Argumentation Studies in the Wake of the New Rhetoric

ARGUMWTAnON AND ADVOCACY 40 (Spring 2004): 267-283

ARGUMENTATION STUDIES IN THE WAKE OF 'IIIE NEW RHETORIC David A. Frank*

Those who resisted the Nazi tyranny, ripe (known in French speaking countries as Jonathan Glover obsenres in his Humanity:A Trailb), which was translated into English in Mod Hitlaty of iha Turnrtreth &fury, tended 1970 as I%eNew Rhetmc A Treatise on Argu- to come from homes in which children were nunfnlim (known in English speaking coun- encouraged to reason through argument tries as llae New Rhclori~$ Perelman set the (382). Children raised by parents who used agenda for the collaboration, as his solitary physical means of gaming compliance or an wntings on a host of subjects before his col- authoritarian style of childrearing were laboration with Olbrechts-Tyteca identified much less likely to rescue Jews. Glover cites the key issues and problems addressed in research conducted by the Oliners, who the NRP. Olbrechts-Tyteca played a major carefully document why some chose the role in the development of the examples moral path during World War 11. Glover and middle range theory (Warnick, 1998; and the Oliners conclude that habits of rea Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1963). soning, expressed through argument and In this article, I consrder the influence of queshoning, elicit concern for the other and the NRP on studies of twentieth-century ar- recognition of values beyond one's own. gument in our field, and its relevance in the Chaim Perelman and Luae Olbrechts new millennium My rehearsal of the argu- Tyteca detected this connection between ar- ment m the NRP is not meant to duplicate gumentation and moral action. the fine surveys of Perelman's work in Foss, Seeking a philosophical balm for the Foss, and Trapp; Conley; and other anthol- wounds of post-war Europe, Perelman and ogies and overviews of rhetoric. Rather, my Olbrechts-Tyteca rediscovered rhetonc and purpose is epideictic in the Perelmanian argumentation, seeing that they could foster sense in that I hope to strengthen a commit- the "contact of minds" necessary for the re- ment to he study of argument as a humane construction of civil society. T~ISis an odd art wltb philosophcal and pragmatic expres- phrase, but it reflects their aspiration that sions. I seek to recall the larger purpose reasoning rather than violence should be the Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca envisioned primary means of dealing with dssagree for argumentation and to trace the tduence ment. Between 1947 and 1984, Perelman, of the NRP on argument studies in the alone and in collaboration with Olbrechts- Umted States. In so doing, I dlcall atten- Tyteca, translated this aspiration into the tion to some key books and scholarship that New Rhetoric F'roject (NRP),which was ex- draw from the NRP to develop insights on pressed in a number of books, articles, and argument. In the conclusion, I suggest the conference papers. The most complete ex- NRP is the most important system of argu- presslon of the project was pubhshed in 1958 ment produced in the twenheth centnry and as Traa & I'atgummfaha: in nouvr[le rh- can serve as an ecumenical site for the development of argumentation theory. My purpose may seem benign, but it di- rectly confronts two movements in the field. The first is the continued fragmentation of the field into a set of case studies with Lnle shared sense of purpose, which David Zaref- 268

ARGUMENTATION STUDIES IN THE WAKE OF NEWRHETaREC SPRING 2004 sky has rightly lamented as a Mure of dis- experience. She saw Eichmann as a uniquely ciplinary coherence. Another movement, modern expression of manstrosity became pregmadiale&cs, otiginabing in the Nether he did not seem to command the capacity to lands, begins with a misreading of the NRP &ink outside of realm of ideology. Reread- to hcha system of argument with quite ing Eidmm as a scholar of argumentation, different goals than those set forth by Perel- I iind it shildng that no one confronted or man The pmgma-diatectidans seek uniform inguedwimEich~~~nm,n~his@&tto standards for all argument and nee contlict ideology comfortable. The intemrrl dialogue resolution as the objective of argumentation. that makes up authentic thinking, so em- I believe the Wssystem navigates be- tial in Arendt's vision of moral action, re- tween f..smentation and enfond nnifor- quires argument Arendt, Perelman, and a mity, and remaies the mat ethical and pow- number of 0thpostwar philosophers un- erful framework available to scholars of derstood the need to consider the mle agwment The NRP is a blueprint for civil played by reason in totalitarian movements sow,with a strength and coherence lack- that captured Eicbmann and his colleagues. ing in other srJtema To belter understand Some conflated reason with totabaim the tension among these movements, it is thoughf and abandoned rationality: others necessary to resituate the and its idu- rallied and sought an expanded sense of rea- ence on argumentation studies in the United son and a new rationalism. States. After the liberation of Betgbun in Septem- ber 1944, Perelman joined thm who sought a reconstituted mse of reason. Until that point, he was a logical positivin, holding that reason was limited to fdlogic and to the Before and during War II, totalitariaps viia mrrtmplatiw (See Frank and Boldnc, seized reason and designed ideologies to From Vila Cow- to Ti hipa). contain it in what Hannah Arendt in her While leading the Jewieh undergmund dur- O@w ef Totalitmicnim termed the "wld ing the War, he hished a book titled logicZ ofthe syllogian (468-472). Ideologi- JwliGc. He concluded in (krJnstia that values sal reasoning is distingoished by its adher- could not "be subject to any rational mite- ence to a premise, which governs a cbain of donn and that they are "u&y &itmy and logic that does not admowledge experience. logically indeterminate.. .' (a&Q 0fJu.s- Such reasoning embraces apodictic logic and rics and uie RobhefA~ 56 67). Perel- is expressed in a hyper-rationality that values man was *deeply dbatis6edn with his con- nothing outside iW Scholars have identi- clualon that there was no rdebasis for 5ed the role of a ruthlaw expression of ideo- value judgments (Ilu Nau iWteric and the logical rationalay in many of the hventieth- HumanUiss 8). He resisted the limitations of mnlmy genocides. A disembodied rationality, logical positivism and saw that the other devoid of humanity, is no guarantee of hu- dominant alternative, ex&entialism, did not mane behavior. give the grounds for justice ice judgment (see Arendt in her Eichmmn in JauMbrn de- Frank and Bolduc, *Ch& Perelman's Firsl scribed the advent of ideological thi Philosophies"). and the peculiarly modern form of evil she As he worked through his dinatWaction, saw on display in the hial of Adolph Eich- he decided to use the method adopted by msen, the Nazi in charge of the final du- Gottlob Frege, the subject of Perelman's dis- tion. Eichmann, according to Arendf was sertation, to study value reasoning. Fmge trapped by the as8mptions and language of analyzed particnlas instances of mathemati- ideology, thereby blo- recognition of cal reasoning to build general principles of ARGUMENTATION AND ADVOCACY logic. Perehnan set out to examine with Mlcial psychology, and U.S. rhetoricians examples and illustrations of arguments to were concerned with historicd studies of determine how humam reawned about val- great speakers (578580).Oliver reports thas ues. In 1947, Lucie Obrechta-Tyteca joined Wiihn James and John Dewey were the him in his seamh and aMer a ten-year explo- philosophen most often dted by American ration, the wllaboraton published their scholars of speech, cultivating a pragmatism Tmik a2 l~~tion:lo mu4 rktmiqrrc. prirndy concerned with effecta of rhetori- The NRP was a major force in the *rhetorical practices (578-580). Oliver and Ameri- cal tmn" of the 19508. Gerald hernotes: can speech scholars saw in Perelman's work a philosophical jusafication for the study of speech, one endorsed by a celebrated wntb nenral philompher. ARer his 1962 visit, Perelman recognized he had strong allies in the field of speech communication. Perelman mte Emily Schossbezger, his editor at the Universjty of Notre Dame, that he wanted to title the En- ~translationlReNm~~:A~fira This "flmry of intellectual work" was, in part, on Argumnrtotion rather than a literal transla- a result of philosopher Henry W. John- tion of the French title, A Trdanje on Arp stone's eacounter with Perelman when he mmWotc ZbNewRhetwicinorderto attRU visited Belgium in the 19508. There, John- potential readers in the American speech stone became familiar with Perelman's work, communication discipline (Perelman to *od Perelman's agenda, agreed that Schossberger). His visit also inapired the atgumentjustified philosophical inquiry, and study of argument as a subject of philosoph- bmught the NRP to the attention of Ameri- ical hqw. In the abstraa of their 1965 can philosophers, Although Johnstone dip book, Ahilar@hy, R&W adArgwnnrUUrgwnnrUUrien, agreed with Perelman on several issues, Johnstone and his colleague Maurice Natao- there is We question that Perelman's work son informed their readers the book was helped to justify the philomphical study of %tended as evidence that a new field of gumen en tat ion in the United States. philosophy has ---a field in which Perelman betthe NRP to the United the concepta of rhetoric and ar$Umentstion, States and Pexmaytvania State University including the rhetoric and argumenta.tion of wl~enhe was invited by Johnstone and Rob- the philosopher himself, we subjected to ert T. Oliver to serve as a visiting professor philosophical scnttiny" (v). The founding of in 1962. Dm&g this visit, he discovered the the jodRhkawpb and Rhatmic was an- field of speech communication. As Oliver other result of Johnstone's enwunter with obsemes in his bietory of Perelman's visit, Perelman. Perelman did not know about the American Renecting the tie between Perelman and field of rhetoric and speech, nor did Ameri- the field of speech, Carroll Arnold wmte the can ncholaes of speech know much about inaoduction to Perelman's Rcalm $&#or&. Perelman. The mud ignorance is ex- Recognizing the importance of the NRF' in phed by the fact that Perelman's view of argumentation stodies in the United States, rhetoric stemmed fkm his h&ation with this journal dedicated a special he,edited logical positivism. his reading of Paulhan by Ray Dearin, to the work of Perelman and and Lahi, and his rediswvery of the Grew Olbrechts-Tyteca A survey of scholarly ar- Roman rhetorical tradition. The speech field tides published in A*gunmtntion andAclvq in 1962 was, according to Oliver, aligned in the la~t13 years revgals that a number of 270

