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Iranian Role in Mass Demolitions and Population Transfers in Syria

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Iranian Role in Mass Demolitions and Population Transfers in Syria Silent Sectarian Cleansing Iranian Role in Mass Demolitions and Population Transfers in Syria © Naame Shaam, 1st edition, May 2015 Foreword This report focuses on two specific war crimes and The primary aim of this report, therefore, is to raise the crimes against humanity committed repeatedly in certain alarm on what appears to be a very serious issue for parts of Syria since March 2011, namely the unlawful the future of Syria. The report does not claim or aim to destruction and appropriation of civilian property and the provide detailed evidence of specific instances of the forcible displacement and transfer of civilian population. crimes in question. It simply provides a few examples and indicators that would need further examination and Together they constitute what appears to be a state investigation by specialised bodies. We hope that the policy of sectarian cleansing, driven by a combination legal framework and discussion provided will stimulate of mafia-style war profiteering linked to the inner circle and provide some guidance for such efforts. of the Syrian regime and a Shi’atisation programme pushed and financed by the Iranian regime and imple- mented with the help of Hezbollah Lebanon. There has been a lot of talk among Syrians about these two subjects over the past two years. But not many people, to our knowledge, are working on documenting and analysing them in a systematic and legally useful way. The majority of what is published and circulated in this regard is often mere rumours, unconfirmed reports or inconsistent information. Foreword 3 This report was produced by the Research and Advocacy Team of the campaign group Naame Shaam. Naame Shaam is a group of Iranian, Syrian and Lebanese activists that focuses on uncovering the role of the Iranian regime in Syria. For more details, see www.naameshaam.org. Naame Shaam is supported by the Netherlands-based Rule of Law Foundation, www.lawrules.org. 4 Silent Sectarian Cleansing Iranian Role in Mass Demolitions and Population Transfers in Syria Contents Foreword 3 Executive Summary 6 I. Rumours, Reports, Evidence 11 1. Destruction 13 2. Demolitions 16 3. ‘Urban planning’ 25 4. Appropriation 27 5. The reconstruction business 30 6. Forced displacement and population transfer 35 7. Sectarian cleansing? 38 II. Legal Framework 44 1. Destruction and appropriation of property 44 2. Deportation and population transfer 46 3. Individual and superior responsibility 49 4. International and non-international conflicts 53 5. Legal avenues 55 Contents 5 Executive Summary This report argues that the grossly careless and malicious position during nuclear talks with Western powers, as destruction and appropriation of civilian property and the it is doing now. It may even have to give up its nuclear forcible displacement and transfer of civilian population dreams once and for all. That is why Iran has been mobi- taking place in Syria since March 2011 amount to war lising all available resources (human, economic, military) crimes and crimes against humanity as defined by interna- to achieve the strategic aim of building nuclear bombs tional humanitarian law. without fearing a massive military retaliation on its soil. It further argues that both types of crime appear to be part The authors review previous reports documenting of a systematic policy of sectarian cleansing being carried the destruction in Syria, including those produced by out in certain parts of the country. the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (Unitar), and conclude that further research is needed to The policy appears to be driven by a combination of contextualise the figures and maps used in such reports mafia-style war profiteering linked to the inner circle of the against reliable news reports and witness statements Syrian regime and a Shiatisation programme pushed and about what was happening at the time and in the at- financed by the Iranian regime. tacks’ aftermath. This is necessary to establish who the perpetrators were and whether or not the destruction The report focuses on certain parts of Syria, such as Homs was justified by the ‘necessities’ of the war as defined by and Damascus, and argues that the aim of destroying and international law. reconstructing these areas is to create loyalist zones and strategic military corridors. The task of conquering and They also review reports on planned demolitions, securing them was assigned primarily to sectarian, Irani- including a 2014 report by Human Rights Watch an-controlled militias (Hezbollah Lebanon, Iraqi and Afghan (HRW) titled “Razed to the Ground: Syria’s Unlawful Shia militias, etc.), which were seen as more reliable and Neighborhood Demolitions in 2012-2013.” The authors better organised than the regular Syrian army. agree with HRW’s finding that the cases of demolition documented in the report were in violation of interna- The ultimate aim of this scheme, which arguably amounts