Egypt: the His Fting Cornerstone to the East-West Balance of Power in 1956 David C

Eastern Illinois University The Keep

Masters Theses Student Theses & Publications

1985 Egypt: The hiS fting Cornerstone to the East-West Balance of Power in 1956 David C. Dalgaard Eastern Illinois University This research is a product of the graduate program in History at Eastern Illinois University. Find out more about the program.

Recommended Citation Dalgaard, David C., "Egypt: The hiS fting Cornerstone to the East-West Balance of Power in 1956" (1985). Masters Theses. 2781. https://thekeep.eiu.edu/theses/2781

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Acknowledgments

My unmeasurable thanks to my loving wife , Lisa, who se patience and support put up with my last minute typing re quests, my messy research , and my cluttered mind . My un_ ending thanks to my parent s, Carl and Dorothy Dalgaard , who se financial , spiritual , and emotional support allowed my dreams of ac quiring my B.A. and M.A. a reality . My thanks to my Professors , Dr . Horak , Dr . Schlauch, and Dr . Koch , who taught me valuable, hard learned lessons of how to research , wr ite , and express history . My grat itude to Dr . Stone , who gave me invaluable, practical exper ience teaching on the high school level. Finally, I wish to thank the rest of my family whose support kept me striving ever onward and upward : Paul and Maureen Dalgaard , Mr . and Mr s. Richard and Kay Renfro , and Jim Renfro , Julie Renfro , and Stewart Davis . Abstract

The seizure and subsequent war over the Suez Canal in

1956 is the maj or theme of this work . The effect s on the

international situation and world events are analyzed . The maj or participants, Great Br itain under Prime Minis ter Sir

Anthony Eden , France under Premier Guy Mollet , Israel under

Pr ime Mini ster Dav id Ben-Gurion , and Egypt under Pres ident

Gama l Nasser , are developed from the ir personal aspirations

and goals surrounding their actions .

These actions led to the chain of event s which disrupted

the bipolar balance of wor ld power . The United States' con

tainment policy was breeched . Secretary of State John Foster

Dulles did not adequat ely repre sent the position of the United

States in this situation , which was stated by President

Eisenhower to his We stern allies. This lack of precise com

munication resulted in the disruption of allied solidarity.

Pres ident Eisenhower had to initiate sanctions against his

allies in order to halt the destruction of Western influence

in the Middle East , to save the United Nations , and to replace

the role played by his allies in the ar ea through the Eisen

hower Doctrine .

The Soviet Union accomplished an immense historic success.

It had successfully achieved a strongly accepted influence

in the Middle East which had been denied since the 1700's.

The Soviets took advantage of the divisions among We stern

power s by entering an area where a power vacuum existed .

Russia , by centering attention on the United Nations and directing world attention to the Middle Ea st , le ssened criti cisms against its action s in Hungary, Taking advantage of a divided and we akened We st , the Soviet Union ruthlessly crushed the Hungar ian revolt . The Soviets, through unrestricted sup plies of arms and economic aid to the Middle East, acquired for themselves a more popular image of Soviet communism than that of Western democracy with the Arab nationalists.

The United States forced an end to the joint Br itish ,

French , and Israeli invasion into Egypt . This caused deep resentment in France wh ich led it to br eak from the United

States and develop its own separate role in wor ld politics .

It was clear ly proven that Great Britain and France had secretly negotiated with Israel regarding Israe l's invasion of Egypt and the subsequent combined "peace keep ing" invasion of the

Suez Canal . Great Britain 's con servative government had to be rebuilt , and its economy was nearly shattered . Arab nation alism became divided between the We st and Nasser's neutral

Soviet-backed government . The Soviet Union gained unpre cedented success, and its influence was readily accepted .

The United States was forced to bear a larger role in the area becau se of the Eisenhower Doctrine . America's democrat ic ideals were viewed with suspicion, and its containment policy was breeched . Table of Content s

1. The Roots of Conflict in the Middle Ea st . 1

2. The Cracks Widen in Middle Ea st Relations. 26

3. Disruption of the Ea st-West Ba lance of Power 36

4. Negotiations Falter and War Clouds Gather . 61

S. A Forced Peace Restored . 84

6. Conclu sion 94

Endnotes . 100

Bibliography

Documents 113

General . 114 Chapter One

The Roots of Conf li.ct in, the Mid,dle East

The Middle East hold s an important posit ion in history for the colonial empires of Great Britain and France . The area wa s named the Middle East due to its geographic posi tion in the middle of the overland routes to the Near East centers of trade , India and China; therefore , the countries of the Middle East were lines of communication . Whoever controlled the se areas dominat ed the Near East trade .