AIlGUMENTATION STUDIES IN THE WAKE OF ntG NEWRHETF)RTC SPRING m4 argument scholars draw on the WRP for in- and a 'contact of mindsdsrather than vio 6igl1ts on the practice of argumentation. lence and imtionallty were responses (Perel- Some of ow mast promising schokrs, such man, New Rhstoric and & Hwnanilids 112- an 'lbeodore Rosise and Brian McGee, have 11'3). deployed the NRP in their articles and un- The only absolute me@bysic Perelman derstand Perelman's larger ambition to situ- defended was that all metaphysical princi- ate axgument as an expression of philosoph- ples were subject to nrision and that hu- id reason. Unfortunately, they are the mans deserved libexty and freedom of exceptions. Scholars of argument, as David choice. (See Perelman. Partdciporiwr aux Zarefsky notes, have lost haek of what binds Dnudssrsr Enrrslimr ds Zucidi). Parties in a the 6eld together. Refleaing the fragmenta- disagreement might all hold partial truths tion in the field, scholars often pluck a con- and uniform agreement wa$ not the primary cept or netion out of the NRP for the pw- goal of the rhetorical encounter. Indeed, the pose of illuminating a pticular case study, NRP endddissent and fostered plural- neglecting the hga larger of Perelman ism, doing so by nesting different and inm- and Olbrechts-Tytew's efforts. The pragma- patible values within a larger realm of rhet- dialecticians are not interested B tbe iatent orie. of the NRP because of i4 purported "bh In this reah, deduction doea not rule and agaht logic" (van Eemeren and Grwten- many different logics flourish. Accordin$y, dorst, Argunrartaiim, Cwmn-n, and Fd- in the NRP buth is in process, dissent reveal- k&3-4). When placed in context, the texts ing the irreducible phnality of values, and of the NRP display a coherent vision of ar- argument senring as a form of reason de- pentan an expression of reason. signed to allow for judgment. Two key val- I hope, in what follow, to highlight for ues recur in the NRP and undergird the argument scholars the key notiona in the moral basis of arpmnt: rapf~*~ and NRP that have bat Focus, been beenad, or dn@e&g. The fint word, from the French, are rmderappredated. In partirular, I wish ta calls for a realignment of forces out of con- revisit their rescue of reapon and persupeion, tlict into harmony; the second, from the Ger- novel inteq-tretation of the relationship be- man, means empathy. Plrrdng the work of tween dialectic and rhetoric, and their inu- Perelman and OlbrechbTyteca in context, mimi& take on audience, epideietic, loci, these two values captpre the Wtof the and the techniques of argument. NRP to h,UmaniK reason by hdqing it into -ent wirh the lived reality of himan beings. Perelman sought a rappmchement between reason and rhetoric, and broadened the domain of reason to incl~degenthent Perelman recogniaed the defining charac- and values. He &o integrated Claasid teristic of totalimian thought: the abaolute Greek thought with Jewish p.znerns of w commitment to the '%old logic" of deductive son, an importaut gesture of reconciliation in reasoning. Having resisted the *myth of the the post war setting [Frank, "Dialectical Rap- twentieth century: the Nazi belief in raeial prochement in the New Rhetoric"). Argu- superiority, Perelman identised pIvallsm as mentative excbauge, in this vision, was not the necessary bulwark against another out- intended to produce uniform agreement but break of totalitariaaism. To erect this M- an appseciation of the irreducible plurality of wark, he contested Desarbs' notion that if human values. Those who make reasonable two people disagree, one must be wrong. arguments put themselves % the pbof Disagreeme* in Perelraan's view, was a others" and nnderstand that hvnens ere aign of societal health an long as agument moved by sentiment and 4.(I& new^W - ARGUMENTATTON AND ADVOCACY FRANK mic and ilk Hm118). The realm of in a non-hierarchid comtelhtion),avoiding rhetoric calls for a broad aad dustsense of the hypotatic impulse bewhich hands reason, one that includes empathy and sen- WbordFnation) embedded in totalitarian timeat. To put thevalues into play, Penl- logic (Perelnlan and OIbrechts-Tyte~a,ilk man and Olbrechts-Tyteca saw tbat they New Rhatwic 158). Parataaical -eat needed to develop a new definition of rem does allow Ior judgment, though such judg- constituting a "break" with the Enlighten- ments are open to revidon and challenge. ment definition of reaeon, whjch featured The NRP took a di%rent tack on the formal ratio& and apobctic logic (2% relationship between rhetoric and dialectic. Nm Rad& 1). Olbrechts-Tyteca noted in her 1963 retro- In reoponse to the compulsion of apodictic spective that those interested in argument logic, embodied and misused as it was in did not connect it to rhetoric &nconke totalitarian thought, Perelman and Olbre- avec La Rhetorique). Obrechts-Tyteca dtea ohtg-Tyteca gave a pMoeophieal grounding Tadmin's 1950 2% plots ofEthirs in Reman to persuasion. Perelman and Olbrechts- as a primary illostration of a wmk on argu- Tyteca highlighted the importance of choice ment th@ both denigrates rhetoric and ig- and liberty in human atfain. Remonstratiw nores the role played by audience in argu- feeson, they noted, does not provide choice. mentation. In contraat to Touhiq Perelman Apodictic lo@ forms a chain of premises and Olb&Tyteca wught a cappmche- and conclusions that uranot be chdenged ment between dialectic (mason) and rhetoric (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 2% Ncou (the art of adapting qumeuts to audiences). Rbtmk 2-4). In cornpadson, argumentation Perelman and OIbrecbts-Tyteca aspired to gives audiences the choice of adherence. bring them into alignment, and efused to The notion of adherence is at the philosoph- completely contlate the two, seeing both a ieal and Jpiritual heart of NRP. The andi- %en and a "distancee between them. This ence has the libeTfY to accept OI mject the "tie and distance' PereLnan and OIbrechts- reasoning offered by ao advocate:'the use of Tyteca eabbEisZl between dialectic and rbet- argumentation implies that one has re oric pmduces an inherent equivocation fiue nmced using force alone, that value is at- trating to those who seek essential and dear tached to gaining the adherence of one's definitions. interlocutor by means of masoned pema- Formal logic provides dehitiod clarity, don, and that one is not "garding him as an Perelman argued, because it in isolated fmm object, but appeahg to tris free judgmentn the world of experience, and is limited to the perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca Tlia New realm of abstrsction and the aita con~la- Rhtorit 55). Pedmbecomes an imp lioa The intent of the NRP was to inflect taut philosophical value, not merely a tech- logic with rhetoric, thereby displeying the nique. expressions of reason used by humans in the Perelmrtn and OIbrechta-Tyteea attended uita naiDo [Frank and Boldrzc, "From mtu the notions of persuasion and adherence Conrenqplarmn to Vita dm'&). The quality of with a rhetorically intlected sense of reason. logic is ultimately dependent on the judg- They developed one of the first systems of ment of the audience. There are, of c-, non-formal logic in the post-war period. stronger and weaker expreapions of logic, but Tbeir system of argumentative logic moved humans situated in context, rather than an beyand eleductjon, aad did not yield to sys; external and immutable set of standards, tademanding alleghw to a first premise, would judge. other than those sdmowl'edgingthe need for Perelman held Peter Ramus responsible continual revision. The logic in the NRP for aeatkg a divide between rhetoric and functioned paratactically (the Wingof ideas logic. Ramus, in vesting philosophy vvith di- A&GUMENTATION STUMES IN THE WAKE OF THE NEW~RIC SPRING 2Ml( alectic (reason and logic) and rhetoric with Obtechts-Tyteca develop a compeUiag the- style and delivery, deah a critical blow to ory of the rhetorical audience, which Gross rhetoric's inkpity (Naw RAcMic end th Hu- and Dearin elucidate in Chapter 3 of their m'th8). Perelman and Olbre~hts-Tyteea excellent book Chdim h&mn(For an ex- sought to overcome the Rami4tic divide by tended review of this book, see Frank, "After expanding the range of mason to feature the the New RhetoricC)~Their vision of mional- role of the audience and to include forms of ity w the focw from the hgid form of logic beyond deduction and modrs pantc. apodictic remning to the v&e hierds Argumentation fond- as a VW to a of~diences.A&+ Peband ~b rhetorical situation in dw, one that deha &a-Tyteea undersrood the need for coher- preadatned or an apodictic lo&.. Reflecting ence and logs re^* among t& this orientstEon, 2% New Rhbric is divided compone~of "BLmwif the;yresisted he into three parts: the hework, slarting c- c- 8f dom$ity dered by @f and tedmiques of argUrnentstEon. The formal logic. They sought to develop a def- t% t% PBIfdis~la~aphilowpb of argumen4 inition of reason, G- and Dearin mite, the second desoibes the psychology of au- that the fh&vision of will from diencm and the third kl~e8arguEnenta- undadiog, one the