in and MMG fire. It is common practice in accordance with PIRA practice the ● 7 Feb - Mid-day – ‘...a car arrived on deaths would have been acknowledged. the forecourt of the lone building – PIRA considered itself as an army – and was it a pub? Two men got out conducted some of the common military carrying rifles. I nodded assent: two practices, which includes acknowledging shots, both men went to ground, but casualties. There is only one PIRA death it was not clear if they had been hit. that has been unacknowledged because That’s what the GPMG was for. Long of the propaganda value and the threat killing burst’. Move to emergency RV. of being sued and the political storm ● 8 Feb – Return with platoon – prevents me from naming that person. There are few serving soldiers who were A Ferret of A Sqn 1RTR overlooking the border at Pettigo, Northern Ireland, 1973 (Tank Museum)

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Ireland to build a brick wall to protect caravans (often found as accommodation at Irish farmhouses) from the prevailing wind and that might be a more likely explanation for the wall. It is not usual terrorist practice to mount an ambush from their base.

Fortunately we have Lost Lives (McKittrick, Kelters, Feeney and Thornton,Mainstream; Revised 2001; Hbk; £30; pp 1648; ISBN: 1 84018 504X) as a source of impeccable integrity. It is a painstaking, non-judgmental record of every ‘Troubles’ related death in NI since 1966. I say again to all regimental secretaries, army libraries and to any MOD branch with an interest in NI – buy a copy for reference. Needless to say, there is no record in Lost Lives of these killings at Strabane in 1973, nor is there a record on Republican/Sinn Fein Saladin at Bovington (Tank Museum) websites. No, PIRA did not spirit bodies away across the border to secret burials. possible as a probable or even a This vignette appears at a good Yes, some terrorists were taken to certainty. It is just something we should time: we need to recognise the myth hospitals in RoI but there were never be aware of – it is part of our military phenomenon because it interferes with unacknowledged funerals. So, how could education to know that many military our intelligence assessment and more we know that “At least 4 of the seven- stories are myths. You will have met NI dangerously it colours behaviour. man ASU had been killed “, or that there warriors who have regaled you with Don’t believe the stories without were 7 of them? stories of terrorists killed. Indeed, from good evidence – they must not be those I speak to we must have killed not allowed to set the standard.  It is a recurring sin of all fighters to 121 terrorists but hundred times that to exaggerate hits – or at least claim a match witness to death.

A Ferret scout car of the 17/21 Lancers at a vehicle check point in Northern Ireland, 1970 – possibly Strabane? (Tank Museum)

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Numerous cuts have probably reduced The tempo for the Army since 2003 is the TA to a dangerously small component not what was planned for, and the What future for of Defence. It may have gone below drawdown in Iraq has not given the critical mass, too small to become a real expected breathing space. The argument element in the event of the need for had probably been won at the MOD that the Territorial mass mobilisation. Much of the country the army is too small at the moment, has no local TA; like the rural Post Office, and, of course, the credit crunch has put Army Post the the local TA Drill Hall has become a thing paid to any increase for the Regular of the past. The whole idea of the Army. However, this is where the TA Territorial Army is that it is local. could be used: to buy time and space for Centenary the Regular Army. (The role of the TA Infantry in the second decade of the

21st Century) Members of 51st Highland Regiment (Territorial Army) based in Perth Scotland, are out in Kabul, Afghanistan, until March 2003. The Patriot volunteer, fighting for his country and his rights, makes Force Lay Down the most reliable soldier on earth. Firstly, the lay down of the TA needs to Lt-Gen ‘Stonewall’ Jackson1862 be looked at and their roles and make up within the regional brigades. For example, my battalion – 3 PWRR - Major Gerry Long TA Poster 1938 (NAM) 3 PWRR stretches from Dover to Portsmouth and The future of the TA, a possible from Canterbury to Farnham. Although Introduction ‘Renaissance’ there is a garrison administration in The future for the Territorial Army is Since the ‘Report on the Strategic Review Aldershot, the Farnham company uncertain. There is little understanding of Reserves 2009’ is dead, what is the administration is done from Canterbury, or vision for the reserve forces as a way ahead for the ‘Weekend Warrior’? The which suggests that the footprint of whole or of those who make up the TA, part-time volunteer solder is as old as units within the TA should be examined. as could be seen by various spokes the Army itself (even the Spartans had a Major units should be linked together persons wheeled out during the current day job), but its present form is a legacy geographically, not as in the 3 PWRR fiasco with regards to cuts in the TA of WW2 and more recently the Cold War, case, which is simply two battalion areas budget who seemed not to understand and reshaped again since then. amalgamated into one, straddling 2 why cutting TA training would affect the separate brigades. This is a wasteful capability of the TA and morale. There is no doubt that Op TELIC 1 legacy that we cannot afford. The changed the TA, and changed it for the Portsmouth PWRR company and the Post SDR better. Gone is the drinking club culture; Farnham PWRR company could combine There is no doubt that the TA provides a and through the Regional Training with the Reading company of the Rifles substantial force for relatively little Centres and the DIE, the standard of the with a HQ element at Aldershot. There is money, if closing the TA down for 6 TA soldier has never been so high. This is no need to lose battalions; some units months saves only £20 million, then in linked to real operational experience; but could be re-roled within a tighter the big scheme of things the TA is small still divide remains. The Regular Army administrative organisation. fry in the Defence Budget. At an has very little understanding of the TA; established strength of 38,500 spread and this showed when it came to cutting Integral (Reserve) Coy Concept over 341 units the TA has shrunk back the budget. What is the easiest thing to (I(R)CC) from its ‘Hendy Days’ of the Cold War. cut? the TA. The reconfiguring of the force lay down

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RMLY Soldiers of the TA Training on Challenger 2 (Stuart Bingham) of the TA could be linked to an based around the regular unit’s training The important thing is to go through the alternative ORBAT for the TA, that is to cycle so the TA Coy would deploy for 2 cycle as a unit and not as an individual, say: fully integrating the TA with the weeks with the regular host, this of except perhaps for some officers. Regular Army. For argument sake we will course would cut down the number of call this the Integral (Reserve) Coy posts for TA officers over the rank of Unit Mobilisation Concept (I(R)CC) this would save much Major, but the TA Coy would find it easier Finally, if we stick to the present money, once again e.g. using A Coy 3 to mould with the regular counterparts formation of the TA rather than go down PWRR as an example it would become and make the mobilisation and the I(R)CC route, currently mobilisation the 4th Rifle Coy of the whichever operational process a lot more is done on an ad hoc bases through battalion was in Aldershot, presently the streamlined and efficient. And the individuals and or small cohorts going to Coldstream Guards (or it could be just as welfare support would be there from the serve (sometimes) with sister units or easily be 1 Royal Anglian in Pirbright), start. This will also do away with the purely to fill gaps where needed. A more the TA centre could be situated within unknown quality that the regulars organised programmed mobilisation the battalion lines it could be currently experience, instead the TA making better use of the TA is an administered by the regular unit, and element is known. obvious solution. Those deploying would when the regular unit is deployed the TA have a proper welfare team to support Coy is mobilised to bring the regular Readiness Cycle them and a formal decompression that battalion up to strength. Secondly, a proper readiness cycle of could be monitored by that same staff. reserve units could be formed around the Such a system could markedly increase This could be mirrored throughout the regional brigade to mobilise them as the numbers of TA soldiers mobilised in Infantry (and other Arms and Service) formed units; with a rest period to support of operations. with a 4th Coy being formed for each reform as a unit post deployment, and regular battalion and mobilised then a focused recruiting and training Conclusion accordingly. Annual Camp would be period before starting the process again. Although the TA is an essential

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component of the Field Army again and designed to stimulate debate and is an and this is currently based on large Scale Deliberate Intervention type the Army could not do without them, important platform for discussion and operations. divisions remain. What is required is real debate. However, it is important to be vision for the future and proper focusing mindful of some factual inaccuracies in ● The TA has a very important role to of resources to get the best for our Major Long’s letter: play with Community Engagement money. The present system is a costly and the footprint it lays down is at legacy item of massed mobilisation of ● Firstly the future of the TA is not the forefront of this. (There are the Second World War and the Cold War. uncertain; Brigadier General Staff currently over 370 TAC locations with This is an opportunity to mould the (BGS) is currently undertaking a 47 of these sites Infantry Platoon forces for the future rather than hang detailed examination of what the out stations). onto the past. requirement for the future TA and ● The Strategic Review of Reserves is Reserves will be. Until BGS has far from ‘dead’. Work is ongoing Comment from Colonel Mike Scott reached his conclusions there is no across 3 strands (Define Capabilities AD Reserves (A), HQLF change to role and size. Future Army Structures Next Steps (FAS NS) may Required, Develop the Graduated Commitment Model, and Develop The Territorial Army (TA) and the well have a different operational Options for TA C2 and Estate Reserves has had some high profile press requirement than currently exists. Laydown) with 15 of the coverage over the latter part of 2009. ● The temporary reduction in training recommendations already in place This press coverage has included news that hit the headlines in 2009 were and a further 32 on track for items relating to The Strategic Review of measures taken after careful completion. This work has been Reserves undertaken by Major General consideration and proportional to the shaped and complemented by the Cottam, Planning Round 2009 TA’s requirement to be placed on a development work carried out by CRF Efficiencies and Current Operational Campaign footing to support (now AG) and D Reserves (A) in early planning in Afghanistan. Major Long has operations in Afghanistan. 2009. presented some interesting ideas for the future of the Territorial Army Infantry. ● The size of the TA reflects the Brig Tom O'Brien will be writing an The British Army Review (BAR) is Regular Army reserve requirement article in the next edition of BAR. 

The Radfan Campaign: A Sergeant-Major of the Coldstream Guards paying local tribesmen who were employed at an up-country camp. R 035164 (IWM)

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AFGHANISTAN: A TOUR OF DUTY UNFORGETTABLE IMAGES OF THE AFGHANISTAN CAMPAIGN

PUBLISHED 29TH OCTOBER

Fast growing specialist international publisher, Third Millennium Publishing, is pleased to announce that it has launched Afghanistan: A Tour of Duty, the very first book of its kind, which reveals a remarkable photographic portrait of the Afghanistan campaign, taken by a former Grenadier Guards officer operating from the front line in the Helmand province. All profits from the book will be donated by Third Millennium to BLESMA (British Limbless Ex Service Men’s Association).

During his six month tour of duty in 2007 Captain (Retd) Alexander Allan, 29, captured a number of unforgettable images of ordinary British soldiers sweltering in the heat, liaising with the locals, training the Afghan Army, fighting off Taliban attacks and taking casualties. His feeling for his troops, the camaraderie, sacrifices and how they cope with what they have been sent to do, is evident from every image. The accompanying words are by the soldiers themselves.

Allan has dedicated the book to one particular colleague, Lance Sergeant Adam ‘Goolie’ Ball, who towards the end of their tour of duty lost his leg while trying to save two Afghan colleagues injured by landmines. In his introduction Allan says: “Some people write prose, some poems, others are raconteurs telling their stories as best they can to an eager audience. These pictures are my diary; take from them what you wish.”