From 1588 to 1914, Great Britain succes sfully dominated the area and all routes to and from the Near East . By using treaties and the powerful Roya l Navy , Britain prevented

Tsarist Russia any entry into the area. France was relegat ed to minor hold ings which were non-threatening to the communi cation routes of the British Empire . Germany , from 1871 , became the maj or power threat to Great Britain's dominance .

World War I marked the beginnings of decline for the British

Empire and French colonial ho ldings .

When World War I started , the Midd le East was divided due to the Ottoman Empire 's union with Austria and Germany against Great Britain, France , and Russia . Great Br itain be came bogged down in fierce fighting in France and could not delegate adequate forces to protect its lines of communication through the Middle East. One of these major lines of communi cation was the Suez Canal wh ich cut a path through Egypt , linking the Mediterranean Sea with the Red Sea . Great Britain had to generat e a native force in the area to protect the vital ( 2 ) lines . A strong motivation had to be created in order to turn people who had close religious and historic ties with the Ottoman Empire into a force against the Empire . National self -determination (or nationalism) was the motivation en 1 couraged by Great Britain .

Arab nationalism, since it did not have a gradual history , was a fiercely emotional and sometimes violent entity. Various

Arab peoples demanded that their national aspirations be satisfied . Arab nationalism was instrumental in the defeat of the Central powers' efforts in the area. At the end of

Wor ld War I, many Middle East areas were placed under League of Nations mandates with Great Britain and France as the domi nant administrators . The Arabs viewed this development as a reinstatement of colonial domination and demanded the ful 2� fillment of the Allies' promise for independence.

World War II became the turning point for the area.

During the early years of the war , the Allies were hard pressed for survival . The vital lines of communication and tran spor tat ion had to be saved . The Arabs were guaranteed their national desires in order to prevent poss ible disruption of key lines. With the end of World War II , two new developments caused intense concern among the Arab Nationalists . The se were the continued Allied presence because of past treaties

and the emergence of large Jewish concentrations in Palestine.

Great Britain still maintained a military presence in the area. In Egypt , even though it was given its independence ( 3)

in 1936 , the Br itish military occupat ion along the canal

zone dominated Egyptian life . Under King Faroukl ru ler of

Egypt from 1936 to 1952 , gr owing sabot ag e and acts of ter- rorism were perpetrated against the British presence . Br itish military forces were finally removed in the 1954 Ang lo-Egyptian 3 Treaty with complete evacuat ion by mid-1956 .

After Wor ld War II , France maintained its colonial hold

over Tunisia , Morocco, and Algeria . However , the eight to

one Mu slim maj or ity (over Frenchmen) steadily moved toward

indeDendence . Increased terrorist action s did not affect

the immediate remov al of the French presence , but conversely

resulted in France 's increased desire to completely control

Algeria . Any force which actively worked to assist the Al -

gerian rebels wou ld be viewed as an enemy of t�e French gov-

ernment .

The shocking picture generat ed by the Nazi persecution

and exterminat ion of the Jews emerged at the end of World

War II . This holocaust enormou sly intensified the Jewish

wor ld movement to create a nation state . Theodor Herzl , a

Hu ngar ian Jew, wr ote a book , The Jewish State (1896) , which

initiated a joint political and relig ious drive for the ere-

at ion of a Jewish state. The British government wa s sympathetic

and offered two ar eas for the creat ion of a homeland . The

Jewish movement picked Palestine as its homeland because

of its ancient religiou s ties to the area. On November 2 ,

1917 , the British government announced the Balfour Declaration

which outlined the format ion of a Jewish homeland within a 4 Mu slim maj or ity Pales tine state . (4)

Jewish immigration int o the area grew rapidly from 1920 to 1948 . British checks on the immigration and land purchases were to no avail . The Arabs were not pacified and actually became enraged by the rapid influx of the Jewish people into

Palestine . Internal tensions mounted and clashes re sulted between the Arabs, Jews , and British . By 1947, Great Britain cou ld no longer maintain order and announc ed that it would withdraw from the area leaving the United Nations to take over the mandate . Before United Nations personnel could settle land disputes , the Jewish state of Israel was declared 5 on May 14 , 1948 .

