ETHICS OF INTIMACY: REEVALUATING THE ETHICAL DISCOURSE FROM THE NON-

SUBSTANTIALIST PERSPECTIVE

By

M. D. Williams

Submitted to the

Faculty of the College of Arts and Sciences

of American University

in Partial Fulfillment of

the Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Arts

In

Philosophy

2009

American University

Washington, D.C. 20016

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2009

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED DEDICATION

For the woman I called Mother. ETHICS OF INTIMACY: REEVALUATING THE ETHICAL DISCOURSE FROM

THE NON-SUBSTANTIALIST PERSPECTIVE

BY

M. D. Williams

ABSTRACT

The project of ethics is focused on the relational maneuverings between two or more individuals, and yet the term intimacy almost registers too close for comfort in an discipline that is founded on first establishing boundaries between two entities and then establishing fixed rules on how one should act in the presence of these boundaries. It is the position of this paper that by denying any permanent or unchanging identity, that is, denying the very boundaries that have been imposed between phenomenal beings, non-substantialist ethics offers an ethical paradigm that brings the ethical relationship to an intimate level while retaining the presence of the individual. This will be shown through the non-substantialist perspective of

Mahayana Buddhist Ethics and Derridean Deconstructive Ethics. In addition to addressing the possibility of an ethic of intimacy, the benefits of intimacy though compassion will be discussed in contrast to the Western normative ethical paradigm.

11 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

With any academic project of this magnitude one cannot, with a clear conscience, take full credit for the outcome. While the words and formulations come from the author, it would require a complete dissociation from the process of writing to overlook the contributions, whether academic or personal, of others throughout the development of this thesis. The most significant of contributions to this project are those of Jin Y. Park. It was her introduction of this topic that laid the foundation not only for the academic project but the development of my own personal involvement with this topic. I am indebted for her own writing and research as well as the many lectures, office hour discussions, and comments on this thesis as well as many other papers. I am also grateful for the contributions and comments offerred by Gershon

Greenberg on this project as well as prior papers that helped in focusing in the writing of this paper. Finally I must show my appreciation to my family and friends who have taught me more about the nuances of intimacy than any text could. I am in constant awe of their ability of being there even through those many evenings when I sought the solitude of a coffee shop to work on this thesis.

111 TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ...... ii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ...... iii

Chapter

1. INTRODUCTION ...... l

2. THE FOUNDATIONLESS FOUNDATION OF SELF ...... 5

3. VIOLENCE AND COMPASSION ...... 21

4. RESPONSIVENESS: THE MANIFESTATION OF A NON-SUBSTANTIALIST ETHIC OF INTIMACY ...... 42

5. CONCLUSION ...... 60

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 62

IV CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Intimacy. Not typically the first word that is presented in a discussion of ethics.

While the project of ethics is focused on the relational maneuverings between two or more individuals, the term intimacy almost registers too close for comfort in a discipline that is founded on first establishing boundaries between two entities and then establishing fixed rules on how one should act in the presence of these boundaries. What happens to the ethical relationship when these boundaries are removed? Is it possible to remove these fixed boundaries without destroying the phenomenal individual that participates in the ethical discourse? It is the position of this paper that non-substantialist ethics is capable of doing just that. By denying any permanent or unchanging identity, that is, denying the very boundaries that have been imposed between phenomenal beings, non­ substantialist ethics are able to offer an ethical paradigm that brings the ethical relationship to an intimate level. In addition to addressing the possibility of an ethic of intimacy, the benefits of intimacy will be discussed in contrast to the Western normative ethical paradigm.

Normative ethics are chosen as the basis for contrast for two reasons. The first, is the place normative ethics holds in the historical development of the ethical discourse in the West. The formal study of ethics in Western philosophy has its beginnings in Ancient

Greece while the term ethics is credited to Aristotle. The second reason normative ethics

1 2

is chosen is the systematic way in which it approaches ethical questions. Simply stated,

Aristotelian ethics, or normative ethics, is a teleological view of the best good. 1 While ethics can be said to be concerned with the best good, one should not necessarily attach a moral connotation to the term good. The best good, within normative ethics, refers to the most appropriate or beneficial possible outcome. Ethics asks the fundamental question,

"How should I live?" This question is always in relation to interactions between individuals or individuals and the state. Ethics, at its heart, is the attempt to understand interpersonal relationships in its most beneficial form. Normative ethics accomplishes this task by focusing primarily on the responsibility one has to an individual by creating or establishing a method or system to regulate interaction between two or more individuals. This systematic approach provides a fair and unbiased arbitrator over the affairs of society. While there are many different movements in the formation of ethics over the history of philosophy, normative ethics seems to rise as the dominant popular view. It would seem that normative ethics still pervades our culture in our media, politics, as well as water-cooler conversations.

If normative ethics have stood the test of time for some 2300 years, what is the purpose in questioning their efficacy? What could possibly have changed over that expanse of time to warrant a discussion of its replacement? The answer is obvious. A myriad of things have changed, except for, of course, the system itself. There are revisions throughout history to the specific guidelines and laws but the fundamental way in which normative ethics relates individually has not. The one thing that the boundaries

1 Terence Irwin, Gail Fine, trans., "Nicomachean Ethics," in Aristotle: Introductory Readings (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. 1996) 1094a- 1094b. 3

instituted by normative ethics is incapable of dealing with, is context. Is context important? For the non-substantialist perspective, context is everything. As we move into the discussion of ethics in the writings of Jacques Derrida and his exploration of deconstruction, we will find a much different view on the basis of ethics and how it is carried out. The word exploration is used because unlike Aristotle's writings on ethics, deconstruction is not a system of ethics. The non-substantialist ethical paradigm offers an intimate evaluation of the conditions and context that bring about an event or action.

It is not merely situational ethics but a fundamental restructuring of the interaction within the ethical sphere.

There is another side to this story of ethics however. The focus on ethics, having its origins in Greece and its development through Western philosophy as mentioned above, is not found within the Buddhist philosophical tradition as such. As Eastern philosophy has become more widely accepted and evaluated by those in the Western tradition, the issue of ethics has become increasingly more important. What, if anything, does Buddhist philosophy have to say regarding the issue of ethics? It is here that the similarities between deconstruction and Buddhism come into view. While both deconstruction and Buddhism are not directly involved in the study of ethics as such, both, in their own ways, are capable of exposing the holes within normative ethics and are able to make a case for non-substantialist ethics through the use of tension. I use the term "make a case for" to stay away from using words like establish, which would undermine the argument for non-substantialist ethics. Simply stated, non-substantialist ethics refer to an ethical perspective that is not grounded in any essentialist claims on the development or necessity of implementation. That is to say, there is no inherent quality 4

found within an ethical agent or the prescription that is able to illicit a necessary response within non-substantialist ethics. Despite the lack of essential or fixed identity within the agent or the prescriptions, non-substantialist ethics does offer an important contribution to the ethical discourse. This contribution is found in the tension that is created through intimacy, once the boundaries between individuals have been removed. CHAPTER II

THE FOUNDATIONLESS FOUNDATION OF SELF

The purpose of this chapter is to explain the non-substantial foundation within deconstruction and Mahayana Buddhism. This will be accomplished through a discussion of identity contrasting the substantialist perspective with the arguments of non-substantialism. The substantialist perspective requires an essentialist frame of reference in evaluating all things, whether phenomenal or conceptual. Identity, from the substantialist perspective, consists of a fixed inherent self. It is this permanent and unchanging self that both Derrida and the Mahayana Buddhist writers seek to refute. It is important to understand, however, that neither Mahayana Buddhism nor deconstruction take an anti-substantialist view. By using the prefix "non", it is communicated that neither philosophical perspective denies outright the presence of phenomenal structures, which would lead to Nihilism. As we move through each rational argument for non­ substantialism, we will find that both philosophical perspectives neither accept categorically nor deny outright, the presence of the self. This chapter serves to present the argument that non-substantialism provides the foundationless foundation for identity and the concept of self within deconstruction and Mahayana Buddhism.

The argument against an inherent permanent self has been present in Buddhism since its origination in India. Originally, the concept of no-self or anatman, was developed to refute the Brahmanic concept of atman. Brahmanism was the leading

5 6

religion in India during the lifetime of the historic Buddha, Siddhartha Gautama ( 484-404

BCE). The term atman refers to the permanent, unchanging self. Similar to the Western

conception of the soul, atman is that which participates in transmigration. Within the

Brahman tradition, atman is the understanding of self that passes through the cycle of

birth, death, and rebirth known as samsara, or cyclical existence.

Siddhartha Gautama's argument against atman is recorded in the Discourse to the

First Five Disciples found in the Samyutta Nikaya, a collection of discourses contained in

the Pali Canon. This discourse purportedly occurs shortly after Siddhartha Gautama's

attainment of enlightenment. Within this discourse, the argument for one of the central

teachings of the Buddha is exemplified, that of dependent co-arising. Dependent co­

arising or dependent origination, refers to the relationally interdependent identity of all

things. The Buddha uses the five aggregates to develop our understanding of this term.

The five aggregates is a hermeneutical device conceived by the Buddha in order

to expose the relational make-up of the self. The Buddha argues that what we call the

self can be further broken up into five categories or divisions; namely, body, sensation,

perception, mental formation, and consciousness. The body refers to the physical self

constructed of tissue and bones. It is this understanding of self that comes into contact

with the outside world. It is the shin that slams into the coffee table. Sensation refers to the physical senses with which we take in information of the outside world. It is the

feeling of pain due to the negligence of the eyes in detecting the close proximity of the

coffee table to the rest of the body. In addition to the five senses commonly accepted in the West, the Eastern conception of the senses includes the mind. This prevents one from 7

establishing a duality between body and mind by grounding even conceptual formulations or thoughts within the phenomenal level. The five aggregates continue with perception which refers to the transmission of sense data to the fourth aggregate, mental formation or our disposition to act. Finally, consciousness is attributed to the self to explain our awareness and ability to draw meaning out of the other four aggregates.

If we concede that the description provided by the Buddha accurately contains all of the functions associated with the self, we can then proceed to evaluate the permanence of these aggregates. Is the physical body permanent and unchanging? Our experience forces us to say no, and concede that the body is therefore impermanent and unchanging.

