Engendering refugees’ livelihood strategies: the case of the Iraqi diaspora in

By Giorgio Heinrich Neidhardt Fondazione Terre des Hommes Italia Onlus

Abstract This study looks at the gender dimension in Iraqis’ livelihood strategies in in the period immediately before the present uprising and repression. It suggests that the lack of resources in Syria has meant that Iraqis have ‘activated’ resources elsewhere, outside Syria and outside the environment of institutional humanitarian assistance, and examines the implications of these transnational practices for Iraqi families and their networks. In the first part of this paper I analyse the characteristics of the host country, starting from the urban milieu in which the refugee communities are situated. I note the relative unimportance of ethnic and sectarian affiliation within the Iraqi diaspora in Syria, and focus on the more significant social and economic constraints on recent refugees following the enforcement by the Syrian government of stricter regulations on entry and stay, and the subsequent separation of families between Iraq and Syria. In the second part I examine the dependence of Iraqi refugees in Syria on family networks to cope with the restrictive measures of the host country on the one hand, and with the conflict in Iraq on the other, in order to comprehend how gender in the Iraqi diaspora in Syria constitutes a determining element with respect to livelihood strategies.

Introduction Since 2003 debate has grown among both prac- understood as the circulation of people, repre- titioners and academics on urban displacement sentations, ideas, goods and services across and and gender in the Iraqi diaspora. On the one within national boundaries (Dahinden 2010) – hand, the urban character of displacement – and may enhance social resilience and capabilities, the inherent higher mobility of the displaced – as it could represent an opportunity to diversify were a subject of study for their fluid and elusive resources while involving women and leading to nature, which posed important challenges to the ‘new gender roles’ (Loughry 2008). provision of humanitarian assistance (Chatelard To access these resources, refugees often rely 2010). On the other hand, the gender dimension on family members and friends in the areas of of displacement has been predominantly exam- origin and destination through a complex series ined in relation to the vulnerabilities of Iraqi refu- of interpersonal relationships that constitutes a gees, notably Iraqi women and girls. transnational network. Family ties are commonly If read through a positive lens, the relation the primary link between these constellations of between ‘mobility’ and ‘gender’ – as opposed individuals (Massey 1988). Transnational family to ‘urban displacement’ and ‘vulnerabilities’ – networks are among the most frequent means may be conducive to the constitution of liveli- among displaced people to mobilise financial hood strategies. In other words, mobility – to be resources, such as remittances, as well as the

Diversities Vol. 15, No. 1, 2013 ISSN 2079-6595, www.unesco.org/shs/diversities/vol15/issue1/art8 © UNESCO Diversities Vol. 15, No. 1, 2013 • ISSN 2079-6595 G. H. Neidhardt

social capital and the information used to enable registered by the UNHCR in Syria are Sunnis. On trade and relocation between the country of asy- the other hand, demographic data collected by lum, the homeland, and third destinations. Iraqi UNHCR show that in Syria females constitute half women and men may have different roles in of the refugee population, with female-headed accessing these networks, a difference that chal- households making up 30% of the cases (UNHCR lenges institutional humanitarian assistance and 2008). Field research conducted in Syria and in policies as well as customary patriarchal hierar- Iraq suggests that ethno-sectarian divisions and chies and structures. family structures that shaped life in the coun- There is growing evidence that transnational try of origin have undergone changes in the livelihood strategies through family networks – diasporic context. Despite patriarchal opposi- including remittance sending as well as knowl- tion, women seem to play a determining role in edge-sharing – may be equally relevant in situa- anchoring family members in the recent diaspora tions of forced displacement as they are in situ- and provide livelihoods through family networks. ations of economic migration (Horst 2004). It is Despite being one of the largest refugee pro- a distinctive feature of Iraqi forced migration in ducing countries, until recently Syria used to host Syria that economic constraints in the country of the majority of displaced Iraqis in the region. asylum mean that remittances are sent from the While Syria is experiencing its own crisis, the country of origin, opposite to the usual trend of Iraqi displacement situation is far from being sending remittances from the country of asylum solved. By relying on the participant observa- to the country of origin (Doraï 2007). tion research method, this paper seeks to pro- Following an overview of livelihood terminol- vide new ways of understanding the conditions ogy and some relevant definitions, I intend to of the Iraqi displacement and possible solutions examine how gender has influenced transna- to it. This research was, however, undertaken in tional livelihood strategies among Iraqis who took the period before the current instability in Syria. refuge in Syria, whether the lack of resources in Any short or long-term solution to the Iraqi refu- Syria has led to the need to ‘activate’ resources gee situation needs to be read in light of other elsewhere outside Syria and outside the environ- displacement situations in the region, which now ment of the regime of humanitarian assistance, includes thousands of displaced Syrians. and how gender might be important in such an attempt to retrieve available resources. A note on terminology The Iraqi diaspora in Syria, especially since the Livelihoods are defined by Chambers and Con- fall of Ba’thist regime, has been characterised by way (1992) as comprising ‘capabilities, assets – a high level of freedom of choice in the place of including both material and social resources – and settlement, with three out of four refugees living activities required for a means of living.’ This def- amongst the civilian population in the country of inition is widely accepted in the discipline of eco- asylum. In 2005 the United Nations High Com- nomics and development studies. For the scope missioner for Refugees (UNHCR) calculated that of this paper, however, Jacobsen’s definition of 10.6 million Iraqis were living amongst the local livelihoods in situations of displacement may population, compared to the 3.6 million Iraqis provide a better framework (Jacobsen 2002). As living in refugee camps or centres (UNHCR 2005). she argues, the pursuit of livelihoods in the con- Despite stricter entry measures adopted by the text of forced displacement encompasses ‘how Syrian government in 2007, the absence of camps people access and mobilize resources enabling implies a relative increase in decision-making for [refugees] to increase their economic security, refugees, which in turn allows us to reflect on thereby reducing the vulnerability created and the variables which determine their movements. exacerbated by conflict.’ While displacement can Gender is an important variable alongside ethnic result in new forms of gender and age vulnerabil- and sectarian affiliation (Al- 2007). In contrast ity, it can also lead to the creation of new strate- to the situation before 2003, most Iraqi refugees gies to access and mobilise these resources, with