Sen- t& A&* tient and inteUeckraI capacities of the huslan should be read as a Mended whole,- the au- being rscognize (=I. thm did that the comeonents of a Johnstone did not find a theory of &- @en argument c'dd be lihd out of its en= *the NRP,h olding &aperelman and s&me faan*&. In part, Perel- 0lb&@-Tyteca wwe eonmed with and Ob*Tyteea extnct argu- categorizing audience kchdqnes ("Rev. lb ments from their rhetorical siWon8 to dip- Nm A T* on Aw- play patterns of reasoning found outside of 225). The pfligmsdlalecticiaos blame the fotmal logic. ueke In part one of the Nsur lthadt, Perelmen NRPs on audience for reducing judg- me& of truth to human opinion. In con- and Olbrechbi-Tyteca estabhh a normative framework for the enactment and eduatim frast, Gwand Dearin's re- is mch more carefnl and nuanced, @jving~igulnent of argument ka a response to totalitarienism fBf and the failwe of lagid positivism and rad- theorists a better undeFatanding of the icd strepticism to he wgrott of ofsvision of audience than that provided reason, perband OIb~&&T~yteeaof - Joaneor the P-~~UW. fdargument&on. ~rgumen~~they According to them,dl argomentatio4 mite, offers the human wmmUnitythe including the inner deliberations of the wn- means ofreasoning about avoid- science, is deaigned for an audience. Pem- ing the Eonclusionthat juaee had no basis in sive efiect is not the only objecttve of the reason. They ahnote that there were times &t~ricalencounter as the speakr an when wentation was not a sutficient ra- obligation to how when it is mang or in- spouse, and illustrated this claim with a ref- WP~to argue, and there are stronger erenee to fiur&asdedsion not to and weaker audiences. Perelman and Olbre- in negotiation8 with IIitler (17). A goal of cbh-TTyte- adopt Stack Sullivan's -ntation is to spur action, but morality view that the speaker's vision of an audience shdd trump the goal of ofe ef- is a construction (19).Those who argue have fect, and argument does not belong every- created images of their audiences. Argu- where (16). ments can be effective if the advocate has Two touchstones in the NRP are the 8u- adequately calibrated the construction of the dience and the epideictic. Perelman and audience to its reality. Theare particular, wmposite, and udrversal audiences vying serving as the judge. The NRP does establish for the attention of the advocate. nonnative 89Sumptlons, wbich Cro~swhite, The particula~audience is one of several Tindale, and 0th- discuss at some length. interconnected audieuces. Although an ap First, there is a wrrnative asamption that peal may be addressed to a parti& audi- audiences should have the freedom to judge ence, many who argue ohface composite ar&uments, ope* up the possibjlity of mix- audiences, those made up of individuals take and misjudgment Yet, this freedom is holding Merent and wnflicting dues. The ultimately mom important than a "tdhhl" universal audience, which Perelman re- claim that is enforced with violence or the ported waa a profoundly mhndemtood no- coercion embedded in fodlogic. Second, tion in the NRP,offers a normative check on there is an active concern m the MIP for the those who present argnments (% New quality of the audience; some audiences are Rhetoric and the Rbetoriciansw).Perelman better able to make judgments. The audi- saw the universal audience aq $retoric's an- ence of scientific arguments illuahaie$ rhia swer to Kant's categorical imperative. The larger point. Alan Omss, in two important universal audience invitm those who argue books, has outlined the rhetorical compo- to useaform of mason that sapires touni- nents of scientiSc a~guments.In these books, verSayr. Gmm and DeaFin in cbupter three Gross studies science as a form of rhetoric of ChPmhn provide a coptexplana- designed to persuade audiences. The scien- tion of the ~iversdaudience and its value tific community, Gross and his w+s m argument theory. They are not alone. The observe, use the scientific article as a meaaP universal audience, which my colleague to cormnuniicate knowledge claims to an au- J~Cr088whiteinhis~lifRwmrhasdience.Theae claimsamjudgedbyanexpezt developed with care, is a symbolic wnshuc- audience. As Gross and his colleagues ob- tion as real as the othm fahioned by a swe, in answering certain questions, the speaker. C&aptm hvo of Cmswvhite's book scienttiic method is superior to 0th. As provides a sequential gnideline for the con- Gross and Dearin note, Perelman was not a atnrction of a univewal audience. Chris Ti- relativisf and accepted scientific arguments dale in his Acts Ofdrguhg also explaim how as strong or weak bat4on the judgments of the universal audience can be used in argu- audiences conunandiag the necess3uy exF ment with dsrity and precision (95-97). tise. TWs shift, from the matbematical strut- Perelman's refurbishing and rqpair of the &UE$ of arpodictc logic, to the lived experi- epideictic, a critically important move in the ence of human beii*etrikes nome as reduc- NRP, highlights a third normative position ing the validity of knowledge claims to in the NRP out of which Bows a metaphysic, audience response. Don Lwi raises this con- epistemology, and axiology of arpent cern when he worries that sdholars using Epideictic discourse does not merely rein- Perelman may be more concerned with per- force values, as Lockwood, m a clear mis- dveimpad ratbe than the rnah content reading af Perelman and OlbrechtsTyteca, of m argument Perelman, bing studied au~b(75-76). Rather, it assumes some formal logic, understood the traditional grin- values and fachnbve g&ed acceptance and ciples used to assess the conectness of argu- validity though persuasion over time. Val- ment. However, k saw that these principles ues and facts are only as strong as the argu- mnld not lead to sound judgmtmts about mentative pmof offered in mppoxt. An au- values or justice md often did not assist with thentic contact of minds requim some humaus sbqghg within W@C contexts. precouditions. mcludiag asguers and d- Perelrmm recognized that there are stronger ences å a symbol system, a desire to and weaker arguments, with the audience engage in communicative exchange, and an attempt by those who arpto address the is the primary factor distmgui&iqg #tic valued of the audience. With the epideictic, lo@ from mgwwtattve mason: tha who deaguments to audiences be The mnessts that one can notice betwnn dasaicJ gin With normative assumptions., the scien- demomomdon and formal lc@ on rme hd,[md] tisf politician, spouse, and ar!M all start with agumenMionon~eotha,ean.itseanqmrwbuk or develop a common wage, value him- to m ddi&rrnce: hedoes not play any role arehieg aod exemplars dwing argumenta- in dwnonraatlon; it is, h-er, in.-- much 8n if* ia tion. Arguen may we vhes aud lmowledge mentation. SQ m that ow wonder claims presumed by the audience as touch- smes for arguments designed for the imm& dare *ce and rhetorical situation. These accepted values and knowledge elaim function, in the NRf' as a "regressive Argument takes place in time, and serves to philomphy,' givitlg the ppro~essand pro& tent, if neeasaq, the prea~lceptionnof the ucts of argumentation a metaphysical stshls. audience, or to assume these preconceptions Perelmas.in a landmark article published in for the purposes of crafliag an argumentative 1949, observed: "ponae to the exigence. In turn, Ulis metaphysia was tied to an epi8telnolOgy of Yconfusednotions. " such notiow and concepts defy attrmpt~at ultimate definition, remaMq plaptlc and indeterminate over the long term, but can yield desof action in the short berm. Justice, in Petelman's work, is the critical conhed nu- tion, one that P&an mgued could host conflietiq and incompatible perspectives. Witbin the epistemolo@d perspective of the NRP, knowledge claims are as strong aa the agrments supporYing them. ID tam, this *ion was grounded in a vahre plnralisln boudd together with reason. Pedman set forth an lodological system this adap(atron,will -not be dooc aulomaticdy, bul in which audiences ddhold merent val- wUI be the work of IIIC he who ia nnwd1e fa ues rhat may cdct. In the re& of rbeto- ric, value confliots can be negotiated and mediated through argumentative +eaaool rather than violence or raw power. The capacity for reason, Perelman held, transcende Perehnan grounded his Mth in a reason value diffecences, In preparing for argument, linked to experience. Argument helped to the advocate can aapmqe that audiences ad- determine what could be learnedfrom expe- here to lod. Hae, as W&& (aooo) has rience over and through time. The revision dem-d, Perelman atid Olb&r%- and adaptation of knowledge clsimn func- Tytea identify five loci, &signed to illumi- tioned as responses to changed &cum- nate the touchstones for a contact of minds: stances and the *18.uence of be.Indeed, in quamtity, quality, romantic, &mica&and the their 1958 retle~tlonon argumentation, writ- indivicbal. The adweate can mow between ten after the ompletion ef the Tm&, Perel- and among loci in search of adherence. One man and Olbrechta-Tytecasuggest that time critical point, often miwed inthe andyaia of ARGUMENTATION AND ADVOCACY FRANK