Captain Patrick Hennessey, author of the Junior Officers’ Reading Club, says: “The Army is fond of saying that a picture paints a thousand words – Captain Allan’s do so with incredible eloquence. Stunning and poignant, nothing I have seen or read in the last few years captures the colour and humanity of the Afghan conflict as well as these brilliant images.”

In his foreword, General Sir Richard Dannatt GCB, CBE, MC, former Head of the Army says: “…this wonderful book is a graphic record of British soldiers’ day-to-day experiences serving in Afghanistan.….along with service, sadly comes sacrifice, and this photographic record does not flinch from the issue. Readers will get an authentic insight into the realities of life for the British soldier on Afghanistan’s front line.

However, they should also be reassured to know that all profits from the sale of this book will, at the wounded soldiers’ own request, go direct to the charity which supports and cares for those who have lost limbs in service. Such motivation and service is truly humbling.”

Copies of Afghanistan: A Tour of Duty can be ordered online at: www.tmiltd.com or www.blesma.org at a special direct price of £10.99 + p&p, or by phoning Third Millennium on 020 7336 0144. (Normal RRP £12.99). Copies are also available from the likes of Waterstone's and other book trade outlets.

Third Millennium has published books for a number of leading heritage, educational and military institutions. These include titles for Westminster Abbey, York Minster, Durham Cathedral and Lincoln’s Inn; the universities of Cambridge, Oxford, Durham, Manchester, Newcastle and SOAS; Harrow, Rugby School and Wellington College; the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, the Royal Artillery, the Household Division, the Royal Green Jackets, the Army Museum Ogilvy Trust and the Royal Hospital Chelsea.

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reiterated that while they may be ‘admirable evidence for the A Young Gentleman way in which the rank and file looked on a battle, a forced march, or a prolonged shortage of rations … we must not trust at War, The Letters them overmuch as authorities on the greater matter of war.’ This was brought forcibly to my notice recently when reading of Captain Orlando the letters of the third son of the 1st Earl of Bradford, Captain the Honourable Orlando Bridgeman of the 1st Foot Guards, Bridgeman, 1st Foot certainly not from the ‘rank and file’! Mostly written during the latter part of the Peninsular War, they describe his experiences Guards In the Peninsula in an attractively produced card-back volume entitled A Young Gentleman at War, impeccably edited by Gareth Glover, and and at Waterloo published by him last year in conjunction with Ken Trotman. One letter, penned to his mother from Irun on 3 October 1813 1812–15 – Edited by while recovering from a wound received at the assault of San Sebastian, concerned the supposed stiff resistance of Spanish Gareth Glover troops when holding the ridge of San Marcial against Soult’s counter-thrust across the Bidasoa. Wellington described this Ken Trotman Publishing, 2008, pp188; £22.50; combat to Stanhope many years later, as ‘in their own accounts’ ISBN: 978-1-905074-71-6; represented as being ‘one of their greatest battles – as a feat that does them the highest honour.’ Bridgeman felt otherwise, When writing of military matters, however much the author commenting to his mother: or editor may have done his best to keep close to the truth when describing the sequence of events, their causes or ‘I am almost afraid to make any remarks on Lord consequences, inevitably he will have second thoughts almost Wellington’s late dispatches to England in which he immediately after sending his text to press. However wide may mentions in such high terms the conduct of the Spaniards, have been his reading of scholarly histories or memoirs of it may be politic towards them, this they certainly deserved battles and campaigns composed by men who survived them, as they behaved better than usual, but from what whenever he may re-read one, or study a new book, as everybody says who saw them, his expressions are too inevitably he will find a point overlooked, or matter providing strong, remember I was at San Sebastian & therefore knew contradictory evidence, at odds with what he had understood nothing till I returned, but all our officers saw the whole previously to have been the case. thing, & at one time so many of the Spaniards ran away that our brigade which was formed close to the high road The graphic narratives of participants should be treated with actually received orders to form a guard in order to stop all caution, for many of them, although writing with immediacy, Spanish soldiers who were not wounded. This I give you my and giving first-hand evidence of what was taking place around honour is fact, had you seen the ground they were formed them, were unable to appreciate the importance of the part upon you would have said it was impossible for the enemy they were playing in the events they were experiencing. Thomas ever to come near them, nor could they have done so, had Henry Browne, for one, was the first to admit when writing his the Spaniards stood their ground like men. I made no Journal, that his observations had been ‘confined to what could remarks upon them in my last letter; but I could not help be picked up in the hurry and bustle of continued marching and saying what I have done after reading Lord W’s dispatch & counter marching ...’ Many other narratives were composed in you will I believe find that almost all the private accounts later years, when dulled memories were jolted by the will agree with mine.’ publication of Napier’s great History, a mine of information from which they could pillage and pad out their own memoirs. This was not the first time Bridgeman had reason to criticise As Oman was well aware, the strength of men’s memories the Spaniards. Writing from the near Cadiz in the previous July, differs: indeed ‘every year that elapses between the event and he had mentioned that ‘On the advanced picquet last night in a the setting down of its narrative on paper decreases progressively very different direction from ours, a Spanish sergeant & twelve the value of the record.’ A failing memory, the love of a well- went very quietly over to the French, & their comrades let them rounded tale, a spice of autolatry, the inclusion of a go without even firing at them, here’s a noble set of men picturesque anecdote, will have impaired the value of many a gallantly defending their country, by jove it is too bad, poor veteran’s reminiscences, while even the most readable devils, what would become of them if it was not for us’. But from narratives occasionally mix up the chronology of events. Oman such asides one should not assume that his letters are merely

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devoted to criticism of Britain’s supposed allies, for very Hougoumont’: the Letters of Captain John Lucie Blackman. many of them are most informative, covering a great variety of topics, from complaints of lack of ready money (for he was But these are only a few of the collections of letters now in born with a silver spoon in his mouth) to urgent requests for print, or in the pipeline. Regrettably, too few of them are to be additional clothing and equipment, but not ‘long cotton found on the shelves of any but specialist bookshops, and stockings which are very inconvenient on service’ (which he rarely attract the notice of reviewers, and readers who would would be sending home). He went on to demand appreciate being advised about the appearance of forthcoming volumes should not hesitate to contact Richard Brown at ‘...six pairs of short cotton & let them be large enough. Next [email protected] direct. comes & saddle & bridle ... the saddle with a crupper, a pad, and straps to carry a very small portmanteau behind me, as it often happens that in a march the baggage does Ian Robertson  not come up for some time after ourselves, & by carrying a small portmanteau behind me I have always a clean shirt &c, in case I am wet through. My father will also remember a small leather roller he had before his saddle to carry his great coat, I should like to have the same for me to carry Gallipoli: The End of my boat cloak, only it must be rectangular with three straps ... a pair of quite plain pistol holsters ... a double bridle the Myth – Robin Prior with a straight bit & rather sharp ... [also] two or three soft tooth brushes, I have plenty of hard ones but no soft.’

(In a later letter, he exigently specifies ‘Smyth’s tooth brushes’, and also demands a good hair brush, as such things were not to be had.)

The fact that these are confidential private letters – rather than notes jotted down at the time to be ‘written up’ later Gallipoli: Attack with a view to future publication – makes this, and other such collections, all the more valuable. Such authentic, from the Sea – Victor unsophisticated, personal responses to the hostile conditions in which their writers found themselves, provide us with Rudenno considerable further insight into their daily needs, interests, reactions, and preoccupations. Yale University Press, 2008, Hbk £25.00, pp338, A Young Gentleman at War is just one of a growing number of ISBN 978-0-300-12440-8 valuable and illuminating memoirs or collections of letters which have been discovered in local or family archives and There are some military campaigns that just seem to go on long-overlooked caches, and which are now being edited by demanding attracting attention decades afterwards. Gallipoli Gareth Glover and a published in a accessible form by Ken 1915 is one of them. Even though libraries of books have been Trotman. Admittedly, some of the earlier volumes have been written about the campaign, they still keep coming. This year, printed in a rather small type-size, but an appropriate design for example, two new major studies have been produced. After (including illustrations in colour in some cases) has now been such rivers of ink, one might wonder what that is new could settled on, and Peninsular war and Waterloo buffs should be possibly be said. grateful to Gareth Glover and his publisher for making them available at a very reasonable price. Robin Prior’s book, the first of this duo, is determinedly revisionist; Prior looks at all aspects of the campaign and sets Among some of the more substantial volumes I have had the about demolishing what he says are the prevailing myths that opportunity of reading in recent weeks, and with great interest, have become attached to it. The biggest, at the level of grand are A Hellish Business: from the Letters of Captain Charles strategy, is that if the campaign had been as successful as its Kinloch, 52nd Foot (partly devoted to the complexities of the progenitors hoped, it would have knocked the props out of the ‘purchase’ and ‘staff appointments’ systems then existing); A Triple alliance and drastically shortened the war. Gallipoli, Guards Officer in the Peninsula and at Waterloo: the Letters of according to Arthur Marder, a respected naval historian, was the Captain George Bowles, Coldstream Guards (extracted from the one bright strategic idea of the First World War. Not so. Robin very rare ‘Series of letters to the First Earl of Malmesbury’, of Prior is a convinced Westerner who concludes that as far as 1870); and, also from the Coldstreams, ‘It all Culminated at Britain and France were concerned, the Western Front was the

