Volume 17, Issue 13 October 20, 2017

In a Fortnight: Presides Supreme Over Start of 19th Party Congress

The Irresistible Rise of the “Xi Family Army” By Willy Lam

Chinese and Indian Competition in Space Heats Up By Sudha Ramachandran

Tigers in the Haze: Chinese Troops on the Border with North Korea in the “April Crisis” By Adam Cathcart

Alternative Models for the Central Military Commission By Phillip C. Saunders

Acknowledging the transformation of Xi Jinping Presides Supreme underway and internal and external chal- lenges facing the state, Xi presented his case Over Start of 19th Party that under his administration China has made Congress important strides toward achieving the “Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese People” (中华民

族伟大复兴) (Xinhua, October 18). China’s 19th Party Congress is now in full swing. On August 18, Communist Party Gen- While the three-and-a-half hour, 30,000-Chi- eral Secretary Xi Jinping started the once- nese-character speech will be distilled and di- every-five-years meeting with a sweeping gested for months to come, a few broad party work report laying out his accomplish- themes are worth highlighting. ments and plans for the future. While the

Congress will see important changes in key A core part of Xi’s public image is his percep- leadership posts, the work report acts as a tion as a man of the people and champion of capstone to the preceding five years. the countryside. This is not pure populism—

rural poverty and growing social inequality are among the ’s (CCP) most pressing issues. In the run-up to ChinaBrief October 20, 2017

the Congress, hagiographic documentaries program to increase the size of farm plots for and books appeared discussing Xi’s time as a greater efficiency) and the environment (ad- “sent-down youth” (urban citizens and intel- dressing China’s soil toxicity problems) with lectuals sent to the countryside to learn from broader concerns about the vulnerability of peasants). As General Secretary, Xi has made China’s sea lines of communication (China poverty alleviation (扶贫) a priority. The coun- Brief, March 2; July 1, 2016; March 8, 2016). try currently suffers from rising inequality, Taken together, these policies will allow, in particularly in the countryside. One reason for Xi’s words “China to firmly grasp its rice bowl this is education gap between rural and urban in its own hands” (Xinhua, October 18). areas. According to research by Stanford Uni- versities’ Rural Education Action Project, To ensure China’s future growth it is not three-fourths of the country’s young people enough to address internal economic and en- lack a high-school education (CSIS, Septem- vironmental problems. Ensuring China’s sea ber 14). Nevertheless, as previewed at the an- lines of communication are secure and grow- nual Chinese Poverty Alleviation International ing China’s trade abroad has led Xi to set am- Forum in May, the Chinese government in- bitious goals for foreign policy and military tends to eradicate poverty by 2020 (China reform. Brief, June 9). Xi’s speech was peppered with references to the program and the success of While Xi’s high-profile visits abroad may have “moving over 60 million people out of pov- lacked some of the novelty of Deng Xiao- erty…and reducing the incidence of poverty ping’s first tours abroad in the late 1970s and from 10.2 percent to less than 4” (Xinhua, Oc- early 1980s, Xi’s shuttle diplomacy has the tober 18). hallmarks of a mature power that his prede- cessors lacked. Befitting this new era in for- Based on the Party Work Report the CCP eign relations, Xi’s three major contribu- clearly views development, managing social tions—“Great Power Politics With Chinese unrest and emerging non-traditional security Characteristics” (中国特色大国外交) and the threats as priorities on par with traditional se- “New Type Great Power Relations” (新型国际 curity issues, as embodied in the “Compre- 关系) and “One Belt One Road” (一带一路)— hensive National Security Outlook” (总体国家 will continue to set the tone for the next five 安全观). The underpinning idea “unifies de- years. However, as Chinese promises of loans velopment and security” and “external and fail to materialize or partnerships sour, this is domestic security” (Xinhua, October 18). the aspect of Xi’s legacy that is most likely in peril (EDM, June 6; China Brief, June 21, 2016). As frequently argued in this column, one noteworthy component of the “Outlook” is Conversely, the military reforms announced at food security—ensuring sufficient domestic the end of 2015 will likely be a cornerstone of food supplies. Food security is emblematic of Xi’s legacy. The formation of new theater Xi’s policies that link trade (such as grain im- commands, and the more recent “below the ports from Russia), land reform (such as the neck reforms” at the individual unit level can

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fairly be described as “historic breakthroughs” higher and higher walls it remains to be seen (Xinhua, October 18). While training and as- where the cracks will begin to emerge. pects of the People’s Liberation Army’s or- ganizational structure continue to be barriers *** to greater effectiveness, Xi has laid the groundwork for achieving the “Dream of a The Irresistible Rise of the Strong Military” (强军梦). “Xi Family Army” Though Western media tends to fixate on By Willy Lam Chinese military developments, it is worth keeping in mind the most important strategic Under President Xi Jinping, whose main direction for the CCP is not North, South, East power base is the People’s Liberation Army, or West, but inward—maintaining its power the famous adage “power grows out of the and ensuring domestic stability. barrel of a gun” has assumed added signifi-

cance (China Brief, February 15, 2013; January This focus on domestic security has led China 9, 2015). On the eve of the 19th National Con- under Xi to develop the world’s largest sur- gress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), veillance state. Tested in China’s traditionally Xi has demonstrated his ironclad control over more restive minority regions in the west, sur- the PLA brass by filling a dozen-odd senior veillance cameras linked with artificial intelli- post with his protégés. Such large-scale per- gence and “social credit” databases are being sonnel changes so close to the quinquen- rolled out nation-wide (China Brief, July 21; nial congress are extremely rare in the tradi- September 21). After decades of theorizing tion of the Party and army. The appointments about such a state under the rubric of “social seem to be Xi’s way of telling real and poten- management” (社会管理), the CCP appears to tial foes that nobody can challenge his status be on the brink of perfecting the modern as “core leader” and “supreme military com- panopticon (China Brief, August 17). mander” (zuigaotongshuai – 最高统帅) due to

his solid grip on the barrel of the gun. China is deservedly proud of its moderniza- tion, economic wealth and scientific progress. Xi’s cobbling together a so-called “Xi’s Family The CCP is clearly focused on ensuring that it Army” (xijiajun – 习家军) has followed in the remains at the crest of the wave of power and wake of the ongoing comprehensive restruc- influence it has ridden as China’s global turing of the PLA command-and-control ap- power expanded after the Reform and Open- paratus which began in December 2015 and ing. China under Xi Jinping and the Party ap- January 2016. To celebrate the 90th anniver- paratus is clearly at its strongest point in sev- sary of the establishment of the Red Army, on eral hundred years. Xi’s influence is such that July 30 Xi, who chairs the Central Military his core ideology has been elevated to same Commission (CMC), presided over a military status as that of Mao Zedong. Nevertheless, parade in the Zhurihe Base in . as Xi and his political allies continue to build Unlike such spectacles in the past, Xi was the 3