)theNRP, is that speakers and audiences are value in formal logic. His intent was to dm not forced to choose between the classical ollpestethelimitati~~~loffdlagieandto (atable or more permanent values) and ro- bmaden the realm of nrason to include the taantic (less stable or impermanent dues) judgment of humam values. To demonatrate loci Although Perrlmea was highly critical the afbity behveen fodand non-formal of the classical tradition, holding that it held reasonhq, Perelman used the traditional vo- to a restcicrive view of truth of tLnelssa and cabdlary of logic: identity, hansitivity, non- immutable values, he did not conclude that contradiction, etc. the romantic alternative, with ib sffvmation In so doing, Penlman and Olbd of novelty, instability, and aporia, was the Tyteca enacted theit theory of argumenta- only remajning option. The advocate codd tion as they used the bevocabulary of logic use both the dassical and romsntc, mvigat- wed by their audieace. This choice, I being between the two in Jeanh of adherence. Eeve, is meant to convey to the reader that With the loci of argument in place, Perel- apodictic and nou-Iormal reasoning, in shaF man and Olbrwhts-Tyteca outline the tech- ing the same vocabulary, belong in the niques of arguments, viewing them as ob house of reason. The prinmy Werence he- jee$ of thought structured by schemes. tween the apodictic and non-formal reason- Argument schemes, which provide a much ing expressed through argument is the role richer attempt to simulate the argument pro- played by time and context Perelman and cess than the Touhnin model, invite the Olbrechts-Tyteca, in their preview to the mitic to view cent as embedded rearron third section of the treatise, discuss the na- supported by a host of hidden Mbutq ture of the argumeub they consider, oh- springs (187-192). The critic's task is to re ing "the meaning and the scope of an iso- veal these springs, and id* how the var- lated qument can rarely be understood iows components of arplnmentative reason without ambignity: the analysis of one link of interact, Perelraan mad OlbrechtP-Tyteca an argument out of its context and irrdepen- iden* a number of argument specimens in dently of the situation to which it belongs the NRP, making b the most hpomeon - involves undeniable dangers. These are due temporary some of argument description if not only to the equivocal charaaer of lan- we use the entries in the OlcJbrB E")rcbpdh guage, but abto the kct that the springs .fRk@& (2001) as a measure. The conhib- suppotting the argumentation are almost utom hun to Pdand Olhchb-Tyteca nwex explicitly describedribed (187). This is a for many entries, including thwe on argu- bdamentd &sumption in their taxenomy mentation, arraogement, exemplum, the fo- of argument as they did not asraune one rensic genre, the conviction-pemasion and could cspOure the meaning oflived argument demonstrationmgumentation dbtinctions, in a univocal langoaep or that argument inference, law and rhetoric, kgw, phs, specimens were purebred. Classical and Ar- practical readon, innrparable, and rhetoric istotelian logic, Perelman and Olbrachtp and religion. Tyteca argued, did not account for the de Perelman and Olbmhts-Tytwa's taxon- of he,leading them to remodel Atistotle's omy of argument is a system-perhaps the three laws of thoughts. kttwentieth cen4ny codihiion-of non- Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteea believe formal logic. The authors hoped their sy&em Aristotle based his dialectic in predieative would complement apodictic lo@, thereby logic, which gave the procedure of his dia- broadening the domain of rewon. However, leetic its form (aNew Rhfwic 84). This given the dkpqhg comments PeRbnan logic, according to Perelman, is based on nuikeu about apodictk reasoning, I can un- three laws of thought identity (A is A), nm- derstabd why Borne believe he did not see contradietion (A cannot be both B and dot- 276