Arab reaction was intense. Troops from Iraq , Jordan ,

Syria , and Egypt answered the challenge . From the fourteenth of May 1948 to October 15, 1949, Israel successfully defended her borders against the Arabs . The humiliating defeat had immense repercussions in Egypt . The lack of adequate weapons , supplies , and rampant corruption led to a radical Free Officers movement wh ich developed inside the Egyptian army . The leader of this movement was a semiconservative general . Gen eral Mohammed Naguib , supported by Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser, launched a successful revo lution on July 23, 1952 and exiled

King Farouk . Nas ser then led a successful coup over General

Naguib by 1954 which started Egypt down the path of a semi radical neutral nation . By 1956, Nasser had become President of Egypt . His ultimate goals were the expulsion of the West from the area , internal improvement s such as the Aswan High ( 5 )

Dam , the destruction of Israel, and his eventual leadership 6 over a united Arab nationalist Middle East .

Nasser wa s not a brilliant statesman , a genius, or a ma ster strategist. He was a nationalistic , tempermental dictator who had seized control of Egypt by taking the leader ship of the 1952 revolution from General Naguib. Nasser placed himself at the forefront of Egyptian nationalism and began to compete for control of the entire Arab nationalist movement in the Middle East . Since he had achieved hi s position by feeding the nationalistic spirit of Egypt , he had to continue to prove or at least demonstrate the need for his services . Nasser also had to ensure continued support from his own government . He used three tactics : focusing Egyptian hatred on a distant outside enemy (Great Britain); economic plans for internal improvement; and finally to be , himself , the leader of the Arab people agains t Israel.

Nasser's internal plan envisioned an improvement of

Egypt 's standard of living . This would be accomp lished by the creation of the Aswan High Dam. The first Aswan Dam had been fini shed in 1902 based on an old 1880's plan for using the water of the Nile . Western techn ology and finances con

structed the fir st dam . It was limited in size, but fore

shadowed what could be accomplished in the future . Under

King Farouk, in 1947 , plans for the Aswan High Dam were de veloped only to be shelved for later use . After Farouk had

been over thr own by General Naguib in 1952 , the plans were ( 6 ) revived. The American government , as of November 1954, agreed to set aside the necessary funds for an Egyptian engineering

survey for the creation of the darn . The proposed darn wou ld

increase the electric power of Egypt eight times and add one third more land for irrigation. This would start Egypt 's

industrial growth off to a strong start . Nasser realized it would be an advantage to have western financial assistance .

It would strengthen Egypt 's credit on the world market and

generate an enlarged job fund to decrease its serious unern- 7 ployrnent problems .

Nasser used the darn as a propaganda instrument of the

highe st impact to cement his position of power . Nasser began

to direct heated anti-Jewish Egyptian passions against Israel.

He denied Israel's right to exist as a nation , pushed for con

tinued pressure against Israel, and called for the extermina

tion of Israel from Arab territory . The main avenue used

for disseminating Nasser 's policies wa s the Voice of Cairo .

He used this government controlled radio stat ion to spread

his policies throughout the Arab world . Its false and inf lam-

rnatory messages became the gospel of the Arab masses. Because

of its use, Nasser and Egypt became the embodiment of the

Ar abs ' anti-Israel hostility . His use of the anti-Israe li

br oadcasts, aimed at the Arab world , gained the popular support

of the Egyptian ma sses . The Voice of Cairo was not only used

by Nasser to gain standing in the Arab world regarding Israel,

but also to seize the reigns of the Ar ab nationalist movement .

Nasser attempted to remake the Middle East into a united unit (7) under his control. He also used the Voice to strike out at

"reactionary" Arab government s, pro-western Arab governments, 8 and colonial Arab governments.

Reactionary Arab governments , such as Saudi Arabia, were in reality governments led by Arab nobility which wished to see Arab unity follow a more controlled and conservat ive growth which would protect their position . Nasser attempted to undercut their governments by gaining for himself a popular following among the Arab masses. In order to secure his desired position , he cr iticized their rule and called for their overthrow.

Pro-western governments were tho se governments which sided with the We stern position in international affair s while denigrating the need for a united Arab state . The shining example of such a country was Iraq . Iraq, in October

1955, joined the Baghdad Pact . It was created by United States

Secretary of State , John Foster Dulles, and signed by Iraq ,

Iran , Turkey, Pakistan , and Britain . For Secretary Dulles, it marked the completion of the encirclement of the Soviet

Union and communism in general. For Nasser , it marked the creation of a militarily and economically western supported

Arab state which could remove the leadership of Arab unity from his control. Therefore , he used the Voice to cause unrest in an attempt to overthrow Iraq's Prime Minister Nuri

Es Said who only saved his position by having nine past prime 9 ministers per suade King Faisal to sign the Baghdad Treaty . ( 8 )

Nasser also struck out at colonial Arab governments.

These were governments controlled mainly by European nations .

