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McMahon–Hussein Correspondence

The McMahon–Hussein Correspondence, or the Hussein–McMahon Correspondence, was a series of On his return journey from Istanbul in 1915, where Faisal ten letters exchanged from 14 to 30 January [1] bin Hussein had confronted the Grand Vizier with evi- 1916, during , between Hussein bin , dence of an Ottoman plot to depose his father (Husayn of , and Sir Henry McMahon, British High bin Ali), he decided to visit to resume talks Commissioner in , concerning the political status with the Arab secret societies al-Fatat and Al-'Ahd that he . Growing Arab na- of lands under the had met in March/April. On this occasion, Faisal joined tionalism had led to a desire for independence from the their revolutionary movement. During this visit, on 23 Ottoman Empire. In the letters Britain agreed to recog- , he was presented with the document that be- nize Arab independence after World War I “in the limits came known as the ''. The documents and boundaries proposed by the Sherif of Mecca”, not in- declared that the would revolt in alliance with the cluding areas in which had interests. This was in United Kingdom, and in return the UK would recognize exchange for Arab help in fighting the Ottomans, led by the Arab independence in an area running from the 37th Hussein bin Ali. parallel near the Taurus Mountains on the southern bor- Later, the 1916 Sykes–Picot Agreement between France der of , to be bounded in the east by Persia and the and UK was exposed showing that the two countries were , in the west by the and planning to split and occupy parts of the promised Arab in the south by the Arabian Sea.[6][7] country. Early in April 1914 Abdullah I bin al-Hussein (the second In January 1923 unofficial excerpts were published by of three sons of Sherif Hussein bin Ali) asked the British Joseph N. M. Jeffries in the Daily Mail[2] and copies of in Cairo what would be the British the various letters circulated in the Arab press.[3] Offi- attitude if the Arab Ottomans revolted. The British re- cial excerpts were published in the 1937 Peel Commis- sponse based on its traditional policy of preserving “the sion Report,[4] but the correspondence was first published integrity of the Ottoman Empire” was negative. How- in full in George Antonius's 1938 . ever, the entry of the Ottomans on ’s side in Referring to the 25 letter, Antonius wrote World War I on 11 November 1914 brought about an that it is: “by far the most important in the whole corre- abrupt shift in British political interests concerning an spondence, and may perhaps be regarded as the most im- against the Ottomans.[8] portant international document in the history of the Arab Following deliberations at Ta'if between Hussein and his national movement... is still invoked as the main piece sons in June 1915, during which Faisal counselled cau- of evidence on which the Arabs accuse Great Britain of [5] tion, Sherif Husayn bin Ali argued against rebellion and having broken faith with them.” Abdullah advocated action and encouraged his father to enter into correspondence with Sir Henry McMahon, the Sharif set a tentative date for armed revolt for June 1916 1 The Damascus Protocol and commenced negotiations with the British High Com- missioner in Egypt, Sir Henry McMahon.[6]

Main article: Damascus Protocol 2 The territorial reservations

The letter from McMahon to Hussein dated 24 October 1915 declared Britain’s willingness to recognize the in- dependence of the Arabs subject to certain exemptions. Note that the original correspondence was conducted in both English and , such that various slightly differ- ing English translations are extant.

Henry The districts of Mersina and Alexandretta, McMahon and Hussein bin Ali and portions of lying to the west of

1 2 3 THE ARAB REVOLT

the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and asked me, as a free agent, to endorse the promises of Aleppo, cannot be said to be purely Arab, and the British Government. I had had no previous or inner must on that account be excepted from the pro- knowledge of the McMahon pledges and the Sykes-Picot posed limits and boundaries. treaty, which were both framed by war-time branches of With the above modification and with- the Foreign Office. But, not being a perfect fool, I could out prejudice to our existing treaties con- see that if we won the war the promises to the Arabs were cluded with Arab Chiefs, we accept these lim- dead paper. Had I been an honourable adviser I would its and boundaries, and in regard to the terri- have sent my men home, and not let them risk their lives tories therein in which Great Britain is free to for such stuff. Yet the Arab inspiration was our main tool act without detriment to interests of her ally in winning the Eastern war. So I assured them that Eng- France, I am empowered in the name of the land kept her word in letter and spirit. In this comfort Government of Great Britain to give the fol- they performed their fine things: but, of course, instead lowing assurance and make the following reply of being proud of what we did together, I was continually to your letter: and bitterly ashamed. Subject to the above modifications, Great T. E. Lawrence (Lawrence of Arabia) in his autobio- Britain is prepared to recognize and support the graphical , 1922[11] independence of the Arabs within the territo- ries in the limits and boundaries proposed by McMahon’s promises were seen by the Arabs as a formal the Sherif of Mecca.[9] agreement between them and the United Kingdom. Lloyd George and Arthur Balfour represented the agreement as a treaty during the post war deliberations of the Council Declassified British Cabinet Papers include a telegram of Four. On this understanding the Arabs established a dated 19 October 1915 from Sir Henry McMahon to the military force under the command of Hussein’s son Faisal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord Grey, re- [10] which fought, with inspiration from 'Lawrence of Arabia', questing instructions. McMahon said the clause had against the Ottoman Empire during the Arab Revolt.[7] In been suggested by a man named Muhammed Sharif al- an intelligence memo written in January 1916 Lawrence Faruqi, a member of the Abd party, to satisfy the de- described the Arab Revolt as mands of the Syrian Nationalists for the independence of Arabia. Faroqi had said that the Arabs would fight if the French attempted to occupy the cities of Damas- beneficial to us, because it marches with cus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo, but he thought they would our immediate aims, the break up of the Is- accept some modification of the North-Western bound- lamic 'bloc' and the defeat and disruption of aries proposed by the Sherif of Mecca. Faroqi suggested the Ottoman Empire, and because the states the language: “In so far as Britain was free to act with- [Sharif Hussein] would set up to succeed the out detriment to the interests of her present Allies, Great Turks would be … harmless to ourselves … The Britain accepts the principle of the independence of Ara- Arabs are even less stable than the Turks. If bia within limits propounded by the Sherif of Mecca.” properly handled they would remain in a state Lord Grey authorized McMahon to pledge the areas re- of political mosaic, a tissue of small jealous quested by the Sherif subject to the reserve for the Allies. principalities incapable of cohesion (emphasis in original).[12]

