HUMANITARIAN ACCESS TEAM (HAT) SITUATION REPORT: The Demilitarized Zone Agreement

DECEMBER 2018 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

After two months of mounting hostilities in northwest Syria, Presidents Putin and Erdogan reached a Memorandum on the Stabilization of the Situation in the Idleb De-escalation Area in Sochi, Russia, on September 17, 2018. This agreement prevented a widely anticipated Government of Syria-led offensive on the last remaining de-escalation area of the Astana agreement, constituted by opposition-controlled parts of Idleb, northeastern Lattakia, southern/ western Aleppo and northern Hama governorates.

With six of its ten provisions at least partially implemented to date, progress on the deal has been reasonable. The Turkish and Russian governments have agreed on the boundaries of an demilitarized zone (DMZ), an area from which armed opposition groups have withdrawn heavy weaponry and in which Russian and Turkish forces are carrying out UAV monitoring. In addition, a series of 12 Turkish observation points established on Idleb’s periphery in mid-2018 have also been reinforced. Though the limits of the agreement have been tested by all parties, hostilities throughout the northwestern de-escalation area are currently low.

Given the Memorandum represents a useful détente for Russia and Turkey, it is likely to remain in effect until at least early 2019. For Russia, the deal provides continued leverage over Syria’s near-term trajectory at a time when retaking the country’s northwest via military means is currently too risky, both politically and materially. For Turkey, the agreement prevents a humanitarian catastrophe along its southern border and constitutes a low cost initiative for retaining Turkish influence in Syria. It also provides Turkey with the time and space to gradually eliminate or co-opt the “radical” armed opposition group, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which represents the greatest threat to the stability of the DMZ. Indeed, the group is likely to continue to test the limits of the deal in an effort to draw concessions from both Turkey and Russia, specifically with regard to cross-line crossing control and transit routes.

Although the Memorandum is unlikely to lead to a wider political solution in Syria, it is expected to support relatively stable local conditions. Providing it remains in effect, the agreement may even lead to a more workable humanitarian operating environment: cross-line access could become formalized, and the Turkish role in aid coordination could increase. Conversely, even a partial collapse of the agreement could lead to more assertive Government of Syria- led military action in the northwest. This is expected to cause hundreds of thousands of people to flee towards the Turkish border and Turkish-controlled Afrin. Given both areas already host large IDP populations, any such movement is likely overwhelm locally available services and significantly increase the scale of emergency needs in these areas in particular. OVERVIEW: FROM ASTANA TO SOCHI

The Memorandum (hereafter, DMZ agreement) between Russia and Turkey represents one of several security agreements to have emerged from the Syrian conflict over the past two years. Unlike other bilateral agreements however, the Memorandum is a product of the Russian, Iranian, Turkish-led Astana process, and a direct extension of the earlier ‘de-escalation area’ initiative of May 2017. This broader arrangement establishment four de-escalation areas in Syria, specifically:

1. Zone 1: Idleb, northeastern Lattakia, northern Hama, and western and southern Aleppo; 2. Zone 2: Northern Homs countryside; 3. Zone 3: Eastern Ghouta; 4. Zone 4: Dar’a, Quneitra, and parts of western As-Sweida.

According to the de-escalation area agreement, hostilities between the Government of Syria and armed opposition groups were to cease in all four zones. The Russian, Iranian, and Turkish governments were to each act as guarantors, establishing military ‘observation points’ in designated buffer zones where necessary. The Government of Syria was to ensure “unhindered” humanitarian access in each zone and restore of government services, specifically electricity and water. Importantly, the de-escalation area agreement’s ceasefire excluded the Islamic State (ISIS), Jabhat al-Nusra, and other individuals and groups associated with al-Qaeda.

Although the de-escalation area agreement was framed as a security agreement which would lead to a broader political settlement, it failed to gain sufficient international support and had no direct Syrian input. Indeed, the entire Astana framework remained isolated from parallel processes until its membership presided over the Syrian National Dialogue summit of January 2018. This summit concluded with a plan to form three constitutional committees to support the UN-led Geneva process, specifically with regard to the drafting of a new Syrian constitution. After the Astana conference of November 28-29 however, a credible, balanced and inclusive constitutional committee is now a more remote prospect than ever, and it’s arguable whether the Astana process has made any notable progress towards achieving a wider political settlement in Syria [1].