As we move down the line we see how each successive aggregate is dependent on the others. Sensation cannot occur without the physical senses provided by the body. Even consciousness has no ability to function in itself without the presence of the other four.

How then, can a permanent and unchanging self exist when it is the sum of relationally interdependent parts? A clear explanation of the identity constructed through dependent co-arising is offered through the example of the chariot in the Vajira Sutta, another discourse from the Samyutta Nikaya. "Why do you assume 'a person'?/ Mara, you have adopted a wrong speculative view/ This is only a heap of processes./ There is no person to be found here./ Just as the word 'chariot' I Refers to an assemblage of parts/ So,

'person' is a convention/ Used when the aggregates are present."2 The self, then, is not fully negated by the Buddha, merely the understanding that the self is permanent and

2 John J. Holder, trans. ed., Early Buddhist Discourses (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. 2006), 87. 8

unchanging. As is communicated by the presence of a physical body within the five aggregates, the Buddha accepts the phenomenal self and all of its functions. Identity, however, is defined as relationally interdependent or dependently co-arising.

Dependent co-arising is the fundamental principle underlying the Buddha's teaching of the Middle Way. This understanding of the middle goes beyond the generally associated understanding of moderation. For the Buddha, the middle represents the move against absolute extremes. The Buddha's concisely phrased opposition towards extremes can be found in the Kaccayanagotta Sutta. "'Everything exists' - this is one extreme.

'Everything does not exist' - this is the second extreme. Without approaching either of these extremes, the Tathagata teaches the dhamma by the middle."3 On the one hand, there is the extreme of eternalism presented by the Brahman understanding of the atman.

The other extreme is the nihilistic view that nothing exists. The Buddha refuses to accept either and moves into a middle space that neither accepts the permanent and unchanging atman nor denies the phenomenal self that one experiences in one's daily life.

The French philosopher Jacques Derrida offers a contemporary view of the non­ substantialist argument from the western perspective. In the writing of Derrida, the understanding of identity as relationally interdependent is referred to as differance. One cursory glance at this word brings us face to face with its bold grammatical transgression.

Derrida builds our understanding of the term differance in a similar manner to the

Buddha's explanation of identity through the five aggregates, as the sum of its

3 Ibid, 83. 9

interdependent parts. Let us then break this word apart in order to fully comprehend

Derrida's contribution to our understanding of identity.

"The verb 'to differ' seems to differ from itself. On the one hand, it indicates difference as distinction, inequality, or discemability; on the other, it expresses the interposition of delay, the interval of a spacing and temporalizing that puts off until

'later' what is presently denied. The possible that is presently impossible."4 The first definition of "to differ" offered by Derrida presents a differential view of identity, the ability to make distinctions. I understand that a book is not a tree through the sensation and perception of characteristics that are not held in common. The book is small, lightweight, and portable. The tree, on the other hand, is large, heavy, and firmly rooted in the ground. These characteristics or differences (with an e ), set in opposition to one another, allow me to draw distinctions between the two objects. According to Derrida however, these distinctions are not possible without the presence of trace within each object. "Differance is what makes the movement of signification possible only if each element that is said to be 'present,' appearing on the stage of presence, is related to something other than itself but retains the mark of a past element and already lets itself be hollowed out by the mark of its relation to a future element."5 Trace is the mark that creates a reference point for difference (with an e) to be evaluated. The ability to distinguish between the book and the tree requires the tree to contain a past expression of

4 Jacques Derrida, "Differance," Speech and Phenomena: And Other Essays on Husserl's Theory ofSigns,trans. David B. Allison (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 129.

5 Ibid, 142. 10

the book. This should not be understood as a physical characteristic but a conceptual

remnant within our understanding of the tree. And yet the word remnant places too much weight on the past. For Derrida, "trace relates no less to what is called the future than

what is called the past, and it constitutes what is called the present by this very relation to what it is not, to what it absolutely is not; that is, not even to a past or future considered

as a modified present."6 For example, trace can be understood as the footprint left behind from a prior conception that alludes to a future act that makes the present possible. The footprint is merely what is left behind from the act of conception itself. It holds no

substantial standing and yet we can establish a value to its presence. The movement of trace resists appropriation by leaving only a footprint.

The second definition of "to differ" provided by Derrida addresses the possibility of this movement of trace alluding to the presence of a delay, both a spacing and temporalizing of identity. Derrida explains this through a discussion of semiology using

Ferdinand de Saussure's formulation of language as constructed through a sign, a word, and the signified, the object. Derrida concedes Saussure's argument that the sign and signified are joined arbitrarily. What Derrida disagrees with is Saussure's claim that the sign is a representation of the thing itself. For Saussure, the word "book" holds no essential connection to the physical book and yet the word "book" is a representation of the book as such, the thing itself. Derrida argues that the need for the sign exposes an inability for the object to be immediately presenced; it is at best a "deferred presence.

6 Ibid. 11

Whether it is a question of verbal or written signs, monetary signs, electoral delegates, or political representatives, the movement of signs defers the moment of encountering the thing itself, the moment at which we could lay hold of it, consume or expend it, touch it, see it, have a present intuition of it."7 This is what Derrida refers to as the "signification as the differance of temporalizing."8 The moment we use the sign in reference to the object, the object has shifted in time and no longer remains in the position it was when the sign was used, thereby changing its relationally interdependent identity constructed through difference (with an e) and trace. Derrida continues to press this definition of "to differ" into the realm of spacing. In the same way that the deferred presence occurs with regard to time, Derrida claims that its position is spatially dislodged as well.

The self can then be understood in the same manner as the object or signified within differance. The self, as relationally constructed through difference and trace, rejects any move of appropriation through this deferred presence. Any move to reify differance, or the self fails for when one names differance, the space and time of that concept or phenomenal object has shifted. Derrida refers to this movement as the play of difference and trace. The concept of play denotes a naive movement through space and time. For a clearer understanding of the concept of play, one needs only to travel to the local elementary school for afternoon recess. Similar to the game of tag, play works in a free and open space in which boundaries and interactions are flexible and constantly changing. As opposed to other schoolyard games like kickball, the play in which Derrida

7 Ibid, 138.

8 Ibid. 12

is referring does not confine itself with rigid boundaries and fixed roles. Differance is always in motion. As reference to one person changes, so does the other. One's proximity to the person who is "it," changes as the game progresses. Similarly, our identity, or self, shifts within the play of difference and trace as the proximity, or presence of each object, inanimate or living, changes.

However, this game of tag as an example of the play of difference and trace has one fatal flaw by presenting a view of differance as actively creating its own direction on those who are participating. Differance should not be thought as a system that imposes its own will on the construction of identity. In the game of tag we have an active agent that manipulates those participating which results in the roles that each individual plays.

The person who is "it" is able to make a choice as to who she will tag. This conscious act results in the shift of positioning durii:ig the game. In contrast, within the play of differance no active choice should be thought to occur. Instead, differance occurs merely as the context of a situation arises. In order to clarify the nature of the impact of differance, Derrida explains his use of the suffix -ance. "But while bringing us closer to the infinitive and active core of differing, 'differance' with an a neutralizes what the infinitive denotes as simply active, in the same way that 'parlance' does not signify the simple fact of speaking, of speaking to or being spoken to."9 Differance, for Derrida, cannot be described as "simply active nor simply passive."10 Instead, Derrida refers to

9 Ibid, 137.

10 Ibid. 13

the motivation or force behind differance as a "middle voice." 11 The middle voice fluidly moves within the realm of activity and passivity. I use the term realm to avoid any dualistic formulation of activity and passivity. The relation of these two concepts when understood through the displacement of time and space as discussed earlier prevents the establishment of a linear continuum. To argue for a continuum is to argue for essential extremes, which have no place in an ever-shifting relationally dependent understanding of identity. The middle voice constantly, in every moment, resists this attempt at appropriation. How is the then possible for differance to be both active and passive, or even more difficult to conceive throngh our western mode of thinking, neither active nor passive?

In the Metaphysics, Aristotle presents three laws that have become the basis of logical thought in the West: the Law ofldentity, the Law of Non-Contradiction, and the

Law of Excluded Middle. These three laws, which must be developed in the given order above, provide a logical argument for the creation of identity, which subsequently results in a dualistic view. The first law, the Law of Identity, creates a boundary around an object in order to distinguish it from all other objects. The second law, the Law ofNon­

Contradiction, then serves as the functional understanding of the identity that was just created. Object A cannot contradict its own identity. Object A is not Object B. This almost seems intuitive but the underlying process that attributes a fixed attribute to the boundary around an object is vital to the discussion of identity. The Law ofNon­

Contradiction solidifies the boundary of an object to prevent it from being internally

II Ibid. 14

affected by those objects around it. That is to say, the first law serves to create the boundary while the second law establishes the objects fixed nature. Once an identity has been created through the establishment of fixed boundaries, Aristotle states that these boundaries cannot be contradicted, that is, infringed upon by any other object. Finally, we come to the third law, the Law of Excluded Middle. Aristotle defines this law stating,

"that it is impossible for the same thing both to belong and not to belong at the same time to the same thing and in the same respect."12 For exampl~, if we take the colors ofred and green to be essentially differing principles, a car painted one solid color can either be painted red or it can be painted green, but it cannot be said to be both. This final clause, according to Aristotle, would be a contradiction and is therefore impossible according to the second law. The importance of this principle is vital to the essentialist perspective.

Aristotle claims that "this is why all those who demonstrate refer back to this belief as ultimate; for this is by nature the principle of all of the other axioms as well."13 For

Aristotle to move forward through his systematic demonstration, he requires an essentialist perspective on the make-up of things. Red must be essentially different from green in order to follow through to a statement the car is red. Furthermore, the car must be inherently distinguishable from the surrounding objects. What is necessary for the essentialist, are clear-cut boundaries.

12 Terence Irwin, Gail Fine, trans., "Metaphysics," in Aristotle: Introductory Readings (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. 1996) 1005b20.

13 Ibid, 1005b30. 15

The logical analysis of 2°d century CE Indian Buddhist Nagarjuna overcomes this

dualistic mode of thinking through the incorporation of the Fourfold Negation, or

tetralemma. Symbolically this formulation is represented as A is A, A is not A, A is A

and not A, A is neither A nor not A. Formulated in this way it would seem that A can be

both A and not A. This is exemplified through Nagarjuna 's argument for dependent co-

arising through the evaluation of fuel and fire in the Mulamadhyamakakiirika.