ARGUMENTATION STUDIES IN THE WAKE OF l7B NEWRHEMRIC SPRING 2004

B), and the excluded middle (Either A is B or theory and will become an expected citation A is not-B). Ropo8itionallogic is designed to in argument studies. elicit general and dvdtnrtbs Hded by The law of non-oontradiction, in Perel- induetion, deduction, and the syk@sm (dn man and Olbrechts-Tyteca's system of aqn- iWtmid IntnwluGtian 58). In the NRP, Perel- ment, yields to the lived realities of antimony man and Olbrechts-Tyteca take these laws of and parado& In formal logic, wntradictiom identity, nonconaadiction, and the ex- @ce incoherence. The problems hu- cluded middle and reformulate them for the mans face often leuture contlida between life and funations gervad by argumentatloa two mutually exclusive vahes that may both Central to the law of iden* is the issue of be reasonable in given eantuas. Perelman, definition. Perelman and OhAts-Tyteca as Dearin and Gross note, did study the reject the dsssical divide behueen 'real* and Iogical anhony before he made his rhetor- "nodn definitions, locating instead a ical hun, and he aaw the need for systems of Ulird option: de6nitions suppwted by rea- reason that could host mnflictimg values (3- soned ventDrawing from the works of 5). Perelman and Olbreehts-Tyteca tr the Steve- and Gonseth, Perelman and NRP set forth the notion of inwmpatibiB!y I Olbrechls-Tyteca contend that definitions as non-ford logic's answer to the law must be pe&ve and open to revision (% of noncontradiction (% hbu ltiktmic 195- Nau M 446-447). Peopk can stipulate 210). In the ndm of human arpment, it is to certain dejinitionq Perelman and Olbre- possible, Perelman and Obreoh&-Tyteca chteTyteca nde, but this agreement is sub- suggest, for mutually exclusive values to be je~tto modification. Clear definitions are not placed in a hierarchy, and that a particular a value independent of nodal context and do value may earn priority because of context not automaticalIy trump attempts to captnre wd time. Values hiling to seawe top bilhng denotaiions that deal with confused notions would not be liqdated or denigrated, but or -tially contested conaepts. would remain viable with the understanding Edward Schiappa, in a recently published that they might move to the top of an agenda book on argument and definitions, makes with a change in context and time. use of the MZP to waythe characteristics The law of the excluded middle h& that of what he calh "dehitive discourse'' (xi). identity cannot be mixed. Perelman and Schhrppa takes a rhetorical perspeative on Obrechts-Tyteca argue that it is possible for definitions, seeking to explain how those separate entities to hesomething in com- who argue make use of definitions in contro- mon, or to coexist within a larger unity. In versies about abortion, obscenity, and a host formal logie, this would be incoherent With of other public policy issues. At several juac- these revisions and ampEications of tke rules tuminthebOdk,SdtiappatumstotheNRP of logic, Perelman and Olbrefhts-Tyteca de- to undetscore the rhetorical natwe of defini- velop a mode of reasuning that is analogie tionn (e.g., dominant de6nitions remain in and paratactic. place until challenged (31); dissociation is In conhast to deductive and hypotactic used to chwdefintiona (36,38);the im- masoning, in which a major ptemise rules portance of audience in definitions (45); the the minor premises and conclusion, analogic importsnce of persuasjon in definitional ar- and paratactic reasoning estabiishes stan- gument (47); choice in definition (49); the dards for comparative judgments. Perelman role of nnma in definition (115); and meta- obsewd. phors and definition (132)). Schiapp'~Perel- marrian auenced insights on definitions constitute a attical coMcaeion of dehition ARGUMENTATION AND ADVOCACY FRANK