ChinaBrief October 20, 2017

only Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) Zhang is deemed to have the highest chance member present. Also in a departure from of inheriting the Politburo slot left by the re- tradition, former top leaders such as former tiring CMC vice-chairman, General Fan presidents and were Changlong (范长龙 – b. 1947) (Brookings.edu, absent from the scene. Even the rhetoric of September 19; Sing Tao Daily [Hong Kong], these highly scripted events was changed. In- September 1). stead of addressing Xi as “leader” (shouzhang – 首长), troops being inspected gave him the Although not usually considered a member of more elevated title of “chairman” (zhuxi – 主 the Xi Jinping Faction, Xu has earned Xi’s trust 席) (Voice of America, August 1; Phoenix TV, after professing his loyalty to the “core July 30). The core leader’s machinations just leader.” He will remain CMC Vice-Chairman two months before the 19th Party Congress for five more years. The former Air Force chief are geared toward asserting his authority in is expected to be put in charge of military re- dictating personnel arrangements and other form, political discipline, and fighting corrup- polices at the CCP conclave. tion. , the former Director of the Equipment Development Department, is, The recent spate of reshuffles at the PLA’s top like Xi, a princeling (offspring of party elders echelons seems to be a precursor of large- and senior cadres). He is the son of General scale personnel changes in the Party’s Central Zhang Zongxun (张宗逊), who was a crony of Committee, the Politburo and the PBSC. For Xi’s father, the late vice-premier the sake of further centralization of power, (习仲勋). General Zhang will be responsible the membership of the CMC is expected to for weapons modernization and logistics shrink from the usual ten or eleven to just five: (Zaobao.com [Singapore], September 2; Sing one chairman and four vice-chairmen. This Tao Daily, August 28). , a veteran breaks with the long-standing tradition that of the former Second Artillery Forces has the heads of the four major PLA divisions— earned Xi’s respect for masterminding the the Ground Forces, Navy, Air Force and modernization of China’s missiles. As a result, Rocket Forces—would be represented at the he was the first senior officer to have been Commission. With Xi at the helm, the four conferred full general status by Xi after the vice-chairmen are expected to be the follow- latter became CMC Chairman in late 2012. A ing veteran generals: incumbent Vice-Chair- former commander of the Rocket Forces, man (许其亮 – b. 1950); former di- Wei’s new mission will be to challenge the rector of the Equipment Development De- dominance of U.S. and Russia in missiles and partment Zhang Youxia (张又侠 – b. 1950); space-related technology. General , a for- former Rocket Forces Commander Wei mer commander of the Ground Forces, has Fenghe (魏凤和 – b. 1954); and newly pro- moted Chief of the General Chiefs Depart- ment Li Zuoucheng (李作成 – b.1953). General Xu, a Politburo member since 2012, will likely retain his position in the elite body. General

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been repeatedly promoted in the past two years. The Chinese media noted that while Li was a much-deco- rated hero of the Sino-Viet- namese War (1979), he was passed over for promotion largely because he refused to bribe the underlings and cronies of the two corrupt former CMC vice-chairmen the disgraced General Guo Boxiong and General Xu Cai- hou. For example, it took Li ten years to advance from the position of Head of the then 41st Group Army b. 1955) as Director of the Political Work De- (1998) to Vice-Commander of the then partment, and the promotion of (2008). And while Li (丁来杭 – b. 1957) as Air Force Commander. became a major general in 1997, it took him All three had worked in Fujian, where Xi 12 years to be elevated to Lieutenant-Gen- served in various positions, including provin- eral. General Li will take charge of day-to-day cial governor, from 1985 to 2002. Gen. Han military operations, including troop move- began his military career in Fujian and is a for- ments and other deployments within the five mer Head of the Xiamen-based 31st Group newly formed Theatre Commands. Army (now the 73rd Group Army). Similarly, (Dwnews.com [Beijing], September 10; Ming , a former political commissar of the Pao [Hong Kong], August 28; Caixin.com, Au- Navy, is also a former political commissar of gust 27; Military.China.com, April 1, 2016). the 31st Group Army. And General Ding had

served in a Fuzhou-based Air Force regiment An examination of promotions over the last (Wen Wei Po [Hong Kong], September 8; Ori- two months throws the true nature of the ‘Xi ental Daily News [Hong Kong], September 2; Army’ into sharp relief. A disproportionately Radio Free Asia, September 1; China Times large number of these future top military [Taipei], August 29). Other Xi protégés ele- leaders earned their spurs in Fujian and vated on the eve of the 19th Party Congress provinces, where Xi served as a sen- include Song Puxuan (宋普选 – b. 1954). A for- ior regional cadre from 1985 to 2007. Take, for example, the elevation of (韩 mer Commander of the , General Song was named Director 卫国 – b. 1956) as Commander of the Ground of the Logistics Support Department in early Forces, the appointment of Miao Hua (苗华 – September. He is a former vice-commander of the now-defunct Nanjing Military Region 5