"If fuel were fire/Then agent and action would be one./If fire were different from

fuel,/Then it could arise without fuel." 14 The question being raised in relation to fuel and fire is one of dependence. Is it possible for fuel to exist without fire? Fuel here is not referencing potentiality, that is to say lighter fluid in a bottle. Lighter fluid remains lighter fluid. It is only in the action of igniting a fire that it becomes fuel. Fire, likewise, requires fuel in order to burn. One cannot have fire without fuel. It is in this relationship that we find identity through mutual dependence; more specifically, mutual dependence that arises together. "Fire is not dependent upon fuel./Fire is not independent of fuel./Fuel is not dependent upon fire./Fuel is not independent of fire." 15 While at first glance this seems to be nonsensical, the meaning is found in the contradiction. Fire can be independent of fuel as well as dependent on fuel if their identities are defined by dependently arising simultaneously. It is a mutual dependency that contains no independent cause. The ability to claim that fuel is both fuel and not fuel is tied directly

14 Jay L. Garfield, The Fundamental Wisdom ofthe Middle Way (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 28, Chapter X: 1.

15 Ibid 29, Chapter X:12. 16

to the understanding of dependent co-arising. Fuel is fuel because it facilitates burning.

However, fuel is not fuel because the identity of fuel is directly dependent on the presence of fire. That is, there is no inherent permanent or unchanging essence that makes fuel, fuel.

Nagarjuna 's explanation of the relational nature or differential notion as the cause of both the fuel as well as the fire helps to expose one underlying difference between the commonly held Western understanding of causation versus the Eastern conception of causation. This difference in the understanding lies at the root of the disconnect between

Aristotle's logical Law of Excluded Middle and the Buddhist incorporation of the

Fourfold Negation. As understood from the quote above from Aristotle's Metaphysics, demonstration is achieved through the logical movement from either proven or accepted axioms. These axioms are then followed in a linear manner, one following the next.

Nagarjuna 's fuel/fire example exposes the inability to construct a linear causal timeline.

"If that on which an entity depends/Is established on the basis/Of the entity depending on it,/What is established in dependence on what?"16 The concept of fuel is conditioned by and requires our knowledge of fire and vice versa or we lose any understanding of both.

Instead of a linear causation it would be better to understand the Buddhist concept of conditioned causality as a space or a void in which the simultaneous arising of conditions brings about our understanding of phenomenon. Is it possible, however, to merely establish a new essence on the basis of mutual identity? Nagarjuna foresees this

16 Ibid, Chapter X:IO .. 17

question within his argument of fuel and fire. "What entity is established through dependence?/If it is not established, then how could it depend?/However, if it is established merely through dependence,/That dependence makes no sense."17 To reiterate this point, Nagarjuna expresses the following in Chapter 15 on the Examination of Essence, "If essence came from causes and conditions,/The it would be fabricated." 18

This fabrication goes against the very definition of essence. This leads Nagarjuna to the relationship between essence and beings. Can there be beings without essence? The prefix 'non' in non-substantialism is used in our discussion to denote the understanding that there is neither the denial nor the reinforcement of essence. So the question remains then, how does one explain the presence of entities from a non-substantial foundation?

This is accomplished through the Two-fold Truth.

By name, the two truths are conventional truth and ultimate truth. I specify 'by name' because our understanding of dependent co-arising negates any move to create a duality between the two 'levels' of truth. That is to say, there is no hierachization within the Two-fold Truth. The use of conventional and ultimate seems to present what is an undue focus on the ultimate. The two levels of truth merely provide two different ways of looking at the same thing and should not be interpreted as offering a higher level of understanding in either designation. Conventional truth, or the conventional world refers to the world as perceived through our senses. The conventional world, then, includes all phenomenal structures we come into contact with on a daily basis. When we observe a

17 Ibid, Chapter X: 11.

18 Ibid 39, Chapter XV:l. 18

chair through our eyes, we see distinguish its shape from that of the surrounding objects.

We can touch the chair, feeling it structural differences between ourselves, and the object.

Our trust in the structural integrity is validated when we sit, feeling the support holding our weight. Once again, it is important to note that Mahayana Buddhism includes mind as the sixth sense thereby including all cognitive processes as conventional. 19 The inclusion of the mind in the conventional realm reduces all consciousness to the phenomenal. For the Buddhist, these objects, the chair, the computer, the pen, are all very real substances. There is no move to deny the interactions with the phenomenal within Buddhism, however, it is necessary that one evaluate these interactions through the lens of dependent co-arising. This is represented through the concept within the

Twofold Truth referred to as ultimate truth.

Ultimate truth refers to the understanding that identity, through differential notion, is itself empty. By emptiness, Nagarjuna , means that it contains no independent cause or inherent identity. This prevents any attempt at drawing essence from a differential identity. As discussed previously, there is the possibility that one may attempt to create an essence of fuel and fire through the relation between the two concepts. However, this is impossible if we understand the relationship between the two, to be empty of any inherent identity. It is here that Nagarjuna equates the concept of emptiness with the

Buddha's concept of dependent co-arising by claiming that emptiness is dependent co-

19 David J. Kalupahana, A History ofBuddhist Philosophy: Continuities and Discontinuities (University of Hawaii Press, 1992), 79. 19

arising.20 Emptiness does not represent a system for constructing identity in the same way that differance for Derrida does not establish a fixed identity through mutually necessary conditions. Nagarjuna sees the possible misinterpretation of dependent co­ arising as a means to create a mutually dependent identity that, in tum, becomes a fixed identity. This occurs through the understanding that when A and B are present, C is created. This provides a fixed understanding of C as the compound of A and B.

Nagarjuna refutes this by applying the Buddha's understanding of dependent co-arising to dependent co-arising. Nagarjuna uses the term emptiness to focus on the lack of a permanent and unchanging identity within A and B as dependently co-arising but also onto the compound identity of C. Object C is itself empty of any permanent or unchanging identity in the same way that A and B are. Emptiness itself is empty of any essential or fixed identity. Furthermore, it also cannot be stressed enough that there is no actual duality between the conventional and the ultimate. The ultimate world and the conventional world are dependently co-arisen, having no essence themselves or through the relation of the two, they are empty. In the same way that object C is empty of any permanent or unchanging essence, concept C or the ultimate understanding of the emptiness of all things is also itself empty. This is referred to as the emptiness of emptiness.

The title ofNagarjuna 's work the Mulamadhyamakakiirikii is translated into

English as The Fundamental Wisdom ofthe Middle Way. The Middle Way in Nagarjuna

's writing similar to the middle voice within Derrida is not a mean or average of two

20 Garfield, 305. 20

essential extremes. The Middle Way for Nagarjuna is the understanding of the Ultimate and Conventional realm. It is emptiness. The Middle Way acknowledges the phenomenal reality of the self while denying any permanent fixed essence through the use of dependent co-arising. This is what is meant but the non-substantialist view that the self both is and is not. Through the Buddha's teaching of the Middle Way, Derrida's use of the middle voice and Nagarjuna 's Middle Path we arrive at our foundationless foundation of the self. The foundation of the non-substantialist paradigm is understood as foundationless due to the lack of a permanent and unchanging identity. However, to deny the foundation, that is the self, would be to ignore the presence of an entity. Neither differance nor emptiness denies the phenomenal world. Despite the non-substantialist denial of permanent fixed identity, the non-substantialist perspective does not accept a nihilistic view of the self. To view identity in this way would serve to place undue importance on the ultimate level of tmth within Nagarjuna 's Two-Fold Truth. The

"middle" within the non-substantialist perspective fully endorses the presence of an entity in the phenomenal realm while fully endorsing the lack of a permanent and unchanging foundation to the identity of that entity. CHAPTER III

VIOLENCE AND COMPASSION

The purpose of this chapter is to provide an understanding of how the establishment of an ethical action from the non-substantialist perspective takes place.

Before we can move into a full-fledged discussion of ethics we must first address the possibility of establishing an ethical action from the non-substantialist perspective. We begin by evaluating Derrida's interpretation of violence in his book, OfGrammatology. I will focus on the use of violence within deconstruction because it is here where we find

Derrida's explanation of how an interdependently related action is manifest into the present. The action that we will be discussing within deconstruction does not yet carry any ethical implications. It is action in it purely neutral state. Once we identify the manner in which an action is manifest into the present we will look at the relationship between Wisdom and Compassion within Buddhism to tease out the possibility of an ethical action. What conditions must be present to act in an ethical manner?

Deconstruction is a constant process, a process that exposes the violence already present in reality. While violence is typically understood through physical phenomenal means such as war or personal assault, Derrida contends that violence occurs long before the first bomb is dropped or the first fist is thrown. For Derrida, the very ability to draw distinctions between the self and other, to name something in contrast to one's self is an

21 22

act of violence. Derrida introduces this understanding within his concept of "arche- writing" through three levels of violence that provide the very foundation of the discussion of ethics from the non-substantialist perspective. "Arche-writing" refers to a writing that occurs prior to speech and writing, either verbal, written, or cognitive. It alludes to a structural basis that organizes language before it is manifested through sensational or cognitive means. It must be understood that arche-writing does not refer to any essential or inherent identity specifically joining a word and it's meaning. Derrida develops this term and its consequences through a discussion of violence.

The argument for the three levels of violence can be found in Derrida's early work, OfGrammatology, through an analysis of French anthropologist Claude Levi-

Strauss' Tristes Tropiques. Derrida uses Levi-Strauss' case study of the Nambikwara, an

Amazonian Amerindian tribe considered by Levi-Strauss as primitive and without any form of writing and who were, according to Levi-Strauss, forbidden to use proper names.21 While Derrida uses this account of Levi-Strauss to expose other factors including Levi-Strauss' own ethnocentricism apparent in the case study of the

Nambikwara as well as the impact that an absence of writing and the prohibition of proper names has on a culture, our discussion of ethics from the non-substantialist perspective will focus on the establishment of proper names and the violence within their use.

