NR 1 january/MARS 2010

The Origins and the First Years of the Battlegroups by Tommi Koivula

it has become nearly commonplace to The inquiry is both European and political claim that the European Security and De- in nature: it focuses on the general European fence Policy (ESDP) has made substantial and global political currents influencing the pro­gress in recent years. A somewhat less emergence of the Battlegroup concept and obvious statement is that we have within the early decisions on their utilization. the last few years witnessed a qualitative The structure of the article is as fol- step in which the EDSP has entered into a lows. The second section focuses on the new operational phase in which its focus background of the European Security and has moved from treaties establishing vari- Defence Policy, starting with the post-Cold ous institutional arrangements to ways of War international environment and the im- implementing them. plications made of it in Europe. This will be The emergence of the European Union followed by a discussion on the stages of the Battlegroups (EUBGs), which reached their institutional birth of the Battlegroup con- Full Operational Capability (FOC) in Janu- cept, discussing the ary 2007, was an important milestone in process, the European Security Strategy and this development. From that point onwards, Operation Artemis as the three decisive fac- the EU has had a capacity to undertake two tors behind its creation. Subsequently, the concurrent single Battlegroup-sized response attention turns to the more recent experi- operations, including the ability to launch ences, with special emphasis on the issue both operations almost simultaneously. of the use of the Battlegroup as a part of However, while a number of both civil- the EU response to the Israeli incursion into ian and military crisis management opera- Lebanon in 2006 and to the ongoing situa- tions have been conducted under the EU flag tions in the Democratic Republic of Congo since 2003,1 thus far the Battlegroups have and Darfur. Finally, consideration will be not been utilized in any one of them. As a given to the explaining factors behind their consequence, there have been occasional non-utilization and their future prospects. signs of frustration because of the inactivity of this standby instrument. Why EUBGs? The pages of this article are devoted to the questions of why and how the European The harsh realities of the post- Union Battlegroup concept came into exist­ ence and where we now stand after a few Cold World War years of their full operational capability. The story of coordinated European defence

110 DISKUSSION & DEBATT was in practice a taboo during the Cold War. during several years of brutal war, politi- There was an effort to initiate an arrange- cal instability and continuous violations of ment called the European Defence Com- international justice by all warring parties. munity, which would have included the po- A further embarrassment for the Europeans tentiality of a European Army, but it failed was that a political solution to the Balkans to be ratified in August 1954. Although the crisis was only reached after Nato, in other Western European Union (WEU) was oc- words the United States, a non-European casionally referred to as a European forum power, became resolute enough to use its for discussing security questions, its military political and military might to enforce peace significance and political role was marginal. in the area – after the various and often con- Thus, Western European security remained tradictory European voices had fallen on a Nato monopoly until the fall of the Berlin deaf ears. Wall.2 Another painful reminder of Europe’s in- After the end of the Cold War, a latent ability to act took place in Rwanda during division of labour emerged between the Eu- the spring of 1994, when full-scale genocide ropean Community, which was focused on was perpetrated by the extreme Hutus close economic integration, and the Atlantic Al- to the Rwandan government within a mat- liance, which found fresh impetus in laying ter of only a few weeks, causing the death of the foundations for new political relations at least 800 000 people. All this time the in- with liberated Central and Eastern Euro- ternational community looked on and won- pean countries.3 dered whether something ought to be done. Some efforts were made towards stronger However, these tragedies were not just coordination of the defence policies of Euro- examples of European powerlessness. An- pean countries, but they met with no success. other failed organisation in this respect was However, progress was more significant in the United Nations, since these cases illus- the field of foreign policy. As a concrete result trated the severe shortcomings of the mul- of these efforts, the leaders of the European tilateral approach to international security Community agreed on the development and crisis management. of a Common Foreign and Security Policy This was particularly distressing from (CFSP), including the eventual framing of the European perspective, since the Euro- a common defence policy, “which might in pean Union was composed of a number of time lead to a common defence” in a treaty small and medium-sized states very closely signed in Maastricht in 1992.4 connected to the world economy and with It was soon realised, however, that the strong interests in maintaining peace and post-Cold War world, or post-Cold War Eu- stability all over the world. Europe was al- rope for that matter, did not prove to be the ready a prominent player in world politics, peaceful and ever more prosperous place being a major donor of international aid that had been anticipated in the most opti- and assistance and producing a large share mistic accounts. A striking and tragic lesson of the world’s GDP. Still, regarding the ca- in this was provided in Yugoslavia, where pacity to affect military crises elsewhere, the a series of bloody wars erupted after 1991. EU and its individual member states lacked Europeans in general and the EU in particu- the necessary resources. The Europeans were lar were both anxious and frustrated to see natural proponents of multilateral coopera- that they were almost completely helpless tion, which, however, did not seem to work.