3 The Arab Revolt The Arab Revolt began in June 1916, when an Arab army of around 70,000 men moved against Ottoman forces. They participated in the capture of Aqabah and the sev- Main article: Arab Revolt ering of the railway, a vital strategic link through the Arab peninsula which ran from Damascus to . The Arab Revolt had begun on false pretences. To gain This enabled the Egyptian Expeditionary Force under the the Sherif’s help our Cabinet had offered, through Sir command of General Allenby to advance into the Ot- Henry McMahon, to support the establishment of native toman territories of and Syria.[13] governments in parts of Syria and Mesopotamia, 'sav- ing the interests of our ally, France'. The last mod- The British advance culminated in the est clause concealed a treaty (kept secret, till too late, in September 1918 and the capitulation of Turkey on 31 from McMahon, and therefore from the Sherif) by which October 1918. France, England and Russia agreed to annex some of The Arab revolt is seen by historians as the first organized these promised areas, and to establish their respective movement of Arab nationalism. It brought together dif- spheres of influence over all the rest... Rumours of the ferent Arab groups for the first time with the common fraud reached Arab ears, from Turkey. In the East per- goal to fight for independence from the Ottoman Empire. sons were more trusted than institutions. So the Arabs, Much of the history of Arabic independence stemmed having tested my friendliness and sincerity under fire, from the revolt beginning with the kingdom founded by 4.3 3

Hussein. After the war was over, the Arab revolt had im- in Palestine, nor was I instructed to warn him plications. Groups of people were put into classes based that such a state was contemplated by Great Britain”.[18] on if they had fought in the revolt or not and what their The secret Sykes–Picot Agreement did not call for Arab rank was. In , a group of Sharifian Officers from sovereignty, but the French and British agreement did call the Arab Revolt formed a political party which they were for 'suzerainty of an Arab chief' and 'an international ad- head of. Still to this day the Hashemite kingdom in Jor- ministration, the form of which is to be decided upon af- dan is influenced by the actions of Arab leaders in the [14] ter consultation with Russia, and subsequently in consul- revolt. tation with the other allies, and the representatives of the sheriff of mecca.[19] Under the terms of that agree- ment, the Zionist Organization needed to secure an agree- 4 Subsequent commitments ment along the lines of the Faisal-Weizmann Agreement with the . 4.1 Sykes Picot Agreement

Main article: Sykes-Picot Agreement 4.3 Declaration to the Seven The Sykes–Picot Agreement between Britain, France and Main article: Declaration to the Seven Russia of May 1916 (made public by the Bolsheviks after the Russian Revolution) was exposed in November 1917 showing that the countries were planning to split and oc- In light of the existing McMahon–Hussein correspon- cupy parts of the promised Arab country. dence, but in the wake of the seemingly competing for the Zionists, as well as the publi- cation weeks later by the Bolsheviks of the older and pre- 4.2 The Hogarth Message viously secret Sykes–Picot Agreement with the Russians and French, seven Syrian notables in Cairo, from the In January 1918 Commander David Hogarth, head of the newly formed Party of Syrian Unity, issued a memoran- in Cairo, was dispatched to Jeddah to de- dum requesting some clarification from the British Gov- liver a letter written by Sir on behalf of the ernment, including a “guarantee of the ultimate indepen- British Government to Hussein (now King of Hejaz). The dence of Arabia". In response, issued on 16 , message assured Hussein that the Declaration to the Seven, stated the British policy that the future government of the regions of the Ottoman Em- The Entente Powers are determined that pire occupied by Allied forces in World War I should be the Arab race shall be given full opportunity based on the consent of the governed.[20][21] of once again forming a nation in the world. This can only be achieved by the Arabs them- selves uniting, and Great Britain and her Allies will pursue a policy with this ultimate unity in 4.4 Allenby’s assurance to Faisal view.[15] On 19 October 1918, General Allenby reported to the and with respect to Palestine and in the light of the Bal- British Government that he had given Faisal, four Declaration that