thinldag to the pmblem of Jerusalem, see Cohen and Frmnk). Disaociatio~,au:ord@ to Perelman and Obrecbts-Tyteca, pmvides a mode of reasoning that seeks out polieiea allowing for the co-existence, if not rsp prochement, between cadlichg values. This expansion of reason to include the possibility of opposites coexisiing is a shildng As the Kneals note in Oheir Wry of logic, advance. Aristotle's Bystem of logic was dominant The NRP has been a. key source for theo- &rough the centuries and blocked the devel- retical insights into argument as a process opment of dogic thinking. Perelman and and a product. However, the work of Perel- OfbrechtsTyteca explicitly develop ana- man and Olbrecbts-Tytecahas received dt- logic thinlring: "analogies are important in icism fmm several sources. The most ener- invention und arguawatation fundamatally getic dtidsm has come from the rhwl of because they facilitate the development and pmgma-dialectics in the Netherlands. adenson of thought" (%hRRcrwic385). This movement from apodictic-hypotactic reasoning to analogic thinking marked a pm- found shiff in thinking about logic. Of the many novel contributions made by the NRP to non-formal logic, the notion of The NRP and Pereimanian pbilmphy 'dissociation" is of particular impor0anee. have critics. Steven Toulmin believes Perel- This notion, discussed by Schiappa in a 1985 man did not open 'the broader perspectives article in this journal, allows arguers to avoid wiW which the new rhetoric functions. . ." the binary thinking so prevalent in 2@ cen- (Olson, "Litenvy Theory, Philosophy of Sci- tury argumentation ("Diss0rjation;in the Ar- ence, and Persuasive Diseo11l8eM).Michael F. guments of Rhetorical Theory"). Dissocia- Bernard-Donals and Richard R Glejm tive reasoning retab opposing values, write that Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca rebbg to allow the problem of difference 'unde~shnd all situations p8 discursive and to prodwe solutions that obliterate compet- therefore chetorica&thereby failing to note ing values to achieve conflict resolution. rhetoric's connection with other fom of n Soch reasoniog take8 into account We and bowiedge, none of which is =objective in context Take fa example the Israeli-Pales. the sense that it is unmediated, but whicb tinian con8ict. One might awme that ope of nevertheless occupy some middle ground the two national movements is authentif and between absolute certainty afforded by a has an irrefutable cldm to the land. Another metaphysics and the absoIute skepticism that assumption might be tha! both have legiti- some see as the upshot of antifoundational- mete, although incompatible daims,calling ism and its rhetorical world'' (15). Peter Good- for dissociation. One product of dissociative rich argues the NRP is "psitively convan- thinking in the Isreek-MWan conflict tional and politically conseryative in the ex- would be a vision that the land should be treme in its invocation of the traditional cat- ahared, and that saued spaces, such as egories of legal reason and of legal Jwalem dgbt be rationed through an al- interpretation" (111). John Ray soglpats the location of ttneslob, similar to the ap. NRP seeks to establish, with the universal proaches used to resolve riparian disputes audience, standards of judgment that are (For an application of Perelman and trsnscendenkd, unaffected by experience or Olbrechts-Tyteca's perspective on andogie a fluid reality. ARGUMENTATION SIUDIES IN THE WAKE OF TUE h'hWmKIC SPRING206(

The most swttained criticism of the NFPs to Lheir dewription adcritique of Perelman system of argoment has come from Frans and Obrechts-TF's syaem of argmnent vm Eemeren and his is1of pra$na-din- that appeaia m qfArgmnm~m lectics. This is not the 6rst fbm I have con- %my. sidered pragmadiaecti~~and the move Hemy Johnstope invited my colleague dstreatment of PereIman'8 philosophy. I James Croaswhite to critique the pragma- &wed van and Grootendorst's dialectic take on Perehnan for and Eemeren l%iLw&vr ,-- Argunurtetion, Cmnm- ad Frrllncisc: Rhetoric. Crosswhite claimed that van Eeme A Ragma-Diolccriml Pcq%&ve for the Qum- ren and Gmotendorst rmsintepret, misread, tdy Jdqf .rgSaclr In this review, I and mistmddPerelman ad Olbrechts- claimed that the authors had been manifestly Tyteea's MIP. Unfortunately and curiously, unf;tir in their treatment of Perelman and the pragmadialectichs have not responded Olbl~cbt+Tyteca's NRP. I red recoiling to Cnxgswhite's 1995 critique in their mauy from the book when I read in the introduc- subsequent whgs, viol* the mquim. tion that a prapa-dialectical perseective ment e8taMished m pmgma-dialectica that was needed on argumentation beeawe those who argue have an *obligation to de Perelman had a "prejudice agaiwt logic" (3- fend a standpoint at iswe, while the antago- 4). I found clear evidence that pragma-dia- nist assumes the obligation to rrspomd criti- lectics was neo-Ramistic and neo-Platonic, cally to the standpoint and the protagonist's hostile to the rhetorical traditian. In a re- defensen (- qfAgrmmWon a- sponse to my review, I(linger defended my 281). Their misreading of Perelman in pragma-dipleaics: Fundananialr qf AwLimc Zhnq re- hearm and repeatsthe misrepresent&ons It is most cmtddy not "NaoRBmiaicin ltthude apd Nee-PIPtonLc in Function," nor dosa it 'Fwive the of the NRP in their 1987 H~~kofArgu. @ofPsralandDMnes,"norisit*gl&dy nidadiar Thsay. My inrent here is to re- sehirnd~~both.md~ormctori~~~mi~spond to five criticisms of the NRPB system b.a aueg.eabed (Fd252). There areoedoos of argument offered by the pragma-dialecti- sad Etlsrga that seem generally itlfoasistentwitbthe ciaas. This response builds from Cross- spirit of van Eemeren adGrootcodmat'~ pmgsrm. While they admit tkat hey- spproachcd the stndy white's earlier effort of argumentation €mm fdloliicand Chorralilen First, the prabpnadiaIecticiafiJ Score the NRP for its faillrre to use a univocal hguage for argument. "Clear deWmare nowhere aplniva h &e United Shtas d elseuhem... . to be found" in the NRP (van Eemeren et al., [qhere schokva have the dmire apd intent ta Md bddgeq not to isolate and daipk. Indeed, their FuACtnnuntab.qfArgunmw&n TllCBIy 122). As move fmal lo.@ d ling'lwca to q.,mm Crosswbite notes, the pragma-dialectidans bltion m m rttempt lo mmkucl a mdi& position do not acknowledge nor h, they appear to barnen rheteric and philwupby. (1 11) contexiualize the motives or the intentions of the Perelman and Olbredrts-Tyteca system I have sought, in the subsequent writings of argument ("Is There an Audience for This of the pragmadialeetieians, for &a spirit of Argument?' 135). Perelman and Olbrechts- genuine interest in the rhetorical tradiiiOrI, Tyteca's system cultivates an equivocal lan- looked at the attempfa at mediation, and guage for reason and logic, doing so to es. examided the bridges they daim to have cape the toxic grip of totalitarian thinking built. I stin believe van Eemeren et al. have and the misuse of apodiutic logic. The NRP seriously misread Perelman and Olbreohts- 19 condemned hy the pragma-dislecticiaug Tyteca AItho& I will not center on the for losing its grstem m elaboration, fsiling to many flaws m the assumptions of the give "dear iwight mto the relations between pragma-dislectical approach, I win reapond sactiom'' in lk Nsu &utwk, and for failing XRGUMENTATION AND ADVOCACY to provide clear definitions. The payoff of made by the audience and the arguments this ctitique, the pragma-didectidma de- presented by thorn who psent arguments. clare, is that 'hy account of the new rhet* Thew are, in Perelman and OIbreehtp ric is badon interpretation" (van Eemeren Tyteca's system, audiences of different qual- et al., Fundahof A~~oa%or), ities and standards. An audience might 121-122). I am hard pressed to understand chow to abide by the mles established by how tltb is a uitieism given most argument the pqmadalectieiaas, and move nicely scholars would agree that any account of through the various stages of a eritieal din- anything is an interpretation, although 1 don.However, an audience might reject gather pregma-dialecticians dus~ergood ar- these deu, seeking iastead to engage in argumentation theory under the label of darity gumentation for other legitimate ptuposes. and had argumentation theory under the cat- The NRP deliberately leaves open the pox- egory of interpretation sibility that those in disagreement might all In comparison to the NRP, pmgma-dia- have truths, some of which must co-exiet. lectics, which is truly a aude form of conflict Agreement to the rules of critical dincussion mlution, seeks to end difference of opinion and tke end of an argument in agreement are Lhrough argument. Ragma-dialectical aqp not sufficient indications of quality. If audi- mentation may be suitable when one is plan- ences are the judges of rationality, then the ning to constmct a building or when one strength of a reason is relative to the quality needs, ~IIIMichel Fdt's words, a "bu- of the audience. The beauty of Perelman and reaucratic moralitywto "keep our papern in Olbrechts-Tyteca's pluralistic view of audi- order" (aArch&@ of Kwz&& 17). ence is that it starts and ends with a diversity hapadialectica is hrtokerant to ininterpreta- of audiences bound together with a bmad tion, and most &y to varied interprets- sense of reason. No one audience can claim tiom, and seeks clarity in the face of a reality ultimate superiority, nor are the rules of di- snd experience that is often irreducibly am- alogue wed. The god, and this is one point biguous, tragic, or in which there are multi- of agreement for PereIman and Olbrechb ple but incompatible truths. Tyteca and the pragma-dialecticians, is to Second, the p"gma-didedi&w hold the impmve the habits of reasoning used by ar NRP "offem an extremely relativistic stan- pers and audiences. dard of rationaliity" (&ndmncntnIrofA'garm- Thin%the pragma-dialecticians complain trrtion PXroty 120). The pmgme-dialecticians that the argument schemes outlined in the believe that if all observers do not agree on NRP are vsgue. They quibble about War- the meaning of a particular symbol then nick and Kline's 1992 article in this jod meaning mast be relative. There is agree- indicating the empirical utility of PereIman ment in the NRP that the nams of reawning and OIbrechts-Tyteca's of the argument held by arpers and dences before arp schemes outlined in lie Naav Rhctotic, doing ment kgins are a function of epideictic dis- so with the accepted modes of social science. mume, a crucial concept van Emeren et al. For my purpose, it is important to note that fail to include in their account of Perelman Warnick and Mine found that obmvers not and OlbrechbTytecals NRP. Theae norms educated in the nuances of argument wuld are a redt of previous argumentatiQn and identify the 1vgizmw.t schemes in the NRP, have withJtood the test of critical scrutiny. and that Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca Ude98 questioned, they remain in place, pmride "an updated and relined topid sys- sesving as the starting points of argument tem enabling the study of argument pat- Rules of masoning alone do not guarantee terns'' (13). The quibbles of the pragma- sound and logical dedsions. The quality of dialectidam aside, Warnick and Kline's the agmrentarion id a function of choices crmdusions remain sound, and the mcm sue- ARGUMENTATlON STIJDlES IN THE WAKE OF lHE NEWRHlDDMC SPRINGBM

