The British Army Review Number 148 Contents 03 Editorial 75 The Celebration of an Idea 119 Geoff Till William Barlow Maritime Dominion and the 78 Manning the Loop - The future Triumph of the Free World utility of the Formation Peter Padfield Articles Reconnaissance Soldier Maj A N B Foden 120 David Benest 06 At Last. Obama's Vision Offers The Children Who Fought Hitler - Hope for all Sides 82 The Peninsular War - An Allied A British Outpost in Europe Clare Lockhart Victory or a French Failure? Sue Elliott with James Fox Colonel Nick Lipscombe 08 Pointing The Way Out: The 121 Christopher Jary Utility of Force and The Basra 90 Boer IEDs Dambusters: A Landmark of Oral Narrative January - August 2007 Lieutenant Colonel IP Mills History Colonel Ian Thomas Max Arthur 96 Intelligence Lessons From 13 Talking To The “Enemy” - Hizballah's Ground Campaign 122 Gerry Long Informal Conflict Termination 2006 Australian Battalion Commanders In Iraq James Spencer in the Second World War Brigadier Sandy Storrie Garth Pratten 27 We Learn from History that We 122 James Spencer Learn Nothing from History BAR Thoughts Clinton's Secret Wars - the Brigadier J K Tanner Evolution of a Commander in 106 Recovering the Dead Chief 36 The Practice of Strategy John Wilson Richard Sale Professor Colin S Gray 108 A Fortunate Soldier 123 David Benest 39 After Action Report – Visit David Benest Oman's Insurgencies - The to Afghganistan and Kuwait – Sultanate's Struggle for 10–18 November 2009 110 FH 70 in a FOB Supremacy General Barry R McCaffrey USA John Wilson JE Peterson (Retd 111 How Myths Are Made 124 David Benest 46 The Great Game: The Role of John Wilson Danger Close - Commanding 3 Intelligence in the Failure of the PARA in Afghanistan 1st Afghan War 1839 - 1842 113 What Future for the TA? Stuart Tootal Major Brian Elliott Major Gerry Long 124 John Wilson 53 Governance and State Building Immediate Response Perspective Mark Hammond Clare Lockhart Books 126 Eric Morris 55 Achieving Unity of Purpose 117 Ian Robertson The Making of the British Army HQ ARRC A Young Gentleman at War Allan Mallinson Gareth Glover (Ed) 57 Winning Friends and Influencing 128 Iain Standen People 118 Geoff Till The Scientific Way of Warfare: Colonel Duncan Barley Galliopli - The End of the Myth Order and Chaos on the Robin Prior Battlefields of Modernity 63 A Chronology of the Higher Antoine Bousquet Control of Defence Gallipoli: Attack from the Sea Victor Rudenno 129 Bruce Pennell 69 Keep the Army in the Public Eye On Art and War and Terror John Wilson Alex Danchev 1 Winter 2009/2010 Contents 130 John Wilson 18 Platoon – 6th Edition Sydney Jary 132 David Betz The Insurgent Archipelago John Mackinlay 134 David Benest Northern Ireland – The Politics of War and Peace Paul Dixon 134 Hugh Boscawen Cavalier and Roundhead Spies Julian Whitehead Afghan Soldier (Alexander Allen) THE BRITISH ARMY REVIEW NO 148 WINTER 2009/2010 We have all got a lot to learn and we have all got something, which, out of own experience and study, we can teach. This magazine is to enable us to share the results of that experience and that study. From the Foreword to the first issue (as the British Army Journal), January 1949 by Field Marshal The Viscount Slim, Chief of the Imperial General Staff 2 The British Army Review Number 148 Editorial operational training to those special stabilisation operations. We can see Afghanistan skills which are not part of our adaptive today that we have barely moved out foundation (general training). So, basic of the kinetic phase in Helmand Over the last few months there has been counter-IED skills, amongst others, will Province, but, at last, with the aid of the much comment on the nature and feature in recruit training. Such a move thoughts that guided 3-40, we can see a conduct of the campaign in Afghanistan. will allow time for more advanced way ahead. And that is what this major The criticism started with the collective training prior to deployment. shift in the British Army’s approach is advisability of intervening at all. about. We have built useful experience Although the advice on that decision More importantly, this programme from bitter battles, now we can expect was a matter for the chiefs of staff, we represents a major change in attitude. to put that experience more fully into will all have our views. We are helped to No longer are operations like HERRICK use. We should be demanding in every form those views by the Chilcot Enquiry and TELIC regarded as aberrations; they area: good equipment (well underway); into the Iraq war which is being are the norm. The implications for such a good