21 Jacques Derrida, OfGrammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), 110. 23

Derrida views writing ve:ry differently from that of the view of Levi-Strauss.

According to Derrida, Levi-Strauss' falls into the trap of "radically separating language from writing."22 While allowing for the colloquial use of this separation, Derrida uses the concept of "arche-writing" to refute this application as a general understanding of speech and writing. The term "arche" requires us to place this form of writing before the colloquial use of both speech and writing. More specifically arche-writing refers to the play of differance, using the concept of differential notion in order to establish a differentially determined identity. For Derrida, the separation between language and writing as essentially different is not possible. Arche-writing exposes the identity of both language and writing as formed through the play of difference and trace. Language is bound by grammatical rules, before the word is spoken and yet, similar to the manner in which writing is bound, so is language. The mere use of words assumes a structural representation that is similarly found in writing. The inability to physically represent these rules using a pencil does not negate the use of these rules, merely a physical representation. It is admitted that the phenomena of writing doesn't exist but the structural basis for it does. Using this argument, Derrida claims that the basis for writing is laid before both speech and writing are possible. It would then be necessary that the rules for language, for both speech and writing, must come from the differentially determined arche-writing thus removing the hierarchical distinction between speech and writing. This arche-writing or play of difference will then lead us to what Derrida refers to as the "originary violence," revealed through deconstruction. This is shown clearly

22 Ibid, 120. 24

through an encounter of Levi-Strauss with the Nambikwara, which Derrida quotes in Of

Grammatology, and uses to develop his argument on the violence of the proper name.

One day, when I was playing with a group of children, a little girl who had been struck by one of her playmates took refuge by my side and, with a very mysterious air, began to whisper something in my ear. As I did not understand and was obliged to ask her to repeat it several times, her enemy realized what was going on and, obviously very angry, also came over to confide what seemed to be a solemn secret. After some hesitation and questioning, the meaning of the incident became clear. Out of revenge, the first little girl had come to tell me the name of her enemy, and the latter, on becoming aware of this, had retaliated by confiding to me the other's name. From then on, it was very easy, although rather unscrupulous, to incite the children against each other and get to know all their names. After which, having created a certain atmosphere of complicity, I had little difficulty in getting them to tell me the names of the adults. When the latter understood what our confabulations were about, the children were scolded and no more information was forthcoming.23

The more common definition of violence would draw its conclusion on the physical violence of the children, the striking of the girl by her comrade. Derrida, however, draws the distinctive level of violence two levels prior to this physical violence.

Similar to the concept arche-writing, Derrida uses the term arche-violence to explain the originary violence spoken of earfier. "For writing, obliteration of the proper classed in the play of difference, is the originary violence itself: pure impossibility of the

'vocative mark', impossible purity of the mark ofvocation."24 The violence spoken of in the above quote refers to the cleaving of an object and its spoken classification, its proper name, thereby rendering it lifeless and still, void of the continuity of that object, in the

23 Claude Levi-Strauss, Tristes Tropiques, trans. John Weightman and Doreen Weightman (New York: Atheneum, 1974), 279.

24 Derrida, OfGrammatology, 120. 25

same way a photograph can be extracted from a moving picture. This can easily be exemplified through the use of familial references. For example, by naming the woman who gave you life mother, you isolate a single aspect or characteristic of a life that has many different functions. This person you isolate as mother could also be a daughter, a wife, a lawyer, a writer, etc. It is the very ability to make distinctions of the continuity of

Being that Derrida refers to as originary violence.

Once the initial violence or originary violence is committed, the second level of violence can emerge. This second level of violence includes the establishment of ethics and morality on society. Once the violence of proper names establishes the other, it is necessary to develop a method by which one will interact in the social setting. "Out of this arche-violence, forbidden and therefore confirmed by a second violence that is reparatory, protective, instituting the "moral," prescribing the concealment of writing and the effacement and obliteration of the so-called proper name which was already dividing the proper ... ,,25

The third level of violence represents the physical act of what we commonly observe as violence. " ... a third level of violence can possibly emerge or not (an empirical possibility) within what is commonly called evil, war, indiscretion, rape; which consists of revealing by effraction the so-called proper name, the originary violence which has severed the proper from its property and its self-sameness"26 (emphasis in text). The emphasis on possibility is important regarding Derrida's three levels of violence and a

25 Derrida, OfGrammatology, 112.

26 Derrida, OfGrammatology, 120. 26

note on deconstruction in general. It is not a determinate system or method to be applied, but once again, a relation of the play of difference. Derrida does not claim that these three categories of violence will always play itself out through the form of physical or phenomenal violence.

Deconstruction reveals this freedom or openness to prevent phenomenal violence through an understanding of what Derrida refers to as the messianic. The idea of the messianic within deconstruction is developedin Derrida's work! Have a Taste for the

Secret as well as in Faith and Knowledge. While the concept of the messianic plays a vital role within deconstruction, it is important, however, to understand the notions this term does not intend to convey. "This messianic dimension does not depend on any messianism, it follows no determinate revelation, it belongs properly to no Abrahamic religion."27 While there are aspects of both the Jewish and Christian conceptions of the messiah, it is not a direct relation to either. It is a "messianicity without messianism. "28

So what does the messianic refer to within deconstruction?

This would be the opening to the future or to the coming of the other as the advent of justice, but without horizon of expectation and without prophetic prefiguration. · The coming of the other can only emerge as a singular event when no anticipation sees it coming, when the other and death - and radical evil - can come as a surprise at any moment. Possibilities that both open and can always interrupt history.29

27 Jacques Derrida, "Faith and Knowledge," Acts ofReligion, ed. Gil Anidjar (New York: Routledge, 2002), 56.

28 Ibid.

29 Ibid. 27

The messianic implies a to-come that is always out of reach from the present. Unlike the

Judeo-Christian teleological understanding of the messiah, for Derrida the messianic can never fully come. "Teleology is, at bottom, the negation of the future, a way of knowing beforehand the form that will have to be taken by what is still to come."30 This non- teleological view also stands in opposition to normative ethics as presented above. There is no end to deconstruction.

So then what makes the messianic possible? Singularity, as the inexhaustibility of the present, is the concept within deconstruction that paves the way for the messianic.

Singularity refers to the moment, the unique assemblage of conditions. It is described as inexhaustible because the present, as understood through differential notion, contains a

31 "radical otherness. " This 'radical otherness' provides the possibility of the future.

Singularity is "that which defies anticipation, reappropriation, calculation - any form of

32 predetermination. " The messianic is the overflow of si~gularity through the inexhaustibility of the present. In order for Singularity to provide the necessary conditions for each moment, it must contain the conditions that are not found within that moment. The messianic is this overflow, that is, the conditions that were not appropriated through singularity in an individual moment. It is the totality of conditions to come.

No repetition will ever exhaust the novelty of what comes. Even if one were able to imagine the contents of experience wholly repeated - always

30 Derrida, "I Have a Taste for the Secret," A Taste for the Secret, 20. 31 Ibid, 21.

32 Ibid. 28

the same thing, the same person, the same landscape, the same place and the same text returning - the fact that the present is new would be enough to change everything. Temporalization itself makes it impossible not to be ingenuous in relation to time. 33

The messianic is an openness, a to-come that one must always be aware and account for.

It must be understood, however, that '"leaving room for the other' does not mean I have to 'make room for the other'. The other is in me before me: the ego (even the collective

34 ego) implies alterity as its own condition. "

The possibility of non-substantialist ethics begins with the ability to make distinctions within the phenomenal understanding of reality. Ethics requires the ability to act. Through Derrida's concept of arche-violence, as a striking through of the differential play of differance, a distinction is made establishing an entity or an action. The role of mother is established through a violent strike through the continuity of being. In the same way, an action is created through the striking through of the continuity of being.

Arche-violence is the ability to make an assertion. To assert one's self in the phenomenal present. The messianic, then allows first for the possibility of non-substantial ethics by providing a space for freedom or choice and second by serving to keep the boundaries of the individual open in reference to the "other." That is to say, the messianic or the 'to come' allows for an openness before one can completely close the boundaries on the entity, thereby preventing its permanence. Within each perception of an entity is found the presence of the imminent future, a future that cannot be appropriated or bound.

Singularity, then, provides the space or ability for the agent and the action to establish

33 Ibid, 70. 34 Ibid, 84. 29

themselves in the present. For withcut the ability to assert one's self into the present, the ethical action would not be possible. One could not even speak about ethics because there would be no space for ethics to take place.

Once the action is manifest in the phenomenal, how does one establish an ethical action? That is to say, what conditions are necessary to establish a positive interaction between two beings? The movement within Buddhism from the foundationless foundation of emptiness towards the manifestation of the ethical action in the phenomenal realm is accomplished through the relationship between Wisdom and

Compassion. The term Wisdom refers to the ultimate understanding of reality as empty of a permanent and unchanging essence. Compassion is the appropriate response to this knowledge in the phenomenal or conventional realm. Shantideva, an gth Century CE

Buddhist Monk, presents the inner workings of the fundamental Buddhist concept of compassion in the Bodhicharyavatara, translated as The Way of the Bodhisattva.

Shantideva's writing provides a compelling description of Buddhist compassion as well as instructions on how to follow this Way. I use the term compelling to denote to the manner in which this text is written. Within the Bodhicharyavatara, Shantideva passionately calls all to follow the Bodhisattva path. In addition, Shantideva provides an argument for the need for one to pursue this path. The impetus for action is a necessary component within Shantideva's writing that communicates as urgency that is to be associated with the practice of compassion.

The basis for compassion within Buddhism is rooted in the same understanding of the foundationless foundation of the self discussed in the previous chapter. Compassion, 30

as a Buddhist ethical paradigm, is founded on the understanding of the self through dependent co-arising. It is made possible through Wisdom, that is the knowledge of the ultimate reality of emptiness. Once again, the concept of emptiness refers to the lack of a permanent, unchanging self. In contrast, our ethical conventions in the west rely predominantly on the presupposition of an inherent essential identity. This serves to set up a boundary around the agents involved in the ethical interaction. This is evidenced in such ethical directives as the golden rule, to treat others as you would like to be treated.

This formulation draws a distinct separation between the "I" and ''.Other". The ethical interaction is one of respect for the boundaries established by an essential self.

