The Role of Religion in Iraqi Nationaiism: 1918-1932
V. O. Lockwood-Drummond
Institute of Islamic Studies McGill University Montreal, Quebec, Canada
A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfhent of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts
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Author: V. Lockwood - Drummond Title of Thesis: The Role of Religion in [raqi Nationalism: 19 18 - 1932. Department: Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University
Degree : Master of Arts
This thesis proposes to deal with the Iraqi Nationalkt rnovement from its emergence after the Fust World War to the establishment of an independent Lraq in 1932. During these years the British controlled Iraq under a mandate granted by the League of Nations. This. in spite of the simultaneous creation of an Iraqi monarchy. Neither the new monarch nor the people were content with the political arrangement, based as it was on foreign control. but the drive for independence emanated from a srnail group of political activists. Both major religious sects of Islam, Sunni and Shi'a, played a leading role in the nationaiist movement: in fact. the movernent cannot be understood without an appreciation of Islam. and its major variations, in Iraqi life.
A historkal background highlights the conditions which allowed lraqism to take precedent over Arabism after the war and examines the reactions of Iraqis to the invasion by modem conquerors and their later occupation. Additionally, it provides a chronological account of the important events during the mandate period and the buildup of Iraqi resentment of foreign control which precipitated their demand for self-government. This thesis is a broad study of the nascent nationalist rnovement in postwar Lraq which engaged in a desperate banle to transform a mandated temtory into a sovereign state. Focus is on the role religion played in its beginnuigs and on the contribution of both Shi'is and Sunnis whose combined and independent efforts led to the formation of modem Iraq. Sommaire
Auteur: V. O. Lockwood - Drummond Titre: Le rôle de la religion dans le nationalisme iraquien: Section: Institut des études islamiques
Diplorne: M. A.
Cette thèse traite du mouvement nationaliste de l'Iraq depuis ses débuts après la Première Guerre Mondiale jusqu' à l'établissement de l'indépendence de 1'- en 1932. Pendant cette période, malgré la création de la monarchie, I'Iraq était sous contrôle de la Grande Bretagne mandatée par la Ligue des Nations. Ni le nouveau monarch ni le peuple iraquiens n'étaient satisfaits de cette arrangement politique base sur une contrôle étranger. Par ailleurs, un groupuscule d'activistes fut le moteur de l'indépendence. Les deux sectes principales Sunni et Shi'a ont joué un rôle important dans le mouvement nationaliste. En fait on ne peut comprendre œ mouvement sans connaître l'Islam et ses diverses répercussions sur la vie des Iraquiens. La recherche historique met en évidence les conditions qui ont permis I'ascendant de 1"'Iraquisme" sur I"'Arabisme7' après la Première Guerre: en outre, elle permet d'examiner les réactions des Iraquiens face à l'invasion des conquérants modernes et de l'occupation de leur temtoire qui suivit: eiie facilite aussi le cornpte- rendu chronologique des événements majeurs de cette période du mandat: eue explique le rejet grandissant des iraquiens du contrôle étranger. ce qui précipita leur demande d' autonomie. Cette thèse étudie d'une manière générale le mouvement nationaliste naissant dans l'Iraq de 1' Après-Guerre qui s'engagea dans une bataille acharnée pour transformer ce territoire mandaté en un état souverain. Elle met l'accent. d'une part. sur le rôle joué par la religion lors de la naissance du nationalisme, et d'autre part, sur la contribution autant des Shi'as que des Sunnis, dont les efforts unis ou séparés ont permis la construction de I'iraq moderne. Acknowledgements
First and foremost, 1 wish to express my sincere gratitude to the Director of the Islamic Institute at McGill University, Professor -4. Uner Turgay. who supported and facilitated the completion of this study from the outset. 1 also wish to thank Ann Yaxley of the lslamic Institutie for her kindness. The invaluable assistance and consideration of Wayne St. Thomas, Salwa Ferahian. and Steve Millier of the Islamic Studies Library staff greatly contnbuted to this thesis. Specifically, 1 wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to Professors Erik Knudsen and Nancy Carrol of the Amencan College of Switzerland without whom this work might never have been attempted: and, to the innumerable students from A. C. S. who inspired my interest in the Middle East and who 1 rernember with sincere affection.
1 would also Iike to express my gratitude to family and fnends who have motivated me and aiiowed for my eccentricities. To Deborah for her professionalism in translating my abstract , Alexandra w hose linguistic abilities are without paraiiel, Barbara for her exceptional insight in the role of religion, Michaei Paul, the judge and jury of ihe significant, and Barbara Am for teaching me the vagaries of the intemet - thank you. Among the many others who have supported me in my dedication to education. 1 am especially gratefûi to Reita, Rana, Patricia, Isobel, Bob, Pme. Tom, Audrey, John, Mary. Alex, Janice, Gordon, and lastly, my own group of seven: Stephanie, David, Michaela Amal, Hannah, Katherine, and Ian.
Most importantly, 1 wish to acknowiedge the devotion and encouragement of my parents, Rachel and Alexander Dnimmond, and it is to them that 1 dedicate this thesis. Table Of Contents
Abstract
Sommaire Acknowledgements Contents
Introduction
Chapter One: Mesopotamian Inheritance
Ottoman Rule in the Nineteenth Century
Policies of Abdulharnid II: 1876- 1909
Diffenng Policies of the Young Turks: 1908- 19 18
Western Expansionism and the Great War
Resistance and Accomodation in Mesopotamia
Chapter Two: Occupation and Mandate 19 18- 1920
Arab Nationalism in Paris and Darnascus
Iraqi Nationalist Resistance
Al-Thawra ai-Iraqiyya al-Kubra
Role of Religion in the Iraqi Revolt
Diarchal Governrnent in Baghdad Chapter Three: Growth of Nationalism in Iraq
Parties and Groups in the National Movement
Role of Religion in the National Struggle
Kurds and Other Minorities
British Reaction to the Nationalist Movement
National Institutions
Chapter Four: The Nationalist Movement: 192 1 - 1932
King Faisal and His Cabinets
The Treaty and Nationaiist Opposition: 192 1 - 1924
Mosul, Oil, and Geographic Unity
Parliament and the Nationalist Opposition
independence and the National Movement
Conclusion
Bibliography Religion was vitai to all aspects of life in ancient Mesopotamia; in that of the nomadic Arab tribes who roarned the great western desen: and, wiih the coming of Islam. in that of the conqueron who ruled over the nch lands of the Tigris and Euphrates. In fact. due to Islam's belief in joint sovereignty of the religious and the secdar, lslamic law played a legitirnate role in the temporal affairs of a reaim ruied by the orthodox Abbasid caliphs. This was a precept which was upheld for cennines by the caliph-sultans of the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, by vimie of the religious and temporal past king concordant, it was not unnaniral that religion played a major role in early Iraqi nationalism, which touched the Lives of ninety-five percent of the people in Iraq who were ~uslim.'
Yet nationalism as an ideology is secular, based on individual self-determination and, more often than not, a common race, culture, and language. The Arab lands in the Middle East differed demographicaily however, and this had an influence. In Greater Syria for example, the religious, ethnic, and linguistic divisions produced a Sunni Arab majority amid Shi'i Arab, Alawi, Drue, Christian, and Jewish minorities. Here, Sunni Arabs. whose religious liberalkm was weil-suited to secuiar ideologies, were at the forefront of nascent Arâb autonomist and nationalist movements.
In the area designated by the Abbasids as 'Irak 'Arabi and Jazirah, the self-same divisions produced a Shi' i Arab majority. Nonetheless, having politically and socially dominated the country for centuries, the Sunnis continued to dominate as an inherent nght.
As in Greater Syria, Sunni Arabs in Iraq were religiously individualistic. They too were prone to involvement in Arab separatist movements. Conversely, Shi'i Arabs were religiously dominated by their pnesthood, whose 'national' inchation was for an Islamic state with a consultative body ruled by Shi'i legists. Sunni Kurds, the largest non-Arab rninority in the country, held national aspirations of their own, completely separate from an Arab state. The remaining five percent of the population, consisting of other non-Arab minorities, were isolated from and, with rare exception, unaffected by autonomist or nationalist endeavor.
Of Iraqis who aspired to national independence after the war of 19 14 - 19 18, the three largest groups, though Muslim. were motivated by self-interest and not by a cornmon goal. Clothed in the orthodoxy and heterodoxy of Islam. Muslirn Arab sectarianism caused disunity and disharmony, as well as a social. economic, and political disparity. Moreover, despite efforts to the contrary, this did not abate with the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. Why. if there was between the Sunni and Shi'i Arab a cornmon culture, a comrnon history. and a common language, could this schism not be heaied?
Acnialiy, for a bief interlude, a healing did occur in an Iraqi nationalist rebellion which brought Sunnis and Shi'i Arabs together in a common goal: the ousting of postwar military occupation forces offensive to both secrs.' Iraqis, mesmerized by promises of power, compromised with each other, with imperialist Britain, and with the nationalist regimes of the Turks and the ~olsheviks.~
Historians have argued that whereas the Sunni Amb looked to the West, the Shi'i Arab looked to the East, both seekhg to strengthen their sectarian aiiiances and political power. But the Iraqi dilemma at this time did not concem sectarianism as such but rather internai demographics which could aiter past political roles in Iraq. Notwithstanding the
Sunni majonty throughout the Muslirn world, the Shi'i Arabs were the majonty in Iraq and, poiiticaiiy rnotivated by Shi'i clergy, Shi'i nationalisis, and other outside influences: could overwhelm the Sunnis, des pite the advantage of Sunni Kurdish numbers.
Therefore, to retain Sunni Arab dominance in Iraq two solutions were evident. although both would cause a renewal of the schism between the sects. One solution was that of fomiing a temporary alliance with the foreign occupying power-and future mandatory authority under the aegis of the League of Nations in Geneva. The Shi'a were opposed to such a foreign alliance under any pretext, although they themselves had been dominated by a foreign-bom priesthood for centuries.
Other Sunni Arabs saw the solution in Arab nationalism and its goal of a single Arab nation rather than a particularist independent state. This would preclude forging a specific Iraqi loyalty or a unique hqi identity. Naturatly. the Shi'i Arabs of Iraq were opposed to what would be a predominantly Sunni Arab nation, as were the Kurds who, though Surmi, would be excluded from real power. While Arab nationalism per se did not prosper in Iraq at this partïcular rime, it did influence the Shi'i status quo and Iraqi future generations?
The solution to continued Sunni politicai dominion proved to be the intrusion and designs of the mandatory power. However, Iraqi nationalism thnved within the purported democratic institutions of Iraq's constitutional monarchy and both Sunni and Shi'i Lraqi nationalists, the nemesis of the mandatory power, were influentid in achieving Lraqi independence. The national stniggle was not merely for independence however. nor was it for the liberal nationalism which espoused liberty, equality, and fraternity? Rather the nationalist movement in Iraq desired iiberation from centuries of alien domination. and an independent, self-governing state within the boundaries of Islam. For religion played a major role, indeed, in the nationalist politics of Iraq in the mandate era.
This thesis is concemed with the historical background to [raqi nationalism, the emergence of the Iraqi nationalist movement after 1918, and its progress until the independence of Iraq in 1932. It examuies the role Islam played during these formative yem with a view to the differing participation of Sunni and Shi'i segments of the country's population. It also demonstrates that the people in general reacted strongly to foreign military occupation and to the mandate which followed, despite the establishment of the Iraqi monarchy which ded in diarchy7 with the mandatory power. It mershows thai diffenng religious sects and ethnic groups within Islam participated in the nationaikt movement in a distinctive fashion. The reason for their differences was, more than anythmg else, based on the degree of political power they wanted to exercise in government.
The focus of the thesis is on the struggle for independence by Mush nationalists under the terms of a mandate imposed by the League of Nations. Emphasis is on Arab influences rather than Kurdish, though their inclusion in the overall Islamic theme will be recognized.
Many works have deait with Arab Nationalism in generai and a few scholars have made specific references to Iraqi Nationdism. There is no work, however. which specificaily examines the role religion played in the Iraqi nationalist movement from 19 18 to 1932. This work is intended to confm the distinct participation of both Shi'i and Sunni Arabs in the process which led to the formation of the state of Iraq. . . l C. Ernest Dawn, 'The Origins of Arab Nationalism," in The Owsof Arab Na_rionalism, edited by Rashid Khalidi. (New York: Columbia University Ress. 1991). Dawn quotes Talib Mushaq, an Inqi Arab Ottoman bureaucrat under the Monarchy. as saying: "Were we reaiIy subjects of impenalism when hq was under Ottoman rule? Never! We were one nation, living under one flag. The bond of religion bound us with the firmest of ties. islam united Our hearts and our feelings, and made us one bloc, supporting each other like a solid building. P. 19. ' The iraqi Revolt brought Shi'i and Sunni Arabs together religiously, in joint services in the mosques of Baghdad and politically, after these religious services, by mernbers of Iraq; nationalist societies who planned the revolt in conjunction with the Shi'i clergy in the Holy Shi'i cities. who incited the tribes to revolt. David Fromkin, A Peace to End Al1 Peace: Creatin~the Modem Middle East 19 14- 1922 (New York: Henry HoIt and Company. 1989) Although the revolt has ken referred to as king primarily anti- British and not nationalistic, Fromkin argues that that is not a satisfactory explanation coming as it did in the same moment in time as riots and rebetlions elsewhere in the Middle East. Egy~t. 'Transjordan', Palestine. P. 453. Hanna Batatu. Tehhq (Classesandceofon: Pnnceton University Press, 1979). Batatu documents the visit of a Turkish major in Mustafa Kemal's liberation my to Najaf, as well as, a Bolshevik pamphlet circulated in Iraq, the 'Society for the Libernuon of the Moslem East' (Jam'iyyar TaWilis-ish-Sharq-il-Islam)and the interest of the Shi'a (and the Turks) in ri Bolshevik rnovement headquartered in Anatolia. Pp. 1 137-39. Elie Kedouie, The Chatham House Version and Other Middl-tern Studies (London: Wiedenfeld and Nicolson. 1970). The author points out that the Shi'i clergy were encounged by the defeat of the Ottomans in 1918 to seek 'power and preponderance' in Iraq. P. 250. Pnor to the Inqi revolt of 1920, they themselves were encouraged by the Turks and the Bokheviks, references to this point of view may be found in the work of Hanna Batatu noted above. The appointment by King Faisai of a Syrian Arab nationalist, Sati al-Husn,as Director of Education in Iraq in 1922 had a direct influence over the glorification of Amb history within the state ducational system which influenced young Iraqis as they grew to manhood, particulady in the late nineteen thirties and eady nineteen forties. Hans Kohn. The Age of Nationalism: The First Era of Global History. (New York: Harpers & Brothers. Publishers, 1962) Kohn daims that "...in most of the new states emerging from the First World War...there was. ..an illiberai nationality poticy in which the power of the state was put. in the nme of nationdism. into the service of the dominant ethnic group. Instead of bi-national or constitutionally multi- ethnic states, the ideai of the pure nation-state was procIairned.*' p. 25. ' A diarchy refers to a govemment by two independent authorities, especiaily. the reformeci indian constitution started in 192 1. Political domination by waves of Foreign conquerors was endemic in the history of
Mesopotamia The ultimate conquest during the First World War was duly followed by military occupation and political domination by a foreign power under the aegis of the League of Nations. In similar episodes throughout the centuries, Mesopotamians bore the ravages of continuous religious, political, and temtorial conflict. Not merely confined to extemal forces, confiict was also internal. Sectarian and racial divisions were causative factors influencing the religious, social, and economic lives of Mesopotamians for over a thousand years. Awareness of these factors and their influence is essential to an appreciation of the social and political dilemma which confronted these lands, the former Ottoman provinces of Baghdad, Basra, and Mosul. This analysis contemplates the role of established religious dicta in the formation of Iraqi nationalism.
Though contemporary nationalism emerged belatedly in the Middle East compared ro Europe, the last decade of the Ottoman Empire witnessed the awakening of Mesopotamians to a latent Arab aliegiance. When faced with Turkish nationalism and British imperialism, Mesopotamians, of whom the Arabs formed the vast majority, dernanded autonomy cvithin the Empire. ALthough an independent nation was not within the realm of their imaginings at this tirne, the concept of nation was not entirely foreign inasmuch as the Islamic comrnunity had ken viewed as such in the religious and political sense. It was also possible to conceive of an Arab tribe as a nation -a people imbued with a cornmon history, language, and culture. and a desert land bordering the sown. The overview below, from Ancient Mesopotarnia to the British occupation after the Fint World War, clarifies the importance of the foregoing and the role of religion prier to nationdism.
From iü ancient beginning religion played a vital role in the history of Mesopotamia. Although the Arab Islamic conquest was crucial to the religious and culturai legacy of Mesopotamia, a developed Arab culture existed even prior to the fïrst civilization of Sumer city-states. Arab nomads. who migrated from the western desert shared with the Akkadians a language with similar "patterns of grammar, syntax. and phnseology ."' Their religion, iike that of the Sumenans, was polytheistic and associationistic: they believed in one living God, yet associated with God eatthly things and "beiings that were not ~od."' On the other hand, Arab tribesmen who had converted to Islam, in contrat to the ancient Mesopotamians, pledged aliegiance to One God and disassociated from other lesser godd
Furthemore, a cornrnon racial heritage was found in the conquerors of ancient Mesopotamia; Akkadims and Sargonids, Amorites and Ass ynans, Canaanites and
Aramaens all shared the same roots of Semitic conquest. These conquerors, as well as those of non-Semitic heritage. adopted as their own the structure, culture. and religion of sumer.' Consequently , this first civilization continued to exist withm the parameten of conquest. When subsequently the Greeks, Persians, Seleucids, Parthians, and Sassanids conquered the region, they imposed their own cultures and religions. thereby severing the link with ancient Mesopotamia Nonetheless, the Sernitic connection sunrived.
in 633 AD, great Arab tribal armies under Khalid ibn ai-Walid, the Muslim general of Medina, took the town of ai-Hirah on the western desen fringe of Persian Sassanid territoq? R.V. Bodley writes that envoys had ken sent earlier from Medina to the Sassanid der announcing the coming of a new religion and the peril in its rejection.'
Prophesy became reality as Muslim Arabs conquered Mesopotamia and assured the fuial destruction of the Sassanid dynasty in later battles at Ctesiphon and Nehavend. Arab government replaced Persian, although much of Persian administration and custom remained. Arab tribal amies. clustered in camp cities on the eùge of the desert. clung to the pmservation of Arab culture and superiority over the larger Persian Sassanid population.'
According to Bernard Lewis, the camp cities of Kufah and Basra played a vital role in the expansion of the Arab nation during the conquests, however. he points out that "the pietists were assigned a minor role" in its creation - although religion was the "symbol of Arab unity and victory.'% Yet Islam itseif embraçed the concept of nation. The comrnunity played a major role as in a modem nation state. The Qur'an's scope extended beyond religion to civil law. Islam's spiriaial and temporal leader, the caliph, niled in consensus, ijmu, with the Muslim community. The Arabic Qur'an, the Sunnah of the Rophet, and the Shari'a were, figuratively speaking, the boudaries of Islam.
W~thindecades of the Arab conquest, Islam itself was rent by discord over the legitirnacy of caliphal succession, causing senous confiid in Mesopotamia where the fourth caliph had made his capital. Caliph Ali ibn Abi Talib, whose nile was contested by
Muwiyyah the Umayyad govemor of Damascus, was assassinated by a dissident Kharidji aibesrnan in the mosque of Kufah in 661 AD.' Subsequently, his son Husain was killed in banle against the ruling Umayyads near Karbala in 680 AD. Thereafter, supporters of Ali, the Shi'at Ni, built shrines to their martyrs in the holy cities of Shi'ism which became centers of Shi'i pilgrimage and learning.
Many of the Shi'at Aii remained in Mesopotamia, while others migmted to northem Persia amid throngs of the discontented. These later rebelled against the Amb govemment.
As for the Persian Sassanids, they slowly assimilm the Arabic language and many abandoiied Zorastnanisrn for Islam in the eighth century.1° According to the tenets of Islam conceming non-Muslirns, the conquered were not coerced and could hiyaccep or reject the new religion. Those who chose to continue in their custornary beliefs could choose to die by the sword or live conditionaiiy in pace with thar Muslim miers. However, peace was elusive in Mesopotamia. In 750 AD, the Umayyads were defeated by the Abbasids, who estabiished the caliphate in the Abbasid province of 'Irak Arabi'. Baghdad, built in 780 AD, became the seat of the Abbasid dynasty and the syrnbol of Sunni dominance. Abbasid rule, though it lasted successfully until 1258 AD. was LUiuted by alien poli tical domination derthe ninth century .' ' Various conquerors mled the region until the sixteenth century at which time the Persians reconquered Mesopotamia led by a Shi' i Safavid Shah. Withui decades, the Ottomans defeated the Safavids and Sunni government was restored to Baghdad. However, the resulting proximity of the Sunni and Shi'i empires served to revive the reiigious rift of the past and continuous sectarian contlict once again becarne temtorial.
After Shi'ism had ken declared the Safavid state religion in 1504 AD, the Shah insisted that the protection of the Shi'i holy cities was the prerogative of the Persian Empire.' Conversely. the Sultan claimed that the lands of the Umayyad and Abbasid were a heritage of the ûttornan Empire, its ultimate fate. Antagonism generated by constant confiict undermined ail efforts at reconciliation. ' The intractable banier of alienation and distrust which existed between both sects, now extended to the Ottoman Sunni pvernment and the Shi'i Arab community, which contended that the govemment was. in fact. illegitimate according to Shi'i law.
During the eighteenth century, a Sunni Afghan invasion of Persia precipitated the migration of many of the Shi'i Penian religious and merchant class of Isfahan to the Shi'i holy cities of Najaf and ~arbala." This created an alien force within Mesopotamia which eventually led to Shi'i Persian domination over the indigenous Shi'i Arabcommunity and the Shi'i holy cities. Moreover, the Shi'i Persian doctors of religious law, rnujtahidin. resident in Mesopotamia acquired preeminent reiigious and political leadership among the
Shi'a of Mesopotamia and of Persia. Their privileged status was tolerated by the Sunni Ottoman government which accrued great benefit fiom Shi'i pilgrimage and burial trafic. Sunni Arab dominance in Mesopotamia existed by vimie of Sunni Ottoman rule. The Ottoman Sultan was an orthodox Muslirn of the Hanafite schoot of law. His government army and courts were distinctly Sunni. Phebe Marr observes that "the shi'i. or Jafarire school of law was neither recognized in the Ottoman code nor accorded a place within the shari'ah ... courts.", nor did the Shi'a in Mesopotamia hold administrative. military. or teaching positions in Sunni Ottoman instinitions." Yet the religious and cultural legacy of the Islamic Arab conquest of Mesopotamia was the only instrument capable of healing and uniting the cloven Muslirn Arab cornmunities.
Islam caused a similar religious cleavage arnung the Kurdish tribes in the northem province of Mosul, although ody small percentage of Kwds adopted Shi'ism. Sunni tribes mainly adhered to the Sufi Qadiri order in the southem Iraqi Kurdistan and Nakshabandi order in the north. Culturai solidarity nurtured a living bond among the predominantly Sunni Kurds of Iraq and their kinsmen in Anatolia Syria, Persia, and Armenia. The rise of Kurdish nationaiism in the nineteenth century affected the whole of Kurdistan.16 Tribal aghas ruied in Mosul, Sulairnmiyya and remote highland strongholds where. despite persistent tribal rivalry, the Kurds remained far rernoved from the inter-Arab contlict to the south. Though subdued by the Ottomans in the sixteenth century, ihey were never conquered by them.
Not ail conquerors of Mesopotamia came bearing arms. British merchants penetrated the head of the Persian Gulf before the eighteenth century bearing Ottoman trade treaties of privilege, sethg up warehouses ai Basra and Baghdad, and using their trade advantage to the detriment of indigenous Arabs, Christians, and .Jews.17 The Gulf becarne a strategic link in protecting India, Britaui's eastem empire, therefore Bntain encouraged these commercial ventures. Furthemore. despite Britain's promise to do so, upholding the integrity of the Ottoman Empire was not an ironclad requisite of British diplomacy. Mesopotamia became a pawn in the "Great Game" of foihg Russian efforts to invade British lndial* Thus, both economically and strategicaily, Bntain held a vested interest in Mesopotamia -a double-edged sword which it used to came Mesopotamia's future.
Ottoman Rule in the Nineteenth Century
in the heght of increased Western technologicd advances and weakening Ottoman military and financiai institutions, the Ottoman governrnent legislated social, political and economic refoms and fostered technologicd and economic concessions destined to bring
Mesopotamia into the modem age. This, all within the general frarnework of the Tanzimt-i
Hayriye -an era of reform in the Ottoman Empire from 18394876 fostered the conditions necessary for the integration of the provinces of Baghdad and Basra into the world economy l9 and changed the political climate of Mesopotamia. thereby preparing the ground for Iraqi nationalism.
During this penod, British telegnph lines covered the countryside and British stearnships plowed the river Tigris. Tribal shaikhs, who ded the land and the sea routes south of Baghdad, saw these changes as a threat to the status quo. Anarchy and acts of piracy went hand in hand with modemization. In 1869, the year of the opening of the Suez
Canai to worldwide shipping, an enlightened Ottoman statesman found the solution to tribal unrest and the furthering of the airns of the Ottoman government.
Midhat Pasha, a dedicated reformer and governor of Baghdad from 1869 to 1872, transformed Mesopotamia. He paved the streets, introduced electrical light and a horse- drawn tramway; he initiated state steamship service between Baghdad and Oman, and built
Baghdad's Fust modem bridge over the Tigris in an attempt to control recalcitrant floodwaters from the upper reaches of the great river. The pasha's enactment of the Law of the Vilayet of 1864 cenualized and rnodemized Mesopotamian administration. which thereafter became a maileable system of provincial and district subdivision. For the first tirne, administration councils included local representatives from among Muslirn and non- Musiim notables, enabling them to gain hitherto inaccessible administrative experience." With the enactment of the Ottoman Public Education Law of 1869, Midhat Pasha established a secular state SC hool system in Mesopotarnia breahg the traditional religious monopoly over education. Traditional educational methods, both Sunni and Shi' i, taught Mush students the alphabet, the Qur'an, and Arabic at mosque schools. Non-Muslims attended confessional schools or private western mission schools. Primas, and secondary
Ottoman state education was free to ail classes and religions. Students were taught science. mathematics and western languages for the fmt time. Secular state education becarne the vehicle for improving the provincial mind and prepared many Mesopotamians for higher education and careers in the Ottoman bureaucracy and military. WMe Sunnis profited from this reform; Shi'i students refused state education rather than risk Sunni indoctrination which later becarne a serious obstacle to their future in govemment and the professions."
Of course, not aiI children attended school, as is clearly iliustrated by the low literacy rate." Membea of the tribes who formed the greater part of the population were rarely litente. their education was Limited to the teaching of their tribal eiders and the art of survival.
Not oniy did Midhat Pasha inaugurate administrative and educational change. he irrevocably transfonned the structure of tribal society. To provide the stability necessary for agrarian reform and econornic revival, Midhat Pasha applied the provisions of the Land
Law of 1858 to settle the tribes on the land. The intent of the law was to provide smallholdings for the tribesmen, however, the majority of tribesmen refused to register for legal titie to the land due to their fear of govenunent control, taxation and conscription.
Consequently, many shaikhs and their families registered for vas t tribal domains, thereby creating a wedthy elite which later becarne a powerful political force. The shaikh, former tribal champion and protector, became a land lord; the tribesman, once the unfettered pastoraiist, became one of his legion of tenant farmer~.'~The 1858 Land Law was a primary factor in the fragmentation of much of traditional tribai society and transforming the religious, social, econornic, and political smicnire of ~esopotamia.~~ Land settlement created a subordinate status arnongst the tnbesmen which had far- reaching consequences long after Midhat Pasha's tenure. The tribal community had been a primitive society with culturai, historie, and linguistic ties bound by families. clans. and a tribal body which meted out justice, shared its bounty, offered its protection and resolution by consensus. It adhered to ancient tribal custorns; religion played a rninor role. As Hanna
Batatu observes, "...Islam sat lightly on ~edouins."'~Therefore, it was not circurnstance alone. nor religion, nor environment but the tribesrnan's need of communal bonding der the transition from nomadic to sedentas, Iife which made him responsive to the procession of itinerant emissaries From the holy cities of the Shi'a in the late nineteenth century.
On the other hand, the Shi'i Persian mujtahidin in Karbala and Najaf had their own motives for seeking to convert the tribes. the most immediate being their need of an indigenous source of income and a protective force for the holy cities and their pilgrims. Regardless of need or motive, the Sunni Ottoman govemment apparently attributed Little importance to a possible change in tribal ailegiance slated to strengthen the Shi'i politicai leadership and influence the country's political future. An ironic and unintended effect of nibal conversion to Shi'ism was the major demographic change in the country. By the tm of the twentieth century, the majority of the population in Mesopotamia was Shi'i rab? The political impact of this change only becarne evident in the early years of the monarchy.
Midhat Pasha's success in implementing Tanzimat reforms in the Balkans, prior to his govemorship of Baghdad, provided the stimulus necessary to create the same miracle in ~esopotamia.'~His reforms as govemor of Baghdad from 1869 to 1872 prepared the ground for future growth in Mesopotamia, drawing it into the orbit of the coming age and into the world economy. Stephen Longrigg, an iraqi scholar with little praise for Ottoman good intentions, nonetheless pnised Midhat Pasha for his agarian-tribal policy, his introduction of representative govemment, and his "expansion of the provincial rnind" through edu~ation.'~These policies created an indigenous elite whose very existence ailowed for the emergence of a nationalkt consciousness. On the other hand, while Midhat Pasha succeeded in curbing ulmM control over education he aiso created conditions conducive to increasing Shi'i polity in southem Mesopotamia. Many of the reforms of this great statesman were successful, others drew critici~rn:'~di provided the basis for further reforms in Mesopotamia during the reigns of Abdulhamid II and the Young Turks.
PoIicies of Abdulhamid II: 1876 - 1909
In the beginning of his reign, Sultan Abdulhamid II adopted the Liberal poiicies of the previous govemment and, in order to aven interventionist reform by European powers. he promulgated the Empire's fint constitution, principally drafted by Midhat Pasha. Mesopotamian representatives to the Ottoman parliament. including notables from iMosul.
Baghdad, and Basra provinces, were corporately elected according to the Law of the
Vilayets instituted by the Pasha in 1869." 0 the critical aftemth of the 1877-78 war with Russia however, the Sultan took power into his own hands and unilaterally suspended both the constitution and the parliament. The sultanate reverted to a pre-Tanzimat absolutism which lasted over thiny yean. in a speech from the throne afier the 1908 Young Turk revolution whch restored the constitution, Abdulhamid referred to its suspension as an act of expediency. His subjects. unprepared as they were for constitutional govemment. required modem education to fully understand its advantages and re~~onsibilities."
While Abduhamid pnontized educational reform during hs reign, he simultaneously followed policies of economic regeneration and Muslirn unification. hstability in the provinces convinced the Sultan that a modem communications systern would ensure the prosperity and unity of his ~mpire" therefore he fostered economic ties with western nations, especidy Gemany. An important step occurred when. in 1888, the Orient Express heralded the state visit of Kaiser Wilhelm II who assured Abdulhamid of Germany's fidelity and in 1898, at the tomb of Salah al-Din, of its pro-hiamic
~entirnents.~'As a result, a German fm was granted the Bosphorus to Ankara railroad concession and a German rnilitary mission was assigned to reorganize the Ottoman army. The awarding of the Berlin-Baghdad Railway concession in 1899 brought about international complications focusing on pan-Germanic intentions in the Middle Ea~t.'~
Germany 's grow ing railroad and cornniercial interests in Mesopotamia was evident in its consulates and warehouses at Baghdad. Mosul and Basra. Moreover. it was German expertise, and worldwide Muslim contributions. which built the pilgrim railroad from Damascus tu Medina, thereby furthering Abdulhamid's programme of rnodemization and highlighting his desire for Muslim unity?
The Sultan's pan-Islarnic policy paved the way for the conversion of the Mid-
Euphrates tribes to Shi'ism on a grand scale, since it disregardeci the differences inherent in sectarianism. Steps were taken by the Sunni Ottoman govemment to promote Sunnism in the region. however they proved inadequate. They inciuded: the inauguration of a Sunni academy in Mesopotamia, al-Madrasa al-[lmiyya alSunniyya by Shaikh Muhammad Sa'id al-Naqshbandi in 1898; the appointment of five S to Basra, Karbala and the
Munrafiq district in 1905; and. the proposed instituthg of "mobile rnudraras" of Sunni uhby a Baghdadi schoiar, dim Ahmad Shakir al-Ahsi.)" The Ottoman archives contain ample documents waming of the unprecedented trend in Shi'i conversion. yet from the
Sunni point of view too lifde was done too late to stem the tide."
Ottoman reluctance to curtail Shi'i conversion may bc found in the Sultan's desire to promote Muslim unity throughout his empire. In the 1890s, Shi'ism's supreme mu/rahid
resident in Mesopotamia, Mina Hasan Shirazi (d.i896), becaw invoived in the religious and political unnst in Persia emanating hma British tobacco concession granted by the Shah. Upon king deported hmPersia, thc nligious reformer Jdal-Din al-Afghani, the most avid and vocal exponent of a movement pmtesting the 'sale' of the resources of an
Islamic state to foreign infidels, sought Shirazi's guidance of the movement?' Distressecl merchants and tobacco growers in Persia appealed to the leadhg Shi'i mujtahui in Teh. whereupon he appealed to the supreme Shi'i rn~jtahrif.'~In alliance with Persian clergy, reformers, and urban merchants. who were at the root of the unrest, Shirazi addressed himself to the Shah of Persia to no avail.
As the movement progressed from passive protest to religious revolt in the major cities of Persia, Shirazi issued a fatwa in Decernber 1891 boyconing the smoking of tobacco und the abolition of the British rnon~~ol~.~~Amid pervasive foreign intrigue and the threat of a holy war. jihad, the Shah abolished the tobacco concession. Shirazi's role in the success of a movement designed to thwart foreign influence was indicative of the growing political power of Shi'i leadership. At same time. the Sultan profited from a visit
from Afghani by prevding upon him to write to Shi'i ulmnn promoting pan-Islamisrn and prornising favours in retwn for supporting his cdiphate.'"
Meanwhile. despite the Sultan's promotion of Muslirn unity in the Arab provinces
by awarding high positions in his govemment to Sunni Arabs, many Arabs, including the Hijazis and the Sanusis. gave the Sultan only nominal suppod2 Furthemore. although pan-Islamism strengthened the political power of the Shi'a of Najaf and Karbala, it changed
Little in Baghdad where Sunni Arab dominance prevaiied in tbe govemment and the
military. Muslim military conscription, until the turn of the century only applicable to
Sunnis, was a negative result of pan-lslamism for the Shi'a and the tribes. since previously
they had been granted exemption from rnilitary duty upon paying a tax. Moreover, while Sunnis took advantage of educational opportunity, the Shi'a continued at traditional mosque schools and refùsed to participate in the more modem Sunni state system.
From the 1880s. Sunnis attended institutes of higher leaming in Istanbul, such as
the militaiy academy, Harbiye, and the civil service academy, Muikiye. Few Mesopotamians attended the Mulkiye. One exception was Hakki Ismail Baban, a Sunni Kurdish notable, a literary figure, and an outspoken future deputy for Baghdad in 1908 and
19 12; he was also a Unionist and Ottoman rninister of education in 19 10- 1 1 .'" Meanwhile,
Sunni graduates of the preparatory schools in Baghdad fùled the cadet ranks at the Harbiye and demonstrated an exceptional bent for military service. A notable example was Baghdadi General Mahmud Sevket, the commander of the "Action Army". Hareket Ordusu. which restored order to Istanbul in the wake of the rebellion of 1909."
Cadets at the Harbiye, of whom many were to become important leaders in the evolving States of the Middle East after the First World War. were subject to the ideas and influences of Pmssian instmctors, a tradition instituted by Helmuth von Molke in the 1830s during the reign of Sultan Mahmud II. Another influence, which was perceived in his published work and personal leadership, was that of General Colmar von der Goltz. head of the Gerrnan military mission from 1883 to 1895. Goltz reorganized the Ottoman army in
1909, commanded the Ottoman Sixth Army Corps at Baghdad in 19 15;' and personally led Arab regiments whose officers had attended the Harbiye to victory at Kut al-Amara.
Despite Abdulhamid's successful policies of reform and modernization. his oppressive policies caused deep resentment among the younj educated elite. Yet control of the press. curtailment of travei, and isolation frorn ail western influence were negligible compared with the Sultan's insidious espionage system found in every corner of the empire. An apt comment on Hamidian policy was 'Balik Basran Koknr' -the fish putrefies from its head do~nwards.'~Resistance to this repressive dewas at first covert and locaiized, later it grew to encompass exiled groups in Europe. In its greatest strength as the
Cornmittee for Union and Progress, the resistance had its Salonka headquarters in Macedonia, a hotbed of Balkan nationalism policed by international powers.