Algeria was a prime examp le due to the large French minority and subsequent French influence . Nasser used the Voice to pr omote assassination s, an internal political revolt , and guerilla warfare against French troops. Egypt also trained and supplied guerilla bands . Needless to say, the French government did not at all care for Nasser 's actions and looked 10 f or a way t o re b u t h.im .

Nasser committed his actions mainly at Western expens e.

The West became a favorite target due to the history of French and British colonial rule , and the creation of Israel by the

British government . His attacks were directed from his dual position of self -appointed spokesman for Arab nationalism and as a neutral nation . Egypt 's position of a neutral nation wa s linked with Yugoslavia, under Pres ident Mar shal Tito,

and India, under Prime Minister Jawahar lal Nehru and Minister

without portfolio V. K. Krishna Menon . The Indian link would

hopefully give Nasser a moralistic voice in the United Nations

to promote his attacks on the West.

Nasser also took a strong stand against communism. He

suppressed the Egyptian Communist Party by outlawing its

existence and by arresting its members. Nasser understood

the threat of communist propaganda to his control. Egypt 's

standard of living was barely above the survival level . Com-

munist ideology could be appealing to the large maj ority of

Egypt 's dissatisfied population . Besides this internal threat ( 9 ) and even though communism was in conflict with the Muslim religion, Nasser distrusted the power of the Soviet Union .

He still considered the West as a better , more reliable , bu siness partner . Hence , he internally persecuted the Egyptian communists and externa lly favored negot iation s with Western 11 nati. ons f or h"is economic. p 1 ans .

France, in a state of decline , was still a colonial power in Asia and the Middle East . France controlled Algeria' s foreign relations , and as a result , exercised a dominating influence over the Algerian population . Such influence resulted from a motion passed by the French Constituent As s embly in 1946 calling for the gradual assimilation of Algeria into

France proper . This motion was further strengthened by allowing the Algerian Assembly to conduct some minor reforms so as to pacify the Mus lim nationali sts. A revolt against French colonial control started in late 1950. The political arm of the revolt , the National Liberation Front (F.L.N. ) ,was headquartered in Cairo, Egypt . The revolt was further aided by the Bandung Conference of neutral nations in April, 1955 .

This conference was formed to show neutral solidarity against the sup erpowers and to assist third world countries in gaining political independence . Arab nationalists further fueled the Algerian revolt because of anticolonist pass ions through- 12 out the Arab world .

France also labored under internal problems caused by

the defeat in Indochina in 1954, and the failure to enact its

comprehensive European defense plan . On February 1, 1956, (10) socialist leader , Guy Mollet, succeeded in defeating Premier

Mendes-France for the Premiership of the government of France .

As a result , the policy of "pacification" of the Algerian nationalists would be changed . Algeria 's population contained roughly one million French-Europeans and eight mi llion Muslim-

Arabs . Standards of living rapidly widened between the two gr oups which caused anti -French pres sures to erupt . The

Algerian anti-colonial movement received much sympathy in many Middle East states. Franc e became one of the two 13 favorite "Western" targets.

Great Britain, even though it had removed the French type of administrative control, still exercised its influenc e in the Middle East through three means : i.e., diplomatic treaties , economic support , and military bases. Due to this influence, Great Britain became tainted with the "Western

Imperialists" image used by the Arab nationalists .

Great Britain maintained various treaties with some of the Middle East countries . These treaties were either for military defensive purposes or for economic trade reasons .

One ear ly example of a military agreement was the Baghdad

Pact in February of 1955. The Pact secured the right of the

British to keep its air bases to complement its North At lantic

Treaty Organizat ion (NATO) strength . Under this treaty, economic aid , mainly from the United States, would be given to the signatories to help strengthen their mil itary forces

. 14 an d economies . (11)

Another similar treaty relationship ex isted between the

Arab state of Jordan and Great Britain . Britain maintained an air base and two military bases in Jordan . In addition to this, Britain provided millions in aid to Jordan 's weak economy . Jordan needed this aid to maintain its economy on a sure footing . It needed British military strength to keep

Jordan safe from Israel and her surrounding Arab sister states.

Jordan 's government did not trust the other states' amibit ions regarding her borders and was especially worried by Nasser 's 15 po1. ic ies. and actio. ns.

Great Britain had an important treaty relationship with

Egypt . This relationship gave Britain a large military base along the canal in order to insure its safety, plus a large controlling interest in the affairs of the canal itself . The treaty had been formed in the 1888 Constantinople Convention .

