Nirodhasampatti -Its Historical Meaning in The- Vijnaptirndtrata System

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Nirodhasampatti -Its Historical Meaning in the- Vijnaptirndtrata System

Noriaki Hakamaya

In the Vijnaptimatrata system, nirodha-samapatti1) (meditation of annihilation) plays a leading role in proving the existence of alaya-vijnana. 2) Such a role of nirodha-samapatti reflects a historical process in which the problem has been discussed whether this samapatti is sacittaka (a state with mind) or acittaka (a state without mind). So Yasomitra records the historical process in his Abhidharmakosavyakhya, which is as follows:3) Among those, (1) the Vaibhasikas and others admit nirodha-samapatti, asamjni- samapatti, and asamjn"ika as acittaka, (2) Sthavira-Vasumitra4) and others admit them as sacittaka, (such states having) an undistinct mental consciousness (aparisphuta-ma-

1) This samapatti is also called samjna-vedayita-nirodha-samapatti. About the literature concerning nirodha-samapatti, see Louis de la Vallee Poussin, "Musila et Narada," MCB, V, (1936-37), p. 210; Etienne Lamotte, La Somme du Grand Vehicule d'Asanga, II, (1938), Notes et References, pp. 15-16. 2) This samapatti is one of the ten proofs of the existence of alaya-vijnana in

the 成唯識論: Taisho ed., XXXI, pp. 17c-18c: Shindo ed., Vol. 4, PP. 4-10: Louis

de la Vallee Poussin, Vijnaptiendtratasiddhi, (1928), pp. 204-214: Wei Tat, 漢英

封照, (Hong Kong, 1973), pp. 228-239. Also see the Mahayanasamgraha : Etienne Lamotte, op. cit. and Tome I (ed.),

§ 50-56. These sections which deal with proving alaya-vijnana by nirodha-samd-

patti is particularly titled 順道理章 of 引謹品 by Paramartha in his transla tion of its Bhasya (Taisho ed., XXXI, p. 175b). Asvabhava comments on these sections as follows: de ltar kun nas non mops pa dan rnam par byan ba mi hthad pas kun gsi rnam par ies pa bsgrub nas hgog pa la snoms par lugs pa rnams kyan ses bya ba la sogs pas hgog pahi snoms par hjug pa mi srid par sgurb po//" (P. ed., No. 5552, Vol. Li, 263a5-1). Therefore, he has also recognized the parti- cular role of nirodha-samapatti to prove the existence of alaya-vijnana. 3) Unrai Wogihara, Abhidharmakoiavyakhya, I, (Tokyo, 1933), p. 167, 11. 5-7.

-1084- Nirodhasamapatti (N. Hakamaya) (34) no-vijnana).5) (3) The Yogacaras admit them as sacittaka, 6) (such states having) alaya-vijnana. These are the divisions of their doctrine. In this paper, we will deal with nirodha-samapatti considering such a process from the standpoint of the vijnaptimatrata system.

Nirod ha-samapatti is a similar state to death itself. Therefore, there are quite a few expressions which treat of this samapatti in comparison with death. 7) However, both are not quite the same. One can rise from this samapatti, but not from death. This is the fundamental difference between them. On this point, nirodha-samapatti may be similar to a deep sleep rather than death. The correspondence between the two is recognized in the Milind apanha:8) The great king! In two circumstances, the mind (citta) is not functioning (appavatta) though the physical frame (sarira) exists: (1) though the physical frame exists, the mind is not functioning when it is falling asleep (middha-samarulha) and entering the unconscious (bhavanga-gata); and, (2)' though the physical frame exists, the mind is not functioning when it has attained the meditation of anihilation (nirodha-samapanna).

4) Concerning Vasumitra of this case, the opinion of two commentators of the AKBh do not agree with each other. Yasomitra regards him as the author of