ChinaBrief October 20, 2017

(MR), which included Fujian and Zhejiang and the first Chief of the Joint Staff, was un- provinces. The youngest rising star among ceremoniously sacked in the summer. The the top brass, Zhong Shaojun (钟绍军 – b. same was true of veteran political commissar 1968), who doubles as Director of the Office and the first director of the Political Work De- of the CMC Chairman as well as Vice-Director partment Zhang Yang. Generals Fang and of the General Office of the CMC, was made Zhang, who are under investigation for cor- Director of the CMC General Office, the PLA’s ruption, owe their illustrious careers at least nerve center in September. Zhong’s rise can partly to the patronage of Generals Guo and almost certainly be traced to a connection es- Xu. Given that Generals Guo and Xu were very tablished when he was Xi’s personal secretary close to former President Jiang Zemin, and when the latter was Party Secretary of that former president Hu Jintao largely went Zhejiang from 2002 to 2007 (Apple Daily along with Jiang’s personnel arrangements in [Hong Kong], September 14; South China the PLA, these personnel movements lend Morning Post, September 13; Dwnews.com, credence to the theory that Xi wants at the August 23). same time to minimize the residual influence of the two former presidents and CMC chair- The extraordinarily speedy elevation of Gen- men (Bloomberg, September 6; HK01.com, eral Han illustrates the lengths to which Xi has September 1). gone in reserving top spots for officers whose fealty is beyond doubt. Han was a vice-com- Yet Xi has apparently disregarded military tra- mander of the then MR when he was ditions and professional criteria (including the made Lieutenant-General in July 2015; seven all-important grade system) by elevating so months later he was appointed Commander many of his cronies and protégés to top slots. of the . The native Despite the apparent success of his one-and- of Hebei Province was made a full general on a-half-year effort to streamline the com- July 28, 2017; two days later he became the mand-and-control apparatus, Xi’s personal commander of the nationally televised Mili- ambition and his obsession of the loyalty of tary Parade in Inner Mongolia that was pre- his aides has dealt a big blow to the PLA’s sided over by President Xi. A week or so later, professional standards. As is the case of hu- he replaced as Commander of man resources management in civilian sec- the Ground Forces (People’s Daily, September tors, the promotion of senior military staff is 1; South China Morning Post, September 1). supposed to follow two principles: that mem- bers of the top brass should come from the Supreme Military Commander Xi has also proverbial “five lakes and four seas” and that taken advantage of the proximity to the 19th they must be “red and expert.” “Five lakes and Party Congress to weed out any “residual poi- four seas” refers to the imperative of factional, son” (yudu – 余毒) left by his two arch ene- functional and geographical diversity; “red mies, the disgraced CMC Vice-Chairmen Guo and expert” refers to the fact that while polit- Boxiong and Xu Caihou. , a for- ical loyalty is important, senior officers must mer commander of the erstwhile Beijing MR have professional competence and notable

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track records. As the indi- six books on China, including Chinese Politics cated is his book Xi Jinping: The Governance in the Era of Xi Jinping (Routledge 2015) and of China, “Good cadres are those who are most recently editor of the Routledge Hand- conversant with politics and knowledgeable book of the Chinese Communist Party (2017). about their professions… who are both red and expert.” (Hebei Daily, December 3, 2016; *** People’s Daily, December 25, 2014).

The military media has disclosed that PLA Chinese and Indian anti-corruption authorities handled 4,000 cases of investigation in the past five years, as Competition in Space a result of which 14,000 officers were disci- Heats Up plined for graft and related crimes (Ming Pao, Sudha Ramachandran September 22; Liberation Army Daily, Sep- tember 20). Despite President Xi’s efforts to purge the ranks of corruption, disciplinary On May 5, India began a new diplomatic problems remain serious. A key reason for push in South Asia by launching the “South these problems in both civilian and military Asia satellite” into space. Built and launched sectors, according to President Xi, is the prev- by the government-run Indian Space Re- alence of “factions and cliques” (tuantuanhu- search Organization (ISRO), the satellite will ohuo – 团团伙伙) (People’s Daily, March 22; provide communications and meteorological , February 16, 2016). The data to India’s South Asian neighbors (Eco- extraordinary “helicopter rides” enjoyed by nomic Times, May 5 and Xinhua, May 5). [1] newly promoted Xi protégés such as Generals The satellite is an attempt to not only Han Weiguo and Zhong Shaojun, however, strengthen India’s ties with its smaller neigh- seem to be based on Xi’s confidence in their bors and promote India-led regional co-op- loyalty rather than the latter’s having demon- eration but also to contain mounting Chinese strated exemplary professional abilities. De- influence in the region and countering its spite the leaps-and-bounds modernization of space co-operation with these countries. weaponry, the dearth of professional stand- ards in the armed forces could jeopardize Xi’s China’s influence in Sri Lanka has grown due goal of closing the military gap with the to robust bilateral economic and defense ties United States by 2049 at the latest. (China Brief, May 15, 2015). Space collabora- tion has taken this co-operation to a higher Dr. Willy Wo-Lap Lam is a Senior Fellow at The level. In 2012, China put a commercial satellite Jamestown Foundation. He is an Adjunct Pro- into space for Sri Lanka (The Island, Novem- fessor at the Center for China Studies, the His- ber 21, 2012). It is extending its Beidou Navi- tory Department and the Program of Master’s gation Satellite (BDS) System to Sri Lanka and in Global Political Economy at the Chinese is setting up at least ten Continuously Oper- University of Hong Kong. He is the author of

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ating Reference Stations there for this pur- 2013 was roughly $1.2 billion compared to pose (, April 1). Having drawn Sri China’s $6.1 billion and the US’ $39.3 billion Lanka into its orbit, China is attempting to (World Economic Forum, Jan 11, 2016; Rediff, build additional space partnerships with Af- November 20, 2003). ghanistan, Nepal and the Maldives—much to Delhi’s alarm (The Hindu, March 21, 2013). In Both programs benefited from co-operation response, India has turned to space diplo- with the Soviet Union and later the Russian macy to court neighbors and allies in East Federation. While such co-operation in the Asia. In Vietnam, India set up a dual civilian- case of China was interrupted following the and military- use satellite tracking and imag- Sino-Soviet split in 1960, India’s co-operation ing center (India Today, January 25, 2016). with Moscow has remained strong. Many of India’s early milestones in space exploration At the height of the Cold War the United were reached with Soviet help. A Soviet Cos- States and the Soviet Union used money and mos-3M vehicle launched India’s first satellite, weapons to build satellite states; today China Aryabhata, in 1975 and the first Indian to fly and India are using satellites in space to win into space did so onboard a Soviet spacecraft influence and secure their geo-political and in 1984. economic interests. They see each other as competition in the global satellite launch Major Milestones business. So how do the Indian and Chinese space programs compare? In which areas is Although China’s space program is decades competition likely to be most intense? behind that of NASA, it is catching up. It has made “definitive progress,” toward becoming Background “a major space power globally” (Institute for Defense Studies & Analyses (IDSA), January China’s space program began in the late 6). Its first major milestone came in 1999 with 1950s and predates India’s by at least a dec- the launch of Shenzhou-1, an unmanned ade. Unlike India’s space program, which was craft. In 2003, when the first Chinese taikonaut driven by development applications of space entered space, China became the third coun- technology, China’s program originated in try in the world to achieve this feat. China has military objectives. In 1993, the China Na- since launched six manned space missions. In tional Space Administration (CNSA) was set 2007, it shot down its own defunct weather up to co-ordinate the country’s space activi- satellite, displaying an anti-satellite (ASAT) ties. capability. In 2011, CNSA launched a space lab, Tiangong-1, and followed that up with India’s space program had a humble begin- two robotic and two manned dockings with it. ning and continues to operate with very lim- It made its first soft landing on the moon in ited resources—the Organization for Eco- December 2014. Although CNSA reportedly nomic and Social Development (OECD) esti- lost control over Tiangong-1 in 2016, it was mates that India’s annual space budget in able to launch another space station, the