While Unionist leaders in Saionika advocated the overthrow of the sultan and the restoration of the Ottoman constitution. it was not planned for the summer of 1908. Emest
Ramsaur points to unforeseen circumstances as the pnmary cause of the fortuitous revolution, not the least of which was the meeting between the king of England and the czar of Russia to decide Macedonia's fate. The prospect of continued international control drew an unanticipated response fiom the Unionists in the Third Army Corps in Macedonia, unanticipated response from the Unionists in the Third Army Corps in Macedonia which included Turkish junior officers to whom the menace of foreign power rneant comprornising Ottoman sovereignty.'" Notwithstanding this nationalist fervour, it was the menace of palace reprisais that ultimately galvanized the revolutionists into action.
Bred on the nationahst zeal found in the military academies of Istanbul. these young Turkish anny officers -arnong hem Major Enver and Adjutant-Major Niyazi- initiated an armed insurrection when discovery by the Sultan's surveillance seemed imminent. Evan Lewin, wnting in 19 16. affirms Enver Bey's role in the revolution begun at Resna and the proclamation in favour of the constitution on July 23. 1908."~The junior officen of the Third Amy Corps responsible for the coup d'etat set in motion demands for the restoration of the constitution by more and more army units and civilian group~.~~
These demands were not lost on Abduihamid, nor was a demand from the Unionist leadership. The Sultan. rather than lose his throne, agreed to constitutionai govemment.
Though self-interest is not to be denied. it was in Abdulhamid's role of sultan and caliph that he encouraged a counter-revolution in April of 1909 by re:igious studenü and soldiers in Istanbul against the secuiarist Young Turk regime. Albert Hourmi documents the role of the sultan as a 'defender of the state which was virtually the last relic of the political power and independence of Sunni ~slarn.'~~Symbols of that role. which Abdulhamid upheld for ail his repressive measures. were his part in the counterrevolution. his construction of the Hijaz railway and his anti-westernism despite the growing ties with
Gemany. Moreover, whether only for personal aggrandizement, Abdulhamid fostered Islamic unity and educative opportunity among all subjects of his empire. and in so doing. he allowed for the growth of nationaiism. In the last throes of empire and beyond, despite the limitation on politicai freedom identifïed with the suitanate, Mesoptamians voiced a preference for a rem to Ottoman rule as late as 1923 rather than that of a govemment controlled by an infidel power.5' Differing Policies of the Young Turk Regime: 1908 - 191 8
Following the coup d'eut of Iuly 1908 by the young Turkish officers of the Third Amy Corps, the Cornmittee of Union and Rogress in Salonika sent a cornmittee of seven
Unionists to Istanbul to oversee the establishment of a new government according to the dicîates of the 1876 constitution. Pokies of Abdulhamid were swept aside; the old infrastructure of religion and bureaucracy was tom down and replaced by secuhization and decenaalization. All citizens. whether Turk, Arab. Christian or Jew. were equal before the law as privilege gave way to egalitarianism. When the Onoman parliament reconvened in December 1908 Mesopotamia was represented by seventeen delegates." Those initial representatives included Sayy id Tali b ai-Nagi b and Ahmad Pasha al-Zuhayr of B am,
Khudr Ludi of Dayr aldur. ismail Hakki Baban and Hasqail Sassoon of Baghdad. Arab delegates from the Arab provinces of the empirc found autonomist inspiration in their common religious, historie. cultural, and linguistic bonds.
However, the enrhusiasm of Muslims and non-Muslirns for the constitution was not shared by ail. Elie Kedourie notes a similar, dispassionate response to the constiturion's restoration in the Arab provinces. In fact, many Arabs were dismayed by the transformation of government policy.53 In accordance with this new policy . exuberant young Unionists ousted influential religious notables, judges, and ciiy officiais from positions in public institutions. Bataîu portrays the Unionists removal of religious officiais from hi& office as an attempt to desû-oy "the very Islamic fabnc" w hich assured Arab dominance." Philip IreIand describes Sunni concerns regarding the "imligiousness" of the Young Turks. and the position of those who met clandestinely, for feu of reprisal, while vehemently opposing the Young Turk policies." Zeine Zeine emphasizes mat although the Arabs criticized the government, their allegiance to the calipkk never fdtered? Sunni discontent with the Young Turk ngime found release in aaxent secret societies advocating Arab autonomy. a pncursor of the nationalisrn to corne. Initially , the Shi' a of Mesopotamia welcorned Young Turk egalitarian policies and constitutional freedoms offering political and educational change. This new political position allowed for open political discourse a a time when the involvement of the mujtahidin in Persian constitutionai poiitics became a controversial issue between student and teacher. Educationally, having obtained a fama from Shi'i mujtahid Muhammad Sa'id al-Habbubi, Shi'ism's first secuiar school in Baghdad was opened. sponsored by such
Shi'i and Sunni liberals as Iafar Abu Timan and Ali al-~azirgan." Shi'i euphoria was short-lived however. Afier the counter-revolution, Shi'i institutions were closed for their failure to comply with the cuniculum of the state system. Moreover, neither Persian student nor Persian cleric in Mesopotamia were able to escape Young Turk policy: foreigners. no longer privileged, became Liable for taxation and conscription for the first tirne? These policies were responsible for the exodus of a considerable number of Persian students which diminished the financial power and independence of the leading rnujtahidin.
By April 1909 many factions in the empire complained there was Little advantage in constitutionalism and agitated for the rem of sultanic rule. Religious students and impoverished rnps in Istanbul, encouraged by their sultan and caliph, launched a counter- revolution. However the Third Army Corps from Macedonia quickly crushed the revoit and declared martial law; thereafter the reins of constitutional governrnent were firmly in the hands of the military. Liberalizing policies onginaily brought about by the restoration of the constitution were amended and limitations were put on civil liberties to protect the state. For his part in the counter-revolution, Sultan Abdulharnid II was deposed by the Ottoman
Nationd Assembly on Apd 27, 1909; and, a fama issued by the leading Muslirn authority, the Sheikh-al-lslam, approved the Sultan's deposition. 59
Revolution once again threatened the Ottomans as nationalkt forces in the empire's European provinces demanded independence and, despite Turkish resistance. they seceded from the empire. This awoke in the Young Turks a sense of their own nationalism and a determination to protect Turkish dominion. in 1913, a coup d'etat was executed by Enver Bey which established the supremacy of the Cornmittee of Union and Progress until the
Ottoman defeat in 1918. The Turkification policies which followed the coup d'etat created strong resistance arnong the non-Turkish population. Whereas in the past kabs. as
Muslims, had accepted Ottoman hegemony, this attempt by a secularist govemrnent to rob them of their Arab inheritance was not acceptable to Arab delegates in the Ottoman chamber of deputies who demanded Arab autonomy. in fact. enforced Turkification policies not only brought forth demands for Anb autonomy, they proved to be a catalyst in the emergence of Arab nationali~rn.'~
Sayyid Talib al-Nagib of Basra, an Arab delegate and Sunni political activist, had led Arab delegates in the chamber of deputies in opposition to an Ottoman govemrnent proposal in 1909, allowing the British to monopolize navigation on the Tigns by acquiring govemrnent stearnships. Acting in concert Baghdadis of every race and creed resisted the acquisition: arnong them were Sunni merchants Abd al-Qadir al-Khadairi and Mahmud Shabandar and Shi'i Jafar Abu Timrnan; Unionist deputies Jewish Hasqail Sassoon and Kurdish Ismail Hakki Baban: and the Shi3 religionkt Shaikh Ibrahim Kh~rasani.~'Citing the commercial and political disadvantage to Mesopotamia and the Empire, telegrams from Baghdad, Basra, and Mosul besieged Arab delegates in the Chamber of Deputies. who voted overwhelmingly against the proposal. Mahmud Haddad sums up this resistance to foreign expansion as protonationalistic, anti-European rather than anti-govemment. However, Mesopotamians sought to align themselves with "Islamic authority" in Istanbul.
62 rather than Unionist policy or Turkish nationdism.
In 19 13, Sayyid Talib al-Nagib was again successful in foiling an Ottoman govenunent proposa1 to exploit Mesopotamia under a property law dowing the sale of state land to foreigners, thereby averting the sale of state land in ~Mesopotarniato Zionist interests intent on creating a homeland for the ~ews.~)The impoverished Ottoman treasury sought to profit hmthe auctioning of Sultan Abdulhamid's vast saniyya estates in Aman and Baghdad provinces, which had reverted to the state afier his deposition. This prornpted an immediate protest by Basra and Baghdad notables, as weil as the Euphrates tribes within whose temtories these lands were to be found. In order to circumvent provincial disorder which the sale of these lands in Mesopotamia would have caused, the Ottoman rninister of the interior, Talaat Bey, announced the state lands, dready sold, had ken reclaimed?
A Merdrarna was enacted in 19 13 involving an attempt by the Ottoman and
British governments to wrest control of the Shan al-Arab watenvay from the Basra municipaiity. Here international issues were at stake: involving an increase in Ottoman customs duties and supervision of the Shatt under joint British-Ottoman authority. In fact. a condition of the resolution of the Baghdad railway negotiations king conducted at the tirne was the recognition of Britain's navigational rights "up to and beyond ~aghdad."~'
While Sayyid Talib and the Reform Party of Basra fought Ottoman legislation intended ta provide new provincial administration which would achieve these ends? angered Basra citizens sought to sever Basra from the control of Istanbul. demanding 'Arabia for the Arabs'. Despite dernands by Mesopotamians to the contrary. history relates Sayyid Talib's fdure to thwart international control of his country's waterways.
These incidents in Baghdad and in Basra demonstrate the growing resistance in Mesopotamia to the Young Turk govemment and the Arab desire for autonomy. However. Mesopotarnians also sought the reintroduction of Arabic in the schools, the use of Arabic in local administration, and the appointment of local officiais. These incidents aiso illustrate a gradua1 but insistent rise in nationalist sentiment. However. these sentiments were not geographically limited. Cries for autonomy and independence were king heard from many lands throughout the Middle East and around the world.
Immediately after the Young Turk revolution of 1908 some efforts were made to create a bond between Arabs and Turks, such as the Ottoman-Arab Fraternity (Ai-&ha al- Arabi al-Uthmani) formed by Arab exiles in Paris. The Literary Club (Al-Muntada al- in Istanbul in 1908 and the Ottoman Decentralization Party in Cairo in 19 12.67 Sunni Arab ties to Istanbul were bound by Islam, therefore societies advocated autonomy not independence. When all Arab societies were banned after the counter-revolution of 1909, the Ottoman-Arab Fraternity re-emerged in Paris as the Young Arab Association (d- Jami'ah al-Arabiyah al-Fatat), an Arab nationalist secret society of mainly Syrian membeehip. The Covenant (&Md)), was a secret society advocating autonomy whose founding members were mainly Mesopotamians: it was originally composed of Arab and Turkish anny oficers, however, it becarne pnmady Arab after 1914.~'
Membership in al-Ahd was recruited from among the off'cers who attended the Ottoman military academy and General Staîf College. the Mektebi-i Harbiye. where their Pmssian instructors gave them a thorough grounding in German nationalism. The Staff
College was referred to as a 'training ground for funire nationalkt leaders': an apt description for Lraqis Jafar al-Askari. Ali Jawdat al-Ayyubi. Nuri al-Sa'id. Yasin al- Hashimi, and Jamil al-~idfa'i.~~One of its most famous Turkish graduates was Mustafa
Kemal, a renowned mycommander during the First world War. a fervent Turkish nationalist in the liberation of Anatolia, and father of modem Turkey. Another was Enver
Bey, a hero of the Young Turk revolution of 1908 and Ottoman war minister from 19 14 to 1918. The army was an avenue to power for these young officers in the coming world conflict which led to their leadership in the post-war modem state.
Once Abddhamid's regime capitulated in 1908, the constitution was restored and the Young Turk govenunent brought about considerable change which gave new-found freedoms to Ottoman citizens; however, secularist and nationalist policies did much to hm the progressive spirit of the govenunent in its relations with the Anb provinces. As Sianford Shaw so rightly concludes, the Young Turks were awakened to their own Turkish identity, which eventuaily destroyed Islamic unity and contributed to the evolution of Arab nationali~rn.~~The spirit of nationalism was very much alive in the early decades of the twentieth century. This spirit, of itself, could account for the autonornist drive of the Arabs in the Ottoman Empire; however, what applied the spur to that drive was Arab resistance to enforced Turliificaîion which posited the loss of Arab identity."
Western Expansionism and the Great War
Foreign expansionism in the Persian Gulf was a characteristic of the early twentieth century. The Tmcial shaikhdorns had long tolerated Britain's supremacy in the Persian Gulf for its commercial, political, and military capabilities. Due to their proximity to Bntish India, the British considered the Gulf and its headwaters their private preserve. Increased international shipping and rurnours of establishing German submarine facilities in the Gulf alerted Britain to the danger to their exclusive rightd2 However. a compromise agreement was reached between British and Geman diplomats in 1913 which allowed for the concluding of the Baghdad railway negotiations-and for the abandonment of the nunoured German naval facilities-thereby assuring Britain's continued supremacy in Gulf ~aters.'~Moreover, the "Great Game" rivalry between Britain and Russia came to an end after Russia's defeat by Iapan in 1905. To protect their individuai interests in Persia. a compromise agreement was signed between the two govements assigning a sphere of influence to Russia in the north and to Britain in the south. Needless to Say the area of Persian control was severely limited.
As war in Europe became imminent, Britain's concem with its Anglo-Persian oil refinery on the Shatt ai-hb intensified, supplying as it did the Bntish oïl-driven fleet. Russia concentrated on securing its interests on the Caspian Sea and the Germans focused on subversive activity throughout Persia, attempting to control the Shah in Teheran and evenniaily the country itself. Expansionist policies abounded as the region feil under the designs and influences of Euopean powers. As Peter the Great had dreamt of a vast Oriental empire, so Winston Churchill dreamt of a British imperial Middle East, and British India, with its teeming millions. of establishing colonies in the Tigris and Euphrates vdeys. Meanwhile, Enver Pasha dreamed of an extended Turkish Islamic Empire.74 In Istanbul, liberal rninisters were in favow of a reconciliahon with Britain. whose influence with the Ottomans had declined after its occupation of Egypt in 1882. The war advocates, of whom Enver Pasha was one, were convinced that the revival of the Ottoman
Empire would be assured by an alliance with Germany. In January 19 14. the mival of
German General Ono Liman von Sanders as the inspecter-general of the Ottoman army was a telling blow to the Liberals. Nevertheless, the Ottoman military establishment rernained firmiy in the han& of Enver, the young Ottoman vice-generalissimo w ho chose once again to lead the empire into revolutionary
In the summer of 1914, Enver and memkrs of the central cornmittee of the Union and Rogress party made ovemires to Gemany and a secret alliance was signed between the Ottoman Empire and the Central Powers. While most Onomans' wished to guard their neutrality. the govemment, &er an unsuccessN foray into Entente negotiations, finally declared war on the side of Gcrmany. To the GemHigh Command, the Ottoman alliance was of great benefit in diverting AUied forces from the western front and guarding the Straits separating the Mediterranean and Black ~eas.'~These straits were the crucial connection between Russia and its western Allies, and their access to raw material in the Balkans. On the other hand, the Ottomans' truncated communications system was a disaster which msaicted the provisioning of supplies and troops to the war fronts on the periphery of the empire.
The most valuable Ottoman contribution to the war effort was the remarkable defense of the Dardaneiles at Gallipoli in eariy 1915 by General Liman von Sanders and his chief of staff, Mustafa Kemal. The defending Turkish and Arab ûvops under their command not only held their ground against the Entente amies, but ultimately forced the invaders to withdraw in January 1916. Iraqi Yasin al-Ifashirni had commanded an Iraqi division in Syna untii discovery of subversive Axab nationalist activity caused its tramfer to Gallipoli. An Oaoman loyalist who also served on the Caucasian and Palestinian fronts: al-tfashimi was decorated with the Cross of Victory by German Emperor Wrlbeh II? Less spectacular were the catastrophe in the Caucasus against the Russians Ied by Enver and the assadt on the Suez Canal against the British Ied by combined German and Turkish forces; both these theatres of war were handicapped by supply and problerns of communication. The Sixth Amy Corps on the Mesopotamian front under German Generai von der Golz presented the Entente with its second major defeat by the Ottomans.
The war in Mesopotamia began in late 19 14 with the ianding of British-Indian forces at Fao and their occupation of Basra with littie or no Ottoman re~istance.~~At the battle of Shaiba on the Tigris just north of Basra, indigenous Arab tribes fought with the Ottoman army. After the British victory, however, the now hostile Arab tribesmen silently allowed the northward passage of the invading British tro~ps.'~From that tirne fonvard. the local tribes abandoned the retreating Ottomans who had ouüm their supplies and foilowed in the annies' wake Iooting and robbing the fallen. This is not to Say that Mesoporamians were not arnong the permanent troops in the Ottoman army. There were Arab regiments of loyal Iraqi Arab and Kurdish officers and regdar soldiery. Meanwhile, the British pushed northward to engage the enerny und Ctestiphon where they were forced to retreat southwards.
The battie for Kut al-Amara in 19 15- 16 was a measure of British rnilitary error and judgement in the early months of the war on the Mesopotamian front against a strong Ottoman army. Officered by Arab officen who were products of the military academies of Istanbul, the Ottomans were commanded by Gennan General von der Goltz of the Mesopotamian Sixth Corps headquartered in Baghdad. It was a major defeat for the British, both militarily and moraliy. Despite the retaking of Kut the following year, the high cost of victory in men, equipment, and prestige piayed a crucial role in future British policy in Mesopotamia.
Important factors in the eventual routing of the Ottoman army were the transfer of seasoned Indian Muslim troops, unable to stand the rigoun of the European clirnate, from the Western front to ~esopotamia~'and Enver Pasha's decision to transfer the Sixth Amiy towards A~tolia~~Baghdad was fidly taken by the British-Indian expeditionary force in
March 1917. and, a. that tirne. Generai Stanley Maude. the British commander in chief. proclaimed Britain's intention of rewarding its liberated inhabitants with self-govemment83
The id1 of Baghdad &er centuries of Muslim rule was a tragedy to most Muslims. although the reactions of the Sunnis and Shi'is in Mesopotamia were conflicting. In April 1917, the British-sponsored Arab Bulletin in Cairo reported that the Sunnis genuinely bemoaned the Oaoman defeat aud the loss of Baghdad to an infidel powertS while the Shi'a were porûayed as delighted that the Sunni government had fallen and now foresaw ,pater reiigious, economic. and political freedoms for the ~hi'a?
D. G. Hogarth of the Arab Bulletin remindeci his readers that the Shi'a have no desire for "unity in Islam." nor do they have "craviog for temporal dominion" which motivates the Sunnis; it maftered liüie if Baghdad was under Christian government or not. as long as Shi'ism was ~n.irn~eded.8~This view conflicted with the stated desire of the Shi'i Persian rnu$ahidin of Mesopotamia for "îempral dominion" if ody in an Islamic state and, as they had cleariy indicated by their continued involvement in the politics of both Persia and Mesoptamia. the mm.tahidin's readiness to assume temporal power.
Within weeks of the original onslaught of the war, Islam's highest authority in Istanbul, the SheiWt-al-Islam , issued a fahua proclairning a jihad against the Allies; a tactic used by the Ottomans to gain the participation of their Muslim s~bjects.'~When the call for a jiM agauist tbe infidei was made in the mosques of Mesopotamia, the British feared its effed on the Indian Muslims who made up the main body of thur troops. While the Germans, hoping for a mass desertion, translated the proclamation into Arabic and
Urdu and dropped leafiets on the western front where indian Mush tmops were also deployed.' British fears pmved groundless, as did Gemian hopes. The jihad had litde dfect on the Muslim faimin a war where the infidel was both dyand adversary alike. Exploited by the Turks and harassed by the British. Mesoptamians concentrated on daily acts of suMval and aüempted to avoid direct involvement in the contlict which
engulfed them. However, isolated as they were from the outside world. they were. nonetbeless. captives of the war's progress and of its outcome. Most Mesopotamians
remainecl largely apathetic to the war, yet some did play a deresisting or collaborating with the ultimate victors.
Warti me Resistance and Accormciation in Mesopotamia
From the outset of the First Wodd War, the Musiim attitude towards the invasion of
Mesopotamia took different forms of collaboration and resistance. Only those w ho stood to gain from the Bntish presence supponed it; thai is. certain Sunni and Shi'i notables. shaikhs, and urban baoking, mercantile, and professional interests. Yet indicatiors of resistance prior to the invasion can also be found in those self same interests. For example. Baghdadi merchants resisted a foreign aansprtation monopoly of 1909 and Basra notables
and shaikhs similariy resi-d an exploitation of staîe land and conml of river navigation in
1913F9 Their success was due to emerging protonationalist sentiment in defense of Mesopotamian soverei gnty .
During the initial stages of the British invasiou, tenifieci Arab inhabitants of Basra collaborated with the Bntish and local shaikhs offered tûeir service^.^ How ever. local
response in other regions was wholly dependent on tbe vested interests of the merchants
and landlords and the @cuiar religious aniliation of the ulrmia and tribes. Reeva Simon estimates thac between 11.000 and 18.000 Arabs tribesmen, Shi'i and Sumi, fought with the Ottoman forces during the Fvst Wodd ~ar.~'
Of the Sunni Arab officers with the Oaoman Sixth Army Corps in Mesopotamia who were captured or sumndered to the British many volunteenxi to fight for Amb independence with the British-sponsored Arab revolt of the Hijazis against the On~i-.
The success of this revolt was in direct con- to the fdure of the cail for a Jhd against the British and its Mes by the caliph in Istanbul. 92 The disintegration of the Ottoman Empire has been direcdy attributed to the negative response of the Muslim faithful and to the nationalist aspirations of the Arab cevolt. Aside from these Arab officers and men who fought in the Arab revolt in the Hijaz, the Arabs in the Ottoman army who fought in such battles as Shaiba and Kut al-Amara remained loyal to the Ottoman cause.
Loyalty to the caliph influenced many Sunni Arabs to favour Ottoman rule in Mesopotamia as it did Kurds, dthough the northem districts witnessed linle of the actual fighting und the last year of the war. However as Sunni Muslims. the Kurds of Mesopotamia were among the most loyal of troops in the Ottoman Army during World War 1, just as they were loyal to the pan-[slamicist Abdulhamid II and his Harnidiye regiments. Having discouraged their separatist activity after the counter-revolution of 1909. the Young Turk regirne used the opposite strategy in 1914, encouraging Kurdish nationalist activity within the empire, to gain their loyalty once agaim9) In fact, Sunni Kurds were arnong the few who responded eagerly to the jihad against the Entente in 19 14, resisting the infidels as Loyal Muslims and Ottoman subjects. Their religious fervour was used to dvantage by the Ottomans against Christian populations in the Caucasus.
Most resistance to the British prior to and during the war came from the Shi'i Persianmujtahidin in Najaf and Karbala who feared their power would lessen under British r~le.~''Much more preferable to these mujtahidut were the Ottomans -and the Germans- who would allow the former status quo in the Arab provinces to continue. while they, the leaders, concentrated on creating an environment capable of supporting an Islamic state in a Mesopotamia of the future.
The hostility of the Shi'i priesthood to British designs in Mesopotamia never altered. It began in the eariy nineteenth century with British interference in the distribution of Shi'i charitable hinds from Oudh in British India. The Shi'i mujtahidin. were most vulnerable in the area of charitable funds. These funds. amounting to untold thousands of pounds sterling, symbolized the political power of the Shi'i clergy, their independence and their prestige. It became clear that the chantable income and the political power of the mujrahidm would be more secure under Ottoman rule. In 1912, the British Resident in Baghdad decided to designate the distributors of the fund, thereby resaicting Shi'i direct control. Hostility escalated when the Bntish atternpted to create a Tobacco monopoly in Persia, a parochial concem of the leading mujtahid of Shi'ism in Mesopotamia. And again, when European penetration of Peaian and Libya threatened the Muslirn faithhil. the Shi'i clergy issued religious decrees, fatwas. and instituted a jihad m~vement.'~
When the cdcarne from the Shi'i holy cities for volunteers to fight the infidel invasion, it was the Sh'i clergy who led them. Arnong their leaders were Shaykh al-
S hari' a Isfahani, Mahdi al-Khalisi, Muhammad Sa' id Habbubi, Mustafa &Kas hani, Mahdi al-Haydari, and Muhsin al-~akim.~~Though it has ken said that Shi'i urban merchants took no part in the resistance against the British, the grandfather of Jafar Abu Timrnan. an
Iraqi Shi'i naùonaiist during the monarchic period, was an exception. A wealthy Shi'i merchant of Baghdad with a long memory, he had suffered fmancially with the advent of the British steamship in the nineteenth cent~~l-y~'ruid was deterrnined to fight further British expansionism. Abu Tirnman, the elder, spent his remaihg fortune maintaining a group of
Shi'i volunteen in the Ottoman Amy throughout the war.
Long-suffering Shi'i residents of Najaf, in contrast, forcefully evicted Turkish troops fiom their city in April 19 15, afier months of king exploited by them. Tribal groups who then controlled the ciq were forced to surrender to the British in 19 17? But the British were no more tolerated by the Najafis than the Turks and resistance organizations were formed to liberate the city from British control. The League of Islamic Awakening,
Jimyat al Nahda al Islamiya, was among the most zealous; its membenhip included clencs. wnters, landlords, and mbal shaikhs. League members assassinated the British political officer, Captain Marshall, in March 19 18 hoping to generate a rebeilion among the Iocal tribe~?~The tribal rebeUion did not materialize however, and those involved in the assassination of the British officer were executed by the British.
The Ottomans used religion as a wartime tactic in their attempt to uni@ Muslirns against their enemies. They were successful to a limited degree in Mesopotamia but only with those traditionaüy loyal to the symbol of Mush authority, the caliph in Istanbul. When the war ended d evidence of Ottoman authority disappeared and British rnilitary occupation prevailed.'OOYet few Mesopotamians gave their loyalty to the victors. Ottoman rule at its worse was. afier dl, Muslirn de and much preferred to that of the infidel. Resistance had rnany faces of loyalty for the multi-religious. multiethnic Mesopotamians who had a long history of political domination.
Mesopotamia harboured pre-Mamic civilizations whose history and culture established the foundation of a unique Iraqi identity. The seventh cenhuy Arab conquest of the country fdy established its Islamic conîîgpration. Whde the Sh'a becme an important mùiority in the land, their dismist of Sunni dominance contributed to their alienation fiom political power. Once in power, the Sunni Arab was relucîant to share with the Arab Shi'a whose control by non-lraqis legitimized their exclusion. It becarne inherent in the Sunnis of Iraq to consider only themselves privileged to rule. By the late nineteenth century, an Ottoman statesman was instrumental in introducing refonns in Iraq which prepared the people for the advent of nationalism. The sum of hqi progress towards emancipation began with Midhat Pasha and Sultan Abdulhiunid, gathering force with the Young Turks and gaining hirther mornentum with the British after the First Wodd War. The age of conqueroe having passed. many Shi'a and Sunnis responded to a growing nationaiist consciousness directed against impenalist Britain, the last conqueror. ' Ismail Rozi al-Faruqi and David E. Sopha eds.. Historicril Atlas of Religions of the Worid (New York: Macmillan. 1974)' p. 7. ' Ibid., p. 8. John Bagot Glubb. and Times of Muhm (London: Hodder and Stoughton Limited. 1970). p. 143 & p. 357.
'' Academic Arnerican Encyclopedia, 1980 ed., S.V. "Mesopotamia" Zarrinkub. Abd al-Husain. 'The Arab Conquest of lran and its Aftermath." in The Cambridge History of b,vol. 4, Tehuas ArabCambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1975). 'The taking of Hira and the pillage of the Arab-inhabited mas on the banks of the Euphrates M only just been completed when Abu Bakr's orden reached Khalid. to decamp with his myto Syria." P. 8. %. V. Bodey, The Messeneer: The Life of Mohammed (New York: Doubleday & Company, [nc.. 1946). Abdullah bin Rawaha is named as emissary to Persia. P. 280. See also. W. Montgomery Watt. Muhammad: Prowhet and Statesrnan (London: Oxford University Press. 196 1 ) The &ab Christian Shayban tribe defeated Persian uoops prier to 632 AD; Muhammad probably had alliances with these border tribes. Pp. 216-218. Gaston Wiet, Baehdad: Metro~oIisof the Abbasid Cali~hate(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 1971). 'The conquenng Arabs, constituting the actual nation. had decided views of superiority over the natives. who retained their way of life without king molested and who were cared for. since it was they who paid most of the taxes." P. 5. Originally. they were offered conversion. tribute. or the sword. Bernard Lewis. The Arabs in History, 6th. ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1993), pp. 54-56.
Y George Jordac, The Voice of Human Justice (Iran: Ansariyan Publications. 1990). p.504-06. See also. H. A. R. Gibb, "Ali b. Abi Talib," (London: Luzac & Co.. 1960). pp. 38 1-386.
'O Zarrinkub, "Arab Conquest of Iran," p. xxii. See also. Lewis. The Arabs in Histoy. Tax-paying non- Muslims were necessary to support Muslirns in power, so conversion of the Persians came Iater. Pp. 71- 72.
" Albert Hotirani, A History of the Arab Peo~les (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 199 l), pp. 209-213. See aiso. Phebe Mm,The Modem History of lraq (Boulder: Westview Press. 1985), pp. 17- 18.
" Yitzhak Nakash, The Shi'ah of Iraq (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994). Satàvids and Qajars claimed "the Shah should be the sole protector of Shi'i interests in Iraq. at the core of whch were the shnne cities of ai-Najaf. Karbala. Kazimayn, and Samarra." P. 14. l3 Robert W. Olson, The Siesof Mosul & Ottoman-Pe~anRelation: 17 18- 1743 (Bloomington: indiana University miblications. 1975). Nadir Shah wanted the Shi'i Ja' fari school of law accepted into Orthodoxy as a fifth sect; Shi'i and Sunni ulerna meeting at Hilla in 1743 did not "resolve doctrinal ciifferences." P. 185. See, Steven H. Longrigg, Four Centuries of Modem iaq (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1925). p. 147. '' Nakash. of tgg. From 1722 to 1763 Persian dama arriveci in Iraq in considerable numbers due to the Sunni-Afghan capture of Isfahan: Nadir Shah's atternpt at Sunni-Shi'i reconcitiation. and the appropriation of religious endowments supporting the Shi'i clergy in Persia. P. 15. '' Marr, Modem History of Irq, p. 7. l6 Robert Olson. The Emer~enceof Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheikh Sa'id Rebellion: 1880-1925. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1989). Shaikh übaydallah referred to the independence of whole of Kurdistan and a Kurdish nation in 1880. P. 2. See also. Sa'ad Jawad, Iraq and Kurdish Ouestion: 1958- 1970. (London: Ithaca Press, 198 1), p. 4. l7 Hanna Batatu. The Old Social Classes, pp. 236-38. ''David Fromkin. A Peace to End Al1 Peace, p. 28. '* James L. Gelvin, 'The League of Nations and the Question of National Identity in the Fertile Crescent" World Affairs 158 (1995), p. 35. Bernard Lewis. The Emereence of Modem Turkev (London: Oxford University Press. 1975). p. 368. '' Marr, Modem Historv of b,p 7. See dso Nakash, Shiah of hq, p. 255. --1 Longrigg, Four Centuries. The literacy rate was one half percent in 1 850 & five percent in 1900. P. 7 1.
'3 Steven Helmsley Longrigg, Iraq: 1900 to 1950: A Political. Social. and Economic History (London: Oxford University Press. 1953). p. 34. 37. Mm. Modem Historv. As applied to Iraq, the refom was intended as a lure to induce the tribes to seule and the shaikhs to develop a vested interest in the presewation of the existing political order. P. 24. Batatu, Old Social Classes, pp. 13. 41. See also. Hanna Batatu. "Iraq's Underground Shia Movements: Characteristics, Cause and Prospects." The Middle East Journal 35 ( 198 1). Here Bafâtu contends that after conversion the tribes were govemed by tribai custom rather than the Shariah or Shia law. P. 585.
I6 Nakash, -of, p. 269.
" Lewis. Emergence of Modem Turkey, In the Balkans, Micihat Pasha brought law and order. inuoduced ri new hierarchy. opened schools. orphanages, industries. roads. bridges. wateways. and a newspaper. He "...increased the provincial revenue fiom 26.000 to 300.000 purses." P. 390. See dso. Zeine N. Zeine. Arab-Turkish Relations and the Emergence of hrab Nationalism (Beirut: Khayat's. 1958). p. 25. '' Longrigg, Four Centuries
" Doreen Wdner, Land and Poverrv in the Middle East (London: Royal lnstitute of International Affairs. 1948)- p. 16. See &o. Peter Sluglett & Marion Farouk-Sluglett. 'The Application of the 1858 Land Code in Greater Syria: Some Prelirninary Obsewations," in bnd Tenure in the Middle East and North Afnca, ed. by Tarif Khalidi (Beirut: Amencan University of Beirut, 1984). p. 418. See dso. Batatu, Old Social Classes, p. 78. Roderic H. Davison, 'The Advent of the Principle of Representation in the Govemment of the Ottoman Empire," in Beginnings of Modernizati~nin the Middle Etist, ed. by William R. Polk and Richard L. chambers (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. f 968)- pp. 103. 107.
" Ahmad Feroz. The YouTurks: The Cornittee of Union and Pro~essin Turkish Politics 1908 - 1914 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), p.29. See also, Lewis, Emergencc of Modem Turkey, AWulhamid [I's regime contributeci to the educational reform and expansion in Istanbul and the provinces. P. 177.
3' EIie Kedourie, Arabic Political Memoirs and Other Studies (London: Frank Cass, 1974). p. 124-25. 33 Roderic H. Davison, me?: A Short Historv (Cambridge: The Eothen Press. 1988), p. 95. Evans Lewin, The German Road to the East (London: William Heinemann. 19 16), pp. 85-89. See aiso. Philip W. Ireland, 1(New York: Russell & Russell, 1970). p. 39; and Charles Issawi. & Fertile Crescent: 1800-19 14 (New York: Oxford University Press. 1988). Kuwait was vetoed as a Berlin-Baghdad Railway terminus. due the potential danger to Bombay's proximity. P. 259.
'5 Zeine. Arab Turkish Relations. As Zeine States "it was inconceivable to the vast rnajority of Muslim Ambs not to support the Cdiphate because support of the Caliphate was support of IsIam." P. 54. Abdulhamid II desired to enhance his role of sultan-caiiph and promote mu-westemism.
3" Nakash, Shiah of m. Nakash considers Selim Deringil's findings of conversion to Shi'ism ris king mainly in the 1890's and early 1900s. Pp. 4 1-42. j7 Selim Deringil, 'The Struggie Against Shi'isrn in Hamidian Iraq: A Study in Ottoman Counter- Propaganda," Die Welt des Isb30 (1990): p. 49. Nikk Keddie, ReliPion and Rebellion: The Tobacco Protest of 1 89 1- 1 892 (London: Frank Cass. 1966). p. 69. Ibid., p. 90. See also, Nakash, Shiah of Irq, p. 2 10. Keddie, Rewon and Re$ellion, p. 95.
" Ibid., p. 72. '''Zeine, Arab-Turkish Reiations, p. 54. See dso, Davison, Turkev: A Short History, p. 94. "'Ahmad. Young Turks, p. 170.
Reeva Simon, ha Between the Two World Wars: The Creation and Im~lernentationof a Nationalist Ideoloa (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986). p. 10. a Longrigg, Iraq. 1900 to 1950, p. 39.
.'7 Emest Edmonston Ramsaur Jr.. The Youn~Turks: Relude to the Revolution of 1908 (New York: Russell & Russell, 1970), p. 1 16. JX Lewin, Cjerman p. 14 1. .''Davison, Turkev: a Short History, p. 105.
50 Houmir History of the Arab Peo~les,p. 3 14. Batatu. Old Social Classa. In Jdy 1923, four hundred Iraqis sent a petition to the cdiph in Istanbul appeding to be delivered from infidels and King Faisal. P. 323.
5' 5' Mm.History of Iraq, p. 27.
53 Kedourie. Arab Political Memoirs, pp. 124132. " Batatu. Old Social Cw.Batm lists Sayyids Isa Jamil and Najm-id-Din Haidan as having been rejected or ousted by the CUP in Baghdad. Pp. 170, 17 1.
55 Ireland, Iraci: A Studv in Political Deveio~ment,pp. 227-28. See also, Howard Morley Sachar. The Emer~ence- of the Middle East: 19 14-1924 (London: Penguin Press, 1970). Sharif Husain cited the Young Turks "... irreligiousness." P. 130. '"ine, && Tu-, p. 72. Nakash, Shiah in m, p. 54. Ahmad. Young Turks, The author cites 2000 1st.. 2nd.. and 3rd. class rnujtahids living in &Najaf and Wala in 1902-03. Pp. 23, 207. See also Nakrtsh, in Nakash also notes that Iraq's Persian colony, which numbered 80,000 in 19 19 enjoyed the pnvileged status of foreign subjects. Pp. 17. 250.