Since the Jewish opinion of the world is in official assurance that whatever measures favour of a return of Jews to Palestine and in might be taken during the period of military as much as this opinion must remain a constant administration they were purely provisional factor, and further as His Majesty’s Govern- and could not be allowed to prejudice the final ment view with favour the realisation of this settlement by the peace conference, at which aspiration, His Majesty’s Government are de- no doubt the Arabs would have a representa- termined that insofar as is compatible with the tive. I added that the instructions to the mili- freedom of the existing population both eco- tary governors would preclude their mixing in nomic and political, no obstacle should be put political affairs, and that I should remove them in the way of the realisation of this ideal.[15] if I found any of them contravening these or- ders. I reminded the Amir Faisal that the Allies The meaning of the Hogarth message, and in particular were in honour bound to endeavour to reach a whether it modified the commitments made in the Bal- settlement in accordance with the wishes of the four Declaration is still debated,[16][17] although Hogarth peoples concerned and urged him to place his reported that Hussein “would not accept an independent trust whole-heartedly in their good faith.[22] 4 4 SUBSEQUENT COMMITMENTS

4.5 Anglo-French Declaration of 1918 of Maysalun in June 1920. They deposed the indigenous Arab government, and removed King Faisal from Dam- Main article: Anglo-French Declaration ascus in August 1920.[27] The United Kingdom also ap- pointed a High Commissioner and established their own In the Anglo-French Declaration of 7 November 1918 the mandatory regime in Palestine, without first obtaining ap- two governments stated that proval from the Council of the .

The object aimed at by France and the United Kingdom in prosecuting in the East the 4.8 The League of Nations Mandates War let loose by the ambition of Germany is the complete and definite emancipation of the After the war, France and Britain continued to provide assurances of Arab independence, while planning to place peoples so long oppressed by the Turks and [28][29] the establishment of national governments and the entire region under their own administration. administrations deriving their authority from United States Secretary of State Robert Lansing was the initiative and free choice of the indigenous a member of the American Commission to Negotiate populations.[23] Peace at Paris in 1919. He explained that the system of mandates was simply a device created by the Great Pow- According to civil servant Eyre Crowe who saw the orig- ers to conceal their division of the spoils of war, under inal draft of the Declaration, “we had issued a definite the color of international law. If the territories had been statement against annexation in order (1) to quiet the ceded directly, the value of the former German and Ot- Arabs and (2) to prevent the French annexing any part toman territories would have been applied to offset the of Syria”.[24] Allies claims for war reparations. He also explained that Jan Smuts had been the author of the original concept.[30] 4.6 Paris Peace Conference At the Paris Peace Conference, US Secretary of State Lansing had asked Dr. Weizmann if the Jewish national Following World War I, the Paris Peace Conference was home meant the establishment of an autonomous Jew- ish government. The head of the Zionist delegation had held in 1919 between the allies to agree territorial divi- [31] sions. It was a well known fact that France wanted a Syr- replied in the negative. ian protectorate. At the conference, Prince Faisal, speak- At the Conference of and the San Remo con- ing on behalf of King Hussein, did not ask for immediate ference in April 1920, the Allied Supreme Council Arab independence. He recommended an Arab State un- granted the mandates for Palestine and Mesopotamia to der a British Mandate.[25] Britain,[32] and those for Syria and Lebanon to France. In August 1920, this was officially acknowledged in the Treaty of Sèvres. Both Zionist and Arab representatives 4.7 Independent Kingdom of Syria attended the conference, where they signed the Faisal– Weizmann Agreement,[33] a short-lived agreement for On 6 January 1920 Prince Faisal initialed an agree- Arab–Jewish cooperation on the development of a Jew- ment with French Prime Minister Clemenceau which ac- ish homeland in Palestine and an Arab nation in a large knowledged 'the right of the Syrians to unite to govern part of the . The agreement was never imple- [26] themselves as an independent nation'. A Pan-Syrian mented. Congress, meeting in Damascus, declared an independent state of Syria on 8 March 1920. The new state included portions of Syria, Palestine, and northern Mesopotamia 4.9 Lawrence’s post-war advocacy which had been set aside under the Sykes–Picot Agree- ment for an independent Arab state, or confederation Lawrence became increasingly guilt-ridden by the knowl- of states. King Faisal was declared the head of State. edge that Britain did not intend to abide by the commit- The was hastily convened, and the ments made to the Sharif, but still managed to convince United Kingdom and France both agreed to recognize Faisal that it would be to the Arabs’ advantage to go on the provisional independence of Syria and Mesopotamia, fighting the Ottomans. At the Versailles peace confer- while 'reluctantly' claiming mandates to assist in their ad- ence in 1919 and the in 1921 Lawrence ministration. Provisional recognition of Palestinian inde- lobbied for Arab independence, but his belated attempts pendence was not mentioned, despite the fact that it was to maintain the territorial integrity of Arab lands, which designated a Class A Mandate. he had promised to Hussein and Faisal, and in limit- France had decided to govern Syria directly, and took ac- ing France’s influence in what later became Syria and tion to enforce the French Mandate of Syria before the Lebanon were fruitless. However, as Churchill’s adviser terms had been accepted by the Council of the League of on Arab affairs (1921–22) Lawrence was able to lobby Nations. The French intervened militarily at the Battle for a considerable degree of autonomy for Mesopotamia 5.2 Arab interpretation 5