training (post operational reports televised now, because it gives us the change are huge and are not without are largely complimentary in this area opportunity to see and hear those who risk. Quite properly the Army has taken with some exceptions which are being gave the advice on that occasion. Some the view that the morally correct thing addressed); good conditions of service witnesses, like Major General Tim Cross, to do is to get the current operation (see next section); good leadership – have written on the subject in BAR. right, if necessary at the expense of the improvements needed in strategic Others will be less known to BAR readers response to a future but unknown threat. thinking (see Chilcot testimony), sound but all are fascinating in their own way – Hence the understandable concern of the tactical leadership – probably never been revealing more about themselves than Royal Navy and the RAF. higher across the board; and brought they had, perhaps, realised. together by carefully planned and This is not the time to take counsel of coordinated operations – much Part of the significance of the Chilcot our fears; it is the time for controlled improvement needed in cross-agency Enquiry is that the decision-making boldness1. We have lost over 240 practice. process for Afghanistan was likely to servicemen, mainly soldiers and marines, have been very similar to that used to go in Afghanistan – but we cannot use the Rewarding the Goal-Scorers into Iraq, which gives us a good insight argument that their sacrifice would Junior soldiers, especially junior into the origins of Op HERRICK. The one otherwise be in vain. The big arguments infantrymen, bear the brunt of the clear similarity which we need to dwell are to do with stopping international casualties and hardship on operations. on is that we got off on the wrong foot terrorism from harming Britain, securing In 2008/9, 38% of soldiers who left the on both occasions. That we did so was Afghanistan for peace and NATO Army left between the ages of 20 and 25 due to over-optimistic assessments of credibility – the national interest (DASA - Table 9 - Outflow of Male Other the situation. In the last issue (147), we arguments. Our more down to earth Ranks from UK Regular Forces by Age and carried articles analysing Op TELIC and argument is that having been told to go Service). So, those that get hurt most we continue that exercise in this issue. there and do the best we can, we have are also those who receive the poorest This is not done as a theoretical educated ourselves in a way that we reward – a recent Parliamentary answer exercise; it is to help us get Op HERRICK have not previously done and are slowly showed that up to 20%2 of soldiers in right - indeed, on 6 and & 7 January, the getting it right. infantry battalions were unable to most senior officers in the Army deploy for various reasons. Now, of assembled at the Land Warfare Centre to There is a real desire to put right the course, like many organisations we analyse Op TELIC with that express aim. mistakes. And we can see that from JDP reward on a seniority scale – those that 3-40 – Security and Stabilisation – The stay longest are deemed to be the better We know, too, of the considerable Military Contribution. JDP 3-40 builds on ones and are better rewarded for their counter IED effort that is building up the good bits from past UK COIN loyalty. Yet, should we not find a way in theatre. That effort is part of a larger doctrine and the US Army’s FM 3-24. It of also better rewarding those 38% programme to put the Army onto a full also takes guidance from many current who do the difficult bit on operations war footing – Op ENTIRETY. For example, writers foremost amongst them General and do not stay to reap the reward of COs from HERRICK regularly comment on Sir Rupert Smith (The Utility of Force). It the higher pay of long service and the time that has to be devoted in pre- puts COIN doctrine into the context of pension? 3 Winter 2009/2010 Not all organisations reward The sharp distinction between those officers, 6 to warrant officers, 1 to a hierarchically. City traders get more than who risk their lives in actual battle staff sergeant and 1 to a sergeant. To city bosses – they burn out earlier and with the enemy and those who do corporals and below – zero. The non- get the bonus to compensate. Their not must not be blurred3. operational awards system is broken bosses get lower but longer term reward, because it sees no merit in anyone below and status. Footballers get pay which is Now FM Montgomery meant something the rank of warrant officer.