This convention des ignated the canal as an international waterway , made it free to navigate in peace and war , and guaranteed its maintenance . British acceptance of the Baghdad Pact and changes in the canal treaty were the beginning of Britain 's problems in the Middle East and its strained relations with the United States. Changes in the canal treaty were initiated by the United States Secretary of State , Dean Acheson, in

1952 with King Farouk . Secretary of State , John Foster Dulles,

in 1954, pressured Britain into changing the military and ma intenance aspects of the Constantinople Convent ion on July 27,

1954 in the Anglo-Egyptian agreement . Under this agreement ,

Great Britain remov ed eighty thousand military troops from (12) the base by July 13 , 1956 . The canal 's importance to Great

Britain was due to the fact that Britain's and Europe 's 16 vital oil supply passed through it .

Britain 's economic relations with the Middle East nations were for the main purpose of securing oil supplies. The three maj or oil producing nations in the Midd le East were the Arab countries of Iraq and Saudi Arabia and the nation of Iran .

Trans -Arabian pipelines went either to ports in the Persian

Gulf or through the countries of Israel, Jordan , Syria, and

Lebanon . Persian Gulf refineries shipped their oil by tankers through the Suez Canal to Europe . This path wa s favored over the longer journey around the Cape of Africa . The pipelines leading into the other countries to the Mediterranean ports traveled mainly through Arab countries . A small portion of the line went through Israel. These pipelines existed under the permission of the various countries . Britain secured favorable treaties by supplying economic aid to these countries 17 to keep the lines open .

Both Britain and France, due to the ir need for oil sup- pliers , maintained their interests in the Middle East . Hence , the polit ical compositions of the Middle East countries were of great importance to the two . Any threat to this aspect of the Middle East could disrupt the pipelines or the canal .

Militant aggressive nationalism , which Nasser grew to represent , threat ened Wes tern interests in the area . The United

States, under Dull es ' foreign policy , downplayed the importance of the economic aspects of the area while emphasizing the

· 18 importance o f cur b.in g s oviet · communism· f rom expand ing. . (13)

Middle East nations did not have the same priorities of France and Britain, and even to a lesser degree , the con cerns of Dulles and the United States. Maj or factors in the

Middle East policies were Arab nationalism and anti-Israel sentiments . Leadership of the Arab nationalist movement involved both Nasser 's new Egypt and the established Ar ab monarchies. In order to gain control, a leader had to prove his importance to the masses. This led to an economic strug gle between the two sides. The side that could strengthen the social position of the Arab people and militarily re gain lost Arab dignity from ashes of previous defeats at the haricts 6f-Isra�l would be the leader .

Saudi Arabia and Iraq did this by channelling some of the oil revenues into their economies to improve their standards of living . Their oil gave them large sums of money to develop relief and improvement plans . Syria, Lebanon , and Jordan used the revenue created by the tolls on the oil pipelines.

In addition , Jordan also relied on economic aid from Great

Britain to improve its economy . Egypt had to rely on what ever economic aid it could get from the West and on profit s from its agriculture exports . To make up for his limited economic means of improvement , Nasser concentrated on scoring propaganda points with the Aswan High Dam . Egyptian and

Arab masses saw the dam as an image of future greatness. The

Ar ab masses were responsive to unity, revenge against Israel,

and to a lesser extent , the anti-imperialist Western propa

ganda . Nasser, in his work , Egypt 's Liberation : The Philosophy (14)

of the Revo lution , provided a general summation of his Arab

policy and potential pressure points to be used against

Europe which Britain and France held as critical to their

survival. Nasser 's intention was to unite all of the Arab

countries . The next step would be the domination of the

African continent by the Arabs , and finally , the unit ing of

all Islamic people throughout the world to offset the

superpowers. The pressure point s mentioned were the use of

oil and control of the avenues which the oil had to travel 19 through : i.e. , pipelines and the cana1 .

Nasser , also, hinted at the effects which could be

achieved if the Arab nations united to control oil production

and sales. An article published by the University of Chicago

was his source for this inspiration . This art icle presented

the various costs of the oil companies in developing produc

tive wells and refined oil. According to Nasser , the cheap

cost and large amount of production available in the Middle

East shifted the center of world oil dominat ion from the

Unit ed States to the Middle East . Arab countries must unite

in order to control oil production . This would generate a

strong power base for the Arab countries, from which they 20 could influence world politics .

The pipeline and the canal could thus act as reigns on the

actions of Europe which wa s dependent on the oil supply. If

the reigns were tightened, the canal 's use restricted, or

pipelines closed, less oil would flow to Europe. If loosened,

more oil would flow to Europe . The European countries could be

influenced and even dictated to because of the ir need for oil. (15)

Britain and France realized where their oil supplies were located and how it flowed to them . In World War II ,

Br itain exerted tremendou s efforts in protecting the canal while fighting for the eventual expulsion of Rommel and the

German Army from North Africa . Br itain had to save its main 21 artery of pre-World War II trade .