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decisive theatre and everything else pretty much a waste of pointing their guns at the city. Would they, could they morally, time, effort and lives, though somewhat surprisingly, given his have bombarded it? Maybe, given the German bombardment of cataloguing of the catastrophic errors of the Gallipoli Paris in 1870-1. But would it have caused then Ottoman Empire campaign, he concludes that a fixation on the Western Front to fall? And would that have led to a successor regime to throw would probably have taken a bigger toll in human lives. This is in the towel ? To judge by French experience, yes and no, tendentious, basically unprovable, and fascinating, stuff but respectively. Again, this ‘what-if’ of history is fascinating, not Prior’s discussion of these mammoth issues is at much higher least because definitive answers are markedly elusive, but what level of generality than their importance warrants and is is clear is that Churchill, Fisher, Kitchener and all the rest of unlikely to convince Easterners, or advocates of the ‘British way them simply hadn’t thought this through. Prior’s account of in warfare.’ this is convincing, although it’s more of a criticism of the estimate process then in use, than a de-mythologising of the He’s on much firmer ground at the operational and tactical campaign. Rudenno seems equally sceptical about the calm levels when he addresses a whole series of apparently brilliant assumption that a fleet off Constantinople simply meant opportunities lost through bad luck or inept implementation. ‘victory’. Three stand out: the naval attack of 18th March, the inability to exploit the success at Y Beach on 25 April and the initially However, Rudenno who concentrates on the naval side of the successful landings at Suvla on 6 August. Taking them in campaign, does draw the reader’s attention to the reverse order, the aim of the Suvla campaign, he says, was more disproportionate moral effect of a few allied submarines to establish a base than to launch a large scale outflanking operating with daring and success in the Sea of Marmora. The campaign. General Stopford, who apparently realized this when moral effect of a full scale battlefleet turning up off the Golden his latter day critics did not, accordingly gets sympathetic Horn is of course almost impossible to predict, but perhaps treatment; in any case, says Prior there were no reserves to shouldn’t be entirely dismissed. Rudenno’s account of the naval engage in anything more ambitious anyway. This was true at Y campaign, is well informed, more descriptive, much more Beach, too; the lack of manpower [partly attributable to extensive but perhaps less analytical than Prior’s; his account already inadequate numbers of allied forces being distributed in particular of the fearless, derring-do of allied submariners is between too many beaches] made the famous walk up to the a needed corrective to the scathing accounts of Prior whose open village of Krithia quite pointless. The notion of so many review leads his readers to conclude that nearly all the chief subsequent critics that here was a priceless opportunity lost is protagonists in the Gallipoli campaign were fools. In their a mixture of ‘fantasy and hindsight’; the army Prior says, had no varying ways and for their very contrasting treatment of what such orders and wasn’t the kind of force able or willing to remains a fascinating campaign, both books are much demonstrate initiative when the unexpected happened. Even if recommended. such an advance had been made, an extended bridgehead would have been no more than that and would have been defeated by Geoffrey Till  the Turks anyway. It wasn’t, therefore, ‘nearly a success’. As to the naval attack on the Narrows up to and including March 18th, Prior argues that the Navy could never have got through, as it had no answer to the combination of Turkish Maritime Dominion and guns and minefields. Prior maintains that given a hitting rate of something like 2 per cent on the Turks’ main guns, the Navy the Triumph of the Free had too few shells and used them too sparingly. Attempts to get through the minefield in the face of Turkey’s mobile World – Peter Padfield howitzers were an exercise in futility. The Navy he concludes did not ‘nearly get through’ and would have failed the next day, or subsequently, if it had tried again. It is interesting to compare this with the more conventional account of Victor John Murray, 2009, Hbk £30.00, Pbk, £12.99, Rudenno who makes many of the same points but nonetheless pp 369, ISBN 978-0-7195-6297-6 highlights the fact that by 2 pm that day, both German and This is the third of Peter Padfield’s masterly sweeps through Turkish accounts conclude that the defenders were almost out naval history, following on from his ‘Maritime Supremacy and of ammunition and in a desperate state. What saved them was the Opening of the Western Mind’ which appeared in 1999 and the small, recent and unexpected minefield laid in the area his ‘Maritime Power and the Struggle for Freedom’ of 2003. where British and French battleships chose to manoeuvre. Padfield is not new to the grand vista style of naval history Buit there’s also the question of what would have happened writing, for his Tide of Empires duo established his strengths in then even if the navy had got through. Prior claims that allied this demanding field. But this latest trilogy is really very policy-makers had not thought through the next step of different, much more ambitious in its scope and having a good working out what to do if a fleet of allied battleships had deal to say about Britain and the 21st Century World. squeezed through the narrows and turned up off Constantinople At first glance, much of the present volume looks like a pretty

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standard naval history of the last 150 years. Padfield packs a analysts of globalisation. Whether they agree or not with his lot in, and the pace is more than a little breathless. The deadly main propositions or, his readers will surely think that Peter U-boat war of 1914-1918, for example is covered in barely 11 Padfield provides an entirely new way of looking at naval pages and there are a number of other topics covered in it as history, and that is a very impressive accomplishment. well. Again on the face of it, scholars seeking major insights into the strategy, tactics or technology of the campaign can Geoffrey Till  hardly expect to find very many in a work of such limited compass – but in fact they would. Padfield has the great gift of identifying key points and getting them over concisely and with effect; his paragraph on the success of convoys, for example, The Children Who says it all. Of course, not everyone will agree with all his conclusions. His whole-hearted espousal of one school of Fought Hitler – A thought in the great debate amongst historians about gunnery before and during the war will raise eye-brows. But no matter, British Outpost in naval history should raise questions as well as provide answers. Europe – Sue Elliott But, much more important than this and much more praise- worthy is Padfield’s extremely interesting efforts to put naval with James Fox history into its proper context. To illustrate the point, his U- boat chapter doesn’t just focus on the questions of ‘to convoy or not to convoy’ and who was to blame for the Royal Navy’s John Murray, 2009, Hbk, £20pp 309, not doing it earlier. Instead, he draws attention to the strategic ISBN 978-1-84854-086-6 importance of the final British victory in this campaign in terms of safely bringing allied troops to the European front and allowing the Anglo-American war industry to overwhelm BAR readers may well recall the excellent television Germany in the Materialschlacht in the Autumn of 1918. He documentary on the theme of this book which was broadcast on also points out how their defeat in this campaign illustrated BBC4 in November 2009 to coincide with Remembrance Sunday. Germany’s fatal strategic, social, political and commercial The story is told of the little known British community based in weaknesses. These were in Holger Herwig’s words, ‘a mirror of Ypres as part of the Imperial War Graves Commission (IWGC), the Wilhelmine class state with its growing antagonisms that later to become the Commonwealth War Graves Commission ultimately split and paralysed German society as a whole.’ (CWGC). The focus is on the sons and daughters of those British citizens who were responsible for the interment of the dead of And with this, we get to the real point and the real value of World War One, followed by the design and landscaping of the Padfield’s trilogy. His real theme throughout is, if you like, the huge cemeteries around Ypres. More specifically, it is about the triumph of Neptune especially but not exclusively in the hands pupils of the British Memorial School, itself generously funded of the British and now the Americans. Sea power has brought by Old Etonians. James Fox was one such pupil. What happened so many advantages to the countries that have made proper use when Nazi Germany invaded Belgium in 1940? There are vivid of it, that they have prospered in peace, prevailed in war and accounts of what it was like to be teenagers under occupation: shaped world history. Over the past several centuries, he some found themselves in internment camps; others fled to maintains, seapower has been associated with freedom, Britain and joined the war effort in the RAF or as SOE agents; because intimately connected with trade. Trade flourishes in some stayed behind to form the Resistance. The accounts are conditions where the political system provides secure property all compellingly told by Sue Elliott, who has obviously and contract rights, personal liberty, stable, responsive, conducted meticulous background research. This is one of the incorrupt government and the rule of law. And trade produces very few accounts of WW2 as seen from the vantage of peace and prosperity. Trade, democracy, seapower and national teenagers and young adults in occupied territory. success all go together, he concludes. Hence the ultimate reason for the failure of the German U-boat campaign – the David Benest  irredeemable faults on their social and political system. Hence the triumph of the British and, now the Americans as their natural heirs and successors. Hence, also, the shape of today’s maritime world order – globalisation. But Padfield ends on a Correction note of pessimism: sea-based globalisation can go bad and the In BAR 147 we attributed the review of The Forgotten whole intricate web of relationships he describes might well Front to Jim Tanner when in fact it was written by unravel. Andrew Banks. We apologise for this error. Editor. Over the past few years, Padfield’s general line of argument has been followed by a host of other historians of Empire and

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squadron, station and group staff, engineers, administrators Dambusters: A and scientists who together made the raid possible. In pole position here is Barnes Wallis, who everyone in this book Landmark of Oral remembers with respect and affection. For most of us, he has merged in our memories with Michael Redgrave, but it seems History – Max Arthur that depiction was by no means wide of the mark. Dave Shannon tells us: a more distressed figure it would have been hard to imagine by the time the last aircraft had landed. He had not realised that there would be this tremendous sacrifice of life. Virgin Books; 339pp; pbk; £7.99; He was in tears and quite pathetic the following morning. ISBN 978-0-7535-1573-0 Wallis’s own account reveals his innate modesty. There is no greater joy in life than first proving that a thing is impossible Let me start by saying that it wasn’t just prejudice on my part and then showing how it could be done. Any number of experts because recently I’ve been working with a small film crew who had pronounced that that the Mohne and Eder Dams could not were a delight: hard-working, dependable, welcoming and possibly be destroyed by any known means. And then one shows creative. But my experience twenty-three years ago was very it can be done – but the doing was done by Guy Gibson and 617 different. For reasons I needn’t trouble you with now, I found Squadron – not by me. myself under attack from an aggressive enclave of middle-class lefties from the film business. Even before they attacked, I It will surprise no one who has read Richard Morris’s excellent knew they saw me as an uncultured, reactionary, junior part of biography that recollections of Guy Gibson are less consistent. the establishment. I remember mischievously suggesting to one This book contains the candid memories of a number of people especially virulent woman that one of the highest achievements who, in the brief, highly pressured time before Operation of the British film industry was The Dambusters. With all the Chastise, had varied experiences of the 24-year-old Gibson’s technical advances since, I argued, it would be a good idea to leadership. One or two remarks from groundcrew suggest gently produce a remake. I was just casting around to find the most that their contribution was perhaps underestimated in the effective way of annoying them; I never thought for a moment round of post-operation celebration and congratulation. None anyone would do it. But, do you know, someone’s doing just of the many aircrew I was lucky enough to know would have that? And the screenplay for the remake is by Stephen Fry, been remotely surprised at this. Their entirely consistent view which is how he came to write the rather touching foreword to was that groundcrew were the unsung heroes of Bomber this book. Command. The list of honours also looks invidious. The pilots, navigators and bomb-aimers of the aircraft that actually Fry says that Max Arthur’s voice has more authority than a attacked the dams were all decorated; except in Gibson’s crew, hundred other historians because it is almost silent. And I think almost all gunners, wireless-operators and flight engineers went he’s absolutely right. This is a wonderful piece of craftsmanship unrecognised. It was a rough and ready approach – these in which selection, skilful editing and structure are all. What matters often are. But the main impression left by the Max Arthur has done, with his customary skill and participants of all sorts was that it was worth doing and they unobtrusiveness, is to locate and assemble within a simple, were glad to have played their part. Except, perhaps, for the coherent structure, the recorded words of scores of people Germans, whose accounts appear here too. Max Arthur includes involved in various aspects of 617 Squadron’s attack on the 35 pages describing the experiences of members of the gun Mohne, Eder and Sorpe Dams on 16/17 May 1943. Foremost crew on the Mohne Dam and of those who survived the among them are five survivors whom Arthur approached appalling flooding that followed the breaching of the Mohne personally: pilot Les Munro, bomb-aimer George ‘Johnny’ and Eder Dams. Johnson, flight engineer Ray Grayston, rear-gunner Grant McDonald and front-gunner Fred Sutherland. Les Munro’s This book seems to me to paint a balanced, vivid, structured, aircraft was hit by flak crossing the Dutch coast and he and his comprehensive portrait of the raid. Read this alongside John crew had to abort the operation. Johnny Johnson was Joe Sweetman’s masterly The Dambusters Raid and you’ll have all McCarthy’s bomb-aimer and attacked the Sorpe. Grayston and you really need on the subject. Stephen Fry says of Max Arthur’s Sutherland were in Les Knight’s crew who together broke the book: I do not believe it has ever been better told. And one feels Eder Dam. Grant McDonald attacked the Sorpe with Ken Brown. especially privileged to hear about it from those – almost all dead now – who were there, saw it and lived it. Many of the other aircrew left interviews and other accounts of their experiences. Foremost among these, of course, is Guy Christopher Jary Gibson’s Enemy Coast Ahead, which Arthur uses skilfully to plug Author, Portrait of a Bomber Pilot  any gaps and to bind the structure together. But this is not just the story of the 133 aircrew, 56 of whom did not return and 53 of whom died that night. It is also the story of the groundcrew,