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new forms of social organisation and networks A note on methodology forming as a result of having to cope with dif- This study is the result of field research con- ferent hardships related to forced displacement. ducted from 2007 to 2011 thanks to the sup- Within this context, refugee men and women port of the UNHCR, the International Organiza- may use different means to access resources and tion for Migration, and Intersos, an international pursue livelihood activities, actively navigating non-governmental organisation. The analysis the opportunities and constraints of their social – ethnographic in nature – is based on 45 semi- worlds. To qualify for assistance from humani- structured interviews, including 29 with refugees tarian organisations, however, women might be and asylum-seekers, 12 refugee returnees, and pushed to adopt identities such as ‘single moth- three displaced Iraqis who were not registered ers’ or ‘women at risk’. In reality, women’s sta- with UNHCR. The interviews were conducted in tuses might be more complex, as their spouses Damascus at the UNHCR registration centre in might be residing in another location with the Duma as well as in the refugees’ houses. Inter- knowledge of the woman (Gale 2006). A single views with returnees were conducted in Baghdad woman with children in Damascus who fits in the and Basrah, mainly at the NGO’s premises. Three vulnerable category might have a husband in Iraq follow-up interviews were also conducted via who supports the family via remittances. In each phone. In addition to semi-formal interviews, case the woman would be termed ‘vulnerable’, I used participant observation as a research tool but her situation would clearly vary, depend- throughout my engagement with the Iraqi refu- ing on the resources available to her, including gee community over several years. Additional those from diasporic family members. Old hier- quantitative data were extracted from the two archies of authority may also be challenged in surveys conducted by Ipsos in 2007 and the 2005 the refugee context with significant implications assessment by the UNHCR–United Nations Chil- for men’s roles as husbands, fathers, protectors dren’s Fund (UNICEF) World Food Program, as and breadwinners, along with their loss of for- well as various UNHCR polls conducted at the mal power networks. Gale’s approach may call border and in Baghdad in 2010. The persons into question conventionally applied categories interviewed include persons coming from higher of vulnerabilities and open up possibilities for a and lower socio-economic backgrounds accord- more nuanced understanding of the situation in ing to their previous employment in Iraq. Ques- which refugees find themselves. tions regarding the faith of the interviewees were As illustrated in the cases examined below, vul- left as optional, in order to avoid further stig- nerability should thus be analysed as a dynamic matisation of this element, which is a frequent concept intended to capture households’ ability ground for fleeing the place of origin (Jacobsen to respond to perturbations or shocks. At differ- and Landau 2003). ent stages of the displacement cycle, the capac- The perception of refugee women was limited ity to cope with shocks may vary along with the by the western origin and the male gender of extent and degree of refugees’ vulnerabilities. the author. Not all refugee women were alone Diverse sources of income – for instance, through during the interview but were instead accompa- different income earners in Iraq and Syria – are nied by male relatives who may have influenced an important basis for refugee families to pursue the answers given during the interviews. On the livelihood security. The existence or lack of such other hand, interviews with male adults were income sources is in turn a key predictor of vul- favoured by a higher level of intimacy, and at all nerability. However, cash income is not sufficient times, trustworthiness was communicated and to ensure livelihood security. This is most evident the informed consent of the respondents was when refugees are forced to rely on negative asked before starting any interview. coping mechanisms such as child labour and traf- The interviews were conducted in Arabic ficking, two aspects that result from and contrib- directly by the author. Avoiding the use of inter- ute to the vulnerability of refugees. preters favoured trust-building as the inter-