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Tiangong-2, a few months later. In April 2017, Racing Ahead China launched its first unmanned cargo spacecraft. China’s space program is ambitious and “ad- vancing on a broad front,” says noted Indian China’s fourth White Paper on its space activ- space analyst Ajey Lele. [3] Indeed, CNSA is ities, which was released in December 2016, making progress in a wide range of space ac- provides a glimpse of its space agenda for the tivities including manned space flights, build- coming years. It plans to land a rover on the ing and operating a space station, space sci- far side of the moon in 2018, which will be a ence and planetary exploration. In contrast, global first, and an orbiter, a lander and rover ISRO’s “focus is narrow. Space science, for in- on Mars by 2020. [2] Should its Mars mission stance, is not a priority for it,” an ISRO official succeed, China would be the second country said. [4] CNSA’s budget for space science is after the US to accomplish this feat. It plans to around $110 million compared with India’s operationalize its permanent space station by $43 million (Live Mint, November 29, 2016). 2022, around when the ISS is due to retire (Xinhua, June 8). However, the recent failed China’s program is significantly ahead of In- launch of a satellite by China’s Long March-5 dia’s in several areas. Its robotic lunar explo- rocket could delay some of these plans (Times ration program, for instance, “is technologi- of India, July 5). cally and programmatically superior to India’s ad hoc lunar and Mars robotic missions.” In- As for India’s space program, although it has dia is “unable to challenge China’s dominance been building satellites and launch vehicles in the robotic exploration of the Solar Sys- since the 1970s, it was only with its successful tem,” write Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan and mission to the Moon in 2008 that its space ac- Vidya Sagar Reddy of the Observer Research tivities caught the world’s attention. ‘Chan- Foundation in New Delhi (Observer Research drayaan-1’s’ landing on the moon made ISRO Foundation (ORF), June 18, 2016). the fifth space agency in the world to land a spacecraft on the lunar surface. Then in 2014, India also trails China in developing indige- ISRO’s ‘Mangalyaan’ entered Mars’ orbit, nous navigation satellite systems. China’s Bei- making it the fourth space agency to enter dou system, which has been in use in China the Martian orbit, the first Asian agency to since 2000 and operational in the Asia Pacific achieve this feat and the only one in the world region since December 2012, will be fully to do so on its first attempt. In addition to be- functional at the global level by 2020. China ing technology demonstrators, ISRO’s Moon plans to provide basic services to countries and Mars missions showcased Indian space that are part of its by successes on a limited budget (Business Line, 2018. Of the proposed 35 satellites for global September 29, 2014). India has some high navigation services, it has already put 23 in or- profile deep space missions planned, includ- bit (China Daily, May 24). India’s Navigation ing a return to the Moon in 2018 and landing Indian Constellation (NavIC) is “far less ambi- a rover on Mars by 2021–22. tious” than Beidou. It comprises just seven

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satellites and is only a regional system; cover- Chinese strength in terms of the quality of age extends to about 1,500 km from the In- technology, if not the quantity of satellites.” dian landmass. It is expected to become fully [7] operational soon. [5] Given Beidou’s expan- sion to cover all BRI countries and several India’s big advantage in the satellite launch South Asian countries as part of the initiative, business is “its reliable and cost-efficient NAVIC may not draw many customers in the launches especially for launching small satel- region. As with the space diplomacy contest, lites in the low earth orbit.” [8] ISRO’s record- this round of the satellite navigation compe- breaking launch of 104 satellites in a single tition appears to have gone in China’s favor. mission in February could bring down further the cost of launches (Hindustan Times, Febru- Looming Competition ary 15). Its successful launch in June of the GSLV-Mk3, which has the capacity to carry 4 India and China account for just 0.6 percent tons to the Geosynchronous Transfer Orbit and 3 percent respectively of the $6 billion (GTO), is expected to open up markets for the global satellite launch services market, which launch of heavier satellites (Live Mint, June is dominated by NASA and the European 15). Space Agency (The Hindu, February 16). In- dian space analyst Kartik Bommakanti notes India’s cost-effective space program has rat- that China has “superior space launch vehicle tled China. Chinese space industry officials capabilities; it has bigger and more powerful described ISRO’s record-breaking satellite rockets, and more satellite tracking stations launch in February as “a wake-up call” for and launch stations” than India. [6] This has China. China would need to “reduce the cost contributed to CNSA’s large and growing of putting satellites into orbit” to expand its number of orbital launch missions. In 2016, market share and had lessons to learn from China conducted 21 successful launches com- India, they said (, February 20). pared to NASA’s 22 and ISRO’s 7 (Space Flight Beijing is now expected “to fast-track the 101, December 31, 2016). It plans to carry out commercialization” of its satellite launches 30 launches this year (Global Times, January (Global Times, February 19). 3). Inefficiency in the state-run CNSA is said to Despite China’s superior launch capabilities, have made its program among “the most ex- Indian space analysts are optimistic. Bom- pensive in the world.” Privatization is ex- makanti also notes that “In due course, India pected to halve the cost of a Chinese satellite will be able to match the Chinese in launch launch in the short-term and reduce it to a vehicle capabilities, particularly with advances tenth in the long-run. This would make China in the GSLV (Geosynchronous Satellite Launch “very competitive” in the global market Vehicle) program and the reusable launch ve- (South China Morning Post, May 20, 2016). If hicle program”. As for the satellite segment, CNSA’s attempts to reduce costs are success- “Indian capabilities do match even exceed ful, Sino-Indian competition for share of the