In practice, the three guarantor states frequently violated the de-escalation area agreement, largely employing it as a means to expand and cement their influence inside Syria and to stabilize front lines. While Russia did establish observation points on the periphery of all four zones and pressured the Government of Syria to reduce or cease airstrikes in some areas, Russia and Iran ultimately aided the State in regaining complete control of zones 2, 3 and 4, and control of part of zone 1 through a combination of military pressure, siege tactics, and local ceasefires. Targeting groups excluded from the de-escalation ceasefire was instrumental to this effort, and was commonly used by the Syrian, Russian and Iranian governments to justify attacks against armed opposition groups with no known linkages to ISIS, Jabhat al-Nusra or al-Qaeda. Meanwhile, Turkey maintained its influence over remaining areas of zone 1 with the establishment of 12 observation points, and as Russia, Iran, and the Government of Syria focused efforts elsewhere, it expanded its influence in northern Syria with a growing presence in northern Aleppo and the capture of neighboring Afrin district.

MERCY CORPS Sitiuation Report: The Demilitarized Zone Agreement A 2 THE DMZ AGREEMENT

Having established full control over zones 2, 3 and 4 by the end of July 2018, the Syrian and Russian governments turned their attention to zone 1 (Idleb, northeastern Latakia, northern Hama, and western and southern Aleppo). Although the 12 Turkish observation points discouraged ground operations, the Government of Syria nevertheless deployed troops to front lines and renewed shelling, and the Russian Air Force resumed airstrikes. With pressure from international actors mounting throughout August however, the Russian, Iranian and Turkish leaders met in Tehran on September 7 to find ways to stabilize the de-escalation deal. While no substantive outcomes emerged from the meeting, Russia and Turkey met again in Sochi on September 17. This subsequent meeting produced a Memorandum on the Stabilization of the Idlib De-escalation Area, in which details relating to the DMZ were set out.

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The DMZ agreement effectively renews the Astana de-escalation areas agreement, and simultaneously allows for Russia and Turkey to avert what appeared to be a major escalation in the northwest. Through ten action points, the agreement seeks to reduce hostilities, isolate extremist groups, and normalize cross-line civilian and commercial transit in the de-escalation area. These ten points include:

1. The Idlib de-escalation area will be preserved, and Turkish observation posts will be fortified and will continue to operate. 2. The Russian Federation will take all necessary measures to ensure that military operations and attacks on Idlib will be avoided and the existing status quo will be maintained. 3. A 15-20 km deep demilitarized zone will be established within the de-escalation area by October 10.

MERCY CORPS Sitiuation Report: The Demilitarized Zone Agreement A 3 4. The delineation of exact lines of the demilitarized zone will be determined through further consultations. 5. All radical terrorist groups will be removed from the demilitarized zone by October 15. 6. All tanks, MLRS, artillery and mortars belonging to conflicting parties will be withdrawn from the demilitarized zone by October 10, 2018. 7. Turkish Armed Forces and the military police of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation will conduct coordinated patrols and monitoring with UAVs along the boundaries of the demilitarized zone. 8. Transit traffic on the routes M4 (Aleppo-Latakia) and M5 (Aleppo-Hama) will be restored by the end of 2018. 9. Effective measures will be taken for ensuring a sustainable ceasefire regime within the Idlib de-escalation area. In this regard, the functions of the joint Iranian-Russian-Turkish Coordination Center will be enhanced. 10. The two signatories reiterate their determination to combat terrorism in Syria in all forms and manifestations.

Following the implementation of the agreement (discussed below), the 11th round of Astana talks took place between 28-29 November. While the talks did not make any significant progress on a future political settlement in Syria, Russia, Turkey and Iran did affirm their continued support of the September DMZ agreement and the need to increase efforts to monitor and respond to violations in the DMZ.

Reactions to the DMZ Agreement Domestic

The DMZ agreement has received widespread support amongst civilians within the de-escalation area. Shortly after the deal was signed, demonstrations in support of the agreement were held in Idleb, Saraqab, Ma’arrat An Nu’man, Dana, and several other communities. Many demonstrators raised the Turkish flag and thanked the Turkish government for preventing a possible humanitarian catastrophe.

