HEMISPHERE FOCUS

Volume XIII, Issue 2 June 28, 2005

A Guide to the July 3, 2005, State Gubernatorial Election George W. Grayson

Introduction Analysts have labeled the Mexico State (Edomex) gubernatorial showdown a “critical indicator,” “overture,” and “preamble” with respect to the 2006 presidential contest. Although social scientists have discredited the concept of “bell weather” jurisdictions,1 Edomex represents a critical confrontation in anticipation of next year’s presidential “Super Bowl.” Five reasons buttress this conclusion about the state: (1) it embraces the nation’s largest population and largest number of voters; (2) since 1993 a tri-party system has prevailed—with the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), the National Action Party (PAN), and the Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD)—dominating the balloting; (3) despite gyrations in final tallies, PRI reverses in Edomex—the late-1996 municipal face-offs, for example— foreshadowed the party’s losing control of the Chamber of Deputies in 1997; (4) a synergism links Edomex to the Federal District (Distrito Federal–D.F.)—many citizens of the two entities read the same newspapers, watch identical television programs, work in the same offices, factories, and stores, and bemoan the common problems of violent street crime, traffic gridlock, pollution, inadequate housing, and unemployment; and (5) opinion leaders like domestic and foreign journalists, many of whom live in or near the state, assign great importance to what happens in Edomex. Not only is the state the largest in terms of population and voters, it also represents a microcosm of the country. Shaped like a high-heel lady’s shoe with the toe pointing southwest, it wraps around most of . In the capital’s northern and western suburbs lies the “Corridor Azul” or “Blue Corridor” dominated by densely populated cities that stretch from Huixquilucan through Cuajimalpa, Naucalpan, Ciudad Satélite, and Tlalnepantla to Tultitlán where the PAN has increased its strength during the past decade. The PAN has also done well in the northeast or “arch municipalities” of Atizapán de Zaragoza and Cuautitlán Izcalli. In fact the three contenders for the PAN gubernatorial nomination—Rubén Mendoza Ayala (Tlalnepantla), José Luis Durán Reveles (Naucalpan) and Carlos Madrazo Limón (Atizapán)—have served as mayors of these booming cities. The PRD has gained important footholds in such dirt-poor municipalities in the northeast “heel” of that state as Texcoco, Nezahualcoyótl (“Neza”), San Salvador Atenco, and Chalco. The PRD also enjoys strength along Edomex’s “toe” that touches Morelos, as well as in the impoverished area contiguous to the affluent homes in the Valle de Bravo located west of . Although the PRI now occupies the city halls of Ecatepec and “Neza,” the party fares especially well in the Toluca-Atlacomulco-Tenancingo-Lerma rectangle, in rural areas, and among the state’s indigenous population, many of whom follow the traditional “uses and customs” of their communities.

Mexico State Election Office to be filled: Governor Outgoing Governor: Arturo Montiel Rojas (PRI); born Oct. 15, 1943, Atlacomulco Election Date: July 3, 2005 Inauguration: Sept. 15, 2005

1 Edward R. Tufte and Richard A. Sun, “Are there Bellweather Electoral Districts?” Public Opinion Quarterly 39 (Spring 1975): 1–18. Americas Program • Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street, NW • Washington, DC 20006 • Tel: (202) 775-3207 • Fax: (202) 775-3199 • http://www.csis.org 2

Demographic and Socioeconomic Highlights Capital: Toluca2 Major Cities: Ecatepec (1,622,697), Nezahualcóyotl (1,225,972), Naucalpan (858,711), Tlalnepantla (721,415), Toluca (666,596) Land Area: 21.335 sq. km. (8,237 sq. miles) Population: 14,925,408 (May 25, 2005)—the population grows by one person every two minutes Road Network (2002): 10,001 kms. (6,200.62 miles) Rail Lines (2002): 1,284.1 kms. (796.14 miles) Airports: Toluca (international); Atizapán (national) Radio stations (2002): 23 Television stations (2002): 12 Telephone lines (early 2004): 2,213,781 GDP in current prices (2002): 603,389 billion pesos (62.5 billion dollars) Share of National GDP (2002): 9.64 percent Main Export Products (2003): Automobiles and auto parts, electrical products, machinery and equipment, plastic goods, tools, organic chemical products, and clothing Main Export Markets (2003): U.S. (67.7%), Canada (2.68%), Guatemala (2.04%), Venezuela (1.87%), Benelux (1.58%), Colombia (1.35%), Panama (1.27%), El Salvador (1.18%), Costa Rica (1.05%), Germany (.98%), others (18.23%) Major Export Firms (2003): General Motors, Daimler-Chrysler de México, Grupo Bimbo, Ford Motor Co., Nissan Mexicana, Controladora Mabe, KOF/Coca-Cola FEMSA, Grupo Modelo, Desc & subsidiaries, Vitro Vidrio Plano, Industrias Peñoles & subsidiaries, Industrias Unidas, Desc Automotriz, Minera México, San Luis Rassini Autopartes & subsidiaries, Siemens México, and Condumex

2 Although the city’s formal name is Toluca de Lerdo, the author has employed the briefer versions—and commonly used— appellations of municipalities in the state. Americas Program • Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street, NW • Washington, DC 20006 • Tel: (202) 775-3207 • Fax: (202) 775-3199 • http://www.csis.org 3

Gross State Product Economic sector Percent Manufacturing 31.04 Restaurants, Hotels, and Commerce 21.54 Financial Services, Insurance, and Real Estate 15.75 Services 15.05 Transport, Storage, and Communications 10.71 Agriculture, Silvaculture, and Fishing 3.14 Miscellaneous 2.77 Total 100.00 Source: Secretaría de Desarrollo Económico, Perfil Básico del Estado de Mexico, www.edomexico.gob.mx/sdeco/htm/principal.asp.