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global space launch market, especially for Notes small and microsatellites will increase dramat- 1. The ‘South Asia satellite’ will make ically. This competition extends beyond di- space technology applications in tele- plomacy and economic competition—India communication and broadcasting, dis- and China both recognize the importance of aster management, weather forecast- space dominance to military competition. ing, telemedicine, tele-education and others available to India’s neighbors. Conclusion 2. “Full Text: China’s Space Activities in 2016,” The State Council Information India and China are competing for markets, Office of the People’s Republic of resources and influence on land and sea, es- China, December 2016. pecially in Asia, Africa and the Indian Ocean. 3. Ajey Lele, Senior Fellow at the Institute This competition is spilling over into outer for Defence Studies and Analyses and space. China’s space program is more ad- head of its Centre on Strategic Tech- vanced and extends over a larger range of ac- nologies, New Delhi, July 29. tivities than India’s more focused program. 4. Senior ISRO official, Bengaluru, August China’s better-funded space program is likely 14. to keep it ahead in the Sino-Indian race in and 5. Ibid. over space. In the short term, Sino-Indian 6. Kartik Bommakanti, Associate Fellow competition can be expected to deepen in the with the Strategic Studies Programme commercial satellite launch business. This at Observer Research Foundation, New competition is likely to intensify as more pri- Delhi, July 29. vate players enter the space sectors of the 7. Ibid. two countries. Although India’s focus on the 8. ISRO official, n.4. military applications of space is certain to grow in the coming years, much will depend *** on its space collaboration with the U.S. Meaningful transfer of technology from the Tigers in the Haze: Docu- US to India would give the latter’s military space program a strong boost but this could menting Chinese Troops on prompt China to accelerate its own military the Border with North Korea program further. Dr. Sudha Ramachandran is an independent in the “April Crisis” researcher and journalist based in Bangalore, By Adam Cathcart India. She has written extensively on South Asian peace and conflict, political and security While China is frequently assumed to have a issues. number of “levers” it could use to control

North Korea, in fact, its policies across the

board—from security to economics—are

much more limited. An examination of actions 11

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in March and April 2017, when China was con- The conventional wisdom outside of the PRC fronted with the destabilizing prospect of uni- today seems to assume that mobilizing lateral U.S. military action against North Ko- troops near the border signals to North Korea rea, and apparently responded by taking that China is ready to either roll in or to block more vigorous steps with Pyongyang, pro- the flow of refugees into China. Too often, vides some useful insight. [1] China allegedly analysis which highlights assertions of Chi- put bilateral economic projects on hold, nese mobilization in the border region ignore threatened North Korea in the press with an the signals already being sent by the Chinese oil embargo, and may have further captured military press (as opposed to Chinese foreign Kim Jong-un’s attention by mobilizing troops affairs periodicals) with respect to North Ko- along its border with DPRK (Global Times, rea, and the documentation of open-source April 12). North Korea complained, but data on related Chinese military drills. backed down. Finally, if China was, in fact, using troop move- When documentation is scarce, claims of Chi- ments to intimidate North Korea, how would nese pressure in its various forms need to be we know a) that troop movements were in sifted, weighed, and contextualized. Nowhere fact happening and b) that China intended is this more true than in outside assertions them to impress DPRK? about the posture and readiness of Chinese troops along the Sino-Korean border during Parsing Rumors periods of crisis. Analysis of the rumors which spread in April As an intelligence and a signaling function about troop movements on the Chinese side dating back to the Korean War, the Chinese of the border with North Korea provides Communist Party has generally sought to some clarity about how to interpret these mask specific military movements behind the events. Confirming regular PLA activities in Ji- Yalu and Tumen Rivers, while promoting an lin province in the month prior to the crisis assumption in Washington, D.C., Tokyo and places this information and misinformation Seoul that Chinese strength in the border re- surrounding these activities into the larger gion was limitless, and that intervention could context of the role of the PLA and its posture occur at any time. [2] Even in periods of po- toward North Korea in the changing environ- litical transition, the defense of the northeast- ment. ern frontier has been a key function of the Chinese state, and the source of internal de- On the Chinese side of the Tumen River valley, bate. [3] A reshuffle of PLA organizations dur- the atmosphere in April 2017 was both hazy ing the “April crisis” and Xi Jinping’s related and tense. The haze was literal—farmers personal orders to every military unit might, around Yanbian were burning down the therefore, benefit from more inspection as stumps of last year’s corn crop, releasing ni- both domestic and international political acts trogen in the soil below and sending grey (PRC Ministry of Defense).

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plumes of smoke into the sky (Yanbian Morn- dizzying third-hand reports that “about ing Post, April 4). 25,000 troops of the Chinese military's 47th Group Army of the Ninth Armored Brigade have been instructed to be ready to move long distances, close to the North Korea bor- der” were subsequently generated in Hong Kong and passed along (UPI, April 12; for ear- lier, similar claims see UPI, November 11, 2016).

Nonetheless, the idea of a general Chinese military mobilization for crisis along the bor- der spread further. In English, the Business In- sider website was particularly successful in at- tracting web traffic by using questionable footage (which was itself at least a month old, and by no means certainly from the Shen- yang region) to imply that troop movements Fires in PRC Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture, April 14 were happening (Business Insider, April 14). 2017. Photo: Adam Cathcart/SinoNK.com News of troop movements was used as proof of the truth of the rumors, as were denials

from the Russian Foreign Ministry (Reuters, For geopolitical tension, one only had to talk April 21). to some locals in Yanbian, or read a bit of the national press to understand why (SCMP April Outlets trafficking in disinformation seemed 23, 2017; NBC, April 13). Under the circum- keen to portray the rumor as hard evidence stances, the occurrence of air drills over the that Donald Trump’s pressure on Xi Jinping border city of Yanji—a commonplace occur- (at Mar-a-Lago and the tweets that followed) rence—seemed to take on greater meaning had finally brought China around to threaten- (Globe & Mail, April 28). ing force against North Korea. [4] Anony-

mous U.S. officials actually encouraged ru- As tends to happen at times of stress and ten- mors of Chinese mobilization for conflict and sion on the peninsula, rumors began to circu- went so far as to indicate China had changed late globally that Chinese troops were moving its posture along the border with North Korea toward North Korea, reinforcing the frontier. (CNN, April 20). The Japanese conservative newspaper Sankei

Shimbun published a report on April 9 that Denials of these rumors were issued by Chi- there were 150,000 troops moving to the bor- nese officials at Ministry of Foreign Affairs and der; this report was then picked up and am- the PLA, but other information circulating plified by the conservative South Korean pa- around the Chinese internet indicated that per of record (Chosun Ilbo, April 10). More 13