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viewees – whether males or females – may feel ment represented by camps (Al-Sharmani 2003; ashamed speaking or more embarrassed to talk Grabska 2006). Moreover, the absence of camps about stigmatising subjects that are proscribed implies an increase in the decision-making pro- in their culture in front of someone from the cess for refugees, and allows us to reflect on the same culture and instilled with the same moral variables which determine their movements. codes. Respect and sensitivity in communicating The following section will examine some areas in with the respondents were of paramount impor- Damascus where a higher concentration of Iraqis tance to minimise cross-cultural tensions. was found and will then provide an analysis the To reduce the risk of bias, interviews were also modalities of settling employed by the Iraqi com- conducted outside the institutional milieu, draw- munity in exile. ing on different clusters of interviewees, includ- Based on the available information, it appears ing both UNHCR-registered and non-registered that Damascus is the preferred destination for Iraqis, as well as aid organisations and shop the majority of Iraqis: over 50% of Iraqi refugees keepers from the host community, thus minimis- have settled here since the beginning of 2007. ing the faults of the snowball approach and the Most Iraqis in Damascus originate from Baghdad; accumulation of information based on only one the number of Baghdadi Iraqis in this city rose source of information. To diversify clusters, inter- from over 50% in May 2007 to 78% in November viewees were also selected in Iraq for referrals of the same year (IPSOS November 2007). Thus, to diaspora members residing in Damascus. The this is a migratory track from and to the larg- numbers of respondents in the country of ori- est urban centres in the countries of origin and gin were, however, limited due to security con- destination. This tendency remained unchanged straints. until 2012 (UNHCR 2012). Iraqis chose Damascus as their destination initially for the lower costs of Distribution of the Iraqi population in living compared to Amman (UNHCR 2006), but Damascus: a reflection of continuity later this does not seem to have been the reason Urbanization of the diaspora and chain for the decision: In 2007, just 3.7% of refugees migration decided to reside in Damascus on the basis of Exile –consists first of an uprooting followed by its lower costs (Ipsos May 2007). The increased a process of reterritorialisation. This reinsertion costs with an inflation rate which reached 10% in into a new context may generate a special mean- the same year partly explain this change in deci- ing for the exiles. Within Iraq, the post-2003 sion-making. However, many Iraqis continued to uprooting resulted in the division of the terri- choose Damascus as their destination. In the sec- tory on an ethno-sectarian basis. By way of con- ond half of 2007, over 55% of refugees claimed trast, displacement to locations outside Iraq led that they chose Damascus primarily because of to the creation of a new and diverse social set- the presence of parents and/or friends (Ipsos ting (Cambrezy 2001). In Syria, as in Jordan, Iraqi November 2007). As Haifa, a mother of 5, put it: refugees do not reside in camps, but amongst We arrived here [in Damascus] because my broth- the local population in rural areas and particu- er-in-law, who has been living in since larly in urban areas; hence the separate defini- 2005. He bought a house here. When I arrived, he tions of urban refugees and rural refugees. The helped me to settle me and my children and I’ve notion of urban refugees stems from an increas- now rented a house nearby his place. ingly recurrent global phenomenon character- ised by a decline in the use of refugee camps, The Syrian capital remained the major centre of which Damascus is an emblematic example. of attraction despite the considerable increase The decreased use of refugee camps has pro- in prices. The major pull factor – the initial low vided researchers with the chance to observe cost of living – was replaced by bonds of family the paths of a diaspora within a host territory, as and friendship, a phenomenon known as chain refugees are not subject to the limits of move- migration.