France 's main ar ea of int erest wa s not the canal , which

wa s originally built and financed by France and Britain , but

to maintain its hold on Alger ia which Nasser threatened .

France sought to remove the main outside influence which

funded , trained , and gave verbal support to the Algerian rebel

cause . Nasser was that influence and source of aid . France

hoped for an excuse to reassert its national and world prestige

by stopping Nasser's aims and regaining control of Algeria .

Such was the general background which led to cancellation

of American fund ing for the Aswan High Dam and the seizure

of the Suez Canal. The first event which led to Western

solidar ity was Nasser 's arms pur chase from communist nations

in the autumn of 1955 . Chapter Two (16)

The Cracks Widen in Middle East Relat ions

Premier Nasser , on September 27 , 1955, publicly announc ed that he had purcha sed and received arms from the Soviet Union through Czechos lovakia . It wa s a bombshell and also a sus- pected truth. Information from various sources had filtered into the Western government s, warning of Nasser 's Soviet nego tiations . United States Secretary of State Dulles failed to realize what Nasser was up to once the United States re fused to sell him arms . Nasser went to the only source wh ich could supply the weapons he needed to realize his dream of defeat ing Israel and securing the leadership of Arab national

ism . Ar ab masses saw in Nasser an ability to override the

influenc e of the West and secure the necessary weapons for 1 success.

This move had wider international repurcussions than

the init ial shock waves throughout the Middle East , for it marked a successful attempt by the Soviet Union to breech

Western containment . Secretary Dulles was , prior to Nasser's

arms deal , in the process of weaving his web of containment .

He had secured the creation of the Baghdad Pact in June of

1955 . This pact when combined with Acheson's and Truman 's

North Atlantic Treaty Organization , and the 1954 South East

Asian Treaty Organization linked the United States, Canada ,

Great Britain, Iceland , Portugal, Denmark , Luxembourg , Norway ,

Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy , France, Greece , Turkey ,

West Germany , Australia , New Zealand , Thailand , Pakistan ,

Phillipines, Taiwan , Iraq , and Iran into a huge, loosely (17 )

joined ring around the Soviet Union and the other communist

countries. Nasser 's acceptance of Soviet aid allowed the

Soviet Union to step over the containment circle giving the 2 Soviet s their first successfu l foothold in the Middle East.

The Tripartit e Pact of 1950, between France , Great Britain ,

and the United States, stipulated that these three were

against the use of force in the Middle East and that only on a cash basis would weapons be equally sold to both Israel

and any Arab country . The agreement was meant to calm Middle

East fear s of one side overpowering the other while main 3 taining a balanced defensive distribution of weapons .

This balance wa s disrupted by the Soviet deal with

Egypt of Czechoslovakian weapons for grain . Such a barter

deal caused Nasser to upset the balance and risk peace in

the Middle East . Besides disrupting the status quo , it also

introduced Soviet influence into an area which, for over 4 two centuries, had been blocked .

The We st had secured its interests and influence in

the Middle East many years before . This was due to coloni-

zation and diplomatic treaties . Secretary Dulles defend ed

the Tripartite agreement because of its curtailment of an

arms race . Dulles used this tactic to prevent Israel or an

Arab state from developing a larger influence than their

respective sizes dictated in the ar ea. A militarily strong

country might try to dominate its neighbors in the Middle

East . When the arms deal was being negotiated , Dulles received (18) warnings which he ignored . At the time of the announcement , he did not rebuke Nasser or make strong complaints to the

Soviet government . In addition , he did not allow Israel to

upgrade or expand its arms purchases to offset Egypt , thus

heightening fears of aggression by Egypt toward Israel. 5

Because of the gr owing evidence of Nasser 's intentions ,

Israel became alarmed . The Voice of Cairo constantly ad-

vocated the removal of the Jews by united force and terrorist

actions. The Egyptian fedayeen , which were guerilla units ,

increased their raids into Israel, and communist weapons were

gr adually deployed along the Israeli border . Israel then fol-

lowed two courses: the first was to formulate plans for a

preemptive strike , and the second was to secure arms , either

outside of the Tripartite countries or with them, in viola-

tion. o f t h ei. r agreement . 6

Secretary Dulles ', and consequently the State Depart-

ment's, view of Israel 's pos ition was one of United Nations '

responsibility . Dulles believed if entrusted to the United

Nations, Israel should not worry about her neighbor s and the

Soviets could then have a controlled say in the Middle East .

