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Sextus Empiricus Outlines of Pyrronism Translated, with Introduction and Commentary, by Benson Mates Oxford University Press, New York Oxford 1996 Book I *89* 1.The Main Difference between the Philosophies When people search for something, the likely outcome is that either they find I it or, not finding it, they accept that it cannot be found, or they continue to search. So also in the case of what is sought in philosophy, I think, some people 2 have claimed to have found the truth, others have asserted that it cannot be apprehended, and others are still searching. Those who think that they have 3 found it are the Dogmatists, properly so called-for example, the followers of Aristotle and Epicurus, the Stoics, and certain others. The followers of Cleitomachus and Carneades, as well as other Academics, have asserted that it cannot be apprehended. The Skeptics continue to search. Hence it is with 4 reason that the main types of philosophy are thought to be three in number: the Dogmatic, the Academic, and the Skeptic. Concerning the first two it will best become others to speak; but concerning the Skeptic Way we shall now give an outline account, stating in advance that as regards none of the things that we are about to say do we firmly maintain that matters are absolutely as stated, but in each instance we are simply reporting, like a chronicler, what now appears to us to be the case. 2. The Accounts of Skepticism One account of the Skeptic philosophy is called "general"; the other, "specific". 5 In the general account we set forth the characteristic traits of Skepticism, stating its basic idea, its origins, arguments, criterion and goal, as well as the modes of epoché [suspension of judgment], and how we take the Skeptic statements, and the distinction between Skepticism and the competing philosophies. In the specific account we state objections to each part of so-called 6 “philosophy”. Let us, then, first take up the general account, beginning the exposition with the various terms for the Skeptic Way. 3. The Nomenclature of the Skeptic Way The Skeptic Way is called Zetetic ["questioning"] from its activity in questioning 7 and inquiring, Ephectic ["suspensive"] from the pathos that arises concerning the subject of inquiry, Aporetic [inclined to aporiai”] either, as some say, from its being puzzled and questioning about everything or from its being at a loss as to whether to assent or dissent, and Pyrrhonean because it appears to us that Pyrrho applied himself to Skepticism more vigorously and conspicuously than his predecessors did. 4. What Skepticism Is The Skeptic Way is a disposition to oppose phenomena and noumena to one 8 another in any way whatever, with the result that, owing to the equipollence among the things and statements thus opposed, we are brought first to epoché *90* 9 and then to ataraxia. We do not apply the term "disposition" in any subtle sense, but simply as cognate with "to be disposed." At this point we are taking as phenomena the objects of sense perception, thus contrasting them with the noumena. The phrase "in any way whatever" can modify both the word "disposition" (so as to make us take that word in a plain sense, as we said) and the phrase "to oppose phenomena and noumena"; for since we oppose these in various ways – phenomena to phenomena, noumena to noumena, or alternando phenomena to noumena, we say "in any way whatever" in order to include all such oppositions. Or we can apply "in any way whatever" to "phenomena and noumena," in order that we may not have to inquire how the phenomena appear or the noumena are thought, but may take these terms in 10 their plain senses. By "opposed" statements we simply mean inconsistent ones, not necessarily affirmative and negative. By "equipollence" we mean equality as regards credibility and the lack of it, that is, that no one of the inconsistent statements takes precedence over any other as being more credible. Epoché is a state of the intellect on account of which we neither deny nor affirm anything. Ataraxia is an untroubled and tranquil condition of the soul. In our remarks on the goal of Skepticism we shall come back to the question of how ataraxia enters the soul along with epoché. 5. The Skeptic 11 The definition of the Pyrrhonean philosopher is implicitly contained in that of the Skeptic Way: he is the person who has the aforementioned disposition. 6. The Origins of Skepticism 12 We say that the causal origin of the Skeptic Way is the hope of attaining ataraxia. Certain talented people, upset by anomaly in "the facts" and at a loss as to which of these "facts" deserve assent, endeavoured to discover what is true in them and what is false, expecting that by settling this they would achieve ataraxia. But the main origin of Skepticism is the practice of opposing to each statement an equal statement; it seems to us that doing this brings an end to dogmatizing. 7. Does the Skeptic Dogmatize? 13 Then we say that the Skeptic does not dogmatize we are not using the term "dogma" as some do, in its more common meaning, "something that one merely agrees to", for the Skeptic does give assent to the pathé that are forced upon him by a phantasia; for example, when feeling hot (or cold) he would not say "I seem not to be hot (or cold)." But when we assert that he does not dogmatize, we use "dogma" in the sense, which others give it, of assent to one of the non-evident matters investigated by the sciences. For the Pyrrhonist 14 assents to nothing that is non-evident. Not even in putting forward the Skeptic slogans about non-evident things does he dogmatize – slogans like "Nothing *91* more" or "I determine nothing" or any of the others of which we shall speak later. For the dogmatizer propounds as certainty the things about which he is said to be dogmatizing, but the Skeptic does not put forward these slogans as holding absolutely. He considers that, just as the "All things are false" slogan says that together with the other things it is itself false, as does the slogan "Nothing is true," so also the “Nothing more” slogan says that it itself is no more the case than its opposite, and thus it applies to itself along with the rest. 15 We say the same of the other Skeptic slogans. So that since the dogmatizer is one who posits the content of his dogmas as being true, while the Skeptic presents his skeptical slogans as implicitly self- applicable, the Skeptic should not be said to dogmatize thereby. But the most important point is that in putting forward these slogans he is saying what seems to him to be the case and is reporting his pathos without belief, not firmly maintaining anything concerning what exists externally. 8. Does the Skeptic Have a System? We proceed in the same way when asked whether the Skeptic has a system. If 16 one defines a system as an attachment to a number of dogmas that agree with one another and with appearances, and defines a dogma as an assent to something non-evident, we shall say that the Skeptic does not have a system. But if one says that a system is a way of life that, in accordance with 17 appearances, follows a certain rationale, where that rationale shows how it is possible to seem to live rightly ("rightly" being taken, not as referring only to virtue, but in a more ordinary sense) and tends to produce the disposition to suspend judgment, then we say that he does have a system. For we do follow a certain rationale that, in accord with appearances, points us toward a life in conformity with the customs of our country and its laws and institutions, and with our own particular pathé. 9. Does the Skeptic Theorize about Nature? We reply in the same vein if asked whether the Skeptic needs to theorize about 18 nature. On the one hand, if there is a question of making an assertion with firm confidence about any of the matters dogmatically treated in physical theory, we do not theorize; but, on the other hand, in the course of opposing to every statement an equal statement, and in connection with ataraxia, we do touch upon physical theory. This, too, is the way we approach the logical and ethical parts of so-called "philosophy." 10. Do the Skeptics Deny Appearances? Those who claim that the Skeptics deny appearances seem to me not to have 19 heard what we say. For, as we stated above, we do not reject the things that lead us involuntarily to assent in accord with a passively received phantasia, and these are appearances. And when we question whether the external object *92* is such as it appears, we grant that it does appear, and we are not raising a question about the appearance but rather about what is said about the appearance; this is different from raising a question about the appearance itself. 20 For example, the honey appears to us to be sweet. This we grant, for we sense the sweetness. But whether it is sweet we question insofar as this has to do with the [philosophical] theory, for that theory is not the appearance, but something said about the appearance. And even when we do present arguments in opposition to the appearances, we do not put these forward with the intention of denying the appearances but by way of pointing out the precipitancy of the Dogmatists; for if the theory is so deceptive as to all but snatch away the appearances from under our very eyes, should we not distrust it in regard to the non-evident, and thus avoid being led by it into precipitate judgments? 11.
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