Views amongst armed groups have been more varied. The Turkish-backed National Liberation Front (NLF), a large, loosely organized coalition of northwestern armed opposition groups including Ahrar al-Sham, Soqor al-Sham, Faylaq al-Sham, and Nourredine al-Zenki, has officially expressed its support, thanking the Turkish government and expressing its willingness to cooperate fully to ensure the DMZ’s success in a September 22 statement [2]. Of note, the NLF’s statement was released after its political representatives met with Turkish officials in Ankara on September 21. During this meeting, Turkish officials reportedly outlined the DMZ’s borders, the demilitarization process, and how it would seek to fulfil its responsibility to remove extremist groups from the de-escalation area.

Jaish Izza, an armed group in northern Hama and southern Idleb which has previously received support from the Military Operations Center in Turkey, initially supported the agreement, but later withdrew after learning the DMZ would be drawn only from areas under opposition control. Though it has yet to further clarify its position on the agreement publicly, it nevertheless appears to be complying with the DMZ’s provisions in coordination with Turkish forces.

The largest group in the de-escalation area, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), has adopted a pragmatic approach to compliance with the agreement. To a great extent, this approach is illustrative of both its difficult relations with Turkey, and its own internal divisions. On one hand, HTS publicly opposed the Turkish-supported Astana process and was classified as a terrorist organization by Turkey in August 2018, thereby making it a legitimate target under both the Astana de-escalation area and the DMZ agreements. On the other, HTS has coordinated with Turkey since the Astana de-escalation area agreement, even expanding its influence over the northwest since this deal was reached in May 2017. Though some within HTS believe this contradiction is justifiable, hardliners continue to oppose

MERCY CORPS Sitiuation Report: The Demilitarized Zone Agreement A 4 the group’s relations with Turkey. Indeed, disagreements between the two camps reemerged upon the signing of the DMZ deal, and several prominent hardline figures have dismissed it entirely. As detailed below, HTS has only partially complied with the DMZ agreement to date. The group issued an official statement expressing thanks to the Turkish government for preventing a large-scale attack on October 14, but also stressed it would never disarm or give up the fight to overthrow the Government of Syria.

The al-Qaeda-affiliated Hurras al-Deen formally rejected the agreement in a statement released on September 22. The group is spread loosely across central Idleb, northern Hama, eastern Idleb, and the Turkmen Mountain region in Latakia. Meanwhile, several other extremist groups, to include the Turkistan Islamic Party, Ajanad Kavkaz, Jabal al-Islam and Jamaat Ansar Al-Islam, each of which is located around the Turkmen Mountain in Latakia, and Jabhat Ansar Al-Deen and Ansar Al-Tawheed, both located in eastern Idleb and western Aleppo, have not issued statements, but have each reportedly rejected the DMZ agreement [3].

For its part, the Government of Syria immediately announced its support for the agreement. Though it stated that it supported any attempt to avoid bloodshed, it also reaffirmed its intention to restore State control over the area, whether through reconciliation or military means. Several Government of Syria officials have reiterated this policy in subsequent statements and have referred to the DMZ agreement as a “temporary” measure.

International

The DMZ agreement has been received positively by the international community. On September 18, a U.S. State Department official told the Turkish Daily Sabah newspaper that the his government supported the agreement, and “any credible efforts that prevent a resurgence of violence and protects civilians.” These followed earlier statements on this theme from President Trump, who, during the escalating tensions in the northwest in early September, said that “President Bashar al-Assad of Syria must not recklessly attack Idlib Province. The Russians and Iranians would be making a grave humanitarian mistake to take part in this potential human tragedy. Hundreds of thousands of people could be killed. Don’t let that happen!”

During discussions on Syria held in Istanbul on October 27, Germany and France welcomed the DMZ agreement, noting it had prevented a potential humanitarian and refugee crisis. The two governments added that they hoped the deal would pave the way for a permanent ceasefire. The UN also welcomed the initiative and called on parties to the agreement to guarantee humanitarian access. Like earlier U.S., German, and French statements, UN representatives also stressed that despite repeated attempts to stall the Geneva political process and constitutional committees, work on these initiatives must begin in earnest with the DMZ in place.