Economic Indicators Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Growth in GDP National 3.7 6.6 -0.1 0.7 1.3 4.4 State 3.7 6.9 1.2 -1.2 0.9 5.1 New Employees 105,782 91,016 20,402 33,837 N.A. 68,208 17,194 (IMSS) (Through Apr. 22) Insured by IMSS 1,202,933 1,293,949 1,314,351 1,348,188 1,344,477 1,412,685 1,429,879 (Through Apr. 22) Salaried N.A. 3,736,079 3,805,967 3,860,774 4,042,500 4,199,703 Workers Growth in Salaried N.A. N.A. 69,888 54,807 181,726 157,203 Workers Growth in N.A. N.A. 35,126 -8,192 57,783 38,203 Unemployed Workers Net Generation of N.A. N.A. 34,762 62,999 123,933 119,000 Employment Direct Foreign 1,018,260 1,295,884 1,045,571 1,315,510 1,321,771 776,270 281,440 Investment (Through $ millions Apr. 22) Projects 52 65 61 80 125 108 26 Completed (Through Apr. 22) Employment 850 9,638 10,601 7,677 20,622 16,989 4,407 Generated (Through Apr. 22) Source: Edomex, Subsecretaría de Planeación para el Desarrollo Económico 2004, May 12, 2005, www.edomex.gob.mx.

Americas Program • Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street, NW • Washington, DC 20006 • Tel: (202) 775-3207 • Fax: (202) 775-3199 • http://www.csis.org 4

Governors of Mexico State, 1904–2005 Governor Period in Office Arturo Montiel Rojas 16 September 1995 – present César Camacho Quiroz 2 July 1995 – 16 September 1995 Chemor 16 September 1993 – 2 July 1995 Ignacio Pichardo Pagaza 11 September 1989 – 16 September 1993 Mario Ramón Beteta Monsalve 16 September 1987 – 7 September 1989 Alfredo Baranda García 21 April 1986 – 15 September 1987 Alfredo del Mazo González 16 September 1981 – 18 April 1986 Jorge Jiménez Cantú 16 September 1975 – 15 September 1981 Carlos Hank González 16 September 1969 – 15 September 1975 Juan Fernández Albarrán 16 September 1963 – 15 September 1969 Dr. Gustavo Baz de Prada 16 September 1957 – 15 September 1963 Salvador Sánchez Colín 16 September 1951 – 15 September 1957 Alfredo del Mazo Vélez 16 September 1945 – 15 September 1951 Isidro Fabela Alfaro 16 March 1942 – 15 September 1945 José L. Gutiérrez 8 March 1942 – 15 March 1942 Alfredo Zárate Albarrán 16 September 1941 – 5 March 1942 (Assassinated) Colonel Wenceslao Labra García 16 September 1937 – 15 September 1941 Eucario López Contreras 3 July 1936 – 15 September 1937 José Luis Solorzano 16 September 1933 – 27 June 1936 (Resigned) General Filiberto Gómez 16 September 1929 – 15 September 1933 D. Carlos Riva Palacio 16 September 1925 – 15 September 1929 General Abundio Gómez Twice between 5 August 1920 and 16 September 1925 Manuel Campos Mena 8 February 1921 – 6 September 1921 Dr. Darío López 12 May – 5 August 1920 Francisco Javier Gaxiola 11 September 1919 – 8 March 1920 Joaquín García Luna 6 September 1918 – 4 March 1919 General Agustín Millán Thrice between 30 June 1917 and 8 March 1920 General Carlos Tejeda 15 January – 20 June 1917 General Dr. Rafael Cepáeda 22 August 1916 – 1 January 1917 General Pascual Morales October 1915 – January 1917 General Francisco Murguía August 1914 – December 1914 General Joaquín Beltrán Thrice between 1913 and 1914 General José Refugio Velazco July October 1913 Francisco León de la Barra March 1913 – May 1913 Dr. Antonio Vilchis Barbasoa 25 March 1913 – 16 May 1913 Manuel Medina Garduño 9 October 1911 – 20 March 1913 Dr. Rafael M. Hidalgo Twice between 1911 and 1914 Carlos Castillo May 1909 General Fernando González Four periods between 1904 and 1911 Source: Roderic Ai Camp, Mexican Political Biographies 1935-1993 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1995), p. 949; and material furnished by the Mexico state government.

Americas Program • Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street, NW • Washington, DC 20006 • Tel: (202) 775-3207 • Fax: (202) 775-3199 • http://www.csis.org 5 Electoral Data Registration (March 31, 2005): 8,770,736—51.79% women; 48.21% men (12.94% of national electorate)

Election 2003 2000 1999 1997 1994 1993 Congressional Presidential Gubernatorial Congressional Presidential Gubernatorial PRI 1,052,317 1,637,714 1,371,564 1,353,077 2,143,122 1,949,356

% 35.29 31.96 41.06 34.33 46.42 58.16

PAN 879,127 2,239,750* 1,146,071+ 765,716 1,179,422 557,009

% 29.48 43.71 34.31 19.42 25.55 16.62

PRD 699,469 961,876** 710,000++ 1,312,142 835,135 271,977

% 23.46 18.77 21.26 33.29 18.09 8.11 Minor 243,096 189,073 3,581 403,257 340,063 347,725 Parties % 8.15 3.69 0.11 10.23 7.37 10.37

Null Votes 106,417 92,743 108,462 106,141 114,214 225,918

% 3.57 1.81 3.25 2.69 2.47 6.74 Total 2,982,048 5,124,572 3,340,178 3,941,922 4,616,437 3,351,985 Votes * PAN joined with PVEM to form the “Alliance for Change.” ** PRD joined with four small parties to form the “Alliance for Mexico.” + The PAN and PVEM ran in an alliance. ++ The PRD and PT ran in an alliance.

