Prospettive Della Sicurezza in Europa

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Prospettive Della Sicurezza in Europa Ricerca CeMiSS 2008 Prospettive della sicurezza in Europa Direttore Dottor Andrea Grazioso I INDICE Sintesi I Executive Summary IV Introduzione 1 I Trattati e gli Accordi di limitazione degli armamenti e di disarmo 7 Le formazioni multinazionali euro-atlantiche 22 Scenari di confronto 31 Conclusioni 57 Annessi Evoluzione degli apparati militari 65 Spesa militare 120 II Sintesi In questo studio si tenta di individuare alcuni dei più probabili elementi di minaccia alla sicurezza dei Paesi del Continente europeo, sulla base dei trend in atto. Per questo esercizio si è necessariamente dovuto restringere il campo dell’analisi, ed in particolare si è deciso di far riferimento ad un concetto di sicurezza “forte”, quella “ hard security ” che viene convenzionalmente associata alla sicurezza “militare”. Si tratta di una scelta consapevolmente “contro-corrente”, giacché da molti anni ormai sembra essere prediletta l’analisi di un più largo spettro di minacce, e quindi un concetto più allargato di sicurezza. Si è invece ritenuto opportuno tornare a ragionare attorno al problema della “ hard security ”, o della “difesa” in senso tradizionale, perché negli ultimi anni si sono sostanzialmente modificate alcune delle condizioni che avevano permesso di “mettere in naftalina” le idee più tradizionali, associate al periodo della Guerra Fredda. La NATO, e parallelamente la dimensione di sicurezza e difesa dell’Unione Europea, sono cambiate sostanzialmente negli ultimi quindici anni, riorientando la loro finalità sempre più verso la proiezione di stabilità al di fuori del Continente europeo, o dell’area euro-atlantica. La postura militare dei Paesi europei è sostanzialmente cambiata, soprattutto attraverso la riduzione degli apparati militari e la costituzione di un crescente numero di Forze multinazionali. Ma con una sostanziale trasformazione della postura di Mosca, relativamente ai rapporti con i Paesi dell’Occidente, in tempi molto brevi sono emersi nuovi fattori di attrito che dovrebbero far riaccendere i riflettori dell’attenzione relativamente ai rischi per la sicurezza dei Paesi europei. In un ristretto lasso temporale, il cui inizio potrebbe essere fatto simbolicamente coincidere con il discorso di Vladimir Putin alla Conferenza sulla Sicurezza di Monaco di Baviera, nel Febbraio del 2007, la Russia ha adottato una serie di misure che vanno in una direzione diametralmente opposta al cammino di avvicinamento e di integrazione seguito nei quindici anni precedenti. In particolare, la sospensione del rispetto delle clausole del Trattato CFE, il breve ma violento conflitto in Georgia e da ultimo la minaccia di dispiegare missili balistici nell’exclave di Kaliningrad, associata alla minaccia di denuncia del Trattato INF, inducono ad un rapido ripensamento su quella che è l’attuale condizione di sicurezza in Europa, nonché sulla validità delle scelte in materia di approntamento delle Forze fatte dalla NATO e dalla UE in questi anni. I In questo studio, quindi, si è inteso ripercorrere in maniera sintetica lo sviluppo di quella serie di misure di confidenza e di sicurezza reciproche che a partire dagli anni Settanta, hanno segnato il progresso nel clima di stabilità in Europa, fino a sfociare nei Trattati e negli Accordi di limitazione degli armamenti e di disarmo della fine degli anni Ottanta e dei primi anni Novanta. Si è poi cercato di sintetizzare la natura e le caratteristiche di quelle formazioni militari multinazionali che sono state approntate in questi ultimi anni. Successivamente, si sono passati in rassegna i punti di crisi oggi aperti sul Continente europeo, inclusi quelli solo latenti. Si sono delineati in tal modo gli scenari per un possibile confronto, politico ma anche militare. È in questo nuovo contesto, che tratteggia inaspettatamente molti dei caratteri tipici dello scenario precedente alla fase di disgelo e di disarmo, che i Paesi europei, la NATO e l’Unione Europea, dovranno nuovamente misurare le loro capacità e la loro compattezza. Il secondo punto, quello della “compattezza”, inteso come capacità di elaborare soluzioni condivise e, soprattutto, attuarle, è eminentemente politico. Da questo punto di vista, la situazione in cui versano sia il processo di “approfondimento” del legame europeo, sia il percorso di adeguamento dell’Alleanza Atlantica alla nuova realtà, pongono diversi motivi di preoccupazione. Esiste però anche un problema di capacità, ovvero di adeguatezza degli strumenti militari sviluppati negli ultimi dieci anni rispetto alle necessità attuali e del prevedibile futuro. Le Forze multinazionali di intervento, concepite quali strumenti altamente duttili e reattivi, ma finalizzati essenzialmente all’intervento nella gestione delle crisi, probabilmente non sono lo strumento