and Transjordan. The British placed Palestine, promised Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, to the Zionist Federation in 1917, under mandate with Hama and Aleppo cannot be said to be purely Arab and a civilian administration headed by Herbert Samuel, and should be excluded." The Arabs and British disagreed divided their remaining territory in the Middle East into over whether Palestine was meant to be one of those ex- the kingdoms of Iraq and Transjordan, assigning them to cluded areas, each side producing supporting arguments Faisal and his brother Abdullah, respectively.[12][34] for their positions based on fine details of the wording and the historical circumstances of the correspondence. Jonathan Schneer provides an analogy to explain the cen- 5 Debate about Palestine tral dispute over the meaning:

5.1 Debated sentences Presume a line extending from the dis- tricts of New York, New Haven, New Lon- “The consequences of interpreting McMahon’s 'wilayahs’ don, and Boston, excluding territory west from as meaning 'Ottoman provinces’ are so disconcerting that an imaginary coastal kingdom. If by districts it was - and, to my mind, still is - difficult to believe that one means “vicinity” or “environs,” that is one McMahon was intending to use the word in this sense in thing with regard to the land excluded, but if his letter. This interpretation would force on us a choice one means "vilayets" or “provinces,” or in the between the two following alternative conclusions: American instance “states,” it is another alto- (i) First alternative: McMahon was completely ignorant gether. There are no states of Boston, New of Ottoman administrative geography. He did not know London, or New Haven, just as there were no that the Ottoman vilayet of Aleppo extended westward provinces of Hama and Homs, but there is a to the coast, and he did not know that there were no Ot- state of New York, just as there was a vilayet toman vilayets of Homs and Hama. It seems to me in- of Damascus, and territory to the west of New credible that McMahon can have been as ill-informed as York State is different from territory to the this, and that he would not have taken care to inform him- west of the district of New York, presumably self correctly when he was writing a letter in which he was New York City and environs, just as territory making very serious commitments on HMG’s account. to the west of the vilayet of Damascus is dif- (ii) Second alternative: McMahon was properly ac- ferent from territory to the west of the district quainted with Ottoman administrative geography, and of Damascus, presumably the city of Damas- was using the word 'wilayahs’ equivocally. Apropos of cus and its environs.[37] Damascus, he was using it to mean 'Ottoman provinces’; apropos of Homs and Hama, and Aleppo, he was using it to mean 'environs’. This equivocation would have been 5.2 Arab interpretation disingenuous, impolitic, and pointless. I could not, and still cannot, believe that McMahon behaved so irrespon- The Arab position was that they could not refer to Pales- sibly” tine since that lay well to the south of the named places. ... In particular, the Arabs argued that the vilayet (province) The documents written by British officials, contesting the of Damascus did not exist and that the district (sanjak) interpretation of McMahon’s word 'wilayahs’ that was of Damascus covered only the area surrounding the city made by me and, before me, by the author of the Arab itself and furthermore that Palestine was part of the vi- Bureau’s History, all date from after the time at which layet of 'Syria A-Sham', which was not mentioned in the [38] HMG had become sure that Britain had Palestine in her exchange of letters. pocket... I do not think that Young’s or Childs’ or Mr Supporters of this interpretation also note that during the Friedman’s interpretation of McMahon’s use of the word war, thousands of proclamations were dropped in all parts 'wilayahs’ is tenable. After studying Mr Friedman’s pa- of Palestine, carrying a message from the Sharif Hussein per and writing these notes, I am inclined to think that on one side and a message from the British Command the drafting of this letter was, not disingenuous, but hope- on the other, to the effect 'that an Anglo-Arab agree- lessly muddle-headed. Incompetence is not excusable in ment had been arrived at securing the independence of transacting serious and responsible public business.” the Arabs.'[39] Arnold J. Toynbee in 1970, in correspondence with Isaiah [35] Friedman 5.3 British interpretation The debate regarding Palestine derived from the fact that it is not explicitly mentioned in the McMahon–Hussein The initial British position, from at least 1916, was that Correspondence, but is included within the boundaries Palestine was included from the land promised to Hussein that were initially proposed by Hussein. McMahon ac- as one of the non-wholly Arab areas of Syria to the west cepted the boundaries of Hussein “subject to modifica- of Damascus. This became public knowledge only in re- tion”,[36] and suggested the modification that "portions of cent years as a result of historians and scholars search- 6 6 INTERPRETATIONS OF FRENCH INTENTIONS