ChinaBrief October 20, 2017

the government was mobilizing bureaucra- publicized military drills of small-scale directly cies in border cities for a nuclear test or a on or just adjacent to the North Korean bor- North Korean collapse (Guancha, April 27). der, it should be noted that these March drills took place over 100 kilometers from the So what were the facts? DPRK’s borders (for coverage of small drills in Tumen in July, see China News, July 7). Official PRC Media Sources A close read of the most extensive report on Chinese military media itself provides a useful the drills does not necessarily tell us much: baseline. These often include formal denials There is little sense of how many troops par- from PLA spokespersons that at least ticipated, and in the press releases the actions acknowledge the awareness of the Chinese feel more like an exercise in morale building state of a sort of externally generated hyste- (China Armed Police Net, March 24; China ria. A less frequently used approach is to ex- News – Jilin, March 23). The troops went amine military drills by the units concerned. In through a simulated “contaminated area” (染 the case of the spring, such reports exist 毒区), putting in 18-hour days wearing packs about drills for military preparedness in Jilin weighing 30 jin (half a kilogram). “There is no province. [5] These are not reliable sources of runner-up in war,” one press release re- information about PLA border troop strength minded readers, while also noting that soldier and posture, but these can help gauge if such had an outbreak of hemorrhoids—indicating actions were intended as a signal to North Ko- there was no room for weakness on the bat- rea, and indicate state attention to overall tlefield. readiness. Movements of People’s Liberation Army troops near the North Korean border Strangely, in the hothouse atmosphere of in- are a closely held secret. Equally important is ternational reporting on North Korea, some the fact that these limited number of publicly coverage of the drills which was written purely available official sources are also available to in military commissar style was appropriated North Korean observers, particularly the and used as evidence of threats toward North DPRK Consulate in Shenyang and the Em- Korea. One member of the unit conducting bassy in Beijing. drills said with emotion, “As we step onto the battlefield, we really must think that we are Jilin Military Drills more complete than the enemy, that we un- derstand the laws of war more clearly than the What is known is that from March 22 to 28 enemy, that we will shoot faster than the en- military drills took place outside of Jilin City in emy, that we are more prepared, so that we an area of 15 square kilometers of hilly and are utterly victorious over the enemy, no rocky woodlands, called Dongman Fengshan. shame!” (Jilin News Net, March 23). The U.K. Military press releases indicated action took newspaper Daily Star promptly reported the place in “unfamiliar terrain” of plains, hills, and drills as a signal to North Korea (London Daily forests. While China will occasionally carry out

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Star, March 29). If every drill with such lan- citizens (边民) who had been frightened due guage in Jilin were a signal to North Korea, to the cannon fire (sounds) from the other then ‘devil week’ drills in the province in Au- side of the border. Drills were also intended gust 2016 and every other drill would require to “block refugees” (阻隔难民) from coming similar interpretation (China News Network, over the border. But in parallel to these intim- August 23, 2016). idating acts, the article stated, was an explicit warning from the Chinese side, clear military- Evaluating Exercises military coordination so the drills did not set off a crisis on the other side. China has published on other border issues that provide insight and reflection on the Ko- One final noteworthy instance of misinfor- rean case: the Chinese military press in these mation was found shortly after the drills, but cases has gone to great effort to explain their in the Chinese military press. In late March, motivations. This should make us cautious the Defense Times published a purported when ascribing signaling elsewhere when it is summary of a Western researcher’s Foreign not similarly backed up in official press. De- Policy article describing how the PLA planned fense Times (Guofang Shibao; 国防时报) pro- to “block” U.S. military access to Pyongyang vided precisely such an essay with respect to in the advent of a North Korean collapse (De- another cross-border ally-cum-adversary, fense Times, March 31). The article seemed to Myanmar, less than a week after the drills in offer a US-sourced vision that China would Jilin concluded (Defense Times, April 3). and could roll down the Korean Peninsula and again stop a U.S. advance, holding to the Published on April 3, Defense Times published gains of the Mao years and preventing a re- an article sourced from Phoenix News, a peat of the trajectory of the first Korean War. Hong-Kong-based pro-mainland news outlet However, the Defense Times article was in fact which has been used in the past to message based upon a single interview with Stratfor by for the CCP. It described in exquisite detail the the Business Insider website (Business Insider, type of signaling cross-border military drills March 16). were intended to send to potential adver- saries—in this case, Myanmar. Reading a Conclusion March 28 Xinhua dispatch on combined drills of PLA Marines, Air Force, and border guards, Personal experience is one flawed but im- and artillery, the piece amounted to the anal- portant way to assess the broader environ- ysis that the foremost purpose of the drills ment in Chinese border regions. I was in the was “to intimidate (震慑) the other side...in- Chinese border region across from North Ko- cluding the Myanmar government, army, its rea from April 8–18, and spent a couple of ‘courageous troops’ and .” The other hours in Tumen in discussion with PLA border purpose of the drills was to rehearse a possi- guards and ethnic Korean plainclothes police. ble counterattack over the border, and to I can therefore confirm other accounts that boost the morale of the Chinese border-area border security was tighter than usual in that

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period and that the PLA in Tumen had orders and far between, and generally not to keep “third-country nationals” (i.e., people helpful. who were not Chinese or North Koreans) at  First-hand accounts on the border least 100 meters from the border as a whole. during a crisis is only marginally Border guards were also tasked with the pre- more useful, but are better than of- vention of photographs being taken of the ficial reporting. Talking to journal- North Korean side. It seemed clear that no ists and reading their reports is foreigner on the ground was going to be able useful in this respect. The new to get a sense of China’s military muscle near counter-espionage campaign will the border. Nor was the Chinese news media likely make this more difficult. going to report on it.  The Chinese military press tends to be more abundant than we give it Around Longjing, the lack of roadblocks credit for, but needs to be read along key crossings and avenues of advance more widely and carefully. also casts doubt on the idea that broader op-  Statements from the PRC Foreign erations were ongoing. In the future, similar Ministry and Global Times newspa- confirmation of real facts on the ground will per are of very limited use. like be even more difficult, as the national  Statements by some academics are anti-spy campaign is not going to make legit- useful as signaling. imate foreign reporting or academic field-  There may be far less drama than work in the border region any easier (Xinhua- we imagine; Consider the possibil- bao wang, April 18). Did Chinese troops truly ity that DPRK has been informed of flood the border region during the “April cri- military movements by the PRC sis” to the tune of 150,000 troops? We have side, making them less threatening. no way of knowing, based upon press reports or personal experience. But the signaling in Chinese reports from the border region, when the press had its purposes. they do emerge are tightly controlled and rarely move much beyond Xinhua copy Questions of information quality ought to fig- (Huanqiu, April 27). Part of the reason that ru- ure high among our concerns during this an- mors spread is that China itself maintains alytical process—observers of this issue need such a grip on the narrative, and does not al- to filter out what was legitimate intelligence low domestic reports. Adding to the ostensi- and data, and which “events” were, in fact, ble weight of any dispatch filed from the bor- propaganda meant to confuse. der region was the fact that, with a few excep- tions, Chinese reporters were themselves for- A few axioms may be useful for understand- bidden from covering anything related to ing the border research environment: North Korea.