Compassion is radically different from this understanding. Shantideva states, "Those desiring speedily to be/ A refuge for themselves and others/ Should make the interchange of 'I' and 'other,'/ And thus embrace a sacred mystery."35 To embrace this sacred mystery is to acknowledge the emptiness of all things. Once the self is understood as contextually defined through dependent co-arising, the boundary between "I" and "other" disappears. While you are phenomenally different and distinct beings, ultimately you are the same. This is what is meant by the "interchange of 'I' and 'other'."

Once one realizes that the boundary between "I" and "other" contain no essential foundation, one views the other as himself. fa a way, one can truly practice the golden rule as stated above without distraction, for when you act towards others you are acting towards yourself. Our contemporary common usage of the word compassion usually brings forth synonyms like benevolence, empathy, and forgiveness. While all of these

35 Shantideva, The Way ofthe Bodhisattva: (Bodhicaryavatara), trans. Padmakara Translation Group. Revised Edition. (Boston: Shambhala, 2006), 8.120. 31

words describe aspects of Buddhist compassion, none serve to offer a complete understanding of the term within the Buddhist context. Yet through a deeper look into each of these characteristics we can see how the interchanging of the "I" and "other" serve to reformulate our understanding of the ethical from the western normative ethical paradigm.

The first characteristic to be evaluated is that of benevolence. Benevolence is a genuine desire to participate in altruistic activities. In other words, benevolence manifests itself through a selfless desire to help another human being. Despite the terminology, "a selfless desire" denies only the desires and needs of an individual. Within

Normative ethics, the boundaries are still firmly situated between "I" and "other." One individual seeks to help alter the position or status of another individual. The practice of benevolence through Buddhist compassion radically reorients one's position in this interaction. The selfless action is in fact self-less. The object of your compassion however, no longer holds its status as "other." In an ultimate sense the emptiness of each individual becomes the other. This understanding of "I" as "other" is not an attempt to form a new boundary through the use of a "one" but to expose the emptiness of both through the sameness of the "I" and the "other." Shantideva explains the equality of beings in the following way. "Since I and other beings both,/ In fleeing suffering, are equal and alike,/ What difference is there to distinguish us,/ That I should save myself and not the others?"36 One's individual activities now serve to care for and alleviate the suffering of others as one would care for their own body since, in a way, it is their own

36 Ibid, 8.96. 32

body. "To free myself from harm/ And others from their sufferings,/ Let me give myself to others,/ Loving them as I now love myself."37

Shantideva also uses this point to argue for the impetus to employ compassion.

"My sight and other senses, now the property of others-/ To use them for myself would be improper./ And it is likewise disallowed/ To use my faculties against their owners!"38

Any use of "my faculties" for my own benefit would only serve to reinforce the attachment to self. This would be a misuse of what ultimately belongs to others.

Shantideva concludes this point by stating, "Thus sentient beings will be my chief concern/ And everything I see my body has/ Will all be seized and offered/ For the use and service of all other beings."39

The second characteristic of compassion I would like to address is that of empathy. Empathy is the way in which a separate and distinct entity places one's self in the position of the "other" in order to alleviate the suffering of that individual. It relies, by definition on the understanding of self, employed by normative ethics. This in tum prevents a complete connection between the two individuals denying the ability to see a person's needs as such and address them. At best, one can only assume or rely on the reports of the "other" to derive conclusions of their true needs. For example, I have seen signs posted on the walls of multiple hospital rooms communicating that an individual is the best witness to attest to the amount of pain that an individual is experiencing.

Hospital employees must rely on the reports of the patient on the amount of pain they are

37 Ibid, 8.136.

38 Ibid, 8.138. 39 Ibid. 8.139. 33

in or observe the struggles and wincing of a patient during certain actions. From there the nurses apply pain medicine based on the reports of the patient. This is an imperfect system. Compassion, applied through the knowledge of the interdependence of self or the interchanging of "I" and "other," is able to provide a way for the nurse to "feel" the pain of the patient and apply the perfect amount of pain medicine. Obviously this example should not be taken literally. The ability to "feel" the pain is only through the

Ultimate understanding ofreality. Through compassion, one can truly comprehend the suffering that the "other" experiences as the same suffering that the "I" experiences. This understanding of self without boundaries, allows for the fluidity of compassion between two phenomenal beings, which in turn allows for the understanding of suffering as such, without the need to rely on observation or personai report from a distinctly separate entity.

The third characteristic of compassion that helps to distinguish non-substantial ethics from normative ethics is the concept of forgiveness. The use of the concept of forgiveness within the discussion of Buddhism is problematic for obvious reasons. The association of forgiveness with Western forms of religion, e.g. Christianity, focuses on the absolution of a transgression by a deity. Obviously within Buddhism there is no such deity to ask or receive forgiveness from. There is no moral judgment passed down from a deity to human beings. Yet I believe there is still a place for forgiveness in a purely secular context. For our discussion of forgiveness we must isolate the concept away from any religious or transcendent framework and place it within the phenomenal interaction between human beings. Forgiveness then, should be understood for our purposes, as the 34

movement of the affected party towards the reestablishment of a relationship severed by a negatively interpreted action. I have made this definition morally ambiguous in order to focus on the relationship and not the moral categories of right and wrong. As many of life's disagreements would evince, interpersonal arguments are not resolved on factual evaluations of who was right or wrong. The moral categories of right and wrong are sufficient for mathematical purposes or some scientific factual pursuits but interpersonal relationships typically require a remedy that is more concerned with the relationship than one's standing with moral categories.40 With this in mind, we can now look at the role forgiveness plays within Buddhist compassion.

Forgiveness represents the ability of an individual to forgive another individual as if a transgression has never taken place. A transgression can be understood as a violation of the boundaries surrounding the individual. The act of true forgiveness becomes difficult for human beings since any transgression will most likely permanently affect the boundaries of that individual. The ability for forgiveness to be experienced fully is made easier in a model where boundaries are not in place from the beginning. Ultimately what transgression can occur if there are no boundaries to transgress. How does one affix blame when the circumstances of an evil act are dependently co-arising? Shantideva pushes this point further identifying the body of the victim as a condition of the harm that

40 The moral categories of right and wrong admittedly, are most often used within legal matters. I purposefully did not include the use of right and wrong in regard to justice or law for reasons that will be made apparent in chapter 3. For now it is important to establish the relationship between phenomenal human beings so that we can later move into a discussion of how the non-substantialist ethical paradigm works in relation to justice and law. 35

was caused. "This body - running sore in human form-"/ Merely touched, it cannot stand the pain!/ I'm the one who grasped it in my blind attachment,/ Whom should I resent when pain occurs."41 The wound caused from the knife is a result of multiple conditions. The knife, the skin that tore, the hand on the knife and the body that did not move out of the way were all necessary for the wound to occur. Shantideva asks how one can be more angry with the assailant than he is with his own body that produced the pain through sensation.

While the transgression did not occur in the Ultimate sense one should not accept the extreme conclusion that the wound is not real in the phenomenal. Shantideva is not questioning the phenomenal occurrence but the attachment to an action preventing forgiveness. Forgiveness is applied in its full capacity because the one pursuing compassion realizes that there is no permanent unchanging action that caused his pain.

Shantideva is quick to address the fallacy in the interpretation that there can be no connection between the agent and the action within Buddhist ethics. "'If self does not exist' you say,/ 'There is no link connecting actions with results./ If when the deed is done, the doer is no more,/ Who is there to reap the karmic fruit?"42 Shantideva acknowledges the inability to observe a direct cause and effect on a linear scale through the lens of dependent co-arising. '"A cause coterminous with its result' I Is something quite impossible to see./ And only in the context of a single mental stream/ Can it be said

41 Ibid. 6.44. 42 Ibid. 9.70. 36

that one who acts will later reap the fruit."43 The inability to find blame for an action does not free one from the responsibility to the "other" through our interdependent relation. Simply because one cannot draw a direct connection between an action and its consequences, does not negate the fact that there are consequences. "If one kills or harms the magical illusion of a man,/ There is no mind in such a thing and therefore there's no sin./ But beings do indeed have mirage-like minds;/ Sin and merit will, in consequence, arise."44

This brings us face to face with the question of right and wrong within the

Buddhist ethical paradigm. How do we discern between what is beneficial and what affects sentient beings negatively? Where does the measure lie? While Buddhism does not deal in absolute dichotomies such as essential interpretations of right and wrong, it would be a gross misinterpretation to say that Buddhism makes no value judgment in this matter. Let's take for example, the action of committing murder. The Normative ethical paradigm would condemn this action as a transgression of the boundary between the self and other. The question arises, how do we offer a value judgment on an ultimately empty action against an ultimately empty self. This question stems from the unjustified weight placed on the Ultimate understanding of reality. A transgression occurs in the phenomenal realm and therefore consequences for that action will result. According to this explanation, one can claim that the action of murder is wrong. Right and wrong, within Buddhism, are then to be understood through what serves to alleviate suffering.

43 Ibid. 9.72.

44 Ibid. 9.11. 37

As mentioned previously, the basis for Buddhist compassion lies in the knowledge of the true nature of one's self, or Wisdom. Once a person understands the interdependent foundation of the self as well as the interdependence or continuity of the entirety of all things, only then can one truly practice cqmpassion. Without this knowledge, one can at best merely offer imperfect versions of those characteristics mentioned previously. One can still love another person as one loves himself, but it would be an imperfect love that continues to set boundaries between the "I" and "other."

It can be said then, that Wisdom must be present as a condition for the practice of

Compassion within Buddhism. Understood in this formulation, however, it would seem as though one must first come to the profound understanding that the self is empty before one can practice true compassion. This formulation serves to set up a linear timeline, which gives compassion a conditional definition but in tum defines wisdom as having a permanent and unchanging essence that must be present for an individual to act compassionately. Time within Buddhism should not be understood as a linear construct.

In order to understand clearly the relationship between Wisdom and Compassion I would like to pull from the writings of the Zen Master Dogen who offers his explanation of time within the Buddhist perspective.

