Xi Jinping Presides Supreme Over Start of 19Th Party Congress

Volume 17, Issue 13 October 20, 2017 In a Fortnight: Xi Jinping Presides Supreme Over Start of 19th Party Congress The Irresistible Rise of the “Xi Family Army” By Willy Lam Chinese and Indian Competition in Space Heats Up By Sudha Ramachandran Tigers in the Haze: Chinese Troops on the Border with North Korea in the “April Crisis” By Adam Cathcart Alternative Models for the Central Military Commission By Phillip C. Saunders Acknowledging the transformation of China Xi Jinping Presides Supreme underway and internal and external chal- lenges facing the state, Xi presented his case Over Start of 19th Party that under his administration China has made Congress important strides toward achieving the “Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese People” (中华民族伟大复兴) (Xinhua, October 18). China’s 19th Party Congress is now in full swing. On August 18, Communist Party Gen- While the three-and-a-half hour, 30,000-Chi- eral Secretary Xi Jinping started the once- nese-character speech will be distilled and di- every-five-years meeting with a sweeping gested for months to come, a few broad party work report laying out his accomplish- themes are worth highlighting. ments and plans for the future. While the Congress will see important changes in key A core part of Xi’s public image is his percep- leadership posts, the work report acts as a tion as a man of the people and champion of capstone to the preceding five years. the countryside. This is not pure populism— rural poverty and growing social inequality are among the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) most pressing issues. In the run-up to ChinaBrief October 20, 2017 the Congress, hagiographic documentaries program to increase the size of farm plots for and books appeared discussing Xi’s time as a greater efficiency) and the environment (ad- “sent-down youth” (urban citizens and intel- dressing China’s soil toxicity problems) with lectuals sent to the countryside to learn from broader concerns about the vulnerability of peasants). As General Secretary, Xi has made China’s sea lines of communication (China poverty alleviation (扶贫) a priority. The coun- Brief, March 2; July 1, 2016; March 8, 2016). try currently suffers from rising inequality, Taken together, these policies will allow, in particularly in the countryside. One reason for Xi’s words “China to firmly grasp its rice bowl this is education gap between rural and urban in its own hands” (Xinhua, October 18). areas. According to research by Stanford Uni- versities’ Rural Education Action Project, To ensure China’s future growth it is not three-fourths of the country’s young people enough to address internal economic and en- lack a high-school education (CSIS, Septem- vironmental problems. Ensuring China’s sea ber 14). Nevertheless, as previewed at the an- lines of communication are secure and grow- nual Chinese Poverty Alleviation International ing China’s trade abroad has led Xi to set am- Forum in May, the Chinese government in- bitious goals for foreign policy and military tends to eradicate poverty by 2020 (China reform. Brief, June 9). Xi’s speech was peppered with references to the program and the success of While Xi’s high-profile visits abroad may have “moving over 60 million people out of pov- lacked some of the novelty of Deng Xiao- erty…and reducing the incidence of poverty ping’s first tours abroad in the late 1970s and from 10.2 percent to less than 4” (Xinhua, Oc- early 1980s, Xi’s shuttle diplomacy has the tober 18). hallmarks of a mature power that his prede- cessors lacked. Befitting this new era in for- Based on the Party Work Report the CCP eign relations, Xi’s three major contribu- clearly views development, managing social tions—“Great Power Politics With Chinese unrest and emerging non-traditional security Characteristics” (中国特色大国外交) and the threats as priorities on par with traditional se- “New Type Great Power Relations” (新型国际 curity issues, as embodied in the “Compre- 关系) and “One Belt One Road” (一带一路)— hensive National Security Outlook” (总体国家 will continue to set the tone for the next five 安全观). The underpinning idea “unifies de- years. However, as Chinese promises of loans velopment and security” and “external and fail to materialize or partnerships sour, this is domestic security” (Xinhua, October 18). the aspect of Xi’s legacy that is most likely in peril (EDM, June 6; China Brief, June 21, 2016). As frequently argued in this column, one noteworthy component of the “Outlook” is Conversely, the military reforms announced at food security—ensuring sufficient domestic the end of 2015 will likely be a cornerstone of food supplies. Food security is emblematic of Xi’s legacy. The formation of new theater Xi’s policies that link trade (such as grain im- commands, and the more recent “below the ports from