the Pan"cavastuka, etc. (AKV, P. 167, 11. 21-22). 普光 regards him as another

acarya who belongs to the Sautrantika (経部異師尊者世友) but not to the Vai-

bhasika (非是婆沙會中世友), and according to 普光, Vasumitra is not one only

(印度國名世友者非一) (倶舎論記, Taisho ed., XLI, p. 100b). Cf. Louis de la Val- lee Poussin, L'Abhidharmakosa de Vasubandhu, Tome I, p. 212, fn. 1. 5) Notice that the consciousness is mano-vijnana even though it is said to be undistinct. 6) The sacittaka of nirodha-samapatti is not factually admitted by Yogacaras the- mselves. But, as considered below, there is a historical background on which it is said they regard nirodha-samapatti as sacittaka. 7) ccsannaoedayitanirodhasamapanno kalam kareyyati?" (Kathavatthu, II, p. 517). "S an"jioattheram pana nirodham samapannam kalankato ti sallakkhetva gopalaka- dayo" (Maj jhimanikaya, II, p. 380). "matassa ca (nirodha) samapannassa ca ko viveso ti?" (Visuddhimagga, p. 709). "問. 入滅蓋定者, 與死有何差別." (成實論, Taisho ed., XXXII. p. 345b). 8) Trenckner, ed., The Milindapanho, (London, 1928), p. 300.

-1083- (35) Nirodhasamapatti (N. Hakamaya) According to this, nirodha-samapatti bears a close resemblance to a state of falling asleep and entering the unconscious. Therefore, we can suppose that one rise from this samapatti just like as one can awake from one's sleep. His mind is simply not functioning' when he is entering nirodha-samapatti. In this meaning, there is a sort of mental state in this samapatti which is called 'bhavanga'9) because not functioning (appavatta)' does not mean death and his mind has not perished like the dead. If so, it would appear that Pali Bud- dhism consider nirodha-samapatti as sacittaka. However, according to Prof. Kogen Mizuno, it does not seem that Pali Bud- dhism has decided whether nirodha-samapatti is sacittaka or acittaka and whether the stream of mind is interrupted during this samapatti or not.10) Pro- bably it might not be important for this school to decide between the two states, because it is enough for PA.li Buddhism to have noted that a mind goes alternately from the unconscious to the surface consiousness, and vice versa."

On the other hand, as the Vaibhasika school does not admit the unconscious such as bhavanga,12) it defines nirodha-samapatti as the annihilation of mind and mental activities (citta-caitta), namely, acittaka. 13) Therefore, its orthodox

9) It means literally factor of existence.' 10) K. Mizuno, The Problem of Mind and Consciousness from the Standpoint of Pali Buddhism (in Japanese), (Tokyo, 1964), p. 208. 11) About the method how the continuity of mind is explained in Pali Buddhism, see K. Mizuno, ibid., Chap. VI, pp. 847-951. 12) As it is known, bhavanga is regarded later as a synonym of alaya-vijn"ana by Yogacaras. According to Vasubandhu, bhavanga is the theory of the Tamraparniya (Karmasiddhiprakarana, ed., by Lamotte, MCB, IV, p. 199). According to As- vabhava, it is that of the Sthaviriya and the Vibha jyavadin (Mahayanasamgra- hopanibandhana, P. ed., No. 5552, Vol. Li, 245b6-246a1=Taisho ed., XXXI, 386b). Concerning the latter, K. Mizuno analogizes the Sthaviriya and the Vibhajya- vadin with the Abhayagirika and the Mahaviharika in Pali Buddhism respecti- vely. Therefore, he concludes that the Vibhajyavadin of this case is different from the school of the same name which belongs to the Mahasamghika and is also called the Prajnaptivadin (説假部) (K. Mizuno, op. cit., pp. 889-893).

-1082- Nirodhasamapatti (N. Hakamaya) (36) theory of the Vaibhasika is established against the opponents asserting sacittaka. The Vibhasa argues as follows:14)

Question. Why do you make this treatise? Answer. Because we declare our own theory, denying that of the other

schools.

The Darstantikas (響喩者)15)and the Vibhajyavadins (分別論師)16)assert that

asubtle mind (細心)17)is not annihilated in nirodha-samapatti. They say that there are not any sentient beings (sattva) without rupa, and that there is neither any samapatti without mind (acittaka). If the samapatti is acitttaka, the vital organ (jivita- indriya) will be eradicated; such a state is not a samapatti, but death. On account of denying their assertion, we declare that there is not a mind at all in niroddha-samapatti. A certain, though admitting acittaka, asserts that (nirodha-samapatti) appears only free from the defilement of rupa-dhatu (rupa-vairagya) because it belongs to the same dhatu (as the arupya-samapattis). On account of denying this assertion, we declare that nirodha-samapatti always appears free from the defilement of akimcanyayatana because it has the mind of nai- vasamjnanasamjnayatana as its samanatara-pratyaya (condition being immediately antecedent). Therefore, sthavira-Vasumitra18) says: "What is nirodha-samapatti?

