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Mexico Is Not at War. It Is a Democracy. and Yet It Is One of the World's Most Dangerous Countries for the Press. Twenty-One J

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Mexico Is Not at War. It Is a Democracy. and Yet It Is One of the World's Most Dangerous Countries for the Press. Twenty-One J June 7, 2008 Mexico is not at war. It is a democracy. And yet it is one of the world’s most dangerous countries for the press. Twenty-one journalists have been killed in Mexico since 2000, seven of them in direct reprisal for their work. Since 2005, seven others have gone missing. Mexico ranks 10th on CPJ’s impunity index, along with such war-ravaged countries as Iraq, Somalia, and Sierra Leone. The impact of this unchecked record of violence is well known and well documented. Fear permeates newsrooms and broad self-censorship is the result. In border cities, where the drug cartels hold sway, gunbattles in the middle of downtown go unreported. There is little doubt that organized crime associated with the drug trade is responsible for much of the violence against the press. But the failure of the Mexican government to fully investigate these crimes and bring the perpetrators to justice has created a culture of impunity that perpetuates the cycle of violence. CPJ commissioned this report because we wanted to take a close look at the factors that prevent these cases from being solved. CPJ Mexico representative Monica Campbell has assembled dossiers on three emblematic cases—the killings of journalists Francisco Ortiz Franco in Tijuana, Bradley Will in Oaxaca, and Amado Ramírez Dillanes in Acapulco. The circumstances of these killings were very different, as were the initial investigations. But all three shared certain characteristics. In Mexico, murder is a state crime and state prosecutors handled the initial investigations in all three cases. Because of shoddy police work, fear, or political pressure, the investigations failed to move forward. Federal authorities eventually stepped in and took over the Ortiz Franco and Will investigations but made little additional progress. There has been much talk in Mexico of “federalizing” crimes against journalists by making it a federal offense to inhibit the exercise of freedom of expression or of the press. CPJ supports this proposal, first, because it would clarify the line of authority, ensuring that one agency has responsibility from start to finish. It would also create political accountability, with the federal government broadly responsible for protecting freedom of expression. Would federalization of crimes against journalists ensure successful prosecutions? No. As these cases make clear, the problems are myriad, from the power of the drug cartels, to the dysfunctional judicial system, to crippling political rivalries. Nevertheless, the current system is not working. Mexico confronts many problems, from the entrenched power of the drug cartels to the slow pace of economic growth. But there is no reason Mexico should remain one of the most murderous countries for the press. The federal government must take responsibility for addressing this problem, and it must devote political will and financial resources to ensure that the killers of journalists are brought to justice. Francisco Javier Ortiz Franco, Zeta June 22, 2004, Tijuana, Baja California Francisco Ortiz Franco was shot in front of his children on an early summer morning on a downtown Tijuana street. Ortiz Franco, 50, was co-editor of the Tijuana newsweekly Zeta, one of the few publications that consistently cover corruption and drug trafficking in Mexico’s northern states. After leaving a medical clinic on the morning of June 22, Ortiz Franco buckled 11-year- old son Héctor Daniel and 9-year-old daughter Andrea into the backseat of his Mazda Comfort, walked around the car, and got in the driver’s seat, according to a 2004 CPJ investigation. Before he could start the engine, a black Jeep Grand Cherokee pulled alongside, and a man wearing a black wool ski mask jumped out. The gunman fired four times from a .380-caliber handgun through the driver’s side window, hitting Ortiz Franco in the chest, head, and neck and killing him instantly, according to the editor’s widow, who has reviewed the case files. The killer climbed back into the Jeep Cherokee, which then sped away. Violent crime is part of daily life in Tijuana, where some of the world’s most powerful drug traffickers battle over lucrative smuggling routes. Brazen daily shootings are common; thorough investigations and timely arrests are not. A recent Mexican congressional study found that federal crimes, including homicide and kidnapping, rose 25 percent in the first half of 2007 as compared to the same period a year earlier. The rate of execution-style murders rose 155 percent between 2001 and 2007, according to the same study. While the level of violence can outstrip law enforcement resources, widespread collusion between police and drug traffickers undermines the integrity of the investigations. In October of last year, 25 federal police officers were arrested on suspicion of protecting the Gulf drug cartel. Three months