59 Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, Historv of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkev, Vol. 2. Rf Rvl in (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p. 282. M Marr, Mwstowof &. 'The impetus of Arab nationalism was the 1st. and rnost significant. contribution of the Young Turks to Iraq." P. 28. " Batatu, OId Social Classes, pp. 275-82. See aiso, Mahrnud Haddad, "Iraq Be fore World War 1: A Case Of Anti-European Arab Ottomanism." in The Orieins of Arab Nationalism ed. by Rashid Khalidi. et al. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1991). It was opposed by 10 out of 60 ;\rab deputies. among thern Shawkat Pasha of Diwaniyya, Ahmad Pasha al-Zuhayr of Basra, & Khudr Lutfr of Dayr al-Zur. Pp. 123-28. See also, Ahmad Shawkat Pasha and General von der GoIz who opposed it were accdof planning the Cornmittee of Union and Progress overthrow. Pp. 56-57.
" Batatu, OId Social Classes, The author discusses the project as king that of the Allegemeine Judische Kolonisations-Organisation and an riutonornous Jewish state in Mesopotamia. Pp. 286-89. Haddad, ''lraq before World War 1." pp. 13 1- 132. " Lewin. Geman Road to East, p. 71. See also, Haddad, "Iraq before World War 1," p. 133. Haddad, "Iraq Before World War 1," pp. 133- 134. " The Ottoman Arab Fraternity in Paris, which later became the Arab Youth Society. al-Fritat, in Beirut - the Decentralization Society in Cairo - and the Literary Club in Baghdad. Bidwd, plun d&'id. Egyptian Aziz Ali al-Misri and Algerian Salim al-kaTirifounded ai-Ahd: Nuri as-Sa'id, Mar ai-Askari, and Taha al-Hashimi of Baghdad were founding members. P. 17. See also, Eliezer Tauber, The Emer~enceof the Arab Movements of World War 1 (London: Frank Cass and Co.. Ltd.. 1993). Ali Jawdat al-Ayyubi. and Jamil al-Midfa'i of Mosul were dso founding members. P. 7. * Phebe Mm, "Yasin al-Hashimi: The Rise and Fall of a Nationalist" (Ph. D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1966), p. 55.
'O Shaw, Historv of the Ottoman Empire, p. 3 10.
" Marr, "Yain al-Hashid." In 19 13, the Young Turks did make concessions to Arab identity. Arabic was language in primary schools and Arabs received more local appointrnents and governorships; but too late to "...stem the tide of Arab nationalisrn." P. 422. " Issawi, The Fertile Crescen?. Rivai European shipping lines in the Gulf from 1890-tg10 were British lndia Steam Navigation Co., the French Messagerie Maritimes. the Russian Steamship and Commercial Co.. the German Hambourg-Amerika Line. the Austrian Lloyd and the Ottoman Harnidiyeh Line arnongst others. P. 259. See dso, Shaw, H'istorv of Ottoman Ern~ire,p. 3 14. Stuart A. Cohen, Policv*. in Mes- 1903- 19 14 (London: Ithaca Press. 1976). p. 263. See also, William R. Polk, Th e Arab World Todav (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, I980), p. 90. 74 Davison. Turkey A short History, p. 115. See dso, Ulrich Tmmpener. Gemauy and the Ottoman Em~ire:19 14- 19 18 (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1968). p. 369.
75 Enver Bey was a potgeneral. for his troops took temble losses against the Russians. After the war. he organized a pan-Turanian movement in Samarkand, Central Asia: he was killed leading a pan-Turanian brigade against the BOIShevi ks.
'6 Peter Graf Kielmansegg, 9%(Fmkfurt am Main: -4kadamische Verlags-gesellschafk Athenaion, 1975). "Die Deutsche Interesse an diesem Raum war. als der +grosse Konflict sich im Sommer 19 14 abzeichnete weiter gewachsen: einmal wegen der Bedeutung der DardaneIlen fur die Isolierung Russlands. zum andern, weil man hoffte, der Einfluss &r Sultans auf der Moharnmad- anischer Volker sei gross genug urn mit seiner Hilfe die Kolonidreiche Englands und Frankreich in Ummhe sturzen zu konnen." P. 102. See dso. Bernadotte E. Schmitt and Harold C. Vedeler. The World in the Crucible: 1914-1919 (New York: Harper and Row. 1984), p. 15. Schmitt, -. Thewoefully thin communications of the Turkish military organization possessed no unbroken rail link from Anatolia CO Syria and central Mesopotamia. since the Anatolia- Baghdad railway had not finished its tunnels through the mountains." P. 102. See also, Trumpener. Gemnv and the Ottoman Empire, p. 8. '' Mm. "Yasin al-Hashimi," pp. 70-71. See dso, Simon. Iraq Between Two World Wars, p. 67.
'9 Ibid., Ali Jawdat ai-Ayyubi surrendered at Basra. P. 423. " Some of the Arab uibes offered their services to the British (& the Turks) for a price. but the British M orders not to engage the indigenous tribes as they had an unsavory and untmstworthy reputation. '' Kielmansegg, m.p. 98. '' Schmidt, World in the Crucible. After Kut was retaken. Maude banled retreating Turks weakened by the loss of the 6th Amy Corps to the Persian front who pursued Enver's vision of an Islamic empire. P. 63. '' Ibid. 'The British ...issued an appeai for collaboration with the British 'liberators'. holding out vaguely the prospect of independence. self-government and Arab union or federation." The proclamation belonged to Britain's overail policy of exploiung in political warfare the discontent of the Arabs. P. 164.
RL Elie Kedourie, Eneland and the Middle East: The Desnuction of the Ottoman Empire. 19 13-1921 (London: Bowes and Bowes. 19%), p. 23C. Ibid., p. 230. Ibid.. pp. 230-3 1. bid. The impact of Baghdad's defeat in March 1917 was felt throughout the Islamic world. "delivering a final crushing blow to the faltering Holy War conducted since November 19 14." Pp. 1 63- 165. " Trumpener, German~and Ottoman Em~ire,p. 1 17. n9 See this chapter, pages 21 and 22.
'O Hennas J. Bergman, "The Diplornatic Missionary: John Van Ess in Iraq." The Muslim World 72 ( 1982). Van Ess, an Arnerican rnissionary who operated the Boys' School of High Hope at Basra. quoted an Arab Shaikh with 12,000 anned tribesmen who, in 19 14, demanded the equivalent of $200,000 to fight with the British; they had aiready been offered $125,000 by the Turks. The British refused. P. 183- 184. Simon, Iraci- Between Two Wars, p. 46.
Y2 Shaw, Historv of the Ottoman Em~ireand Modem Turkev, p. 3 10.
93 Jawad, Irasthe KwwOuestion, p.5. * Cohen, British Policv in Mesouotamia, in September 19 14, the rnujtahids rvere wamed thac urtless they stopped their political acùvities against the British, their funds from the Oudh Beqm would c-. P. 1O.
95 Nakasb Shiah in @, p. 57.
Bamtu. Uld Social Classe& p. 294. *~akash,Shiah of kq, p. 20. See also. Batam Old Socid Classq, p. 9; and Arnold T. Wilson. Lovalties: M~mtamia1914 1917 andon: Oxford University Press, t 930). The Turks were aiso omed from Karbala Hillah and Kufah by the Shi'i inhabitants. P. 72.
99 Tauber, Amb Movements in Wald War L Najaf uibal families rebeiied agahst the British in 19 18, who laid siege to the city, ody for it to be relieved by the intercession of the supreme Shi'i mujrnhid, Muhammad Kasim Yd,upon sumader of the assassins. P. 3 1-32 See also, bngrigg, Iraa: 1- 1950, The minder of the afficer was *an opeaing move of a Gemorganized progamme for a series of such crimes." P. 95. "One of the -test postwar controversia over the disposition of an Onoman province took place at the Lausanne COIlfimnce of 1923 over Mosul. The Ottoman army was amdly in command of the city of Mosul when the armistice of Mudros rvas signed in 19 18, rherefore, the Onornan surrender to the British mywas after the fact. Mosui was occupied by the British four days after the armistice was si- CHAPTERTWO
OCCUPATIONAND MANDATE 1918 - 1921
After victory had ken achieved at Baghdad in 19 17. there wzs Little doubt that
Britain would fil1 the power vacuum in Iraq following four hundred years of Ottoman rule.' However. active resistance to the post war Bntish occupation reflected the Iraqi fear of British permanence. There were those who concurred with British mie, in particuiar Sunni
Arab notables and shaikhs. but there were others, especiaily Shi'i dam. who were opposed to an infidei overlordship. The Iraqis who made the Paris Peace Conference their battleground for Arab independence acknowledged the necessity of short-term Western assistance in the initiai stages of Iraqi self-government. Yet when independence was denied them at the San Remo conference in favour of a British mandate under the auspices of the League of Nations. the battleground becarne Iraq.
The protection of its economic and strategic interests in the Middle East had ken an immediate concem of the British govemment after the armistice of 1918. To a Britain depleted by a war which had cost so much in British lives and resources, the protection of its oil interests in Persia. the as yet undeveloped oil potential in Mosul, the irnperial air roure, and the sea approaches to Bntish India were of vital importance. By 19 19, the cost of the occupation of Iraq had risen to 2,700,000 pounds sterling per month.' causing domestic pressure to weigh heavily on Britain's maintainhg its overseas cornrnitments. Ai the same tirne, expansionisr designs of emerging nationalist regirnes in Turkey and Iran, as weii as those of the Bolshevik state, made the British presence in Iraq strategically imperative. The key to protecting British economic and strategic interests was an haqi mandate which wiis vehemently opposed by both Sumi and Shi'i haqi nationaiists. Active resistance to British expansionism in what was then Mesopotamia was evident corn die nim of the cenhuy; therefore. not surprisingly, it continued afrer the war's end. Out of the Ottoman defeat, the British. French. and Americans made grandiose dedarations favouring emancipation of the former Ottoman possessions. Under the guise of the Oceupied Enemy Temtory Administration, the British brought order out of the chaos that war had caused and assumed direct conûol of the country, much to the chagrin of nationalist elements. Resistance to British authority in Iraq became a major dynamic of the postwar era and throughout the mandate.
Sir Percy Cox, the pre-war British resident in the Persian Gulf and chief political oficer from 1914-1918, undertook that authority in the postwar era. He was known and respected by many Iraqis for his understanding of Arabs and the Middle East in general.
However, Con was temporarily posted to Persia and his deputy. Colonel Arnold Wilson, replaced him as acting civil commissioner. Trained in India, Wilson identified with al1 the imperialistic vimies of men who had controiled British India for centuries. Intrinsically, he was an outspoken advocate of British direct rule in Iraq, believing Arabs incapable of self- pvemment He refused the repatrïation of experienced iraqi ex-army oficen now empioyed by the Syrian Arab govemment, among whom were commanding officers with at least one holding the rank of general.' Wilson was, for whatever motive. a major factor influencing continued British direct dein Iraq and rebellion against such de.
Though Colonel Wilson created efficient govenunent with Muslirn Indian civil servants and law and order with a Musiirn Indian police force, he created considerable hostility towards the British presence. He osiracized the local ems. foimer Iraqi members of the Oaoman civii semce, creabllig unemployment. He collected more taxes than any previous govemment, thereby increasing govemment revenue but provoking the urban and shaikhly landowners? Shi'i m$ahidin and tribal shaikhs became incmingly apprehensive about the diniinution of their powers under British de. Aside from Bntain's miiitaq might, its mie was irnpressive by providing a stable and durable govenunent 39 which was, nonetheless, never popular with the tribes of Iraq nor with the Shi'a.
Conversely. Sunni notables and shaikhs. having habiniaily Lived in the shadow of the incumbent power for centuries, became the bulwark of the British administration.
In an attempt to demonstrate a seerningly pro-British majority. discourage a growing nationaiist trend, and ascenain the political will of the Iraqi people. Colonel Wilson proposed a postwar plebiscite. Only particular strata of Iraqi society, for example. uifluential urban elite or pro-British tribal shaikhs. participated in the B ritish-controlled plebiscite: however, the British govemment would be infonned of the Iraqi preference on such questions as the future boundaries. ruler. and govemment of an hqi state.'
The designated boundaries of hqfrom Mosul in the north to the Persian Gulf in the south were unanimously agreed upon. The choice of ruler ran the gamut of a son of the Sharif of Mecca to the Englishman Cox to 'an Iraqi for the Iraq", the most frequently mentioned of whom was Sayyid Talib al-Nagib of Basra. From Karbala carne a petition demanding an Islamic govemrnent have a representative clencd council to assure its adherence to Islamic Iaw which bore the signature of the supreme Sh'i Persian rnujtahid. Mirza Muhammad Taqi ~hirazi.~
One of the most important petitions subrnitted during the plebiscire delineated the choices of the people of Baghdad who manifested a desire for an end to sectarian conflict and for the unity of Shi'a and Sunnis within the above mentioned national borders of an
Iraqi state. Daîed January 1919, the petiûon also demanded an Arab constitutional monarchy within an Islamic nation. This was a manifestation of [raqi nationalisrn long before the onslaught of postwar Arab nationalism. It read:
We, the representatives of the Shi'ites and Sunnis, residents of Baghdad and suburbs, inasmuch as we are an Islamic nation, desire that the regions extending from north of Mosul tilI the Persian gulf shail be one state, Arab, at whose head shaU be a Mush Arab king, one of the sons of our lord, Sharif Husayn. He shali be subject to a national legislative council, whose seat shall be in the capital of Iraq, Baghdad. ' The piebiscite did not elicit the expected response in favour of British de: rather it affmed the Iraqis' desire for independence. Sunnis and Shi'is of Baghdad would prefer to unite, to govem, to be subject to a monarch and the laws of Islam. After centuries of disunity and subordination to alien conquerors, this was a momentous decision. Many prominent Shi'i and Sunni signatories of the Baghdad petition. including Shaikh Sa'id al- Naqshabandi, Iafar Abu Timrnan. and Ali al-Bazirgan. later played significant roles in the modem state of Iraq and attempted to rnake the words of their petition a reality. Yet the words of the Sunni Nagib of Baghdad, reflecting Iraq's traditional role. foreshadowed the future of the Iraqi state.
The English "have conquered this country, they have expended their werilth. and they have watered the soi1 with their blood. The blood of Englishrnen. of Austraiians. of Canadians. Muslims frorn India and idoiaters has drienckd the dust of Iraq... Other conquerors have overwhelmed ùiis country. As it fefl to them so it has falIen to the English ...And when 1 am sked what is my opinion as to the continuance of British rule, 1 reply I am the subject of the victor."
The piebiscite brought to the fore the desires of Iraqis relative to British dein Iraq and the effect of their support or opposition of Britain itself. This was not the result Colonel Wilson expected from his proposal -a proposai better left unproposed sowing as it did the hope of selfdetermination and the seed of nationalist revolt. Shi'i Arabs. making up fifty-five percent of the population, were opposed to deby the British. therefore Britain's interests would of necessity suffer under a Shi'i-dominated Islamic government. Conversely, the Sunni Arabs, an Iraqi rninonty who had enjoyed centuries of social and political dominance under the Sunni Ottomans, by catering to British interests could expect to retain that dominance. However, insofar as the British were concemed, it was obvious that the emancipation of the country was in direct opposition io the interests of imperial
Britain. In fact, at the peace conference in Paris the victors were in the throes of discussing spheres of influence in the Middle East and the advisability of mandatory tutelage in Lieu of immediate independence. Nationalism in Paris and Damascus
In its tirne, the First World War was the most cataclysmic event known to man in terms of the humanity it absorbed, the destruction it wrought, and the transformation of society forged in its aftermath. What endured was the classic dynamic of conflict: to the victors go the spoils. They were the reapers of the harvest and nowhere was the harvest greater than in the Middle East.
in January 19 19, at the peace conference in Paris. Aiiied statesmen prepared to dispose of the Ottoman Empire arnid an atmosphere at once militarist and imperialist, yet with an aura of regret. To the gathered representative delegations of former Ottomans. the
Anglo-French Declaration of November 19 18 offered freedom and self-govemment.' An earlier announcement by the Amencan President. Woodrow Wilson, assured the emancipation of those fomerly under Ottoman rule.lo Amid the plethora of secret agreements and documents however, there emerged insrnountable barriers to the independence of the Ottoman Empire's former citizens.' '
Amir Faisal ibn Husain ai-Hashim of the Hijaz, headed the Arab delegation as the representative of his father, the Sharif of Mecca. and of Anb nationalist daims to independence. Faisal came to Versailles to redeem a secret pledge given by the British to the Sharif in rem for Arab allegiance during the war. The Arab delegates were Amir
Faisal, Rusnim Haidar, Fa'iz al-Ghusayn, Awni Abd al-Hadi. Jamd Mardan, Ahmad ai- Qadri, and Tahsin al-Qadri of al-Fatat and the Iraqi, Nuri al-Sa'id of al-~hd." Faisd seemingly spoke for al1 Arabs, despite reports that Ibn Saud showed no interest in an Arab nation nor did Iraqis offer support for his father as king of the "Arab nation".13 Arab nationalists claimed independence within a single united Arab nation as defined in the
Damascus Protocol of 19 15 signed by Arab nationalists from Damascus and ~a~hdad."
Rumours and signs of British duplicity did not dispel Arab hopes although inevitably, the power of Europe prevailed. AUied statesmen established a League of Nations as keeper of world pea~e.'~and readied a mandatory system of tutelage for nascent
States until they were able to rule independentiy in theû own right. ln April 1920. the mandates were announced. France was assigned the mandate for Syna and Lebanon. in recognition of its nineteenth century claim as protector of Chnstians in the Levant. Britain was assigned the mandates for Palestine and Iraq, guardians of the imperhl route to
India? Throughout the Middle East. Arab aspirations for independence and trust in the West were laid waste."
Yet, not only the hungenng of Europe, but other factors directly linked to the local context aiso weighed in the decision to htindependence. Iraq, as a new state. would have had littie chance of sumival before the rising tide of Kemalist forces to the north and the acquisitiveness of Ibn Saud in the southwest.18 Nor couid a weak state survive the internai threat of the Shi'i demand for an Islarnic state or the Kurds' repeated bid for an independent Kurdistan.
Arabs felt betrayed by the decision of the AUies nonetheless. Yet Kedourie denies the alleged betrayal, insofar as the Sharif of Mecca was perfectly aware of British obligations to the French in Syria. A fact corroborated by D. R. Hogarth of the wanime Arab Bureau in Cairo, and by Mohammed Rashid Rida, the nationalist ideologue.19 The
Husain-McMahon correspondence of 19 16 clearly stipulated the French and British spheres of influence in Syna Mesopotamia and Palestine. David Frornkin speculates that President Wilson's noble ta& had "pitched the world's hopes too high:" that the promises of the West allowed subject peoples to believe in their ernan~i~ation.'~This. Arabs saw as a beuayal. while the decision to impose a mandate was influenced b the acquisitiveness of the AUies and the divisions and conflicting goals of the Arabs.
In early 1919, Faisal's memorandum to the Council of Ten stated his belief that nationai status for a single Arab nation was premature, the Hijaz and Syna should be granted independence. while Iraq should not rather it should receive the assistance of a foreign power. " Aware of the machinations of the European powers. Faisal used them to further his own ambitions. Overtures were made to him at Versailles by the French and the
Zionists. The Amir had Listened to them Arab unity was not achieved at the peace conferences, however, arnong its Arab delegates and members of the Arab government in
Damascus were those who would further the aims of Arabism and independence for iraq.
The Arab Revolt of June 19 16. led by the charismatic Arnir Faisal ibn al-Hashirni.
is important to this study only insofar as it affects Iraq. Many of its participants becarne Ieading political figures in hq; its leader became a king whose adherence to Arab nationalism influenced many generations of Iraqis. As for the motivation for the Arab revott against the Ottomans, sufice it to Say that the Sharif of Mecm was aware of the Young Turks' intention to remove him from off~ce.'~The Sharif s agent approached the British in Cako, and they saw mutual advantage in an alliance. They signed a secret agreement
prornising the Sharif a single united Arab nation -with certain limitations- and the Bntish support of the Arabs in their war effort. As eariy as 19 15, the British reco,gnized the possibilities in cultivating the forces of Arab naiionalism as a political tool with the potentiai for shaping the Middle East of the future.'" Consequently, a yemlia Arab army was
formed of Bedouin tribesmen and regular troops, former Ottoman junior officers who had ken captured or had defected, and a full complement of Bntish liaison officers and rnilitary
advisors. While the significance of the military contribution of the Arab Revolt to the Ailied cause has ken questioned by historians, afier the cal1 for a jihad against the Allies. the
psychological impact of the revoit by the Sharif of Mecca -the holy city of islam and birthplace of the Prophet- inflicted ùnmeasurable hmon the Ottoman war effort.''
According to T. E. Lawrence, at the forefront of every Sharifian guerda raid and
railroad blast dong the road to Damascus were Sunni Iraqis, Arab nationalists to the core.
AU served their apprenticeship at the Harbiye, in the officers corps of the Ottoman Army and as members of al-Ahd. Among them were Jafar Pasha Askari, Nuri Pasha Said, Shukri Pasha Ayyubi, Jamil Pasha Midfa'i, and Mawlud Pasha Mukhiis -the filst regdar
44 officer to join Faisal and former commander of the Turkish cavw at Shaiba "who. for rampant nationalism, had been twice degraded in the Turkish am~y."~~Al1 becarne membea of the postwar Arab government in Syria and many fùture prime rninisters of Iraq.
At the end of the war, the Arab govemment in Damascus was installed under the aegis of the British commander in chef in the Levant, General Allenby . Headed by the
Sharifian Amir Faisal, the govemment's real power actually Iay with the Arab nationaiist society, ai-Fatat, whose rnemben were in the majority Syrian civilians. Officer members of al-Ahd also held important posts. such as the Iraqi Generai of the Sharifian army, Jafar &Askari, the govemor of Aleppo. Iraqi Generai Yasin ai-Hashimi of the Ottoman army in
Palestine becarne chief of staff of the new Arab army in Syria. However, in 19 19. local nationaiists opted for independent statu for Syria; rather than an Arab nation unithg ai! the former Ottoman Arab provinces. Consequently, Syria declared its comection with the Hijaz religious not political," aithough Faisal remained its head of state Ai-Ahd split into two regionai factions, al-Ahd al-Suri and al-Ahd al-lraqi. each faction focusing on local independence. Iraqis resigned their positions in the Arab government in Syria and many attempted to remto Iraq. However. the British in Baghdad, intent on direct nile. refùsed the repatriation of Iraqis whose nationalist tendencies could pose a problem to that nile.
As talk of mandates for the Arab provinces progressed at the peace conference in Paris, preparation for armed opposition against British rule began in the northem reaches of Iraq. in December 19 19, local tribes and Iraqi officea of ai-Ahd al-Iraqi in Syria attacked an isolated British post in the town of Dayr al-Zur on the Syria-Iraq border." When the mandates were announced in April 1920, a rash of anti-British agitation broke out in the major cities of the Middle East. A second attack on a British ganison at Tal Afar in May 1920 was led by an lraqi Sharifian officer, Jamil al-Midfa'i, with a band of four hundred local tribe~rnen.'~These raids marked the beginning of armed resistance against the British Occupation. Iraqi National Resis tance
To the British in Baghdad. intent upon creating an adjunct to Britain's colonial empire, a border incident on the Upper Euphrates by discontented Iraqi Arab officers in
Syna and local tribesmen was of Littie importance. By arbiuarily sening the Syrian-Iraqi border on the Kan river, and dividing the domain of a Iocai tribe, the map makers in
London and Park gave the vibesmen reason to attack the outpost at Dayr al-Zur. However. the Ahd ai-Iraqi attack on Tal Afar, a town some tifty kilometers from iMosul. was an incident which did concem Baghdad. British officen were killed and the town of Td Afar was taken over by Ahd ai-Inqi revolutionaries. When the Iraqis marched on Mosul itself," the British authorities in Baghdad sent ground troops and air power against them whereupon the revolutionaries retreated to Syrian territory
Yet stili the British were not overly disturbed by these signs of northern discontent.
They had successfully quelled a rebeihon in northeast Iraq which had threatened British hegemony in Iraqi Kurdistan. Sayyid Mahmud Barzinji, a Kurdish shaikh who had created an independent govemment in Sulaimiyya had also been defeated by British air power."
Having been promised a state of their own by the peacemakers in Europe. the Kurds were not involved in the Iraqi national struggle nor in the hqi attempt to create an independent govemment ; they were, however, growing impatient for self-government.
Whiie plans were king laid to strip Britain of its power in Iraq, the Briùsh were creating efficient government, collecting taxes and making costly long-term improvements to irrigation facilities. These improvements distressed the tribal shaikhs who were losing profits in the process. If Iraqis protested they were threatened with fines, the right of assembly, or other restrictions. The status quo was becoming increasingly galling to the tribes who were at no time enamoured with efficient government, nor paying taxes, nor forced labour. In the meantime. the tribes were being stirred up by nationalists and the Shi'i clergy against continuance of British rule. Notwithstanding the turmoil in the north, the British who had arrived in the region in the seventeenth century were not lacking in supporters in the countryside. They had recruited Sunni tribal shaikhs during the great war, particularly those of the Dulaim. the Anaiza, and the Shammar in the northwest, as weil as Shi'i tribes in the south. including the Bani as an." Under the British occupation, these shaikhs were given positions of authority, land. and British subsidies; in retum. they gave loyalty to the British on demand and collected taxes from their uibe~rnen.'~The British also found support for their administration arnong urban Sunni religious notables, Jewish banking interests. and merchants of aü persuasions. Of the urban elements who refùsed to support the British presence, the most troublesome were young unemployed Arab bureaucrats whose positions had been usurped by hdian Muslims employed by the British adminis~ation.'~Other disruptive forces were local members of al-Ahd and the newly-founded nationalist societies in Iraq such as the Baghdad-based Independence Guard, Haras al-Istiqlal.
Founded directly after the British plebiscite of L919. membership in Haras al-
Istiqlal was open to both Muslirn sects although it was predominantly Shi'a. The "piding nucleus" of Haras %Istiqlal (and the centrai cornmittee of the Inqi nationalist movement). was Aref Hilmiat al-Alusi. Naji Shawkat, Mal Baban, ALi al-Bazirgan and Mar Abu ~imman." The society was dedicated to the complete withdrawal of the British from iraq and the independence of a united nation-state incorporating the former Ottoman provinces of Baghdad, Basra, and ~osul.~~In direct contrast to attitudes during the war. Haras contacted the Hashimites in the Hijaz and in Syria declaring their desire for an Inqi monarchy headed by a son of the Sharif. Shi'i nationalist societies formed at this hme intent on founding a reiigiouslycontrolled klamic tat te,^' are discussed in chapter three.
Meanwhile, al-Ahd al-hqi nationalists in Syria made contact with the Shi'i Penian clergy in kaq, known to be anti-British, in an effort to mutudy work for Inqi independence. Many membea of al-Ahd were Sunni Ottoman ex-officers who had served in the Sharifian army. however, it's acknowledged leader, Yasin al-Hashimi, had rernained
47 an Ottoman loyalist as well as an Arab nationalist. It was he who instigated the first nationalist attacks in northem Iraq before king imprisoned by the British during this period, ostensibly for subversive activities . Yet as early as July 1919. an iraqi ex-
Sharifian in Syria, Jafar al-Askari, was in correspondence with the chef Shi' i mujtahid,
Muhammad Taqi al-~hirazi.)' As a result, an unusual alliance was forged between the Sunni Arab nationalists in Syria and Iraq and Shi'i Penian mujtahidin in the holy cities whose goal was not a united Arab nation but an Islamic state in Iraq controlled by the Shi'i clergy. Moreover, differences within nationalist ranks arose between those in favour of Bntish assistance in a future Iraqi state, rnembers of al-Ahd al-haqi, and those who were diarnetricaliy opposed to British aid, rnembers of Haras al-Istiqlal.
An alliance had also ken formed between the Haras nationalists and the Shr' i rnujtahidin who, in tum, were allied with many of the Shi'i shaikhs of the southem Iraq.
The liaison between the nationalists in Baghdad, the mujtahidin in the Shi'i holy cities. and the shaikhs of the Middle Euphrates tribes was Jafar Abu Tirnrnan. a Shi'i merchant from the Baghdadi suburb of Kadhirnain who was dedicated to the reconciliation of the Shi'is and Sunnis and the eliminaûon of Bntish power in Iraq. According to Batatu. Abu Timrnan's enduring significance derives from his role in the great iraqi revolt and to huii belongs "...the credit for bringing, at that historical juncture. Shi'is and Sunnis t~gether."~~
Haras al-Istiqlal members were the political backbone of the Iraqi nationalist revolt .
As the peace conferences drew to a close and the mandates were announced, Arab resentment enipted. Arabs found expression for their bittemess and sense of betrayal in riots in Damascus and lerusalem, but none were as effective, as those in Baghdad. Whde the British public. in response to the violent reactions to the mandate. demanded immediate withdrawal of British forces, the lessening of its military cornmitments, the reducing of its expenditures abroad, and increasing post-war rehabilitation at home. However, the Bntish did not withdraw from Iraq nor their daim to the coveted oiifields of ~osul.''~ Al-Thawra al-Iraqiyya al-Kubra
After the announcement of the British mandate of Iraq in 1920, the resentment of Iiaqi Arabs resulted in a nationalist' revolt. There are two views conceming the onset of
revolution: first, that it was planned; and second, that it was spontaneous. The latter view
holds that a Shi'i tribal shaikh was imprisoned for failure to pay taxes. and was rescued by members of his tribe." The former view holds that these events were planned by nationalist activists in conjunction wiih tribal leaders and the clergy." In support of this view is a fatwa issued by the chef mujtdid Muhammad Taqi al8hirazi, legitirnating the revolt.'"
Actuaüy, the document insisted that peacefùi measures should first be atternpted. after which defensive measures could be taken.
Whether the revolt was planned or spontaneous, there are differences of opinion as to the reai cause of rebeilion in Iraq in 1920 and each theory deserves mention. Firstly.
many historians are of the opinion that the Iraqi revolt was a direct response to the announcement of the British mandate when ail hope for independence was extinguished." While it is me that anti-British demonstrations broke out at that time. these particular
dernonstrations were only indirectly involved in the revolt. They were part of a chain reaction in the Fertile Crescent to the San Remo announcement of the mandates.
Secondly, Batatu cl- that the Iraqi revolt was a "shakhs' affair". as opposed to
a nationalist movement, and that the shaikhs were used by a few "insignifkant nationaiists" for their own ends."' Undoubtedly, the main concems of the rebellious shaikhs were land
acquisition , enforced taxation, and conscripted labour for irrigation maintenance. Yet significant numbers of al-Ahd and Haras nationalists are recorded as having ken involved in the revoit conducting political meetings and instailing provisional govemments. as noted below. Ireland argues similarly that these shaikhs' had a legitimate grievance against the autocracy of cenain pro-British shaikhs whose authority and landownership were protected by the British; however. neither the shaikhs who rebelled. nor their tribesmen. saw any advantage in the abstract concept of nati~nalism.'~
Longrigg attributes the revolt to the Indianization of the British Administration. as well as tribal grievances, religious influence, and nationalist pr~paganda.'~From 19 14 to 1920 Iraq was controlled by a British India policy. employing Indian civil servants. indian policemen, Indian laws. and Indian currency." Tribal policy was pattemed on the
Sandeman system used in India. giving the shaikh authority and largesse as long as he maintained fealty to Britain. Iraqis feared the settlement of Muslim colonists from India in the Tigris and Euphrates valley. Their fears were not groundless. The introduction of the Indian rupee demonstrated to every hqi Britain's intention to recreate Bntish India in Iraq.
As the memoirs of the British irrigation expert Sir William Willcocks show. colonization was, if not planned, at least predi~ted.'~
In contrast, Philby points to the Ahd al-Iraqi attack of May 1920 on the garrison of Ta1 Afar as the signal for the rev01t.'~ This amck in which Bntish officers were killed by local tribesmen was, Philby asserts, a continuation of the Arab nationalist agenda in northem Iraq agauist British rule. Moreover, because the British in Baghdad did not retaliate after the first attack, the commander of the British forces, General Haldane, alleges that an uprising became a certainty5' As important to the mid-Euphrates tribes' was the lack of numencal strength of the British standing army. Yet no concrete evidence exists coordinating these attacks in the northwest with the revolt in the south despite propaganda and the alliance between al-Ahd al-hqi and the Shi'i mujtahidin.
While all of the above factors were present, they did not preclude local nationalist activity arousing the tribes, nor did they exclude international involvement in the revolt.
Outside influence was plentiful and varied, especially in the Shi'i holy cities. FO; example, after the war the Arnericans demanded an "open door" policy in the Middle East. including oil exploration in Iraq. Amencan interest in the potential oilfields of Mosd led to the involvement of the Standard Oil Company and that of the American consul in Baghdad in
subsidizing the in~ur~ents.~'Within this Ume frame, the Bolsheviks were involved in a
uoika which included Turks and iraqi Shi'is. A representative of the Kernalists. Major
Ajaimi, was known to have been in Najaf and Karbala, and the Bolsheviks to have specificaiiy mentioned the name of Mina Muhammad Rida, the son of the supreme Shi'i mujtahid, Mohamrnad Taqi Shirazi, as working for their cause.53
Whatever sparked the revolt the tribesmen did release their shaikh from the British jail at Rumaitha and, as if by prearranged signal , the whole southem region was enflamed. Led by Shi' i shaikhs of the Middle Euphrates tribes for the most part, attacks on British fortifications created havoc in the countryside and dong the railroads. These tribes were by far the most powerful force among the Iraqis. The revolt spread to other tribes and
gradually extended to Kirkuk and Khaniquin. Chaos reigned for four months during which time the holy cities of Najaf and Karbala were taken over by the revolutionaries.
British miiitaty forces had been reduced to a bare minimum and lone Bntish officen were guarding isolated outp~sts.~'Before reinforcements could arrive rnany of these
officers were kiiled. Large nurnbers of troops from India and Persia were employed at great
cost to bring order to the country; however, it was Britain's use of air power whch was
decisive in bringing peace to the countryside. For aii intents and purposes, the revolt was suppressed by Ocrober 1920 although there were pockets of Iraqi resistance util February 1921. The outcome of the revolt, in the long tem, despite arguments to the contrary, was
the modification of Britain' s implemen tation of mandatory govemment in hq.
Fighting in the revolt involved tribes from a wide macovering most of southem Iraq and north of Baghdad as far as Mosul. Many hqi tribes distanced themselves from the conflict; notably the pro-British mbes of the upper Euphrates and the lower Tigris. The
ethnic minonties were not involved; nor the Sunni Kurds whose nationalist rebeilion of
19 19 had ended in defeat, but Shi'i Kurds near the Persian frontier joined the revolt briefly. While the countryside bediately south and north of Baghdad was imrnened in rebellion. the cities did not take part in the acnial physicd conflict. aithough iraqi nationalists continued the political and religious revolution within the urban areas.
Initial victories resulted in the Iraqi occupation of Ba'quba in the vicinity of Samarra and Mandaii near the lranian frontier where nationalist politicians set up provisionai govemments which were symbolic, though short-lived? Once the British rein forcements arrived, overwhelming odds made short shrift of the revolt's nationalist govemments. The
Shi'i tribes fought most of the banles and suffered most of the losses. ln fact. Colonel Lawrence, who advocated a free and independent Iraq, reported in the British press that some ten thousand tribesmen were killed or wounded? By late August, many religious and nationalist leaders of the revolt had been arrested, deported, or executed. Haras al-
Istiqlal was abandoned: its prominent members including Sayy id Muhammad al-S adr. Jafar Abu Timman. Aii al-Bazirgan, Yusuf ai-Suwaidi, and Shaikh al-Daud sought refùge from the British in Mecca and Syria, only reniming after the general amnesty of 1921. Despite the Mure of the revolt, Iraqis consider the combined efforts of Inqi tribal. religious, and nationalist elements5' in the Inqi national struggle for independence to be the most enduring characteristics of the great Iraqi revolt, al-Thmvra al-iraqiyya al-Kubra. Less enduring but of greater significance was the phenomenon of Islarnic unity.
Role of Religion in the Mandate Reaction
Sectarian conflict which rent the early Musiim comrnunity and which was a primary cause of the wars between the Persians and Ottomans was responsible for four centuries of Sunni Arab dominance and Shi'i Arab subordination under the Ottomans. The result was a deeply-imbedded social, economic, and political disunity between the two communities.