On September 18, an Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson stated that “the agreement between Turkey and Russia is an important step in eliminating the remaining terrorists in the area,” and added that Iran supports the agreement given aligns with the aims of the Astana process. Iran’s support for the agreement, and no substantiated attempts to undermine it, are emblematic of its reduced visibility in Syria over the past year. Part of this may be due to Russia’s growing influence in Syria generally, and leadership of the Astana format specifically. Though it may also be the result of an assessment that its resources in Syria are better applied elsewhere, such as in the Iraqi border region, on the Israeli border in the southwest of Syria, and the corridor between Damascus and Lebanon.

MERCY CORPS Sitiuation Report: The Demilitarized Zone Agreement A 5 Status of the Agreement Implementation to Date

To date, notable progress has been made on the implementation of the DMZ agreement. Provisions 3, 4, and 6, are the main points of the agreement and have been almost fully implemented. Between 19-21 September, Russia and Turkey agreed on the boundaries of the demilitarized zone (DMZ), carving it entirely from opposition territory. According to Syrian observers on the ground, the zone is between 10 to 20 kilometers deep, and constitutes approximately 30% of the de-escalation area (of note, neither Russia nor Turkey have released an official map of the DMZ). Consequently, armed opposition groups open to complying with the agreement initially disputed the boundaries with Turkish officials and called for the DMZ to be drawn evenly from opposition and Government-held areas. However, the groups accepted the original boundaries after Turkish officials reportedly explained to armed group representatives that such a split would likely lead to the establishment of Russian-manned military positions within the DMZ, effectively creating a staging post for potential Russian incursions into the de-escalation area. Of note, Abu Issa al-Sheikh, leader of NLF member group, Soqur al-Sham, and Hassan Soufan, former leader of the NLF member group, Ahrar al-Sham, have reportedly been tasked with managing communication on the agreement between Turkey and HTS.

Once the boundaries of the DMZ were agreed upon, the NLF withdrew all heavy weaponry from the DMZ by the October 10 deadline. According to an NLF representative, the withdrawal was swiftly completed given the majority of heavy weaponry possessed by NLF member groups is already stored in areas outside the DMZ. Given NLF member groups are not considered as “radical” groups by either Russia or Turkey, the DMZ agreement allowed these groups to maintain forces with light weaponry within the demilitarized zone. As such, lists detailing NLF fighters and light weaponry remaining in the DMZ were submitted to Turkish officials. This is an important provision of the agreement: Nourredine al-Zinki and several key Ahrar al-Sham units are located almost entirely within the DMZ. In coordination with Turkish officials, NLF member groups have therefore been permitted to retain military positions along front lines within the DMZ. HTS also withdrew heavy weaponry from the DMZ by October 10 [4] [5].

Fully Partially Not Provisions of the DMZ Agreement Unknown Implemented Implemented Implemented The Idleb de-escalation area will be preserved, and Turkish observation posts 1 will be fortified and will continue to operate. The Russian Federation will take all necessary measures to ensure that military 2 operations and attacks on Idleb will be avoided and the existing status quo will be maintained. A 15-20 kilometers deep demilitarized 3 zone will be established within the de- escalation area by October 10. The delineation of exact lines of the 4 demilitarized zone will be determined through further consultations.

MERCY CORPS Sitiuation Report: The Demilitarized Zone Agreement A 6 All radical terrorist groups will be removed 5 from the demilitarized zone by October 15. All tanks, MLRS, artillery and mortars belonging to conflicting parties will be 6 withdrawn from the demilitarized zone by October 10, 2018. Turkish Armed Forces and the military police of the Armed Forces of the Russian 7 Federation will conduct coordinated patrols and monitoring with UAVs along the boundaries of the demilitarized zone. Transit traffic on the routes M4 (Aleppo- 8 Latakia) and M5 (Aleppo-Hama) will be restored by the end of 2018. Effective measures will be taken for ensuring sustainable ceasefire regime within the Idleb de-escalation area. In this 9 regard, the functions of the joint Iranian- Russian-Turkish Coordination Center will be enhanced. The two sides reiterated their determination 10 to combat terrorism in Syria in all forms and manifestations.