Current Distribution of Major Offices Party Federal Chamber State Legislature Municipalities** of Deputies* (Congreso local) PRI 15 24 68 PAN 13 24 24 PRD 6 19 23 PVEM 2 4 0 PT 0 2 4 Convergencia 0 2 3 Total 36 75 125 * Directly elected deputies only. ** The Partido Alianza Social and the Partido de la Sociedad Nacionalista have one municipality each.

Allocation of Resources to Political Parties for Gubernatorial Election Political Party Funds Received (pesos) Dollar Equivalent* % of Total PAN $89,439,220 8,281,409 28.37 PRI 89,114,483 8,251,341 28.27 PRD 75,442,650 6,984,431 23.93 PVEM 25,713,694 2,380,898 8.16 PT 19,949,183 1,847,147 6.33 Convergencia 15,629,848 1,447,208 4.96 TOTAL 315,288,297 29,192,434 100.02 * 10.8 pesos = $1.00. Source: Instituto Electoral del Estado de México.

Americas Program • Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street, NW • Washington, DC 20006 • Tel: (202) 775-3207 • Fax: (202) 775-3199 • http://www.csis.org 6 Political Record Mexico State boasts the nation’s largest population (15 million) and largest number of registered voters, but it is twenty-fifth in terms of land area (8,237.5 sq. mi.). In comparison with U.S. counterparts, it has approximately the same number of people as Illinois, living in an area slightly smaller than that of New Hampshire. Mexico State boasts 36 seats in the 500-member Chamber of Deputies and—like other states and the Federal District (D.F.)—four senators. On May 30, 2005, its voting registry embraced 8,869,630 men and women, representing 13 percent of the national electorate. All told, Edomex has more voters than a dozen states combined.3 Moreover, the turnout of the state’s citizens in the 2003 congressional and 2000 presidential contests exceeded that of the national average. Until the early 1940s, local politics followed a rough-and-tumble pattern associated with neighboring Michoacán, Guerrero, and other less-developed, violence-prone areas of the country. In fact, Governor Alfredo Zárate Albarrán, who took office in mid-September 1941, paved the way for the governorship of Isidro Fabela Alfaro (1942–1945), a man who had distinguished himself as a federal deputy, law professor, secretary of foreign relations, diplomat, and prolific scholar before entering the statehouse. The cosmopolitan, strong-minded Fabela insisted that the state’s politicians spurn violence in favor of civilized behavior if they wanted his support. During his three-and-a-half–year tenure, he began inculcating a new political culture, which officials in the state now exhibit in several ways: ƒ An intense pride in their state exhibited—in part, at least—to prevent absorption by the Federal District, which was carved out of Edomex; ƒ An emphatic belief that Mexico State deserves to play a leading role in national politics; ƒ A formal, legalistic approach to addressing political issues; ƒ A confidence in their ability to resolve even difficult questions through negotiation and compromise with political opponents, who—since Fabela’s rule—have generally been treated with respect; and ƒ A sense of superiority—bordering on arrogance—for their political skills, which mexiquences claim surpass even those of the politically adroit veracruzanos. Observers credit Governor Fabela with founding the celebrated “Atlacomulco Group,” named after his hometown—and that of his successor Alfredo del Mazo Vélez—located 40 miles northwest of Toluca, the state capital. The Atlacomulco Group represented not a tightly knit organization but a collection of like-minded individuals who sought to recruit politicians congenial to Fabela’s values, advance the political careers of comrades, and assist each other with economic ventures. Despite its growing population and increased modernization, the state has produced only one president in recent memory—Adolfo López Mateos (1958–1964), a granite bust of whom overlooks Nepantla and other villages. By the late 1950s, Carlos Hank González had assumed de facto leadership of the Atlacomulco Group. Born in Tianguistenco de Galena, Mexico State, in 1927, Hank taught secondary school in Atlacomulco from 1947 to 1951. There, the “profesor,” as he came to be known, became a protégé of Fabela, establishing contacts that helped him attain the mayorship of Toluca (1955–1957), a federal deputy’s seat (1958–1961), directorship of the mammoth state food purchasing entity Conasupo (1961–1964), governorship of the state (1969–1975), and the mayorship of Mexico City (1976–1982). Before his death in 2001, he also held two cabinet portfolios: secretary of tourism (1988–1990) and secretary of agriculture (1990–1993). His sons remain active in politics: Jorge Hank Rhon, an iconoclastic racetrack owner who collects lions and grizzly bears, was elected mayor of in 2004; and Carlos Hank Rhon may seek a senate seat next year. The profesor’s legendary economic success complemented his political achievements. In the late 1990s, Forbes Magazine placed his wealth at $1.3 billion. The gentlemanly power broker coined the epigram, Un político pobre es un pobre político (A politician who is poor is a poor politician). Although they lack evidence, leftist journalists in Mexico attribute enormous behind-the-scenes influence to the Atlacomulco Group, just as their right-wing American counterparts bemoaned the clout of the Trilateral Commission a few years ago. It appears, however, that a medley of factors—economic growth and diversification, political pluralism, Hank’s demise, and intra-PRI factionalism—explain the evolution of what was, at best, an amorphous consultative body composed of the current governors and his six