He did not see night raids of Arab guerilla units on Israel

as acts of aggression by any Arab state. Furthermore, he

did not think the Soviet Union would back Nasser 's domestic 7 or foreign policie s just because they had sold him arms .

Dulles ' view of where America 's interests lay in the

Middle East and how best to preserve the achievement of (19) these interests became the policy which the State Department followed and President Eisenhower accepted . Most politicians br ing into their offices their own personal characteristics and views of the world . Secretary Dulles was no exception but moreover an extreme embodiment of such a politician . He brought into the State Department and the White House his

Calvinistic ethics and moral evaluations of the various polit ical entities of the world . Eisenhower allowed Dulles to virtually dictate United States ' foreign policy and even attended Dulles' church, although he had never been a very religious man . Dulles became the embodiment of America 's foreign policy in the 1950's. Dulles viewed the Soviet

Union with suspicion.and distrust . He publicly asses sed , 8 interpreted , and despised every action of Soviet communism .

Dulles contended that the United States had to exercise moral responsibility in the Middle East. As a result , Dulles tried to improve the West 's image in the area . He despised colonialism and realized the gains that America could achieve if the United States showed Arab nationalists that America also disapproved of French and British positions in the area .

His first step secured British military withdrawal from its

Suez base . Dulles believed the United States could improve the relations of its allies with the Arab countries , thereby ending hostilities toward the West while allowing Western in fluence to become stronger . This would increase the ability 9 of the We st to hopefully lock out Soviet influence from the area . (20)

The situation which Dulles inherited from Truman 's

former Secretary of State Acheson in regards to the Midd le

East was as follows : Egypt wa s in the avant garde of Arab

nationalism, and its greatest dispute with the We stern position

was due to British occupation which had begun in the late

1880's. In 1936 , the Anglo-Egyptian treaty virtually removed

Br itish occupation from Egypt . The concession for the British

withdrawal was a large mil itary base at the Suez Canal. In

1951 , the United States State Department enc ouraged Egypt to

abrogate the treaty, but this attempt failed and resulted in

British Foreign Secretary Sir Anthony Eden disapproving of

the State Department 's actions, Egyptian acts of sabotage ,

and a rejection of a British plan for a Middle East Command

alliance of Great Britain , France, the United States , and 10 Egypt for all of the Middle East .

United States' plicy, in reference to France, wa s one

of hesitant acceptance. The United States government con

sidered Algeria to be a protectorate of France . The United

States did not like French control of Tunisia and Morocco.

The only pres sure placed on France was to change their

policies in tho se two countries .

When Dulles ent ered the State Department , he pressed

for British withdrawal from the Suez base. He publicly ac

cepted the rights of France to suppress the anti-colonial ,

radical revolt in Algeria and its contr ol over its government .

Furthermore , he wanted the creation of a "northern tier"

against communism which , in fact , eventually became the

-- (21)

Baghdad Pact . Dulles , in early 1953 , became the first Sec- retary of State to actually tour the Middle East and South

Asia for the purpose of assessing the domestic problems of those areas and also to show a sign of American friendship 11 for the new third world nation s.

This tour was important for his public press release of his impressions of each nation and general conclusions show some very accurate repres entations . He saw the need to stimulate Middle East economies by investing large amounts of Unit ed States aid in irrigation , communication , and housing proj ects . In fact , he heavily stressed the moral responsibility of the United States in reference to improving the food production of the various areas . He came across in the press release as favorably accepting the various governments of the twelve countries he visited even though some were avowed 12 neutra 1 s . in regar d s to t h e bipo. lar d iv. .isi . on o f wor ld po 1 .itics . .

Dulles ' initially favorable impress ions of these nations underwent a drastic reversal before 1956 . At fir st, he equated any noncommunist nation as being an acceptable government worthy of American assistance . By 1956 , he viewed any neutral nation, nonaligned with America or a Western

European power , as being an enemy of the United States. If a nation was neither a friend of the Unit ed States and its allies , nor an enemy of the Soviet Union , it wa s an indirect enemy . The neutral nations were growing in power in the

United Nations. They might eventually present a formidable (22) opposition bloc to Western proposals . Neutral nations would pursue a political course which favored their intere sts with the hope of making the United Nations and int ernational politics a three-sided configuration . This perception of the emerging third world sharply affected Dulles' handling of

Nasser's policies .