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Militarily, the Europeans were almost civilian crisis management, and that actual totally dependent on the resources of their combat was just one element among others. powerful ally, the United States. Basically, All the same, from now the reorganisation the United States was willing to encourage of defence emerged on the European agen- the development of better European crisis da, with an added emphasis on force projec- management capabilities, at least to the ex- tion and the management of far-off crises.7 tent that these capabilities would not chal- This reorganisation, However, turned out to lenge U.S. military might. The Americans be a slow business. wanted its allies to do more, either on a bi- The Amsterdam Treaty of 1996 marked lateral basis with the American military, or the beginning of a conscious development within a UN or Nato framework, or even of the European Union’s crisis manage- within a purely European framework on ment capabilities. Among the most signifi- occasions when the U.S. decided not to be cant achievements of the Treaty was that, involved. thanks to an initiative by two new member Thus, step by step, a new kind of under- states with a background of neutrality, Swe- standing of the very basic European secu- den and , the Petersberg Tasks were rity deficit became widespread: even though incorporated into it and thus into the EU Europe’s political and economic capabilities agenda.8 were considerable, and even though the use of force was neither regarded as the first nor The Emergence of the the only way to deal with regional or inter- European Security and national crises, such as those in Yugoslavia or Rwanda, it became increasingly common Defence Policy to assess that the EU must have at its dis- During this process of building a Common posal a certain level of forces at a certain Foreign and Security Policy a spectrum of state of readiness and operational efficiency, opinions on European defence had emerged if only to widen its range of options when within the EU. It ran from countries such faced with a crisis and to facilitate decision- as the UK, Denmark and the , making at the highest political level.5 which had been consistently keen on main- As a consequence, a reorganisation of taining Nato, and thus U.S., involvement Europe’s military forces began in June 1992, in Europe, to France and Belgium, which brought about first and foremost by the had been most interested in building an Western European Union, (WEU), which autonomous EU capacity. Those members defined its operational roles in the Peters- which had been traditionally neutral (Aus- berg Declaration. These, later referred to as tria, Finland, Sweden and Ireland) had in the “Petersberg Tasks”, included ‘humani- turn been less ambitious about building tarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks anything resembling a European Army.9 and also tasks of combat forces in crisis Leaving this spectrum of opinions aside, management including peacemaking’.6 European defence issues had traditionally The Petersberg Tasks, although not yet been dominated by two member countries, adopted by the European Union at that France and Great Britain. Thus it was no time, were the first expression of Europe’s surprise that the launching of an indepen- new strategic environment. It is noteworthy dent European security and defence policy that these tasks included a strong element of was based on a declaration made by these

112 DISKUSSION & DEBATT two nations at St. Malo, in December 1998. tors, combining the European capacity for Much more surprising for many was the autonomous military action desired by the fact they were able to find a common un- French with the conformity with the Euro- derstanding over the future of European pean countries’ obligations to the Atlantic defence in their declaration. Therefore, the Alliance required by the British. As the St. St. Malo Declaration can in many senses be Malo Declaration puts it: interpreted as a small revolution in the Eu- ropean security setting. …The European Union must have the ca- The background to the declaration lay pacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to to a large extent in the minds of the British decide to use them, and a readiness to do decision-makers. By 1998, the Blair govern- so, in order to respond to international ment had grown increasingly frustrated over crises. Europe’s operational powerlessness, despite … In strengthening the solidarity be- its economic size, which was considerably tween the member states of the European greater than that of the US, and concluded Union, in order that Europe can make its that if the imbalance between the Europeans voice heard in world affairs, while acting in conformity with our respective obliga- and Americans continued the foundations tions in Nato, we are contributing to the of the Atlantic partnership would in the vitality of a modernised Atlantic Alliance long term be jeopardised. It was estimated which is the foundation of the collective by the British that the only way to solve this defence of its members.”11 problem and to safeguard the future of the Atlantic Alliance would be to somehow de- The logic behind this entente was clear, and velop European defence capabilities .10 so was its importance. It was and remains On the other hand, France had tradition- a generally known fact that Britain and ally been perhaps the strongest advocate of France were the two most influential EU the EU as a security policy actor and had countries in terms of security and defence seen it as a way of being better able to safe- issues. Consequently, when these two coun- guard French interests. The EU had tradi- tries reached agreement on the need for an tionally been regarded by France as a ne­ autonomous European security and defence cessary counterbalance to the perceived US policy and presented their common position global dominance. to the other EU countries, a rapid European- Now, at St. Malo, however, the French isation of the St. Malo Agreement followed were willing to reach a compromise by con- throughout 1999, very much helped by the fessing to the legitimacy of the Atlantic part- renewed European experiences of concern nership, which was a necessary prerequisite and powerlessness during the Kosovo con- for any European defence arrangement as flict the same year.12 In this way, the bilater- far as the British were concerned. The frus- al initiative became a European reality and trating experiences in the Balkans also played changed the European defence identity into a significant role in this case, as the recent ex- a European defence policy, the ESDP.13 perience of joint military operations in that Along with the Kosovo experience, a area helped the two countries to create an at- number of institutional steps were taken at mosphere of deepening mutual cooperation. the June 1999 in Cologne Thus, a historic compromise was reached to make a European defence policy possible between two major European military ac- in practical terms. Among them was the cre-

113 NR 1 january/MARS 2010 ation of a new central body in the CFSP and The aim was to place forces at the Union’s ESDP, the Political and Security Commit- disposal that would be capable of carrying tee (PSC), consisting of ambassadors of the out all the Petersberg missions, including the member states. Its purpose is to deal with all most demanding ones, in operations up to aspects of CFSP and ESDP in order to man- the army corps level, i.e. 50 000 to 60 000 age developing crises, carry out planning troops at 60 days’ notice. Member states work and advise the European Council. The undertook, by 2003, to deploy forces role of the PSC would become particularly important in the event of any deployment of Militarily self-sustaining with the neces- military forces from the Union, as it would sary command, control and intelligence then assume political control of the day-to- capabilities, logistics, other combat sup- port services and additionally air and day direction of military operations.14 naval elements, as appropriate. Member Another new organ was the Union’s most states should be able to deploy in full at senior military body, the European Union this level within 60 days, and within this Military Committee (EUMC), composed to provide smaller rapid response ele- of the chiefs of defence staff of the member ments available and deployable at a very countries or their representatives, the task of high level of readiness. They must be able which was to give advice and recommenda- to sustain such a deployment for at least one year.16 tions to the PSC. The European Union Mili- tary Staff (EUMS) in turn was established to Efforts to build European forces in this provide expertise for the PSC, in particular quantity nevertheless soon ran into po- in the conducting of a military crisis manage- litical, administrative and legal troubles in ment operation. Even though not equipped various member countries. Moreover, only sufficiently to serve as the headquarters of a few EU countries had any capability for a crisis management operation, it was to be transferring troops to distant areas in any responsible for early warning facilities, situ- quantity.17 ation evaluations and the strategic planning The next stage was to make up the short- of Petersberg missions. It was regarded as falls. The gap between what was required constituting a source of technical expertise to meet the Headline Goal and the forces for the Union on all aspects of security and actually committed by member states was defence, and as acting as an interface be- identified in the Helsinki Process Catalogue tween the political and military authorities (HPC) of June 2001, which served as a ba- within the Union.15 sis for discussions at the Union’s Conference on EU Capability Improvement in Novem- The institutional birth of the ber 2001, at which the European Capabili- ties Action Plan (ECAP) was launched. This EU Battlegroup concept: Action Plan dealt mostly with procurement Three prerequisites and structural or doctrinal initiatives, and therefore did not contribute directly to en- The Helsinki Headline hancing Europe’s crisis management capa- Goal process bility. In December 1999, just one year after St. Another complicating factor was that Malo, the EU Helsinki Summit set out the many EU countries had earmarked the same ESDP process Headline Goal objectives. troops for several pools and registers, i.e.