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The major concentrations of Iraqis were in people interviewed by UNHCR in a recent sur- the peripheral areas of the capital, mainly in vey refused to specify their faith – saying simply the quarters of Sayyida Zaynab, Jaramana, Qud- that they were Muslims. Such a trend may be the saiyya, Yarmuk and Masakin Berzeh (Ipsos May result of the stigmatisation of their affiliation. 2007). When one takes the history of these areas I don’t understand why they need to keep asking into consideration, some interesting details if I am Arab, Kurd, Shiite or Sunni!? I am Muslim emerge. Often these quarters were the same and I am Iraqi. I already had to pass through this in sites where previous generations of Iraqi refu- Baghdad. So why they keep asking me? gees had settled. One of the largest concentra- tions is found in Sayyida Zaynab. A Shiite Iraqi Secondary moves by Iraqi families within Damas- community started to settle here in 1970 and cus suburbs and rural areas were also observed. 1980, when individuals were deported because These seem to be dictated by the financial con- of their alleged Iranian origins (Babakhan 1996). straints faced by Iraqis who initially relied on sav- Sayyida Zaynab is one of the major pilgrimage ings and saw their depletion in the face of high centres of the Imamite Shiite community. Thou- inflation. continues: sands of people pay a visit (ziarah) to this site We had to move from Masakin Berzeh to Yarmuk where the daughter of Ali Ibn Abu Talib is because we could no longer afford the price of liv- said to be buried (Mervin 1996). Today Sayyida ing in Masakin Berzeh. The apartments there are Zaynab is important not only as a pilgrimage cen- way more expensive. tre, but also for being one of the centres of the exiled Iraqi community. Shiites as well Sunnis live New patterns also appeared after the intensifica- in this area. The original Shiite character of this tion of violence in Syria following the unrest of quarter and the presence of an equal number of March 2011. Since then many Iraqis have been Sunnis confirm that sectarian differences do not secondarily displaced from conflict-affected necessarily determine where Iraqis decide to set- areas like , , , and Dar’a, tle, even though those who took refuge in Syria while others who used to live on the outskirts were escaping from the sectarian violence which of Damascus, most notably in Sayida Zaynab, was dividing Iraq. As Khadija explained: , Arbeen, Barza and Duma, had to relo- cate to safer areas within the city – particularly We fled from the sectarian violence [taifiya] in No- Jaramana, where an increasing number of inter- vember 2007. I settled in Sayyida Zaynab because here I had some friends who had fled Baghdad for nally displaced Syrians also converged. the same reason. As pointed out by Lassailly-Jacob (1996): ‘Con- trary to widespread stereotypes, the first groups The Iraqis living in Syria are often well-educated of refugees are not fleeing randomly, but they and previously belonged to the middle class. follow familiar routes.’ Lassailly-Jacob’s research Before the fall of Saddam Hussein, Khadija used confirmed that, after the fall of the Ba’th regime, to work together with her husband in the Min- the Iraqi diaspora has followed migration pat- istry of Culture. Because such Iraqi refugees are terns similar to those of the pre-2003 diaspora, themselves the victims of sectarian conflict, they despite the considerable change in the sectar- are unlikely to cause a spill-over of the conflict in ian composition of the refugee population. Ties the country of asylum (Leenders 2008). The high of kinship or friendship, as well as economic and presence of ‘mixed’ heads of households among security factors, significantly contributed to the Iraqi refugees, i.e. belonging to both sects, cor- continuity of this migration process, and pre- roborates this thesis. vailed over sectarian differences. Muhammad, a Sunni Arab, is married to Jwana At the same time, the higher mobility of exiled K., a Sunni Kurd woman. Like many other inter- women in the new urban context was often viewees, he had initially hesitated to mention his found to exacerbate the anxieties of their hus- ethnic and religious affiliation. In fact, 69% of the bands, who remained rooted in their traditional

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patriarchal views. For displaced Iraqi women, the In a phone conversation a month later, Zaynab experience of conflict as well as the hardships explained: posed by their exile and refugee status often I had to go back but I could not find my son. Now introduces a new structure of opportunity and we are stranded here in Baghdad and we cannot go constraints into a changing social, political, and back to Syria because we do not have a visa. economic landscape. The largest proportion of returns has been dic- The dispersal of family members tated by the socio-economic constraints the refu- Syria has not ratified the 1951 Geneva Conven- gees faced in Syria (UNHCR 2010). As duiyuf, or tion relating to the Status of Refugees, nor its ‘guests’, Iraqis in Syria are not allowed to work. Protocol. The government allowed the entry of In order to have access to regular employment, Iraqis, adopting a relatively open borders policy it is necessary to have a work permit, which is until October 1st 2007, when it decided to limit obtainable when a long-term residency permit access to Iraqis, blaming the illegitimate war led (iqamah) is issued. The latter may be very - dif by the United States and the negative repercus- ficult for Iraqi refugees to obtain, thus limiting sions on Syria resulting from the large presence access to work. of Iraqis (Saleh 2007). With the closure of the bor- Syrian authorities have generally tolerated der, family members were separated between the irregular staying of Iraqis. Nevertheless, they Iraq and Syria. When interviewed, Basima, a posed severe limitations on access to the formal young married woman from Baghdad who lived labour market. In addition, Iraqi employees are with her older son in Sayyida Zaynab, had been vulnerable to regulations that withdraw their separated from the rest of the family in Iraq. work permits if they are found to have commit- My husband had registered with UNHCR in Damas- ted offensive acts in respect to šaraf (honor) cus, but then he had to return to Iraq for work and and adab (decency). These acts are considered now he cannot leave the country. Every once in a crimes (jinayah) and reporting them to the while I manage to talk to him via phone. He had authorities is entirely at the discretion of the tried to get a visa from the Syrian embassy to re- employer (Saleh 2007). The considerable com- turn to Damascus, but it’s so hard. petiveness to find employment – most notably Nevertheless, growing numbers of family mem- in the informal labour market – further reduces bers decide to take the risk of returning to Iraq refugees’ chances of obtaining work with decent with no guarantee of being allowed to re-enter wages. the country. The Syrian government later soft- As a result, Iraqis are left with few options but ened these entry measures by allowing a limited to rely on their savings: These constitute the pri- number of Iraqis to obtain a visa at the border. mary form of support for 41% of refugees (Ipsos Despite this change, surveys indicate that only in May 2007). The high cost of rent together with 63% of cases is the composition of the family unit the lack of earned income can soon exhaust sav- the same as prior to departure from Iraq (Ipsos ings, leaving no alternative but to seek resources 2007). in Iraq (UNHCR May and December 2010). The The reasons that push Iraqi refugees to return case of Muntadhar, who had spent over a year home vary. For instance, Zaynab, who lost her in Damascus with his family without finding husband when he was assassinated in his police employment, is emblematic: car, claimed: Since we left Baghdad because of the threats of I want to go back to Baghdad together with my the Shiite militias, we’ve lived in Damascus only daughter Hala, to look for my son who has been thanks to our savings. In Baghdad I used to work kidnapped. as a taxi driver, while in Syria I had to spend most of my time at home. My wife Noora obtained her The risk of not being able to return to Syria did residency permit only thanks to her mother who not prevent her from going to look for her son. is Syrian.