ing through the declassified files in the National Archives. them would have to be studied together. The Arab rep- In November 1918 the Political Intelligence Department resentatives submitted a statement to the committee from of the British Foreign Office had drafted a confidential Sir Michael McDonnell[42] which explained that whatever memorandum on the issue for the use of Britain’s del- McMahon had intended to mean was of no legal conse- egation at the Paris Peace Conference, which also con- quence, since it was his actual statements that constituted cluded Palestine was included in the Arab area. The East- the pledge from His Majesty’s Government. The Arab ern Committee of the Cabinet, previously known as the representatives also pointed out that McMahon had been Middle Eastern Committee, subsequently met on 5 De- acting as an intermediary for the Secretary of State for cember 1918 to discuss the government’s commitments Foreign Affairs, Lord Grey. Speaking in the House of regarding Palestine. Lord Curzon chaired the meeting. Lords on 27 March 1923, Lord Grey had made it clear T. E. Lawrence, General Jan Smuts, Lord Balfour, Lord that, for his part, he entertained serious doubts as to the Robert Cecil, General Sir Henry Wilson, Chief of the Im- validity of the ’s interpretation of perial General Staff, and representatives of the Foreign the pledges which he, as Foreign Secretary, had caused to Office, the Office, the Admiralty, the War Office, be given to the Sharif Husain in 1915. The Arab repre- and the Treasury were present. According to the minutes sentatives suggested that a search for evidence in the files Lord Curzon explained that Palestine was included in the of the Foreign Office might throw light on the Secretary areas as to which Great Britain pledged itself that they of State’s intentions. should be Arab and independent in the future.

In the public arena, Balfour had come under criticism 5.3.1 List of British interpretations over time in the House of Commons, when the Liberals and La- bor Socialists moved a resolution 'That secret treaties A list of interpretations by British politicians and civil ser- with the allied governments should be revised, since, in vants is below, showing the evolution of the debate be- their present form, they are inconsistent with the object tween 1916 and 1939: for which this country entered the war and are, there- fore, a barrier to a democratic peace.'[40] In response to growing criticism arising from the seemingly contradic- tory commitments undertaken by the United Kingdom 6 Interpretations of French inten- in the McMahon-Hussein correspondence, the Sykes– tions Picot Agreement and the Balfour declaration[41] the 1922 Churchill White Paper, took the position that Palestine In the areas with Maronite, Orthodox, and Druze pop- had always been excluded from the Arab area. Although ulations the Great Powers were still bound by an in- this directly contradicted numerous previous government ternational agreement regarding non-intervention, the documents, those documents were not known to the pub- Reglement Organique Agreements of June 1861 and lic at the time. As part of preparing this White Paper, September 1864. During a War Cabinet meeting on pol- Sir John Shuckburgh of the British Colonial Office had icy regarding Syria and Palestine held on 5 December exchanged correspondence with McMahon, and reliance 1918, it was stated that Palestine had been included in the was placed on a 1920 memorandum by Major Hubert areas the United Kingdom had pledged would be Arab Young, who had noted that in the original Arabic text, the and independent in the future. The Chair, Lord Cur- word translated as “districts” in English was “vilayets”, a zon, also noted that the rights that had been granted to vilayet being the largest class of administrative district the French under the terms of the Sykes–Picot Agree- into which the Ottoman Empire was divided. He con- ment violated the provisions of the Reglement Organique cluded that “district of Damascus”, i.e., “vilayet of Dam- Agreements and the war aims of the other Allies.[58] (The ascus”, must have referred to the vilayet of which Dam- publication of the Sykes–Picot Agreement caused the res- ascus was the capital, the Vilayet of Syria. This vilayet ignation of Sir Henry McMahon.[59]) extended southward to the Gulf of Aqaba, but excluded most of Palestine. In a Cabinet analysis of diplomatic developments pre- pared in May 1917, William Ormsby-Gore argued that: While the British Government have held that the intent of the McMahon Correspondence was not to promise Pales- tine to Hussein, it has occasionally acknowledged the French intentions in Syria are surely in- flaws in the legal terminology of the McMahon–Hussein compatible with the war aims of the Allies as Correspondence that make this position problematic. For defined to the Russian Government. If the example, the weak points of the government’s interpreta- self-determination of nationalities is to be the tion were acknowledged in a detailed memorandum by principle, the interference of France in the se- the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in 1939. lection of advisers by the Arab Government and the suggestion by France of the Emirs to A committee established by the British in 1939 to clarify be selected by the Arabs in Mosul, Aleppo, the various arguments observed that many commitments and Damascus would seem utterly incompat- had been made during and after the war - and that all of ible with our ideas of liberating the Arab na- 7