3 Aguascalientes, Sur, Campeche, Colima, Durango, Morelos, Nayarit, Quintana Roo, Tlaxcala, Querétaro, Zacatecas, and Yucatán. Americas Program • Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street, NW • Washington, DC 20006 • Tel: (202) 775-3207 • Fax: (202) 775-3199 • http://www.csis.org 7 living predecessors.4 The group’s most conspicuous ritual finds these six men gathering for breakfast at the governor’s mansion on the morning of the state executive’s annual informe or state of the nation address. At other times, they back the incumbent governor when he seeks their assistance, keep in touch with each other by telephone, and exchange views at social gatherings or when horseback riding together. Photographers frequently snap the ex-governors at La Bombanera soccer stadium, rooting for their favorite team, Toluca’s Diablos Rojos, whose star players make no secret of their priísta loyalties. Demographic changes have diminished the power exercised by the Atlacomulco Groups and other traditional politicians when the Toluca-Atlacomulco-Tenancingo-Lerma rectangle constituted the state’s major influence zone. The growth of relatively prosperous middle-class suburbs to the north and east of Mexico City has provided fertile ground for organizing efforts by the center-right National Action Party (PAN). In 2002, the PAN captured city halls in the huge municipalities of Naucalpan, Tlalnepantla, Atizapán, and Cuautitlán. In turn, the leftist-nationalist Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) registered its greatest triumphs in Nezahuoalcóyotl, where more than 1.2 million people live in bleak slums near the Mexico City airport, Chimalhuacán, Ixtapaluca, Ixtlahuaca, San Felipe del Progreso, and Chalco. Chalco, a meandering slum southeast of the capital, has benefited from major federal and state social projects. Reflective of the changes in Edomex, approximately one-quarter of the denizens of this municipality have emigrated from Oaxaca. Increasing competition among the PRI, PAN, and PRD has found politicians ready to play “hard ball” to achieve their goals—to the point that one PRI veteran has referred to “mafia style” behavior. He said that Governor César Camacho Quiroz (1993–1999) called a popular leader into his office to give him “an offer he couldn’t refuse.” The incumbent told his visitor that there were two cars waiting outside the building. One would take him to bless the candidacy of Arturo Montiel, the incumbent’s choice to succeed him; the other would take him to the attorney general’s office along with evidence of the politician’s wrongdoing in public office.5

Selection of Gubernatorial Nominees PRI Governor Montiel handpicked Enrique Peña for the nomination (see chart on page 9). Since the PRI has lost the presidency, state executives are acting like viceroys in their bailiwicks. They don’t have to worry about hectoring phone calls from Los Pinos or from the Ministry of Gobernación. Montiel’s selection of Peña mirrors the incumbents’ naming of their successors in various states: José Murat Casab selected Ulises Ruiz Ortiz in Oaxaca (2004), Tomás Yarrington Ruvalcalba anointed Cd. Victoria Mayor Eugenio Javier Hernández Flores in Tamaulipas (2004), Juan S. Millán named Jesús Aguilar Padilla in Sinaloa (2004), and Manuel Ángel Núñez Soto picked Miguel Ángel Osorio Chong in Hidalgo (2005). Meanwhile Enrique Martínez Martínez favors Saltillo Mayor Humberto Moreira Valdés, the likely standard- bearer in the contest for the Coahuila statehouse on September 25, 2005. The choice of Peña sparked controversy. Early in the campaign season, 10 priístas6 publicly expressed interest in the nomination—with the most prominent being state party president Isidro Pastor Medrano, former finance secretary Héctor Luna de la Vega, and businessman Carlos Hank Rhon. In fact, the party scheduled a primary to select its nominee. Party president sought to influence the selection outcome by convincing the hard-charging Pastor— known as the “Chorizo Mussolini” because of his bald head and militaristic style—that he was his choice for the nomination. When Pastor began to campaign actively, he ran afoul of Montiel, who is challenging Madrazo for the PRI’s presidential nominee. The confrontation precipitated the ouster of Pastor from the PRI. Madrazo also encouraged