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Hopefully somewhere someone is working on a similar title with Australian Battalion regards to battalion command in the British infantry in the Second World War or perhaps Afghanistan. Afghanistan alone Commanders in the (2006-9) would be a sizeable tome with some very relevant lessons learned, until that appears those taking up battalion Second World War command or aspiring to it could do a lot worse than read this excellent history, I leave the final word to one of the finest of Australian Army History Australian Battalion commanders: ' Fred Chilton CO 2/2 Bn, (later Commander 18th Bde) ‘there is nothing like a fighting Series) – Garth Pratten unit, an infantry battalion...the people are the salt of the earth'

 Cambridge University Press; 2009, Hbk, £65, Gerry Long pp456 , ISBN-10: 0521763452

Battalion Command is the pinnacle of the soldiers trade as a Clinton’s Secret Wars – commander, as Colonel David Hackworth (after his battalion command) put it in a later war ‘you can do so much with a the Evolution of a Battalion of men, at Division… you had to be some kind of manager…but if you can manoeuvre six hundred men, you could Commander in Chief – do near anything with them… take that Battalion and mould it like piece of clay and make them the best fighting force’ that is Richard Sale what the essence of this book is about, moulding that clay to the will of the commander and making it work to the same purpose. St Martin’s Press, 2009, $27.99, pp512, ISBN: 031237366X The Australian Army being born of the same mother as the British Army but distant enough to have its own doctrine is an Had Bill Clinton become First Man to his wife Hilary, the world excellent vehicle to study that command. There are few books might have re-kindled its interest in him. But he did not, and of such detail and thought about battalion command, (why do so continues to fade into history. What is remembered of him? so many narratives of the Second World War concentrate on the “Slick Willie” who dodged the draft, didn’t inhale marijuana, strategic level command, on the likes Monty and Slim in and had a penchant for “trailer trash” women. Mostly, Clinton’s command of armies). Literature by British or Commonwealth presidency was ‘back in the halcyon days’ after the collapse of command at this level is particularly thin, I can think of only the USSR and before the calamitous events of the GW Bush John Masters ‘The Road Past Mandalay’ that deals with Administration. command in this way and Masters’ book is really about observing others and his own temporary command of a Chindit This book is an unabashed attempt to hasten the analytical brigade. process of political history. Happily for those who wish to understand the politico-military nexus, Richard Sale examines Pratten’s book deals with battalion command throughout the Clinton’s evolving use of covert and overt forces. Sale is Australian Army, a predominately infantry force. The AMF has unflinchingly honest about all the figures in this epic, allowing some very relevant lessons with regards to battalion command anonymity to few. He extends this “warts and all” treatment to at any time. Going as it does from the AMF’s less than glorious foreign actors also, not sparing even the British. (In this, Sale foundations after the Great War, through the Middle East corroborates Sir Christopher Meyer’s contemporaneous through Tobruk, El Alamein and on into perhaps the lessen observation about the USA’s “close relationship” with the UK, known to (UK readers) the Australian Pacific campaign which rather than “Special Relationship” so trumpeted by British was markedly different form the much better known US politicians.) experience. Many of the scenes Sale charts – the venal factionalism within Pratten makes some excellent observations on battalion the Administration, the politico-military tensions – are command in the Second World War, the clear out of the dead universal to politics. As a Washington insider of long-standing, wood of the post Great War army, the youth of the battalion Sale takes for granted many of the aspects of the Executive (in commanders (under 30 in most cases by 1945) and that many particular its revolving-door patronage cliques) which are so after achieving so much returned to civilian life after the war alien to foreigners; yet in telling his tale Sale lays the to continue there pre war lives as normal. Executive’s workings bare, such that on one level the politics are irrelevant; rather the institutional mechanics fascinate. Also

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laid open is the way in which Administrations of both parties operate internally in much the same way, and the fluid Oman’s Insurgencies – parameters within which the Executive operates: re-configuring according to personality, rather than statute. The Sultanate’s The book is divided into three parts: the Transformational Struggle for Supremacy President, Forward to Baghdad, and A Special Kind of Evil: Al Qaeda in the Balkans. The course of the book jumps about from – JE Peterson theatre to theatre, mimicking – perhaps unintentionally – the global jigsaw with which the US President is confronted daily. As the tale unfolds, Clinton’s policy team is winnowed and SAQI, London, £55, Hbk, pp522, threshed by events, while he himself learns the capability (and ISBN: 978-0-86356-456-7 limits) of force, of multilateral action, and of intrigue. Clinton’s own political acumen and personality increasingly synchronise Despite its success, there have been few accounts of what with these levers of power, resulting in a surprisingly sure grasp happened in Dhofar. Most have been autobiographical, the best of the cut and thrust of international politics, although this is from John Graham and Corran Purdon (Commanders Sultan’s often constrained by domestic political realities: “It’s the Armed Forces (CSAF) John Akehurst (brigade command), Tony economy, stupid!” Jeapes (the role of SAS), Bryan Ray (battalion command) and Ian Gardiner (company operations). Clinton’s Secret Wars makes use of high-level, intimate sources, including many still serving politicians, providing not only the John Peterson provides the nearest we will perhaps ever see of result, but the reason – often all too human in its weakness. an official history. He is eminently well qualified for the job: an The book has a comprehensive bibliography, but as so often, it academic historian with specialist knowledge of the Arabian lacks maps (or any other illustration.) Given the geographical Peninsula and Gulf; Deputy Prime Minister for Security and complexities of the theatres, and the passage of time, maps Defence in the Sultanate of Oman; and Official Historian to SAF. would have been useful to those now more familiar with Iraq or He is refreshing in his chronology and analysis. He points to Afghanistan. Similarly, while the impact of 24 hour and the uniqueness of the particular political circumstances of satellite television is mentioned, its huge impact – now taken Oman in general and Dhofar in particular. He traces in detail for granted – was first felt on Clinton’s watch. There are how a nationalist war of liberation against a conservative occasional, distracting, lapses into journalese but otherwise Sultan (Qaboos’s father) eventually became a Marxist Sale has written an informative and eminently readable revolutionary movement, backed by all the Communist Powers account. of the time.

To an admirer of Bill Clinton or a student of modern US politics, The British policy was that South Arabia and the Gulf would be this book will be a useful addition to their shelves. However, its abandoned by 1971. The Chinese and Soviets seized this chief value is for foreigners trying to comprehend the function opportunity and hence the advent of the Peoples Front for the – and dysfunction - of the US political system. In particular it Liberation of the Occupied Arab Gulf States (PFLOAG), its lays bare for servicemen how the Highest Commander’s intent is insurgent leaders trained in Peking and Odessa, with support in formed (and waivers) and most modern politicians’ ignorance of terms of arms, advice and training form across the Cold War the military “train sets” they control. divide, including North Vietnam, Cuba, Iraq and East Germany.

This is a superb historical study of almost contemporary Peterson demolishes many of the myths that have arisen as to politics, which resonates with, and provides depth to, current how to ‘do’ counterinsurgency. The notion that victory might be events and personalities on every page. Some of the more achieved by deploying special forces alone was clearly not the searing criticism can make for uncomfortable reading, but it is case. That a counterinsurgency could be fought without highly recommended for those who would understand how helicopters was absurd but this was the situation up until 1971. policy is decided, and the use of force is managed or Troops on the ground were in short supply and UK plc, faced mismanaged. with a considerable deployment to its own counterinsurgency in Northern Ireland, was hard pressed to do much about it. James Spencer  Fortunately, Iran and Jordan thought otherwise given the stakes involved - the real possibility of a pro-Soviet state on the Straits of Hormuz. Peterson reminds us that though declared ‘over’, the war did not end in December 1975, but went on until 1980. Development in Dhofar and the winning of ‘hearts and minds’ could only really take off after the insurgent threat had been neutralised, not before. The significant British

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contribution was in commanders and leaders, some of the best From a higher perspective, the story almost beggars belief. The of their generation, many of whom were to play a considerable assumption that development can precede security is shown for role in the Falklands war in 1982. Indeed, this reviewer would the fallacy it is. The command arrangements were ludicrous and go so far as to claim that the Falklands War was ‘won’ in Dhofar. ensured that his brigade commander (Brigadier Ed Butler), despite his extensive personal experience of counterinsurgency, Peterson’s style of writing is clear and concise. He tries to was removed at the moment critique from the chain of relate very incident as it arose and in this sense, the command. The battle group was pitifully under strength for the chronology is at risk of being criticised as tedious. His task in hand - ‘In short , we were fixed and our resources were appendices are of particular value: a ‘Glossary and Gazetteer’; stretched to breaking point’( p111). Intelligence on the enemy ‘Sultanate Command Arrangements’; ‘A Chronology of the War in was abysmal. The bravery of the Chinook pilots (see review of North Oman’; and ‘A Chronology of the Dhofar War’. There are Immediate Response – Major Mark Hammond DFC RM – later in some useful maps but no photographs at all – surely an this section – Ed), was beyond the call of duty but the failure omission. This is the best to date on Dhofar. At £55 a copy, it to provide anywhere near enough helicopters was deplorable. will probably best serve as a work of reference and should British 0.50 calibre HMG ammunition was ‘faulty’ and soldiers certainly be made available in every Service library. therefore had to beg, borrow or steal ammunition from NATO partners. MOD reaction to a vivid but factual account by the David Benest  eminent journalist, Christina Lamb of a contact in Zumbelay village, resulted in a media black out. The policy on R&R, opposed by the Commanding Officer, required every soldier to take 2 weeks leave back in UK, entailing a shortfall of over 100 Danger Close – troops at any one time, as well as greater risk and strain on an inadequate helicopter force. DFID failed even to connect a Commanding 3 PARA in single washing machine in a hospital. The treatment of the wounded on Ward S4 at Selly Oak Hospital was third rate. Why Afghanistan – Colonel so many (avoidable) failures of policy? Stuart Tootal DSO OBE, Tootal resigned his commission soon after the end of the deployment as did one of his company commanders and his brigade commander. The Armed Forces lost not only 15 killed John Murray, 2009,Hbk, PP 306, £18.99, and 46 wounded in the battle group deployment but also three ISBN 978-1-84854-256-3, highly talented and experienced leaders. In all, this is a harrowing account of how badly things can go in 3 PARA was the first battlegroup to deploy to Helmand Province counterinsurgency and is thus compelling reading. More in 2006 under Operation HERRICK. This is the only account to importantly, it is a stirring account of leadership, moral and date written from the perspective of a commanding officer. physical courage and endurance in the face of adversity. Tootal recalls his experiences in command from every aspect, coping with uncertainties and when the odds against success David Benest  were stacked high. He brings home the reality of the non-linear battle space where the CO’s Tac party is as likely to be engaged in combat as anyone else: thus leading by example and in the thick of the many engagements with the Taliban was an every Immediate Response – day occurrence. The relationships with his operations team are vividly recounted. In addition, he conducted over 120 Mark Hammond DFC interviews with soldiers, wives, parents and widows so as to bring home the impact of the tour on the families of those deployed. He recalls the sense of pre-deployment nerves that affect most soldiers, regardless of rank, akin to most experiences of military parachuting. He is open and frank in admitting that adrenalin and fear invariably arise. The account Penguin, 2009, £17.99, Hbk, pp304, of operations is graphically told. The burden of responsibility in ISBN: 978 0 718 15474 5 command is ever present, especially as casualties mounted. Tactical decisions, especially whether to abort a mission after discovering that the helicopter LZ was ‘hot ‘weighed heavily. Mark Hammond is a Royal Marine major serving with the RAF Above all, the courage and fortitude of the young soldiers as a Chinook pilot. And this book is the story of his time in shines through on every page. Afghanistan. It was co-written with Clare MacNaughton presumably because Mark Hammond is not a professional writer