Given HTS and other “radical” groups remain visible within communities and on front lines within the DMZ, almost no progress has been made on provision 5. All such groups were required to withdraw from the DMZ by October 15, and although Russia has been critical of Turkey’s inability to force HTS and other extremists from the DMZ, Russian authorities have continued to openly coordinate with HTS forces, specifically at the Murak cross-line crossing, which reopened on November 2 [6].

After armed groups strongly protested the presence of Russian forces in the DMZ, provision 7 was amended. Patrols in the DMZ have therefore yet to begin, and will instead be carried out exclusively by Turkish forces. Both Russia and Turkey are still permitted to carry out UAV monitoring, and local observers have seen both Russian and Turkish UAVs in the area. Additionally, provision 1 of the agreement continues to be implemented, as Turkey expands its 12 observation points with increased troop numbers and heavy weapons.

To date, only partial progress has been made on provision 8. Civilians and traders have direct cross-line access to the M5 highway via the Murak crossing in northern Hama, and the Iss crossing in southern Aleppo. On the opposition side, both crossings are overseen by HTS, with Russian military police overseeing the Government of Syria side. Of note, at the Murak crossing, Russian military police are located in Suran (Hama); at Iss crossing, they are located in al-Hader. In August 2018, the Syrian and Russian militaries increased pressure on the de-escalation area. Russian police closed Murak crossing for three months between August and November (the Iss crossing remained fully functional). Following the September DMZ agreement and talks between Russian and HTS crossing officials however, Russian military police reopened the Government of Syria side of the Murak crossing at Suran (Hama) in early November.

MERCY CORPS Sitiuation Report: The Demilitarized Zone Agreement A 7 Traffic has moved normally since this time, with the exception of two temporary periods of closure, between November 9 and 11, and between November 16 and 18. Meanwhile, civilians and traders have no direct access to the M4 highway from the de-escalation area as there is no currently no cross-line route in the area.

Although the reopening of Murak, the continued operation of Iss, and the regular access via several other smaller crossings elsewhere signify that some progress has been made on provision 8, it is currently unclear how: 1) Turkey will normalize secure civilian and commercial access via the two highways by the end of the year, and; 2) how Russia and Turkey will establish direct cross-line access to the M4 highway. Though the NLF enjoys a considerable influence in certain communities along the M5 and M4 highways, HTS remains the most dominant armed group along the length of the M5, and is present alongside a series of extremist groups along the length of the M4. Additionally, both highways traverse some of the most volatile parts of the de-escalation area, where Turkish influence has proven particularly weak. As a result, the full implementation of provision 8 will remain vulnerable to a core objective of the DMZ and de-escalation area agreements, namely, to isolate and eliminate extremist groups, including HTS. Finally, transit along the M4 highway is further complicated by a lack of cross-line access. In order to create this access, Russia and Turkey must establish a crossing in the vicinity of Jisr al-Shughour, which is located within the DMZ but falls under the control of the extremist Turkistan Islamic Party.

Provisions 2 and 10 are not clearly defined, and the extent to which they have therefore been implemented remains unclear. The relatively low number of serious Government of Syria violations and limited Government of Syria troop deployments on the DMZ’s periphery indicates that Russia has been able to discourage President Assad from fully undermining the agreement. However, sustained Government of Syria shelling in northern Hama and southern Idleb, as well as sporadic shelling elsewhere, suggests that Russia is either unable or unwilling to ensure the Government of Syria fully abides by the DMZ agreement. On provision 10, it is unclear what has been done by either the Turkish or Russian governments to combat terrorism in the de-escalation area. While Russia has used the provision to justify Government of Syria violations, it has not taken steps to target HTS or other extremist groups, and continues to coordinate with HTS officials at the Murak crossing, whose presence is a violation of the DMZ agreement. Meanwhile, Turkey has made ostensibly no progress on ensuring HTS and extremist groups leave the DMZ, and has provided no public or private indication on how it will compel them to withdraw.