13) "nirodhas citta-caittanam" (AKBh, p. 70, 1.2). "tasmad acittaka nirodha-sama- pattir iti Vaibhasikah" (ibid., p. 73, 11. 3-4) 14) Taisho ed., No. 1545, Vol. XXVII, 774a. The first half of this quotation is tra- nslated into French by L. de la Vallee Poussin (L'Abhidharma...... op. cit., p. 212, fn-2). 15) As for the relation between the Darstantika and the Sautrantika, see K. Mizuno, op. cit., pp. 238-244. 16) We cannot decide here whether this Vibha jyavadin indicates the Pra jfiaptivadin or the Mahaviharika. See above, fn. 12. Cf. P. Demieville, "L'Origine des Sects Bouddhiques d'apres Paramartha," MCB, I, p. 49.

17) The originality of this word 細心 is doubtful though Poussin also translates it into 'une pensee subtile' (op. cit., p. 212. fn. 2). See below, fn. 25. 18) Though Vasumitra is qualified as 'bhadanta' or sthaoira, ' here sthavira' would be used as in the case of the AKV for 玄二 translates it distinguishing 尊者

(sthavira) from 大徳 (bhadanta). 'Vasumitra of this case indicates clearly one who belongs to the Vaibhasika because his definition of nirodha-samapatti is admitted as the orthodox theory in the Vibhasa.

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What, one having been free from the defilement of akimcanyayatana (akinzcanyatana- vitaraga), his mind and mental activities are annihilated (citta-caittanam dharmanam nirodhah) by the mental orientation preceded by the conception of tranquility (santa-vihara-samjna-parvakena manasi-karena) that is called nirodha-samapatti." On account of these reasons, we make this treatise.

Thus according to the Vaibhasikas, nirodha-samapatti is entirely the annihilation of mind and mental activities. If so, how does the mind rise again? This is a very important question. But the Vaibhasikas answer easily that the mind rises again from the previous past mind to ni rod ha-samapatti, for they admit that the past exists in reality as well as the present and future-19) The Abhid hrmakosabhasya presents another two kinds of answers different from the Vaibhasikas. 20) (1) One answers that the mind rises from the existing body provided with organs (sendriya- kaya-) because he denies the real existence of the past. (2) Another answers that it is not necessary for him to explain the way how the mind rises again because he admits that in nirodha-samatti there is a mind which will always be succeeded by a next mind. According to Yasomitra, the first is the assertion of the Sautrantikas. 21) The second assertion represented by Vasumitra's Pariprccha is manifested under the theory of sacittaka of nirodha-samapatti. 22) And this theory seems to match with that of the Darstantikas and the Vibha jyavadins quoted above. Now let us return to the sacittaka theory and consider it further.

III

The Karrmasiddhiprakarana is one of the treatises in which the sacittaka

19) "katham idanim bahu-kalam niruddhac cittat punar api cittam jayatel atitasyapy astitvat isyate Vaibhasikaih samanantara-pratyayatvam/" (AKBh, p. 72, 11. 16-18). 20) AKBh, p. 72, 11. 18-22. 21) "apare punar ahur iti Sautramtikah" (AKV, p. 167, 1. 16). 22) As we have pointed out before, this quotation from the Pariprccha is quite the same as that of the AKBh cited below in this paper. See my article, "On a Verse Quoted in the Tibetan translation of the Mahayanasamgrahopanibandhana," JIBS, XXI I-2, (1974), p. 19, fn. 6.

-1080- Nirodhasamapatti (N. Hakamaya) (38) theory of nirodha-samapatti and the opposite view against it are discussed most in detail. This treatise also quotes the Pariprccha as a pattern of the sacittaka theory just like as the Abhidharmakosabhasya does, 23) which is shown in the following paragraph. There is the difficulty (to explain how the mind rises again after nirodha-samapatti) in their theory itself which regards the state (of this samapatti) as acittaka. Some admit that the stete is sacittaka.24)For example, bhadanta-Vasumitra says in his Pariprccha: "There is the difficulty for them who regard nirodha-samapatti as acittaka. But (there is no difficulty) for me who regards the nirodha-samapatti as sacittaka."25) And they qnote a sutra as the trustworthy scripture to prove it, which says: "The one who has attained nirodha-samapatti, his corporeal energies (kaya-samskara) has annihilated." etc. up to "[But) his organs (indriya) do not deteriorate, and his consciousness (vijnana) does not leave the body."26) What a kind of consciousness do they admit in such a state? Some say that (they admit) the mental consciousness (mano-vijnana). The weak point of the sacittaka theory is that it admits sacittaka by mano- vijna na. Theref ore, the opponent attacks at this point. The refutation is divided roughly into two kinds:

23) Etienne Lamotto, "Le Trait' de l'Acte de Vasubandhu: Karmasiddhiprakarana," MCB, IV, (1936), pp. 193-4, pp. 237-8. S. Yamaguchi, The Karmasiddhiprakarana of Vasubandhu (in Japanese), (Kyoto, 1951), pp. 168-9. 24) According to Sumatisila's commentary, this assertor of sacittaka is one of the Sadbahyarthavadins (phyi rol gyi don yod par smra ba) (Las grub pahi brad pa, P. ed., No. 5572, Vol. Ku, 94b8). On the basis of this commenntary, S, Ya- maguchi has some doubt on the traditinal opinion that Vasumitra in this case belongs to the Sautrantika (op. cit., pp. 169-171). 25) Tib.:...... kyi kho bohi ltar na hgog pahi sn"omspar hjug pa sems dan bcas pa

fiid pas"(Lamotte op. cit., p. 194). Tr. of. 毘目智仙: "我滅三昧是有心故" (Ta-

isho ed., XXXI, 779b). Tr. of 玄莫: "我説滅定猫有細心故" (ibid., 784a). Accor- ding to the same quotation in the AKBh (p. 72, 11. 21-22), its original Sanskrit is restored as follows:"...... mama to sacittaka nirodha-samapattih." As seen from these comparisons, the letter 細 in the tr。 of 玄英 is added by 玄英 himself. Therefore, Lamotte's tr.: "Mais je soutiens que ce recueillement d'ai ret est muni

d'une pensee subtile (suksmacitta)" (op. cit., p. 237) is according to 玄莫 and is not adequate as S. Yamaguchi had pointed out (op. cit. pp. 170-1).

-1079- (39) Nirodhasamapatti (N. Hakamaya) (1) If there is mano-vijn"ana in nirodha-samapatti, there will be the sensation (sparsa) which consists of the triple contact (trika-saannipata) detween object (visaya), sense-organ (indriya) and consciousness (vijnana), which will be succeeded by the feeling (vedana) and concept (samjn"a) that should not exist in this samapatti.27) (2) If there is only mano-vijnana in such a state independently of sparsa, vedana and samjna, then the mano-vijnana should have to be morally good (kusala), defiled (klista) or non-defiled-non-defined (anivrta-avyakrta). But it is impossible for the mano-vijnana to be any of them without associated mental activities.28) The two kinds of refutation are fitting logically as far as the mano-vijnana is an external phenomenon of consciousness as used by the Vaibhasikas even though it implies an undistinct mind or a subtle mind. But the sacittaka theory seems to give a clue into developing into an internal phenomenon of the unconscious. Therefore, the opponent makes a stepping stone from the theory and declares as follows:29) Being as such, how is it admitted that (nirodha-sarnapatti) is sacittaka 2 (It is admitted) as a certain Sautrantika admits. How does he admit it ?30) He admits it as follows: The consciousness of retribution (vipaka-vijnana) provided with every kinds of germ (sarvabijaka), continuing without interruption in such and such an existence from the first moment of a new life (pratisamdhi) and changing in various ways by the various kinds of causes, does not interrupt the perpetual proceeding each time up to the nirvana. (Thus there is the vipaka-vijnana in nirodha-samapatti.) Therefore, such a state is called sacittaka. But the six categories of consciousness

26) This sutra is quoted in considerable literature prov ing the sacittaka of nirodha- samapatti. E lamotte traces this sutra to the Majjhimanikaya, I (Mahavedallasut- ta), p. 296 (op. cit., fn. 78). According to Vinitadeva's commentary on the Tri- msikavijnaptibhasya, this sutra is titled the Dharmadanasutra. "chos byin gyi mdo sde dan hgal to (/) de las ni rnam par ses pa lus las mi hdaho ses jibyun no//" (P. ed., No. 5571, Vol. Ku, 19b7). 27) E. Lamotte, op. cit., p. 194, p. 239: S. Yamaguchi, op. cit., pp. 171-174. 28) E. Lamotte, op. cit., pp. 194-197, pp. 239-244: S. Yamaguchi, op. cit., pp. 174- 190. 29) E. Lamotte, op. cit., p. 197, pp. 244-245: S. Yamaguchi, op. cit., pp. 190-194.