 Chinese reports from the border At the apex of the worries of war between the region during tense periods are few US and North Korea, precisely one report was

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filed from the outskirts of Tumen city, where http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/arti- a sheep breeder had suffered huge losses due cle-4399076/China-deploys-150-000- to nighttime attacks from an endangered troops-North-Korea-border.htm species of northeastern tiger (Yanbian Morn- 2. Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the ing Post, April 14). This was a kind of an alter- Yalu (New York: Macmillian, 1960), pp. nate reality, having nothing to do with border 64-67; Bruce Cumings, Origins of the guards or international conflict. Had the Korean War, Volume II: The Roaring of farmer’s sheep been plundered by hungry the Cataract (Princeton: Princeton Uni- North Korean border guards, the very forces versity Press, 1990), pp. 738-745; see known for stealing farm animals from the also Robert Rigg, Red China's Fighting communities downriver? No, rather, it ap- Hordes (Harrisburg, Pa.: Military Ser- peared to be a rare instance of a Northeastern vice Publishing, 1952). Tiger (Dongbei hu) shredding sheep in the 3. Dai Maolin, Zhonggong Zhongyang early morning haze. Dongbeiju, 1945-1954 (Shenyang: Liaoning Renmin Chubanshe, 2017). Adam Cathcart is Lecturer in Chinese History 4. For examples of disinformation or at the University of Leeds (UK). He has pre- poorly sourced reporting see: Tyler sented policy papers on North Korea’s northern Durden, “China Threatens To Bomb regions to Chatham House, the Korea Eco- North Korea's Nuclear Facilities If It nomic Institute of America, and the UK Foreign Crosses Beijing's "Bottom Line" Zero- Office, and does regular fieldwork on the Chi- Hedge, Apr 12, 2017; Alex Jones, nese-North Korean border. He is also the editor “North Korea Backs Down in Nuclear of the SinoNK.com research website. Adam Showdown with Trump,” Infowars, Cathcart can be followed on Twitter @adam- April 14, 2017. ; Jack Posobiec, "Inside cathcart. Trump’s deal with China on North Ko- rea," The Rebel Media, April 28, 2017. Notes 5. Liaoning, the other province with an extended border with North Korea, is 1. The argument that Chinese pressure in another matter for investigation, see Pyongyang was working was made by Adam Cathcart and Adam Cathcart, ci- several Western journalists: John Ever- tation of PSB materials in Liaoning, ard,"Trump's North Korea policy might ‘Evaded States’ just be working," CNN, April 20, 2017; Kelly Mclaughlin, “China 'deploys *** 150,000 troops to deal with possible North Korean refugees over fears Trump may strike Kim Jong-un follow- ing missile attack on Syria’,” Daily Mail online/Reuters, April 10, 2017,

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ChinaBrief October 20, 2017

Alternative Models for the The CMC is the supreme national organ in charge of military and defense affairs. Its ma- Central Military Commission jor functions include formulation of military By Phillip C. Saunders strategy, handling contingencies, building ef- fective military forces, coordination of mili- tary, economic, political, and diplomatic strat- The Chinese Communist Party’s 19th Party egies, and formulating military guidelines and Congress, which starts on October 18th, will policies. [1] Despite this consistent mission, make major changes to the membership of the size and structure of the CMC have varied key Party organs such as the Politburo (and widely over the years, adapting to new strate- the Politburo Standing Committee), the Cen- gic and political contexts. Party Congresses tral Committee, and the Central Military Com- and associated plenums have typically been mission (CMC) as older leaders retire, others the occasion for major decisions on the are promoted or transferred to different posi- CMC’s structure and membership. tions, and new leaders are appointed. Within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), many of In 2016, the PLA embarked on a major organ- these personnel moves have already been izational restructuring that converted seven made, such as the announcement in late Au- army-dominated Military Regions into five gust that General Li Zuocheng, current PLA joint Theater Commands; removed the oper- Army commander, has replaced General Fang ational command role of the services and Fenghui as Director of the CMC Joint Staff De- gave them “plan, train, and equip” responsi- partment. bilities; and converted the four stand-alone

general departments into parts of a reor- In addition to changing which individuals oc- ganized CMC staff (China Brief, February 4, cupy key positions, the Party Congress also February 23). This restructuring was accom- provides an opportunity to adjust the struc- panied by extensive transfers of senior offic- ture of the CMC to match the PLA’s post-re- ers to lead the reorganized CMC depart- form organizational structure and the ments, the services, and the theater com- changes in responsibilities of the senior offic- mands. [2] ers who lead different parts of the PLA. There are four likely models for a restructured CMC Despite this major organizational restructur- (a “status quo plus” CMC; an enlarged CMC; ing, there have been no changes to the formal an operational CMC; and a management membership of the CMC itself (see Table 1). CMC), each with respective pros and cons. Admiral remains a CMC member, Decisions about how to restructure the CMC even though he has been replaced as com- will provide new evidence about Chinese pri- mander of the PLA Navy by . Cur- orities, the relative influence of different parts rent CMC members Fang Fenghui and Zhang of the PLA (and the officers chosen to lead Yang are reportedly under investigation and those parts), and the state of civil-military re- are not included in the list of PLA delegates lations in China. to the 19th Party Congress, but have not been

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removed from their CMC positions. General Li Zuocheng was named commander of the PLA Army (newly established as a separate service), but has not been made a member of the CMC, even though the com- manders of the other services have that status. This reflects the practice of having CMC appoint- ments be made by the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Commit- tee.

Operational considerations that may influ-

ence the structure of the CMC include: Political considerations that may influence the structure of the CMC include:  The right representation and expertise

to offer good advice on high-level  The imperative for the CCP to maintain strategic/military decisions. control of the PLA and the desire to  Xi Jinping’s practical need to limit the strengthen subjective and objective time he personally devotes to military control mechanisms over the military. decisions. [3]  A membership that reflects the logic of  Xi’s desire to centralize decision-mak- PLA restructuring (e.g. new roles of ing in his hands and not delegate ma- services, theaters, and CMC depart- jor decisions, known as the Chairman ments) and a grade structure compat- responsibility system. ible with other parts of the PLA.  The initial reforms provided jobs for all  Supporting a logical career progres- PLA senior officers to reduce potential sion that will give future senior PLA opposition to reform. We may see leaders the right mix of joint, opera- changes to the grades of organizations tional, and staff experience. and office-holders commanders as in-  Potentially reduce size to improve de- cumbents retire or transfer and are re- cision-making speed. placed by younger officers.