cesefol argument textbook in the United Gadamer's hermenentics and PereIman's States, Edward Inch and Barbara Warnick's m,ac~odbg to Mootz, &OW legal S&d- CrihirJ lhinking and nddM: i% Use ars to avoid 'apodictic certitude" and Vela- ofRMson in ArguW, draws from the NRP in tivistic irrationalism* in favor of "rhetorical its approach. knowledge." In grounding legal understand- A fourtb criticism made by the pragtna- ing in rhetorical knowlw and by placing dialecfhbns is that Perelman does not 'elab- Gadamer in relationship with Perelman, orate syntematidy on how the new Fhetoric Mwtz observes: can be applied to law" (RUMofh From a 4ermcneuW peRpective, the new rhetmic gn- gn- Zfwq 127). This is a fajllw be- provides guidao~eio Lhe faEe of hermmeuticsl ide- caw Perelmsll "aives dd&n of the .lirm: by mewien from mcoloav IO mlitica. acbIsn way in dih and the circul;l,tancesin em fos& B miti& inquiry ai<edawan~impmv- bkg oar various rhetorical prsetiDea and thereby which, the specific kinds of Ioci constitated Fonswratve impLi- the by the general legal principles can be effec- ,,,mod$ with a model remised m ~beas~t tive in convincing an audience" (127). This notions dhbnkity and &he, Acccodiog m tlds criticism seems G-at that Perelman and nppoech the br&aOwu of the Carte. OlbrachtpTyteca &odd have established *' p.ndigm fmm the dhr~of a onrolagi~daecwnt of e~nununicatimand unb concrete rules for pemadinglegal audiences stMh,.hsthm ,,, sather than learning from the charadenstics obiiemahoddonieal huinr. 16330) of legal reasoning.-Their concern wa9 the latter and with the larger philosophical issues The system of argument outlined in the NRP comedug justice and juispmdence; their ad& a humble stlnce on auestiom of truth work might be faulted for not proscribing andjustice, remains phdistic in olientation, &mtifulsr strategies for legal advocates, but and serves as a check on both Fdghtenment that was not their intent. dltims to absolute truth and the &cal skep Yet legal scholars have drawn &om the tics denial of any huths. With the help of NRP in addressing legal principles and rea- Perelman, Mwk has embarked on an &n soniug. Consider the +al issues of No& to develop a sydtematic undersmhg of le- a~r Law find(1985) and Laa, and gal reason, one that deserves the dose atten- Rh@hy(1966) devoted to the legal impli- tion of argument scholars. cations of Th Nau &hm& A number of legal scholars cite Perelman and the NRP in ~-A~ON 3N •÷%iEWAlKE legal atides devoted to reasoning, justice, OF THE NRP and qpmnt. The has served to ex- At this point, we can reconsider KIinge~'s plain the nahue of legal reasoning and to claim that the pragma-&ticans *desire provide the took necessary for the interro- and intend to build bridges, not to isolate gation of legal claims. I d attention to a and deIligtakn (111). nose who seek to merit attempt by Ftancis J. Mook 111, pro build bridges between rhetoric and pragma- fewof law at Pennsylvania State Univer- dialectics would need to be tolerant of mnl- sity, to build a theory of legal reasoning and tiple perspectives on aquwnf and embrace argument by yoking the works of Perelman the desirability of pldty and the possibil- and Hans-Georg Gadamer. In a 63,000- ity of mntiple interpr~Wo~~that might atl word essay in the SwhClpl$nia Intmdic- be reasonable. Prapa-dialectics explicitly dphty &wJorrd Maok values what the cannot support an ecumenical spirit nor does pralpna-dialecticians lind wbak in Perelman, it sponsor continued dialogue, it seeks an the u&al to coUapse hia inquiry into just a end to disapement. Pragma-dialecticians methodology of rhetorical techniques" (608). speak in one language in saaFch of a unitary ARGUMENTA'TTON AND ADVOCACY FRANK tmth. At most, the pragma-dialecticians see what Vickers has dedthe "undbtinpished rhetMic serving the hmction of "st~ategic translation" of the Trcaik (592). maneuvw in Berrirce to a rule bound Eva with these Grnitations, scholars of disJdc. Rhetoricians may be welcomed in ar~pnneotationand rhetoric have and will the realm of pmpa-dialecticians, but as sec- continue to draw hmthe many high@in ond& Eitizeas who offer insight on "he- the new NRP. Mweli, who knew Perelman torical techniques.' weU, in a littlenoticed book, declares in its ThereisabtidgefromNRPtopragma- title that the NRP ahodd be the "philosophy dialectics. If advocates and audiences agree and methodology* for this century. This to )theuse of a univocal language and seek bold title betays Maneli's more modest aim, resolution of wnfiicf wbich may be justified which is to cultivate a philosophy of phd- in certain contexcp, the NRP can embrace ism and tolerance as a response to the vio- pr%gma-dialectiEsTheadop&mofapragma- lent traumas of the twentieth century. A dialectical perspective is a choice made by noted legal scholar and author of two excel- humans in a @en coat& Humans might lent books on legal masoning, Uan& saw make other and diffexwt choices that might the dialectical paspective developed by be reasonable as well. I am joined by oh Perelman as a philomphy needed to counter scholars in their criticism of the prsgms- the dering caused by totalitarian move- dialecticians' misreading of the NXP and ments. Man+ who escaped from the Ger- concw with Wamick when she notes in her man concentration camps, and later partici- entry in the OwE~lycropsdh ofRhutori8 pated in a negotiation designed to b* the that the 'lucid" account of the Ws"tbw'y Vietnam War to an end, sought Yo bring of argwmentation" in Fuhmrclls qfA@- Perelmanian highto bear on the prob- DIcnlorimr is undermined by k- lems of society. Although he does not ad- founded* criticisms and *a mimaderstarid- dress the secondary lituature on the NRP, ingof some of Perehnan's work" (Conviction Manen offers a piritual interpretation of 174), Grosswhite when he concludes that Perelman's work. van Eemeren's d Grootendorst's interpre- This interpretation is unexpected, as tation of Perelman is "indlycrude and Maneli and Perelman were both atheists. backward (138pand Tinsdale's obsewation Both faced the mthlesness of the Nazis, ex- that *A charge that 'anything goes' has no perienced the cruelty of anti-Semitism, and, force against Perelman's popition, and van after the war, sought the reconstruction of a Eemeren and Grootendorst's concern that wodd they believed operated independently the position pmmotes undue subjectivism is of deities and transcendental truths. The Ho- misplaced (lOO).p lacaust and the destruction of Europe placed I not suggesting the NRP is immacu- the burden of proof on those who had fiifh late, conceived &t flaws. Gross and in human reason to redeem if which Perel- Dearin, who admire Perelman's work, iden- man did with the NRP. Maneli and Perel- tify his limitations, whieb they believe in- man turned to regressive philosophy, tradi- olude a failure to deal wid emotional proof, tion, natural law, and epideictic discourse to an underdeve10ped process of arguing, and a avoid metaphysical foundationalism and the possible injustice to his coUabomtor Lucie problem of infinite regress to ground trnfhs. Olbrechts-Tyt eca, for which he is -mi- They did have an abiding faith in hum*, ble, because her role in the NRP project is and the cap* of humans to construct hu- not spe&d or celebrated (3-5). There is an mane laws and just soeieties through argu- obreprity embedded in some of their ideas mentatiop. They did not cede the spiritual to that is lees than helps02 and English readers the religious as they had an abiding faith in may lose the nuances of the original due to the power of human reapon and its expres- ARGUMENTATION SNDIES IN THE WAKE OF THE NEWRHMORiC sion through argument They saw argumentation serrring a central role in the humaui- tien and as a humane & as it provided the human community with the means of yoking an expanded sense of Peason to liberty.