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Muntadhar is despondent that he can no longer lected by UNHCR (UNHCR 2008). As Muhammad fulfil his role as breadwinner. He used to have explained: stable employment before he was forced to leave Reluctantly I had to leave my wife in Damascus to- Baghdad, together with his family. Pushed by the gether with my children, while I’ve returned here lack of work opportunities, he decided to go back [to Baghdad] to check on our properties and try to to Baghdad, where he now works and occasion- gain a living. I could not let my woman and children ally sends remittances to his wife and children. live here. Here in Baghdad there is no future for Despite the regulations which limit their my family. mobility, Iraqis manage to find ways to return, Even though the risks associated with return for example, by renewing their residency permits remains high, men often shuttle between Iraq prior to return to Iraq. Muhammad explained: and Syria to preserve the ‘duty’ – as Muhammad puts it – of the head of the family: I cross the border periodically; I verify the situa- tion and the conditions of our goods in Al-Mansour, When I go back to my family [in Damascus] I bring Baghdad. We’ve rented out our place there, and the money I earn with me; otherwise I send them the rent is our major source of income in Syria. to my wife through hawalat bankiya [bank trans- I still try to go back as little as possible. There are fers]. It is not much but it is vital for them to keep too many risks and threats as we’ve first experi- living there. enced fleeing Baghdad. As a mixed family, Jwana and Muhammad had to Family networks, commonly known to be a chan- move to Syria in order to save their lives and to nel to send remittances from the country of preserve their family unit. However, the division asylum to family members in the country of ori- of their family, and the temporary return to Iraq gin, thus tend to be upset by the livelihood con- of some of the family members, is now the only straints in Syria. Iraqi husbands who are unable way left to compensate the lack of resources in to find resources in Syria decide to look for them Syria. back in Iraq, and are thus temporarily separated from their wives and families who remain in the Livelihood strategies and the feminisation of country of asylum. As illustrated in the cases the diaspora above, the migration of displaced Iraqis is often De-constructing family networks circular across a wide area, as a result of a strat- For many Iraqis, the solidarity between commu- egy of managing risks through the dispersal of nity and family members is one of the few ways family members along family networks and gen- of coping with the lack of financial resources. At der lines. the beginning of 2007, 86% of those Iraqis who received assistance did so from family members, Resettlement and family reunification most notably through family networks (Ipsos Although few Iraqis are said to benefit from 2007). When Syria introduced stricter border humanitarian assistance, the referral mechanism regulations, there was a radical change in the for resettlement managed by UNHCR does have way that family networks operated, with remit- a significant influence on the livelihood strate- tances to the Iraqi refugees coming mostly from gies of refugees. UNHCR uses measures based on Iraq. Refugees’ perceptions of threats to physical positive discrimination in identifying those who security, together with Syria’s adoption of stricter are eligible: Women at risk and female-headed border regulations, have led to a gendered dis- households are amongst the most vulnerable persal of the family unit, with a new structure categories according to UNHCR and therefore emerging in order to foster means of activating the most likely to be referred for resettlement resources. The majority of family members who to a third country when no alternative solu- decided to stay in Iraq are male adults, while tions are available (UNHCR 2010). The number of the children and the wives tended to anchor resettled Iraqis from the to industri- in Syria. This trend is corroborated by data col- alised countries rose from a few hundred in 2006