4 The ex-governors are Jorge Jiménez Cantú, Alfredo del Mazo González, Alfredo Baranda García, Ignacio Pichardo Pagaza, Emilio Chuayffet Chemor, and César Camacho Quiroz. 5 The source of this story is Miguel Ángel Granados Chapa, “Guerra sucia mexiquense,” Reforma, March 6, 2005, p. 17A. 6 Guillermo González, Gustavo Cárdenas, former Deputy Jaime Vázquez Castillo, Fernando Alberto García Cuevas, Cuauhtémoc García Ortega, Isidro Pastor Medrano, Enrique Jacob Rocha, Héctor Luna de la Vega, businessman Carlos Hank Rhon, and Enrique Peña Nieto; see, Enrique I. Gómez, “Registra PRI Edomex a 10 precandidatos,” Reforma, October 29, 2004, Internet ed. Americas Program • Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street, NW • Washington, DC 20006 • Tel: (202) 775-3207 • Fax: (202) 775-3199 • http://www.csis.org 8 his friend, businessman Hank Rhon, to pursue the governorship only to learn, belatedly, that the son of the profesor lived in Mexico City and did not satisfy the three-year state residency requirement for a gubernatorial nomination. In mid-January, Montiel made clear his preference for Peña, a distant relative and one of the so-called golden boys in the governor’s entourage. Under intense pressure from Toluca, most of the other wannabes threw their support to the governor’s choice, obviating the need for a primary as Peña emerged as the “unity candidate.” Only Fernando Alberto García Cuevas expressed his discontent with the imposition of the governor’s dauphin. Nonetheless, he, too, stepped aside.7 At the same time that Montiel obtained the nomination for Peña, he reached an agreement with Jorge Emilio González for the PRI and PVEM to forge an alliance in this campaign. PAN Rubén Mendoza Ayala (52.06%) captured a majority against José Luis Durán Reveles (47.94%) in a closed primary in which 10,788 panistas participated on November 14, 2004. A third contender—Carlos Madrazo Limón, a senator and ex-mayor of Atizapán de Zaragoza—dropped out before the balloting. Durán Reveles, former undersecretary of gobernación, ex-mayor of Naucalpan, runner-up to Montiel in the 1999 gubernatorial race, and a supporter of Santiago Creel, protested the outcome. Even though the loser claimed that Mendoza Ayala had engaged in fraud to win the nomination, the PAN’s National Executive Committee (CEN) upheld his victory. When the State Electoral Tribunal voided Mendoza Ayala’s candidacy—possibly in response to pressure from Montiel—the CEN—in a 17 to 14 vote with three abstentions—once again named Mendoza Ayala its standard-bearer. PRD From the outset, it was clear that the fragmented PRD had no candidate from the state who could win the governor’s mansion. This did not stop a number of perredistas from expressing interest in the nomination.8 Encouraged by the victory of independent businessman Zeferino Torreblanca Galinda in the Guerrero gubernatorial election on February 6, 2005, the PRD leadership sought to recruit a “citizen candidate” to counter the party’s image as a group of radical rabble-rousers. On December 5, 2004, the PRD’s State Council selected as its standard-bearer Yeidckol Polevnsky Gurwitz, an independent who had served as vice president of the Canacintra business chamber. She enjoyed strong support from Mexico City mayor López Obrador. In addition, she garnered the endorsement, albeit reluctantly in several cases, of representatives of five party currents: Grupo de Acción Política, Nueva Izquierda, Foro Nuevo Sol, Los Cívicos, and Movimiento Vida Digna. The only public holdouts were ex-deputy Sergio Benito Osorio Romero and Valentín González Bautista, a federal deputy, head of the Unión General de Obreros y Campesinos de México (Ugocem), and mayor of Nezahualcóyotl (1997–2000).

7 Israel Dávila et al., “Madrazo, Montiel y el Niño Verde concretan Alianza en el Edomex,” La Jornada, January 14, 2005, Internet ed. 8 The “precandidates” included Valentín González Bautista, ex-deputy Sergio Benito Osorio Romero, Leoncio Arvizu, Deputy Héctor Bautista López, ex-deputy Tomás Cruz Martínez, Jaime Enriquez Félix, ex-deputy Jaime López Pineda, Francisco Núñez, Javier Salinas, ex-deputy Emilio Ulloa Pérez, and Higenio Martínez Miranda, gubernatorial candidate in 1999, ally of López Obrador, and leader of the Grupo de Acción Política, the strongest current within the state PRD. Americas Program • Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street, NW • Washington, DC 20006 • Tel: (202) 775-3207 • Fax: (202) 775-3199 • http://www.csis.org 9

Contenders for the Governorship of Mexico State Candidate Date and Place of Professional Political Activities Major Supporters Birth Background Enrique Peña July 20, 1966, Law degree (U. Joined PRI in Gov. Montiel and Nieto (PRI + Atlacomulco, Panamericana); 1987; national and key members of his PVEM) Edomex. advanced studies state political team: Government in business counselor; founder Secretary Manuel administration of the state Cadena Morales (ITESM); Instituto de and Attorney professor at Capacitación y General Alfonso UNAM (1989-93); Desarrollo Navarrete Prida; notary public; state Político; secretary PRI establishment secretary of general of Instituto in the state—with administration. Político the exception of Empresarial of the Isidro Pastor. state PRI (1998- 99); member and PRI coordinator in the state legislature (2003-present). Rubén Mendoza Feb. 2, 1961, Law degree Entered politics as First Lady Marta Ayala (PAN + Tlalnepantla, (UNAM-Acatlán); a member of the Sahagún; ex-PAN Convergencia) Edomex. advanced studies PRI; the death of president Luis in comparative Luis Donaldo Felipe Bravo politics Colosio and Gov. Mena; former state (Cambridge U. and Chuayffet’s party president UCSD); vetoing his making Isidro Pastor coordinator of a bid for federal Medrano; municipal deputy prompted spokesman for promotion in him to jump to the former President Edomex; private PAN in 1996; the , secretary to PAN rejected his Carlos Salomón commissioner of nomination for Cámara; ex-PRI Instituto Nacional mayor of governor of de Migración. Tlaltnepantla; Chiapas, Eduardo founded Consejo Robledo Rincón. Cívico de Tlalnepantla helped Ruth Olvera Nieto win the mayorship (1996); city councilman and municipal president of Tlalnepantla (1999-2002); federal deputy (1997-99; 2003- present).

Yeidckol Jan. 25, 1958, Degree in Political Mexico City Polevnsky Mexicali, B.C. psychology (U. independent. Mayor López Gurwitz Anahuac); Obrador; ex-PRD (PRD + PT) President of governor of Canacintra. Zacatecas, Ricardo Monreal.

Americas Program • Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street, NW • Washington, DC 20006 • Tel: (202) 775-3207 • Fax: (202) 775-3199 • http://www.csis.org 10

Poll Results (percentage) Candidate Reforma El Universal Reforma El Universal Reforma Milenio Reforma (June) (June) (May) (May) (March) (March) (February) Peña 46 46 44 44 36 34 37 Mendoza 26 30 35 33 38 24 39 Polevnsky 28 24 21 23 26 15 24 None* n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 28 n.a. * While de la Heras included those with no preference, the Reforma pollsters simply recalculated their figures without including this cohort of approximately 15% of respondents in their surveys. Source: Grupo Reforma, “Aventaja Peña a sus contricantes,” Reforma, June 5, 2005, Internet ed.; María de las Heras, “Solo 32 por ciento, interesados en la elección de gobernador,” Milenio, March 11, 2005, p. 19; “Encuesta Edomex mayo 2005,” El Universal, June 10, 2005, Internet ed.; “Llega Peña con ventaja definitiva a elección,” El Universal, June 24, 2005, Internet ed.; and Alejandro Moreno and Patricia Méndez, “Cae Rubén Mendoza y pespega Peña Nieto,” Reforma, June 24, 2005, Internet ed.