From the late nineteenth century, the Shi'i Penian mujtahidin in Najaf, Karbala, Samarra. and Kadhimain became increasing powerful and with their growing political successes in the twentieth century came their determination to establish a Shi'i polity in southem Iraq? The Shi'i Arab cornrnunity, dorninaîed as it was by its religious hierarchy, was open to political mobilization by its clergy. 59 Conversely, Sunni Arabs. who are not obliged to follow the ,guidance of an mdividual religious leader as are the Shi' a. were not similady infiuenced in their political opinions. The religious cornmitment of the Sunni Arab community was more liberal and individudistic and, since most Sunnis were concentrated in urban areas, they were more politicdy aware. Beginning with a 1920 fanva issued by the chief mujtahid. Muhammad Taqi al-S hirazi. warning the Shi' i community that service in the infidel administration was con- to Islamic law, political mobilization of the Shi'i masses against British debecame a potent force in the hands of the Shi'i clergy
As previously noted, the Shi'i Persian rnujtahidin in the hoiy cities and the Arab nationalists of al-Ahd formed an alliance, while Iraqi nationalists of Haras al-Istiqlal and the Shi' i clergy formed a similar agreement. 6' During the following summer. both Arab and Iraqi nationalist propagandists flourished in the streets of Baghdad whilst the rebellious tribes raged throughout the countryside. At this time. the most active were not the nationalists of al-Ahd ai-Iraqi but those of Haras al-Istiqlal. So passionate was the nationalist cornmitment that Sunnis and Shi'a, traditional sectarian adversaries. laid aide their age-old enmity and made comrnon cause in the cities in their desire for independence.
Joint religious ceremonies in the mosques of Baghdad becarne political forums after the services whereupon nationalists of Ham al-Istiqlal and al-Ahd spoke before the crowds. Underground groups were formed and worked to stir up the people against foreign rule. Nationalist propaganda found fertile soi1 among the unemployed ex-Ottoman bureaucrats, the eflendis of Baghdad whose resentment of the Bntish was evident and volatile. 62 AS it had with the Shi'i Persian clergy of Najaf and Karbala who had long fought Bntish expansion in Muslim lands. Each group looked to its own self-interest, yet was willing to compromise. Thousands attended the religious ceremonies and political meetings which continued throughout the month of Ramadan. Sunni celebrations of Muhammad's birthday. the mawlud. and the Shi'i commemoration of Husain's death, the ta '&a. were held simultaneously in the mosques and in the homes of Shi'i and Sunni ~aghdadis.~~There was great significance in these joint seMces. The anniversary of the birth of the Prophet was celebrated by all Muslims. However, the laying aside of the enmity of the Shi' a and the Sunni in the ta'czja was said
CO be unprecedented in the Muslim world.
Themes of unity ernphasized at these joint ceremonies and meetings were important to Iraqi nati~nalisrn.~'After centuries of conflict, the unification of Sunni and Shi'a was of momentous importance to the future of Iraq. In a letter to Mar Abu Timman. the chef Shi'i mujtahid expressed his joy with the "bnity of the nation": however, he reminded the Inqi nationalist that the damu were still concemed with the rights of the people.n5 Refemng, no doubt, to the Shi3 majority. While certain Sunni religious leaders were known to disapprove of the combined services, this did nothing t~ dispel the emotional bond formed between the Sunni and Shivaat this time.
Although the sectarian reconciliation was occurred primarily in Baghdad and
Kadhirnain, it augured well for the future of Iraq. Hama Batatu emphasizes that the tender bond created between Sunnis and Shi'is was an irnplicit promise of the graduai g~owthof an Iraqi nationalist community6' Yet this bond dissolved once the Inqi revolt was suppressed by the British. Moreover. the leadhg Shi'i mujtahidin (who were Persian) were found unacceptable as representatives of the rebel Shi'i tribesmen. Theû non-lnqi status was used, and would be used again in the funire. to curtail their influence with the Shi'i Arabs of Iraq. Nevertheless, Shi'i and Sunni opposition to the British mandate did not cease. nor did religious participation in the nationalist cause.
Diarchal Government in Baghdad
Dernonstrations during the months prior to the hqi revolt brought the British government face to face with the ~npopul~tyof British direct mie in Iraq. Reeva Simon promotes the traditional argument of British indecisiveness in the various depamnents of the Bntish govemment over Iraq's status which inciuded: ( 1) the support of British
Arabists in Cairo for Arab nationalist govemment; (2) and. the advocacy of British impenalists in India for direct ~ule.~~The most fervent advocate of direct rule was Colonel Wilson in Baghdad. Conversely, Colonel Lawrence mounted a campaign against direct dein the British newspapers while favouring an Arab nationaiist government for Iraq.
Citing the financial burden to the nation caused by the British occupation of Iraq, the Bntish press and public demanded overseas comrnitments be temiinated or dnsticdly reduced. According to Kedourîe, a change of policy became evident when the alternative to the British withdrawal was estabtishing an indigenous government in Baghdad; this change. however, was due more to the campaign in the British press than to pressures arising out of the hqi revoit? In fact, before the revolt got under way. a British House of Comrnons debate in early June 1920 laid the goundwork for a poiicy change, an hb government, and a treaty relationship between Britain and Iraq.69 London arranged for the
replacement of the postwar British administration in Iraq by an interim Anb govemment to
be implernented by Sir Percy Cox upon his remto Baghdad in October 1920.
According to Article 22 of the Covenant of the League Nations, the British mandate of Iraq was effective until such tirne as lraq fuifilled designated prerequisites for self- govemrnent and attained membership in the League of ~ations." These prerequisites were: a constituent assembly, a constitution. a parliament. democratic elections. and defined borders. The responsibility of preparing the hqi leaders for self-government and realinng the Iraqi ambitions for independence lay in the hands of the British high commissioner of hq, as representative of the mandatory power.
Upon his arriva1 in Iraq in October 1920, Sir Percy Cox issued a proclamation
advising Iraqis that a national govemment would be set up when ali hostilities cea~ed.~'in the interim, a Council of State, representative of the major cities and tribes, was instaiied. President of the Iraqi Council of Ministers was the leader of the Sunni religious comrnunity of Baghdad. Abd al-Rahman al~ailani'~;the minister of interior, Sunni Sayyid Talib al- Nagib of Basra; the minister of defense, Sunni ex-Sharifian Jafar &Askari of Baghdad: the minister of education and health, a moderate Shi'i rnujtuhid. Sayyid Muhammad Mahdi Tabataba'i: the minister of finance, the Jewish fmancier Hasqail Sassoon: and five ministers without porfolio included two Christian notables and three Shi'i tribal leaders." British advisors assigned to each minister reported directly to the high commissioner.
Although the Council of State had ali the uappings of high office. Cox acWy held the power of ultimate authoriry invested in his office by the League of Nations.
The Council was called upon to assist in the drafting of an electoral law and establishing a constituent assembly. At British insistence, it made provision for tribal representation despite the obvious inexperience of the shaikhs in the political system." The Council also arranged for the repatriation of Iraqis whose retum had not ken sanctioned by the former British administration. In eariy 192 1. a large contingent of Lraqi officers arrived from Syria and Turkey, including Nuri al-Sa'id. Tahsin &Askari, Tawfiq al-Suwaidi. and Naji al-~uwaidi.'' Nuri al-Sa'id. former chef of staff of the Sharifian myduring the Arab revolt, was appointed chef of staff of the newly created Iraqi amy.
While a general amnesty had been declared, notable exceptions were made against the remof certain Iraqis. Yasin al-Hashimi, Ali Jawdat al-Ayyubi. Jarnil al-Madfa'i. and
Mawlud Mukhlis of al-Ahd al-Ii-aqi in Syria who had been involved in the deaths of British officers in northem Iraq. Sayyid Muhammad &Sadr, Yusuf al-Suwaidi, Ah Al-Bazirgan. and Jafar Abu Tirnman of the defunct Haras al-Istiqlal who had been politicaiiy active in the iraqi revolt against British rule. 76
The independeni Arab state envisioned by Iraqi nationalists did not fully materialize. The petition of Baghdad, it is to be remembered, sought not only the unification of an Islamic nation fiom the Persian Gulf to Mosul, but also the Ulufication of the Shi'a and Sunni within an Arab kingdom. While the province of Mosul did become an integral part of the Iraqi state, Iraqi unity was hampered not oniy by the British and the Shi' a but by the
Sunni proclivity for Arab nationalkm which would give them advantage in a larger Arab entity. A constitutional monarchy did materialize, however. In a well-planned scenario staged by T. E. Lawrence and Winston Churchill, Britain's Colonial Secretary. a conference of Middle East experts in Cairo was arranged to decide, arnong other things. a future Iraqi govemrnent in keeping with important British priorities.
In March 192 1, the Arabists who gathered in Cairo proposed an Iraqi constitutional monarchy, an Anb govemrnent, and an army which would reduce the burden to British ta~payers.~~Meanwhile, the Nagib of Baghdad, Abd al-Rahman al-Gailani. Taiib Pasha. and Hikrnat Sulayman formed a movement advocating an Iraqi der for 1raq." Yet the proposed hqi candidates were eliminated by diplomatically applied pressure or simple coercion by the British. For exarnple, Sayyid Talib Pasha al-Nagib of Basra. an early defender of Iraqi sovereignty whose reputation was tainted by corruption and British disfavour, was an outstanding candidate who was exiled. Churchill's desire that Britain remain a strong presence in Iraq took the fom of support for a Sumi Arab king who would be amenable to British interests. One candidate , Amir Faisal of the Hijaz whose reputation as an Arab nationalist and a leader of the Arab revolt did not preclude hs susceptibiiity to British persuasion, fulfded Britain's requirements.
King Faisal 1 was the Fust Arab to ascend the throne of ancient Mesopotamia since the thixteenth century. Although an orthodox Sunni, he was acceptable to the Iraqi Sh'a because of Faisal's descent from the Prophet through his daughter Fatima and his grandson Hasan. Nonetheless, his overtures to the leading Shi'i clergy were met with suspicion. Faisal realized the danger of such an independent and highiy politicaiiy religious body within Iraq's border^^^ -a danger increasingly apparent with the formation of the Iraqi governrnent . Upon his arriva1 from Jidda in June 192 1, Faisal was also disappointed with his reception from the people of Iraq who evinced Little feeling for independence or for unity, a feeling he was determined to create."
The king was more popular with the Bedouin tribes. His thunderous welcome at
Rarnadi by the pro-British chiefs of the hilaim and Anaiza bore witness to his having spent his earfy youth in the Hijaz in the traditional manner with the Bedouin. Sluglett, however. makes the point that other than these tribal shaikhs, whose actual degiance was to British power, there were only the few educated urban Sunni elite and Sharifian offcers who were actually in favour of Faisal's rule." Indeed, his sources of support were primarily those who had served with hirn in the Hijaz and in Syria. nationalists desirous of gaining power for thernselves in an independent Iraqi state. Principal among his supporters were the Sunni Iraqi Arab officers Nuri al-Sa'id and Jafar al-Askari and the Syrian Arab Sati al-Husri from
Aleppo; the Syrian Rustam Haidar was a Shi'i Arab from ~aa1bek.x'
Shortly afier the king's arrival, the council of ministers was dissolved and an iraqi government was instaiied wherein the British high cornmissioner held effective p~wer.'~
This menage à deux was a fom of government modeled on a sirnilar diarchy introduced in
British Lndia in 1921. The key to iraqi acceptance of this arrangement was King Faisai. His nomination by the British resulted from their understanding that he would be conducive to their interests and guidance -a misplaced conception of a king who aspired not only to the leadership of an independent hqistate but of a fume united Arab nation .
Faisal believed that Iraqis, backward and iuiterate, must be ,@ded and indoctrinated in a deliberate mariner? Ismail Haqqi Baban of Baghdad, an Ottoman ex-deputy, emphasized in 19 13 that the Iraqi masses 'must be led by a suong ha~~d."'~Yet Faisal did not lead with a strong hand, rather he led with persuasion and compromise. Growing up in the Ottoman capital, he had Iearned to dissemble. to manoeuvre in a world of politics and intrigue; as a deputy in the Ottoman parliament, he had played a dual role of Ottoman loyalist and Arab nationalist? T. E. Lawrence described Faisai as "tenacious and weak"; while the French viewed him as treacherous." His willingness to compromise. once he was deprived of his throne in Syrïa, gained hirn a second throne in kaq; however. his willingness to compromise with the French and the Zionists at the peace conference gained him threats of deposition or worse from local notables and nationalists in ~yr-ia?
In choosing Faisal as king, the British introduced into iraq a strong advocate of pan-Arabism and its implied unification of Arab States. However. there were many divisions of Arab nationalism in the Middle East in the early twentieth cenniry. including levels of local, religious, and secular nationalism. iraqi nationalism, Kurdish nationalism. and Arab nationalism were dl present in Iraq in the 1920s. and although their ultimate goals differed al1 shared the same desire for independence and the end of British influence.
Despite promises of independence, the Arabs had returned from the peace conferences with the knowledge that once more they would be subject to the political domination of a foreign power. Moreover, although the revolt in Iraq whch followed the announcement of the mandate was the result of a compiex of factors. a primary cause was. without doubt, the devastating feeling of betrayal and resentment at the fdure of Britain to honour its cornmitment to the Arabs. The healing of centuries-old conflicts which unified Arab Muslims at this time, though historic. was fleeting. Once the revoit was suppressed by the British, the Sunnis and the Shi'is no longer presented a united front and they fell into the age-old abyss of anirnosity and dienation. The constitutional rnonarchy imposed on lraqis was guided by infidel mandatory tutelage und prerequisites to independence, the estabiishing of democratic institutions and geographical unity dernanded by a coterie of European statesmen, were fidfilled. Furthemore, once the ahen Sunni monarch was enthroned as king of Iraq and his cornrades-in-amis, the Sharifians, were installed in positions of power, there was little hope of a united Iraq emerging out of the ashes of what had been the Ottoman Empire. Resentment of foreign domination continued as Iraqi nationalists sought to extricate the country from an unbidden bondage. ' Emest Main. 'riiQ- hmMandate to Indeeence (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 1935). David Lloyd George, Prime Minisrer of Great Britain. stated in the British House of Commons before the end of the war that Bntain would be assigned the mandate for Iraq and Mosul. P. 7 1. Daniel Silverfarb, lt(New York: Oxford University Press. 1986). p. 7. Aaron S. Klieman. of Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970). Col. Wilson viewed Iraq as a future British protectorate, beiieving Iraqis should be "...given as much freedom and self-government as is in accordance with 'good and safe government."' P. 53. See also Mm, "Yasin al-Hashimi." Iraqi Generds were more or less "running the whole of the military and civil administration in Syria." Yet Wilson advised al-Hashimi. al-Said. and al-Suwaidi they could only hope to work on municipal councils in Iraq. P. 433. See also. Fromkin. A Peace to End al1 Peace, p. 326, ' Eliezer Tauber, The Formation of Modem Swia and Iraq (Essex. England: Frank Cas and Co.. Ltd.. 1995). p. 185. Nakash, Shiah of Iraq, No unified opinion emerged. what the plebiscite showed was a wiltingness of many Shi'is and Sunnis to tolerate British rule if it memt irnproved economic conditions. P. 62. "id. Shirazi issued a fanva forbidding Shi'i from asking for other than a Muslim der. P. 65. ' Tauber, Fonn&on of Modem Svria and Trag, p. 279. "edourie, Endand and the Middle East, p. 184. The text of the Anglo-French Declaration of November 7. 1918 was known to most politicized kabs.
'O Hans Kohn, The Age of Nationalism. Wilson wrote in the 1901 Atlantic Monthlv: 'The East is to be opened up and tmsformed whether we will or no; the standards of the West are to be imposed upon i t nations and peoples which had stood still the centuries through are to be quickened. and made part of the universal world of commerce and ideas which has so steadily been a-making by the advance of European power from age to age. It is Our pamcular duty, as it has been England's. to moderate the process in the interests of liberty; to impart to the people thus driven out upon the road to change ... the free intercourse and the naturai development which shall make [hem at last equal members of the farnily of nations." P. 13 1.
" In particular the Husain-McMahon correspondence, Balfour Declaration, and Sykes-Picot Agreement; these wartime secret agreements divided up the Ottoman Empire between the British, French, and Russians.
" Tauber. Formation of Syia and Erag, p. 116. l3 A. T. Wilson, Lovaitiss. "Sharif Husain carried no weight in Mesopotarnia; his .pretensions were ridiculed ...his claims to speak on behalf of Sunni and Shi'iah were vehemently denied." P. 305.
" The Darnascus Protocol of 19 15 delineated the borders of the Arab nation and was signed by Syrian and hqiArab nationalists among whom was the iraqi Ottoman General Yasin al-Hashimi. '' Kohn, Age of Nationalism. 'The Leaguc of Nations was created to hmess ambitious nationaiist tendencies, ruid guard the hard won peace and distribure justice." P -133. South African Jan Smuts, in favour of the mandate system, said 'The world has to be done al1 over again on a new basis and on an enormous scaie... Europe is king liquidated and the League of Nations must be the heir in the great estate." P. 162 '"rance was granted Mosul in the Sykes-Picot agreement. In rem for relinquishing these daims. France got a 25 percent share in Mosul's oil by Britain. Many deds were stnick during the mandate negotiations. in which the spoils of the Ottoman Empire were divided by the great powers.
- - . *- !' Kohn, Reffections on Modem mov: The Histonan and Human Responsibility (Connecticut: Greenwood Press Publishers. 1963). "From the Arab point of view. the policy foliowed by the West after both World War 1 and World War II seemed to have the purpose of wedcening, dividing, and humiliating the Arabs and driving them against their will. into an attitude of hostiiity towards the West." P. 200. ''Mrs. Steuart Erskine. Kin~Faisai of & (London: Hutchison & Co. Publishers. Ltd.. 1933). p. t 1. l9 Kedoune. çh atham House Version* p. 375. See dso. Sachar. Ex,p. 128. Fromkin. A PwdAl1 Peace, p. 399.
" Tauber. Formation Of Modem Svria and Iraq. In 19 19. Amir Faisal describeci Iraq thus "aside from three 'civilized' towns, Iraq consisted of immense 'wastes' oniy inhabited by semi-settied nornads. therefore. representatives of its Arab government should be selected for the present not elected." And further. 'The world wishes to exploit Mesopotarnia rapidIy, and we therefore believe that the system of govemment there wili have to be buttressed by the men and matenal resources of a great foreign power." Pp. 1 16.329. " Erskine. Kine Faisal, p 99. Tauber, Fmergence of Ar& Movem. The Ottomans' intention to remove the Sharif and his sons was corroborated by .4mir Faisal who made plans with Arab nationalists in Dmascus for an Arab revolt. P. 62. Schmitt. World in the Crucible, p. 160. Fromkin, A Peace to End Al1 Peace. The author States history was rewritten by the British in 19 1 8. The British Public were told the Hejaz army was enormous when actually it was only a few thousands. P. 327.
26 T. E. Lawrence, Revolt in the Desen (London: Jonathan Cape. 1927). p. 35.
" Tauber. The Formation of Syria and Iraq, p. 330. Ibid., p. 201. See also, Longngg, Iraq: 1900 to 1950, p. 1 19. See also. Main. Iraq: From Mandate to Independence, p. 70.
29 Sachar, Emereence of the Middle East. Sunni lraqi Jamil ai-Midfa'i's attack on Tal'afar led the British refused his repatriation until 1923. P. 36. See Tauber, Formation of Svria and Inq. Al-Midfa'i organized an attack on Mosul after Tal'afar, however. the attackers were defeated by British air power. P. 336. Tauber, Formation of Modem S~riaad m. Members of a very active branch of ai-Ahd al-lraqi in Mosul were in direct contact with the Iraqi nationaiists in Syria. In an attempt to unify iraqi resistance they "'calIedupon Christians to remernber that they were from the same Semitic race as Muslims." P. 263. j' Abdulghani Jasim M. 1ma - & Iran The Years of Crisis (London: Croom Helm Ltd.. 1984). p. 13 1. Geoffrey L. Simons, Sumer to Sakiam (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd.. 1994). The Kurds were defeated &ter a bornbing by squadrons of the British Royal Air Force in the winter of 1919 - 1920. P. 179. j' Nakash. aiah of Irsig. The British were warned by the paramount shaikh of the Bani Hasan. Urnran al- Hajj Sa'dun, in May 1920 that an anti-British "propaganda offensive" was brewing and adviseci taking strong action against the ringleaders in Karbala. P. 71. j3 This was the Sandernan system, a system used by the British in India to achieve the sarne ends.
3.1 Kedourie, Eneland and the Middle East. In June 1920, a member of the British House of Commons submitted during a debate thar Arab and hdian tension waf "notorious" and that the presence of Indian uoops in Lraq was "the main cause of the political difficulties in that country today." P. 194. 3s Batatu, Qld Soc-. A nucleus of Sunni and Shi'i kabs and Sunni Kurds. P. 221. '' Tauber, *of. The proognm was to unite Iraqi communities and sects. oppose British assistance, and aid independence for m. Sayyid Muhammad al-Sadr was president; Shi'i members included Ja'far Abu Timman, Muhammad Rida al-shabibi. Muhammad Baqir al-Shabibi. Shakir Mahmud, Naji Shawkat, Sami Shawkat; Sunnis were represented by Ali al-Bazirgan. Yusuf al-Suwaidi rud Kurd Jalal Baban; Afaj, Dagharra. and Awabid tribal chiefs were also members. Imam Muhammad Taqi d- Shirazi was contacted in April 1919. Pp. 286-289.
37 Ibid. The Iraqi-Arab society (al-Jam'iyya d-lraqiyya ai-Arabiyya) was established in Karbala in 1920 rrnd headed by Mirza Mohammed Rida. the son of Imam al-Shi&. It had isfarnic ovenones and svove to set up an Islarnic Arab government in Iraq. The British claimed it was finance by Turkey. P. 29 1.
38 Ibid. Al-Ahd al-iraqi had its headqu%m in Syria. where it 'reached the peak of its activity ... with the conquest of Dayr al-Zur in the border region between Syria and Iraq.' From there they spresid propa_wd;i within Iraq, mainly in cooperauon with al-Ahd in Mosul. There was also a bmch in Baghdad. P. 363.
39 Batatu, Old Social Classes, pp. 294-95. A. J. P. Taylor. WIish History. 19 14- 1945 (London: Oxford University Press. 1965). p. 153. "' Tauber, *ofModern On June 30, 1920, Sha'lun Abu al-Jun of the Zawalin tribe. imprisoned by the British, was released by his tribesmen which was a signal for the revolt to begin. P. 307.
" Sources on the lraqi Revolt include the works cited in this study in English by Hanna Batatu. Stephen Longrigg, YiWNakash, and Eliezer Tauber. AIso, in Arabic. those of ai-Bazirgan and al-Firman.
" Nakash. Shiah of m.The fatwa was signed by Shirazi in August 1920 just before his death. P. 7 1. U Simon, Becween Two Wa.Factors leading to the revolt inciuded "local opposition to British mle incîted by San Remo, by the results of the plebiscite, and by propaganda from Syna." One hqi author. Fa'riq aI-Fir'aun. refers to the revoIt as a regional tribal insurrection against British methods while another. Ali al-Bazirgan. insists it was an anti-British nationalist revolt. P. 52. See Man. Historv of kq, p. 32.
" Batatu. The Old Social Classes, p. 1 19. * Ireland. @: A Study in Political Develo~ment,pp. 247-49. 47 Longrigg, ha: 190- 1950, pp. 1 10. 1 14. See also Slugiett. Britain in kq, p. 26; and also Mm. Modem History of Traq, p. 3 1. a Fromkin, A Peaçe to End al1 Pme. Seventy million predominantly Sunni Muslirns Iived in India and s large part of the British Indian Army and its civil service was Sunni. P. 97. '' Tauber, Formation of Svria and m. The Times of London quoted possibiy three million Indians. P. 185. Klieman, Foundations of British Policv, p. 57. . - 5' Lieut. General Sir Aylmer L. Hddane, The Insurrecmn in Mesopcrtamia. (London: W. Blackwood rud Sons, 1922). A pro-British Amarat chef of the Anizah, Fahd Beg ibn Hadhdhal, said "if you do not reoccupy Dair ai-Zaur you will have a rebellion on the Lower Euphrates within six months." P. 33. '' Fromkin. A Peace to End al1 Peace. t ) Standard OiI sent an undercover geologicd team forbidden to enter Occupied Enemy Temtory in 19 19.2) A letter, written by the Arnerican consul in Baghdad, was taken from a rebel rribesman which proved funds were king distributed through him to the rebels. Pp. 533-35.
53 Batatu, Old Social Classes. Mina Muhammad Rida was the son of the chief mujtahid. P. 1 142. " Main, From Mandate to -nq. The British reduced their military to 3.500 men deployed to guard 170.000 square miles of territory. P. 6 1. 55 Longrigg, & 1900-195Q p. 125.
56 Kedoune, EnsIand and the Middle East. T. E. Lawrence regaled the British public in the press with al1 the misdeeds of the colonial administration and cites ten thousand Arabs killed as 'sacnficed.' P. 273. See also. Ireland, Iraa: A Studv in Politicai Develo~ment,p. 273. Batatu. OId Social Cl-. The author Iists many of "Islam's nobility". the sadah. "...as being active in the Iraqi 'uprising' against the British': Muhammad as-Sadr, Hadi al-Zuwain. Alwan as-Sayyid Abbas. Muhsin Abu Tabikh, Alwan al-Yasiri, Nur al-Yasiri, and Hadi al-Mgutar." P. 166. '"akash, The Shi& of Iraq. p. 75. 59 Batatu, "lraq's Underground Movements: Charactenstics. Causes and Prospects." p. 586-587. See also. Marr. mHistorv*.Each Shi'a follows a leading Shi'i mujtahid which gives a sense of stronger leadership and cohesion to the Shi'i community than the Sunni comrnunity which does not. P. 5. Tauber. Formation of Sy-ia and b.This appeared immediately before the mandate announcement in latc April, strengthening the participation of the ulama and tribal shdchs in the nationalist movement, P. 294. See also, Slugiett. Britain in Iraq, p. 39. " Kedourie. Eneland and the Middle East. Jafar &Askari corresponded with mujtahid Muhammad Taqi al- Shirazi in July 19 19. Also, Mawlud Mukhlis sent propaganda from Dair as-Zur in as fat. as Amara Januq 1920. Pp. 187, 190. An alliance existed but there is no evidence that Sharifians actually traincd the tribes.
63 Tauber, Formation of Modem Svria and Iraq. In May, Abu Timman made contact with Shi'i iilama rind tribal shaikhs from Karbala and Najaf at Shirazi's home. Peaceful demonsmtions were to foIIow combined Sunni and Shi'a religious ceremonies. "During the next three months ceremonies of Mawlud (a Sunni rite celebrating the birth of Muhammad) and of ru':iyu (a Shi'a rite comrnemorating the dath of Husayn) were heid simultaneously in the mosques of Baghchi" Decisions to dernonsnation peacefully for independence were made. if the British refused, they would revolt P. 296. See also Marr, "Yasin al-Hashimi." pp. 51-52. Tauber, Formation of Modem Svria and Iraq. September 1920 nationalist propagan& quoced "the readiness of Arabs to die for their country"; favouring unity of the Shi'a and Sunni in a common nationalist cause, and demanding the retum of al1 Imqi politicai exiles. P. 284 " Ibid., p. 299. h4 Batatu, The Otd Social Classes, p. 23. See aiso Nakash. Uhof Irag, p. 69. '' Simon. Iraa Between Two World Wars. This had providcd Arab nationalists from hq"five years to regroup and formulate their own plan." Pp. 46, 38. See also Erskine. King Faisal. These British Arabists had been part of the wartime Arab Bureau in Egypt: a "...Political Intelligence center for al1 Arab-speaking countries within the sphere of the British high comrnissioner." P. 52. a Kedourie, mandand the Middle East. T. E. Lawrence. the Sharifians' champion in the British Press. carnpaigned against British mle in iraq and for the Arabs' right to rule there. while former Middle East 'hands' championed these Iraqis in the House of Commons and the Colonial office. Pp. 198-99.
70 Gelvin, The League of Nations." p. 55.
7' Klieman, Foundations of British Poficv, p. 61. See Tauber, *of, p. 317.
7' Hourani, &story of the Arab Peo-. The Naguibs were the head of the nobility of Sunni Islam. P. 7 1. -. 73 Longrigg. I9W 195Q p. 127. See also Kohn. History of N-sm in the p. 308. See also Marr, "Yasin al-Hashimi, pp. 97-98. '"lretand. Iraa. -- A StudsThe cococil accepted Jafar Pasha's proposal of two tribal representatives per district. P. 292.
75 Tauber, Formation of Modem Svria and Irag. The Minister of Defense Mar al-Askari's was Nuri al- Sa'id's brother-in-law and former commander of the Arab Northern hyfrom the Hijaz. P. 32 1. See also Longrigg, b:1900 - 1950. Nuri is referred to as "a brilliant officer and pre- 19 14 patriot." P. 129. '"auber. Formation of Modern Svria and Irari, p. 322-23. Longrigg, Iraq: 1900 to 1950. The agenda included the selection of a der. the treamient of the mi Kurds. the reduction of British financial burden, and the defense of lraq der the British rnilitary had withdrawn. P. 130. See also Marr. "Yasin al-Hashimi." Among the "experts" were Sir Percy Cox. Gertrude Bell, and T. E.. Lawrence. Also. Iraqis Jafar al-Askari. a Sunni Arab. and Sassoon Hasqail. a lew. P. 430.
" Ireland. b.Talib Prisha al-Nagib, an important iraqi Ottoman deputy from Basra and poli tica1 activist. fought for Arab rights from 1908-19 14. P. 305. See also Tauber. Formation of Svria and @, p. 334.
79 Nakash, The Shiah of Iraq, p. 72. The author highlights the leading role played by Shaikh al-Shari'a Isfahani in the Iraqi revoit and his subsequent Ieading role during the time of the monarchy. P. 7 1. . . '"Gerald de Gaury, Three in B&dad , (London: Hutchison. 196 1 1. p. 25. '' Sluglett. Britain in Iraq: 1914-1932, p. 68. " Mm,Modem Historv of Iraq, p. 36.
" William R. Polk. The Arab Wodd. Polk refers to this period as a school for national independence and graduation from this "schooi of mandates" was entry into the world of the international state system. p. 64. nJ Batatu. OId Social Classes. Faisal said "there is still no iraqi people but unimaginable masses of people. devoid of any patriotic idea... we want to fashion a people which we would train. educate. and refine." P. 25. '' ibid. Refemng to Iraqis. the full quote reads: "As long as government will not interfere in the private Iife of the inhabitants and concern itself with their lodging, with their food even. as long as they will not be led by force and against cheir wishes towards progress like soldiers, there will be hem neither prospetity nor civilization. They must be led by a srrong hand." P. 32 1.
X6 De Gaury, Three Kin~sin Baphdad, pp. 32-33.
" MalcoIm E. Brown. The Letters of T. E. Lawrence (London: Oxford University Press. 199 1 ), p. 349.- Tauber, Formation of Modern Swia and Iraq. 'There was talk of assassination, deposition and replacing hirn." However, a delegation went to Faisal, headed by Arnir Mahrnud al-Fa'ur and Ahmad Muraywid, and inferred that if he wanted to keep his position he must give up this peaceful policy with France and give the triks a free hand. P. 47. See also As'ad ûaghir, Mudhakirati. (Qahirah: Dar al-Qahirah lil-tiba'ah, 1953). The author, who was with the delegation, claims that Mreiwed emphasized that the "Lajmat al-Istifta"' only listen to demands of complete independence. p. 132. Chapter Three
Growth of the Iraqi National Movement
Building on pre-war patriotism and protonationaiism. the Iraqi nationalist movement emerged in the Iraqi revoit of 1920 in response to a growing nationalist sentiment. To hqi nationalists. the suuggle to end alien domination. achieve complete independence. and institute indigenous self-government in a modem lraqi srne was paramount. To Arab Nationalists, the criterion was that such a struggle >hould ultimaîely uni- self-goveming Anb States politicaily in one Arab nation. This implied a Sunni dominated state which wouid gain &ab unity few convens among the country's Shi*i kabs and Sunni Kurds. On the other hand. the Iraqi national movement went hand m hand with the stniggle for social, econornic. and political equality for aii whch nationalism implied. yet rare1 y ac hieved.
Factors which contributed to the growth of nationalism in Iraq, and which made the vision of an independent Iraqi state possible. have been previously mentioned in this study. These were: the introduction of modem methods of communication and transponation: the birth of a new chss whose education and world view were modem. influenced by European and Arab points of view: ' and the growing awareness of Iraq's hisroncal subordination to foreign powers. Though secularism was present in ail these factors. religion nevertheless played a major role. Nationalism was destined to favour some Iraqis substantially more than others, yet ail fought for emancipation from centuries of alien domination. When the govemment of Iraq was inaugurated in the autumn of 192 1. the ideology of the state had not as yet been defined: however, Iraqi nationalism kame more prominent than Arab nationalism. Nationalism in terms of level of consensus was minimal. Nationalism. both lnqi and Arab, was an elite, as opposed to a popular, movement. Notables. officiais, and officers were exposed to modem forms of nationalism in the years prior to the First World War. This, however, did not develop into a national-scale sentiment in Iraq because of the low level of communication among urban areas, and between urban and ninl areas. While urban dwellers were aware of a higher form of government and their relationship with it. nomads and rural dwellers had Little knowledge of govemment, apart from paying taxes and military conscription.
Throughout the 1920s only a very small segment of the Muslim population was involved in the nationalist movement. Politicai activists came from the educated classes. pnmarily those Sunnis and Shi'is who had ken introduced to the nationalist idea via the academic and military institutions of Istanbul or Europe. Nonetheless. having been charged with the emotionalism of postwar demands for self-determination, the masses were for independence. They refused to accept colonial stanis even though they were not endowed with a well-defined nationaiist consciousness~
Nationaiism in terms of locus of identity demands a closer questioning of the past. Which level of identity was important to the iraqi -Muslim. Arab. or Iraqi? As subjects of the Ottoman Empire for example, hqis identified with the political and religious dualism of the caliph-sultans as Muslims. "This dualism is inherent in Islamic society of which the Umma of Muhammad is the ge~."3Moreover, although under Ottoman rule [raqis were subjected to alien rule, it was still Muslirn deand, tlïerefore. acceptable. Yet, when the Ottomans' policy of secuiarization sought to diminish that Muslim identification after the deposition of the pan-Isiamicist Abdulhamid II, the Iraqis resisted.
As Arabs, and more than seventy percent of Iraqis were Arab, they resisted the attempt to rob them of their identifcation with more than a millennium of Arab culture and history during the period of "Young Turk Turanian chauvinism".' The Arabs gave expression to their Arab identity by dernanding auionomy for the &ab provinces within the empire md the reinstaternent of the &ic language in their schoois and local administration. However. it was not only Turanian chauvinism but dso Europem sxpansionism which gave nse to the protonationalist response of "Arabia for the Arabs".
The embryonic Iraqi identity which grew out of the bond created mong Arab
Muslims during the nationalist revolt against alien domination could have gemiinated and matured. had it ken hinher nourished by the nationalist eiite of the time. Iraqi identity could have endured together with an inherent Arab or Muslim identification among Sunnis and Shi'is. However. there were Iraqis who believed an Iraqi identity existed. A case in point is excerpt from an article published in Mosul in 1919: "From a reiigious.
2ueographicd. and economic viewpoint we are tied to Iraq, and the fate of Baghdad will be our frite also. We cannot live without Mosul and Baghdad because Our needs are common and our interests are rnut~ai.''~ Iraq, as we know it today, was considered one unit. historicÿlly. geographicdl y. and econornically ; in which many Iraqis were considered similarly linked.
Hourani believes a comon characteristic of the educated Arab of the 1930s was his absorption with the collective identity of his nationab In hq. Muslims made up ninety- tive percent of the population: and. the largest racial group was Arab. albeit divided dong
.;ectarian lines.' Sunni Kurds who constituted more than one fifth of Traqi Muslims svinced no desire for an hqi identity due to traditional animosity towards Aiabs and. more importantly. their strong identification with Kurdish tribes in other States. The rernaining five percent. those %lands of nations' preserved by the Face of the detsystem and the
Ottoman Empire, were neither Amb nor Muslim. Yet ethnic and religious homogeneity ÿre not neçessariiy indicators of national identity. Nor may a collective identity be presumed tiom among the disparate peoples of Iraq who shared centuries of comrnon history. evidence of which does not constitute an agreed Iraqi identity. Arab tnbes in the mid-nineteenth century accounted for more than half of the population of [raq. William Polk ascribes to the notion that the Bedouin "nations" of the Great Syrian Desen were for all practical purposes autonomous ~tates.~The Arab nomad identified with his family, clan, region and, with an interactive society until change forced on it by the West shattered it.9 Having enjoyed the benefits of primitive nationdism. the tribal collective not unnanirally refused the impositions of westemized govemment which they saw as unfavourable to the ,pater tribal interest.
The revolt of the tribes reflected their identification of govemment as an antagonist.