114 DISKUSSION & DEBATT besides being listed in the Helsinki Force threat and the Union’s own expansion. Catalogue, the same units were often also The reaction of the U.S. government listed for use by Nato and the UN (in its after the September 11 terrorist attack High Readiness Brigade SHIRBRIG).18 One brought to the surface a difference of per- practical consequence of this situation was ception between American and European that no new capability really emerged with security thinking that had perhaps already the Helsinki Headline Goal process, imply- existed behind the scenes for some time. In ing that the rapid, coordinated reaction re- this view, as reflected in the U.S. National quired by the politicians would be an over- Security Strategy of 2002, the Americans whelming task.19 were seen as having a higher propensity Even though the Headline Goal was de- for resorting to unilateral military action clared operational, with certain limitations, once they estimated that their security was at the Laeken European Council in Decem- threatened. This seemed to imply that the ber 2001, there was still a strong sense of Americans had distanced themselves from a lacking European capability. In the face the multilateral approach deemed so impor- of this situation, which would most likely tant in Europe.22 have required a serious longterm undertak- As time passed and the EU expanded dur- ing, the political current seemed to start to ing the late 1990s, and in anticipation of its favour more limited projects that would be major enlargement in 2004, the broader Eu- achievable in the near future term.20 The EU ropean security context also changed. The Battlegroups turned out to become the chief borders of the union were gradually mov- item among these undertakings. ing closer to “security hotspots,” so that a secure environment on the other side of the European Security Strategy Mediterranean, in North Africa, almost au- tomatically became a matter of paramount Thus, the heightened consciousness among importance, as was also the termination of European decision-makers and the politi- the ongoing conflicts in the Balkans. Apart cal developments described above notwith- from these two, there were other obvious standing, the EU lacked a comprehensive potential mission areas for the EU to be seen toolbox to the security issues surrounding in the Southern Caucasus and the Middle- it, and its security policy aims were more East. or less unclear.21 On the other hand, there Although this was not officially stated was a need for a roadmap which would anywhere, Africa was regarded as the main give a signal that the EU wished to be a operational area for the European Security credible security policy actor. The Euro- Strategy, and thus for the Battlegroups, too. pean Security Strategy was created to meet This emphasis was of course natural in the these shortcomings. sense that the Mediterranean Sea rather There was a clear sense of urgency be- brings Africa and Europe together than hind the EU Security Strategy, caused by separates them, a bond felt especially strong an increased awareness of the insecurity in by such member states as Spain and Italy. the contemporary world, in particular the The African emphasis in EU crisis manage- threat of international terrorism due to the ment efforts also fitted into the division of 9/11 incident and to worries about the way labour between the security organisations, in which the U.S. would respond to that since Nato and the United States tended to

115 NR 1 january/MARS 2010 be more interested in the Middle East and well informed about or interested in the in- the CIS area. dividual aspirations of small nations, whose On the other hand, it could also be ar- role then easily becomes one of adapting to gued that Britain and France had a partic- the requirements and concepts decided upon ular interest in Africa. Both of them hap- elsewhere. pened to be former major colonial powers The Security Strategy, which was first in Africa with considerable African popu- proposed by the High Representative for lations in their area. Britain and France the CFSP, Javier Solana, at the Thessaloniki also had substantial military resources and Summit in June 2003 and endorsed in Brus- experience, especially regarding African sels in December of the same year, stated countries. As a matter of fact, most of the very clearly that the EU needed to be a more remaining EU countries had a very limited active international player, more unified and amount of military power or know-how more able to take action. to add to these two countries’ capabilities The security strategy identified a num- regarding Africa. But politically, the other ber of risks and threats that needed to be EU countries were in a position to make a addressed. The key threats were terrorism, big difference. International attention be- WMD proliferation, regional conflicts, state comes essentially more positive if military collapse and organised crime.24 The EU operations are executed by the European response as envisioned in the strategy was Union rather than by these former colonial based on three pillars: first, response to the powers themselves. The fact that most of global threats of terrorism, WMD prolif- the manpower and expertise in a single op- eration and organised crime by recognising eration came from the former great pow- that the first line of defence now lies abroad; ers becomes less visible when it can be an- second, building security on the borders of nounced that the EU, as a whole or in part, Europe by consolidating stabilisation in the was involved.23 Balkans and extending economic and politi- From the viewpoint of small EU member cal cooperation to neighbours in the south states such as Sweden or Finland, the big and east and remaining engaged in and picture of the ESDP and Battlegroup devel- committed to the resolution of the Arab- opment contained mixed elements. On the Israeli conflict, which is a strategic priority; one hand, the whole process was in their and finally, upholding and developing inter- interests in many respects. By themselves national law, strengthening the United Na- they would not have been able to tackle the tions Charter and building an international numerous issues and problems that in any order based on effective multilateralism.25 case affect their living conditions, and join- The strategy also communicated the ne- ing forces was practically the only way to cessity for developing capabilities more sys- pursue the “effective multilateralism” which tematically through cooperation between they were so dependent upon. On the other the member states, as well as a need for more hand, the process remained a telling exam- flexible and mobile forces able to handle the ple of the relative position of small states in new threats. It gave a clear signal that EU international affairs, including those of the capabilities and those of the member states EU, in that the concept was negotiated and needed better coordination. With its insis- agreed upon between just a few influential tence on more flexible and mobile ability for states that may not have been particularly handling new security threats, the European