NRP set a course between radical skepti- Al;;;di~mnaah.lh ' . #Tob&mmfm 2d eel. cd cism and certainty by cawing out a realm of New Y& Meridian%h 1956. Amakl, Card. "Inhodoction.' l& fr RWJtaBbamic rhetoric. In this realm, ethical action is a w.cbm P~(IYELSarm md: ~otrr ulli. function of the moral powof reasoning, a commitment to irreducible pluralism, and the priority given to the value of dissent As Fereband OIbrechts-Tyteca state in the pennllimate sentence of the Nm RlLCfpril: The theory of argument will help to [provide] the justification of the possibility of a human commnoity in the sphere of action when this justiscation cannot be baaed on a reality or objective bth" (711). This theory of argmat &odd be at the heart of any authentic aystem of argumeat or vision of participatory democracy. There is an em bedded humility in Perelman and OIbrechts- Eerneren, Fnna H. van, Rob Grmvmtorsg md T& Tyteca's work as it does not claim transcen- *. Hmdbwt 6.4 ' 7bmJaI.al dent truths. This attitude of humility is SYm ofuu%uaI~~- complemented by a faith in the abii of humans to make good, if not absolute, deci- sions. When read in the proper light, the Nm Rhsoeric remains a chic,offering deep itwighi into the meaniog and experience of argument ~,.r.. ~.. -~ ,-.... -.. F& hvidA. a~iaeaicd lathe New Rhetoric? ,&membn 97 d~~1998):1I I- FG~David A. 4be NmPb&dc,Judai.m, md Part The CCulburl (1997): 311-331. Fnak,DnvidA.Rcu.P-H.var~.sdRob

F4David A, and Miehdle K Bolduc. "ChhPer& -'I 'F*n Pbilwbphh PBd kepdye l%hm MdTmdiuim.~md FML. Duvld A. and Mi&& K Bolder .Pmm Yitr -AakuminI*

WMh, ARGUMENTATION AND ADVOCACY FRANK

Glover, odm.Hrmnic,: A MordHisfq gffh M- fiuh hamy. New Iiavon. CT: Yale Udi- Prn* 9m

, ------H&, GedA "Hm.y W Jhrtocle, Jr.: Reviving the I)ldo@e af PhilmDphy lad Rhetodc." %&am 1 (ZWl): 1-25.

mu: AnyD & Bsmn, 2002. Johnstom, Henry W. 'New OEl(bdU m CODOmwrsy: hfw $912 (15SIJh 57-67. Jo- Hanry 'A New Th ofP161emphical &oo: mh&, adZnnIMlpgim~Rc d 15 (1954) 244-.5$!.

dly Park P&jlya State u&rmly Pas, 1965. OUlmba-Tncrr. ae. Twuonm Avw L. RWo. fodd: 0xf&'unive& 2001. 583-92. Wa~ni*, B&JW *Conviutm." Oy%d Enclcbpshi rf Memk Ed. ThmSlq ZWI. 171-75. wsrnids Bvban *l&a Orbrmhb-Tyba'a Cnmibu- tron to the New Rbetnic." &km@ & %it Yoica: lb RtuMrfml~D/H~Wennn Ed. Mdy Mel- in Wmhnmr. CXbbia X:Uniwdv of ktth hobk 1998. Wsmi& Embaa, pnd Sum me.%e New Rhe ricrics-Sehnep: A6ulaodcalViiofPFac- tidReuollirrg.s~andMwmy29(I-)

kpmHara OjW h&i&.Ed.J&ce Schuc~. ~d w T ~eigha,minois: ~sve- land Rat. 1z287.414.