Violations to Date Several areas within the DMZ have witnessed significant hostilities. Most of the instability produced by these clashes in opposition-held areas has been observed in southern Idleb and northern Hama, where Government of Syria shelling has been practically constant since the DMZ agreement was signed in mid-September. Clashes between opposition groups and the Government of Syria have since intensified in this area, beginning on November 1, when HTS attacked a Government of Syria checkpoint in Abu Qumis in retaliation for the incessant shelling. Three soldiers were killed, prompting Government of Syria forces to shell Jarjanaz, in Ma’arrat An Nu’man subdistrict, which caused the death of ten civilians. After a week of continued shelling but relatively few clashes, November 8 witnessed the Government of Syria launch a surprise ground attack against Jaish Izza in Zalaqiyat, in Muhradah subdistrict, resulting in the death of 19 Jaish al-Ezza fighters. Two days later, on November 10, HTS launched a retaliatory attack against Government of Syria forces in the same area, killing 7 Russian and 17 Government of Syria soldiers, and wounding several more. Government of Syria shelling again struck Jarjanaz, in Ma’rrat An Nu’man subdistrict, on November 23. Ten civilians were reportedly killed, four of whom were students.

Hostilities in the Turkmen Mountain region in the Latakia countryside and in western Aleppo were initially limited to sporadic shelling, however, there have been a series of events since mid-November which point to an escalation in these areas. On November 16, the Jabal al-Islam Battalion attacked Government of Syria positions in Forou,

MERCY CORPS Sitiuation Report: The Demilitarized Zone Agreement A 8 north of Joureen, killing 10 Government of Syria soldiers and wounding severalothers [7]. Then, on November 20, members of the Hurras al-Deen-led Wa Harred al-Moa’meneen operations room killed 18 Government of Syria soldiers in Jabal al-Akrad, in northern rural Lattakia. In western Aleppo, Government of Syria-held neighborhoods of Aleppo city were allegedly hit with chlorine gas, an attack which Russian reports claim were launched from nearby opposition-held Khan Tuman and Al Rashidin, in Jebel Saman subdistrict. The Russian Air Force conducted a series of airstrikes on these locations on November 25, marking the first attack by Russian warplanes since the DMZ agreement was reached. A Russian Defense Ministry spokesperson stated that the Turkish government had been informed that these airstrikes would be conducted.

Turkey has issued a statement declaring it would hold any armed groups who violated the DMZ agreement to account. To date however, it has proven unable or unwilling of doing so. Meanwhile, Russia continues to state that HTS and other extremist groups in the DMZ are attempting to derail implementation of the deal, and has characterized Government of Syria violations as legitimate acts of self-defense or permitted targeting of extremist groups. During the 11th round of Astana talks between 27-28 November, Russia, Turkey and Iran agreed on the need to increase efforts to monitor and respond to violations in the DMZ.

Analysis and Forecasting

Although Government of Syria forces have the capacity to inflict significant territorial losses on the opposition across the northwest, they are reliant on Russian military support. For Russia however, the cost of retaking the zone is currently far too risky, both politically and materially. On the ground, the northwestern de-escalation area is larger than the other three zones, and more mountainous. Opposition and HTS fighters are better supported, equipped and trained than their counterparts in the other three de-escalation areas, and they have been joined by irreconcilable combatants from across the country. Finally, and unlike the other de-escalation areas, neither Syrian nor Russian representatives appear to have made any inroads with tribal or business networks that might facilitate a ‘soft’ advance in combination with increased military pressure. On the international level, Russia has likely avoided a military campaign on the de-escalation area for two reasons: first, because any such campaign would encourage cooperation between Turkey, the U.S. and European countries, and; second, because Russia has a vested interest in leveraging the possibility of making the agreement a permanent arrangement to secure European support for reconstruction in Government of Syria-held areas.

For Turkey, the agreement prevents a humanitarian catastrophe along its southern border and constitutes a low cost initiative for retaining Turkish influence in Syria. It also provides Turkey with the time and space to gradually eliminate or co-opt HTS, which represents the greatest threat to the stability of the DMZ. Though the Russian government has complained of Turkey’s slow progress on dealing with HTS, a Turkish presence in the DMZ enables it to pressure US-backed Kurdish forces in eastern Syria, making any Russian action in the northwest even more unlikely over the next few months. Given the DMZ agreement maintains a useful détente between Russia and Turkey, it is therefore likely to remain in effect until at least early 2019.