tional humanitarian law because they either served no to sectarian cleansing and to a foreign occupation, ap- necessary military purpose and appeared to intention- pears to be securing the Damascus–Homs–Coast corridor ally punish the civilian population or caused dispropor- along the Lebanese border in order to both provide a tionate harm to civilians. geographical and demographic continuity of regime-held areas and secure arms shipments to Hezbollah in Leba- However, the authors argue that the demolitions ex- non, while at the same time cutting off those of the rebels amined by HRW and other similar cases are linked to coming from or through eastern Lebanon. the armed conflict in two other ways (not just collective punishment and disproportionate harm). Indeed, the main reason behind the Iranian regime’s uncompromising determination to save Bashar al-Assad’s Firstly, the targeting and destruction of certain areas regime and take over control at any cost is to maintain appears to have been intended to not only punish the its ability to ship arms to Hezbollah in Lebanon via Syria. communities supporting the revolution or the armed This will ensure maintaining a strong deterrent against any rebels, the majority of which happened to be Sunni, but possible Israeli and/or Western attack on Iran’s nuclear also to ‘cleanse’ those areas of all ‘unwanted elements’ facilities. This ‘line of defence’ is meant to secure the and prevent them from returning home in the future. The Iranian regime’s survival. If the Assad regime falls, Iranian result is changing both the political alliances and the arms shipments to Hezbollah are likely to stop and Hezbol- demographic composition of those areas. lah would no longer be the threatening deterrence against Israel that it is now. Secondly, at least in some areas, it appears that the war has been utilised as an excuse or a cover to implement The Iranian regime would therefore feel more vulnera- long-term or pre-existing plans of sectarian cleansing ble and would not be able to negotiate from a strong and demographic change. 6 Silent Sectarian Cleansing Iranian Role in Mass Demolitions and Population Transfers in Syria To achieve this double aim of cleansing rebel areas and More evidence is also needed to show that the prac- implementing long-term plans of demographic change tice has been widespread or systematic enough so as in those areas, destruction and demolitions had to be to reflect a state policy (or that of a de facto authority). followed by ‘reconstruction’ projects. Only then can it be said that these property purchases amount to unlawful appropriation of civilians’ or the To prove these claims, the report examines the Syrian enemy’s property tantamount to a war crime, as defined regime’s policies and presidential decrees in recent years by international law. concerning ‘urban planning’ of ‘unauthorised’ residential housing areas. It shows that, in a number of cases, there The report then examines various ‘reconstruction’ pro- had already been plans for ‘reconstructing’ the whole jects being implemented by old-new mafias linked to the area well before the current conflict started. inner circles of the Syrian and Iranian regimes as part of these alleged schemes of sectarian cleansing. For example, the demolitions in al-Mazzeh in Damas- cus appear to be a continuation of a long-standing plan Particular focus is given to Rami Makhlouf’s company of creating an ‘Iranian zone’ in the area similar to the Cham Holding, Iyad Ghazal’s Cartel Group, the Damas- Hezbollah stronghold in the southern suburb of Beirut cus and Homs City Councils, Sepah Pasdaran’s con- (al-Dahiyeh). The plan was simply accelerated because struction and engineering arm Khatam al-Anbia, as well of or under the cover of the war. And the Iranian em- as other Iranian cement and construction companies. bassy in Damascus appears to be at the heart of this plan. The authors argue that the ongoing war and the mass destruction it has brought about present a golden op- The authors conclude that, in addition to the wanton portunity for many Iranian companies that already have destruction of civilian property (i.e. grossly careless and contracts in Syria to expand their business there. The malicious), these urban planning schemes amount to new market also presents an opportunity for Iran to not an unlawful appropriation of civilian property not justified only evade international sanctions but to also consoli- by military necessity, even though they took place in the date its economic and political power in Syria. context of the armed conflict. In other words, such plans are more political than eco- Various Iranian officials appear to be implicated in these nomic. They are based on the assumption that invest- schemes, including the Iranian ambassador to Syria, the ments in Syria will, in the long term, give the investors Iranian mediator in Homs known as Haji Fadi, Iranian or partners significant leverage in how the country is businessmen and Sepah Pasdaran commanders with governed, even if the investments do not return financial responsibilities in Syria.
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