Democracy, Judicialisation and the Emergence of the Supreme Court As a Policy-Maker in Mexico

The London School of Economics and Political Science Democracy, judicialisation and the emergence of the Supreme Court as a policy-maker in Mexico Camilo Emiliano Saavedra-Herrera A thesis submitted to the Department of Government of the London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, August 2013 1 Declaration I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by myself and any other person is clearly identified). The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior written consent. I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party. I declare that my thesis consists of 73,214 words. 2 Abstract In 1994, four days after taking office, Ernesto Zedillo, the last president to govern Mexico emerging from the once hegemonic National Revolutionary Party, promoted a major redesign of the Supreme Court of Justice that substantially expanded its constitutional review powers and reduced its size from 26 to 11 members. The operation of this more compact and powerful body was left in charge of 11 justices nominated by Zedillo. During the period 1917-1994, the Supreme Court adjudicated only 63 constitutional cases of its exclusive jurisdiction. In contrast, since the reform came into force in 1995, it has been the arena in which more than two thousand constitutional cases have been ultimately settled. Why do courts established under authoritarian rule become effective policy-makers as democracy develops? Using Mexico as a case study and drawing on the strategic approach for the study of courts, this thesis argues that the Supreme Court turned into an effective policy-maker as a result of the convergence of three factors: institutional change (from judicial reform), political fragmentation (from democratisation) and an unprecedented internal stability. Judicial reform set a new institutional framework; political fragmentation triggered the use of constitutional review by political actors; and stability enhanced experience within the Court and prompted justices to more proactively engage in policy-making. Through an appealing case study, a novel research strategy and original evidence consisting of four original datasets and thirty-five elite-interviews, this thesis contributes, first, to the comparative analysis of courts by offering a systematic and comprehensive account of judicial rulings and precedents and their impact both within and beyond judicial boundaries; second, to the judicialisation literature by highlighting the effects of the delegation of power to courts on judicial performance; and third, to the Mexican politics scholarship by providing a re-assessment of the role of the Supreme Court in regime dynamics. 3 Acknowledgments I would like to recognise the different people and institutions that provided academic, financial and moral support for the pursuit of this research. I am most grateful to my supervisor, Professor George Philip, for his unwavering support and patience. Without George’s experienced and intelligent guidance this thesis would not have been possible. Muchas gracias. This research was funded by the Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología and the Secretaría de Educación Pública. I will always value the great privilege and opportunity that was being sponsored by two public institutions from my home country, Mexico. In the elaboration of this project I also became indebted to Dr. José Ramón Cossío Díaz, Justice to the Supreme Court of Mexico. His generosity was essential in conducting a productive field research in Mexico City. In the last decade I have had the privilege to count on the encouraging support and friendship from Antonio Azuela and Carlos Herrera. They greatly contributed to transform my basic concern with football refereeing into the broader and more challenging endeavour of empirically researching judges. Thanks so much, comrades. I thank Paulina Terrazas and Raul González for their fraternal support, Fabiola Segovia and Fernando Grediaga for the timely rescue, Karla Macias for her solidarity, and Enrique Coloma for being always present. I want to express my deepest gratitude to Paulina Strassburger for her caring and enduring complicity. Finally, I would like to pay tribute to Mericia, Carlos, Haydée and Vladimir. Their love for life has and will always be my most important source of inspiration. This thesis is dedicated to the memory of my father, Carlos Fernando Saavedra Fernández. 4 Contents 1. Introduction ................................................................................................... 10 1.1 Democracy, Judicialisation and Courts .......................................................... 18 1.2 Constitutional Judicial Review and Policy-Making .................................... 25 1.3 Decision-Making and Policy-Making by Courts.......................................... 33 1.4 The Supreme Court and Policy-Making in Mexico ..................................... 38 1.5 Research Strategy ............................................................................................... 44 1.6 Organisation of the Thesis ................................................................................ 49 2. The Institutional Design of Constitutional Review in Mexico ......... 53 2.1 Constitutional Review and Policy-Making ................................................... 54 2.2 The Emergence of Constitutional Review ..................................................... 60 2.3 The Subjection of Constitutional Review ...................................................... 68 2.4 The Consolidation of Constitutional Review ............................................... 74 2.5 A Constitutional Court upon a Supreme Court ........................................... 81 2.6 Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 85 3. Democracy, Constitutional Review and Judicialisation ..................... 88 3.1 Democracy and Political Fragmentation ....................................................... 90 3.2 Constitutional Controversies: Judicialisation from below ......................... 97 3.3 Actions of Unconstitutionality: Judicialisation from above .................... 110 3.4 The Determinants of Constitutional Litigation ......................................... 125 3.5 Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 131 4. Constitutional Review and Policy-making .......................................... 133 4.1 Policy-making in the Structure of Decision-making ................................ 134 4.2 Decision-making in Practice .......................................................................... 145 4.3 The Supreme Court as Policy-Maker ........................................................... 151 4.4 The Determinants of Arbitration and Rule-Making ................................. 159 4.5 Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 169 5 5. The Supreme Court and the Legal Status of Abortion ...................... 171 5.1 Abortion, Politics and Courts ......................................................................... 174 5.2 The Legal Status of Abortion in Mexico ...................................................... 179 5.3 Induced Abortion and the Right to Life ....................................................... 186 5.4 Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 198 6. The Supreme Court and Expropriation Laws ...................................... 200 6.1 Overriding Jurisprudencia .............................................................................. 201 6.2 Expropriation in Law and Practice ............................................................... 205 6.3 The Right to Prior Hearing in Expropriations............................................ 211 6.4 The Effects of Jurisprudencia beyond Judicial Boundaries ...................... 217 6.5 Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 220 7. Summary and Conclusions ....................................................................... 222 7.1 Courts as Policy-makers .................................................................................. 224 7.2 Democracy and Judicialisation ...................................................................... 228 7.3 Arbitration and Rule-making ......................................................................... 232 7.4 Effects of Policy-making ................................................................................. 235 7.5 Implications and Future research .................................................................. 237 Bibliography ........................................................................................................ 241 Appendix I. Datasets .......................................................................................... 259 Constitutional Review Judgements Dataset 1995-2011 .......................................

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