tion and of establishing a free and independent [8] http://www.law.fsu.edu/library/collection/LimitsinSeas/ Arab State. The British Government, in au- IBS094.pdf p. 7. thorising the letters despatched to King Hus- [9] English version quoted in "Palestine: Legal Arguments sein before the outbreak of the revolt by Sir Likely to be Advanced by Arab Representatives", Mem- Henry McMahon, would seem to raise a doubt orandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs as to whether our pledges to King Hussein as (Lord Halifax), January 1939, UK National Archives, head of the Arab nation are consistent with CAB 24/282, CP 19 (39) French intentions to make not only Syria but Upper Mesopotamia another Tunis. If our sup- [10] See UK National Archives CAB/24/214, CP 271 (30). port of King Hussein and the other Arabian [11] Lawrence, T. E. (25 October 2015). Seven Pillars of Wis- leaders of less distinguished origin and prestige dom & The Evolution of a Revolt (Complete Edition with means anything it means that we are prepared Original Illustrations and Maps): Lawrence of Arabia’s Ac- to recognise the full sovereign independence of count and Memoirs of the Arab Revolt and Guerrilla War- the Arabs of Arabia and Syria. It would seem fare during World War One. e-artnow. ISBN 978-80- time to acquaint the French Government with 268-4556-0. our detailed pledges to King Hussein, and to [12] Waïl S. Hassan “Lawrence, T. E.” The Oxford Encyclo- make it clear to the latter whether he or some- pedia of British Literature. David Scott Kastan. Oxford one else is to be the ruler of Damascus, which University Press 2005. is the one possible capital for an Arab State, which could command the obedience of the [13] “Arab Revolt” A Dictionary of Contemporary World His- other Arabian Emirs.[60] tory. Jan Palmowski. Oxford University Press, 2003. Ox- ford Reference Online. Oxford University Press.

[14] Khalidi, Rashid (1991-01-01). The Origins of Arab 7 See also Nationalism. Columbia University Press. ISBN 9780231074353.

• Pan-Arabism [15] Report of a Committee Set up to Consider Certain Corre- spondence Between Sir Henry McMahon and the Sharif • Anglo-Persian Oil Company of Mecca in 1915 and 1916, UNISPAL, Annex F.

• T. E. Lawrence [16] Friedman, 2000, p. 328. [17] Kedourie, 2002, p. 257. 8 Notes [18] Huneidi, 2001, p. 66. [19] The Sykes–Picot Agreement : 1916, Avalon Project [1] http://www.law.fsu.edu/library/collection/LimitsinSeas/ IBS094.pdf p. 8. [20] Friedman, 2000, pp. 195–197. [21] Choueiri, 2000, p. 149. [2] Sahar Huneidi (7 April 2001). A Broken Trust: Sir Herbert Samuel, Zionism and the Palestinians. I.B.Tauris. pp. 65– [22] Report of a Committee Set up to Consider Certain Corre- . ISBN 978-1-86064-172-5. spondence Between Sir Henry McMahon and the Sharif of Mecca in 1915 and 1916, UNISPAL, Annex H. [3] Antonius, 1938, p.180: “In actual fact, the terms of the McMahon Correspondence are known all over the Arab [23] Report of a Committee Set up to Consider Certain Corre- world. Extracts have from time to time been officially spondence Between Sir Henry McMahon and the Sharif published in Mecca by the Sharif Husain himself, and sev- of Mecca in 1915 and 1916, UNISPAL, Annex I. eral of the notes have appeared verbatim and in full in Arabic books and newspapers. It is open to any person [24] Hughes, 1999, pp. 116–117. with a knowledge of Arabic, who can obtain access to the [25] DESIRES OF HEDJAZ STIR PARIS CRITICS; Arab files of defunct Arabic newspapers, to piece the whole of Kingdom’s Aspirations Clash With French Aims in Asia the McMahon notes together; and that work I have done in Minor four years of travel and research, from Cairo to Baghdad and from Aleppo to Jedda.” [26] [Britain, the and Arab Rule, 1920-1925, by Timothy J. Paris, Routledge, 2003, ISBN 0-7146-5451- [4] Report Of The Palestine Royal Commission, Chap. II.1, 5, Page 69] pp. 16–22. [27] “Faisal I” A Dictionary of World History. Oxford Univer- [5] Antonius, 1938, p.169 sity Press, 2000.

[6] Paris, 2003, p. 24. [28] Federal Research Division, 2004, p. 41.