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and she provides the breathless prose. And it is terrible – the that he was a sort of flight commander, who also happens to story is good – and it is worth suffering the abysmal writing to captain a Chinook. And that he has responsibilities beyond his get Hammond’s message. One more thing about the writing and crew and flying. When in fact he was an aircraft captain who then I promise I won’t mention it again – she has employed a was given extra responsibilities on an ad hoc basis. It would random effing generator. We know that marines talk in such have been useful to have that spelt out – Clare probably felt terms but the book would have been about half the length that it would have got in the way of a good read. She’s without them. probably right; I just thought that a bit of education would not have gone amiss. Hammond captures the fear and excitement, and allows a glimpse into the world of the support helicopter aircrew. I A trick was missed, an opportunity to educate was overlooked: guess that most of us admire and respect the work of the why do RAF aircrew (and I understand AAC aircrew) do short Chinook crews. No-one has yet died in an accident in a RAF tours? I can guess at the reasons – I even know some of them, Chinook in Iraq or Afghanistan, nor have we lost a but Hammond might have used this book to explain why a 6 serviceman/woman (known hereafter as a soldier for reasons of month tour is too long. A book like this shouldn’t be just an brevity) to enemy action in one. Aircraft have been downed and exercise in showing off – it is fair that he (Clare) tells us of the men wounded in them, but no-one killed – and this story helps difficult and the dangerous, but we could have gained far more to explain why the RAF has such a good record. understanding of the stresses and strains and even of some of the technicalities of flying. But that would have taken a better The dedication and professionalism shines through; although writer – and we had Clare. you won’t get much in the way of insights into their methods. This is a book about impressions, there is no analysis and I In a way I admire Hammond’s approach. Of course, I admire his suspect that Hammond is that sort of a chap – an action man, flying skills and courage – that is easy to do. He lives for flying not an ideas man. If I am wrong, well he has Clare to blame, and he is in a system that will let him do that – which permits not me. He revels in his world of the highly competent jack- high levels of professionalism. Maybe we could learn from that. the-lad aviator. The combination of marine and pilot is irresistible – to him. And all your prejudices and pre- General Rupert Smith has a way of classifying soldiers1– conceptions are pandered to, to an almost unbelievable extent. implementers and innovators (the RHA have a similar idea: Apart from some mawkish sentimentality, Hammond appears to benefiters and contributors). Broadly speaking the higher the have no thoughts beyond banter, his mates, bawdy good rank the more the holder moves towards innovation. I guess humour and how wonderful – sorry, how awesome – the that where many in the army diverge from General Smith’s Chinook is. analysis is the numbers in each group. You don’t need many innovators and we have an army where too many try to be If Hammond was a corporal or a subaltern, the absence of deep innovators. RAF aircrew probably get this balance better than reflection would be understandable, damn it he is a field officer we do. The RAF lets their people fly if that is their thing; hence – a major, and a Marine major and pilot at that, who is earning the specialist aircrew system – experienced (elderly?) flight markedly more than his brown apparently equally ranked lieutenants (a good blend of mainly implementer with a dash of infantry colleague. But maybe it is me getting it wrong. Do I innovation) on wing commander’s rates of pay. This achieves want to be flown by a couth, educated and cultured man who real expertise. Clearly our soldiers can achieve this expertise writes sonnets to while away the time between sorties? Well, because they spend most of their time at regimental duty. Our not if the better pilot is the rude, crude, professional need is to achieve something similar to that for most officers – Hammond. ie more time as a platoon commander, more time as a company commander – maybe ops offrs should be second tour company Hammond hints at that by his dismissal of an AAC squadron commander types? In other words let those who want to be commander (major): He seemed to me to be everything I most warriors be warriors, much as the RAF lets aviators be aviators. disliked in an Army Air Corps officer, an ambitious promotion Subject, of course, to fitness. thruster who just happened also to be a pilot. Except for the tautology, Hammond is pretty straightforward. Apart from I am grateful to Clare for sparing us Hammond’s life history. Too detesting REMFs, he is largely free from bile and criticism of many of these books spend pages on where the author grew up, others. Whether he (or Clare) means to or not, he does let us his mother’s cooking, his father’s jokes and how blissful/tough into this closed world of the aircrew. It is a very self-centred his school was. We have been spared, too, the usual stuff about world and he seems to have spent little time with other parts early training and how hard commando/para/flying training is, of the Force in Helmand. In fairness, the intensity of the and how he achieved an ‘A’ grading on the Health and Safety operations may prevent such activity. course. Rightly the book concentrates on Afghanistan.

Yet I rather suspect that (I can feel Hammond sneering at that To recap – rubbish book, great story – worth buying (in ‘rather’) I am simply misunderstanding his position. I imagined paperback).

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Whitelaw, often remarked subsequently that he took profound 1 In his reply to the Palmer Report, General Sir Rupert Smith then a comfort from the fact that he had heard the future Archbishop brigade commander wrote: of Canterbury utter the F word! The third issue that needs to be addressed is to answer the question: What does the army want commissioned officers for in the future? Of The Archbishop preached a sermon on the “Just War.” To my course, it needs leaders but not all our leaders are commissioned nor recollection it was the only time in all those years that this need they be. I suggest that up to now we have required our subject was ever addressed. Maybe the sermons became more commissioned officers to implement and innovate, as well as lead. At uplifting and relevant after I left (in 1984): certainly the the risk of over simplification, our NCOs & WOs implement and hardly recently retired Chief of the General Staff, Sir Richard Dannatt innovate, our 2/lts - majors do both and lt cols and above innovate more than they implement. In an essentially practical profession like referred to the Christian ethos of the British Army. But for more ours you cannot innovate satisfactorily unless you have the lowly souls such as myself it is no wonder I spent so much time experience of implementation to go with the required intelligence reading the memorial plates to the British infantry regiments and imagination. Thus we have required our commissioned officers to that adorned the pillars in the chapel. spend a period, with the benefit of an experienced NCO or WO implementer at their elbows, of apprenticeship before we examine I justify such distractions by claiming that this gave me an them for promotion and stream those judged to be the best potential insight into at least a part of the British Army, for these innovators through Camberley. I am sure we want the innovators but do we need so many commissioned implementers in the future? memorials were almost exclusively infantry and cavalry.

If, against the background of social change, agreement can be Does Allan Mallinson’s book give me a feel for the British Army? reached as to the purpose of the Army in the 21 Century and the role of its commissioned officers then some valid solutions can be found to the problems identified in your Terms of Reference. My own view is It is a mammoth tome and hugely ambitious in its scope but I that we should: fear it pleases and disappoints in equal measure. The author is at his best in the formative years of his account and the post a. Reduce our requirement for commissioned officers. Second World War period. b. Expand the responsibilities of the Sgts Mess. c. Make the zoning for promotion etc more flexible. At the start he takes the reader back to the English Civil War, through to the early 19th century and the defeat of Napoleon. By reducing the requirement for commissioned officers I mean Here the story develops in the best traditions of English that we should set out to recruit only our potential innovators. military history and the writing is at times outstanding in the To over simplify again, we should aim to recruit our Camberley quality of its prose. entry plus a percentage for wastage and mistakes (Editor’s emphasis – the Staff College annual entry (1986) for British Army officers was 120 and the army strength (TAM/TAF) was My first grunt of disapproval comes with the war of 1812, which 145,423).  for some reason the author chooses to dismiss as a footnote. The question I wanted answered was how come an army, which fought under Wellington in the Peninsular and from which some of its regiments were then transferred to North America, were soundly trounced at the Battle of New Orleans? The author The Making of the dismisses this little war as “unworthy of study” which frankly is just not good enough. British Army – Allan By the time The Making of the British Army reaches the outbreak Mallinson of the First World War we are reading an account which is heavily biased towards infantry and cavalry. This is not my field of specialism in military history but if the Great War was anything it was surely also a war of artillery and how this Bantam Press, 2009, £20, pp480, critical arm was developed and equipped and performed is ISBN: 0593051084 covered in a superficial manner.

In the 14 years and 2 terms I was privileged to spend on the Similarly, at the end of the First World War and as the army academic staff of the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, the reverted to its peacetime posture, it underwent the trauma of Royal Memorial Chapel figured prominently in my life. During the Irish Rebellion. What happened to the Irish regiments, that time I must have sat through hundreds of sermons. Most especially those recruited beyond the Six Counties? Where were were mundane: only one was memorable and that was given by they deployed? And what happened to the officers and men the then Archbishop of Canterbury, Robert Runcie. He won an with the creation of the Irish state? Again, Allan Mallinson has MC in 1944 in Normandy as a subaltern in the Guards Armoured little to offer yet he does cover the mutiny at the Curragh Division. A fellow officer at the time, the redoubtable Willie before the outbreak of the First World War. Perhaps he has a

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justification for his selection of episodes but does not share present day. Even so it was always my understanding that the this with the reader. deployment of the 1st British Armoured Division from BAOR to Saudi Arabia in 1990 was anything but smooth. I remember The interwar years were a time of stagnation which this author conversations with its commander, Rupert Smith, which left me covers extremely well. But it was also a period of imperial with the impression that the whole of BAOR had to be scoured policing in some very nasty parts of the world. Returning to my and plundered to produce two brigades of armoured fighting preferred reading during Academy Sundays, many names on the vehicles. The long drawn-out struggle then to have the main memorials listed campaigns in Mesopotamia, Waziristan, battle tanks modified for desert warfare by the industrial Afghanistan, Burma, China, Palestine and bits of Africa, etc. suppliers was a nightmare. Allan Mallinson makes much – and correctly too – of the searing experience of divisional commanders in 1939 who had In these pages of the post war period the author still persists fought in the trenches a quarter of a century earlier. But others with the throwaway lines which are such a distraction. For too, notably the redoubtable Bill Slim, arguably the finest example he describes Dag Hammarskjöld as, “The UN’s second British Army Commander of them all, had also learned his trade finest Secretary General.” Who was the first, who came third, in pursuit of the “Great Game.” were questions that came to mind rather than the text.