Zen Master Dogen Kigen (1200-1253 CE) was the founder of the Soto school of

Zen Buddhism in Japan. His written work, Shobogenzo, provides the foundation for the

Soto teaching and exposes the influence of Do gen' s knowledge of Chan Buddhism

(Chinese Zen Buddhism) that he obtained on two separate stays in China. The fascicle 38

entitled Uji, or Being-time, outlines his views on the interdependence of time in light of emptiness.

D6gen's discussion of time focuses on the isolation that occurs within each moment. In the same way that Derrida uses violence to explain the isolation that occurs to bring about an action out of the totality or.continuity of reality, Dogen claims that by isolating a moment out of the continuity of time, one forcefully attaches a permanent and unchanging identity to that moment. Our discussion of Derrida focused on the isolation of continuity within identity. This was exemplified through the discussion of the different roles that a person may be defined through. In a similar movement, Dogen focuses on the isolation of events that occur within the continuity of being. Our life becomes a series of moments. I learned to crawl and then eventually learned to walk.

We construct a series of events that lie on a definite timeline giving a permanent and unchanging order to the events of our life. Time is then often understood and measured as a linear movement from one isolated moment to the next. The past is constructed by individual moments that have occurred and have passed by, not to be revisited again.

The future then, can be understood as the possibility of moments that will at some point manifest themselves in the present. If we were to understand time as a linear motion, one would be forced to ascribe a permanent essence to those moments that have passed or have yet to pass. This is why I contend that under the understanding of time through a linear construct, the experience of enlightenment, the attainment of the profound Wisdom of the true nature of the self, would then be given an essential identity. 39

In order to remedy this linear view of time, Do gen argues that time and being are one in the same. Time should be understood as individual moments, but unlike the linear view of time that argues for an essential identity to each moment, Do gen contends that each moment contains in it the entirety of every other moment. This collapses the past and future into each present moment. This is not to say that time is stagnant. Dogen refers to the passage oftime as a sequence of nows, or seriatim passage. "[Time] passes from today to tomorrow, passes form today to yesterday, passes from yesterday to today, passes from today to today, passes from tomorrow to tomorrow."45 From this quote we see that while time passes, it is not bound by the typical unidirectional linear definition of the movement of time. The seriatim passage of time occurs as the interdependent conditions present themselves. Similar to the construction of self, Dogen contends that the seasons themselves pass not because of a linear time frame but due to the presence of conditions that represent spring. That is to say, we experience spring because the conditions we associate with spring become manifest; the air begins to warm, the amount of daylight increases, and so on. Spring is not an essential point on a timeline but a term we use to describe the conditions that are present during that stage of the year. Do gen refers to this as Being-Time because it is the presence of phenomenal conditions that bring about the passing of time. Being should be understood as the totality of phenomenal reality and not merely human beings. The computer is being-time. The pen is being-time. Time is then based on conditions and not a linear causal relation.

45 Dogen, The Heart ofDogen's Shobogenzo, trans. Norman Waddell and Masao Abe. (Albany: SUNY Press, 2002) 51. 40

Wisdom then should not be understood as an essential point on a timeline that

brings about compassion. Because the conditions are present, we say that Wisdom or

Enlightenment has been obtained. These conditions are perfect love, perfect sympathy,

and perfect care to name a few. In other words, we say wisdom has been obtained

because the conditions of Compassion are present. So then which is correct? Does

wisdom bring about compassion or does compassion bring about wisdom? The answer,

similar to the answer given by Nagarjuna in the previous chapter of this thesis is yes, no,

both yes and no, and neither yes and no. Dogen's formulation of time is referred to as

Being-time. Applying the concept of dependent co-arising to time Dogen contends that

being is a necessary condition of time and that time is a necessary condition of being. It

is not that being is capable on its own of creating time or that time is of its own accord

able to bring about being, it is merely Being-time. In the same way, wisdom should not

be viewed as containing the ability within itself to cause compassion or that compassion

can in some way on its own bring about the realization of the true nature of the self.

Compassion is Wisdom. Wisdom is Compassion. There is no essential difference

between the two on the Ultimate level. This does not negate the fact that on the

phenomenal level we observe the passing of time. We have memories of times past that

we cannot merely conjure up to the present, but there is no inherent permanent

unchanging essence of that occurrence. In a similar manner, enlightenment, that is, the

moment one attains Wisdom, is said to occur as an event. Compassion then appears on the phenomenal level to rush forth from that point in phenomenal time. This is only half

of the full truth. The Ultimate realm and the Phenomenal realm are only separated 41

through abstraction and do not appear separate in reality. On the phenomenal level, compassion and wisdom appear to be two separate and distinct occurrences, however, ultimately they are the same and arise only in conjunction with the other.

The possibility ofNon-substantialist ethics is found in the arising of conditions.

Similar to the foundationless foundation of the self, ethics is not viewed as permanent and unchanging, but as an ever-changing interaction in the present. Context is fluid and as the conditions of the need for ethical behavior continue to present themselves, so will the guidelines used to monitor and measure them. It is not an ethics of relativity but an ethics of context, of compassion, of seeing the "I" as "other" and the "other" as "I." CHAPTER IV

RESPONSIVENESS: THE MANIFESTATION OF A NON-SUBSTANTIALIST

ETHIC OF INTIMACY

Thomas Kasulis, author of the book Intimacy or Integrity, offers a vibrant picture of the manifestation of non-substantialist ethics. Through a comparative look at the

Eastern and Western conceptions of ethics, Kasulis teases out what an ethical paradigm based on a foundationless foundation of context looks like. Kasulis structures his discussion on what he terms the Integrity based model typified through Western culture, and the Intimacy model which he associates with the Eastern perspective on relational interaction. The integrity model refers to those models of ethics in which fixed boundaries are established between two objects, two individuals, or between an individual and an object. Kasulis defines integrity as "being able to stand alone, having a self-contained identity without dependence, or infringement by, the outside."46 Our discussion of normative ethics would piace said ethical paradigm within the description of the integrity model.

The defining characteristic of the relationship between two entities within the integrity model would be responsibility, which is established out of the respect for the

46 Thomas P. Kasulis, Intimacy or Integrity: Philosophy and Cultural Difference (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2002) 53. 42 43

fixed boundaries between any two objects. For example, let us look back to the case of murder presented in the previous chapter. Those ethical paradigms, which fall under the integrity model, can argue that murder is wrong due to the transgression of fixed boundaries. Whether one argues from the phenomenal boundaries broken through the act of murder or the conceptual imposition of one's will on another, the lack of respect for the fixed boundaries violates those laws that are in place to protect the individual. This need for respect of boundaries within the integrity model presents an additional nuance of normative ethics. Normative ethics can be understood not only as based on fixed rules, but also as a contract between two separate and distinct entities. In order to prevent the transgression of boundaries, individual entities come under agreement as to the actions that are permissible and those that are not within a society.

The intimacy model, as proposed by Kasulis, differs in its relational structure in two different ways. The first fundamental difference focuses on the lack of fixed boundaries within the intimacy model exemplified through our discussion of no-self theory within Buddhism. Despite the presence of phenomenal entities, the self contains no permanent or unchanging self. Compassion, as discussed in the second chapter, provides the mechanism with which phenomenal entities can then interact in a positive way. By viewing "I" as "other" and "other" as "I," one is able to address the problem of suffering as such on the ultimate level. While commonsense leads us to admit that the phenomenal structure still exists, and that one cannot conveniently forego the communication of needs between an ailing person and those who are trying to help, we can gain intimate knowledge of the ailing person providing the possibility to better 44

address the suffering of an individual. Boundaries, by definition, prevent one from getting too close. However, when we understand that these boundaries are not ultimately real, we are able to forge a bond allowing an individual to relate to another person as if we were relating to our own self. This is the basis of compassion as discussed in the previous chapter. "By trying to read each other's intimations and by intimating ourselves, we seek the intrinsic interconnectedness that constitutes the basis of intimate relationship ... This common ground, this discovered overlap, is the very definition of internal relatedness."47

The second fundamental difference between the integrity model and the intimacy model is the volitional nature of the intimacy model. In contrast to the integrity model, which requires the contractual agreement between two separate entities, the intimacy model provides an ethical paradigm that always requires the willingness of the parties involved. The volitional nature of intimacy promotes an active role with those individuals involved. Whereas integrity can be respected without the active influence of another individual, intimacy can only be created through the mutual desire of the parties involved. Conversation, for example, requires the effort of at least two individuals; otherwise it is no more than a monologue or a lecture. In the same way, intimacy cannot be achieved without the genuine availability and presence of all parties involved. Kasulis draws the comparison stating, "Integrity's moral demand is to be fair to the other person; intimacy's is to be there for the other person"48 (emphasis original). This presencing,

47 Ibid, 45.

48 Ibid, 120. 45

required for intimacy, focuses our attention on the contrasting concept ofresponsiveness within the intimacy model to that of responsibility within the integrity model.

The use of responsibility within the non-substantial ethical model is unable to stand due to the lack of fixed boundaries between entities. Instead, one is able to offer a response to the intimations between two entities in order to quell the suffering within that individual. In his book, Kasulis offers the example of a friend who spent a night with him in the hospital walking him through the process of post-knee surgery rehabilitation.

Kasulis recalls the pain immediately following the surgery as well as the petitions to the doctor for additional pain medication that were dismissed due to protocol on weaning patients off of pain killers. Recounting the story of the doctor's answer to Kasulis' request, his friend offers the comment, "They have their rules and guidelines for treatment and that doc in particular goes by the book. Sometimes it seems he treats the disease and forgets about the patient."49 Instead of offering an explanation of the guidelines as the doctor did, Kasulis' friend stays with him through the night. His friend exemplified the 'being there' found within the intimacy model. Responsiveness through intimacy attempts to treat the individual, which in this case is the patient. This is not to say that the disease goes untreated but that the disease is treated through each individual case. Kasulis summarizes the outcome of each model by stating, "in the integrity orientation ethics is primarily a morality of principles; in the intimacy orientation, however, ethics is a morality oflove."5° Kasulis' formulation of the intimacy model of

49 Ibid, 3.

50 Ibid, 120. 46

ethics provides a clear example of the efficacy of ethics from the non-substantialist viewpoint. The context-based approach repels any attempt to be institutionalized into a formal system, while still offering ethical guidelines for action. Through an ethic of responsiveness, non-substantialist ethics provides an individual approach, both phenomenally and conceptually, to address the suffering found in one's immediate proximity.