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Security Strategy serves as another direct Basically, the story of Artemis was sim- prerequisite for the Battlegroup concept. ple. The operation took place at the request of the United Nations and consisted of the Operation Artemis – the Battle- deployment of an Interim Emergency Mul- tinational Force in Bunia in the Ituri region. group concept introduced The aim of the mission was to contribute The beginning of the war in Iraq in the to the stabilisation of security conditions spring of 2003 caused a visible division in Bunia and to the improvement of the among the EU countries over whether to humanitarian situation, and to ensure the support the U.S. policy there or not. These protection of the airport, displaced persons divisions notwithstanding, which were per- and the civilian population. EU forces num- haps given too much attention in the public bering around 1800 troops from several EU eye, serious considerations about what the nations, but mostly from France acting as EU could do were going on in many mem- framework nation, stayed in the area until ber countries. 1 September and were replaced by troops Despite severe disagreement over the cri- under the auspices of the UN. Artemis was sis in Iraq, efforts to improve the ESDP in- thus a very limited operation in terms of stitutional settings and operational develop- time, space and resources.27 ments had continued and in fact intensified The completion of Artemis was greet- among the EU member states.26 Simultane- ed with satisfaction in the EU. While the ously, political pressures towards some sort achievements in terms of regional security of rapid progress in the ESDP increased, turned out to be relatively temporary, the and there was no objection to this being operation had demonstrated that the EU de- something concrete and high-profile. It was cision-making and military planning organs at this point that the predecessor of the EU were able to execute and finish a purely EU Battlegroup concept came into the picture. operation in a case of urgent need. It was The concrete development that was to also possible to interpret Artemis as a show- produce the EU Battlegroup concept had its case of successful multilateral crisis manage- origins in the European military operation ment versus the simultaneous unilateral U.S. Artemis that sought to tackle the rapidly de- involvement in Iraq. teriorating security situation in the Demo- Building on the success of Operation Ar- cratic Republic of Congo during the sum- temis, the dynamic security duo of France mer of 2003. Launched in June of that year, and the , this time along it was the first autonomous European crisis with Germany, presented the “battle group” management operation. Although agree- concept in February 2004 with a view to im- ment on the availability of Nato resources proving the EU’s capacity for rapid reaction. for EU operations had been reached just a Two months later EU defence ministers ap- few months earlier, Artemis was managed proved the trilateral proposal, transform- outside the “Berlin Plus” agreement and be- ing it into a European initiative. According yond the continent of Europe. The decision to this concept, battle groups, or “tactical to proceed with the operation was originally groups”, of approximately 1500 troops, in- made by the French, and it was meant to be cluding the appropriate support elements, a French operation, but by the summer of were to be formed ready for deployment 2003 it had become an EU operation. within 15 days. They should be capable of

117 NR 1 january/MARS 2010 high-intensity operations, either as stand- the ability to launch both operations almost alone forces or as initial-entry forces for op- simultaneously.31 erations on a larger scale. Another feature However, while a number of both civil- of these groups was that they were designed ian and military crisis management opera- to be either national or multinational, com- tions have been conducted by the EU since posed of troops from one or more member 2003, thus far the Battlegroups have not countries. In line with the European Security been utilized in any one of them. As a con- Strategy, these forces were designed specifi- sequence, critical tones and occasional signs cally, but not exclusively, for use in response of frustration have been expressed because to requests from the UN.28 of the inactivity of this rather costly standby Possible scenarios for these Battlegroups instrument. included support missions for the delivery There is no doubt that potential crises of humanitarian aid, evacuation operations, have existed. Conflicts, such as the Israeli conflict prevention, stabilisation operations invasion of Lebanon in 2006, or the con- and the separation of hostile parties. As the tinuously unstable situations in the Demo- concept was based on small force packages, cratic Republic of Congo or Darfur have all it significantly increased the flexibility and provided potential testing grounds to the deployability of the Union’s armed forces, BGs and for the EU to show decisive lead- and as such constitutes an important step ership envisioned in the European Security towards Headline Goal 2010.29 Strategy and the Headline Goal documents. A closer scrutiny of these cases and to the After full operational related pan-European discussion may pro- vide ideas to explain this apparent discrep- capability ancy between the ambition and the outcome Congo, Lebanon, Darfur: with the EU Battlegroups. unsuited cases or missed Lebanon 2006 opportunities? On 12 July 2006 Israel invaded Lebanese The period since Operation Artemis has territory after a cross-border raid by the seen an impressive growth of European Hezbollah organisation. After a few weeks Union crisis management activities with of intense fighting, a UNbrokered cease-fire over 20 launched EU civil and military op- came into effect on 14 August. Consequent- erations in the Balkans, Africa, Asia and ly, a rapid troop deployment by the interna- the Middle East.30 tional community in Southern Lebanon was Simultaneously, the ESDP structures called for, both in Europe and elsewhere. have been strengthened in several ways At that point, the idea of utilizing an EU with the introduction of such institutional Battlegroup in the area came to the fore, es- structures as the pecially as a potential initial entry force of (EDA). As a part of that development, the limited duration, supporting the larger UN EUBGs reached their Full Operational Ca- crisis management operation.32 pability (FOC) in January 2007. From that While France was initially somewhat point onwards, the EU has had a capacity hesitant about the idea (even though she to undertake two concurrent single Battle- eventually committed 2 000 troops to group-sized response operations, including UNIFIL II mission) and while Germany