-1078- Nirodhasamapatti (N. Hakamaya) (40)

(sad-vijnana-kaya) does not proceed (in the samapatti) . Because the germ of these (six) consciousnesses has been corrupted within a certain time by means of the mind which enters nirodha-samapatti etc., therefore such a state is called acittaka. Thus the same state of nirodha-samapatti is called, on one hand, acittaka from the standpoint of the six categories of consciousness that is an external phenomenon of consciousness, or is called, on the other hand, sacittaka from the standpoint of the vipaka-vijnana that is an internal phenomenon of the unco- ncious. But it is right conclusively to call it acittaka because of the lacking six consciousnesses, just like the chair that lacks one of its legs, though having some legs, is called an 'unleged' chair. 31) This is Vasubandhu's view expressed under the name of a certain Sautrantika.'32) Here we can recognize the process of developement forming the vi j napti ma- trata system. The internal phenomenon of the unconscious can be no more included in the traditional concept of the six categories of consiousness. The- ref ore, Vasubandhu gave the unconsious the new conception of vipaka-vijnana,

30) Tib.: "ho na sems dan bcas par ji ltar Mod par bya se na/ ji ltar mdo sde pa kha cig hdod pa lta bur ro// mdo sde pa kha cig ji ltar hdod ce na/." Tr. of 毘

目智仙: "云何彼是有心三昧. 如修多羅法師信読, 修多羅師云何信説." (Taisho ed., XXXI, 779c). Tr. of 玄奨: "若爾云何許, 滅定等諸無心位亦有心耶. 慮如経爲

量者所許, 細心彼位猫有." (ibid., p. 784b). Tr. of Lamotte: "En ce cas, d'apres vous, le recueillement d'arret est-il un etat (avastha) prive de pensee (acittaka) ou muni de pensee (sacittaka)? Nous repondons que cet etat est muni d'une pensee: la pensee subtile (suksmacitta) admise par une categorie de Sutrapramanika." E. Lamotte's understanding of this paragraph seems to arise from its tr. of 玄莫

and especially his adherence to the word 細心. We do not here follow him be-

cause we are doubtful about the originality of 細心. According to Lamotte's understanding, the theory of Vasumitra would not be completely denied. 31) sems gnis pa (=sad-vijfnana) ma tshari bahi phyir sems med pa yin tel dper na khri rkan pa gcig pa la rkan pa gsan ma tshari bahi phyir/ rkan pa med pa ses bya lta buho// (E. Lamotte, op. cit., p. 197). 32) "ji ltar mdo sde pa kha cig hdod pa lta buho ses bya ba nil de lta bur sems dari bcas par hdod do ses bya ba lhag maho// hdis ni slob dpon bsed pahi phyogs ston toll kha cig ses bya ba ni dari pohi khyad par rnam par hbyed pahi chos kyi rnam grans la sems pa dag yin no ses bya bahi tha tshig go//" (Las grud pahi brad pa, op. cit., 100a5-1). See S. Yamaguchi, op-cit., p. 192, p. 193, note 3.

-1077- (41) Nirodhasamapatti (N. Hakamaya) while he admitted acittaka according to the traditional theory of consciousness in which the consciousness except the unconsious must de limitted logically. Vasubandhu at that time seems to have been very closely adjacent to the vijnaptimatrata thought,33) for he quotes in the following paragraph a verse from the Samdhinirmocanasutra and regards alaya-vijn"ana, adana-vijnana as the synonym of vipaka-vijnana.

As considered above, some Buddhist scholors has become aware of the unconscious underlying the six categories of consiousness during the discussion of the problem whether nirodha-samapatti is sacittaka or acittaka. But the unconscious cannot be included in the traditional categories. This is quite a new thing. The new one must be named by a new concept, that is alaya-vijana, adana-vijnana or vipaka-vijnana. It is the vijnaptimatrata thinkers that have done it. So it is supposed that they used the nirodha-samapatti in order to prove the existence of alaya-vijnana which is a new concept unknown by their opponents because the nirod ha-samapatti well known by them had formed a new concept in the long process of discussion. And by introducing the new concept, their own theory of the unconscious also had developed still more. Here we can get the following schema from the verses 5a, 7b-d, 1634) of the Trimsika which represent the most organized vijnaptimatrata system. As seen in the schema, the unconssious is divided into two kinds of alaya- vijnana and klista-manors by which the seven kinds of states such as arhat etc. are clearly defined. Consequently nirodha-samapatti is defined not only by the annihilation of six vijnanas but also by that of klista-manas. So the fundamen- ntal difference between nirodha-samapatti and asamjni-samapatti depends on

33) A. Hirakawa, Index to the Abhidharmakosabhasya, Introduction, pp. 23-24. 34) "tasya (=alaya-cijnanasya) oyavrttir arhatce" (5a). "arhato na tat (=klista- manas) l na nirodha-samapattau marge lokottare na ca//" (7b-d), ccmano-viinana- sambhutih sarvadasamjnikad rte/ samapatti-dcayan middhan murcchanad apy acit- takat/l (16).