Staying with the example of the patient in the hospital, Kasulis admits that there is a place for treatment within the intimacy model. Despite the summation of intimacy as a

"morality of love," Kasulis is not claiming that it is enough to simply tell the patient in the recovery room that you love them and that it will all be better. Similarly, in the ethical realm, there is the establishment of guidelines that is necessary to direct one in the best manner to alleviate one's own suffering as well as the suffering of another.

According to Derrida, the establishment of ethical guidelines occurs on the second level of violence. The originary violence, or first level, pierces through the continuity of being into each inexhaustible moment of the present, distinguishing between objects, entities, or concepts. Once the proper name is established and boundaries are created, it is necessary to prescribe a way in which one responds to that social environment. In this moment, a law is established. The interpretation of the nature of any individual law, however, differs between the perspective of the integrity model and its counterpart in the intimacy model.

There are two characteristics that are fundamental to the use of law within the integrity-based normative ethical paradigm. The first focuses on the way laws are 47

established within an ethical paradigm. The laws found in normative ethics are derived from the social norms of a society based on the mixture of ideals and realistic necessities of that individual society. In either case, whether realistic or constructed from the ideals of a culture, it is the cultural worldview that is then reified into laws or guidelines.

Cultural ideals take on the form of a constitution to bring cohesion to the individual experience within a culture. The moment separate individuals become a group, it is necessary to establish the modes of interaction between the individuals. Laws serve a regulatory function within the community. Through a normative system, laws are agreed upon and ratified by those within the community. It is possible that not everyone will be in complete agreement, however, by placing one's self under the authority of the governing body one is accepting of the guidelines as the authority on ethical interaction.51

Similarly, laws within the non-substantialist ethical paradigm are constructed through a normative process, through the values present and agreed upon by a culture. It should be understood then, that in reference to the establishment of laws through communal agreement, non-substantial ethics offers no disagreement with its normative counterpart.

The second characteristic of normative ethics is the fixed nature of the law within normative ethics. Once the establishment of a law occurs, that is, the institutionalization of a concept, the law becomes a fixed measuring stick to be used in all appropriate matters. One example of this institutionalization can be found on the roads one travels on

51 The creation of a normative ethical paradigm as discussed here serves merely to describe the communally derived norms or laws from the ideals of those involved in the creation process. This does not account for the possibility of slaves who have no part in the process or the possibility of an individual usurping authority and subsequently dictating the laws to the powerless masses. 48

a daily basis. Throughout this country, roads are marked with speed limit signs defining the line between observing the legal speed and breaking the law. This speed limit is not altered by conditions caused by weather or traffic congestion but represents a fixed line between legal and illegal, right and wrong. Similarly, normative ethics establishes a fixed measure to value right and wrong that is not easily altered despite its relational or communal conception. The fundamental difference between the non-substantial and normative ethical paradigms lies in the role and nature of the law that is established.

Derrida clarifies the provisional quality of the law through his discussion of the relationship of Justice and law in the writing, Force ofLaw. According to Derrida, the law does not hold a permanent or unchanging status within itself in the same way that the self holds no permanent and unchanging essence within the non-substantialist perspective. Laws themselves, created through a normative process, are constructed within a culture, relating to the needs and views specific to that time and place. Practices such as slavery that were justified by the laws of past civilizations are seen as cruel and inhumane by our standards. I would also hypothesize that some of our practices such as the use of nuclear weapons would be considered barbaric and cowardly by some passed civilizations. This is not to argue for the justification of either, as I would hope especially in the case of slavery that humanity has progressed in some level, understanding the nature of Justice through equality. These examples are provided to expose how laws are established through context. As a civilization progresses whether through technological or idealogical advances, certain institutions or perspectives demand to be reevaluated. 49

Laws, however, should not be dismissed as merely arbitrary. The lack of an

attachment of an imperative from authority does not negate the use and even necessity of

law. As stated earlier, the establishment oflaw is necessary once the proper name has

been given. The validity of law can be :iccepted through our understanding of the use of

Justice within deconstruction.

Justice, for Derrida, represents the totality of conditions necessary for the best

possible outcome. In a sense it is reminiscent of Plato's Forms except with one major

difference. According to Derrida, one cannot be positive of the existence of Justice.

While it lies just beyond one's grasp similar to Plato's Forms, Derrida is not attempting to posit an essential ideal outside the reach of human experience. "One cannot directly

speak about justice, thematize or objectivize justice, say 'this is just,' and even less 'I am just,' without immediately betraying justice"52 (emphasis in text). Specifically in popular culture within the United States we hear calls for justice regularly. Victims want to see justice. Yet through Derrida's understanding of justice, it would be impossible, for to know justice is to know the totality of all actions and possible motives. This totality, within deconstruction, is always to-come. In this understanding laws are not handed down by deities nor do laws carry the authority of an imperative should or ought.

Derrida is also very careful here not to claim that Justice exists with complete certainty.

To make this assumption would be to posit for an ideal form of Justice, that is a permanent unchanging presence of Justice just outside our reach. The possibility of

52 Derrida, "Force of Law," Acts ofReligion, 237. 50

Justice within non-substantialism, as well as the possibility of ethics are always just that, a possibility.

When evaluating the cost analysis of any given situation, Justice would be the ability to evaluate all possible conditions. Once the conditions were understood, one could make the best possible decision based on the facts. Decisions, however, are always made with a limited understanding of the scope of the situation. A judgment is at best, an exercise of probability. One weighs the chances that one is acting in the best possible manner and makes a decision. For example, if we think of each decision as being weighed on a set of scales, according to Derrida, there would never be a moment in which our knowledge of the conditions would place all of the weight on one side of the scale. Instead the scale shifts with our understanding of the situation leaning slightly to one side or the other. It is important to point out that while the scales are typically associated with justice, it is not the ultimate understanding of justice that Derrida has in mind. At best, the use of the scales represents the human appropriation of Justice. For

Derrida, the appropriation of Justice is found within the law.

The permanent or unchanging conception of laws from the normative ethical perspective seems to equate the observance of the law with the experience of Justice as such. That is to say, the normative ethical perspective would claim that we can experience justice in its fullest sense through the observance of the law. Whether normative ethics takes on an authoritative position from a deity or is merely the acceptance of social goals within a secular society, law becomes synonymous with justice. Derrida contradicts this sentiment argued by normative ethics stating, "Law is 51

not justice. Law is the element of calculation, and it is just that there be law, but justice is

53 incalculable, it demands that one calculate with the incalculable. " In a similar way that the proper name distills the referent, law appropriates and distills justice. Law, in itself, is no more than the fallible interpretation of a concept that cannot be folly defined or grasped. According to Derrida, "Justice in itself, if such a thing exist, outside or beyond law, is not deconstructible. No more than deconstruction itself, if such a thing exist.

Deconstruction is justice"54 (emphasis in text). This statement equating deconstruction to justice, is similar to the Buddhist understanding of the emptiness of emptiness provided in Chapter 1 by Nagarjuna. Justice, if such a thing exists, cannot itself be appropriated.

Emptiness is itself empty, that is, emptiness cannot be grasped as a permanent or unchanging thing. The process of deconstruction relies on the openness of the future as something that may possibly happen but cannot be brought about. Simply stated, Justice cannot be bound. As discussed above, the experience of true Justice would require knowledge of the continuity of being, that is, comprehension of all causes and possible causes leading up to an action. According to Derrida, "justice has to be thought of as what overflows law [droit]."55 By defining Justice as the overflow oflaw, Derrida reiterates the inability to comprehend the entirety of Justice. One cannot accurately comprehend the measure of the ocean when one attempts to pour the ocean into a juice cup. While one can imagine the impressiveness and vastness of the ocean through this

53 Jacques Derrida, "Force of Law," Acts ofReligion, ed. Gil Anidjar (New York: Routledge, 2002), 244.

54 Ibid, 24 3.

55 Derrida, "I Have a Taste for the Secret," A Taste for the Secret, 21. 52

exercise, an attempt to construct any knowledge on the size of the ocean in this manner would be futile. Likewise, the attempt to comprehend the entirety of Justice through the experience of the law would end in failure.

Derrida's discussion of Justice and law exposes the contextual application of laws within the intimacy model. Despite the contextually derived foundation of non­ substantialist ethics, the use of laws or guidelines within this ethical paradigm is retained.

However, as discussed, the use of the law is not a perfect application of Justice. There is a space in between law and Justice that cannot be bridged. One cannot be completely sure that the decision one makes is just. Derrida refers to this relationship between justice and law as an aporia, a statement that contains evidence both for and against its acceptance. To Derrida, "aporias are the experiences, as improbable as they are necessary, of justice, that is to say moments in which the decision between just and unjust is never insured by a rule."56 For example, in order to have the ability to abide by laws I must have the freedom to transgress the laws. However, the law requires obedience thereby denying freedom. This case is an example of aporia. Derrida claims that justice cannot occur without this experience of aporia. Non-substantialist ethics cannot then, be thought of as a system that can be applied. The presence of aporia exposes the inability for a concrete fixed value to be attributed to one outcome over the other. This is not simply the value of good or evil as a moral designation but the inability to bridge the gap between Justice and law in totality. A system assumes knowledge of the totality of conditions. That is to say, a system must be able to account for every contingency. The

56 Derrida, "Force of Law," Acts ofReligion, 237 53

inability of law to fully appropriate Justice prevents non-substantialist ethics achieving the status of a system.

The space separating law and Justice can only be resolved through tension. This is evinced in the intimacy model through the close relationship without permanent boundaries. A direct connection can only occur between two entities that have permanent boundaries with which to connect. Tension, in contrast, allows for the relationship to occur within a contextually fluid space. Tension, like the electrical currents that move through space, is volatile. It is not entirely predictable. A system leads to certainty whereas tension leads to an uneasiness about the outcome. However, the system is rigid in its application, whereas tension is able to shift as our understanding of the ethical situation shifts. Tension is the ability of non-substantialist ethics to be "there" for the individual.

The tension found within the establishment of the law from the Buddhist perspective can be seen in the seventh century CE Korean Buddhist Monk Wonhyo.