118 DISKUSSION & DEBATT took a rather cautious approach towards Europe-wide pressure to show leadership, engaging her military in the Middle East, indicated strong reservations, for instance the most enthusiastic member state seems by publicly announcing that it would pro- to have been Italy, which saw the occa- vide no more than one-third of the troops sion as a window of opportunity to take required for the EUFOR.36 Another factor the lead in bolstering European efforts to contributing to EUGB inactivity was that revive the Middle East peace process and the mission was regarded as a planned one more broadly to inject momentum into the rather than one of crisis response.37 Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP).33 Late in 2008 the DRC again became a However, even though the EU member focus of international attention as tens of states did provide the backbone of the emerg- thousands of refugees took to the roads in ing UN peacekeeping force in Lebanon with the North Kivu area, despite a ceasefire an- almost 7 000 troops, it turned out that the EU nounced by the rebels on 29 October 2008. members were not able to yield the necessary There, renegade General Laurent Nkunda decision within the narrow EUBG “window of and his band of Tutsi fighters fought against opportunity” timeframe of a few critical days Hutu rebels, while the DRC army, backed and weeks in August, 2006. The opportunity, by the UN, tried unsuccessfully to force the if such a thing existed in the first place, evap­ peace. orated far too quickly for the Europe-wide po- For the EU, the developments raised the litical decision-making.34 issue of whether it should intervene, espe- cially after pressure from Belgium and a re- The Democratic Republic of quest from the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, asking the EU to provide a rapid Congo 2006 – 2008 reaction force to the scene. The scene of Operation Artemis, the Dem- In the face of the emerging humanitar- ocratic Republic of Congo, which con- ian disaster, one option would have been tinued to struggle with severe instability to deploy the then standby-ready Franco- was to attract the EU’s attention on sev- German Battlegroup, or the other standby eral occasions. In 2006, for example, the unit, the British Battlegroup. However, EU launched a military operation there in while France showed interest in the op- support of the UN mission MONUC to se- eration, the UK and Germany, along with cure and oversee the election process (Op- Spain and Italy, which were scheduled to eration EUFOR RD Congo). The military provide the following standby Battlegroup operation, which was conducted in full within a couple of months, were all hesi- agreement with the authorities of the DRC tant about sending a rapid reaction force and in close coordination with them and to the area. The most persistent stance was MONUC, was concluded on November taken by the UK government, whose For- 30, 2006.35 Although this autonomous EU- eign Minister David Miliband argued that led operation was conducted within the additional troops should be sent through framework of the ESDP, it did not involve the UN instead of the EU.38 The main rea- an EUBG either. This was partly because son for this decision was most likely that Germany, which was the framework nation the UK’s overstretched defence priorities at of the Battlegroup at that time in a stand- that time lie elsewhere – above all in Iraq by status and simultaneously a target of and Afghanistan to the extent that another

119 NR 1 january/MARS 2010 potentially long commitment was deemed Thus, opposing considerations notwith- to be out of the question. Through this, standing, the EU has so far ruled out em- any move to send a Battlegroup to Congo ploying the EUBGs to Darfur.42 Instead, was blocked. the outcome has been the EUFOR Tchad/ RCA operation which was approved by a Darfur UN peace-enforcement (not peacekeeping) A third recent potential testing ground for mandate: to provide refugee security and the EUBGs has been the conflict in the Dar- logistics in eastern Chad and in the north- fur region, in the western part of Sudan, eastern Central African Republic – in the vi- where a brutal civil war has been waged by cinity, but clearly outside the border of the the government against the regional rebel war-torn Darfur.43 The EU also stepped up groups. In fact, from the very early stages its financial support for the African Union of EUBG planning, Darfur had been raised Monitoring Mission (AMIS) in place in as a potential area of operations , stirring Darfur. Like the previous EU military mis- memories of the horrors that the interna- sions, here too the EU operation took the tional community saw in the Great Lakes form of a tailored force rather than a rapid region in the previous decade.39 reaction force. In the years 2007 and 2008, the ongoing drama in Darfur sparked some interven- An instrument in search tionist proposals, for instance in the Nor- dic countries. The main argument in this of a toolbox discussion was that while the Khartoum During their first years of existence, the government was unlikely to be deterred or Battlegroups have been subject to big ex- coerced by economic sanctions and diplo- pectations and political ambitions. While matic efforts alone, the Battlegroups per- some have praised their achievements, oth- haps could, acting alone or in conjunction ers have raised critical voices and seen the with Nato or other forces, apply the needed outcome as a disappointment. Are we then pressure or buy time for other initiatives to talking about a temporary phase within the come into play.40 larger evolution of the ESDP? However, the not-so-permissive interna- Many of the problematic issues facing tional environment turned out to become the Battlegroups today were conscious the main or at least the most visible ob- risks that their planners were aware of. It stacle for an EUBG operation. Since, ow- was known that issues of political will in ing to Russian and Chinese opposition, any member states and questions of decision- intervention to Sudan would have had to making would entail great challenges. be initiated without a firm UN mandate, Neither was it a surprise that the EUBGs a number of member states started to look would not be particularly well-suited to act for other options than military measures. as stand-alone units, or that they instead As one of the countries that would likely would better serve their roles as a part of be asked to bear a significant part of the a more comprehensive EU crisis manage- burden, France signalled that it would not ment machinery. support coercive measures, marking the However, criticism becomes more un- end to any serious talks about employing derstandable in the light of the otherwise the Battlegroups to Darfur.41 impressive development of the European