[7] Biger, 2004, p. 47. [29] Milton-Edwards, 2006, p. 57. 8 8 NOTES

[30] Project Gutenberg: The Peace Negotiations by Robert to be more accurate, of the Smuts theory, on Lansing, Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Com- the part of the European statesmen. pany. 1921, Chapter XIII 'THE SYSTEM OF MAN- DATES' [31] 'The Secretary’s Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pi- chon’s Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Thursday, 27 If the advocates of the system intended to February 1919, at 3 p. m.', United States Department avoid through its operation the appearance of of State Papers relating to the foreign relations of the taking enemy territory as the spoils of war, it United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919: Vol- was a subterfuge which deceived no one. It ume IV (1919), The Council of Ten: minutes of meetings seemed obvious from the very first that the 15 February – 17 June 1919, Page 169 Powers, which under the old practice would have obtained sovereignty over certain con- [32] (Biger 2004, p. 173) quered territories, would not be denied man- [33] http://www.mideastweb.org/feisweiz.htm dates over those territories. The League of Nations might reserve in the mandate a right [34] “Lawrence, Thomas Edward, 'Lawrence of Arabia'" A of supervision of administration and even of Dictionary of Contemporary World History. Jan Pal- revocation of authority, but that right would mowski. Oxford University Press, 2003. be nominal and of little, if any, real value provided the mandatory was one of the Great [35] Arnold Toynbee and Isaiah Friedman (1970). “The Powers as it undoubtedly would be. The al- McMahon-Hussein Correspondence: Comments and a most irresistible conclusion is that the pro- Reply” (PDF). Journal of Contemporary History. 5 (4): tagonists of the theory saw in it a means of 185–201. JSTOR 259872. clothing the League of Nations with an ap- [36] The Arab-Israeli Conflict parent usefulness which justified the League by making it the guardian of uncivilized and [37] Schneer 2010, p. 66-67. semi-civilized peoples and the international agent to watch over and prevent any deviation [38] Biger, 2004, p. 48. from the principle of equality in the commer- [39] Report of a Committee Set up to Consider Certain Corre- cial and industrial development of the man- spondence Between Sir Henry McMahon and the Sharif dated territories. of Mecca in 1915 and 1916, UNISPAL, Annex A, para- graph 19: “The contention that the British Government It may appear surprising that the Great did intend Palestine to be removed from the sphere of Powers so readily gave their support to French influence and to be included within the area of the new method of obtaining an apparently Arab independence (that is to say, within the area of future limited control over the conquered territo- British influence) is also borne out by the measures they ries, and did not seek to obtain complete took in Palestine during the War. They dropped procla- sovereignty over them. It is not necessary to mations by the thousand in all parts of Palestine, which look far for a sufficient and very practical rea- bore a message from the Sharif Husain on one side and a son. If the colonial possessions of Germany message from the British Command on the other, to the had, under the old practice, been divided effect that an Anglo-Arab agreement had been arrived at among the victorious Powers and been ceded securing the independence of the Arabs, and to ask the to them directly in full sovereignty, Germany Arab population of Palestine to look upon the advancing might justly have asked that the value of such British Army as allies and liberators and give them every territorial cessions be applied on any war in- assistance. Under the aegis of the British military author- demnities to which the Powers were entitled. ities, recruiting offices were opened in Palestine to recruit On the other hand, the League of Nations in volunteers for the forces of the Arab Revolt. Throughout the distribution of mandates would presum- 1916 and the greater part of 1917, the attitude of the mil- ably do so in the interests of the inhabitants itary and political officers of the British Army was clearly of the colonies and the mandates would be based on the understanding that Palestine was destined to accepted by the Powers as a duty and not form part of the Arab territory which was to be consti- to obtain new possessions. Thus under the tuted after the War on the basis of independent Arab gov- mandatory system Germany lost her territo- ernments in close alliance with Great Britain.” rial assets, which might have greatly reduced her financial debt to the Allies, while the lat- [40] No Peace Basis Yet, Balfour Asserts, 21 June 1918 ter obtained the German colonial possessions without the loss of any of their claims for in- [41] Zachary Lockman “Balfour Declaration” The Oxford demnity. In actual operation the apparent al- Companion to the Politics of the World, 2e. Joel Krieger, truism of the mandatory system worked in fa- ed. Oxford University Press Inc. 2001. vor of the selfish and material interests of the [42] Report of a Committee Set up to Consider Certain Corre- Powers which accepted the mandates. And spondence Between Sir Henry McMahon and the Sharif the same may be said of the dismemberment of Mecca in 1915 and 1916, UNISPAL, Annex C. of Turkey. It should not be a matter of sur- prise, therefore, that the President found little [43] Friedman, 2000, p.292; FO 371/6237 (1921), file 28 opposition to the adoption of his theory, or, E(4), volume 1, pages 110-12 9