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to approximately 50,000 in 2010 (UNHCR 2010). Bearing in mind UNHCR’s policies on resettle- The vast majority was resettled to the USA. In ment, many Iraqi women decide to remain in Syria the numbers of admissions to the USA Syria to secure their departure from Syria to declined in the following years because foreign third host countries, while husbands go back and state officials found it impossible to process the forth from Syria to increase access to resources refugees’ claims. (Reliefweb 2012). Once the women are resettled, From May 2007 to December 2012, 10,784 Iraqi men, as well as other family members, may Iraqi female refugees arrived in the USA from try to join them in a subsequent step. Family Syria, thus representing over 52% of resettled reunification is promoted byUNHCR according refugees by sex. Following the criterion that to the right of a family to live together. In 2009, single women and women at risk are more likely 6,122 women who were identified by UNHCR as to be resettled to third countries, Iraqi women at risk were admitted for resettlement in vari- often choose to separate from their husbands in ous hosting countries, while 922 followed for Syria in order to be considered for such resettle- family reunification (UNHCR 2010). The US, the ment. Living in a transitional situation defined as major resettlement country in the world, issued a ‘limbo’ (Danış 2007), Iraqis have high expecta- a special priority procedure to allow refugee tions of asylum in third countries. 27% of Iraqis family members to reunite with their Iraqi rela- surveyed by Ipsos claim that resettlement is the tives in the USA. As with movement from Iraq only reason they want to register with UNHCR, to Syria, chain migration from Syria to industri- as in the case of Umm Husseyn, an elderly Shiite alised countries was found to be a decisive factor woman who resides in Sayyida Zaynab: to pull Iraqis across remarkably different gender lines. I fled the quarter of Salama [previously known as Mintaqat Saddam] because a Sunni armed group Forced marriage and trafficking persecuted me. I’ve then moved to Qamariyyah together with my daughters who are married to Although its actual magnitude is unknown, Sunni husbands. I’ve managed to come to Syria but arranged marriage is another frequent method my daughters had to stay in Iraq because they had used by Iraqi women to foster mobility and problems with their passports. I do not want to go access to resources. This is particularly evident back to Iraq, and neither do I want to stay here. in the Arab world, where the relevant regula- I want to start a new life in Ireland as a human be- tions about polygamy are less restrictive than in ing with dignified life, without having to go to the Suq and seeing dead bodies on the streets. Europe. Such a marriage may be the decision of either the male or the female head of the family. Although growing numbers of Iraqis have man- An example was given by Fatima, the mother of aged to depart for resettlement, the majority of Rana. Fatima moved to Damascus following the refugees have to wait up to a year before their wedding of her daughter to a Syrian man. The cases are processed by the resettlement coun- mother declared: tries. Pending resettlement screening, many With considerable efforts, I’ve managed to give Iraqis are unable to secure the resources needed my daughter in marriage to Husseyn. I did it in her to cope with their increasingly precarious situa- interest after my husband died of cancer last year tions in Damascus. At the same time, Iraqis who [2006]. Now, Rana tries to take care of me. attempt to return are disqualified from obtain- ing refugee status and resettlement to a third Family networks are often at the core of these country (Chatty and Mansour 2012). Hence a transnational cross-border strategies, to enable high proportion of Iraqi families anchor in Syria access from a first to a second country of asylum. to secure the processing of their cases, while For example, in her interview, Aisha, who lived other families decide to split along gender lines in Baghdad alone to complete her studies before between Syria and the home country. joining the rest of her family in Syria, confessed

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to be eager to marry her cousin in Canada. The Education and Residence degree of coercion in these situations often var- Since the 2003 war, Syria is the only country in ies and may be subtle. the region which has provided access to basic A frequent and serious phenomenon – services to Iraqis, including access to primary although more often unreported – is represented health care as well as to primary and second- by the trafficking of women for prostitution. This ary education. Registration at school is one of may be managed by criminal organisations, how- the few solutions left to obtain a residency per- ever, family networks are also a pathway for sex- mit in Syria. An example is a family of five. In ual exploitation (USDS 2011). Despite being offi- Baghdad, the father used to be the director of cially prohibited, prostitution is often condoned a business, while the mother was a ministerial by local authorities with arešwa , or bribe. Young employee. The father was threatened, but the women are invited to Syria by their relatives and police did nothing, so the family fled to Damas- offered employment, but are then coerced to cus, and now live in Mašru‘ . The par- work in brothels. A typical case is that of Rizan, ents obtained a residence permit thanks to one who was married when she was still 16 to Ahmad, of their daughters, who has enrolled in school in a Sunni man: Damascus. Because enrolling in Syrian schools is a means to obtain the residency permit, the After the escalation of violence in 2006, my son and I fled to Syria to my husband with forged passports. highest peaks of refugee arrivals in Syria coincide Once we finished our savings, my husband decided with the beginning of the academic year (UNHCR to use our place as a brothel. Ahmad was running 2010). According to the Syrian Ministry of Edu- the business together with a Syrian guy; he forced cation, only 26,124 Iraqis are enrolled in schools, Iraqi women into prostitution, while we resided in equivalent to 13.5% of the Iraqi population in the same apartment. When I tried to convince him Syria aged between 6 and 14 years (Williams to leave this activity, he beat me. So I left him and 2007). This may be because not all families were I returned here in Al-Maqal [Basrah], where I live with my parents. initially aware of the possibility to enrol children in school. Often the credits acquired in Iraqi The Syrian authorities are often silent about schools were not recognised by Syrian schools, these episodes, but not always. Women accused as they have different educational curricula, and of prostitution in Damascus can be deported frequently school certificates had been left in to Iraq, with serious threats to their physical Iraq. Moreover, formal access to education does safety. Although the actual scale of trafficking in not imply actual attendance at school. According women and girls is unknown, this phenomenon to the same source (Williams 2007), the major- – together with arranged marriages – certainly ity of Iraqis dropped out of school after the first represents a common cross-border strategy for month of the academic year, mostly because of Iraqis in Syria. Negative coping strategies become economic constraints. According to a 16-year- more frequent when few other options are avail- old who now lives in Damascus together with his able in a protracted situation. Exploitative sexual mother and his younger sister in a flat in Sayyi- relationships were found to be more wide-spread dah Zeynab: among the poorest segments of the refugee pop- I used to go to school but the Syrian shebab [kids] ulation, who are often the ones who have fewer always looked for trouble. My mother does not means to survive. The cases examined reveal a earn enough money to make a living. Then I went consensus among women and youths that sell- to work in a factory where they produce gasoline ing sexual favours, whether formally for cash or heaters. I used to earn 200 lira a day [4 USD] work- on the basis of a kind of patronage, is a function ing 12 hours. The owner of the work then fired me dictated by unequal power relationships and lack saying I was Iraqi. My father is still in Iraq with the family of his second wife. So I had to help my moth- of alternative prospects. er to find a living, otherwise we won’t pay the rent.