The nationalists of Iraq and the mujtahidin of Shi'ism, whose power was at its height in 1920, attempted to use the tribes to create their respective envisioned forrns of national identity. For one, a theocratic state based on the political power and aspirations of the Shi'i Persian clergy in Iraq, for the other, a nation-state based on Arab supremacy as envisioned by the Iraqi Arab and local nationalists whose ideological goals. though sirnilar. were different and were bound to create dissidence in govemment.
Nationalism in Iraq, within the spectrum of ideology. was rooted in a fm foundation in the religious political nationalism of Islamisrn and in the constitutionalism of
~ttomanism.'~However, when the Ottomans were defeated in World War I. Ottomanism was no longer an option. The burgeoning cause of Arab nationalism was not unknown in
Iraq, but few Iraqis supported the idea of Arab unity." During the mandate era, the most compelling ideologies in Iraq were Arab nationalism and Iraqi nationalisrn. The first. a supranational idea of the unity of .hbStates in one single nation founded on cornmon Arab bonds of language and history, and. in its original form. of Islam. The second. a local nationalism which embraced the idea of the unity of di Iraqis in one state which espoused ail its ethnic, Linguistic. racial, and religious diversities.
Though many Iraqis were determined Arabists. there were those whose local loyalties were simiiarly resolute. For a time Iraqis functioned within what Au al-Azmeh refers to as the more contemporary "parailel nationalism" of hqi and &ab, Syrian and Arab, or Egyptian and Arab nationalism without denacting one from the other." Understandably, not aU nationalists in Iraq were taken with the emotionaiism of an ideology attached to Arab renaissance. nor were others with the challenges of [raqi ~niversality.'~However from the very outset thts variance of ideology did nothing to deter
nationalists, intent as they were. fiom focusing on the independence of the hqi state and the termination of the British mandate.
h its genesis. Arab nationalism for obvious reasons attracted only hqi Sunni Arabs of the urban middle and lower middle classes. Fint. during the centuries of ûttoman domination of Iraq, the Sunni Arabs gravitated towards the cities where they were favoured by the Sunni Ottoman administration, in conuast to the Shi'i Arabs who were rnistrusted for their unorthodoxy and past loyalty to Shi'i Persia. Consequently. hqi Sunnis became more sociaily and politicdy advantaged. They achieved prominence in the Ottoman bureaucracy , the military , and the parliament. As urbanized and politicized S unnis. they were the fint to demand autonomy for the Arab provinces in Istanbul. the milieu of Arab nationalism aspirations. Obviously, the Shi'i Arabs of iraq were not drawn to an ideology where the Sunni Arab would predominate nor were Sunni Kurds drawn to the idea of an Arab nation which would subordinate the Kurdish minority."
Kohn daims that the programme of the Arab National Committee of 1905 cailed for the unification and federation of Arab States based on the renaissance of Islam and the Amb past, as did that of the Sharif of Mecca in 1916." Sirnilarly. Dawn contends that "Arabism" sought the renaissance of Islam and the Arab nation out of the pre-Islamic Arab past, the waves of the Semitic conquests, and the days of glory of the Abbasid caliphate.I6 This was a concept which influenced Arabs throughout the Middle East. The force of Turkish secularization and nationalisrn developed Arabism further, although the secularist factor inherent in nationalism itself influenced Arab nationalism in Syria and in Lebanon with its Christian Arab population more so than in Iraq. Khalidi sees Arab nationalism as 69 representative of an "expression of identity and group solidarity". exemplified by the ding elite and by the new social forces Muenced by western idead7
Whether these views were expressed as Arabism, Arab nationalism, or pan- Arabism. fundamentally the ideal and the goal were similar. They did not becorne uinuential in the postwar Fertile Crescent. Arab struggles for independence at ths tirne were struggles for local independence, and Arab political activists were, in pracîice, regionalists. According to Tauber, when the choice had to be made. "Separate national identities and separate nationalist ideas prevailed over the general Arab idea-"ls This proved me in Iraq, dthough Iraqi nationalism succeeded in part because the equation was simplified: the government was involved, the people were not.
Sluglea contends that Iraqis have ken ascribed a "greater degree of coherence and continuity within national thinking than acnially existed"; that patriotisrn, Iraqi nationdism. and pan-Arab nationalism existed for them simply as nationali~m.'~This. however. postulates an unfounded ignorance arnong politicdly aware Iraqis. adrnittedly very fe W. when acnidy ihere was Little misinterpretation. The dynamic of politics is power, and many Arab and Iraqi nationalisü sought power in the 1920s by any means. IdeoloBes were no&set in concrete. Yet that changed when independence was in sight -witness the frantic manoeuvring for power arnong the avowed Arab and Iraqi nationalisü towards the end of the mandate compared to its beginning; witness the power stniggle between the Sunni Arab king and his ministers, his comrades-in-arms and Arab nationalist colleagues, in the last days of mandatory tutelage. What can be said is that in iraq nationalism did not necessarily imply Liberty and equaiity although it did imply some degree of fraternity; the ideals of nationalism in Iraq were not coherent with those of the West.
Iraqi nationalisrn emerged out of a pauioùc response to foreign expansionisrn which would have depnved Iraqis of a country in which nationalism could grow. Iraqis proved prior to the First World War that the protection of the citizen's rights, no matter what his religion or social affiliation. and the protection of the country's sovereignty were paramount.'O Of course, these sentiments did not last. Nationalism was detected in the resistance of Iraqis in a war which was primarily a struggle between European nations for world power; and, in a revolt to oust their conquerors who attempted to legitimize their de:and later, in the tenacity of nationalist demands for independence.
When the Syrian pan-Arab ideologue and educator. Sati ai-Husri, was appointed
Director-General of Education. he was given license by an alien king commined to an Arab
nation to implant pan-Arabist ideas in the mincis and history books of the youth of Iraq. Al-
Husri spread the idea of Arab unit~,beiieving it to be the "best way of effacing regionalism"." The king, however. was more intent on nation-building. He attempted to form an Iraqi army and to forge an Iraqi identity through the integration of ail the ethc and sectarian diversities of Iraq. Though not entirely successful, what emerged in the state's infancy was Iraqi nationalism, not pan-Arabism.
Although during the fmt decades of the twentieth century the majority of Iraqis were politically unaware, arnong those who were, there were few '"pan-Arab nationalistsT in the strict sense of king in favor of merging Iraq into a larger Arab entity."" Most historians agree that the niling elite in its totality was very small. According to Tarbush.
out of fifty-nine Jiaqi rninisters who held cabinet posts berween October 1920 and October 1936. the "inner circle" of cabinet ministers nurnbered only fourteen: eleven Sunnis, two Shi'a, and one ~ew.'~Five Sunnis and one Shi'a in this elite group were Arab nationalists in Faisal's entourage; however, Iraqi nationalists outnumbered the Arabists in parliament.
Politicai Parties and Groups in the Nationalkt Movement
Irnpottant contributon to the growth of Iraqi nationalism in the early twentieth century were the members of the nationalist societies and political parties who encouraged political activity and provincial separatism. Because of its exposure to western ideas and expansionism, Basra was one of the fmt cities where clubs and societies advocating autonomy were formed and much of Iraqi protonationalism evolved. Less isolated than Basra fiom the Ottoman capital, Baghdadis and Mosulis thrived on clandestine Literary and political associations. Also, Iraqi representatives in the Ottoman parliament and officen in the ûttoman arrny were engaged in political activity in the very center of Ottoman power. Some of Iraq's earliest activists were: Talïb al-Nagib and Abduilah Bashayan of Basra: Yusuf al-Suwaidi, Kamil ai-Tabaqchali, and Abd-al-Rahman al-Haidari of Baghdad: and Abd-al-Ghani al-Nagib, Muhammad al-Fakhrim and Habib al-Ubaidi of ~osul."
The original aim of most Arab secret societies was intemal autonomy for the Arab provinces. although there were those whose aim was decentralkation or independence. Two of these Arab secret societies are relevant to this thesis. The Covenant, al- Ahd, whic h was founded in Istanbul in 19 L3 by mainly Arab army officers who were Sunni and whose original goal was local autonomy within an Ottoman federation." Also, the Young Arab
Society, Jamiyyat al-Arabiyyat al-Fatat, known latterly as al-Fatat. which was founded in
Paris in 1909 and, from the outset, was dedicated to Arab independence?
Tawfiq al-Suwaidi was Iraq's fust arnbassador to Iran in 1929 and an early Iraqi member of al-Fatat." Rustum Haidar, a founding member of al-Fatat, was an Arab delegate at Versailles in 1919 and one of King Faisal's entourage in Iraq; he was a Syrian Shi'a who became an Iraqi citizen, cabinet aster,and head of the Royal Diwan. Jafar al-
Askari, Ah Jawdat al-Ayyubi, Yasin al-Hashimi, Jamil ai-Midfa'i, and Nuri al-Sa'id were ail membea of al-Ahd who participated in the flairs of the Iraqi state.
Mer hostilities ceased, members of al-Ahd and al-Fatat assisted in forming an
Arab govemment in Syria in 19 18. Within months, Shi' i and Sunni merchants. teachers. bureaucrats, oficers, and dama '' had formed the Independence Guard, Haras al-Istiqlal, in Baghdad. This populist, nationalist society was dedicated to the Liberation of the country from aii foreign influence^.'^ Long festering opposition to British occupation involving both the Ahd and Haras al-Istiqlal., escalated into a full scale revolt in 1920. After its defeat, Haras al-Istiqlal was outiawed and its leaders were hanged, exiled. or in f~ight.~'
The Covenant, al-Ahd, whose goals became nationalistic der 19 19, was a viaduct for
Arab Nationalist aspirations of Ottoman officers and, as early as 19 13, had branches in
Mosul and ~a~hdad."Yasin al-Hashimi, Ali Jawdat al-Ayyubi, and Jamil al-Midfa'i were the founders of the Mosul branch while serving in the Ottoman amiy in the area. The members of these societies formed the nucleus of nationalist activity from 19 18- 1932.
From July 1922 kaqi politicians intent on furthering their persona1 goals forrned political parties with iittie or no agenda. Three parties with defuiite nationalist tendencies emerged. The Free or Liberty Party, Hizb al-Hm, headed by Mahmud ai-Gailani, the son of the Nagib of Baghdad, was rnonarchist. The National Party, ai-Hizb al-Watani. was an opposition party led by Shi'i nationalist Jafar Abu Timman. Its membershtp included middle merchants, nationatist inteilectuals, members of the academic, law, and literary professions, and discontented ex-Sharifian officers." The Iraqi Renaissance Party, Hizb an-Nahdha al-hqiya, headed by Shi'i Sayyid Mohammad al-Sadr and Mohammad Husain
Charchafchi, advocated, as did the National party, independence and govemment reform in educational, agricultural, irrigation, and public welfare sectoa.
in August 1922, both these Shi'i-led parties united in violent anti-British demonstrations in front of the Palace. The British high coMnissioner demanded that the govemment take action against the instigators. The parties were disbanded and their leaders exiled. The pro-monarchist Free Party, although not involved, ody lasted the term of the
Nagib of Baghdad's premiership." Ln fact, political parties seerned to stay alive only as long as their leader was in power; then they dissolved. As Tarbush correctly emphasizes, political parties were a one-man shows.3'
The Progress Party, Hizb al-Taqaddam, was formed in 1925 by Abd al-Muhsin Sa'dun who served as prime minister in four cabinets. Sa'dun was a Sunni pro-British tribal shaikh from the Muntafïq who had attended the shaikhs' coLlege in Istanbul, had been a deputy to the Ottoman parliament and an officer in the ûttoman army. The Peoples'
Party, Hizb al-Sha'ab., was the vehicle for promoting the political career of the Sunni Arab nationdist Yasin al-Hashimi whose postwar nationalist activities in Syria eamed him a seat on the opposition bench which attacked the government on treaty issues. Al-Hashirni advocated Iraqi independence and League membership, developed national administration. agriculture, economy, and education, and strengthening "the patxiotic feeling and spreading the soiidarity" among the population.)s
Al-Hashimi transferred Ioyalties briefly in 1926 when he becarne minister of finance at which time, the Peoples' Party was dissolved. During the interim. the iraqi Nationalist
Party, Hisb al-Watani al-Iraqiya the old Nationalist party had been banned but was revived again headed by Jafar Abu Timman. He and al-Hashimi combined nationalist forces which put al-Hashimi, whose cabinet had by then been defeated, back on the opposition benches.
A reformist party greatly influencing politics in the 1930s was the Jarna' at al- Ahali.
Essentiaily Iraqist, al-Ahali was formed in 1929 by Iraqi students at the American
University of ~eirut,-'~among its members in Iraq were Iafar Abu Timman, Kamil Chadirchi, and Yusuf Izz al-Din. The lraqi Covenant party was formed in 1930 by a member of the defunct secret society al-Ahd in support of Nuri al-Sa'id's govemment: it followed the pattern of most political parties and dissolved when Nuri resigned in 1932. Ali Jawdat al-Ayyubi fonned the National Unity parîy to support his govemment. While in late 1930, together with Hikmat Sulaiman, a brother of the renowned Ottoman vizier, Mehmet Shevket, al-Hashimi formed yet another opposition party narned rather ironically the National Brotherhood, al-Ikha al-Watani. Penrose describes the Brotherhood as "hostile to any concessions to, or even recognition of any other sentiment than Arab nationahsm". directly opposing King Faisal, who was prepared to mediate with the British, and the 1930 treaty with Bntain." The National Brotherhood and the Iraqi Nationalist Party formed an alliance dedicated to eliminating British and monarchist influence. The desire for Arab autonomy resulted in the foming of man? societies md clubs
in Iraq in the early mentieth century and were secular and others were bound by religion.
albeit sectarian. Societies and clubs founded in the large urban centen were more often Sunm and seculariy-oriented. whle those founded in the hdy cities of the Sh'a were
religously onented. Religron played a major dein the protests against discnmnator).
policies of the infidel overlord. the foreign imperialist. Religious affiliation. in fact. was the mat salient level of organization among the pdi tically-oriented elite. The pre-monarchic
wrieties, Haras al-Istiqlal and al-Ahd al-Iraqi, were non-sectarian to a limited depand
their memkrs played important roles in the formation of the Iraqi state. However. Islam
was an integal part of the Iraqi govemment; at the opening of the Iraqi pariiament, King
Faisal declared Iraq an Isiamic state bound by and under the protection of Islamic law."
Role of Religion in the National Stmggle
Illustrating the correlation between religion and natrondism. Kedourie reminds us
that while Abraham was a man possessed of a vision of Orr God. he was also a Bedouin
chef 'intent on endowing his horde with a national identity'; and, Mubarrunad was a man
endowed by God as 'the seai of the Prophets' and the founder of a ~ation.~~Abraham was
a religious man and, one might say. a Cliltidst; while Muhammad was a man who
founded a religmn and a don-an Arab raiion whose religious and politicai institutions
were attended by one der. Wwn utes dySumi politid theoxy as "the idealizaûon of
this der. the caliph, and his governwnt, the calipharr- hawing on this reference. he
says that iWyif Muslims were govemed as one nation, the law and the faithfui wodd
fom me amgrcgation uni@ under one deras in the pst If such a form of govemment . . Eoidd heal the schisrn of centuries, then such a &on should exist However, considering
Iraq's disparate sec@ and eaimc groups, the theory of one nation for aii Mus1ims -or d
Arab- was MH naxsarily ideal. In the years immediately preceding the mandate, many Sunnis and Shi'a advocated just such a platform by urging the formation of an Islamic Arab state. An alliance was
formed between Sunni Iraqis and the Shi'i pnesthmd which, although these alliances
proved to be pure subterfuge on both sides, '" succeeded in brkfly bndging the religious
differences of centunes between the two sects and inciting the tribal shaikhs to revolt. Of course, having eluded Ottoman control for centuries and evaded British control during the postwar occupation. these norninally-religious. freedom-loving shaikhs would hardly have
ken tempted by old rnasters in new garb, whether they be Persian or Iraqi.
The degree and distinction of Muslim participation in the national struggle varied: prirnarily geographically, raciaily, and religiously defined, Mush society in Iraq was divided between the Shi'i Arabs in the south, Sunni Arabs in central Iraq, and Sunni Kurds
in the north. This, a result of history more than geographic division, fostered isolationist and separatist tendencies. Muslim orthodoxy united the Sunni Arabs with the caliphate in
Istanbul: the holy cities of Shi'ism were catalysts which bound the Shi'i Arab to their CO- religionisü in Persia; and, although mountain ranges divided the Kurds of Iraq from their kinsmen in distant lands, they were united in language. culture, and history.
Participation in government by the Shi'i Arab had ken negligible during Ottoman nite; therefore, in Iraq's formative years, the fight for equality in politicai representation was taken up by the Shi'i clergy in Najaf, Karbala, Samara, and KaWnain, as well as by the political opposition parties. Sunni Arabs focused on retaining their aimost exclusive political power in government by aligning thernselves with the Sunni king and a British mandatory whose interests were served best by collaboration. Sunni Kurdish participation in the Iraqi nationaiist movement was virtuaily nonexistent simply because they demanded
a state of their own or, at the very least, autonomy in their own areas. From the to time, however, there were token Kurdish ministers in Iraqi cabinets and Kurdish tribal shaikhs played a large role in representative government. Religious politics was a crucial issue in postwar Iraq where Sunni dominance had existed unchdenged throughout Ottoman rule. A constant reminder of the tenuous Sunni position was the overwhelming ratio of Shi'a to Sunnis and the power of the Persianulama who supported the formation of a Shi'i state in southem Iraq. A leading mujtahid had formulated a theory which supported the Persian constitution definhg the nature of the Shi'i legists representation in such an Islamic state to ensure the protection of religion." Although a Sh'i state in Iraq did not materialize, the intention the mujtahids was evident in the petitions of the plebiscite and the support of the Iraqi revolt. In fact, the vehicle for
Muhammad Taqi Shirazi's Islamic state was to have been the 1920 revolt. However after it had been suppressed, the British refused to accept Shi'i Persian mujtahidin as mediators for the rebel Shi'i tribesmen owing to their non-hqi status which subdued the Shi'i clencs for want of a legal basis for dissent."
During the mandate, the Sunni and the Shi'a confronted entirely different religious and social impediments to power in Iraq. On the one hand, there was the continued Sunni fear of the political power of the Shi3 rhand, on the other, the Shi'a lack of the education required for government employ and rePresentation." Had the Iraqi Shi' i community not ken dissuaded by their non-kaqi clergy to forego the opportunities of the state school system, the educationd impediment would not have existed. Equally, had the mujtahids not been motivated by political goals, a collective Iraqi identity could have eradicated fear of Shi'i Persian encroachrnent. As it was, the realities relative to governrnenr power merely ensured the Sunni dominant position.
Sunni dominance did not, however, inhibit Shi'i opposition. An elected constituent assembly was necessary to ratiQ the lraqi constitution, the electoral law, and the treaty of alliance. Yet in early 1922, the Shi' i mujtahidin attempted to control the formation of the democratic processes of state governrnent by issuing a fatwa forbidding Shi'i participation in the election of a national constituent assembly. Ironically, the Shi' a refusal to vote in elections was a direct contradiction to their demand for equal representation.
77 The foliowing year another fatwa was issued in the same vein, however. a third fatwa involving the protection of the state brought kaqi government action. The Turkish
nationalists had by then Liberated Anatolia and laid claim to Mosul. Turkish irregulars
crossed the frontier, attacking the Christians and intirnidating the Kurds. In April 1923. pro-Turkish elements within the Shi'i clergy prevailed upon Mahdi al-Khalasi to issue a fatwa making it iIIegal. haram, to defend Iraq against fellow Mu~lims.'~This was the
undoing of the non-Iraqi clergy. Shaikh Mahdi Al-Khalisi was deported and many Shi3 Persian clergy left Iraq in protest, depriving the Shi'is in Iraq of their leadership.
Thereder, the Shi' i community participated in the elections which produced a national constituent assembly. Their grievances continued against the government however,
especidy their lack of representation proportionate to their n~rnbers.''~As has already been made clear, few Iraqi Shi'a had the educationai background for political representation. Moreover, many of the Persians in the holy cities who were capable spoke no Arabic. the language of the state; they owed no loyaity to Iraq and were not loath to obstruct the normal
processes of state. Although al-Khaiasi did not rem. permission was granted to the
Persian rnujtahidin by the hqigovernment to remto Iraq in 1924 with a proviso which forbade future involvement in Iraqi politics.'7 Most Shi'i religious leaders were not only anti-Sumi, they was anti-British. which made the participation of the Shi'is in diarcha1 government mcult indeed. The Kurdish rninority in northeastern [raq, though Sunni. proved as difficult by refusing integration within the greater Iraqi community.
The Kurds and Other Minorities of Iraq.
One of the greatest legacy of the Ottoman Empire to its minorities was the imposition of the millet system, a confessional form of semi-autonomy which ensured the
presenration of their language, culture, and history: in short, their nationality. One of the
major beneficiaries was the Kurds, the largest non-Arab minority in Iraq, a semi-nomadic people living in northeastem Iraq whose ethnic identity remained intact through close kinship with other Kurdish tribes in the Ottoman Empire, in Persia, and in Russia. For decades Kurdish nationalists had fought for an independent state of Kurdistan which would encompass the millions of Kurds living in these areas. In 19 10, Kurdish students and
lawyers formed the fmt Kurdish political Party. Kurdish Hope. It elicited Little support fiom a mountain people dorninated by religion and powefil shaikhs?' however, with the help of the British, a Kurdish delegation at the postwar peace conferences petitioned AUied statesmen for Kurdish independence. In contrast to the Arabs, the Kurds were =wted national status in August 1920 in the Treaty of Sèvres. subject to its ratifi~ation."~
The Kurds in Iraq speak an hdo-European language which has Sorani and Kimianji dialects; they are ethnically man and claim descent from the Medes. They were predominantly Sunni Shafites who converted to Islam in the sixteenth cent~ry.~~
Approxirnately one percent of Kurds were Persian-speaking Shi'a who were loyal to Pesia. Rival Sunni Sufi shaikhs of the Qadiri or Naqshbandi orders and their tribesmen Iived mainly in isolated mountain strongholds in the 1920s. The semi-feudal tribal structure current at the time bound the tribesmen to their leaders by both religious and tribal bonds. Powemil tribal aghas. landowners of great tracts of cultivable land worked by serfs. had profited from Ottoman land registry in the Tanzimat era and the British occupation. Those tribal leaders who bore the title of shaikh were Sunni religious dignitaries, the spiritual leaders of the Kurdish tnbes, many of whom were sayyids, descendants of the Prophet, and respected for the? noble ancestry.
Many early Kurdish nationalists were Sufi Shaikhs of Ottoman Kurdistan such as: Shaikh Ubaiduilah of Shamdinan and Shaikh Ahmad of Barzan in northern Iraq - adherents of the Naqshbandi order- and Sayyid Shaikh Sa'id and Sayyid Shaikh Mahmud of Barzinja in southem Iraq -who adhered to the Qadîri order? Robert Olson documents the stages of the Kurdish national movement from the rebeilion of Shaikh Ubaiduilah and the Kurdish Tribal League in the 1880s to the rebellion of Shaik Sa' id in the 1920s; he finds a pattern in the Kurds' "sense of cornrnunity" and their dominance by religious figures in their national movement. *'
For exampie, in Iuly 1880, two hundred religious representatives of the Kurdish Tribal League met with Ubaiduilah, the spiritual leader of Ottoman Kurdistan. to discuss the establishment of the state of ~urdistan.'~As a result and in retaliation for Persian raids on Kurdish temtory, UbaiduiIah Ied a successful Kurdish revoit against the Persians: however, when he tumed against the Ottomans he met with defeat." Conversely. Kurdish tribesmen, religious zealots, fierce fighters, and excellent horsemen, were used to advantage by the Ottoman Sultan in the Hamidiye cavaky regiments and by the Young
Turks in the Ottoman army defending Islam against the infidel. The postwar Shaikh Sa' id rebellion, coinciding with those in Suiaimaniya, was unsuccessful.
The interest shown by the British in establishing a fom of Kurdish autonomy in
1918 was rnainly to keep the Northern Tier, always a sensitive area. free from foreign penetration and, most importantly, to influence the disposition of Mosul in the future. The British had, through their involvement with international oil cartels, economic and strategic interests in the province. However, when Britain changed iü pro-Kurd position in favour of a pro-Arab policy, it was to the detriment of the Kurd as Britain intended the inclusion of certain Kurdish areas into an Iraqi state." Ln April 1920. the British accepted a mandate for Iraq-the Arab provinces of Basra and Baghdad- and for the Kurdish province of Mosul.
Whlle the Kurdish nationalists anticipated an independent Kurdistan, Turkish nationalists contested the occupation of Anatolia in a passionate war of liberation.
Meanwhile, although the Kurds were ili-prepared for self-government, they had been given a degree of local autonomy and a governor of Sulairnaniyya during the British occupation. The national revival in Turkey nuiiified the Treaty of Sèvres and, inevitably, the promise of an independent ~urdistan? To compensate the Kurds, the British promised local autonomy within Iraq. This, however, did littie to appease the Kurds who rebeiled against British control. Al though their attempt to ac hieve independence was defeated once again. the Kurds steadfastly clung to their national identity and refüsed assimilation within the Iraqi state.
Inter-tribal conflict was traditional to the Kurdish tribes of Mosul, Kirkuk, and
Sulaimaniya. Tribal power was set in geographical patterns: the Qadin Baizinji shaikhs of
Sulairnaniya dominated the south where tribes spoke Sorani, and the Naqshabandi Barzani shaikhs of Baradost controlled the north where the dialect was Kirmanji. Their diversity and nvalry iimited the unified leadership necessary against a common enemy. In Sulaimaniya, the centre of Kurdish nationdism. the deof the Baninjis was law. '' and it was from here that Shaikh Mahmud Barzinji led the f~stof many Kurdish rebellions against Baghdad until his final exile in 193 1. Thereafter. Mahmud' s rival, Shaikh Ahmad of the Barzanis led the Kurdish nationalist srruggle against Baghdad. Constant inter-tribal rivalry decidedly harmed the Kurdish nationalist movement, preventing the emergence of a capable or committed Kurdish leader.
Kurdish opposition to Baghdad was characterimi by this persistent national struggle. in an attempt to establish a Kurdish state in southem Kurdistan, Shaikh Mahmud Barzinji rose in revolt against Bntish military occupation in 19 19. Subdued within weeks. the revolt resdted in the Shaikh's exile to India. However, when the Turks sought Kurdish support to regain Mosul, the British brought back Mahmud to raüy lus tribesmen agakt them. In 1922, the Kurds rose up again. This time, if oniy briefly, Mahmud succeeded in instituting independent governrnent in ~ulaimani~a~~When the Royal Ai.force defeated the Kurds in Sulaimaniya, Mahmud, bowed but not beaten, fled to the mountain fastness of Kurdistan, only to return again.
The 1923 peace negotiations in Lausanne, revoking the provisions for the state of Kurdistan made at Sevres, centered on Turkey's clairn to Mosul province and Britain's concern, on behalf of Iraq, for Kurdish nghts. Abdul Rahman Ghassernlou argues that once "the Mosul question was arranged to Britain's Iiking and the British had signed a concession for oil, the question of Kurdish rights was dropped, never again to be revived by the Briti~h."'~While it is true that Kurdish nghts were visible in the autonomy offered by the British in 1918 and 1921 and applied spasmodicaily by the central govenunent in Baghdad, it was the League of Nations not Britain which showed concem for minority rights in Mosul. Rich in oil deposits. Mosul was coveted by the Turks and the British who were determined to gain the province for Iraq.
in 1924, a referendurn was held to rneasure Kurdish opinion vis-&vis the future of Mosul. The Kurds of Sulaimaniya, swayed by their economic ties to Baghdad, voted in favour of lraq in contrast to Mosulis' negative vote, while Kurkukites demurred. One year later. the League of Nations commission report awarded the Mosul province to Inq with the following stipulations: 1) the British mandate must continue for twenty-five years, 2)
Kurdish must be the officid language and, 3) Kurdish officiais must be appointed in
Kurdish areas. FaiIing that, demarcation dong the Little Zab wodd mean the loss of Anb
Mosul yet it would stdl gain the Kirkuk oilfields for Iraq. While it is not known if the Kurdish referendum influenced this decision, Gertrude Bell, an advocate of Inqi rule. stated the belief that it was a guarantee of the growth of Kurdish nati~nalism.~'
For decades Kurds had punued their goal of an independent Kurdistan. free of alien masten and alien governrnent. Certainly, the great majority of the Kurds of Iraq were not prepared io play a role in a state where Arabs predorninated, despite sectarian agreement.. However once the Treaty of Lausanne was signed, the Kurds were more redistic and wiliing to accept autonomy, "either federated or in some other close reiationship with ~aghdad."" hqi ministers in Baghdad disagreed. In their view, the Kurdish people fomed an integral part of the Iraq state and, despite continuous rebellion, Iraqis expected the Kurds would at length willingly accept their inclusion in the Lraqi state. They were mistaken. The Kurds of Iraq continued to fight for a free and independent state. yet, they were no doser to achieving their goal at the end of the mandate than at the partition of Mosul from Turkey.
The smaiier non-Muslim minorities of Lraq who lived largely in isolated villages in the Mosul province or the main urban centers resisted integrahon with the greater Mush population. They had enjoyed comparative independence during Ottoman tirnes and were miniature nations within themselves. Yazidis who live in the Jabai Sinjar West of Mosul are
Kurds by ethnic origin and language but not by religion. The religious practices of this sect, erroneously attributed to devil worship, have a basis in ~orastrianism." Theu objection to military conscription led to persecution in the 1930s. A Yazidi leader. Daud Daud, fled with his tribesmen radier than endure forced conscription which resulted in two hundred Yazidis kiiled and, in a subsequent tribunal, leaders were hanged or imprisoned.63
Christian minodies also lived isolated within their own communities, among whom were Assyrians, Jacobites, Chaldeans, Syrian Catholics, Mandeans, and Armenians whose
métiers were those of artisan, cultivator, hotelier, professional, and teacher. Many of the Assyrians. who spoke Aramaic, originaliy lived in the Hakkiari district of Turkish Kurdistan. Having fought aiongside their Czarist protectors, they fled an advancing
Ottoman army in 19 17 and arriving in Persia, they fought with the British forces. At war's end, many Assyrians soldiers joined the British Iraqi Ievies and the community settled in Iraq under British protection and, being Protestants, the Church of England. The Turks had
refused their rem to Hakkiari. In 1925, the League of Nations recommended that the Assyrians be granted local autonomy in northern Iraq afier the demarcation of the Turkish- Iraqi frontier south of Hakkiari AIthough dispersed throughout the northern region, the Assyrian community continued to foiiow their pauiarch, the Mar Shamoun.
The Jews of Iraq were urban dwellers who lived in large communities in Baghdad and Mosul. They, too, were accustomed to the aütonomy of the millet; yet as bankers, doctors, and merchants they were "closely affiIiated with the Iraqi ~ommunity".~~ .Moreover. man. of the most affluent associated with the Bntish and foreipn interesls abroad. Hasqail Sassoon was the Jewish community's mat active politician pnor to and duing the monarchy; an Ottoman pariiamentanan and an Iraqi minister of finance in the provisional pvemment in 1920. he served in many Iraq cabinets under the monarchy.
Minorities played no real role in the Iraqi national movement preferring, as the y had in the pst. ia remain wi thin their own communities. gurded by their own leaders. At the end of the mandate. there were appmximately 90.000 Jews, 80,000 Chnstians, 60.000
Turcomans. 4.000 Yazidis, and 4,000 Sabeans in Iraq which açcounted for five percent of the population.66 Before the League of Nations approved Iraqi membership in 1932. it demanded a guarantee of protection for Iraq's racial and religious minorities which the newly-emergmg state was obliged to gwe, in writing, to the Cound of the League.
British Reaction to the Nationalist Movement
1n the earl y twentieth cenniry. a wave of religious rebellions and nsing na~onaiism was endemic to colonialism. Britain faced mest in Cathoiic and Protestant Ireland, Hindu and Muslim India, Coptic and Muslim Egypt, Jewish and ~uslimNPallestine. as well as in
~raq.~' The Iraqi revolt of Shi'a and Sunni Arabs against the British was a clear indicauon of the power of religion and nationdim. Britain was aware tbaf as the rnandatory power. if it was to achieve its strategic and economic goals in the couotry, it had to pacify the future architects of Iraqi statehd
In. 1921. Britain's High cornmissioner portrayed Iraqi natidsm as sensitive. suggesting tn the Colonial Offce that to ensure the &on of a' national state conducive to Bntish intereats it should 'ï~eadsoftl y" with regards to the mandate. Having ~cenilyput down a natiooalist-inspird tribal revoit and imposed an imperialist-inspird Sunni monarchy, it was in the British interest to oter to Iraq sensitivity. However, when Iraqi nationalists demanded an end to the mandate in exchange for a eeaty relationship endoaed by a seerningly docile king, the British Lion roared. Winston Churchill let it be known that as long as Britain was paying the bills, British interests would be ser~ed.~~
Iraqi nationalists believed that the imposition of the mandate denied them their birthnght, 'O whereas, the British believed the mandate to be a means of recuperating its recent losses and protecting its future gains. However, if a maty relationship would appease the Iraqis, the British were not adverse to this arrangement and promises were made accordingly. The arrangement, however, was to be within the datewhich was made public when the bague of Nations' approved the treaty in November 192 1. The reaction of anti-British Sunni and Shi'i nationalists -Jafar Abu Timman, Mohmad al- Sadr, Ali al-Bazirgan, Shaikh Ahmad al-Da'ud, and Rashid ai-Khoja was to present the king with demands proroguing mandatory authority, and katenhg his deposition if their demands were not met." From that moment forward the exmme nationalists sought an end to the mandate and British influence in Iraq.
John Darwin, writing on Bntish imperid policy. admits that the dificulty in iraq lay not in restructuring an old but in constnicting a new regime. Ln a region "which tacked aimost ail the attributes of political, social, economic, or religious unity," the British wanted to form of Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul a united nation-state -not out of nanird tendency or historical precedent, but because Britain was convinced the provinces codd only be ruied as a coalesced enti~.~~Danvin suggests diat imperid econornies demanded a strong autonomous regirne and that local advantages would aid and abet Britain's imperid poiicy. These advantages were: 1) the strategic importance of the state to British security in the region which made withdrawai unlikely: 2) the embryonic natue of iraq which prevented growth of a nationalist movement capable of hstrating Bntish ah;and, 3) the military conquest and administrative power which gave Bntain direct influence and "real control over the representatives of local ~pinion."'~ Despite its seerning soundness, Danvin's appraisal of the Iraqi scene can be disputed on several counts. It is tme that the construction of a new regime was necessary to Iraq, as it was to most States in the Middle East (and elsewhere, for exarnple, Africa and the Balkans) fabricated at will by Europeans out of the former provinces of the Oaoman
Empire. However, centralization of the three provinces was the only hope of protecting
Britain's interests overall -its air routes. sea routes, oil interests. and supremacy in the area. The British desire to form of Basra. Baghdad, and Mosul one state for the reasons stated above was impossible without the prompt reconciliation of its various racial and religious groups. As to the uniikelihood of withdrawai or the British "bag and baggage policy", to the British public -no hostage to an air and sea route to India -withdrawal, from the nationalist revoit to the acquisition of Mosul, seemed highly likely." Once Mosul did become a part of the mater Iraqi entity and the oiI concession was "bagged", so to speak, withdrawal became a certainty. Moreover, persistent nationalist opposition fnistnted the British from 1921 until 1923," and, except for the penod of indecision over
Mosul, continued until 1932 when both British and iraqi aims were met. Finally. it is histoncally impossible to negate Darwin's last point, military conquest and administrative power did account for British influence and conuol, regardless of how it was gained or maintained; the diarchy did not give Iraqis (not even the King) equal power with Britaid6
Derek Hopwood sees the mandatory power in Iraq as rejecting those elements not conducive to British influence, which it saw as "nationaiist", and choosing instead more stable factors to create the Iraqi state? In the early years, British reaction to the nationalist movement was to offer minor concessions whiie demanding treaties to protect its own national interests and to establish a facade of democntic institutions and national government. In order to bolster the popularity of the politicai system, the British preferred thek decisions legitimated by the king, identified as a British subordinate throughout his reign. There was neither constituent assembly nor constitution during this penod. Tribal shaikhs, subsidized by the British governrnent in rem for loyalty, were a primary tool used by the British to oppose renegade hqi nationalists.
No sooner was Faisal instailed than he questioned the treaty anangement. When negotiations became long and devious, Britain began thinking of deposing him andor evacuating the country. The British often threatened withdrawal. One reason they did not was the low-cost of conirolling Iraq with minimal air power. The British dealt with Arab and Kurdish intemal dissent with squadrons of the Royd Air Force, as they did with the Turks and Wahhabis on Iraq's borders.