-1076- Nirodhasamapatti (N. Hakamaya) (42)

○ indicates the existence of vijnana. × indicates the non-existence of vijnana. the existence or non-existence of klista-manors. The clear definition of the two is given by Asarnga in his Abhidharmasamuc- caya: 35) What is asamjni-samapatti? What, one having been free from the defilement of subhakrtsna and not yet having been free from the defilement of the superior stage, his non-constant mind and mental activities (asthavaranam citta-cetasikanam dharmanam=six vijnanas and its activities) are annihilated by the mental orientation preceded by the conception of deparature (nihsarana-samjna-purvakena ynanasikarena) that is called asamjni-samapatti nominally (prajnaptitas).36) 37) What is nirodha-samapatti? What, one having been free from the defilement of akimcanyayatana (akimcanyatana-vitaraga) and having started off bhavagra, his non-constant mind and mental activities and a part of constant ones38) (=klista- manas) are annihilated by the mental orientation preceded by the conception of tranquility (santa-vihara-samjna-purvakena manasikarena) that is called nirodha- samapatti nominally (prajnaptitas). 39)

35) V. V. Gokhale, "Fragments from the Abhidharmasamuccaya of Asanga," JBB- RAS, N. S., Vol. 23, (1947), p. 18, 11. 23-27. 36) There is another important problem whether asamjni-samapatti and nirodha- samapatti, etc. are prajnaptitas or dravyatas, to which we do not refer in this paper.

-1075- (43) Nirodhasamapatti (N. Hakamaya) The non-existence of klista-manas distinguishes fundamentally nirodha-samna- patti from asaanjni-samapatti. Therefore, Asafiga says also in his Mahayana- samgraha that the two samapattis of asamjni and nirodha would be undisti- nguishable if one did not admit the klista-manas by which the former is cha- racterized. 39) Such a difinition of nirodha-samapatti by Asaiiga is entirely different from that of the Vaibhasika. Here let us return to the schema shown above. From the standpoint of the existence of klista-manors, asamjni-samapatti is put in the same state as asa- mjnika, acittaka-murchana (non-minded stupor) and acittaka-rniddha (non-minded sleep). Consequently it is in the two kinds of states, namely, ni rod ha-samapatti and lokottara-marga that alaya-vijnana only exists and klista-manas does not exist. It is also by this reason that we can recognize the important role of nirodha-samapatti to prove the existence of alaya-vijnana. (P.S.) As it is known, the vijnaptimatrata system has been organized as the amalgamtion of both theories of Abhidharma and Prajnaparamita. The doctrine of alaya-vijnana is brought up in the tradition of Abhidharma, while the doctrine of tri-svabhava is in that of Prajnaparamita. Therefore, it is necessary for us to study both traditions in order to clarify the formation of the vijnaptimatrata system. This paper is an attempt to examine the alaya- vijnana in the tradition of Abhidharma. As for the Prajnaparamita tradition, we should scrutinize the *Maitreyapariprccha (ed. by Conze in Melanges d'Ind- iame a la memoire de Louis Renou, 1968) from the historical standpoint of Vijn- aptimatrata thought.

37) Compare the following definition of nirodha-samapatti with that of the Vaibha- sika by sthavira-Vasumitra as cited above. 38) "a part of constant ones" is supplemented accrding to Tib. : "brtan pa de dag

Zas kyari kha cig (D ed., 9b) and Chin.: "恒行一分" (Taisho ed., XXXI, P. 665c). Gf. P. Pradhan, Abhidharmasamuccaya of Asanga, (Sntiniketan, 1950), p. 11, fn. 7. 39) "hdu ies med pa dan/ hgog pahi snoms par hjug pa bye brag med pahi skyon du yan hgyur tel hdi liar hdu ies med pahi snoms par hjug pa ni non mops pa can gyi yid kyis rab to phye ba yin gil hgog pahi snoms par hjug pa ni ma yin tel gsan du na ghis bye drag med pa Rid du hgyur roll" (E. Lamotte, ed., p. 5)

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