So by the time that Allan Mallinson addresses the Second World Was Afghanistan such a resounding success in the early stages? War there are gaps in his account. One in particular is that of Yes, the US-led forces along with their Northern Alliance allies officer education and training. Woolwich has some coverage, liberated Kabul and hurled the Taliban and Al Qaeda back to the Sandhurst very little and the East India Company’s Officer Cadet borders of Pakistan. But if more troops had been deployed in College even less. The Staff College at Camberley has a the final operations at Tora Bora and the escape routes denied sentence or two but he leaves us with no idea of what was maybe we would not be there now. taught in any of these establishments and whether it mattered to an officer’s career. Allan Mallinson is outstandingly good at The final pages – covering Chapter 32 “The Army Falters” and describing in intimate detail the relative qualities of the Lee “The Epilogue” – are outstanding. The trials and tribulations Enfield and the standard of musketry but does not address suffered by the army in Basra, after the liberation of Iraq, are professional development. sensitively handled but with honesty and integrity. There is blame to be attached and the author apportions it with justice. To this reviewer’s mind these are important questions if we are But then as Mr Mallinson points out in 300 years of history to take the title of this book at its face value. Any reader would there have been a fair share of setbacks. The great strength of interpret the words “The Making” to refer to professional the British Army is its ability to learn on the job and put development of its soldiers and their terms of service as much matters right. as to the technical side of their weaponry. The author makes an eloquent defence of the need for infantry The treatment of the Second World War is better than that of even at the price of super carriers and more Typhoons and it is the Great War. But again there is vast canvas to paint and the very hard not to agree with this statement that, “Afghanistan is author has to be selective. Successful battles such as El more Victoria’s wars than network-enabled.” One interesting Alamein are given wide coverage and the Eighth Army is aside is whether Mr Mallinson feels that the army of today is discussed in detail. Was it as good as Allan Mallinson very different in terms of its social makeup from that of Queen maintains? Other writers have pointed to its weaknesses and Victoria’s, and even earlier. An interesting statistic he provides, even Montgomery himself described its morale as “brittle.” which will doubtless fuel the cries of those who still see the Much of this comes to the fore of course, when the Eighth Army army as an exclusive public school preserve, is that it is the finds itself into the heart- and back-breaking campaigns main source of employment for young men leaving Eton. slogging its way up the length of the Italian Peninsula. This period receives little cover and Cassino, that great clash of So overall a worthy read and for those who are not familiar with opposing forces in a series of battles more reminiscent of the the history of the British Army there is much to enjoy. A good Great War, has no mention of any consequence. Christmas present, especially if the buyer goes on line rather than paying the RRP – but then that is why the High Street Normandy and the advance through Europe provide some bookshops are disappearing. interesting insights. But of course one is spoilt because Allan Mallinson’s chapters do not stand comparison with the Eric Morris  impressive account, albeit in much greater detail, in Anthony Beevor’s latest book.

Some of the best chapters in “The Making of the British Army” are those dealing with the post war period through to the

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central tenets of what the Americans call Network-Centric The Scientific Way of Warfare (NCW) or in the UK, Network Enabled Capability (NEC). Warfare: Order and Bousquet’s coverage of the first three ways of warfare is very much an historical review. His perspective provides some Chaos on the interesting and novel views on the development of warfare over the last three hundred years. His approach is very academic; as Battlefields of a result this is a very rich and erudite text, but at times a little hard going. It is really only in the last third of the book that he Modernity – Antoine tackles some of the issues that, I suspect, the average reader of Bousquet the BAR might be interested to explore. In this final section of the book his central premise on chaoplexic warfare is that: Hurst Publishers Ltd, 2009, £15.99, Pbk, pp276, ISBN: 978-1-85065-945-7 ‘…despite a clear move in the direction of a new non-linear way of warfare, network-centric warfare still remains mired in cybernetic conceptions.’ Antoine Bousquet is a lecturer in International Relations at Birkbeck College, University of London and this book is the By this he means that progress to date has, and remains, product of his doctrinal thesis. It is an examination of the largely in the automation and computerisation of command and relationship between warfare and science, and how, as the control systems. It has not delivered the radical organisational author states: and conceptual changes necessary to enable the transformation of warfare envisaged by the original NCW gurus such as Alberts, ‘…the manner in which scientific ideas have been Gartska, Stein and Cebrowski. He does however recognise the systematically recruited to inform thinking about the very difficulties in doing this and the dichotomies it raises. nature of combat and the forms of military organisation Improvements in the ‘network’, enabled by high-speed data best suited to prevail.’ links, will create superior battlefield situational awareness and allow the ‘network’ to become all pervading. This leaves a wide He postulates that since the first real impact of science on left and right of arc in our choice of how to exploit the warfare there have been four different scientific ways of warfare opportunity. On one hand increased connectivity, and the which he categorises as: mechanistic, thermodynamic, cybernetic consequent wealth of information, would enable a very strong and chaoplexic. Each he characterises by a key technology (the centralised control to be exercised by a commander with a very clock, the engine, the computer and the ‘network’ respectively) flat command structure. Alternatively, the perfect omnipresent, which, with their associated scientific concepts, act as network could allow all force elements, however small, to have metaphors for the resulting form of warfare. The underlying the same shared situational awareness and therefore enable the premise is that throughout the history of modern warfare the self-synchronized ‘swarming’ behaviour envisaged by NCW military has continually turned to science in its attempts to purists. Bousquet suggests that although these possibilities are impose order on the chaos of the battlefield. starting to emerge, the issue remains the military’s ability to effect change. The mechanistic way of warfare was that which existed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Characterised by drill ‘According to network-centric warfare, these huge volumes and rigid tactical deployments, it imposed order through the of information and the resulting superior battlefield creation of military organisations that worked like ‘clockwork’. knowledge are supposed to be the basis on which force- The author cites the example of the Prussian Army of Frederick multiplying decentralisation and self-synchronisation can be the Great as the zenith of this form of warfare. The achieved. However, such a scheme jars with much of the thermodynamic way of warfare spanned the Napoleonic era historical evidence on the successful practices pertaining to through to the end of the Second World War. Powered by the the organisation of armies.’ engine, a form of warfare emerged that was characterised by mobilisation, motorisation and industrialisation and reached its It would be easy to dismiss this book as specialist academic pinnacle with the use of the atomic bomb at the end of the territory and indeed the first two thirds would probably fall into Second World War. The third period of warfare, cybernetics, that category. However, the final third asks, and in part brings us closer to today with the automation of command and answers, some of the fundamental questions that we need to control enabled by the computer, with the Cold War as its peak. address before we continue our NCW and NEC quests. Not the The author postulates that the final, chaoplexic, way of warfare least of these is, do we have the intent, vision, culture, and is where we are moving to now. It is characterised by the resources necessary to fully achieve the full potential or are we

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content just to automate our existing processes? Whether Danchev achieves this aim, or not, is arguable. In such a diverse collection, it would be unusual if readers did not find Colonel Iain Standen some of the essays more convincing than others. Danchev’s Defence Network Enabled Capability analysis of Evelyn Waugh and other literature of the Second Programme Office  World War is compelling in its conclusion that their fictions often tell truths that histories do not. Similarly in dealing with Alanbrooke as diarist, Danchev highlights the pressures and “torque of mutable feeling” which impact on these records, but which make them nonetheless valuable. In recounting the On Art and War and shameful catalogue of interrogation methods used by the “night shift” teams at Abu Ghraib, Danchev quotes from Kafka Terror – Alex Danchev and Camus to reinforce the humiliation and shame that these acts bring upon us all. In the final two essays, Danchev examines how film has dealt with the so-called global war on terror, and, starting from an analysis of the codewords and hidden meanings in this and previous conflicts, the tension Edinburgh University Press, 2009, pp256, between civilised and barbaric behaviours. Both are fresh and Hbk, £60.00, ISBN: 9780748639151 original. Other essays are less effective. Danchev is clearly no fan of Even after having worked my way twice through Alex Danchev’s Tony Blair’s, but I found it a stretch to make the leap from new collection of essays, I’m still unsure how to review it. What describing the provenance of the Braque painting “The Guitar I am confident about is that this book will neither become a Player” to a discussion of the abuse of authenticity in politics. bestseller, nor is it likely to be on many Christmas lists. It is, Likewise, Danchev invites us to consider Richter’s Baader- nonetheless, remarkable, taking the reader from Seamus Heaney Meinhof artworks in terms of the moral responsibility of the to In the Valley of Elah, from Georges Braque to Tony Blair, from artist, but without much conclusion. The essay on war Liddell Hart to Lynndie England. It certainly merits our photography (which Danchev considers to be “the new war attention. poetry”) begins promisingly. Don McCullin’s famous Vietnam–era photograph of a US Marine’s thousand yard stare is compared Danchev is a name with which the reader may already be with a Goya sketch of Wellington. However, despite Danchev’s familiar. In more distant times he was an Army officer (John erudite prose, the narrative thread lacks conviction. Keegan is on record as saying he was “one of the two most Occasionally, the prose itself grates. Frank McLynn has written brilliant people he taught at Sandhurst”) and, in due course, a of Danchev’s writing overfilled with “gnomic utterances and successful academic – professor of politics at Nottingham learned asides, the relevance of which often escaped me.” The University. Since the early 90s, he has published or edited over use of illustrations in the essays – especially on visual media – 50 books, notably including an award-winning biography of is also variable. Liddell Hart and as co-editor of the bestselling Alanbrooke Diaries in 2001. However, Danchev has ventured far beyond the Overall, this is far from an easy read. War historians may field of “drums and trumpets” military history in his work; he is appreciate new perspectives on Alanbrooke, or Liddell Hart a genuine polymath, even considering how often the term is (although these essays are reworked versions of writing overused. previously published), and the inter-disciplinary scholars may admire the overall approach. The footnoting and referencing is According to Danchev, the aim of this collection is to “put the impeccable but occasionally intrusive, whilst the index is imagination to work in the service of historical, political and thorough. But the whole is somehow less than the sum of the ethical inquiry.” This is an ambitious, worthwhile and truly parts, which is disappointing when the aim is so original and multi-disciplinary aim. What it means, practically, is that thought-provoking. Danchev quotes Seamus Heaney: “The Danchev offers the reader 10 essays on subjects as wide ranging imaginative transformation of human life is the means by which as Waugh’s “Sword of Honour” trilogy, Gerhard Richter’s we can most truly grasp and comprehend it.” In a few of these artworks inspired by the Baader-Meinhof terrorist group, and essays Danchev demonstrates that he has the ability to show “War Photography and the ethics of responsibility.” The linking how this might be, but he demands much of the reader in so thesis is that poetry, fiction, diaries and art, in its widest doing. sense; not only matter to us as things of beauty in themselves but as ways of better interpreting the world around us, and its Bruce Pennell  history. “Armed with art,” Danchev claims in his introduction, “we are more alert and less deceived.”

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Western Front. The older and more senior survivors probably found themselves commanding companies or in battalion 18 Platoon – Sydney headquarters for the latter stages of the campaign. Sydney Jary was 19, and even in war, 19 year olds didn’t command Jary MC companies. Although Sydney took over D Company, 4th Battalion Somerset Light Infantry for 48 hours of fierce fighting at Mount Pincon when his company commander was severely wounded and the replacement was found wanting. As Dennis Clarke MC, his estimable and elderly (34) FOO said, “ A grown- RHQ The Rifles, 14 Mount St, Taunton, up will take over soon, sonny”. Somerset TA1 3QE - 01823 333434 Email: [email protected] Now take out from the survivors those who can’t write, those 6th Edition, Hbk, pp 138, ISBN: 1 901655 01 6 who don’t want to write and those who weren’t very good – even in wartime some not-so-goods survive intact, in command. And of those who do get published, how many just write about the fighting? Precious few. The British Army has had plenty of experience in fighting since the end of World War 2, but I doubt that any post-Second War soldier has participated in as many intense fights as a 21 Army Group infantry soldier. Look at Sydney Jary’s sub-campaigns: Normandy, The Seine, Market Garden, Groesbeek, The Winter Battles, Cleve, Across the Rhine and the nasty slog to Bremerhaven. Eight parts to the main campaign – and how many battles, recces, fighting patrols, night patrols, ambushes,

USMC Mountain warfare mule

I doubt that there are many privately published books on their 6th edition. So, there must be a reason for the phenomenon of 18 Platoon. And that reason is quite simple: it is about fighting a platoon in a major war. There aren’t many books about fighting a platoon in North West Europe in 1944/45 and the reason for that is simple, too: not many platoon commanders survived to do so. MOUNTAIN WARFARE TRAINING CENTER, BRIDGEPORT, Calif. - A Marine with a company from 2d Marine Special Operations Battalion, US Marine Corps Forces, Special Operations Command leads his mule during a mule and troop The casualty rates for platoon commanders fighting in movement. Marines and Sailors went through mule packing classes here Normandy in 1944 were on a par with the worst battles of the April 26, 2009. (US Marine Corps photo)

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reliefs in place, advances to contact, trenches dug, meals missed does that amount to? A lot. And not many men actually did the lot. Infantrymen, tank crews, artillery observers and some sappers took the brunt – and even then few went from Normandy beach to the Baltic as part of a platoon or a troop. No goretex, no waterproofs, no sleeping bags, no rucksacks – just itchy, absorbent battle dress, leather soled boots, ’37 Pattern Webbing and tins of ‘Meat and Veg’.