From 1920 to 1932 the British ceaction to the nationalist movement varied. When the nationalists demonstrated violently against the Bntish mandate, the High commissioner imposed his authority on the country as he had in August 1922; when they obstructed the establishment of govemment institutions, the British advocated the exile of foreign nationals as they had in June 1923; or when they objected to British treaties. the British sought the shaikhs' support to achieve their objective as in June 1924 or used possible loss of Mosul to gain nationalist accord for the oil concession as in September 1925. The king was not immune to British authority: however, it was partly Faisal's intransigence which caused Britain to give ''piecemeal" concessions from 1926 onwards. Once the prerequisites were fulfilled and the treaty revision of 1927 was signed, the British reaction was to bow to pressure from London and Baghdad and to apply for Iraqi membership in the League of
Nations at the earliest opportunity. In this way, independence was guaranteed. the mandate was ended as were the responsibilities for Iraq's intemal affairs.
National Institutions
The Sunni Arab king owed his crown to British vested interest in Iraq, yet he owed his allegiance to the people of Iraq and the cause of Arab unity for which he, and many Iraqis, had fought. He was fùily aware that the survival of Iraq -and his crown- was ensured ody as long as the British interest was served and that the independence of the state was attainable only by the efforts of the nationalist mo~ernent.'~Therefore. Faisal attempted to conciliate al1 interesfi: the British, the nationalists, and his own which sought the creation of a Hashemite dynasty in Iraq. Consequently, towards the end of his reign when the national goal was within reach, he attempted to form a coalition government of Arab and Iraqi nationalists. Meanwhile, Faisai attempted to build a nation -a national identity- which embraced Iraq's diverse religious and ethnic gr~ups.~~
Faisal was identifiai with the Arab revolt in the Hijaz, the Arab government in Syria, and the Arab delegation at the peace conferences. He had been educated in Istanbul. had served as a deputy for the Hijaz in the Ottoman parliament and had accrued an international stature with French and British statesmen as well as Zionist arbiters. He was well-versed in the functions of state government, its compromises and its intrigues. In meeting with his fist government in 192 1, Faisal gave priority to govemment institutions important to Iraq's independence. Believing his failure in Syria was due to the lack of a strong army, Faisal focused on building a militq arm and an air force - capable of defending the nation and uniQing the state." He also gave importance to a state school system which would provide education for the young (thereby, he felt. ensuring the future of the state). Furthemore, he was intent on the integration of racial and sectanan eiernents into those institutions of government which would foster the creation of an Iraqi identity.
During the interim government of 1920 an inchoate national army had been created by the MUiistry of Defense and its minister, the former commander in chef of the Sharifian forces Jafar al-Askari. On his repatriation fiom Syria in 192 1, Nuri alSa'id was appointed commander of general staff of the Iraqi army. From the beginning of hs reign, Faisai took a keen interest in improving this volunteer. indigenous force as a means of furthering national goals and fostering national sentiment." Most officers were Sunni Arabs or Kurds, although there was a rare Shi'a, Christian or tribal officer. An Iraqi prime rninister, Abd al-Muhsin Sa'dun of the Muntafiq, had attended the tribal school in Istanbul, served in the ûttornan army, and as an aide to the Ottoman Sultan. Mark Heller points out that the 88 veteran Sunni Sharifian and Ottoman officers, who bore significant animosity towards each other, füled the top ranks because they were the only Iraqis with military qualifications.'"
In contrast, the rank and file were mainly from the Shi'i tribes in the south.
At this early stage, the iraqi army was not capable of defending the counüy: it was an army king schooled for the füture. From 1922 a British Royal Air Force squadron was used for both interna1 and extemai defense, controlling fractious tribes and guarding remote frontiers of the state. Iraq bordered the newlyemerging States of Turkey. Iran. and Saudi
Arabia, whose strong nationaiist leaders -Mustafa Kemal, Riza Khan Pavlavi, and Abdul
Aziz ibn Faisal al-Saud- were a constant source (but not the only source) of problems during the mandate period. Turkish nationalists made persistent raids over the northem frontier until 1924; Wahhabi fanatics raided in the southwest und 1927; and, a strong
Iranian conscripted army attacked hqi Arab tribes to the east of the Shatt al-Arab. Although peace maties were signed with Turkey and Saudi Arabia during Faisal's reign, he was aware that building a strong national army before independence was imperative.
British military advisors attached to the rninistry of defense and to the Iraqi army bore the major responsibiiity for decision-making. Privileged Sunni Arab and Sunni Kurd cadets were trained in England, as were a few from Shi3 tribes near Nasiriya Amara, and ill la.'^ In 1927, an Iraqi officers' training coilege and an hqi Royal Air Force were founded. Still the rank and file of the army were mainly recruited from the Shi'i tribes and. being voluntary, the army offered no incentive for the masses. At this time, the Iraqi army had a permanent force of fifteen hundred volunteers and six hundred and forty officerssJ - an army too srnail to control a tribal rebellion in which the tribes were better equipped than the army, much less to control the frontiers of a state.
Military conscription would have solved many problerns in the early years.
However, strong opposition -from the Shi'a, the Kurds. the tribes and, oddly enough. the British- made miüiary conscription in Iraq unfeasible. Traditionally, the tribes and non-Muslims had paid exemptions rather than serve in a conscripted army. Despite opposition, the king worked unùringly to have passed a compulsory conscription biii in which he was supported by important politicians. Faisal's desire for a conscnpted army which would act as an encouragement to the national spirit would aiso give some degree of homogeneity to recruits drawn from diverse racial and religious backgrounds and serve as a symbol of national sovereignty, maintainhg intemal security and acting as a deterrence to extemal agg~ession.~~Aside fiom the impracticality of attempting to solve the nation's ills solely through compulsory service, the army was kept under strength for economic and strategic rasons. Most importantly, the mandatory authority, which had no wish to weaken its own position, was a major opponent of conscription and widespread state education among the politicdy uninformed masses of Iraq.
Many histonans have noted the role of education in the development of nationdism. Elie Kedourie wrote that the goal of education, while teaching literature and mathematics and other skiils, was primarily political, and in the sarne vein. "National self-determination is, in the final analysis, detemination of will, and nationalism is. in the fust place. the method of teaching right determination of ~iil."'~WMe Hans Kohn reco,@zed the importance of the educator in promoting nationalism. he said, "lt was the schoolmaster to whom the new struggle for independence was conducted with greater forethougb and caution and, rnoreover, smick deeper roots in all classes of the popdation-*'''
Education in Iraq during the mandate was largely limited to the provision of primary schooling with advanced training availabie only to prornising student~.'~One reason for minimal education was budgetary considerations. another the view of those concemed with the direction of policy that education was a luxury and, therefore, a low pnority. Sluglen States that Iraqi politicians had no wish to change the existing Ottoman system of rudimentq primary public education. Similarly, the author points out that British dictums of the time deemed it kwise and unj~s~ed"to spend public fun& educating a class of young people for whom no jobs existed and who were destined to becorne political 90 agitator~.~~The conflict over whether or how to distribute the benefits of education rnay also be seen as the dynamic of a class smiggle between traditional Iraqi groups.
The Director General of Education from 1922 to 1927, Syrian Sati al-Husri, whose education policy focused on limiting education to the upper classes and the urban centea generally, can also be seen as preserving the existing class structure, which was drawn dong class and religious ine es.^' Lionel Smith. the British hspector General of Education in Iraq from 1920 to 1930, believed that Iraq was not properly equipped for independence. in general, and Ieast of all educationally. He was of the opinion that the duty of education was to combat illiteracy through the spread of elementary education, combining it with higher education with a view to govemment employment of the carefblly selected few. In essence, Smith agreed with Husn and admired hun for both his administrative expertise and "knowledge of and passion for ed~cation."~'Here then is an instance of agreement between the Sunni nationalist political elite, largely well-educated, and the British imperialist mandatory authority. Both groups believed that an educated Shi'a majority would be potentialiy dangerous to both.
Sati al-Husri was a prominent exponent of Arab nationalism in Iraq, and he made a clear distinction between it and Islamic nationalism. In an article published in 1944, he wrote: "Whoever opposes Arab unity, on the pretext of Muslim unity, contradicts the simplest requirements of reason and logic, and 1 hesitatingly Say that to contradict iogic to this extent cm be the result only of deceit or of deception." 9' Inspired by Geman philosophy, he believed, 'The nation was the prirnary existentid focus, logically prior to statehood, geography, and even reiigious identity."
Arab nationalism, therefore, was expressed through the curriculum of the state school system. Under Husri's personal direction. textbooks were rewritten to elllninate pre-Arab Iraqi history and to reflect a notion of hqi identity which began with -and was limited to- Arab nationdism. Similarly, in an effort to further promote Arab nationdism. Husri engaged Syrians and Palestinians as teachers in the Iraqi state school system.
Husri's insistence on pan-Arabism and anti-sectarianisrn as the basis for the state of Iraq and as its ultimate goal caused conflict with non-Arab groups, such as the Kurds, and also with the Shi'a who though Arab identified strongly with the Shi'i Persian clergy.
These conflicts precipitated his eventual resignation from the rninistry of education in 1927.
Reeva Simon attributes the failure of Iraq to integrate its minorities to Husn's anti-sectarian policy which weakened the Iraqi entity itself and promoted xenophobia and racial prej~dice.~"It is ciifficuit not to agree with such a conclusion when. for the most part. education was Lunited to the larger cities, to a privileged class, and its curriculum, dedicated to Arabisrn, was imposed upon the students of private. mission. and non-Musiim schools.
Aithough the barracks and the schoolroom encouraged national sentiment to a certain extent, there was no cornmonality strong enough to create an Iraqi national identityg5 Without the stimulus of mutual nationalist articulation, the multi-layered nature of the people was not conducive to the creation of such an identity. Furthemore. [raqis had been too long associated with the sectarian rivalry and social stratification of the Sunni
Ottoman Empire for a mere decade to eradicate centuries of tradition. Nakash however, contends that the Shi'i Arab did attempt to accommodate a dual Shi'i-Iraqi identity and contrary to widely-held belief sought integration in the Iraqi state, not self-de or a merger of Iraq and The cardinal elernent of iden~cationin Iraq was Islam: therefore. national identity was contingent upon achieving solidarity among Muslim elements.
Yet this aione would not sufice. For Iraqi national identity to evolve. a new paradigm for nationalkm would have to be ernbraced whereby the multi-layered reality of Iraq -the religious, ethnic, Linguistic, and cultural reaiity- could be recognized. Lord Acton's beiief that a state of various races and religions had the greatest potential for achieving success was as true for Iraq as any other nationO9' in creating a new pdgm for such a state, the integration of the Arab, Persian, Kurd, Christian. and Jew in aU their diversities had to be a prionfy of the nationalist rnovement.
Among the nationalist groups which aspired to power once the Iraqi govenunent was in place, the most successful was a group of Sunni Arab nationalists who had aliied themselves with the Sharif of Mecca and the British in Cairo in 1916. Mostly military men, they had proven themselves capable of g~veming.~'After graduating from the irnperial rnilitary academies in Istanbul they cornmanded Ottoman and Sharifian arrnies in the great world war and Ied governments in Arab Liberated Syria. Their view of the ski11 and wisdom of goveming was not inspired by public service rather by the desire for personai power.
Accustomed to command, they saw themselves as bringing progress to a provincial Iraq which could benefit from their education and experience. Their loyalty at this time was prirnarily to the larger Arab entity and to the coterie of Arab nationalist officers with whom they shared a rveltmschauung, a world view. '' Their Sharifian leader and king shared these selfsame Ioyalties and appointed many of the Sunni Arab officers to high office.
There were other groups whose share of power was not comparable to that of the priviieged few who were among the king's closest companions. Ex-Ottoman bureaucrats from the old Sunni families of Iraq bitterly resented these young Arab officers who had had neither position nor power before the war. These ex-officiais fought to reestablish themselves in government and succeeded in king appointed to the cabinet in the mandate era. In contnst, demographic equality was not significant in tem of cabinet appointments and government representation for Shi' i Arab nationalists. Although there were few Lraqi
Shi'a capable of goveming, there were exceptions to the nile to be sure.loO Following the inauguration of the monarchy, Shi'i Arab laity, merchants, and landoviners joined with their Sunni colleagues in a banle within govemment institutions for independence from foreign control and equality of indigenous opPo& ty. ' ' Iraqi involvement in the nationalist movement began in the parliament, the bureaucracy, and the academies of Istanbul, as well as the major cities of the Sunni Ottoman Empire where secret political societies flourished. In Iraq, these societies were nationaiist and non-nationalist, sectarian and non-sectarian, and, in most cases. membership reflected this orientation. However, religious differences were "bridged withm the nationalist movement in the 1920 revolt in Iraq and between Sunni and Shi'i ularndo2 which succeeded in briefly healing age-old animosities within Islam. Religious motivation was behind the phenomenal role played by the Shi'i dama in the revolt and their alliance with the nationaiists; a literal crusade agauist the infidel in traq.lo3 Political dissension occurred within nationalist ranks when pan-Arab nationalists favoured limited cooperation with the British while Iraqi nationalists rejected any and al1 concert with foreigners. AU attempts to coordinate the efforts of these two groups failed and a later attempt to unite nationalkt forces in 1930 fded yet again.
The British reaction to nationaiism in Lraq was to control the extremists and support the moderates whose desire for power proved them amenable to British influence. King
Faisal, attempting to strengthen his position with both moderate and extremist nationalists. urban officiais and tribal shaikhs, concentrated on achieving national goals in lieu of supranational unity in the future. The victors in the battle within the nationalist movernent were a Sunni elite consisting of Sharifian ex-oficers and Ottoman ex-oficials who ruled Lraq with British consent for over a decade. The nationalist opposition in Iraq consisted of Sunni extremists who were Arab nationalists, Shi' i extrernist who were lraqi nationaiists, and Shi'i politicians who wore no nationaiist stripe. However, most nationalist rnovements in the Middle East which emerged in the early twentieth century had "signifcant Muslim components, both in temof mernbers and of concepts" although nationalism per se was not expressed as such.lM ' Batatu, Old Social Classes, p. 22. See also Gelvin. 'The Lcague of Nations." The author contends that dependent capitalisrn and modem institutions the Tanzirnat era and the mandates and ".,.parailel evolutionary paths ..." of protonationalism in the twentieth century produced national & supranational identities. P. 35, ' Edith and E. F. Penrose, -wons ?nd National kvetopment (London: Ernest Benn Ltd., 1978), p. 45. Lewis, Arabs in Historv. "In that time and place it was inevitabie." P. 44. ' Zeine N. Zeine. -S. 'Had Arab consciousness ken submerge3 and destroyed by the Young Turks as is claimed, 'they' would have had little difficulty in Turkifying the Arab lands". P. 122. Tauber, Fo-on of the Modem Syria and Iq, p. 333. Albert Hourani, A Historv of the Arab Peoulee pp. 308.-309. Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, 'The Historiography of Iraq," Ametican Historical Review 96 (December 1991). The authors maintain that "experts" pronounce Iraq a heterogeneous population, but it has a homogeneous population of more than 70% Arab and 95% Muslim. P. 1413. William R. Polk, The Arab World Todq, p. 68.
Y Ibid., p. 69. See also Farouk-Sluglett. 'The Historiography of Iraq." p. 141 1.
'O Kohn, HistorvsfNationaIismt. Early "Islarnic religious nationalism" was responsible for the Arabism of Mesopotamia and Syria having first superseded purely primitive tribal organization. P. 366.
" Mohamrnad A. Tarbush, The Role of the Military in Politics: A Case Studv Of lraq to 194 1 (London: KPI Limited. 1982). In 1937 the anti pan-Arabist Iraqi press wrote "when the position and politics of Irq are considered, we must not view Iraq as a hostage to Arab unity, but instead. we must view it as an independent country having its daily tasks and international obligations." P. 258. l2 Aziz Al-Azmeh, "Nationalism and the Arabs." Arab Studies Ou~erIy17 (Winter 1995). p. 1 1. l3 Penrose. m:_Inteniationais. In nation-state nationalism, traditional Ioyaities baianced "rnass appeal& emotional drive" of pan-Arabism. P. 366. See also Rashid Khalidi. "Arab Nationalism: Historical Problems in Literature." American Historical Review 158 (December 199 1). Nation-state nationaiism was a competing form of loyalty to Arab nationalism which was not pan-Arabism. Le. Arabs unity in a single Arab nation. P. 1365. . . '" Farouk-Sluglett, 'The Hi-~hv of hq," p. 1415. '' Kohn, History of Nationalism. It reads that "a federal union of Arab counuies, the retm of the Caiiphate to the land of its origin, and the restoration of Damascus and Baghdad to their ancient glory." p. 279. l6 Dawn. From Ottarnanism to Arabism. Dawn claims 'Arabism originated as a defense of Islam' which, in the face of Young Turk secular policies, was likely. pp. 184-187. See Kohn. History of the East. He identifies Islarnic religious nationaiism bridges the pre-Islarnic past and the Arab conquests. p. 266. l7 Rashid Khalidi. "Arab Nationalism: Historical Problems in Literature." p. 1363. l8 Tauber, Fomon of Modern S-yria -, p. 334. l9 Farouk-Sluglett. "Historiography of Modern Iraq," p. 14 14. . . . . a Cohen, British Polrcv xn Me-. A British navigational monopoIy was to offset the German Baghdad Railroad. P. î57-9. " Phebe Mm,'The Development of a Nationalkt Ideology in Iraq: 1920- 194 1 ." Muslim World, Lxxv (ApnI 1985). p.95. -77 Farouk-Sluglett, "Historiography of Iraq," p. 1415.
'3 Tarbush, -sof pp. 46-47. '"Simons, pp. 17 1 - 172. Tauber, Arab Movements in World War 1. Iraqi. Syrian, Lebanese, Li byan. and Hijazi activists numbered 57 in ai- Ahd and 1 15 in al-Fatat between 19 14- 19 18: 8 from al-Fatat and 17 Iraqis irom al-Ahd were active pnor to 19 14 of these. the 17 Sharifian Arab nationalist al-Ahd activists governed Iraq after 1 92 1. P. I 13. See also Marr, Modern Ristorv of Formed in 19 13, ai-Ahd had 4,000 members by 19 14. P. 99. '' Fromkin, A Peace to End Al1 Peace. The author contends that the nationalists. were actually separatists, not dernanding independence but equal representation. P. 102. See Dawn, Onomanism to Anbism, p. 152.
-? Birdwd Nuri as-Sa'id: A Studv in Arab Leadership, p. 15. See dso Mm, "Yasin ai-Hashimi." In Paris seven Muslim students iounded al-Fatat dedicated to independence from the empire. p. 66.
" Simon. kgq Between Two Wm,p. 34. See Tauber, Formation of Modem Syia and Irag Haras could better mediate Shi'i-Sunni nationalist goals with Shi'i mujtahids. P. 287. See Marr. "Yasin al-Hashimi." The Shi'i Jafar Abu Timrnan. the Sunni Ali al-Bazirgan. and the Kurd Jaial Baban were members. P. 432.
" Tauber, Formation of Modem Syria and kq. Before anythmg else it intended to unite the Iraqis of various communes and sects and to invest their efforts to put an end to divisive factors in religion. P. 289. Haras was an Iraqi nationalist party which had goals and a membership inclined towards a liberated hq.
JO Naksh. Shiah of Iraq. Outlawing of Haras al-Istiqlal and exiling members proved ineffective. and the momentum created by the celebrations continued. P. 70. See Tauber. bation of Svria and Irag. He lists Sunnis Ali al-Bazirgan. Mal Baban. Shakir Mahmud. and Yusuf al-Suwaidi; Shi'is Jafar al-Timrnan. Mirra Muhammad Rida, Baqir al-Shabibi. Naji and Sami Shawkat, and Sayyid Muhammad ai-Sadr. P. 286. Frornkin, A Peace to End AI1 Peace, p. 99. See also Nakash, Shiah of Irag. Al-Ahd Shi'i symprithizer Muhammad Rida al-Shabibi facilitated contacts between Sharifians & Mujtahids in 191 9- 1920. P. 6 1. '' Ibid. The majority of the rnembers were tradesmen and handicraft workers. P. 295. '' Tarbush. The Role of the Militay in Poiitics, p. 62.
3s Ibid., p. 63. j6 Marion Farouk-SIuglett and Peter Sluglett, & Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship (London: KPI Limited, 1987)' p. 14 15. j7 Penrose, vtp. 82. j8 Kohn, Historv of Nationalisrn in the East. In 1925. Faisal ceminded parliament "Istamic law was based upon negotiation and discussion. and that the Koran comrnanded men to take counsel togethet." P. 3 12.
39 Kedourie, JVationm, pp. 73-75. a Dawn, Ottomanism to Arabism, p. 190. '' Nakash. of m. The mujtahids desire for an Islamic state free of dien control was not shared by al1 Shi'is. The Sharifians stressed independence and the Iraqi right to self-mle as in Syria not "the stniggle between Mustim & Christian." P. 68. See Wilson, Lovalties, p. 251. See also Kedourie, England. p. 183. '' Nakash, -of. A political theory by Muhammad Husayn Na'ini published in 1909. P. 50.
43 ibid. The leading mujtahid Shaikfi al-Shari'a Isfahani was refused permission by the British to "negotiate the terms of submission of the insurgent Shi'i tribes... as Iranian subjects, the mujtahids' political outlook was 'colored' From an Iraqi national point of view." P. 5. " Farouk-SIuglett, "Historiography of Iraq." Despite state education since Midhat Pasha's tenure, Shi'is excluded themselves from state schools resulting in few qudified Shi'a in govemmental employ. P. 1413. Kohn. mtory of Nationab. "So suong was the national sentiment of common Orientai interests even among these divines, who were thorough-going reactionaries in religion and formerly animatecl by an unbound hostility to the Sunnites." P. 3 12.
J6 Nakash, Shiah of iq, p. 277.
" Ibid. NakaSh maintains the mujtahidin were penniless in Persia and womed about their wealth in Iraq; the Mid-Euphrates tribes accused them of becorning wealthy at the expense of Iraqis, leading the tribes astray in the 1920 revolt, and asked they remain in Persia while hqi Arab Shi'i mujtahidin took their place. p. 76.
JR Jawad, The Kurdish Ouestion, p. 5.
J9 Erskine, Faisal of IraQ, p. 161. See Jawad Kurdish Ouesti~n,p. 6. See also Ismet Sherif Vanly. "Kurdistan in Iraq." In Peo~leWithout a Countm: The Kurds and Kurdistan. ed. by G. Chalimd (London: Zed Press, 1978). Kurd General Sherif Pasha, Ottoman Ambassador to Sweden represented Kurds. "Articles 62.63, and 64 envisaged the creation of an independent Kurdish state" as a mandated temtory. Pp. 159- 160. Jawad, The Kurdish Ouestion, p. 3.
" Stephen Pelletiere, The Kurds: An Unsale Element in the Gulf (Boulder: Westview Press. 1984). p. 42.
" Olson. Emereence of Kurdish Nationalism. Previously leaders were princes, emirs or tribal aghas. P. 1.
53 Jawad, Kurdish Ouestion. Tribal representatives gathered at Ubaidullah's headquarters at Nehri to discuss a revolt of nationalistic goals. They asked Britain and Russia for assistance against the Turks. Pp. 4. 26.
Kendal. 'The Kurds under the Ottoman Empire," in People W i@out- ri Countrv: The Kurds and Kurdistak ed. By G. Chaliand (London: Zed Press, 1978). The Shaikh inherited his religious influence from the Naqshabandi order. P. 3 1.
55 Olson, Erner~enceof Kurdish Nationaiism. As late as March 192 1, the British states "purely Kurdish areas should not be included in the Arab State of Mesopotamia." p. 58. By September 1925. British poticy had changed from thoughts of Kurdish statehood to Kurdish autonomy within the Arab state of Iraq. P. 147.
56 Longrigg. Iraq: 1900- 1950. p. 13 1. See Sirnons. From Sumer to Sacidam. p. 263. See also Jawad. The Kurdish Question. In 1923 Kurdistan was divided between Turkey. Iraq, Iran, Syria. and the USSR. P. 6. " Erskine, King Faisai of Iraq, p. 140. Jawad, The Kurdish Ouestion. Shaikh Mahmud -who the British appointed governor of Sulaimaniya in 19 18- declared himseif King of Kurdistan in 1922, as the Anglo-hqi treaty was being debated it left Faisai no aiternative but to treat him as a fellow der. Pp. 7-9. See also. Abdulghani, IranûndMahmud's rivai Shaikh Ahmad of Barzan also led the rebellions of 19 19, 1927, 193 1-32. P. 131.
59 Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou, (London: Collets Holdings Ltd.. 196% p. 70.
60 Pelletiere, The KU,p. 60. O' Farouk-Sluglett, "Historiography of Iraq." The authors daim that there were some 500. 000 Kurds in the Mosul 'wilayet' in 192 1. P. 1413. See also Erskine, King Faisal of Iraq, p. I 39
. . 63 Tarbush. The Role of the Military in Polit ICS, p. 1 11. Ibid., p.96. See also Silverfarb. Britain's In formal Emp ire in the Middle East, p. 34. . . 65 Ahmad A. R. Shikara, Politics 1921- 1941: nebtetaçtion-tic politics and ~~~a Policv (London: LAAM Ltd., 1987). p. 23. 06 Ibid., p. 24. '' John Darwin, Britain. Ew~tand the Middle East: Im~eriaiPolicv on the Aftemath of War 19 18- 1922. (Oxford: St. Martin's Press, 1993). Postwar insurrection appeared in many of British colonies where it haî forrneriy mled supreme. In 1919, Hiuel told Wilson in Iraq " We musc swim with the new tidc which is set towards education and not towards the government of what used to be cailed the subject peoples." P. 267. ha Sluglen, minp. 70. * Kliernan, *. Churchill's acnial words to Cox were "advise Faisal that whether under a mandate or treaty arrangement Britain expected to be consuited so long as we are meeting heavy financial charges in Mesopotamia." P. 168. 7"Penr~~etM. The nationalists also protested the alien fonn of government imposed upon Iraq. P. 84.
" Sluglett. in h,p. 305.
72 Darwin, Britain. WD~and the Middle East, p. 273.
73 Ibid., p. 274. Kliernan. Foundations. Turkish-Russian annexation could threaten impecial security. P. 4. '' Sluglett, Britain in M. Sluglett refers to British withdrawal numerous cimes. as the 'bag and baggage' policy, "Quit Mesopotamia", or the evacuation of Iraq. Pp. 42. 37, 79-8 1. 109. 264. '' Ibid. Anglo-iraqi Treaty of 1922. Protocol of 1923. Anglo-iraqi Treaty of 1926, of 1927. and of 1930. Pp. S. 80, 124, 154. 169.
76 Elie Kedourie, Nationalism (London: Hutchkon University Library 1960). The British desire to dominate the Middle East and elirninate other foreign influence resulted in an interest in Arab nationalism in 19 16. P. 99. See also Siuglett. Brirain in Iraq, p. 21.
77 Derek Hopwood. "Social Structures and the New State 192 1- 1958," in m-.Power and Societv. ed. Derek Hopwood (Oxford: Ithaca Press. 1993), p. 7. Batatu. Old Social Classes, pp. 25-26. See dso Tarbush, Role of the Militarv in Politics, pp. 37, 38.
Abdulghani. Iran and iq. The author argues "the failure to mate a new national identity for the hqi state" led to the assertion of Kurdish nationalism rather than assimilation by Arab nationalism. P. 13 1. The failure was not to give the Kurds prornised limited autonomy, not the fear of Arab nationalism. . . . . Tarbush, Bple of the Milwin Politic& p. 79.
" Mm, "Yasin al-Hashimi." A volunteer cost 100 pounds a year - very expensive for a new state. P. 436. Mark Heller, "Politics and the Military in Iraq and Jordan, 1920-1958: The British Influence". Armed Forces and Society 4 (1977). p. 84. See also Marr, "Yasin al-Hashimi," p. 173. - - 83 Man. "Yasin al- Hashimi," p. 173. See also Tarbush. Role of the Military in poli tic^, p. 78. . . . * RS Tarbush, Role of th- in poli tic^, pp. 77. 83. Ibid., p. 73.
86 Kedourie, Nationalism, p. 8 1. 83-
X7 Kohn, History of Nationalism, p. 79- Sluglett. m.Education's share of the national budget grew. In 19 19. it was I percent of the national budget; it increased to 3 percent in 1921; 4 -5 percent in 1925: and 6 percent in 1929. P. 287.
R9 Ibid.. An educator in Sudan feared "the effects of unrestrained access to Western learning." P. 274.
VO Simons. From Sumer to SxU?m. Iraq's class structure was already in flux and genented. p. 192. See also Kedourie. Nationalism Transformed by the mandate, "the tradi tionai urban poups, of which Shi ' i tes. Kurds, and Jews were an important element. found themselves undermined by the Sunni elite." P. 128.
91 Hodgkin, "Lionel Smith: Education in Iraq," p. 257. See also. Samir ai-Khalil, Re~ubiicof Fear: The of Modem (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1989), p. 160. Sati al-Husri. "MusIim Unity and Arab Unity." In Arab Nationalism: An Antholow, rd. Sylvia G. Haim. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962. p. 151.
Y3 Simons, Sumer to Sacidam, A prominent intellectual. Sati al-Husn was 2lso a colleague of Zia Gokalp. the theonst of Turkish nationalism. P. 91. See aiso Al-Azmeh. "Nationdism and the Arabs," p. 6. Yi Simon. Berween Two Waa p. 33.
YS Farouk-Sluglett Iraa Since 1958. This revoit was significantly "the first manifestation of a forrn of lraqi national identity." P. IO. " Nakash. Shiah in Iraq, p. 138.
" Kedourie, Nationalism. "A state which is incompetent to satisS, different races condemns itseIf."Pp. 133.
Y8 Biton Cooper Busch, Britain, India. and the Arabs: 19 14 - !9Z 1 (Berkeley: Berkeley University Press, 1971). The British Foreign Office in 1919 marked Sharifians as educated men with Western ideas; one official said "...the success of Our regime in Mesopotamia depends on Our finding a sphere for these men." Iraqi Sharifians in Faisal's Syrian government expected the sarne privilege and high office in Iraq. P. 342. 99 Reeva Simon. 'The Education of an Iraqi Amy Officer," in The Origins of Arab Nationalism. ed. by Rashid Khalidi et al (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991). p. 163.
lm Sluglett, 'The Historbgraphy of Iraq." Although modern state education was instituted in the lace 19th century, "few if my Shi'is aaended new state schools. Consequently when the Iraqi state was created in 1920. there were few qualified Shi'is able or wiiling to take part in the leadership or in the administration. and this situation continued with regard to cabinet participation throughout the monarchy." P. 14 13.
'O' Ndcash. The Shiah of b."Internai poiitics was dorninated by the British. the Sunni ex-Ottoman officers, and by the royal family ...in the palace." While each was motivated by different interests. "they shared a degree of cornmon interest in their attempt to undermine the position of Shi'i Islam in Iraq. P. 75. Kohn, Nationalism and Imberiaiism. Bridging these differences created a united front in the revolts. P. 1 15. See also Sluglett, Britain in Irag. An alliance between Sunni and Shi'i dama also existed. P. 303
'O3 Nakash, aahof b.The mujtahids saw British occupation of Palestine and Iraq as an attempt to control Persia by a ueaty relationship and a threat against Islam. Their religious motivation is cornborateci by the words of Shaikh ai-Shari'a Isfahani and Mina Muhammad Taqi Shirazi in 1920. P. 67.
'IMJohn Esposito and John Voll, Islam and Democracv (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). p. 5. CHAPTERFOUR
THE NATIONALMOVEMENT: 1921 - 1932
In a petition presented to the British occupation administration in 19 19. the Shi'a and Sunnis of Baghdad expressed their wish for an independent Arab state under a Muslirn
Arab king, subject to a national legislative council.' This rare example of cooperation between traditional antagonists anticipated the decision taken by the British at Cairo in
192 1. The British choice of king was Faisal, a son of the Sharif Husain. According to
Tarbush. the prince had corne to gnps with the grim reality of the hiture of the Hijaz. the wisdom of a British relationship.' and. no doubt. the unlikelihood of another offer of kingship. Having failed in Syria and forfeited his throne, he would not fail in Iraq. Faisal understood the necessity of identiwing himself with the people, of cultivahg "'enduring ties of common feeling and purpose" arnong the diverse racial and religious Croups of
1raq.) Although an Arab nationalist whose dtimate goal was a unifed Arab nation, Faisal ibn Husain al-Hashimi focused first on replacing the British mandate with a treaty of alliance in order to ensure the emergence of a sovereign state of hq.
The coronation of King Faisal 1 of Iraq on August 23, 192 1 took place amid tense negotiations to defme the position of the king within the mandatory structure. The ceremony was suitably sensitive to colonial interests; therefore. the demand that the king formally deciare his subordination to British authority in his coronation speech was withdrawn.' The king's rather cryptic acceptance of that authority, as interpreted by the
British high commissioner, was suffkiently servile to reassure the British govemrnent in
London.' However, Faisal was no sooner enthroned than he became the center of a crisis over the Anglo-Iraqi treaty. Differences arising out of the British concept of the king's role and Faisal's own concept of thaî role led to disagreement between the British and their protégé. The king clearly recogmzed the importance of adhering to the British lead; yet, he demanded iraq's retationship with Briîain be dictated solely by the parameters of a treaty, not a
Although Faisal's atternpt to gain public support for the treaty failed. the British were already regretting theîr choice of king. Angered by the crisis and the king's 'treachery'.
Winston Churchill, the British colonial secretary, let it be known that treaty, mandate. or both, "Faisal would be a long time finding a third throne."'
From the beginning of the monarchy in 1921, three factions influenced affairs in the mi provinces of Baghdad and Basra -Mosul was to become a province of Iraq in lanuary 1926. These factions were: (1) the British. through the representaûve powea of its high commissioner in Baghdad; (2) King Faisal and his Iraqi and Syrian Arab nationalist entourage; and, (3) the hqi Shi'i and Sunni nationalist opposition. This triad. while forming the institutions and fulfilling the conditions requisite to independence, effectively controlled the power of the state in Iraq until 1932.
Undeniably, the British were obsessed by their vital lines of communication and economic interests. In fact. Britain viewed Iraq as a possible catalyst in its postwar economic rebirth.' The king envisioned an Lraq devoid of ethnic disunity, sectarian discord, social inequality and economic dilemma but only as a preliminary step to uniting ail Arab States in an Arab nation or federation which he would foster and de. However, consideration must be given to his ambition of building not only a state but an Iraqi heritage for his descendants. With the exception of its important influence on the educational system, Arab nationalism lay practically dorrnant in Iraq untii afier independence. Arab and Iraqi nationalists, moderates and extrernists, sought power as a means towards realizing their divergent goals; however, the pathway to that realization was strewn with struggles for personal power and wealth. These goals did not take precedence over the Iraqi desire for independence from British de.
101 It is to be rernembered that, dthough nationalist leaders were fighting for power. the legai nght to power in Iraq lay in the discretion of the League of Nations which had invested in Britain the responsibility for preparing the former Ottoman provinces for independence. Although nationalists might weil have questioned the legality of League authority over Iraq in temof popular sovereignty, it was incumbent upon the government to prepare for and be worthy of independence -fulfillment of which would be their passport to League membership and Iraqi emancipation. The fint steps had been taken: an indigenous army was formed, a constitution and a treaty of alliance drafted. Only the approvai of the govemment and the ratification of the documents by a national constituent assernbiy was required for them to pas into law. Many nationaiists and non-nationalists considered the survival of Iraq dependent on British assistance while others weighed the possibility of unilateral independence. a return to the Turkish fold. or a merger with iraq's
Persian neighbour. As reveaied above in chapter three, both Sunni and Shi'a, in spite of divided ideological loyaities and conflicting ultimate goals, charted the coune of the country' s future.
Sluglen has constructed a loose categorization of lnqi poiiticians in this period: the
'court,' composed of Faisal and hs close companions; the nationalists. who were mostly urban Sunnis, for reasons of education and political experience: and, as we have noted. the
Shi'a, who were in the majority, but not ail nati~nalists.'~Because of the highly personal. as opposed to party-oriented, nature of Iraqi politics during this period. individuais sometimes belonged to more than one of the above-mentioned groups. In several cases, loyalties were owed to di three categories. Thus Faisal's imer circle included men who were hindamentaily nationalist (such as Jarnii ai-Midfa'i, Yasin al-Hashimi) as well as anti- nationalist (Muhammad al-Sadr). Muhsin Abu Tabikh followed ''cornplex courses of action", to use Sluglett's phrase, and at various times belonged to each of the categories.
Most nationaiists refused to iimit the growth of the state in its formative years, ho wever, there were elements which objected to the controlling influence of the British.
102 Therefore, from the fit days of his reign, not unlike the politicaily charged days of the Young Turks, the king was obliged to "run with the hare and hunt with the hounds.""