Contours of the Campaign None of the three candidates got off to an auspicious start in their bid to succeed Montiel. Not only did Mendoza Ayala face challenges from Durán Reveles for the candidacy, he became the target of attacks and jokes. Foes dredged up the fact that, as mayor of Tlalnepantla, he had paid his mother $6,773 (73,250 pesos) per month to head the state Family Integral Development program, known as DIF.9 While seeking votes, Mendoza Ayala exuberantly flashed three fingers—an embellishment on Fox’s “V for Victory” sign in the 2000 presidential race. Meanwhile, Fox announced a major march in Mexico City on July 2 to celebrate the fifth anniversary of his victory over the PRI. His foes, however, averred that this was a not-so-transparent means to boost the PAN’s fortunes in Edomex. The public agreed: 75 percent of respondents to a June survey said that the president should cancel the event, which drew support from only 13 percent of those queried.10 In addition, despite lobbying from Los Pinos and other PAN notables, Mendoza Ayala failed to garner backing from his primary opponents, Durán Reveles and Madrazo Limón. They may support him eventually for the sake of their standing in the party, but any action will be pro forma. PAN traditionalists revile Mendoza Ayala as a typically corrupt priísta who used underhanded methods to capture their party’s candidacy. As a result there is no love lost between the nominee and Juan Rodolfo Sánchez, the PAN’s coordinator in the state legislature, Felipe Calderón Hinojosa, presidential pre-candidate, and other veteran party activists. To his credit, Calderón was the only presidential aspirant who appeared at the closing event of Mendoza Ayala’s campaign.11 Despite these obstacles, his campaign began to pick up speed early in the year. A late February Reforma poll found Mendoza (39%) battling neck-and-neck with Peña (37%) and running well ahead of Polevnsky (24%). Mendoza Ayala expected his momentum to build after he received the post-Easter endorsement of Trinidad Franco Arpero, the former head of the SNTE teachers union in the state. He also convinced Convergencia to enter a coalition with the PAN, which, it was hoped, would add 95,000 votes—equal to a point or two—to Mendoza’s final tally. Then came the announcement by Isidro Pastor that he would throw his support to Mendoza Ayala. While a controversial figure, Pastor claims a devoted following of 600 leaders in 80 of the state’s 125 municipios. These men and women resonate to “Pastormanía,” which includes Gregorian chants and pre-game style pep talks at rallies. The Pastor move backfired. On the one hand, the laying on of hands by the wily Pastor—the aggressive president of the state PRI until early 2005—further alienated the “orthodox” leader of the PAN. At the same time, Pastor did not mobilize his forces behind the Mendoza Ayala. This inaction prompted some conspiracy theorists to speculate that Montiel “planted” Pastor in the PAN’s camp to disrupt its campaign. This hypothesis gained greater credence in early June when Pastor abruptly withdrew his support and even eliminated Mendoza’s name from his Web site (http://pastormania.com.mx). In any case, Mendoza Ayala’s inability to parlay early-spring endorsements into a stronger campaign has prompted quirky behavior on his part. When Marta Sahagún failed to appear at a rally on May 11, he