idoneo a fronteggiare i nuovi rischi, a rispondere alle nuove necessità. Il pesante fardello rappresentato dalla condotta di operazioni complesse e molto prolungate ha infatti imposto una revisione al ribasso delle capacità esprimibili dalla NRF, semplicemente perché i Paesi Membri non dispongono delle capacità per mantenere contemporaneamente un congruo numero di Reparti fuori area, in missioni impegnative, e al tempo stesso Forze di alta qualità in stand -by . In altri termini, la logica alla base delle Forze multinazionali di intervento sembra vacillare, stante la nuova realtà che si sta affermando in Europa. Troppo basso è il consenso in ambito alleato circa le questioni cruciali che si stanno delineando, o che hanno già raggiunto la nostra soglia di casa, e troppo alto il rischio di un confronto militare “vero”, contro uno Stato militarmente organizzato, propenso all’uso della forza militare molto più di quanto non lo sia la maggioranza dei Paesi europei. II Sembrerebbe allora necessario rimettere in discussione l’attuale organizzazione e struttura della Forze, nell’attesa che anche l’architettura istituzionale ed il processo decisionale dell’Alleanza Atlantica e dell’Unione Europea si adeguino alle necessità. Una delle possibili soluzioni potrebbe essere rappresentata da uno schieramento avanzato di pacchetti di Forze, fornite da quei Paesi Membri che avessero “sovranamente” deciso di partecipare a quella specifica operazione. Ma questo genere di nuova “mappa degli impegni” confliggerebbe, molto probabilmente, con i già numerosi doveri che i Paesi europei hanno assunto, o ritengono di dover assumere, per la soluzione delle crisi nella altre aree del globo. Sarebbe ad esempio molto difficile reperire le Forze per condurre una difesa avanzata della Regione dell’Artico, degli Stati Baltici, del Mar Nero, ed al tempo stesso mantenere gli attuali impegni in Afghanistan, nei Balcani e potenzialmente in Africa. Delle scelte, quindi, si imporranno, e la prima occasione per verificare l’interesse dei Paesi della Comunità euroatlantica a perseguire nuove strade sarà data dalla revisione del Concetto Strategico della NATO, che partirà verosimilmente nel corso del 2009. III Executive summary The purpose of this study is to identify the rising threats to the security of European continent. As for the definition of “security”, in this study the guideline is to assess the so-called “hard security” issues, that is those elements that directly affect the traditional, military-related defence. Although the idea of security has been broadened during the last decade, encompassing today a more comprehensive criteria and including trans-national crime, terrorism and perhaps even the security of our “welfare system”, there is definitely room for the analysis of the traditional concept of military defence. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, as well as the defence and security dimension of the European Union, deeply changed their posture over the last decade. After the end of the Cold War, both the Organisation re-oriented their attention towards the “projection of stability”, beyond their own territorial reach. Therefore, the crisis-response operation have become the major commitment of NATO and EU Members, and of the two Organisation as well. However, the unexpected change in Russia’s attitude, as far as the relations with the West are concerned, substantially changed the scenario. Over the last two years, and more specifically after the speech of President Putin in Munich, in February 2007, Russian Federation has made a sort of “U” turn in its path of increased closeness with Western democracies. In few months, Russia suspended its participation to the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, invaded Georgia and acknowledged the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and more recently threatened to deploy ballistic missiles in the territory of Kaliningrad, in the middle of European continent. All these changes require a new assessment of the present level of military security for European countries. In this report, those treaties and agreements on force reduction and disarmament signed between the end of the Eighties and the early Nineties have been re-analyzed, in order to assess their importance and enduring relevance. Also, there is a critical review of the very concept of the multi-national military forces, created but seldom employed by NATO’s and EU’s countries during the last fifteen years. After that, the authors have surveyed four scenarios of possible confrontation between Russia and Western states, namely the contentious issue of the anti-ballistic system in IV Poland and Czech Republic; the Russia-Ukraine dispute over Crimea and the naval base of Sevastopol; the ongoing confrontation in Southern Caucasus, both for territorial
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