Wonhyo addresses the paradoxical relationship between emptiness and following the

Buddhist precepts in the commentary Essentials of Observing and Violating Bodhisattva

Precepts. The Bodhisattva precepts outline the regulations of practice for Buddhist monks. Once an individual had made the Bodhisattva vow, one was expected to follow these accepted rules following the right path towards enlightenment. The term 'accepted' is used to underscore the communally derived guidelines for Buddhist practice.

However, these rules must be viewed through the lens of conditioned causality or emptiness. Unlike normative ethics, which derives fixed laws from communal origins 54

that are permanent and unchanging within that culture, non-substantialist ethics provide a fluid structure to the concept of law, understanding that the context of the action is just as important as the context with which the laws themselves were derived. This contextual basis leads Wonhyo to question what the true nature of observing the Bodhisattva

Precepts is.

As previously mentioned, Wonhyo's writing was in the form of a commentary.

The text under analysis, the Pusa jie ben (On Conferring Bodhisattva Precepts) presented four major precepts and 41 minor precepts that were to be followed by Bodhisattva's.

The four major precepts discussed in this text are: "first, precept on praising oneself and disparaging others; second, precept on being stingy about the correct dharma; third, precept on not accepting repentance because of anger; and fourth, precept on slandering the correct dharma."57 Through Wonhyo's analysis of the first major precept, we will see the paradox found in merely following the letter of the law without understanding the context surrounding the event.

In the case of the first precept, praising oneself and disparaging others, Wonhyo argues that the strict adherence to this precept can in fact have a negative outcome. For example, an assignment is presented to an officer in the military requiring the utmost attention to detail and vigilance on the part of a leader for success. Knowing that he possesses the abilities to succeed and that other officers do not, he praises his own ability and talks negatively, yet honestly, about his fellow officers. In this situation, I would

57 Wonhyo, "Essentials of Observing and Violating Bodhisattva Precepts: Wonhyo's Non-Substantial Mahayana Ethics," Han 'guk Pulgyo chonso. English translation by Jin Y. Park, Unpublished. 14,15. 55

argue that the officer acted prudently answering those in authority to him honestly, not for personal gain, but for the success of the mission. The ability to offer examples of situations in which the strict adherence to a fixed rule will result in ignoring the facts, exposes the limitations of fixed rules. In calling for the deeper knowledge of the reason behind the precept, Wonhyo offers his explanation of the shallow and profound understanding of the precepts themselves.

For Wonhyo, the shallow interpretation of a precept focuses on the letter of the law. That is to say, the literal directive given by a law or precept. One example of this would be the instructions written on the back of a shampoo bottle, rinse, lather, repeat. A shallow understanding of this directive would lead one to remain in the shower until he or she runs out of shampoo. In contrast, the person who exemplifies profound understanding looks to the intent of the law. "When the person of higher dispositions hears [the first precept], the person gives a weighty thought to its meaning.

Understanding that when one corner is lifted, the other three corners follow." 58 By understanding the meaning behind the precept one can apply principles instead of individual precepts. For example, when a child with profound understanding is told not to throw a ball in the house, the child comprehends that not only should balls not be thrown inside, but also that he or she should be mindful of the fragile objects within that home at all times. In this example, the child extends the meaning of the directive outward applying it to similar situations.

58 Ibid, 7. 56

Precepts are similar to the law within the western ethical paradigm in that they are constructed as guidelines to promote ethical behavior. However, precepts, as argued by

Wonhyo, by definition refuse the movement towards reification or institutionalization.

That is to say, precepts should not be understood as having a permanent or unchanging nature. Precepts are not rigid laws but contextually based guidelines. "The characteristics of offense are based on conditioned causality; so are the precepts."59 On the ultimate level, precepts are themselves empty of permanent and unchanging essence.

Following the precepts merely to follow the precepts, is to misunderstand the ultimate nature of the precepts and is a wrong understanding. However, it should be clearly understood that the negation on the ultimate level does not negate the obedience of the precepts on the phenomenal level. "Even though the nature of what to observe and who to observe are not calculated as if they exist, bodhisattvas do not deny the phenomenal existence of precepts."60

This creates a tension similar to the tension found in the aporia between Justice and law. Specifically, this tension is found in the space between the requirement of a monk to follow a precept that foundationally must be understood as empty. Wonhyo's interpretation does not allow for the use of a Platonic Ideal from which we can in turn derive a fixed law. There is no direct connection between an Ultimate ideal and the phenomenal manifestation since the Ultimate merely exposes the emptiness of the precept itself. Instead, we find a tension present between these two levels of

59 Ibid, 11. 60 Ibid. 57

understanding, a connection that is not directly connected in the sense of a linear path but one that is established through the disconnected space between the Ultimate understanding of the precept and its ~henomenal manifestation.

The presence of tension within Buddhism is evinced by the 'mad monks. ' 61 The term 'mad monk' is used to reference how certain monks "challenge institutional authority" while seemingly possessing a logic beyond that of "normal" people. Their understanding of Buddhist thought drives them to understand the following of precepts in the following three ways:

First, precepts are non-real, because they are constructed by various conditions, and do not exist through their intrinsic essence; second, the non-substantiality of precepts, however, does not negate their existence; third, if the practitioner becomes attached to the idea of observations (second aspect) and fails to practice its non-reality (first aspect), then observing precepts will ironically turn out to be its violation. 62

For the mad monks, the symbolic transgression of the Buddhist precepts, are the logical application of the precepts themselves. This creates a tension that forces a higher level of vigilance and knowledge of the precepts. Vigilance is necessary due to the volatility of tension.

The example of the raft simile provided in the early Buddhist textAlagaddupama

Sutt a, helps to tease out the function of the precepts for the Bodhisattva. In this parable, the Buddha describes a stretch of water to be crossed.63 The opposite bank of this

61 Jin Y. Park, "Transgression and Ethics of Tension," in Deconstruction and the Ethical in Asian Thought, ed. Youru Wang (New York: Routledge, 2007), 192-213. 62 Ibid, 200.

63 Walpola Rahula, What the Buddha Taught (New York: Grove Press, 1974), 11, 12. 58

waterway is safe and calm whereas the bank that his disciple stands on is dangerous. It is necessary for the disciple to make a raft of "grass, wood, branches, and leaves." The construction of this raft represents the necessity of the conventional world within the study and practice of Buddhism. Upon making the raft the disciple travels to the opposite bank to find safety. After some deliberation the disciple determines that the abandonment of the raft is necessary knowing that the raft, or teachings and practice, are empty. In a similar manner, the teachings or practice lie on the same plane as the precepts. One is no longer bound by the limits of the raft once gradual-cultivation has negated the necessity of the raft, or practice. That is to say, once a Bodhisattva moves to the profound understanding of the precept, the precept itself can be discarded on the ultimate level. This is not to say that laws or precepts disappear, but that the intent is carried out without the need for direct implementation. For example, simply by understanding the intent behind the directive not to kill does not mean that one transcends the consequences associated with its transgression. For one who truly understands the interconnectedness of all beings would not perform the act of murder. The intent is intact despite the removal of the directive.

It is the enlightened monk who understands that it is not merely enough to follow a, b, cat all times, and one will be following the middle path. For the enlightened monk, the continued practice would be evidence of grasping. Practice is the means to obtain enlightenment; it is not an end in itself. The "madness" within Buddhism occurs in the tension created when one follows precepts knowing that the precepts themselves are empty of any permanent or unchanging essence. "Awareness of such a tension is the 59

groundless ground of one's ethical involvement with the world, in which normative ethical codes of a community are always understood against the background of their non­ substantiality. "64 The concept of tension is not a justification of transgressions nor is it a system in which to merely apply finite principles to actions. The tension found within the non-substantialist ethical perspective addresses the concept of ethics, not through the obedience found in normative ethics but through the responsiveness of non-substantialist ethics. That is to say, responsiveness requires the individual attention of one person to another as well as the individual case-by-case application of laws and precepts. Non­ substantialist ethics calls for the manifestation of the profound understanding of laws and precepts as discussed by Wonhyo. Once the profound understanding is implemented, non-substantialist ethics allows for a deeper relationship than its normative boundary­ laden counterpart.

64 Ibid. CHAPTERV

CONCLUSION

The non-sustantialist ethical paradigm offers a fundamental shift in our understanding of ethics from its normative counterpart. This shift begins with the evaluation of the question, "How should I live?" By positing an understanding of "I" that is contextually defined, the non-substantialist perspective exposes the lack of permanent and unchanging boundaries between phenomenal beings while retaining the presence of the beings themselves. Once free from the essential boundaries, intimacy is provided with a space to work through the tension. This space, then, frees the non-substantialist ethical paradigm from the confines of an imperative, that is, from a "should" or "ought", as there is no direct connection between the totality of Justice and its appropriation through the law. Laws, for Derrida, and Buddhist precepts are always provisional. Non­ substantialist ethics acknowledges the need for guidelines while refusing their reification into fixed rules. Fixed rules within normative ethics dismiss context as an obstacle to be overcome. From the non-substantialist perspective, there is only context. The relationship of context within the open space allows for an ethics of intimacy.

Intimacy is manifest through compassion. Through the dissolution of the boundaries between "I" and "other" imposed by an essentialist framework, intimacy approaches suffering from within. While the phenomenal experience may vary from

60 61

individual to individual, ultimately it is a shared experience. The movement to alleviate suffering comes from an individual that is not objectively removed from the situation but is directly involved despite the lack of phenomenal shared experience of pain. Each individual becomes personally invested in the well-being of the "other." In contrast to a responsibility, which is based on the respect of boundaries, responsiveness recognizes and acts for the benefit of the individual in reference to the surrounding context. This is where the strength of non-substantialist ethics through intimacy is found and the normative ethical paradigm is found wanting. Normative ethics can only offer fixed guidelines when presented with an ethical problem. If we recall the example of the

Doctor from Chapter 3, treatment is applied through strict application of tested remedies.

While this may in fact result in the alleviation of suffering in a particular area, the surrounding context is not accounted for. Intimacy provides an ethical paradigm that deals with suffering holistically. This is not to say that pain will not be experienced but that the surrounding context is given' equal importance as the initial cause of suffering. BIBLIOGRAPHY

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