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Alternative Models for a Restructured CMC the current system (theater commanders are grade three, while most CMC members are A “Status Quo Plus” CMC: keep two military grade two and the CMC vice-chairs are grade vice-chairs and Minister of National Defense, one). keep service commanders (and add the Army commander), and keep new heads of former An Operational CMC: remove heads of former general departments (which are now CMC de- general departments and service chiefs from partments). CMC; build a smaller CMC focused on opera- tional command and control. This model This has the advantage of being closest to the might retain the head of the CMC Joint Staff existing CMC structure, and therefore being Department (which has an operational com- the easiest to implement. It would also repre- mand role) and potentially add the Com- sent the views of both the operational parts manders of the Strategic Support Force and of the PLA (including the heads of the former the Joint Logistics Support Force (which both general departments) and the services (with have significant operational responsibilities). their army-building functions). This has the advantage of creating a smaller, However, it would not necessarily match the more agile CMC that is better equipped to ex- political intent of the PLA reorganization (in- ercise operational control of joint forces and cluding the desire to rein in the power of the supervise the theater commands in wartime general departments, which were viewed as and contingencies. independent kingdoms that were vulnerable to corruption and which needed more super- A major drawback is that a smaller, operation- vision). ally focused CMC would not have the right representation to perform the CMC army- An Enlarged CMC: keep two military vice- building and strategic advice functions. The chairs and Minister of National Defense, keep services and former general department service commanders (and add the Army com- heads would use this need to argue for their mander) and heads of former general depart- continued membership on the CMC. ments; and add the five theater commanders. A Management CMC: keep service command- This has the advantage of making the CMC a ers (and add the Army commander), remove venue to reconcile operational demands (via the heads of former general departments, participation of theater commanders and for- and reallocate supervisory responsibilities mer general department heads) and army- across the CMC vice-chairs (and possibly add building requirements (via service chiefs). a civilian vice-chair or give the Minister of De- fense more responsibility). The CMC vice- However, this enlarges the CMC significantly chairs (and possibly an empowered Minister (which would slow decisions) and includes of Defense) would divide the operational, po- members who have three different grades in litical, equipment, and logistics portfolios and

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have de facto supervision of the relevant for- and/or CMC chair after his two terms as Gen- mer general department heads, who could be eral Secretary are over? reduced in grade. The CMC General Office Di- rector might be added as a CMC member to The Strategic Support Force is not a full ser- represent the views of all the CMC depart- vice and has an operational support role ra- ments. ther than an operational warfighting function. Its director, therefore, might not be qualified This has the advantage of making the CMC for CMC membership. smaller (and thus better able to reach deci- sions) and reducing the influence of the for- The Minister of Defense has historically not mer general department heads (and thus had a major operational or military decision- their ability to function as “independent king- making role. Could this change given the re- doms”). Empowering the Minister of Defense form’s emphasis on civil-military integration? or adding a civilian vice-chair could signifi- Could the Ministry of Defense take on more cantly enhance civil-military integration, responsibility for weapons development, re- which is one of the major goals of the PLA re- search and development, mobilization, and forms. other areas that require interaction with other parts of the Chinese government and civilian However, this model would substantially industry? Alternatively, could a third CMC vice downgrade the role of the Director of the chair (possibly civilian) take on these roles? Joint Staff Department, who currently super- Many of these functions are now the respon- vises operations and interacts regularly with sibility of individual CMC departments or foreign military leaders. (The CMC vice-chair CMC commissions; having a senior PLA officer with the operational portfolio might pick up in charge of all them could improve coordina- these responsibilities.) This model would also tion with the government and industry. empower the CMC vice-chairs, which could cut against the political goal of centralizing Will the former general departments be re- responsibility in the CMC Chairman’s hands duced to theater commander-grade organi- and tightening CCP control over the military. zations and their directors denied seats on the CMC? This would reduce their influence as Other Considerations “independent kingdoms,” but it might be dif- ficult to downgrade the status of the Director There is a historical pattern of appointing the of the Joint Staff Department. political successor to the CCP General Secre- tary to a civilian CMC vice-chair position two The CMC General Office is listed first in pro- or three years before the successor takes over tocol rank on the CMC staff. Does this qualify as General Secretary and Chairman of the the Director of the General Office for CMC CMC. Will Xi appoint a successor? Would the membership? Could the General Office Direc- need to supervise the military provide a justi- tor be the sole CMC department head with fication for Xi to stay on as general secretary CMC membership?

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This analysis has focused on potential and the state of civil-military relations in changes to the membership of the CMC ra- China. ther than the equally important (but much harder to predict) question of which individ- Dr. Phillip Saunders is Director of the Center ual officers will be selected to fill which posi- for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, part of tions. Assessments of the capabilities, per- the National Defense University’s Institute for sonal loyalty, and political reliability of indi- National Strategic Studies. The views expressed vidual officers may determine both which are his own and do not reflect the official policy senior positions they are assigned to and or position of the National Defense University, what responsibilities are given to those posi- the Department of Defense, or the U.S. govern- tions. ment.

Conclusion Notes

China is almost certain to make at least mod- 1. Tai Ming Cheung, “The Riddle in the Mid- est changes in the membership of the CMC at dle: China’s Central Military Commission the Party Congress, and the possibility of in the Twenty-First Century,” in Phillip C. more dramatic changes cannot be ruled out. Saunders and Andrew Scobell, PLA Influ- The most likely outcome is a “status quo plus” ence on China’s National Security Policy- CMC with the addition of the PLA Army com- making (Stanford, CA: Stanford University mander. This would be the least disruptive Press, 2015), 89. change, but would not fully adapt the CMC to 2. See Joel Wuthnow and Phillip C. Saunders, meet the objectives of the PLA reforms. An Chinese Military Reform in the Age of Xi enlarged CMC would be too unwieldy and an Jinping: Drivers, Challenges, and Implica- operational CMC would not be able to fulfill tions, China Strategic Perspectives 10 all the CMC’s responsibilities, so these op- (March 2017). tions are unlikely. A management CMC that 3. This distinction is from Samuel Hunting- reduces the size of the CMC and empowers ton. Subjective control mechanisms at- the CMC vice-chairs might be better adapted tempt to ensure that the military will obey to the PLA’s new organizational structure and because it has the same political values to the goal of increasing civil-military integra- and beliefs as civilians; objective control tion, but would require Xi Jinping to have mechanisms are intended to ensure com- great confidence in the personal loyalty and pliance by effectively monitoring military political reliability of the CMC vice-chairs. behavior.

Whatever structure China ultimately chooses will provide some insight into CCP and PLA *** *** *** priorities, the relative influence of different parts of the PLA (and the influence of the in- dividuals chosen to command those parts),

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