Although it is tme that Sunnis held the positions of power, Faisai's appointments to his cabinets, whether as a matter of policy or a means of insuring his own popularity, included a superficial srnattering of Shi'is, Kurds, and other minorities. It has in fact been said that Faisal gave no indication of Shi'a or Sunni bias; like Sharif Husain of Mecca, his son apparently held " a simple pre-schsm interpretation" of Islam."
THE KING AND HIS CABINETS
In September 1921, the fust cabinet was appointed by royal decree and included a nucleus of predominantty Sunni ministers from the provisional government. Iraq's fus[ prime rninister was Abd al-Rahman ai-Gailani, the Sunni Nagib of ~aghdad;" two of
Faisal's rninisters, Jafar al-Askari and Hasqail Sassoon, formed part of the 'inner circle' while the new rninister of justice, Naji al-Suwaidi, was a dedicated Sunni Iraqi nationalist.
The cabinet itself was representative of most groups in Iraq. Faisal created a power base through his appointments of Sunni Arab nationaiists who had ken loyal to him in the past. including: Jafar al-Askari, Nuri al-Sa'id, Jdal Midfa'i. and Ali Jawdat al-Ayyubi - each of whom eventudy became prime minister.I4 The iraqi army, commanded by the ex-
Sharifian Nuri al-Sa'id, was created by his comrade-in-arrns. Jafar al-Askari, the rninister of de fense.
Tarbush roughly estimates that between 1921 and 1936 city notables received fi@- four percent of cabinet posts, the officer class thirty-eight percent, and the merchant class eight percent." Of the fourteen prime ministers from 192 1 to 1932, there were nine former
Suni Ottoman officers; similarly thuty-six of the fifty-six major cabinet memben during the same penod were officers. It was these men who retumed to Iraq with Faisai. whose ailegiance he could count on, who fded most of the important civil and rnilitary posts. With successive governrnents, those in power rarely changed. The same nationalists exchanged places at the top; the reshuffling of posts was primarily among the Sumi urban nationalists not averse to excluding from power representatives of the majority Shi'i cornrnunity or the largest non-Arab minority, the Kurds.
One example of tokenism in Faisal's cabinet appointrnents was his habitua1 selection of a Shi'a to the position of minister of education, although Sati al-Husri who held the nominally subordinate post of director-general of education from 1922 to 1927 wielded the real power over educational policy. In fact, the Shi'i ministerial appointee was frequently a religious leader from Karbaia or Najaf who did not speak Arabic.I6 The inability of these appointees to participare consmictively in cabinet affairs because of their lack of Arabic serves to highlight Faisal's strategy of a highly symbolic appointment to a position which remained, for al1 intents and purposes. impotent.
hother exarnple of tokenism was the inclusion of Muslim and non-Muslim minorities in the govemment. Jmal and Jdal Baban of the landowning nobility, the Sadah. were Sunni Kurds who heid cabinet posts during the mandate." Hasqail Sassoon. the previously mentioned Jewish deputy for Baghdad in 19 13, was the minister of finance in the Fmt and successive governrnents. Tribal shaikhs were influentid in Baghdadi politics; as hereditary chieftains, they controiled the tribal domain, although, as pillars of Bntish authority, few tribal shaikhs achieved cabinet rank. The exception was the erudite Abd al- Muhsin Sa'dun of a tribal Sadah farnily and prime rninister four times in the 1920s.
The Sunni Arab nationalists who were appointed io the cabinet by the king and composed the governing elite were mainly those of whom the Bntish approved or found it expedient to appoint. Three prominent non-Iraqi Arab nationalists appointed were: Sati al- Husri, director-general of education; Tahsin al-Qadri. his military attaché; and the Shi'i
Rusturn Haidar, Faisal's fmt chief of the Royal Diwan. AU became Iragi citizens and held important govemment positions weU beyond independence. Sunni and Shi'i nationalists in opposition to the govemment and to the British presence were not within Faisal's inner sanctum. They disapproved of the alien king and, in fact. made ineffectua1 attempts to depose him in 192 1 and again in 1930.
In late 1921, the Anglo-Iraqi treaty was sent to the League of Nations for approval while the constitution. drafted by the king, the prime minister, and the British high cornmissioner was presented to the cabinet. Aithough the constitution was designed to give legislative powers to the king and the representatives of the people. "the British controlled one and the nationalists the other."ls Although, the king was perceived as a pawn of the British throughout his reign, his influence over the cabinet was considerable. inasmuch as there was Little scope for nationalist participation in government until a parliament was inaugurated. When the League of Nations declared its approval of the treaty within the manahte framework, the extrernists reacted by mobiiizing nationalist forces against both the British and the king.
It seems that the British-Iraqi treaty of alliance was misconstrued by nationalists as the end of mandatory tutelage. To the Iraqi nationalists, who perhaps saw the treaty as a recognition of sovereignty, the mandate was a form of colonization. To the British. the treaty was intended to protect British rights in 1raq,Ig not to replace the mandate which legitimized Britain's position in Iraq. Understandably, negotiations were long and arduous.
uisistence on a treaty relationship, prirnarily due to cost effectiveness. was defmed at the conference in Cairo in March 192 1. Under such a treaty arrangement the fmancial burden of the mandate would be removed from the Bntish treasury to the Iraqi govemment whiie maintainhg Britaùi's legitimate authority as delegated by the League. Cabinets were appointed or dismissed by the king as dictated by Bntish authority. Decision-making would continue to be controlled by British advisors responsible to the high commissioner. Britain would remain responsible for intemal order and for the defense of Iraq by the British air force which was due to take over in 1922 from the British my.The Iraqi army would be
105 kept under-manned and under-armed. The uibes were better equipped than the Iraqi -y" -but less of a threat to the British. Sunni and Shi'i nationalists were, nanirally, against a treaty which recailed so vividly Iraq's long history of foreign domination.
National opposition to the treaty and the mandate was mounted by the nationalists, the intelligentsia, and the Iraqi press. A delegation of Sunni and Shi'i extremis& presented the king with demands which would Lunit British deto "diplornatic representation" and would end British influence in ~raq." In effect, the nationalists issued demands for irnmediate liberation. independence. and self-government which would, if not met. lead to Faisal's deposition. In support of the nationalists, prorninent Shi' i clergy panicipated in anti-British demonstrations in which the Shi'a and the Sunnis were united once more. --17
in their opposition to the British the mujtahidin issued a fa~~to which many Shi' a rernained faithful, forbidding Shi' a from government service. Moreover in April
1922. there was funher opposition rnounted at a conference in the Shi'i holy city of Karbala. The funire Ayatollah, Mahdi al-Khalisi, cded together two hundred [nqi dama. notables and tribal shaikhs including those of the Mid-Euphtes, the self-same tribes which led the 1920 hqi revoit - seemingiy to discuss ment Wahhabi raids but. in reality, to foment discontent and opposition to the treat~.'~ The king declined the invitation, as did the proBritish Sunni tribal shaikhs. Except for the Mid-Euphrates tribes. there was no Wied opposition to the treaty although the mujtahidin issued a jihad against the Wahhabis to which the Sunni dama objected.
Meanwhile, a member of the Nagib's cabinet. the Shi'i leader Jafar Abu Timman. "resigned rather than sign the treaty"? His National Party joined with the Renaissance Party in anti-treaty nationalist demonstrations which fmally halted the entire election process for a constituent assembly. The extremists denounced the treaty, the mandate, and the Sunni cabinet and called for the appointment of a Shi'i scholar, Sayyid Muhmad al- Sadr, as prime minister." In August 1922, the king's encouragement of the extrernisd6 provoked the resignation of the prime minister and the rancour of the high commissioner. Faisal ensuing illness is said to have saved his deposition. Determinecf to thwart nationaiist ambitions, Sir Percy Cox assumed direct administrative authority over Iraq. After taking control of the government, he banished the nationalist leaders to an island in the Persian pif. He ordered the bombing of vengeful ixibes. He dismissed Arab officiais with exverne nationalist tendencies and had advisors act for them; he suspended the freedom of press and assembly: and he banned the Shi'i political parties" who issued manifestoes protesting British interference. The British high commissioner issued an ultimatum - sign the treaty or revert to strict mandatory de."Al1 pretense of autonomy" was over?
The cabinet fonned in September 1922 was again headed by prime minister Abd al- Rahman al-Gailani; it also included the defense rninister, Jafar &Askari and the new interior minister, Abd al-Muhsin Sa'dun. AU were Sunni nationalists. In October of thaî year, pressured by the Bntish. the cabinet approved the Anglo-hqi treaty of alliance: its subsidiary financial, judicial, military . and foreign and domestic agreements: and. in accordance with the mandate, a constitution and electoral law." The lack of an elected national constituent assembly delayed the raüfïcation of the treaty and the constitution. Meanwhile, British personnel were to advise each Iraqi minister, to supervise the lraqi army, and to decide Iraqi financial and foreign poiicy while preparing haqis for self- govemment. In essence. the Bntish had achieved actuai control of Iraq, its govemment, and its rnilitary .
The Iraqi cabinet's approval of the treaty did not end opposition however, nor did it ensure the treaty's ratification by a national constituent assembly. To both Sumi and Shi'i nationaiists, the treaty bore the stigma of subjection. Ratification of the treaty was also harnpered by the govemment's fear that its legitimacy would be jeopardized by the Shi'is refusal to participate in the elections of an assembly while Shi'i and Sunni nationalists and non-nationaiists continued to protest the British mandate. This anti-British activity
1O7 produced an anti-election fatwa. Sayy id Mahdi Khdisi, Sayyid Abdul-Hasan Isfahani, and
Mina Muhammad Husain Na'ini issued fatwar declaring it udawful for Muslims to vote in the elections; disobedience would esult in 4'excommunication'~.30In November 1922, the elderly prime minister, Abd al-Rahman al-Gailani, resigned in favour of Abd al-Muhsin
Sa'dun, a prime minister of ‘@ester vigour and readier mind, and one who could form a more effective counterpoise to Faisal", who was again consorting with the opposition.
The king feared an hqi might yet mie Iraq, a possibility discussed by hqi nationalists.
Diarchal authority functioned as an integral part of the central govemment and each Iraqi minister had a pardel British advisor in order to prepare Iraqis for self-government." Deeply resented by the Iraqi ministers, the Sunni Arab nationalist politician Yasin al-
Hashimi. who joined Sa'dun's cabinet in Novernber 1922, was no exception. An avid opponent of the pro-British govemment and the Anglo-hqi treaty but prone to opportunism. he was penuaded to accept a mînistenai position despite the govemment's position favouring the treaty." Hashirni, hprisoned by the British in late 1919 for subversive activities while a mernber of the postwar Arab governrnent in Syria, had pater influence at the time than Faisal - a fact which the king resented and refused to forget."
Understandably, Yasin al-Hashimi did not belong to the govemrnent 'inner circle': however, owing to his political acumen, he held various cabinet posts but spent most of his energies in opposition. He headed the Treaty Cornmittee from 1922 to 1924 which he attempted to innuence. Of the meen members of the cornmittee, nine were tribal shaikhs: seven Arabs and two Kurds who vacillated on the treaty issue 35 - a consideration which both the government and the opposition attempted to exploit. Almost three years would pass between the draftuig of the treaty and its ratification, during which tirne changes affecting the terms of the treaty of alliance and the acquisition of the province of Mosul would prove more favourable to Iraqis. Ln February 1923, nationalists' articles in the Iraqi press critical of the mandate concurred with the British press' advocacy of the withdrawal of the British frorn Iraq. The press thus influenced the British govemment's curtailment of the original terms of the Anglo-hqi treaty. '' Jh April 1923, a protocol of the Anglo-Inqi treaty of 1922 reduced the mandatory period from twenty to four years - a more viable proposition for both Sunni and Shi'i nationalists. However, the failure to elect a constituent assembly. due in large part to opposition by the Shi'i Persian clergy," necessitated the intervention of the Iraqi government to rat@ the treaty and the constitution.
Important steps taken by the cabinet in April 1923 affected the Shi'i cornmunity. First, the British announced that the protocol to the Anglo-hqi treaty would not take effect until after the "ratification of a peace treaty with Turkey."" Turkish nationalists under Mustafa Kemal had by then liberated Anatolia and they claimed their former province of Mosul by reason of race. economics ties, and occupation der the armistice. They had not only repossessed their own country, they had deprived Iraqi Kurds of a promised independence and proffered Iraqis a renewal of their former ties. Had the Turks not abolished the caliphate the following year, the Iraqis rnight have been more prone to accept.
Acts of intimidation and agression by the Turks against the local inhabitants on the northem frontier were causing concem in Baghdad and London. When a religious decree issued in Karbala by the Shi'i Persian clergy in April 1923 favoured the Turks, Baghdad reaçted imrnediately. Pro-Turkish efements within the SM'i Persian clergy prevailed upon the Shi'i alUn Mahdi ai-Khalisi to issue a fanva which forbade my Shi'a to defend Lraq against his brother Mu~lirns.'~This fatwa -and a second fatwa forbidding Shi'a participation in eiections- was the undoing of the non-hqi clergy. An amendment to the immigration law. allowing for the deportation of non-Iraqis for anti-govenunent activity, was invoked to end the political power of the Shi'i Persian mujtahidin in Iraq." Mahdi al-Khalisi and his family were deported and traveled to Mecca in June 1923. whereupon Isfahani. Na'ini, and other ~rlmna lefi for Persia in protest." The response from the Shi'i Mid-Euphrates tnbes and the Shi'i comrnunity was not excessive. Since the death of the supreme mujtahid in December 1920, the leadership of the Shi'i comnity had been divided, allowing for the "Anb rnujtahids to quietly chailenge Persian influence." The most outstanding of the Iraqi Shi'i Arab mujtahidin to emerge was Muhammad Husayn Kashif al-Ghita who was descended from a local tribal fa~nily.~~Al-Ghita helped to reconciie the Shi'a with their loss of leadership and assisted in the fight for Shi'i rights and representation in govemment. Permission for the Persians' rem to Lraq was granted by the Iraqi governrnent under conditions which forbade funire involvernent in Iraqi politics.
Ln summarizing the influence of the Persian clergy up to this tirne, the Slugletts note that the clergy's opposition was not directed agauist the predorninantly Sunni govenment. Rather, as was shown by their support of the Ottomans against the English during the war and. no doubt, their stand in favour of the Turkish caliphate until it was abolished in 1924, they were inclined to "stand on the side of 'Islam' against 'the infidels"'.'" Hans Kohn contends that it was "cornmon Oriental interests" which motivaied the divines, normally hostile to Sunnis and especially Turks "known for their irreligious attitude" who were threatening Mos~l."~Shi'i Persian clergy were accused of inept leadership, especially mi- election decrees, anti-government activity, and appeals to foreign elements. narnely Persia
After June 1923, the Iraqi Shi'a ceased to maintain a united political front. Two groups emerged: those who worked with Sunni nationalists to oppose the Bntish presence in Iraq and those who defined theû self-interest more narrowly and sought to improve the status of the Shi'a through cooperation with the British. The latter group, whose characteristic withdrawal from Ottoman politics le fi it w ith few politically experienced leaders relative to the Iraqi Sunnis, relied on the British to protect their intereds Although there were notable exceptions. this placed the majonty of Shi'a in opposition to the nationalists. With the depamire of the influentid non-Iraqi clergy, the Shi' i Arabs participated in the political process. Elections took place for the National Constituent Assembly which convened in March 1924 under the presidency of Abd al-Muhsin Sa'dun? Dw to nationalist opposition more than six months would elapse before the Assembly ratified the treaty and then only after a British threat to apply the original mandate." Extreme nationalists were not deterred by the British ultimatum however. Shi'i Sayyid Muhammad al-Sadr, who advocated a policy of alliance with those Sunni politicians who opposed the ruiing elite, joined Yasin al-Hashirni, Naji al-Suwaidi, and Shaikh Ahmad al-Da'ud in an effort to discourage the Shi'i shaikhs of the Euphrates from "voting the treaty through the Constituent ~ssernbly."~~Sluglen states that the shaikhs favoured British rule because they felt it would better protect their rights than the Iraqi govemment.
Members of the Assembly were pressured and manipulated by inrimidahg articles in the Iraqi government press. Kedourie quotes from articles airned at extremist deputies using the Mosul negotiations in process as a lever suggesting they would lose Mosul province if they did not rat@ the treaty. One quote reads "Raiher than have Sir Percy Cox and the full rnight of Britain to defend Mosul ...the Assembly prefers to trust Shaikh Ahmad ai-Shaikh Daoud to defend Mosul against the Turks." In another, published just pnor to the vote on ratification, the author asks the nationalists to consider if they wished '?O restore
Mosul to the Turks or to keep it for ~raq.'*~When the nationalists did rahfy the treaty, an addendurn stipulated that the document would have no affect "if the govemment does not safeguard die rights of Iraq in the whole of the Mosul vilayet.'"'
According to Longrigg, the nationalist campaign consisted of intimidation and violence by both the government and the opposition, one instance of whch led to the wounding of two pro-Treaty deputies in the street~.~'in June 1924, an ad hoc session of the constituent assembly was cailed by Prime Minister Jafar al-Askari to ratiw the treaty. The loydties of the pro-treaty and anti-treaty nationalists in the National Constituent Assembly and the power of the aibal shaikhs who were Shi'a and Sunni. Arab and Kurd are listed below:
Favored: Jafar al-Askari, Ali Jawdat, Nuri as-Sa'id, Sabih Nasha't, Abd al-Muhsin Shaliash, Yusuf Ghanirnah, Yasin al-Amir, Akbashi as-Sa'd, Sulaiman Ghazalah, Da' ud al-Haidari, Habib at-Talibani, 1s haq Afia' irn, Mirzah Faraj , Fatah Muhammad. katUthman, Sa'id Qadir, Taufiq Ahmad, Ali as-Sulaiman, Fatah Sirsirn, Yahya Smikah, Shawaya al-Fahad, Falih as-Suhyud, Shabib al-Mazban, Abd ar-Rahman al-Haidari, al-Majid ash-Shawi -25 nationalists, 7 Arab and 5 Kurdish shaikhs. Opposed: Yasin al-Hashimi, Ra'uf al-Chadirchi, Ahmad as-Da'ud, Naji as-Suwaidi. Abd ar-Razzaq Sharif, Muhammad Zaki, Asif Qasim Aqha, Da'ud al-Chalabi, Abd ar-Razzaq, Ahmad ash-Shawwish -10 nationalists, 13 Arab & 1 Kurdish shaikh. ''
There were eight abstentions and thirty-one absentees. Notably absent were Jafar Abu Tùnman who had renounced politics but not his convictions: and Sayyid Muhammad al- Sadr, the Shi'i scholar and political non-nationalist activist. Ten of the fifteen rnembers of the Treaty Cornmittee which Yasin al-Hashirni headed and influenced were opposed to the ratification of the treaty.
Those hqi nationalists and non-nationdisis who delayed the growth of the state in its formative years fought the British on every issue, demanding independence at every turn. It is remarkable that, in spite of political rivahy, they chose not to be so resolute with the iraqi government of the day. Yet, the inevitability of establishing dernocratic institutions had to be acknowledged if independent self-government was to be achieved. The Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1922 provided for British supervisory responsibilities; however. it also provided for religious and educational freedom and an Iraqi constitution s3 without whch the prerequisites to independence could not be fulfded.
Opposition to the treaty was oniy part of a major power struggle between Iraqi nationalist politicians and the mandatory authonty. The constituent assembly also debated the Iraqi constitution, which was kally ratifïed in July of 1924. The constitution decreed that: Islam become the official state religion and Arabic the official language: that Christian and Jewish communities be accorded their own religious counciis; and, that Sunni and Shi' i courts be built into a unified Muslim legal ~ystern.'~Tribal law, already paramount in the rural areas since 1916 via the Tribal Criminal and Disputes Replation, was officially entrenched in the Constitution in 1925.55thereby increasing the power of the tribal shaikhs. The constitution provided for a monarchy, parliamentary govemment. bicameral legislatue, an appointed senate, and an elected house of representatives.
The vident anti-British elements had gradudy disappeared from the political scene: the Sunni Kurdish shaikhs of the Barzinjis and Shi'i Arab shaikhs of the Mid-Euphrates were replaced by more pliant candidates; however, the Sunni Iraqi nationalists formed political parties in opposition to the govemment. There was no place for those unwilling to work within the mandatory structure. As long as the Briùsh prioritized appointments. those in power included Sunni Sharifian officers, Sunni urban officiais, and pro-British tribal shaikhs, Sunni and Shi'a, Arab and Kurd. Those excluded were the extreme lraqi nationalists of both sects, secular and religious. Once the treaty had been ratified, Jafar al- Askari and his cabinet resigned office, the constituent assembly was dissolved, and Yasin al-Hashimi, usuaiIy arnong the opposition, took over as the new prime minister.
Sunni Prime Minister Yasin al-Hashirni's cabinet of August 1924 was a variation on former cabinets: Rashid Ali al-Gailani, a Sunni Judge in the Appellate Court, was Wster of justice: Muzahim &Pachachi, a Sunni iawyer and Arab nationalist, minister of works and communications; Muhammad Rida al-Shabibi, a Sh'i pet, intellectual and merchant. minister of education: Hasqail Sassoon. Jewish financier, minister of finance. AU of the above were from Baghdad. Ibrahim al-Haidari of Irbil, a Sunni Kurd and former Shaikh al- Islam, was minister of auqaf, and, Abd al-Muhsin al-Sa'dun, a Sunni shaikh from the Muntûfq and former Ottoman deputy, officer, and graduate of the Shaikhs' Coiiege in
Istanbul, minister of the interior? Sa'dun was an Anglophile whose post was engineered by the British to contain the ambitious prime minister, his rival in the nationalist movement. MOSUL, OL, AND GEOGRAPHICALUNITY
The cabinet's negotiations of the ternis of the oil concession with the British- controiled consortium went hand in hand with Turkey's clah to Mosul at a hearing with the League of Nations Council in September 1924. Terms involved the sale of royaities, the bais for royalties. and a dernand for twenty percent equity in the company - originaliy given to the Turks and at San Remo to the Iraqis - for participation in iü management." Company negotiators refused the Iraqi request for a share in the company; rather the union of Mosul with Iraq was used as leverage to intimidate cabinet members. After months of debate, the oii concession was acquired by the Turkish Petroleum Company, later the [raqi Petroleum Company, "without Iraqi participation", an outcome that resulted in the resignation of two cabinet ministers, Rashid Ali al-Gailani and Muhammad Rida al-
hab bibi? Iraq agreed to a seventy-five year concession which was approved in March 1925. The oil concession was successfully tied to the assessment of the northem border and the disposition of ~osu1.~~
A volatile area and a constant threat to the stabiiity of the [raqi govemment. Mosul
was of economic, political, and religious interest ro Iraq. The disposition of the province of Mosul caused controversy among the Iraqis, the Kurds, the Turks, and the British. The Kurds ciaimed the province as part of Kurdistan, rebelling when the British attempted to include Mosul in the mandate for Iraq in 1920. The Turks pressed their clah to their former province by armed incursions over the border, attacking Christian inhabitants. and intirnidahg Kurdish tribesmen. However. with its close proximity to the routes to Persia and India and its oil potential, Mosul was of strategic and economic importance to the British. AUy and enemy alike coveted the oil-rich provinceoO
British statesmen, acting on behaif of Iraq, and their Turkish counterparts failed to
resolve the question of Mosul during the negotiations at the Lausanne conference in 192 3.
As a resuit, a League of Nations' commission of inqujr was set up. The predominance of an Arab population in Mosul was proven by the British and used as the basis for a legitirnate daim to the province; there were too few Osrnanli Turks in the province to support Turkey's claim? Turkish border attacks on the Christian minorities were another important factor infiuencing the union of Mosul with Iraq. In September 1924, at a hearing in Geneva on Turkey's daim to the temtory, the League of Nations upheld the decision of its commission. Turkey challengd the League's authority; however, the Permanent Court of International Justice also upheld the League's de~ision.~'As compensation. a British- Iraqi agreement assigned Turkey ten percent of Mosul's oil production.
ûil had not, as yet, become a profitable source of revenue for Iraq; exploration and production had not even begun. Yet there was no question that Mosul with its potential oil wealth would benefit the economy. In fact, many hqis believed that without Mosul's oil income the provinces of Baghdad and Basra codd not survive economically, nor could the minority Sunnis swive in a "Shi'i-dominated tat te."^^ In consequence, nationalists agreed that its acquisition was worth the price that had to be paid -the Anglo-Iraqi treaty of 1926.
The League of Nations' award of Mosul to Iraq was contingent upon the prolongation of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty for tweniy-five years - unless the League accepted Iraqi membership at an emlier date.64 To protect Kurdish rights, the League insisted on this condition; otherwise, it decreed, Mosul would go to Turkey. It was also a consideration in the simultaneous assaying of the Iraqi-Turkish frontier.
The demarcation of national borders was a prerequisite to self-government but it also helped to establish foreign policy with Iraq's neighbours. With the Great Western Desert as a frontier, border problerns between Syria and Iraq were minimal - no more than the traditional rivalries of nomadic nibes. A green line indiscriminately drawn on a map of the southem desert by Iraq's British high commissioner, Sir Percy Cox, in 1922 was agreed to by Kuwait's derat the tirne, Amir Mubarak? This "line in the sand" became the official Iraqi-Kuwaiti border, Iraqi relations with Turkey's Mustafa Kemal, the Najd's Faisal ibn Saud. and Persia's Reza Khan who aii beset Iraq with border disputes were not quite as amicable.
Sunni Turks attacked Christian inhabitants in the north, 66 Wahhabi purists attacked Arab tnbes in the south, and Shi'i Persians incited Arab and Kurdish triks in the east. The Iraqi- Turkish border was established by the League of Nations Council in October 1924 as an intenm frontier and. on the recornrnendation of the bague's commission. "the retention of the Brussels line" was confmed in July 1925 provided Kurdish rights were ~rotected.~'
The Iraqi southem frontier with Najd was problematic for most of the mandate. necessitating constant parrollhg by the Royal Air Force. In the name of purist religion and led by the fanatic Shaikh Faisal al-Dawish. Arabian Wahhabis attacked Iraqi frontier outposts and isolated Shi'i towns and tribesmen until 1929? A civil war between ibn Saud and al-Dawish succeeded in ending the raids and a Saudi-[raqi treaty and boundary
(with fiee zones) were eventudy established in 193 1.
Border disputes with Persia involved the Shatt al-Arab waterline and the Iraqi Kurds sanctuary. Tariq Isrnael identifies three penods and issues pertinent to the Shatt dispute: the period of regional imperid rivalry when tribal allegiances were considered: during imperialist expansion, the geographically fixed points: and. during nationalist rivairy. the cultural characteristics of population^.^^ The legality of an 1864 Ottoman-
Persian treaty setthg the boundaries was disputed. In 1932, Iran (until 1925 known as Persia) requested that the Shatt al-Arab boundary be detemiined on the 'Thalweg principle" which Iraq rejected." Persians granting sanctuary to the rebel hqi Kurds frorn lraqi govemment forces was an issue not settied during the mandate.
Although sorne issues were dealt with, not dl border problems could be resolved.
Iran and Iraq saw armed conflict throughout the 1980s. regional and international conflict plagued Iraq and Kuwait in 196 1 and 1990, and recuning Kurdish problems cause strife with Tebran and Ankara even today. However in the 1920s, the hqi govemment was intent on securing her borders not as an independent sovereign state but as one of the prerequisites to statehood demanded by the League of Nations.
The iraqi bicarneral parliament was inaugurated by King Faisal in 1925. The first president of the senate was Yusuf al-Suwaidi, a dedicated Iraqi Sunni nationalist. early member of al-Fatat and of Haras al-Istiqlal, and among those exiled after the revolt of
1920.'~A young Baghdadi lawyer and Sunni mernber of Sa'dun's cabinet. Rashid Ab al- Gailani, becarne president of the chamber of deputies. Among the parliament's eighty-eight deputies and twenty senators. Sunni and Shi'i Arab notables and shaikhs predominated with only the rare rninority representative. The emergence of govemment and opposition parties was an evolution of parliarnentary development; the Progressive Party was the party of the Sunni prime rninister Abd al-Muhsin Sa'dun and the Nationalist Party that of the Shi'i nationahst Jafar Abu ~irnman.~~Yasin al-Hashimi. the leader of the opposition. formed the Peoples' Party, a non-sectarian parliamentas, bloc of twenty delegates which included the Shi'is Baqir and Moharnmad Rida Shabibi. both of whom could provide the opposition with Shi'i support.73 After five years of summary decision-making by the cabinet, the parliarnentary system gave the opposition a forum for debate.
Cabinet appointments were still made by the king and approved by the British. In an effort to gain at least a share of the political power, many ShiTa reversed their former intractable opposition to the British. Pro-British shaikhs were also a source of British power in Iraq's parliament, as they had ken in the constituent assembly. Furthermore, whiie many of the former official class resented the infidel bitterly, they were not loathe to cooperate with the British. On the other hand, they did not hide their "distaste for, and poor opinion of Faisal" and his Sharifians who headed many of the cabinets during the mandate.'' Nevertheless, Sunni ex-officers Jafar al-Askari. Nuri al-Sa'id. Ali Jawdat ai- Ayyubi, and Amin Zaki, although Arab nationalists, were not wanting in Iraqi nationalist sentiment -however much they wanted power and prestige.
De Gaury's evaluation of the Iraqi parliament contends that: 1) there were insufficient experienced men to work the system even had they wished to do so or had they understood it; 2) other govemment business was held up dunng elections because the bureaucracy was busy rigging the latter. and, 3) courts were compt because judges were insufficientiy
~aid.'~Emest Main state that there were only a few men of Cabinet rank in the entire
country and it was, in +- a democracy but an oligarchy with a king at its head.76
In late 192 1. : .dis& in Iraq divided into two camps: extrernists, both Shi'i and Sunni, demandea cornplete British withdrawal and complete Iraqi independence while moderates, mostly Sunni. were arnenable to a treaty relationship with Britain providing that the mandate was revoked. The British and the mandate remained. The ensuing years saw the downfall of the Shi'i Persian clergy, the disappearance of many Shi'i activists from the political scene, and the entrenchment of Sunni officen and urban notables in positions of power. By the second session of parliament in 1926, prerequisites for independence were realized and the Lraqi nationalists demanded self-government.
In Novernber 1926. with the appointment of two Shi'is to the cabinet, the minister of education Sayyid Abd al-Mahdi (a Shi'i tribal shaikh of the M~nt~q)and the minister of irrigation and agriculture Abd al-Husain al-Chalabi. a step forward in Shi'i representation. The new prime minister, Jafar &Askari, headed a coterie of Sunni officen and Iawyers who were "strongly influenced by the militaristic and Iegalistic thinking" of the Ottoman Empire -including the Sharifians al-Askari, al-Sa'id, al-Hashimi, and Zaki as weii as members of the legai profession. such as Rashid &Gailani and Ra'uf al-~hadirchi."
Conscription becarne an important parliarnentary issue despite Shi'i and Kurdish (and British) opposition. Aware that the Iraqi army was rnilitarily incapable of defendhg Iraq against outside aggression, the govemment introduced the National Defense bili. It had ken a hard-fought issue since the beginning of the monarchy, and in the constituent assembly in 1924. its introduction in parliament in 1927 brought about a strong Shi'i reaction. Its advocates, the king, the Sharifians, and the moderate nationalists, who were mostiy Sunni, had headed the military in Iraq since conscription was introduced by the Ottomans in the Iate nineteenth century. The moderates believed that conscription would not only strengthen the army numencally but was also "an easy way to achieve national cohesion and the development of a consensus which would somehow dissolve ethnic and religious differen~es."~~
The king and his rninisten toured the counüy to generate votes in favour of conscription, at times. offering promises of lucrative position in governrnent. Its opponents, however, represented both those who would be obliged to serve in the rank and file, -rnainly the tribes, Shi'a, and Kurds- and the mandatory power. The British were unwilling to aid in forcibly instituting a bilI which would give Iraq a strong indigenous army and limit its own effectiveness. When it was introduced in parliament, the Shi'i minister of education, Sayyid Abd &Mahdi, resigned in protest. Shi'a and the Kurds attacked the National Defense bill in the nationalist press and in the parliament untii it was eventually tabied. Consequentiy, conscription was not introduced until 1934.
In 1927, Iraqi nationalists demanded a revision of the new treaty and a review of Iraq's status, citing Iraq's parliamentary and governrnental capability in directing affairs of state. Nationalists demanded a lessening of British administrative control. finding the presence of British advisors consûicting and not conducive to Iraqi interests. They also demanded a reduction in the cost of British wartime railway and port facilities to a level which the hqi economy could support. ln late 1927, the treaty revision was signed in London by King Faisal. Prime Minister Jafar al-Askari, and the British high comrnissioner: however, iittle except a recognition of Lraq's independent status was changed. The treaty promised to support Iraqi rnembership in the League if "progress is maintaineci"; a Limitation, seized upon by nationalisü in parliament, to which al1 other issues were s~brnerged.~~
None of the modifications to the Ficial and Military Agreements, to which the extreme nationalists objected, had ken addressed. The king, who had demanded the relinquishment of British military control to the lraqi army and the fledgling hqi Air Force, confidently began a "trial of strength with the British high cornrnissioner which
Iasted until 1929 -neither communicated personally for two years.sO
While Faisal continued to ask for a lessening of British militlvy control. the British government persisted in refusing. According to Batatu, the dedock between the Iraqi monarch and the British govemment was broken by a change in British policy: Faisal had outplayed the British and military control "eventually found expression in the Anglo-Lraqi
Treaty of 1930."~'The financial agreement, however, remained in effect. Yasin ai-Hashrmi and, a member of the opposition, Rashid ai-Gailani resigned in protest against unduninished British control. The following month the cabinet of Jafar ai-Askari also resigned and Inq sought admittance to the League of Nations.
Membership in the League was up for review every four years. In early 1927, Iraq applied to the British for an end to the mandate and recornmendation for membership. In
July of that same year. the Iraqis were advised that although Britain would not recommend Iraq for membership in 1928, providing Iraq continued its socio-economic progress. a recomrnendation would be made in 1932. Such a condition, as cm be expected, was a blow to the extreme nationalists who had presumed their right to emancipation once the prerequisites were hilfilled. The nationalists argued that progress was ody possible with less British control, an argument which caused serious upheaval in parliament on both the govemment and the opposition sides.
In 1928, the new Labour government in London, reaiizing that the state of Britain's economy necessitated changes in overseas commitments, promised to i-ecornrnend Iraq without qualification. British socialists offered to apply for Iraq's admittance to the League in 1932 which sparked a British cabinet crisis frorn January to April 1929. There were, in fact, conditions attached to this offer because Britain insisted that the Iraqi government buy
British prewar construction in Iraq and sign a new treaty to protect imperiai interests. In essence, this le.to the high commissioner's promise to support Iraq's "early entry" into the League and a new treaty of alliance, with forma1 relaxaiion of British control?'
Despite the govemment's obsession with treaties and the nationalists' cry for independence, the standard of living was low. the economy stagnant. and the army incapable of defending Iraq against outside aggression. Clearly, the need to solve these socio-econornic problems was evident, however, financial resources were Limited: the total revenue of the government was 3.9 million pounds in 1921 and only 4.1 Monpounds in 1933, compared with 129.3 million pounds in 1958.~~The fuiancial outlook changed in
October 1927 when a substantial oiiwell was found at Baba Gurgur near Kirkuk which eventually produced revenue to resolve some of Iraq's formidable socio-economic issues.
Also in 1927, the Shi'a became active on the political scene. They had strong nationalist leadership, a tribal 'bloc' in parliament, and an intelligentsia who were capable of power-sharing in govemment?* The fanva issued by Mirza Muhammad Taqi ai-Shirari in 1920 against working for the infidel had been revokeddS and Sh'i participation in govemment and the civil service had increased. However, the Shi'a struggled against attempts to diseredit Iraqi Shi'a by questioning their Arab ongin and discrimination in state education, especidy in rural areas? Both were issues which had to be addressed by their political representatives in parliament.
A serious incident created havoc arnong the Shi'a when an anti-Shi'i publication by a
Syrian teacher in Iraq, Anis al-Nusuli, caused Shi'i riots and demonstrations. A major repercussions was the resignation of the Arab nationalist Sati al-Husri, the director-general of education. A second incident involved a clash between government troops and Shi'i moumers in a religious procession in Kadhimain. This event caused senous consternation in govemment circles." In Ianuary 1928. a new cabinet ushered in Abd al-Muhsh Sa'dun as prime minister, Nuri al-Sa'id as minister of defense, and othen of their supporters in the Progressive Party. The May 1928 pariiamentary electims resulted in fewer elected Sunnis than normal, whereas an unprecedented 26 Shi'a were elected to the Chamber of Deputies. as well as 16 Kurds. 16 Bedouin Shaikhs. 4 Christians. 4 Jews. and 34 ~unnis.~~B y early 1929, political events in iraq had become reactionary and nationalists pressed for independence.