[44] John Quigley (6 September 2010). The Statehood of 9 References Palestine: International Law in the Middle East Conflict. Cambridge University Press. pp. 11–12. ISBN 978-1- • Biger, Gideon. (2004). The Boundaries of Modern 139-49124-2. Palestine, 1840–1947. London: Routledge. ISBN 0-7146-5654-2 [45] National Archives, CAB 24/68/86, British Commitments to King Husein, Political Intelligence Department, For- • Choueiri, Youssef M. (2000). Arab Nationalism: A eign Office, November 1918 History. Blackwell Publishers. ISBN 0-631-21729- 0 [46] ‘Memorandum on British commitments to King Hus- sein’. Peace Congress file, 15 March 1919. The National • Cleveland, William L. (2004). A History of the Archives, London. Ref: FO 608/92. Modern Middle East. Westview Press. ISBN 0- 8133-4048-9 (see pp. 157–160). [47] National Archives, CAB 24/72/6, The Settlement of Turkey and the Arablan Peninsula, British Commitments • Federal Research Division (2004). Syria: A Country to King Husein, Political Intelligence Department, For- Study. Kessinger Publishing. ISBN 1-4191-5022-7 eign Office, 21 November 1918 • Friedman, Isaiah (2000). Palestine, A Twice- [48] Walter Reid (1 September 2011). Empire of Sand: How Promised Land. Transaction Publishers. ISBN 1- Britain Made the Middle East. Birlinn. pp. 71–75. ISBN 56000-391-X 978-0-85790-080-7. • Hughes, Matthew (1999). Allenby and British Strat- egy in the Middle East, 1917–1919. London: Rout- [49] Palestine Papers 1917–1922, Doreen Ingrams, page 48 and UK Archives PRO. CAB 27/24. ledge. ISBN 0-7146-4920-1 • Huneidi, Sahar (2000). A Broken Trust: Herbert [50] Friedman, 2000, p.294; F.O. 371/5066, E. 14959/9/44, Samuel, Zionism and the Palestinians, 1920–1925. “Memorandum on Palestine Negotiations with the Hed- IB Tauris. ISBN 1-86064-172-5 jaz,” by H[ubert] W. Y[oung], dated 29 November 1920 • Kedourie, Elie (2000). In the Anglo-Arab Labyrinth: [51] British White Paper of June 1922, The Avalon Project at The McMahon-Husayn Correspondence and Its In- Yale Law School. terpretations, 1914–1939. London: Routledge. ISBN 0-7146-5097-8 [52] National Archives CAB 24/159/6 17 February 1923 • Mansfield, Peter (2004). A History of the Middle [53] House of Lords debate, HL Deb 27 March 1923 vol 53 East. London: Penguin. ISBN 0-14-303433-2 (see cc639-69 pp. 154–155). • [54] Report of a Committee Set up to Consider Certain Corre- Milton-Edwards, Beverley (2006). Contemporary spondence Between Sir Henry McMahon and the Sharif Politics in the Middle East. Blackwell Publishing. of Mecca in 1915 and 1916, UNISPAL, enclosure to An- ISBN 0-7456-3594-6 nex A. • Paris, Timothy J. (2003). Britain, the Hashemites [55] House of Lords debate, HL Deb 20 July 1937 vol 106 and Arab Rule, 1920–1925: The Sherifian Solution. cc599-665, Viscount Samuel: “Speaking to him of Lord London: Routledge. ISBN 0-7146-5451-5 Grey’s speech, I said I wished to write to him on the sub- • Schneer, Jonathan (2010). The Balfour Declaration: ject, and he said he could tell me facts that I could com- municate to Lord Grey. He gave me, quite unofficially, The Origins of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Random this note dated April 12, 1923” House. ISBN 978-1-4000-6532-5.

[56] Friedman, 2000, p.292; FO 371/14495 (1930) 10 External links [57] Report of a Committee Set up to Consider Certain Corre- spondence Between Sir Henry McMahon and the Sharif • The Hussein-McMahon Correspondence at the of Mecca in 1915 and 1916, UNISPAL. Jewish Virtual Library.

[58] See UK National Archives CAB 27/24, EC-41. • The 1937 on the McMahon cor- respondence and the “Arab Revolt” [59] See CAB 24/271, Cabinet Paper 203(37).

[60] See UK National Archives CAB/24/143, Eastern Report, No. XVIII, 31 May 1917. 10 10 EXTERNAL LINKS

“Districts” according to the McMahon letter and their administra- tive category in the Ottoman Empire

McMahon–Hussein Letter 25 October 1915 11

Emir Faisal’s party at Versailles, during the Paris Peace Confer- ence of 1919. At the centre, from left to right: Rustum Haidar, Nuri as-Said, Prince Faisal, Captain Pisani (behind Faisal), T. E. Lawrence (known as “Lawrence of Arabia”), unknown, Captain Tahsin Qadri.

1918 British Government map entitled “Map illustrating Territo- rial Negotiations between H.M.G. and King Hussein”

The interpretation of the British Government changed between 1918 and 1922. The left hand page is from CAB 24/68/86, November 1918, whilst the right hand page is from the Churchill White Paper of June 1922 Minutes of the Paris Peace Conference 1919. The correspon- dence was described by David Lloyd George as “the Treaty with the Arabs” 12 10 EXTERNAL LINKS

Cmd 5974 Report of a Committee Set up to Consider Certain Correspondence Between Sir Henry McMahon and the Sharif of Mecca in 1915 and 1916 13

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