Russia), land reform (such as the neck reforms” at the individual unit level can 2 ChinaBrief October 20, 2017 fairly be described as “historic breakthroughs” higher and higher walls it remains to be seen (Xinhua, October 18). While training and as- where the cracks will begin to emerge. pects of the People’s Liberation Army’s or- ganizational structure continue to be barriers *** to greater effectiveness, Xi has laid the groundwork for achieving the “Dream of a The Irresistible Rise of the Strong Military” (强军梦). “Xi Family Army” Though Western media tends to fixate on By Willy Lam Chinese military developments, it is worth keeping in mind the most important strategic Under President Xi Jinping, whose main direction for the CCP is not North, South, East power base is the People’s Liberation Army, or West, but inward—maintaining its power the famous adage “power grows out of the and ensuring domestic stability. barrel of a gun” has assumed added signifi- cance (China Brief, February 15, 2013; January This focus on domestic security has led China 9, 2015). On the eve of the 19th National Con- under Xi to develop the world’s largest sur- gress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), veillance state. Tested in China’s traditionally Xi has demonstrated his ironclad control over more restive minority regions in the west, sur- the PLA brass by filling a dozen-odd senior veillance cameras linked with artificial intelli- post with his protégés. Such large-scale per- gence and “social credit” databases are being sonnel changes so close to the quinquen- rolled out nation-wide (China Brief, July 21; nial congress are extremely rare in the tradi- September 21). After decades of theorizing tion of the Party and army. The appointments about such a state under the rubric of “social seem to be Xi’s way of telling real and poten- management” (社会管理), the CCP appears to tial foes that nobody can challenge his status be on the brink of perfecting the modern as “core leader” and “supreme military com- panopticon (China Brief, August 17). mander” (zuigaotongshuai – 最高统帅) due to his solid grip on the barrel of the gun. China is deservedly proud of its moderniza- tion, economic wealth and scientific progress. Xi’s cobbling together a so-called “Xi’s Family The CCP is clearly focused on ensuring that it Army” (xijiajun – 习家军) has followed in the remains at the crest of the wave of power and wake of the ongoing comprehensive restruc- influence it has ridden as China’s global turing of the PLA command-and-control ap- power expanded after the Reform and Open- paratus which began in December 2015 and ing. China under Xi Jinping and the Party ap- January 2016. To celebrate the 90th anniver- paratus is clearly at its strongest point in sev- sary of the establishment of the Red Army, on eral hundred years. Xi’s influence is such that July 30 Xi, who chairs the Central Military his core ideology has been elevated to same Commission (CMC), presided over a military status as that of Mao Zedong. Nevertheless, parade in the Zhurihe Base in Inner Mongolia. as Xi and his political allies continue to build Unlike such spectacles in the past, Xi was the 3 ChinaBrief October 20, 2017 only Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) Zhang is deemed to have the highest chance member present. Also in a departure from of inheriting the Politburo slot left by the re- tradition, former top leaders such as former tiring CMC vice-chairman, General Fan presidents Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao were Changlong (范长龙 – b. 1947) (Brookings.edu, absent from the scene. Even the rhetoric of September 19; Sing Tao Daily [Hong Kong], these highly scripted events was changed. In- September 1). stead of addressing Xi as “leader” (shouzhang – 首长), troops being inspected gave him the Although not usually considered a member of more elevated title of “chairman” (zhuxi – 主 the Xi Jinping Faction, Xu has earned Xi’s trust 席) (Voice of America, August 1; Phoenix TV, after professing his loyalty to the “core July 30). The core leader’s machinations just leader.” He will remain CMC Vice-Chairman two months before the 19th Party Congress for five more years. The former Air Force chief are geared toward asserting his authority in is expected to be put in charge of military re- dictating personnel arrangements and other form, political discipline, and fighting corrup- polices at the CCP conclave. tion. Zhang Youxia, the former Director of the Equipment Development Department, is, The recent spate of reshuffles at the PLA’s top like Xi, a princeling (offspring of party elders echelons seems to be a precursor of large- and senior cadres). He is the son of General scale personnel changes in the Party’s Central Zhang Zongxun (张宗逊), who was a crony of Committee, the Politburo and the PBSC.

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