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Although the parents in Iraqi refugee families but also in increased freedom of movement. This are often well educated, work by minors is in may cause resentment among male adults and fact common. With average wages of only 50 lira lead to acts of domestic violence against their [1 USD] per day, children are generally exposed wives and daughters. Such episodes of gender- to work exploitation. The opportunity to com- based violence are likely to go unreported. plete their education is not in fact taken up once In the essentially patriarchal structure of Iraqi the residency permit is obtained. Isolated from families, the male head of the household often the local communities, Iraqi children are thus left withholds the passports of the other family with their mothers to find a living. Girls are often members. The difficult circumstances of exile in left at home to take care of their younger siblings, Syria, however, challenge such traditional behav- whilst the mothers may have occasional work iour, as does the process for accessing asylum. as maids. According to Iraqi women, authori- UNHCR’s procedures for registration require that ties may close an eye when sons are found to be the asylum-seeker be present at the interview, working, but the authorities do not do tolerate even though it usually takes place several months their husbands working without the work per- after the first appointment with the UN Refugee mit. On the other hand, most well-off families Agency. While male heads of the families often expressed anxieties in letting their children go have to go back and forth between Iraq and Syria, to school, fearing that the school’s environment the women settle more permanently in Syria, and may not be safe and that their children may be can register with UNHCR Syria as asylum-seekers victims of bullying. and follow the procedures required to obtain the refugee certificate.L eaving women alone in Syria Redesigning the family structure stimulates male anxiety about perceived threats Often forced to leave Iraq for Syria without their to female modesty and sexuality. This is signifi- husbands, Iraqi women find themselves -tak cant in the case of Mustafa, who lost the chance ing on unprecedented roles. Abdallah, a former to register as refugee because he was going back aeronautical engineer and Ba‘th member who and forth between Syria to Iraq: graduated from university in Paris, now suffers When we first approached the UNHCR, I applied from senile dementia. His wife Fatima and her for the interview under my name. I knew I would daughter take care of him. While I conducted have had to go back to Baghdad – but you know – I the interview, Abdallah pretended to be inter- could not let my wife to do the interview alone be- viewed instead of his wife, and asked the reason fore the UNHCR. My wife is a simple woman. Alone why the questions were not addressed to him. she could not have done the registration. On the The elderly man needed medical treatment. At other hand I had to go back to come back here [to Baghdad] because it is the only place where I could that time, the family was living from their- sav find work. ings and from the money they had managed to earn by selling their assets in Baghdad. The wife In the end, neither Mustafa nor his wife regis- and daughter faced an uncertain future that tered with UNHCR. Mustafa stays in Baghdad to would require paid employment by one or both work and only occasionally manages to visit his of them, as they were no longer able to count on wife and children, while his wife renewed her res- Abdallah’s work. idency only thanks to her children’s enrolment in While women become the main wage-earners school. However, not showing up at the UNHCR in the refugee context, men often suffer from the interview and the subsequent lack of registration loss of role and authority, which becomes evident means losing the opportunity to obtain refugee in feelings of frustration. This primarily stems status. For this reason, a large proportion of men from an evolving role of women in the mobili- have had to renounce their exercise of monopo- sation of resources through a higher degree of listic control over the rest of the family, leaving autonomy. The latter includes the involvement female family members to take on new roles of Iraqi females not only in generating income, and deal with authorities to ensure the fam-