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Security and Defence Policy. The ESDP has tlegroups – the being entered into a new operational phase where one of the exemplifying cases. These ef- the focus is moving from treaties establish- fects may have been smaller in single-nation ing various institutional arrangements to units, which, on the other hand, may also ways of implementing them. The frustra- have had a lesser need for such a transfor- tion may be explained by this increased mation catalyst, owing to the fact that they level of EU politico-military ambition: it tend to be operated by the most militarily seems that expectations have proceeded capable member states. Indeed, the rapid even further than deeds.44 development of the Battlegroup concept So what is the EUBG balance sheet after can be seen as a way to induce in particular six years of conceptual existence and a few small European militaries to accelerate their years of Full Operational Capability? modernisation programmes and to ensure On the asset side, the Battlegroup con- that national contingents can work together cept undoubtedly has simply by its existence effectively. promoted military integration in Europe. Furthermore, it should not be forgotten Until present times, member states have that there are plans to extend the concept not just been keen to provide troops for the to air and naval forces, although not to the EUBG standby roster, but the concept has extent of having a single standing force on gained additional following as two non-EU readiness, but, rather, scattered forces which Nato-countries, Norway and Turkey, par- could be rapidly assembled when so decid- ticipate in a group each. In addition, as fur- ed. If realized, these additional components ther evidence of the role of the Battlegroups would significantly enhance the capabilities as a motor of the EU defence integration, of the Battlegroups.46 the Lisbon Treaty’s idea of Permanent Struc- Turning to the liabilities and to the pos- tured Cooperation mechanism, allowing a sibly underlying reasons why the Battle- number of participating member states an groups have so far not been utilized, the opportunity to proceed faster in military EUBG shortcomings can be discussed on capability development without the other three levels; first, by focusing on the Battle- members being involved, is in practice a group’s conceptual limitations, secondly, on codification of the principles already ap- ESDP-related problems and finally on the plied with the Battlegoup concept.45 more general issues dealing with the EU’s In a similar vein the Battlegroups have Common Foreign and Security Policy. also served other important integrative Starting from the Battlegroup-specific functions: the most important among these conceptual problematique, it can be argued has been their role as an instrument of mili- that conditions seldom align perfectly to tary transformation in member-states, al- facilitate the engagement of fixed standby though the EUBGs do not officially carry forces such as the EU Battlegroups.47 In- such goals or programmes. Moreover, some stead, the three cases above suggest that of the EUBG concept’s inherent qualities, evolving conflict situations tend to favour such as the troop certification process, pre- coalitions between nations that share politi- pare and enhance the capability of the EU cal and military inclinations. Arrangements member states to undertake expeditionary based on coalitions allow the fact that po- operations. These qualities are highlighted litical will for intervention is distributed un- especially in small-state multinational Bat- evenly among member states. The EUBGs

121 NR 1 january/MARS 2010 with their pre-fixed structures are not a par- involving potential Battlegroup interven- ticularly flexible tool in that respect.48 tion, the EU has not had a cohesive vision Perhaps the so far lacking utilization of of what its missions should accomplish, or the EUBGs can, especially in the face of over where and how the accomplishment should 20 other more or less successful EU crisis take place. This of course requires that rel- management operations, also be seen as a evant political issues have to be settled as reminder of the fact that short small-scale to how, where and when the EU’s military interventions may be required less often capacity should be put to use, rendering the than longer-duration stabilisation opera- issue a wider problem of the EU’s Common tions in contemporary crisis management. Foreign and Security Policy. After all, the The latter will require a variety of support ESDP should be considered as the Common units – from helicopter squadrons to logis- Foreign and Security Policy’s operational ticians to intelligence or security advisory arm. teams – at lower levels of readiness to de- A stubborn politico-technical bottleneck ploy perhaps, but able to spend a longer pe- issue has been the decision-making process: riod of time in theatre before handing over winning timely political support at national to a relieving unit.49 This, as has been dis- level for an EU mission would have been cussed, has been the area in which the ESDP and remains essential for any Battlegroup has still not achieved very much. The simi- operation. This in turn demands not just lar problems with the Nato’s high readiness explicit and consensus-building objectives capability underline this mismatch between but also some well-oiled political machinery supply and demand in contemporary crisis in national capitals. Curiously, even though management. the ESDP missions seek to respond to global Moving to the sphere of the EDSP, even or transnational phenomena, decisionmak- though the failure to engage EU Battle- ing at the point of choosing the mission has groups in operations so far should not be remained strictly and stubbornly national.50 seen as a failure for the ESDP, the above The fact that some countries’ constitutional cases of Lebanon, Congo and Darfur do arrangements imply that their governments suggest a certain aura of underachievement. need formal parliamentary approval for Common – and somewhat unsettling – to military deployments, while others merely the cases discussed above has been the fact require parliamentary notification has not that the EU has failed to intervene with its made things easier, even though some prog- Battlegroups in crises that once seemed ide- ress has been made in this field.51 ally suited to them: all have potentially in- Overall, finding suitable crises for the cluded missions that the EU has set to itself, EU Battlegroups – crises that would meet such as various humanitarian tasks, tasks the criteria of limited scale, short duration, of peacekeeping and peace-enforcement or and, preferably, excellent prospects of rap- post-conflict stabilisation with Lebanon and id success – has proved to be difficult. This the DRC also having a clear positive signal bears witness to their many conceptual and from the United Nations. political limitations. However, there are In a more general sense, it seems that the chances that some of the EU rapid reaction EU’s inability to act has been due to member shortcomings will be remedied in the near states’ lack of political will and the lacking future, for instance by the Lisbon Treaty vision of an end-state. In the above cases and the December 2008 European Coun-

122 DISKUSSION & DEBATT cil recommendations in Paris.52 Yet, while fundamental question of the finalité of the there is a more or less common understand- European security policy remains the most ing of the various conceptual and technical challenging issue – not just for the EU Bat- problems involved in the Battlegroups, the tlegroups but for the future of the ESDP challenges are apt to become more daunt- and CFSP in general. ing once one approaches the higher levels of policy coordination in the European Union. Indeed, it seems that the core issues The author works as a senior researcher at may turn out to be the most demanding is- the Department of Strategic and Defence sues for the future of the EU Battlegroups: Studies, the National Defence University of i.e., how to find a unified European vision Finland. Previously, he has been a Lecturer on its foreign and security policy and its at the University of Tampere (Finland) and a crisis management goals and what use the visiting researcher at the University of Kent EU instruments are for. Undoubtedly, this at Canterbury (UK).