9 Heidy Torres and Francisco Ortiz, “Una madre muy cara,” Reforma, August 19, 2004, Internet ed. 10 Alejandro Moreno and Patricia Méndez, “Cae Rubén Mendoza y despega Peña Nieto,” Reforma, June 24, 2005, Internet ed. 11 Inti Vargas, “Va Mendoza contra encuestas,” Reforma, June 26, 2005, Internet ed. Americas Program • Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street, NW • Washington, DC 20006 • Tel: (202) 775-3207 • Fax: (202) 775-3199 • http://www.csis.org 11 sobbed openly in front of television reporters. “Why are you crying?” journalists asked. “Because the press is unfair and doesn’t inform people like it should,” he responded. His foes accused him of being inebriated.12 Polevnsky also had some explaining to do when it was found that she had used two previous names: Citlali del Carmen Ibáñez Camacho and Citlali Ibáñez Avila Camacho. After dancing around the controversy for a month, she held a news conference to explain that, although born Citali del Carmen Ibáñez, she changed her name to Polevnsky at age 12 in an attempt of avoid the ignominy of having had a child out of wedlock. This session endowed her with millions of dollars of free publicity, but she has yet to demonstrate that she can defeat either Mendoza or Peña. The politically savvy but arguably biased Onésimo Cepeda Silva, bishop of Ecatepec, wrote her off because who is going to have confidence in a person who has two birth certificates? Nevertheless, López Obrador has dispatched Ricardo Monreal, former Zacatecas governor and one of his shrewdest operatives, to oversee the PRD campaign in Edomex. In light of Monreal’s success in Guerrero, where the PRD-backed candidate vanquished his PRI-PVEM opponent by 13 points, it would be naïve to dismiss the candidacy of Polevnsky. Leonel Godoy Rangel, who recently stepped down as national PRD president, has taken the reins of the state party to help Polevnsky. Analysts believe that every additional vote that she wins will come at the expense of Mendoza Ayala. Despite the help she has received, Polevnsky has proven a lackluster candidate. She holds fewer events than her opponents, arrives in an armored car, travels with a coterie of bodyguards, and only reluctantly presses the flesh with those who have shown up at her rallies. Moreover, she has articulated no issues of her own but has promised an Edomex version of the popular programs that López Obrador has launched in the D.F. She made headlines on June 22, though, when a PRD activist suggested that her campaign was gaining energy from an unlikely source: described as Unidentified Flying Objects. He was referring to images of rod-like items darting in front of the candidate several times when she addressed a gathering in Mexico State. “We don’t know if this is a paranormal phenomenon,” said adviser Raúl Correa. “It could be a good vibration for us, and I hope it favors us for the July 3 election,” he added. TV anchorman Carlos Loret de Mola laughingly dismissed the objects as “insects.”13 While Mendoza tried to unite his party and Polevnsky sought to gain traction, Peña got off to an insipid start. Fellow party members criticized his youth, inexperience, and status as Montiel’s fair-haired boy. One pundit suggested that the best way for Peña to invigorate his campaign would be to “join the PAN.” By late spring, he had overcome an awkward beginning to take an emphatic lead. His success sprang from three factors. First, the three wings of the state PRI—those headed by Governor Montiel, Chamber of Deputies leader Emilio Chuayffet Chemor, and ex-governor and current senator César Camacho Quiroz—united behind their candidate. Despite his earlier kibitzing, Madrazo gave his blessing to Peña. The nomenklatura realized that the PRI had to win Mexico State to have a chance to regain the presidency against the formidable challenge presented by López Obrador. Most insiders believe that the PRI will fragment if it remains out of power 12 years. Second, the PRI and state government began to spend money and dispense largess in a traditional manner to ensure Peña’s success. Finally, his publicists have emphasized his boyish good looks, which give him the kind of star power that makes women clamor to kiss him or, at least, get a hug. At his rallies, females of all ages wave hand-written posters proclaiming: “Enrique—You Are So Sexy,” “Enrique—I Want to Have Your Baby,” and “I Love You Even Though You Are Married.” Although Peña forms part of the establishment, he offers a striking contrast to the jowly, pot-bellied, old war horses who have dominated Edomex politics. Pablo Montero, Maribel Guardia, the Merenglass band and other celebrities appeared at the young candidate’s last pre-election rally.14 Mendoza Ayala has tried to counter Peña’s personal appearance with 78 billboards that enunciate the following messages: “Yes, I Am Ugly, But I Know How to Govern,” “I Will Never Be Handsome, But I Will Be A Good Governor,” “I Am Not A Good Boy, I Am An Upright Man,” and “My Talent Is Not To Pose, But To Govern.”15 The ever more-confidant Peña took the high ground in responding to these advertisements. “This is a serious election [based] on proposals and promises, not a beauty contest,” he affirmed. “Fortunately, citizens don’t rely on images in

12 “Rubén Mendoza: Los feos también lloran,” Reforma (Enfoque), June 12, 2005, Internet ed. 13 John Rice, “Mexican Party Raises Idea UFOs Spotted at Campaign,” Associated Press, June 23, 2005, Internet ed. 14 Graciela García, “Cierre Peña con estrellas en Izcalli,” Reforma, June 25, 2005, Internet ed. 15 Francisco Ortiz, “Modifica propaganda Rubén Mendoza,” Reforma, May 28, 2005, Internet ed. Americas Program • Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street, NW • Washington, DC 20006 • Tel: (202) 775-3207 • Fax: (202) 775-3199 • http://www.csis.org 12 deciding [for whom to vote], but on proposals and these I will not stop making.”16 In early May, attention briefly shifted from the candidates when the seven members of the State Electoral Institute (IEEM) were forced to step down. The resignations sprang from allegations that several of the counselors had received bribes to award the contract for ballot boxes to Cartonera Plástica y Samesa.17 In the final stage of the campaign, the three coalitions claimed to have mobilized a combined force of 235,000 lawyers, activists, and observers in order to combat “mapaches,” the colloquial term for practitioners of vote manipulation.18

Conclusions The Edomex contest will have a number of consequences for Mexico’s political scene. First, the winner’s party will get a boost in next year’s presidential race, whose front-runner is now Mexico City’s mayor. A mid-May 2005 poll found López Obrador (42.5%) well ahead of the PRI’s Roberto Madrazo (24.3%) and the PAN’s Santiago Creel (20%).19 Second, a PRI victory would loft Governor Montiel’s stock within “All United against Madrazo” (“Todos Unidos contra Madrazo”—Tucom), composed of leading figures20 who oppose the presidential nomination of the party president. Tucom must decide on its own candidate before it has any chance to wrest the nomination from Madrazo. That Peña has caught fire because he is young, handsome, and unknown to the public indicates that the PRI (and the PAN) might look beyond the present contenders for a “new face” with whom to challenge López Obrador. Third, the election of Peña would also immunize Montiel from a state investigation of alleged financial irregularities during his sexenio. Fourth, the outcome will affect López Obrador. In private conversations, PRD insiders doubt that Polevnsky can win, but they hope she will capture one-quarter of the ballots cast—with the hope that these voters would then line up behind the mayor in 2006. Aided by resources from the D.F. and López Obrador’s powerful, visible backing, she might attain this goal in a tight three-way race, even if she fails to win the statehouse. Quite apart from his backing of Polevnsky, López Obrador’s presence in the campaign is evident. All of the candidates have adopted one of his signature programs—that is, providing aid to senior citizens. Fifth, a Mendoza Ayala victory would boost the standing of PAN party president Manuel Espino whose hard-line “panestroika” policy has outraged many long-time party activists, especially those who lost their seats on the PAN’s National Executive Committee (Comité Ejecutivo Nacional). The most prominent defection has been that of Tatiana Clouthier, whose late father Manuel J. Clouthier ran for president in 1988 and helped bring fresh blood (including ) into the party. Sixth, the Edomex campaign provides a glimpse of the coalitions that may contest the presidency—with one exception. Convergencia, which has allied with the PAN’s Mendoza in Edomex, will likely gravitate to López Obrador in 2006 unless, of course, it names its own candidate. Both former foreign secretary Jorge Castañeda Gutman and Monterrey industrialist Alfonso Romo have actively pursued Convergencia’s nomination, but this party of Dante Delgado, Jesús Martínez Alvarez, et al., is looking for a winner. Seventh, although increasingly unlikely, a Mendoza triumph would be a feather in the cap of Marta Sahagún, who was extremely visible at the candidate’s campaign kickoff, but assumed a lower profile in the run-up to the balloting. The popular Sahagún has her eye on a senate seat or some other elective post in 2006. Insiders claim that the federal