For its part, the actions of HTS indicate that it will seek to test the limits of the agreement in an effort to draw concessions from Turkey and Russia. Though HTS has not been openly hostile to the agreement, its belated and tepid public response, frequent (and publicized) patrols in the DMZ, and informal support for violations by other extremist groups suggest that it believes it has continued leverage. HTS is therefore expected to permit extremists and its own hardliners to occasionally violate the agreement, while seeking compromises with Turkey and Russia regarding its continued control over international and cross-line crossings, as well as a stake in any wider transit access to the M5 and M4 highways. If Turkey proves unwilling or unable to reach an agreement with HTS over the next few

MERCY CORPS Sitiuation Report: The Demilitarized Zone Agreement A 9 months, it is likely that the DMZ agreement in its current form will collapse. If this were to happen, Russian-supported Government of Syria military action to secure parts of the zone will likely be permitted by Turkey, especially in northern Hama and southern Idleb. As a result, Turkey may be able to exert greater influence in a smaller more manageable area, whilst also exercising increased leverage over a weakened HTS.

Of note, the DMZ agreement, and the Astana DEZ agreement, are unlikely to lead to a wider political solution in Syria in the short to mid-term. Given the divergence amongst Russian, Turkish and American policies in Syria, it is not expected that a reduction in hostilities, or even renewed multilateral talks, will result in any substantive agreement on Syria’s political future.

Humanitarian Situation According to REACH, 3.4 million people currently reside in the Idlib de-escalation area, of whom 1.4 million are internally displaced persons (IDPs) variously from Aleppo city, Rural Damascus, Homs, Hama, Deir Ez-Zor, Dar’a and other parts of Syria. The following presents the likely implications for meeting the needs of these populations in the event of: 1) No change/fuller implementation of the DMZ agreement in its current form, and; 2) a collapse of the existing agreement.

No change to DMZ/Fuller implementation

If the DMZ agreement remains in place, but no additional progress is made on provisions 7 and 8, the humanitarian situation in the Idlib de-escalation area is likely to remain relatively stable and unchanged. Alternatively, the situation could improve if progress is made on provisions 7 and 8, and on provisions relating to increased humanitarian access contained within the de-escalation area are more fully implemented. Such a scenario would necessitate a stabilized security situation, but would likely lead to increased market access and the fulfilment of basic needs if cross-line access was regularized. It may also entail an increase in direct Turkish involvement in stabilizing the security and humanitarian situation, similar to its efforts in northern Aleppo. If Turkey augments its role in the area, it is likely that local and international humanitarian organizations will be required to gradually complete registration with Turkish authorities, that local governance bodies and humanitarian organizations will come under Turkish pressure to increase coordination with Turkish humanitarian and development agencies such as AFAD and IHH, and that money transfers will be heavily scrutinized. Although these developments could lead to an improved humanitarian situation over the mid- to long-term, I/NGO funding to local humanitarian organizations could be constrained in the short-term due to Turkish interference.

DMZ Collapse (total or partial)

If there a total or partial collapse of the DMZ agreement, the humanitarian situation across the northwest will almost certainly deteriorate. Following a period of more frequent DMZ violations, the Government of Syria, with Russian support, will likely launch operations along one or several of the following axes: 1) from northern Hama to southern Idleb, specifically in communities in the vicinity of the M5 highway (home to estimated 118,426 people); 2) along the M4 highway, from the Turkmen Mountain region in Latakia to areas in the vicinity of Saraqab, in eastern/central Idleb governorate (home to an estimated 75,539 people) and, 3) in communities in the western Aleppo countryside, specifically around Al Rahsidin (home to an estimated 6072 people). While it is unlikely Government of Syria and Russian forces currently have the ability to advance on all three axes simultaneously, or could engage all three without risking an international response, even advances on one would likely force hundreds of thousand of people to flee towards the Turkish border and Turkish-controlled Afrin. As both areas are already home to significant IDP populations, a surge in IDP numbers could greatly exacerbate conditions in these areas. Meanwhile even a partial

MERCY CORPS Sitiuation Report: The Demilitarized Zone Agreement A 10 collapse of the DMZ would likely lead to restricted access to markets and basic needs throughout the de-escalation area. Economic activity would likely slow, and all six cross-line crossings would likely be closed by Russian and Syrian government forces. In addition, the two border Syria—Turkey border crossings at Bab al-Hawa and Kherbet Eljoz could also be either temporarily closed or restricted due to the influx of IDPs near border areas.