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1. Its first military crisis management operation J.H.: “The EU Made Me Do It” in En- was operation CONCORDIA in the Former gelbrekt, Kjell and Hallenberg, Jan (eds.): Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) The European Union and Strategy: An in March-December 2003. Emerging Actor. Contemporary Security 2. These considerations, of course, do not apply Studies, Routledge, 2008 p. 31-32. to the neutral European states or to those 11. St. Malo Declaration, 4 December 1998. committed to the Warsaw Pact. http://www.iss-eu.org/chaillot/chai47e.html#3 3. European Defence. A Proposal for a White It was also stated in the declaration that “In Paper. Report of an independent Task Force. order for the European Union to take deci- Institute for Security Studies, European sions and approve military action where the Union, Paris, May 2004, p.37. Alliance as a whole is not engaged, the Union 4. See article J.4 of the Maastricht Treaty. must be given appropriate structures and a 5. Op cit, note 3, p.6. capacity for analysis of situations, sources of 6. For the text of the Petersberg Declaration, see intelligence, and a capability for relevant stra- http://www.weu.int/documents/920619peten. tegic planning, without unnecessary duplica- pdf tion, taking account of the existing assets of 7. Op cit, note 3, p.41. the WEU and the evolution of its relations 8. The considerable role of Sweden and Finland with the EU”. in the Amsterdam Treaty, and thus also in the 12. Rieker, Pernille: From Territorial Defence to birth of the EU Battlegroups, is somewhat Comprehensive Security? European integra- ironic, because the Battlegroups can be seen tion and the changing Norwegian and Swed- as an unintended consequence of their policy. ish security identities. Norwegian Institute of Once the two countries were in the EU since International Affairs, Working Paper Nr. 626, 1995, their scepticism towards any Euro- (2002) p.23. pean defence arrangement was directed at 13. It is instructive in this regard that the Battle- the Maastricht Treaty and its formulation of groups were wholly developed by France the notion of an eventual common defence. and the UK before Germany was invited as a Thus, in April 1996, the foreign ministers of third partner. Op cit, note10, p. 31. Sweden, Lena Hjelm-Wallén, and Finland, 14. International Crisis Group, EU Crisis Re- Tarja Halonen, published an article in the sponse Capability Revisited. Europe Report morning papers Dagens Nyheter and Hels- No 160 – 17 January 2005, Brussels. p.19. ingin Sanomat in which they suggested that 15. Op cit, note 3, p.48. the EU should enhance its role and capabili- 16. European Council, Helsinki, 10-11 December ties within the area of conflict management. 1999, Presidency Conclusions. This was the beginning of a Swedish-Finnish 17. Germany, for example, had severe legal initiative that led to the incorporation of the constraints regarding the participation of its Petersberg tasks into the Amsterdam Treaty. military in foreign operations. This ‘demilitarisation’ of the EU’s security 18. At the same time, the Nordic countries estab- dimension was perceived both in Finland lished a register and built up their capabilities and in Sweden as a major diplomatic success, for assembling a multinational Nordic crisis since it meant that development towards management brigade within the framework collective defence had been avoided and that of NORDCAPS. participation in the European security dimen- 19. Since then it turned out that the Helsinki sion was compatible with a non-alignment Headline Goal was not achievable as planned policy. Dagens Nyheter 21.4.1996, Helsingin by 2003. In October 2003, the EU foreign Sanomat 21.4.1996. and defence ministers accepted that the 9. A separate case is that of Denmark, which Union could have the capacity to carry out does not participate in elaborating or imple- the Petersberg tasks in all circumstances by menting EU policies with defence implica- 2010. tions. 20. Biscop, Sven: Permanent Structured Coopera- 10. For further discussion on the UK consider- tion and the Future of ESDP: Transformation ations on ESDP development, see Matlary, and Integration, paper presented at the 3rd