Incidentally, one of things that mystifies Sydney Jary is the weight that our modern soldiers carry. Sydney, with Michael Crawshaw (previous editor of BAR), was a tireless campaigner for the ‘Bren Gun Carrier’. They recognised the need for a basic load carrying vehicle at platoon level – a mechanical ‘Mule’. The soldiers of 21 Army Group had a good administrative system to support them in the front line. Post arrived regularly (as it did to the BEF in WW1), cooked hot food, ammo and spares were brought forward to them and BCRs were drafted in as needed – British soldiers with wounded on pack mules travelling over rough terrain noting that the army was short of infantryman then, as it is (IWM) today. No one expected soldiers to fight with their large pack on their back. However good the explanation for the equipment I wonder if the Army Training and Recruiting Agency uses that carried by an infantryman in Afghanistan, the Sydneys of this formula? Does the Military Secretary appoint on these criteria? world will wonder if that is really wise and would suggest that Do cadre courses test for harmony and a sense of the some discretion is in order – and a modern load carrier please. ridiculous? Well, if you do, then I suggest that you have an army that will not perpetrate atrocities. An infantry company in Understandably, many authors of war memoirs spend time on an occupied country in war which hands back to the German their early life or the Regiment in peace and war. And they owner the silver cutlery it borrowed for dinner is unlikely to kill often make for good reading – an outstanding example is prisoners or rape women. General David Fraser’s – Wars and Shadows. But Sydney Jary writes about fighting a platoon, which includes the men in it. These men out-fought the Germans. They did not manage it The men of 18 Platoon fought a decent war, as he says immediately, but once they had gained the bitter experience “Aggression increases the farther one goes behind the lines”, and they beat the Wehrmacht. 18 Platoon took on Panzer troops, he lists the qualities of a soldier, Fallschirmjaeger and SS troops. They killed and captured at a most favourable ratio. Indeed, 18 Platoon led the 2nd Army advance from Cleve to Bedburg at a rate of 3 miles in the morning, pretty good going for a dismounted platoon with no artillery or armour support, brushing aside the opposition by their skill and manoeuvre. Of course, it came at a price: 4 Som LI lost 47 officers and 1,266 soldiers killed or wounded from Normandy to North Germany, (the battalion establishment was 36 + 809). It is possible to fight hard and decently and 18 Platoon explains why it is that the British Army can do that. Our Army’s record is not perfect, just better than any other.

In a sense Sydney Jary has never grown up. He left the Army in 1947 from Palestine and built up a successful business as a Bren Gun Carrier publisher. So, his military experience stopped at the platoon level and he has been left uncorrupted by the experience of more senior command in a peacetime army, which has allowed “..sufferance, without which one couldn’t survive…a quiet him to write solely about the platoon at war. The success of 18 mind, which enables a soldier to live in harmony…a sense Platoon and its enduring appeal to a new generation of soldiers of the ridiculous which helps a soldier to surmount the is easy to understand when you have read this short and simply unacceptable. Add to these a reasonable standard of written book by a good soldier and writer. physical fitness and a dedicated professional competence, and you have a soldier for all seasons.” John Wilson 

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have a lot to learn and I did so in substantial part by listening to what he had to say. Readers of this book will have a similar The Insurgent experience. He has the knack for, as the Americans put it, ‘cutting to the chase’—demystifying a (now) highly popular Archipelago: From Mao subject plagued by too much punditry and humbuggery, cutting away extraneous and tangential detail to focus on the to Bin Laden - John underlying dynamics of the phenomenon under study.

Mackinlay The book is sweeping, as the subtitle ‘From Mao to Bin Laden’ suggests; yet it is also admirably succinct at 292 pages Hurst and Company, 2009, £20, 292 pages + vii, including notes and index.2 In design it is exceedingly clear, ISBN: 1 84904013 3 consisting of three parts—‘Maoism’, ‘Post-Maoism’, and ‘Responding to Post-Maoism’, which reflect the basic components of his argument. Insurgency’s classical form is the John Mackinlay has been thinking about insurgency and brainchild of the carnivorously ambitious strategic and political counterinsurgency in one way or another for the better part of genius Mao Zedong who gave meaning to the now familiar a lifetime, from 1964 when he first reported for duty in Borneo bumper sticker that insurgency is ’80 per cent political and 20 as a junior officer in the 6th Gurkha Rifles, and then after a per cent military’. Mao’s innovation was to figure out what to twenty-year military career as a research academic during which fill that 80 per cent with: industrial scale political subversion time he has written many highly regarded scholarly articles and by which he was able to harness the latent power of an monographs on the subject. This book, The Insurgent aggrieved population to the wagon of political change, to whit Archipelago, is the product of those many years of observation the victory of the Chinese Communist Party in the Chinese Civil and thought. It is an important book because unusually for the War which ended with the proclamation of the People’s Republic insurgency and counterinsurgency literature which, as I shall of China in 1949.3 This ‘Maoist prototype’ of insurgency was describe below, is relatively slow-moving, and repetitive (even subsequently adopted and adapted widely by various static), it has something new to say. It is a timely book revolutionaries in the course of the myriad ‘wars of national because eight years into the inaptly named ‘Global War on liberation’ which wracked the decolonizing world from the Terror’, about which Mackinlay says insightful and needful 1940s through to the beginning of the 1970s. Western things, with the cost in blood and treasure of the two major countries, most notably Britain, in turn, developed techniques expeditionary campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan far exceeding of defeating Maoism which were laid down in doctrine and in the hopes and expectations of those who launched them, and quasi-doctrinal works such as those of Thompson, Galula, and with meaningful success still elusive, it is past time for a Kitson.4 Though unevenly applied in practice and repeatedly strategic rethink. This elegantly written book, without jargon forgotten by the major armies of the world, there exists a well- and largely unburdened by academic hokum, provides an developed body of theory informed by practice for defeating essential guide to the ‘when the rubber hits the road’ issues of Maoism. The celebrated US Army/Marine Corps field manual FM global insurgency, what it is, how to understand it, and, 3-24 Counterinsurgency represents something of an apotheosis possibly, how to deal with it. of this genre.5

But by way of full disclosure before I review the book’s most The problem is that what we now face in the form of ‘global important findings I should tell a short story. Just over five insurgency’ is not Maoism but Post-Maoism—a form of years ago I was sat with John Mackinlay on the pleasant insurgency which differs significantly from that which preceded terrace of Somerset House on The Strand, which is located it.6 We have, in essence, been searching for the right tool to beside King’s College London, where we both have the pleasure defeat today’s most virulent insurgency in the wrong conceptual of working in the War Studies Department, talking about an tool box. This is perhaps the most uncomfortable truth to be article I was writing on the adaptation of land forces to laid out in this book; another worrying one is that the security operating in the environment which Rupert Smith describes as interests of Western Europe differ markedly from those of the ‘amongst the people’.1 This was a new area of research for me United States—because the threat in the former emerges from and so, naturally, I craved the advice of the most their own undigested Muslim minorities which are alienated knowledgeable of my more senior colleagues on the matter: further by their involvement in expeditionary campaigns which, John Mackinlay. ‘You’ve got a lot to learn about insurgency’, he arguably at least, serve the needs of the latter well enough. remarked after hearing my plan. I write this for three reasons. But there are many other useful observations in the book First, obviously, because I must declare a bias in reviewing the which, perforce, in the interests of time and space I shall book of a colleague whom I admire and with whom I work aggregate and summarize them into just two for the purposes closely; second, because it illustrates, I think, one of of this review. Mackinlay’s qualities—he is willing to speak uncomfortable truths; and third because he is a good teacher. I did indeed The first of these is that whereas the study of insurgency and

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counterinsurgency has been static and repetitive for decades, more than a secondary weapon, valuable only if intended to inform and not to fool.9 meticulously combing through the same campaigns—Malaya, Vietnam and Algeria, for the most part—and, more or less, There is much wisdom in what Galula says in general but this coming up with the same conclusions,7 the practice of passage in particular represents one of the most fundamental insurgency has not; it is constantly changing and therefore and widespread theoretical mistake in the entire literature. what worked to defeat it in the past may not necessarily work Facts speak louder than words for both sides; both sides strive again. The second is that insurgency naturally reflects the to shape the information environment in part through society from which it emerges. Insurgents exploit the features harnessing the media; in crude terms, the job of the of whatever terrain that is available to them in order to offset counterinsurgent propagandist is to make the insurgents stand the gross disproportion of their military strength as opposed to up for their actions.10 that of the government and its security forces which they oppose. If what’s available is steaming jungle then it is But this is also why the book is to be treasured for what beneath its leaf-thatched and leach-infested canopy that they Mackinlay does, unusually for this literature, is say something will make their encampments; if it is trackless desert then like new. With The Insurgent Archipelago he has planted a flag on Lawrence of Arabia it is in that vastness that they will lose new territory which others may explore too, to contest or to themselves; similarly, if it is dense urban conglomeration that confirm. His theory is complete and clearly articulated and defines their territory than they will hide in plain sight in the sorely needed. It deserves to be apprehended by all those anonymous multitude; and if, as Mackinlay argues, their milieu whose task it is to defeat the challenges posed to the post- is the increasingly globally networked and borderless human industrial West by global insurgency. Looking for the cutting society that will mean that it is the ‘virtual territories of the edge of theory on insurgency and counterinsurgency? Here it is. mind’ that they will seek to exploit. This is not so much true of the counterinsurgent, however, because the counterinsurgent David Betz possesses infinitely more baggage—a fact which was apprehended so clearly and presciently by C.E. Callwell a hundred years ago when he observed that the fundamental asymmetry between insurgency and counterinsurgency lies in 1 Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern the fact that, while tactics favour the regular army, strategy World (London: Penguin, 2006). favours the irregular.8 Insurgency naturally reflects the society from which it emerges; counterinsurgency, by contrast, must 2 Compare this with Robert Asprey’s two-volume 2000 plus pages War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History (Lincoln, NE: iUniverse, consciously laboriously adapt structure, organization, and 2002) which says much less in almost ten times the length. mindset to the realities of the new environment. If the insurgent is the proverbial ‘fish’ swimming amongst the sea of 3 See Peter Zarrow, China in War and Revolution, 1895–1949 the people, as Mao put it, the counterinsurgent tends to be the (Abingdon: Routledge, 2005). metaphorical fish out of water. 4 See Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency (St. Petersburg, FL: Hailer, 2005—originally published 1966); David This is not a book to be agreed with a priori; Mackinlay has a Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (New York: story to tell—albeit a carefully constructed one informed by a Praeger, 1964); and, Frank Kitson, Low-intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency and Peacekeeping (London: Faber and Faber, lifetime of study—but a story nonetheless which he invites the 1971). reader to come along with. Not all readers will or necessarily should. Rather this is a book to be challenged by, to consider 5 United States Army and Marine Corps, FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency carefully and deliberately, and to debate. I myself who have (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006). good reason to agree with most of it cannot bring myself to 6 On ‘global insurgency’ see David Kilcullen, ‘Countering Global agree with all of it. Mackinlay, for instance, identifies Insurgency’, Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 28, No. 4 (2005), Propaganda of the Deed as the essence of the global insurgent’s 597–617, and by the same author The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting concept of operations. He maintains that it is solely a tool of Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One (London: Hurst, 2009). the insurgent and not one available to the counterinsurgent. I 7 There is little difference in the spirit or even the detail of the personally am not ready to concede that point—though to principles of counterinsurgency outlined by Thompson, Galula, or Mackinlay’s credit I have not a better theory yet. I am, instead, Kiston, noted above, or for that matter in Charles Gwynn’s Imperial simply reminded of Galula’s famous injunction about the Policing (London: Macmillan, 1934). asymmetry of insurgent and counterinsurgent propaganda: 8 C.E. Callwell, Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice (London: HMSO, 1906), 85. The insurgent, having no responsibility, is free to use every 9 Galula, 14. trick […] Consequently, propaganda is a powerful weapon for him […] The counterinsurgent is tied to his 10 See Neville Bolt and David Betz, Propaganda of the Deed 2008:  responsibilities and to his past, and for him, facts speak Understanding the Phenomenon (London: RUSI, 2008). louder than words […] For him, propaganda can be no