INDEPENDENCEAND THE NATIONALISTMOVEMENT
The nationalists' demand for an end to the mandate and to the high commissioners' authority caused a violent parliarnentary crisis and four changes of government in 1929. When Sa'dun replaced Askari in 1928, the nationalist opposition in parliament imrnediately debated the modifications of the treaîy and the financial and military agreements. However. Iraqi demands for the "assumption by Iraq of complete responsibility for its defense. Iraqi comrnand over the joint forces. uansfer to haqis of the railroad and port of Basra. and relief from the expenses of the high commissioner's retin~e."~met with a British refusal and, in Ianuary 1929, resulted in Prime Minister Sa'dun's resignation.
In Aprii 1929, the Iraqi nationalist Tawfiq al-Suwaidi formed a new cabinet and. leaving the maty issue aside, stressed the need for socio-econornic development in Iraq. His povernrnent was neither popular with the opposition nor the king and was replaced in June 1929. The opposition contuiued to debate in parliament modifications to the treaty and, as Marr clairns, "the consistency of their attacks on the Bntish were, in fact. responsible for the eventual relinquishment of the Bntish hold on the instruments of intemal power." 90 Whether this is a vaiid assumption or not, the fact remains that the British socialisü who came to power in England in mid-1929 - aided by the British press. the public, and the state of the economy - voted to reconcile Bntain's interests with those of Iraq and terminate its mandate over the latter in 1932.~'
In September 1929 the king appointed Abd al-Muhsin Sa'dun to form his fourth cabinet with Naji ai-Suwaidi, Nuri al-Sa'id Yasin al-Hashimi, Amin WU, Naji Shawkat,
Abd al-Aziz al-Qassab. and Abd al-Husain al-Chalabi. 92 The conscription issue was again bitterly opposed, as was the attempt to estabiish new treaty relations with Britain. The nationalists violent opposition to these issues and personal attacks on the pro-British prime
rninister Sa'dun and his cabinet resulted in the suicide of Sa'dun on November 13. 1929. Naji al-Suwaidi took over as prime minister and attempted unsuccessfully, to Werdie program set by Sa'dun: al-Suwaidi and his cabinet resigned four months later.
Nuri al-Sa'id, a fervent Arab nationalist and Sharifian commander who had sexved
in many cabinets, was appointed prime rninister in March 1930. Arnong his ministers
were the ex-S hari fian Jarnii al-Micifa' i, Ali Jawdat al- Ayyubi, Jafar al- Askari, the Sunni
Arab notable JamiI al-Rawi, the Kurdish lawyer Jamai Baban, and the Shi'i Abd al-Husain
al-~halabi.~~Treaty negotiations began immediately. The terms of the treaty established a
close alliance between Iraq and Bntain. An important issue was the transfer of rniiitary commitments to Iraq while still allowing for Britain's defense of Iraq in case of war and necessitating the leasing of two air bases from the hqis. The treaty's validity was 25 years fiom Iraq's admission to the League of Nations. In March 1930, after the tem of the
treaty had been announced, the nationalists provoked violent anti-treaty demonstrations.
The main obstacle to a positive end to the ueaty negotiations was the Iraqi nationalists' objection to the air bases. Nationalists saw them as a symbol of foreign
domination and as infringing on Iraq's sovereignty. However, the Bntish Air Ministry
rehised '20 rely on Iraqi controlled air bases for refueling purposes" or to relinquish air
bases 9' which linked the Bntish air route to India, provided support to Iraq in tirne of war. and defended Bntish interests in the oilfields of northem Iraq. The Iraqi government feared that without the air bases Britain would retain the mandate. In Apnl 1930. when it was still doubtfui that the League would end the mandate without an Anglo-Lraqi treaty of alliance,
Kùig Faisai, Prime Minister Nuri al-Sa'id and Defense Minister Jafar al-Askari suggested a compromise rneant to satisw both the opposition and the British -withdrawal from the Mosul and Hinaidi air bases, retention of Shaiba in the south and the building of
Habbaniya, fi@ miles West of Baghdad. 95
Although the nationalists objected. and continued to object. to the treaty it was the only means to assuring independence and their assumption of power in the future. The mling elite consisted mainly of a handful of Sunni politicians. dl eager for personal power and prestigious position - each supported by his own clique and political Party. Accordingly, in June 1930. an extraordinary session of parliament was called where. once again, the shaikhs influenced the vote in favour of the ratification of an Anglo-iraqi treaty which fmaily paved the way for Iraqi admission to the League and independent statehood.
The struggle for independence had been, as Marr points out, 'me one issue whch united the nationalists"; now, with independence in sight, it precipitated a stmggle for power among the nationalist politicians in the govemment and the opposition. 96 Extremists
Yasin al-Hashimi, Ali Jawdat al-Ayyubi. Naji al-Suwaidi, and Rashid Ali alGailmi resigned from Parliament and continued their opposition to the new Angio-Iraqi treaty in the press. New parties carne into king such as the National Brotherhood Party. al-Ikha al- Watani, fomed by Sunnis Yasin al-Hashimi and Rashid Ah al-Gailani which united briefly with Shi'i Jafar Abu Timman's hqi Nationalist Party, al-Watani al-lnqiyya.
Young Iraqi university students of both sects fonned a socialist group, the Jama'at al- Ahali, with an Iraqist and reformist programme: its rnembership "believed in religion, tradition, and the redistribution of wedth." 97 One of its major proponents was Jafar Abu Timman, the Shi'i hqi nationalist who has ken hailed as a unifying force for Shi' i and Sunni cohesion during the lraqi revolt of 1920. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Nun al-Sa'id attended a meeting in Geneva to discuss Iraq's membership in the League of Nations, which would end the British mandate and create of Iraq an independent nation. A special commission of inquiry looked into Iraq's self-governing capabilities to which the Bntish gave guarantees of moral responsibility.
After formal debate, the decision was reached. Iraqi membership in the League of Nations was unanimously approved on October 3, 1932.9~
in a mandate situation the eventud aim is statehood or, as Kedourie contends, "self- determination is the political issue par excellence": in the case of Iraq it was national policy in Britain, in the face of economic hardship, and not Iraqis which had dictated the decision to terminate the mandate.99 Whiie this may be me, Longrigg comectly observes that nationalism was "the strongest single force in contemporary Iraqi politics." 'O0 although the self-detemination issue of the Iraqi nationaiist movement ultimately caused the demise of the mandate.
Yet Batatu advances an intriguing theory substantiated by Baghdadi police and British intelligence files on Jafar Abu Timrnan, Muhammad al-Sadr, and Yasin al- ash hi mi.'^' From August 1928 to April 1929, an Iraqi met with Soviet diplomats in Persia representing Shi'i and Sunni members of an Lraqi revolutionary party who sought Soviet moral support. training, and arms for an uprising in Iraq. In early 1929, a pro-Soviet article in an Iraqi newspaper stated that if "the policy of irnperialisrn continues unchanged Iraqis mus t seek other means to achieve independence; an article which al-Sadr implied was "cdculated to induce the Bntish to soften their policy towards Iraq." This theory suggests that once aware of Iraqi ovemires to the Russians, the Iraqis were offered independence to protect British future interests.
The national movernent in Iraq had been galvanized by the Baghdadis desire to create an independent Islamic state bound by a national legislature headed by a Muslim Arab king.
This was to be accomplished through the efforts of Iraqi nationalists representing both religious sects. Inevitably, political differences surfaced between the Shi'a and Sunnis. A major source of these differences was the political activity of the non-Iraqi Shi'i religious leadership, an ultra-conservative and xenophobic group w hic h was responsible for inhibithg Shi'i and Sunni unity in the nationalist mo~ernent'~'while also seeking proportional representation. Aithough the Sunni ruling elite was ensconced in govemment. the Iraqi nationalists in parliament influenced the flairs of state and the lessening convoi of the mandatory power, eventually achieving success and the independence of Iraq.
Iraq's Arab king worked within the framework of the national movement, attempting to forge an iraqi identity by integrating the diverse religious and racial peoples of Iraq. Thus. Faisal "in spite of his descent from the Rophet and his standing in the Muslim world, Faisal did not go in State on Fndays. His son and his grandson did not parade their religion. though that is no reason to doubt the genuineness of their beliefs."lO-'h Iraq, the invisible nature of religion in Sunni nationalism contrasted with that of Shi'i nationalism: however, the foregoing is evidence of the nature of religious loyakies in both groups within the national movement.
Iraq was faced with implementing a democratic constitution unsuitable to its tradition as a Muslim nation and was mled by a Sunni governing class which numbered not more than two or three hundred at the most. 'OJ The King attempted to form a coalition cabinet of Sumis and Shi'is towards the end of the mandate without success. After independence, the Arab nationalist party accepted cabinet posts in a coalition government. however, the Iraqi nationalist party did not receive a similar offer - a rneasure designed to divide and de which effectively dissolved the short-iived nationalist alliance. Arab nationalism became a major force in the 1930s, a force which had leamed al-Husri's message of "Arabism fmt" 'Os in the hqi state school system. Notwithstanding the innuences of Arabism and irnpenalism which molded the future, hqi Sunni and Shi'i nationalists achieved the liberation, independence, and self-government for which they so tenaciously fought for twelve years and brought into being a sovereign Iraqi state.
126 ' Tauber. Formation of Modern Svria and Iraq. "We. the representatives of the Shi'ites and Sunnis, residents of Baghdad and suburbs. inasmuch as we are an Islamic nation. desire that the regions extending from north of Mosul till the Persian gulf shall be one state. Arab, at whose head shall be a Muslim Arab king, one of the sons of our lord. Sharif Husayn. He shall be subject to a national legislative council. whose seat shafl be in the capital of Iraq, Baghdad." P. 279. A petition received during the British plebiscite of 19 18- 19 19. . - . . ' Tarbush. The Role of the Milim in Pol=, p. 37. See also Main. From Mandate to Independence, p. 77. ' Batatu, Qld Social Classes, p. 15. Simons. h:From Sumer to Saddarn (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd.. 1994). The British who M encouraged prewar Arab nationdism now sought to contain it: they placed Faisal on the throne of iraq not "3sa gesture of Arab independence. rather as a means of securing British influence" in the country. P. 190. See also Fromkin. A Peace to End A11 Peace, p. 469. See also Longrigg, ira$; 1900 to 195Q, p. 133. ' Sluglett, Britain in Iraq. it &. "Apart from my personal ideas in direction of Arab nationality 1 am an instrument of British policy. H.M.Govemment and 1 are in the same boat and musc sink or swirn together. Were insirument to fail and in consequence they left Iraq, 1 should have to leave too. Having, so to speak, chosen me, you must treat me as one of yourseIves, and I must be uusted as H. M. Government uusts you. 1 undertake to be guided by your advice... and the mere fact of your presence here and that of Advisors should be sufficient guarantee to those whom it may concem of preservation of your interests." P. 7 1. Fromkin, Peace to End Al1 Peace, p. 508. See KIiernan, Foundations of British Policv. At Caïro. the British agreed to create "under strict British supervision" an Arab govemment. an Iraqi army, and police force, to enable Britain to withdraw its troops, reduce its expenditures and safeguard its interests. P. 7. ' Klieman, Found~onsof British Policy, p. 163. "ritain was in financial straits after World War 1, and it laid great store in the govemment's interest in the oilfields -one reason British P. M. Lloyd George refused the suggested 'scuttle' policy.
Y Tauber, Formation. lnqi nationalist leaders Jafar Abu Timman. Sayyid Muhammad al-Sadr. Yusuf al- Suwaîdi, Ali al-Bazirgan. and Shaikh Daud were among those who opposed cooperation with the British in 1920. P. 301. Al1 were part of the opposition to govemrnent between 1921-32. Sluglett. Britain in p. 173. See also Nakash, Shiah of Iraq. Shi'i Shaikh Mahdi al-Khaiisi and Sayyid Muhammad ai-Sadr accepted Faisal because of his relation to Mecca and Sharif Husain and gave him "conditional supporr if his mle was free of foreign interference and he was bound by a parliament." P. 77.
. * . . " Tarbush, Role of the Mi1ita-y in Politrc~,p. 183.
" Lawrence, Revolt in the Dese~p. 172.
" Cohen. British Policy. The "Anglophile tendencies of the Naguib of Baghdad had been duly noted. as the fact that he was "bitterly hostile" to the Young Turks. P. 299. See also Batatu, Old Social CI-, p. 22 1.
" Batatu, Old Social Classes, p. 334.
l5 Tarbush. Role of the Militarv in Politics, p. 44. See also Batatu. Old Social Classes. Notables hm Baghdad. Basra, and Mosul who served as mernbers of the Chamber of Deputies in the Ottoman parliament were appointed to serve in the new govemment, as were pro-British notables and shaikhs. P. 221. 16 Shglett, minp. 277.
'' Tarbush, Role of the Military in Politics. Jamal Baban held five cabinet posts while Jalal Baba held tluee. P. 46. Ashraf or Sadah were those whose lineage showed direct descent From the tribe of the Prophet.
l9 Simons, From Sumer ro Sacida, p. 183. See dso Klieman. Foundations of British Policy. Britain never considered giving up the mandate which was its "judicial right to remain in Iraq." P. 90
'O Batatu, OId Sqcial Cb,pp. 25-26.
" SiugIett, Britain in Iraq. It was to convoke a National Congress. appoint a Minister for Foreign Affairs. withdraw British advisors, and limit Sir Percy Cox's hnctions to diplornatic representation. P. 305. " Hms Kohn, Historv of Nationalism in the East (London: George Routledge & Sons. 1929). p. 309. Mm,"Yasin al-Hashimi," p. 110. See Nakash, m.Neither Faisal nor any Sunni tribal shaikh attended the conference. Those who did reWto "sanction counterattacks against the Ikhwan." P. 78. See dso, Sluglett. Bntain in u-iiq. They demandeci: a jihad against the Wahhabis, a convocation of a national assembly, half of Iraqi cabinets and officiais be Shi'a. and British recognition of Iraqi independence. P. 305. '' Marr, "Yasin al-Hashimi," p. 113.
'5 Ibid., p. 114. See also Sluglett, Britain in Iraq. By March 1923, ai-Sadr had advised his supporters that oniy if demands for participation were met should vote in elections. P. 307.
26 Sluglett, &gain in Irag. Faisal's suppon of the Shi'i hierarchy angered hs mostly Sunni cabinet -aware of the Shi'is' dislike of thern- and the British -1ikely to demand his "abdication or deposition." P. 307.
'7 Kohn. Historv of Nationalism, p. 309. See also Longrigg, Iraq: 1900 to 1950, p. 141. See also Sluglett. Britain in Iraq. Nationalists Sunni &Pachachi and Shi'i Abu Timman went to Henjam. the Shi'i religious scholars Sayyid Muhammad &Sadr and Shaikh Muhammad al-Khdisi left rather than face arrest. P. 306. Kohn, Bistory of Nationalism. Iraqi nationalists gathered at the palace on August 21, 1922 and publicly denounced the British; the king, rather than punish the nationalists. was conveniently iIl. P. 309. See dso Sluglett, Brirain in Iraq. Only Faisal's appendicitis saved him from deposition. P. 306. " Ireland. Iraa: A Studv in Political Development, pp. 290-29 1. Naksh, The Shiah of Irag. The fatwa: "We have passed judgment againsr the elections. Whoever takes part in them is fighting God. the Prophet, and the imams, and will not be buied in Muslim cemeteries." P. 79. See dso Erskine, King Faisal, pp. 152- 162. See dso Kelidar, Intemtion of Modem Iraq, p. 18. Batatu, Old Social Classes. A number of Sunni sadah inciuding Talib ai-Nagib. Ahmad Basha'yan. Muhammad Amin Basha'yan, and Abd al-Karim Sa'dun met to discuss with other landowners the setting up of a republic with Abd al-Muhsin Sa'dun as president. Pp. 188-89. " Kedourie, Chatham House Version. The British theory of Lrayi tutelage was to dlow Iraqi officiais who were incompetent and corrupt to "make mistalces if they want to, don't harnper their initiative". P. 263. See also Marr, Historv of Modem Iraq. The advisory system was the basis of British indirect rule. P 38.
j3 Marr, "Yasin ai-Hashimi." 'The British made public acceptance of the Treaty a prereqWsite for any cabinet taking office." Hashirni previously opposed it in opposition or would "straddle the fence" P. 144 Tauber, Emergence of Modem Syia and Irag. Faisal had lirnited influence in postwar Syria; influentid al- Fatat activists at the Syrian congress of March 1920 who announced Syria's complete independence included Sati al-Husri, Rustum Haidar, Ali Rida Rikabi, and Ahmad Muraywid, as well as lraqi Yasin al-Hashirni. P. 327. See Kedourie, mdand the Middle m, p. 171. See also Batatu, Old Social Classes, p. 197. " Mm."Yasin al-Hashimi." Tribal delegates against the treaty were leaders of the Iraqi revolt. '-Abd al-Hajj Sikr. head of the ai-Fatlah tribe and Shaikh Umr al-Hajj Alwan. a sayyid frorn Karbala, whose votes could be swayed by the guaranteeing of their land rights and tribal law." P. 137- 139.
36 Main. to undence, p. 23. See also Sluglen -. Amin al-Charchafchi. Abd al-Hasul Kubba, and Sayyid Muhammad Mahdi Basir were either arrested or deported. P. 307. " Nakash. Shiah of Iraq. The Shi'i mujtahids feared that the election of Shi'i laity to a constituent assembly would undennine the their position and that of Islam. P. 79.
3R Kohn, Histop of Nationalism, p. 3 1 1.
39 Nakash, Shi& of m. The mujtahids alluded to British 'infidels' attacking Turkish Muslims. P. 80. See also Batatu, Old Social Classes, p. 1 140. Nakash, -W. The "injudicious act of protest" by nine prominent Persian mujtahids who Ieti for Qum was a relief to the government. P. 82. See also Kedourie, The CwmHouse Version, p. 250.
." Ahmad Kazerni-Moussavi. The StniggIe for Authority in the Nineteenth Century Shiite Community: The Emergence of the Institution of Marja-i Taqlid" (Ph. D. dissertation, McGill University. 1992). Isfahani and Na'ini retunied to Najaf six months later. but modernizing trends checked the religious authorities. the marja'iyat. P. 199. See also Batatu, "Iraq's Shi'a Movements: Characteristics. Causes, and Prospects." The "great Ayatollah Mahdi al-Khalisi" was prominent in the 1920 "uprising". P. 593.
'" Nakash. Shiah of Iraq. When the supreme Persian rnujtahid died. no was Ieading Shi'i cleric which improved "the position of Iess senior Arab mujtahidin" such as Iraqi Arab Ali Kashif al-Ghita. Pp. 76. 85.
43 Peter Sluglett and Marion Farouk-Sluglett, "Sunnis and Shi'is Revisited Sectarianism and Ethnicity in Authorirarian Iraq," in Iraa: Power and Socie ed. by Derek Hopwood (Oxford: Ithsca Press. 1993). p. 84. Kohn, Estory of Nationalisrll, p. 3 1 2.
" Sluglett, Britain in Iraq, p. 3 1 1. * Ibid. When the mujtahids al-Isfahani and ai-Na'ini were given permission to return to Iraq they wm obliged to revoke their anti-election fatwas as well as renouncc active politics. P. 307. See also Lon_gigg. Ir=: 1900 to 1950, p. 150. Kohn. Histow of Nationalm. British prime minister MacDonald gave the Zraqis until July 1 1. 1924 to ratify the treaty, after which it would be withdrawn. The president of the lraqi Constituent Assembiy, 'without previous notification' catled together its members; 69 of 100 members rippeared and voted 37 for and 24 against ratification. P. 3 13. See dso Simons, -, p. 196.
'"Sluglett, Britain in Iraq, p. 3 10. See Batatu, -Social 34 out of 99 were tribal shaikhs. P. 95.
" Kedourie. Chatham House ver si or^ p. 257. Farouk-Slugiett, Iraqi Since 1958, p. 273. See Ireland, Iraq: A Studv in Political Develo~ment,p. 103.
51 Longrigg, Iraq: I9OO to 1950, p. 150. '' Man. "Yasin Al-Hashimi," As quoted from Iraqi government documents. P. 438.
53 Sachar. menceof the Middle East p. 381. " Simons, From Sumer to Saddam, p. 197.
55 Farouk-Slugiett. Iraq Since 1958, p. 12. 57 Marr, Modem mm,p. 42. Marr, "Yasin al-Hashimi," p. 154.
59 Batatu, 01d Social Classes, p. 189. * Kohn. Historv of Nationalism. Yet France willing telinquished its daim to Mosul in 1920 when by mutuai agreement. Britain assigned one quarter of the oi1 of Mosul to France. Pp. 306, 3 13.
" Sirnons, S-. The League had "predictably' decided in favour of Britain. the Coun with the League which unpredictably demanded Britain's guarantee for the protection of the Kurds. P. 197. " Batatu. Old Social Classes, p. 13. * Sluglett, p. 124.
" Deborah Amos, Lines (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991). p. 7. John Bulloch mi Harvey Morris. Saddam's War: The Orieins of the Kuwait Conflict and the International Resuonse (London: Faber and Faber. 199:). With Ibn Saud at Uqair in 1922. Cox draws the iraqi, Saudi. and Kuwaiti frontiers with a 'red' pencil, thus ending conflict for at tirne, it was renewed in 1990. P. 123. 66 Kedourie, Chatham House Version. A reason the MosuI settlernent -and the demarcation of the frontier- favoured Iraq was the Turks mistreatment of the Assyrîan Christians. P. 246
67 Mm, Modern Historv of Iraq. These rights included having their own language, teachers and officiais in their own schools and local administration. Pp. 42-43. See aIso Mm."Yasin al-Hashimi." p. 152.
6R Batatu, Old Social Classes, p. 329. De Gaury, Three Kinas, p. 83. Longrigg. Iraa: 1900 to 1950, p. 137. ri<) Ismael, Roots of Conflict, p. 1.
70 Ibid.. p. 10. See Abdulghani, Iraq and Iran. A repercussion frorn the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1932. p. S.
" Longrigg, Iraa: 1900 to 1950. Yusuf Suwaidi, the Senate president, was an early nationalist who was mested by the Cornmittee of Union and Progress for his nationalist activities in 191 3. Pp. 46. 164. '' Kohn. Historv of Nationalism, p. 3 13.
73 Man, "Yasin ai-Hashirni," p. 161. '' Kedourie, Chatham House Version. Kedourie is here refemng to the Nagib of Baghdad. Sayyid Abd ai- Rahman al-Gailani. an oIder and wiser man who cooperated with the British and was fust premier. P. 255.
75 De Gaury, 'Ihree Kings in Ba~hdad,pp. 63-64.
76 Main. Iraa_from Mandate to ~~~~~ndencc, p. 166. Man, "Yasin al-Hashimi," p. 164. Ibid., p. 174.
79 Ibid., p. 178. Batatu, O-, p. 328. Ibid., p. 332.
RZ Kohn. (London: George Routledge & Sons, 1932). p. 220. See also Kohn, History of Nationdism. "At the end of 1927, a treaty was concluded between lraq and Great Britain, anticipating the abolition of mandatory status" and admission to the League. P. 3 14. Longrigg, Iraq: 1900 to 1950, p. 178. '' Nakash. Shiah of ira^. Arab Mujtahid Muhammad Hasan Kashif ai-Ghita acted independently to lift ban and promised to aid with conscription in return for half of government appointment for Shi'is. P. 37. " Ibid. Pan-Arabists in Iraq stressed the Persian threat, however, Shi'is argued their CO-religionistshad no bearing on their Iraqi national identity to which they were faithful. P. 1 13.
X7 Simon, Between the Two Wa. It was viewed as rinti-Shi'i provocation by the governrnent. P. 1 19. na Longrigg, Iraa: 1900 to 1950. These numbers were the effect of strong mti-govemment Shi'ism. P. 180.
" Marr, "Yasin al-Hashimi." p. 180.
" Silverfarb, Bnfain's.This was part of a wider policy and at this time India. Ireland. Egypt, and Transjordan was given more self-nile. P. 18.
92 Longrigg, m: 19ûû to 1950, p. 18 1. '' Ibid.. p. 182.
YJ Silverfarb, Britain's Informal Empire, p. 24.
V5 Ibid.. p. 153.
Y6 Mm, .'Yasin al-Hashimi," p. 189. Tarbush, sofpp. 129- 13 1.
Kedourie, Nationaiism, p. 136-7-
'O0 Longrigg, Iraq: 1900 to 1950, p. 19 1.
'O' Batatu, Old Social Classes, pp. 1 156- 1 158. '@Mm. "Yasin ai-Hashimi." Shi'i extremists. secular and religious. were accused of inept leadership and excluded from power. while the Sunni ruling elite. the Sharifians. "rose to positions of influence and prestige." P. 141.
'O3 De Gaury, Three Kine in Baghdad, p. 63. Hodgkin, "Lionel Smith Education in Iraq." Smith. a British official. described the Sunni politicians as. "more or Iess incornpetent and conupt placehoiders paraiyzing any kind of good governrnent." P. 254
'O5 William L. Cleveland, The Making of an Arab Nationalist: Ottomanism and Arabism in the Life and a Thought of Sati al-Husri (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 197 1 ), p. 182. Conclusion
The nationalist movement in Iraq which emerged after the defeat of the Ottoman
Empire in 1918 was born out of the desire of Lraqis for independence. for libention from centuries of alien domination. and for self-government in a united sovereign state within the boundaries of Islam. Not di nationalisis in Iraq shared these goals however, there were those who envisioned Iraq as a theocratic state. as a supranational component, or as a natioid entity comprising a distinct society. Some idealized a cornmon future. while others were motivated by particular interests. Notwithstanding these differences. Sunnis and
Shi'is both participated in a unique manner in the national struggle which led to the formation of the state of Iraq as we know it today.
Racial and sectarian divisions were. generally, more important than their common herirage as citizens of the Ottoman Empire or members of the Muslirn cornmunity. In the
1920s. the reason for their differences was. more than anything else. based on the degee of political power they wanted to exercise in government. Sunni Kurds who had resisted assimilation by their Arab and Turkish CO-religionists preferred instead the bonds of kinship with other Kurds in other lands. Sunni Arabs. although a minorit'y in the plurdism of lraqi society, who had ben politically and socidy dominant under the Sunni Ottoman Turks sought to mie again in Baghdad as in the past. Shi'i Arabs, the largest majority in hqwho had been excluded from and subordinated to the advantages of Sunni power. sought equal representation. The greatest impedirnent to a united iraq state a ths time was the religious dichotomy between Sunni and Shi'i Arabs.
Based on a dispute within the Islarnic cornmunity of the seventh century whch remained undiminished with the passage of time. this religious schism played a major role in the national struggle for independence. It was also a prirnary cause of the social. economic. and political disparity between the Sunni and Shi'i Arabs of Iraq. As this thesis has shown however. the advent of change in the late nineteenth cenniry which prepared
Iraqis for protonationalist activity saw the rise of a powerfid Shi'i Penian clergy in the holy cities and increased Sh'i Arab politicai awareness in the urban areas. as well as Sunni hb involvement in autonomist societies of the rnilitary institutions of Istanbul and the major cities of the empire. Sectarian differences which were briefly bridged in the protonationalist response to the Young Turk regirne after 1908 and in the formation of a nonsectarian nationalist society in 19 19, cuiminated in joint religious and political events prior to the nationalist revolt against the infidel British administration of 1920.
Sunni and Shi3 Arabs could agree on a cornmon enemy. without agreeing on a mutual politically acceptable form of state. Was religion the dynamic responsible'? Did the
Shi'i and Sunni dichotomy prevent or make this happen? Sunnism, though practiced by the
majority of Muslims worfdwide, was a minority in Iraq. Conversely. the largest majority in
Iraq was the Shi'a due to the conversion of numerous Arab tribes, a majonty controlled by
Shi'ism's most prominent religious herarchy resident in the Shi' i holy cities of Iraq w ho
were Persian. Couid both sects lay aside the schism of centuries and share the rnantle of power in an independent Iraq?
As the preceding pages have illustrated, the most propitious events in the rise of hqi nationaiism had religious overtones: among others, the effort by mernben of differin;
sects and religions who acted in concert to limit the growth of foreign expansionism in Iraq; the resistance of the Shi'i Arabs and their ulama to the British invasion; the co1Iaboration of
Sunni Arab officers with the British in a revolt against the Ottomans: the postwar uprising
against their former ailies by these sarne Sunni nationalist officers and their inexplicable aiiiance with the Sh'i Persian clergy of Najaf; the revolt of Shi'i Arab tribes against the
British administration fostered by clerics and nationalists; and, the uniting of both Sunni
and Shi'i Arabs in unprecedented joint religious and political events in support of the bid for independence it inspired. Aithough unity dissolved in the aftermaih of defeat. religion continued to play a major role in the nationdist opposition to British rule.
During the formative years of the hqi state, the Shi'i Persian dama denounced the infidel. the mandate. and the Anglo-lraqi treaty, whle attempting ro rouse the tnbes in a second [raqi revolt. They inundated the Shi'i Anb cornmunit)' with religious edicts which forbade Shi'is working in an infidel administration, participating in govemment elections. and. lastly, defending [raq against brother Muslims. Their anti-govemment strategy had been successful. however this edict roused the government to action. X leading politicized clenc was deported and other ulmwithdrew to [ran in protest leaving the Shi'i leaderless.
Their political strength. their one effective resource against Sunni dominance. dissipated.
Although Shi'i and Sunni Iraqi nationalists continued to demonstrate againsr the British mandate and the pro-British Sunni elitr in power. they could not defeat the elections whch
Irgitimizcd the haqi government and its democratic institutions. These crucial years of state formation were conspicuous for the role played by religion in nationalist politics in kaq.
The new hqi parliament becarne a forum for hqi nationalist opposition to the pro-
British Sunni Sharifian elite who held the most important portfolios in the cabinet. In fact. the composition of most hqi cabinets showed a serious irnbalance. Sunnis predominated while the Shi'i Arab, Sunni Kurd. Christian, and Jew held only token representation.
Nevertheless, the nationalist opposition combined forces and fought to Mt the power of the Sharif'ians as they did in vetoing the conscription bill in 1977. They consistently fought the Anglo-hqi treaties -four during the twelve year mandate - which gave the Bntish increasing influence. At every opportunity, the Iraqi nationalists opposed continuation of
the British mandate.
When the British negotiated for the hqi acquisition of Mosul province. they ais0 ÿrranged for a government oil concession to be senled in favour of Bntish interests. While the terms of the oil concession were unacceptable to Iraqi nationalists, the oil potential of hfosul would ensure the economic stabili ty necessana for i nde pendence. Hoc\ ever. the condinon attached to acquinng the oil-nch province by the League of 'iauons was a mens-five year extension of the British mandate. a condition wtuch iraqis were loathe to accept once al1 the prerequisites to independence were fui filled. By constant nationalist pressure in parfiament Iraqis evennially forced the Bntish to consider Iraqi independence at a much eariier dare than anticipated. The terminauon of the mandate was. however. contingent upon Iq's acceptance of a preferential mty to protect British interests and Bntain's future ifluence in Iraq. Without the treaty Britain would not agree to Iraqi independence. therefore. Iraqi nationdists were forced to compromise.
Sunm and Sh'i nationalists pamapated in this pursuit of an independent Iraqi state. however, there w ere those w ho envisioned a tufidArab nation. Faisal' s mintment of a
Span Arab nationalkt to the directorate of public educaaon, for example, had divided rather than Wied Iraqis and had susrained raîher than elirninated secrananism. Iraqi youth were su bjected to unequai ediicational oppornuiity and. su bsequentl y. unequa1 representation in future Iraqi govemments. Conversely, in his atkmpts ar nation-building and in spite of his penchant for Arab uoity, the kmg artempted to umfy Iraqis by reconciling the sects. Faisal knew the cardinal element of idenafication was fsiam and Iraqi unity was dependent upon solidarity arnong its Muslim elements. A solidarity which would not on1y resmct British and Persian influence but allow for independent govenunent under his de. as weU as. pmcipîxon of Iraqis of both sects.
Weit is tme rhat the Shi'i Arab cummunity in Iraq was infiuenad by its religious political leadership prior to 1924, once that lntluence was minimmd, the depof Shi*a paracipation in electiom, politicai pasties, and govemment option was meaningful and had improved significantly by the end of the mandate. Yet Shfi representdon was limited by the Sunni elite who fedShi'i power and mistwted Shi'i alledance. Meanwhile,
Shi'i Ar& sou@ integmûon in the Iraqi state, not self-mle or a merger of Iraq and Iran. The Shi'a also sought to acc~inmodatetheir Shi'i-AmbIraqi identity. bMany Shi'i Arab poliucians made important conuibutions to die lormauon ot' the
Iraqi state. A case in point was Sayyid iMuhamad Husayn Kashif al-Ghita. a prominent
Shi*i Arab mujtahd who was also a political activist. Jafar Abu Timrnan, a respected Shi' i merchant and pasionate iraqi naiionalist. was most responsible for the unit). of Shi'is and
Sumis in the summer of 1920. Briefly Iraqi minister of commerce in 19-22, Abu Th= devoted his life to the demise of British influence and the dawn of Iraqi independence.
Sayyid Muhammad al-Sadr. a distinguished Shi' i scholar and president of Haras al-1s tiqlal. shared his exile in Mecca with Abu Timman after the Iraqi revolt He fought for Sh'i nghts and Iraqi independence throughout the mandate. as leader of the Renaissance party and the
Iraqi senate. Both alSadr and abu Timman. and Sunni opposition leader Y asin al-Hashimi. were implicated in subversive artempts to ehnate the British. Wary of the Shi*i numencal potential, the Sunni elite and the British aurhonty chose to Limit rhe Shi'is' political pwers.
Sunni Iraqi nationalists were most often found in opposition to the govemment and many played important roles the Iraqi midia movement Yusuf al-Suwaidi and Ali ai-
Bazïrgan were among Iraq's earliest patriots. signatones of the Baghdad~petition, memben of Haras al-Istiqlal, and activisîs in the Iraqi revolt Al-Suwaidi was appcnnted president of the first Iraqi senate in 1925. Sayyd AMal-Muhsin Sa'dun. a Muntafiq shaikh, sewed as a dtary aide to Sultan Abdulhamd II and, during the mandate. four temis as pnme minister of Iraq. Yasin al-Hashimt was a distinguished OItoman officer and Onanan loyalist who served two tenns as pnme minister of Iraq. Al-Hashimi was an Aiab nationaikt and an Irq e-t who led the pariiament in opposition to both British and
Sharifiaa mnml. Many Sunni cabmet ministers were favound members of King Faisal's
"inner circle" who conaibuted to tk achieving of Iraqi independence. Most notable were the powerfui Sunni Arab exdhadian officers who had fought agatnst the ûü~man~in the Arab revoit, such as Nuri al-Said, Jafar al-Askan, Ali Jaw&t ai-Ayyubi. Jamil ai-Midfa'i, and Mawlud Mukhlis. In fact, it was Nuri al-Said who, as prune minister of Iraq in 1932. accepted Iraq's memberstiip in t&e League of Nations. the symbol of indepndence. Dunnp the Arab conquest religon Kas the symbol of uni5 and victory. This cmot be said of religion dunng the mandate era. although it played a major role in the nationalist movernent Religion per se was not a unifying factor in the stniggle for independence. nor was it in die name of relipon that independenœ was finaily achieved. The religious leader of the Sunm Arab comrnuiuty in Baghdad deplored the unification of the Sunni and Shfi sects. Funherrnore. the politically powerful Shi' i religious hierarchy fought for Shi*i quai representation in Iraq's formative years knowing the overwhelming rano of the Shi'a to the
Sunni would soon overume exclusive Sunni leadership. However, xnne of Iraq's mat ardent nahonalists were Shi'is and Sunnis who sought the emancipation of the Iraqi people. Iraqi naaonalists who formed political pmes during the man- era worked in unison and went to great lengths to undermine British influence and the Bri tish-sponsored government.
It was the opposition of such Imqi nationalists which won independence fur Iraq.
Power-shanng between Shfis and Sunnis was not an option between 1918 and
1932, in facf the power of the onhodox Arab etite was contingent upon the continuation of the Shi' i-Sunni dichotorny. In spite of undeniable self-interest, rhese Sunnis held positions of power Wsely because of their wiilingness to work within the mandatory system to gain Iraq its independence; an opportuni ty which many Shi' i narionalists refused. ïhere were Arab nationalists among the dite. however they were not wanting in Iraqi sentiment and engageû in the nationai stniggle to transfomi Iraq from a mandat#l territory a sovereign state. Ths is not to say tbat Iraq nationalists of both sec& did not amtnbue 0 the evennial independence of Iraq. (ni the contrary, despite Hitical and secman obstacle^. the cumbined and independeut efforts of Sh'i and Sunni nationaiists contnbuted to the emergence of the Iraq state and the tennination of the British mandatedateBoth maja religious sects of islam. the Sunni and Shiva, played major roles in the nahmht movement in Iraq and in the bartle to end aliai politicai -011 of centuries. Select Bibliography
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