16 Quoted in Inti Vargas, “Critica Peña campaña del feo,” Reforma, June 1, 2005, Internet ed. 17 “ Elections Inspire Rancor,” The Herald (El Universal), May 30, 2005, Internet ed. 18 Humberto Padgett, “Arman Ejército cazamapaches,” Reforma, June 20, 2005, Internet ed. 19 “Mexico’s López Obrador Gains in Presidential Poll (Update1),” Bloomberg.com, June 2, 2005; during the same week, a Reforma poll also placed López Obrador (36%) ahead of Madrazo (25%) and Creel (24%). 20 Leaders of Tucom, which formally calls itself the Grupo Unidad Democrática, include Senator Enrique Jackson Ramírez, Governor Eduardo Bours Castelo (Sonora), Governor José Natividad González Parás (Nuevo León), and Governor Enrique Martínez y Martínez (Coahuila), and ex-governors Manuel Ángel Núñez Soto (Hidalgo), Tomás Yarrington Ruvalcava (Tamaulipas), and Miguel Alemán Velazco (Veracruz). Tucom also enjoys the support of PRI secretary general and chief of the 1.2 million-member SNTE teachers union Elba Esther Gordillo, who is believed to be seriously ill. Her health problems aside, Gordillo has formed a new organization—El Partido Nueva Alianza—that could nominate its own presidential candidate in 2006. A reconciliation between Gordillo and Madrazo, whom she loathes, appears out of the question. Americas Program • Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street, NW • Washington, DC 20006 • Tel: (202) 775-3207 • Fax: (202) 775-3199 • http://www.csis.org 13 government has boosted expenditures in Edomex in 2005, and President Fox and his wife have been distributing houses to families in Chicolapan and bicycles to alumnae de Primaria Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz in Xonacatlán.21 Of course, Montiel is also said to have spent state monies like water on behalf of Peña. Eighth, the Mexico State race will permit the parties to try out themes, organizing techniques, and media strategies. In view of ubiquitous street violence and the brazen killings by drug cartels in Sinaloa and along the northern border, the PRI is eager to determine whether it can articulate a powerful law-and-order message to overcome López Obrador’s current advantage. The party believes that one of the mayor’s weaknesses is his readiness to attribute crime to illiteracy, joblessness, and other social issues. Its candidate can be expected to stress that “the presidency requires a strong leader not a namby-pamby social worker.” Ninth, turnout may be low—in part, because of the nastiness of the campaign and, in part, because of recent accusations of conflicts of interest over the purchase of election materials by the State Electoral Institute (IEEM).22 The latter issue is especially disquieting inasmuch as Mexico’s continued advance toward democracy depends on the credibility of its citizen-run electoral institutions. Finally, the election could be voided—or the offending political party severely fined—if Peña or another candidate egregiously exceeds the spending limit for the gubernatorial campaign. In fact, Montreal, the PRD-PT representative before the IEEM, and Mendoza Ayala contended two weeks before the election that there had already been enough anomalies to impugn the outcome of the contest if Peña triumphs. The country’s highest electoral court—the Tribunal Electoral del Poder Judicial de la Federación—may ultimately determine the winner.23

About the Author George W. Grayson, the Class of 1938 Professor of Government at the College of William & Mary, has made more than 125 research trips to Mexico since 1976. He is a senior associate at CSIS; an associate scholar at the Foreign Policy Research Institute; a member of the board of advisers of the Latin American Advisor (Inter-American Dialogue), and a senior adviser on Mexican affairs for the Washington, D.C.–based Capital Insights Group. Grayson lectures regularly at the Foreign Service Institute of the U.S. Department of State, at the National Defense University, and at universities throughout the United States and Mexico. In addition to his work for CSIS, he has written a dozen books on international affairs, including Mexico: The Changing of the Guard (Foreign Policy Association, 2001), Strange Bedfellows: NATO Marches East (University Press of America, 1999), and Mexico: From Corporatism to Pluralism? (Harcourt Brace, 1998). He is currently preparing a study on Mexico City mayor Andrés Manuel López Obrador. Grayson earned his Ph.D. at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University and his J.D. at the College of William & Mary. He served as a member of the Virginia state legislature for 27 years and belongs to Phi Beta Kappa. His e-mail address is [email protected].

The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), established in 1962, is a private, tax- exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific public policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).

© 2005 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

21 Leopoldo Ávalos, “Arman los Fox intega de apoyos,” Reforma, March 15, 2005, Internet ed. 22 “Los envuelve el escándalo,” Reforma, June 9, 2005, Internet ed. 23 Padgett, “Arman Ejército cazamapaches.” Americas Program • Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street, NW • Washington, DC 20006 • Tel: (202) 775-3207 • Fax: (202) 775-3199 • http://www.csis.org