later, four municipal police officers in the border city of Nuevo Laredo were accused of working directly for the cartel. A number of news reporters and academic researchers have documented links between the infamous Arellano Félix drug cartel and police officers past and present. Drug traffickers have also cultivated financial and personal ties to government officials. In 2000, researchers at the National Autonomous University of Mexico detailed relationships between organized crime leaders and high-ranking politicians. The researchers cited evidence that some politicians began accepting campaign donations from drug traffickers in the early 1990s. In a November 2004 special report, “Free-Fire Zone,” CPJ said the Arellano Félix drug cartel was probably behind the Ortiz Franco slaying. Shortly before the murder, CPJ found, Ortiz Franco did extensive reporting for a story alleging that Arellano Félix lieutenant Arturo “El Nalgón” Villarreal had directed the January 21, 2004, assassination of former Assistant State Attorney General Rogelio Delgado Neri. The story was written by Jesús Blancornelas, the now-deceased editor of Zeta, and published under Blancornelas’ byline. Ortiz Franco reported a second story on drug trafficking just weeks later, this one under his own byline. The story recounted a May 4, 2004, FBI press conference in San Diego in which the bureau released photographs of fake police credentials used by Arellano Félix cartel members. The story didn’t break much news, CPJ sources said, but Ortiz Franco angered traffickers by publishing the photographs along with his piece. As one source noted: “These guys lived double lives. Now, all of a sudden, their kids know daddy is not really a policeman.” Zeta conducted its own investigation into the slaying, alleging in a July 22, 2004, story that three men were possible masterminds. They included Villarreal and Jorge Eduardo Ronquillo, high-ranking members of the Arellano Félix cartel, and Jorge Hank Rhon, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) candidate who was elected mayor of Tijuana in August 2004. Zeta cited Ortiz Franco’s investigation into allegations that Hank’s bodyguards were involved in the unsolved 1988 killing of Héctor Félix Miranda, a co- founder of Zeta. Hank has denied any involvement in either the Félix or Ortiz Franco slaying. Because murder is a state crime in Mexico, the initial investigation into the Ortiz Franco case was led by state officials. Zeta staff members told CPJ that this was a crucial misstep because some of the same officers responsible for investigating the murder had been named in Ortiz Franco’s articles. Investigators did not search Ortiz Franco’s office computer or his files, according to colleagues. Reporter notebooks were left unexamined in his car after the slaying, his wife told CPJ. Several friends, coworkers, and relatives told CPJ that police conducted only cursory interviews with them. Little investigative progress was made in the crucial period immediately after the murder—a pattern repeated in other Mexican journalist slayings. Ortiz Franco’s family told CPJ that they blame the lack of progress on a breakdown at the local level. Zeta staff members said they support legislation making violent crime against the press a federal offense. In August 2004, nearly two months after the shooting, the Ortiz Franco case was finally handed over to federal authorities. José Luis Vasconcelos, then head of the organized crime division of the federal attorney general’s office, took control of the case after determining that it was linked to drug trafficking, a federal offense. Vasconcelos told CPJ that a suspected participant in the slaying, Jorge Eduardo Ronquillo Delgado, also known as “El Niño,” was executed by fellow members of the Arellano Félix cartel in October 2004. Villarreal, a U.S. citizen, was arrested in August 2006 in waters off the coast of Baja California and charged in San Diego with drug smuggling. He faces a 30-year U.S. prison sentence. Federal officials in Mexico have told local reporters that there is insufficient evidence to link Villarreal to Ortiz Franco’s murder. Extradition to Mexico, where Villarreal faces drug trafficking charges, remains in the preliminary stages. Those proceedings, for now, do not involve the Ortiz Franco murder. Bradley Will, freelance October 27, 2006, Santa Lucía del Camino, Oaxaca Bradley Roland Will, 36, an independent documentary filmmaker and a reporter for the New York-based Web site Indymedia, was videotaping antigovernment protesters in Santa Lucía del Camino, a municipality outside the state capital, Oaxaca, when a street battle erupted between demonstrators and plainclothes men believed to be working for the embattled governor. Will, stationed among the protesters, let his camera roll. His final video, available on CPJ’s Web site, shows protesters hurling rocks and captures the sounds of gunshots and a shout: “Stop taking photos!” A shot is heard whizzing toward Will. The journalist’s own video records him screaming, falling, and uttering “Help me” in Spanish. He was struck twice, once in the abdomen and once in the right side.
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