MERCY CORPS Sitiuation Report: The Demilitarized Zone Agreement A 11 Endnotes:

[1] The original constitutional committee plan called for the formation of three committees, one by the Government of Syria, one by the opposition, and one by the UN. However, the Government of Syria has opposed a direct UN role in the formation process and has called for the third committee to be formed by Syrians selected by Russia, Iran and Turkey. With talks stalled following the failure to agree on the UN-submitted ‘third list’ of constitutional committee representatives (drawn primarily from civil society), Russia and Turkey met in late-November to discuss moving the constitutional committee formation process forward. After this meeting, President Putin announced on December 1 that the constitutional committee process is “delicate and requires patience”.

[2] In the same statement, the NLF also stressed that it is prepared to defend against any attacks by Syrian, Russian, or Iranian forces.

[3] Hurras al-Deen was formed in February 2018 from seven extremist groups, including: Jaysh al-Malahim, Jaysh al-Sahel, Jaysh al-Badiyah, al-Sahel Companies, Kabul Company and Jund al-Shariah. Many of the groups were made up of defected hardline HTS members and former members of the ISIS-affiliated Jund al-Aqsa group.

[4] HTS is organized according to a ‘sections’ structure. Each section, known as a qataa, oversees a specific area, and is managed by a distinct leadership. This leadership includes an emir, who enjoys full executive authority over the area under the command of that section. While relations between section leaders and the HTS central leadership vary, the HTS Hama section has remained extremely independent, and is considered as more hardline than most others. Meanwhile in September, HTS reportedly established three fighting forces across the sections, including Jaysh Abu Bakr al-Sadiq from the Idleb and Hama sections, Jaysh Omar bin al-Khattab from the Aleppo and Eastern Ghouta sections, and Jaysh Othman bin Afan from the Border, Coast and Damascus sections.

[5] The HTS Hama section includes many fighters from the now defunct HTS al-Badiyah section, whose leadership split from HTS after the group renounced its ties with al-Qaeda. The defected leaders of the al-Badiyah section joined Hurras al-Deen, while those who joined the HTS Hama section reportedly continue to function semi-autonomously from Hama section’s leadership. [6] Murak crossing is in fact controlled by Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham. The route is used for commodity trade, mainly fuel and gasoline. Fees and taxes are imposed. Murak was established in coordination with Russian military forces after the Government of Syria captured Abu Dali, and subsequently replaced the Abu Dali crossing in October 2017.

[7] On October 15, Hurras Al-Deen, Jabhat Ansar Al-Deen, Ansar Al-Tawheed, and Jamaat Ansar Al-Islam formed a military operations room (Wa Harred al-Moa’meneen) to coordinate attacks on Government of Syria-controlled areas on the periphery of the DMZ. Despite concern in opposition circles that the operations room would launch ground attacks against Government of Syria forces and draw a serious response, the operations room’s actions have been limited to sporadic shelling over short periods only.

MERCY CORPS Sitiuation Report: The Demilitarized Zone Agreement A 12 CONTACT MALCOLM SAVAGE Humanitarian Access Team [email protected]

Contributing information sources to this document include public and nonpublic­ humanitarian information provided by local partners, UN Specialized Agencies, INGOs, non­state actors, and sources on the ground. The content is compiled by Mercy Corps, is by no means exhaustive, and does not reflect Mercy Corps’ position on the aforementioned subjects. The provided information, assessment, and analysis are designated for humanitarian purposes only. Mercy Corps and its Humanitarian Access Team will continue to closely monitor the evolving situation on the ground and inform accordingly.

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MERCY CORPS Sitiuation Report: The Demilitarized Zone Agreement A 13