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The role of General George Monck is common knowledge to the successors of those hardy men who spent three cold weeks in a Northern Ireland – The muddy village aptly named Coldstream in December 1659, but is not so well known to others. With good intelligence, Monck, a Politics of War and former royalist and now Parliamentarian General Officer Commanding Scotland, who was more fearful of anarchy than Peace - Paul Dixon monarchy, set out for London on 1st January 1660 to oversee the recalled ‘Convention’ Parliament which debated the return of King Charles the Second. While based in Berwick, Monck used Palgrave, Second Edition, 2008, pp 405, ‘commissioners’ and paid agents to keep him in touch with ISBN 10: 0-230-50779-4 events across England and Ireland: he was giving instructions to trusted people in places as far away as West Cornwall. In late 1659, Monck interpreted the signs of growing popular Paul Dixon is a senior lecturer at Kingston University. His feeling against the army-backed London government well: his account of Northern Ireland is thus from an academic rather march Southwards was unopposed as a result. than a military perspective. He covers the history of the Northern Irish conflict through the lenses of: Power, Ideology The author of Cavalier and Roundhead Spies, Julian Whitehead, And Reality; Partition and Civil Rights; the Crisis of Policy 1968- was commissioned into the Intelligence Corps in 1966 and has 73; the First Peace Process 1972-4; Withdrawal to Integration combined historical interests with Service knowledge to 1974 -81; the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement; and the Good Friday produce this account of ‘intelligence’ in its broadest sense Agreement et seq since 1998. The political ground is thus well during this turbulent period. The Preface, however, reads like covered. This is an ideal text book for those wishing to the opening Royal Military Academy Sandhurst lecture on understand how, why and where we have come from over the Intelligence, and jargon terms like SIGINT, IMINT, ELINT, past century. It has received judicious acclaim from seriously JSTARS and GCHQ leap from the page, surprising in a book on well placed academics such as Paul Bew and Jonathan Tongue. decades in the Seventeenth Century. The acronyms do show, It is not an easy read but Paul Dixon, nevertheless, covers his however, that this country today has a professional intelligence ground admirably. system – and spark the thought that however sophisticated the product, leaders, then as now, need good judgement to David Benest  capitalise on the information presented.

Julian Whitehead uses few original sources, and some of the books quoted, and historical interpretations are dated. His Cavalier and judgements on some tactical actions are also debatable: intelligence failures were not always the reason for Civil War Roundhead Spies: defeats. That said, the approach is reasonably effective, and he describes quite well how the intelligence side of the campaigns Intelligence in the Civil was managed, sometimes with very sparse ‘intelligence’ derived from intercepted letters, observation from reconnaissance or War and Commonwealth routine reporting, or questioning those A1 sources: fearful innkeepers, wary landowners and unemployed soldiers. - Julian Whitehead The timeliness of intercepted and deciphered letters meant that they tended to contribute more to strategic intelligence, but Pen and Sword, 2009, Hbk; £19.99 , pp 243, better organised scouting certainly influenced tactical actions. ISBN: 978 1 84415 957 4 The author introduces practitioners of military ‘scouting’ or reconnaissance, codebreakers, including Sir Samuel Luke, and others like the administrator, postmaster general and Cavalier and Roundhead Spies is an unusual hybrid: it combines intelligence director John Thurloe, although it is surprising that a military history of the English Civil War and Commonwealth the awful description of John Wallis as ‘a GCHQ, albeit of only period (1649-60) with a commentary on the role that one person’ escaped the editor’s blue pencil. intelligence played, at least where evidence allows. The Commonwealth era occupies over half the book, but the The coverage of counter-intelligence during the Commonwealth descriptions of the infamous Rule of the Major Generals and the may have less interest for general readers but the book explains collapse of the army junta in 1659 following Oliver Cromwell’s Cromwell’s efforts and sketches in General Monck’s intelligence death and his son Richard’s disinclination to assume the Lord methods. The Commonwealth was unstable and subject to Protector’s mantle make interesting reading. several coup attempts, including one by the Fifth Monarchist

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Thomas Venner in 1657. Venner’s plot was discovered and he to remain: Pen and Sword could do with a good Colour Sergeant was locked in the Tower. After the Restoration, the New Model shouting ‘attention to detail’ on a regular basis. A fair degree of Army was disbanded, and all but Monck’s Regiments of Horse knowledge of the period is assumed, and there are some and Foot had gone when, in January 1661, Venner led an historical confusions, notably regarding the sieges of Bristol. uprising in the City of London. Monck’s Regiment restored There are no maps. That said, this is an intriguing account of order, and this led to the last-minute decision to allow Monck the Civil War and Commonwealth period from the military and to keep his regiments in the royal Army (it was not really the intelligence perspective. At a discounted price of less than British Army until 1707). Monck’s Regiment of Foot became ‘His £15.00, Cavalier and Roundhead Spies represents reasonable Majesty’s Coldstream Regiment of Foot Guards’ after its value, and perhaps offers a way of explaining intelligence to Colonel’s death in 1670. novices to the business. I recommend it, but with reservations.

There are some disappointing features to the book. Poor editing Hugh Boscawen  and proofreading have allowed howlers and typographical errors

Communications) Brigade, Royal Signals. 253 Medical Regiment (102 Logistic Brigade) stood by to provide Barker Crossing – emergency first aid to personnel on the bridging site.

All these units and brigades are commanded by HQ Theatre Theatre Troops Troops which demonstrates the span of utility and capability within the command. This capability was then given to the – Specialist Support local Brigade HQ in the NW (42 Bde) to command, which then used it to carry out the bridging operation itself. Most military eyes are on operations in Afghanistan at the to Operations moment but when Cumbria County Council asked for assistance during the recent heavy rains and flooding the Army was called in. The Chief Executive of the county council Maj PLC Crook TD RWxY formally asked for assistance on the 26th of November and work began immediately. The forward assembly area for the bridging equipment was established at Halton Training Camp On Monday 7th of December 2009 a temporary pedestrian near Lancaster and the bridging site itself was to be crossing known as Barker Crossing was opened across the commanded by CO 64 Works Group with the immediate River Derwent. This linked north and south Workington for the surrounding area under the command of CO The 4th Battalion first time since local bridges were damaged and brought down the Duke of Lancaster's Regiment (V) (4 Lancs). The building as a result of flooding. of the bridge itself was carried out by 3 Armoured Engineer Squadron from 22 Engineer Regiment. The HQ of 42 NW The operation to erect the Logistic Support Bridge was carried Brigade was established at Preston and this Brigade HQ out by 64 Works Group RE of 170 Infrastructure Support Group coordinated the entire operation together with the Police and commanded by 8 Force Engineer Brigade. The bridge was County Council. At the same time the Minister for the Armed transported by the men and women of 27 Transport Regiment, Forces had granted permission to call out the Higher Royal Logistic Corps, part of 101 Logistic Brigade. Readiness Reserves of the TA who had been standing by for Communications to support the whole military effort, the civil just such an emergency. authorities and the bridging task were provided by 2 (National It is easy to see the complete coordination of effort from central government, through the County Council and local Police, down to the local Brigade and to the units actually doing the work. HQ Theatre Troops provided the technical expertise to carry out the transport and bridging operations together with the communications plan and medical support. The local regional forces helped with security and other aspects of the task.

A combination of Regular and Territorial Royal Signals, including Higher Readiness Reserves personnel from 10 Preparing the Site Signals Regt and 32 Signals Regt (V) deployed an Immediate

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Response Team to Carlisle Castle to provide communications The team assembled the bridge on rollers and pushed it across support with the Airwave system. A second Immediate the river from the south side. It used 17 pairs of 3m long Response Team from 10 Signals Regt moved up to Stafford to prefabricated steel truss panels braced together. The main be prepared to support other elements. At the same time a bridge section was guided at the front by 12 lightweight truss Command Support Team from 32 Sig Regt (V) deployed from sections acting as a “nose”. A counterweight was fitted to the Edinburgh to support the GOLD HQ in Penrith. All of this was back section of the structure during the push to prevent it commanded by 32 Sig Regt (V) RHQ based in Glasgow, which from dipping. The trusses are linked by transverse steel also had further Higher Readiness Reserves mobilised in transom beams which carry a proprietary Mabey Bridge support of the Operations Room. decking system.

The actual construction of the bridge was carried out by 3 So the people of Workington now have a functioning foot Armoured Engineer Squadron of 22 Engineer Regt under the bridge which allows them to get across the River Derwent supervision of 64 Works Group RE who designed the solution. until a permanent bridge is built. In spite of the pressures of the operational tempo in Afghanistan and elsewhere, the Most of the Royal Engineers' bridge kit is currently in use in Army rose to the challenge and provided aid to Cumbria Afghanistan, so the bridge was built from available parts from County Council. HQ Theatre Troops and its brigades and units two bridges that eventually formed a single lane, 51m long, played a crucial part in this operation thus demonstrating the steel truss bridge. The structure is a Mabey Bridge Compact considerable capabilities both Regular and TA within the 200 panel bridge _ typically used as a military logistics command.  support bridge.

The Team

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