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seminar in the EUISS-coordinated series on Analysis Base Data Report, March 2006, p. the European Security Strategy: Strengthening 12-13. ESDP: The EU's Approach to International 30. Its first military crisis management operation Securrity Helsinki September 2008, p 14. was operation CONCORDIA in the Former 21. Although this was understandable considering Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) the speed with which the ESDP had developed. in March-December 2003. 22. On the U.S. National Security Strategy 31. Declaration on European Military Capabili- 2002, see http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/ ties, Military Capability Commitment Confer- USnss2002.pdf ence, Brussels, 22 November 2004, Annex A. 23. Bailes, Alyson:”The Motives for Overseas 32. Lindström, Gustav: “Enter the EU Battle- Missions: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly” in groups“. Institute for Security Studies, Chail- Eskola, S: (ed.) Crisis Management in Crisis? lot Paper No 97, February 2007, p. 58-59. National Defence University, Department of 33. Italy contributed the largest contingent with Strategic and Defence Studies, Series 2, no.40, 2 450 troops. Her increased involvement fol- 2008, p. 75. lowing the 2006 war seems to have reflected 24. Solana, Javier: ”A Secure Europe in a Better the eagerness of Romano Prodi’s centre-left World. European Security Strategy”. Docu- government (elected in April 2006) to coop- ment adopted at the European Council, Brus- erate with other EU members to reinforce a sels, 12 December 2003. European foreign policy and depart from the 25. Op cit, note 3, p.11. “Atlanticism” of the Berlusconi era. 26. An important development was that after dif- The Guardian, Saturday 26 August 2006. ficult negotiations, EU-Nato relations, which 34. Obviously, it should be noted that the Battle- had to some extent been open to speculation, group concept was in those days still only par- were established with the “Berlin Plus” agree- tially activated. ment in December 2002, in which it was agreed 35. Council of the European Union, that the EU could use Nato planning support http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/ or Nato capabilities and assets for the execu- showPage.asp?id=1091&lang=en. tion of any operations. The agreement was a 36. Op cit, note 10, p. 33-34. major practical step towards autonomous EU 37. Eventually, 21 EU member states contributed operations, since the EU did not have any such to the operation, as well as one non-EU nation capabilities. On the other hand, it also caused (Turkey). a political problem in the sense that Nato did 38. Rikard, Jowziak, Split EU may decide soon not extend this agreement to countries which on Congo mission. were not Nato members or involved in the PfP http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/ Process with a security agreement with Nato. 2008/12/split-eu-may-decide-soon-on-congo- Consequently, Cyprus and Malta are currently mission/63337.aspx. left out of the Berlin Plus arrangement. 39. See for instance “Value of EU ’Battlegroup’ 27. Op cit, note 3, p.63-64. plan stressed by Annan”. Irish Times Friday 28. Ibid, p.59. 15th October 2004. 29. The development of the Battlegroup concept In fact, looking at the 2003 ESS, Darfur would should also be assessed in the light of the de- seem exactly the sort of question that the velopment of the Nato Response Force (NRF) ESDP was created to handle. The situation fell at the Nato Prague Summit in 2002 and the within the narrow confines of where the EU adoption of its Initial Operational Readiness states have agreed that the use of force can be in October 2003. While there have been some necessary. Further, the crisis would not clearly similarities and differencies between the two benefit the national interest of any single EU concepts, it should be noted that most Europe- state, which eliminated any claim that any sin- an states contribute to both with a single set of gle state was using the CFSP to further its own forces. See Granholm, Niklas and Jonsson, Pål: national interest. Toje, Asle: “The Consensus EU-Battlegroups in Context. Underlying Dy- – Expectations Gap: Explaining Europe’s Inef- namics, Military and Political Challeges. FOI ficient Foreign Policy” Security Dialogue vol. - Swedish Defence Research Agency, Defence 39, no. 1, February 2008, p. 135.

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40. See, for instance, Burgess, Mark: ”Darfur and stand-by forces. the EU’s Responsibility to Protect,” Defense 49. Witney, Nick: Re-energising Europe’s Security News, June 25, 2007. and Defence Policy. The European Council 41. Op cit note 39 (Toje), p. 136. on Foreign Relations, 5th Floor Cambridge 42. Elsewhere, Sweden and Norway have consid- House, 100 Cambridge Grove, London W6 ered dispatching forces to assist the AU/UN 0LE, 2008, p. 44. force in Darfur and Norway’s defence minister 50. A related problem in need of improvement are has suggested deploying the NBG there. the so far lacking procedures for rapid financ- 43. Officially, the EUFOR Tchad/RCA has the fol- ing, which, however, might be solved by the lowing objectives: To contribute to protecting Lisbon Treaty’s proposed options for the start- civilians in danger, particularly refugees and up funds for rapid EU action. displaced persons, to facilitate the delivery of 51. Op cit, note 23, p. 85. humanitarian aid and the free movement of 52. According to the Presidency Conclusions of humanitarian personnel by helping to improve the European Council of 11 and 12 December, security in the area of operations, to contrib- 2008, Europe should be capable of planning ute to protecting UN personnel, facilities, in- and conducting simultaneously: stallations and equipment and to ensuring the - Two major stabilisation and reconstruction security and freedom of movement of its staff operations, with a suitable civilian compo- and UN and associated personnel. nent, supported by a maximum of 10 000 men http://consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/ for at least two years; showPage.asp?id=1366&lang=en -Two rapid response operations of limited du- last accessed 21 October 2008. ration using inter alia the EU’s battle groups; 44. Simultaneous global developments, such as -An emergency operation for the evacuation the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) concept of European nationals (in less than ten days), have increased the pressure from their part. bearing in mind the primary role of each Mem- R2P insists that every state has a responsibil- ber State as regards its nationals and making ity to protect its people. When a state is unable use of the consular Lead State concept; or unwilling to protect its population from se- – a maritime or air surveillance/interdiction rious harm, or is complicit in inflicting that mission; harm, this responsibility passes to the interna- – a civilian-military humanitarian assistance tional community. operation lasting up to 90 days; -around a 45. See Article 42(6), on the Lisbon Treaty’s Pro- dozen ESDP civilian missions (inter alia po- visions on the common security and defence lice, rule of law, civil administration, civil policy. protection, security sector reform and obser- http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/ vation missions) of varying formats, inter alia st06/st06655.en08.pdf in a rapid reaction situation, including a major 46. The issue of lacking EUBG naval, amphibious mission (possibly up to 3 000 experts), which and air power components has been discussed, could last several years See Brussels European for instance, in Op cit, note 29 (Granholm and Council, 11 and 12 December 2008, Presiden- Jonsson), p. 27-29. A related EUBG disadvan- cy Conclusions 17271/1/08, REV 1, Annex 2. tage has been the unresolved question of BG http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/ reserve forces. Whilst it is generally agreed that cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/104.692.pdf the Battlegroups need a strategic reserve, an- other standing Battlegroup can only be of ben- efit if it is not concurrently deployed. Should that not be available, providing the necessary reserve would most likely be the responsibility of the respective Framework Nation. 47. Op cit, note 32 p. 59. 48. A related development has been the increased EU cooperation with the African Union through the Joint Africa-EU Strategy, in which the EU supports enhanced African capaci- ties in crisis management, including regional

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