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ily’s future. As observed by Özyeğin: ‘Patriarchal had joined me here in Damascus. Here I sometimes opposition to women’s waged work, rooted in work as a cleaner for Syrian families, and I volun- teer to decorate the church, but it is not enough deep-seated anxieties about perceived threats to and I am now finishing my savings. female sexuality and modesty and to men’s hon- our, drastically limits the sort of work women can The remittances and other assets sent by Iraqi perform and the contexts in which they can work’ men are irregular and insufficient to secure (Özyeğin 2001). However, the severe limitations the livelihoods of their families. Thus most of following exile have introduced a radical change the women interviewed – from different socio- in the involvement of Iraqi women in access to economic backgrounds – undertake different resources (Danış 2007). During the interview, kinds of labour, mostly low-skilled casual work Khadija explained how her husband, who used for modest wages, while their children are also to be a sergeant until the fall of Saddam Hussein, often compelled to find supplementary sources is now unemployed in Syria: of income. The previous gender- and age-based roles of family members have therefore been We are here [before the UNHCR registration cen- transformed as a result of the conditions in exile. tre] looking for treatment. My husband has got a problem… He drinks too much. Now I try to gain a wage working as a carer in a Syrian family. Though, Conclusions I can’t take care of my children who are just 7 and Through the process of chain migration, the 10 years old. recent Iraqi diaspora followed pre-2003 patterns, characterised by solidarity networks made up A large number of women, who prior to displace- of family ties rather than ethno-sectarian ele- ment belonged to the Iraqi middle class, today ments. At one level, therefore, the diaspora is work in the informal labour market in Syria. While marked by continuity. However, socio-economic only those with sufficient financial resources constraints in Syria and the subsequent adoption manage to flee Iraq, over half of UNHCR-regis- of stricter entry regulations by the Syrian - gov tered Iraqi refugees have now been in Syria for ernment in 2007 greatly influenced Iraqis’ liveli- over five years, and their progressive destitution hood strategies and led to considerable changes is continuing because of the depletion of their to the roles of men and women. The cases here savings, the lack of stable income, and the high examined show how Iraqis adapted to the norms level of inflation affecting the country of asylum. which regulate their mobility – registration and As a result, even the most well-off families resettlement criteria, family reunification, and were pushed to undertake unskilled work in the access to education – in order to activate differ- informal labour market. Marie, a 50-year old ent resources. Iraqi woman, provides an example of this recur- Gender was found to be a critical factor in rent phenomenon. She claimed: determining who moves, how those moves take place, and the resultant ability of displaced I am an artist. In Baghdad I used to do taškil zinai [plastic arts]. I now live in Masakin Barzeh, in Da- women and families to access available resources mascus’ outskirts. I left my place in Al-Mansur at after the division–of the family unit (Boyd and the beginning of 2007: my 18-year-old son speaks Grieco 2003). The redirection of remittances English well, so he followed a British company in from Iraq to Syria implied an increasing devolu- Basrah to find employment. Together with a couple tion of authority to women as heads of house- of friends he was instead kidnapped by the mili- holds who channelled resources and developed tias. His friends’ parents phoned me to inform me some local ties, thereby allowing male family that the militias had requested a 20,000 USD ran- som to release them. We paid and then moved to members to stay mobile. Sulaymaniyya [Northern Iraq] together with my As pointed out by Chatelard, breadwinners second son. We lived there for a while and then are ready to take some degree of risk to look for I left to Syria while my two sons were stranded in work, but access to work and other services may Habbur between and Iraq, and eventually still be too risky for other household members

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(Chatelard 2010). Pushed by their traditional origin, is also an international human right and role to comply with this duty, male heads of the a means for the displaced to access resources. households tend to undertake such risks. Despite Institutional humanitarian assistance should the reluctance of their husbands, wives are sub- build upon this by supporting community-based sequently anchored in the host country together projects aimed at enhancing these capabilities with their children. Such cases illustrate a chal- and social resources. A holistic approach should lenge to the traditional family structure because also be adopted by paying equal attention to the of their conflict with its patriarchal character. needs of male heads of households, who often Such a change – which often affects wealthy as undertake dangerous journeys to their home well as poorer families – should not be romanti- compelled by their traditional role of bread- cised. These alterations appear to be disruptions winner, and who may be subject to frustrations rather than positive evolutions. In fact, women dictated by the loss of role in the country of are often forced to undertake roles which are asylum. far from emancipation, but are rather the result The Iraqi displacement has reached a critical of social exclusion. What the long-term conse- stage. International interest in Iraq is declining. quences of such a redesign of family roles will Yet the lack of security, continuing civil conflict, be – for example, whether the displacement and economic uncertainty make it unlikely that will become an opportunity leading to women’s a mass Iraqi return will occur. More likely, Iraqi empowerment – remains to be seen. refugees will remain in neighbouring states All too often humanitarian organisations have under increasingly difficult circumstances. As viewed freedom of movement only as a chal- their savings diminish and their circular move- lenge in terms of reaching those needing their ments into and out of Iraq to enhance their liveli- assistance. However, freedom of movement, hoods become more precarious, it is likely that including cross-border movements between and onward migration will become more necessary within the country of asylum and the country of and urgent.

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Note on the Author Giorgio Heinrich Neidhardt (MA in Human Rights and Conflict Management, MA and BA in Middle Eastern Studies) currently works for Fondazione Terre des Hommes Italia Onlus in Syria. He has research experience from the Institut français du Proche-Orient (IFPO) and the Universita’ Ca’ Foscari, and field experience in Syria, Turkey, Tunisia, Jordan, Yemen and Iraq. His research interests include forced migration, gender and conflict in the Middle East and North Africa.

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