Dulles obviously courted Egyptian favoritism to gain

Arab acceptance. His first move opened negotiations between

Britain and Egypt . He persuaded the British government to evacuate it s military and technical staffs from its

Suez base. The treaty was signed in 1954 and the British withdrawal wa s completed by June 13, 1956. It stipulated that Egyptian technicians would maintain the base to insure its useability for a period of seven years . This stipulation stated that British troop s could reenter the base up to seven years if Egypt and/or the safety of the canal was threatened by an outside aggressor. After Dulles completed this mediation , he expected Egyptian and Arab nationalism to swing in 13 f avor o f Ame ric. an pol" icies . .

Premier Nasser represented a violent , competitive nationalism which from his track record of advocating Israel's de-

struction , political assassinations, and guerilla warfare , did not portray an individual wh ich could be dealt with on a moralistic level. These personal characteristics of Nasser wou ld cause Dulles great complications in handling the

future situations . (23)

Dulles' Middle East tour led him to realize that economic aid and irrigational programs must be undertaken on a large

scale basis. He started negotiations which resulted in an

initial American comm itment to fund an Aswan Dam proj ect with Egypt on November 20, 1954. The timing was important

because it preceded Nasser 's attempt to purcha se arms from

the West . Dulles committed financial assistance for an en-

gineering survey of the dam site. Dulles later initiated

a tripartite backing for the irrigation project . He formu-

lated a three way loan agreement between the United States,

the World Bank , and Great Britain . They would jointly loan 14 the necessary technicia. . ns an d f in. ancia. 1 ai"d to Egypt .

Characteristics of the loan were thoroughly evaluated

by the World Bank . Its president was Eugene Black, who would

not accept the loan unless a thorough evaluation of Egypt 's

economic stability proved to be adequate to repay the loan .

Af ter Black assessed the necessary information, he accepted 15 Du lles ' offer of participation .

Great Britain also accepted the loan proposal but made

its part icipation dependent on America 's actions . If the

United States participated , so too would Britain . If the

United States did not participate, Great Britain could not

pr oduc e the amount of capital required for the project .

Great Britain realized that besides helping Egypt 's social

and economic conditions, it would improve Great Britain's

Middle East image . It was also hoped that �hi s aid would (24) keep Nasser in line with the West . The use of dollar - pound diplomacy hopefully would have a deep impact on the 16 political policies of the receiv ing country .

Dulles also hoped to receive Nasser 's participation in the Baghdad Pact with Great Britain , Iran , Pakistan , Turkey, and Iraq which was signed in 1955 . Dulles had given encouraging press statements hinting to Egypt 's favorable acceptance of the Pact . To further grease the wheels of its passage , he gave Nasser a total of forty million in op en aid.

Nasser not only took the aid and turned down the Pact , but also verbally attacked the Pact as being a tool of Western domination . He called for , through the Voice, the violent re j ection of those who accepted the Pact . This was due to 17 N asser ' s nee d to b ecome t h e centra 1 axis. o f A ra b nati. ona1° is m.

Secretary Dulles wa s not pleased with Nasser 's actions

but did compensate America 's policy by trying to work around the Baghdad Pact . To keep a favorable image and an open

situation for further American policy actions in the Middle

East , the United States government did not become a signator

of the Baghdad Pact . This was a direct shock to �r eat Britain ,

for its government was counting on an active American parti-

cipat ion in the defensive pact . Dulles ' move of adopting a

pro -Arab nationalist image , clear of European taint , heightened

Br itish Prime Minister Anthony Eden 's distru st of any actions

Dulles undertook . Dulles defended hims elf by inferr ing that

America would not hinder its future relations with the various

Arab nations by becoming a signator of the Pact . He conformed (25) with the nationalism of Nasser . Thus the United States became a middle man which Dulles' allies and Egypt were suspicious of and neither fully understood .

Secretary Dulles viewed the world through moralistic

lenses . His Calvinistic morality influenced State Departme nt policy . Dulles ' policies were fine when the situation was between so called "Christian" countries . It is difficult to channel the foreign policy of a country along a Christian viewpoint when dealing with the Muslim world of the Middle

East . The Crusades and Western colonialization did not de velop a favorable view of Christian principles in action.

Arab-Muslim nationalism, based on rel igious beliefs of

an eye for an eye , turned the area into a hotbed . Violence ,

if deemed a useful means to a desired end , was therefore

used . Dulles would not consider a gentleman 's agreement as

binding when dealing with Nasser , nor would he consider that

a treaty be viewed as sacred . Nasser held Machiavellian

views regarding the use of treaties . Treaties were useful

to achieve a desired goal and , once having been secured,

the treaty was no longer of any value . Hence, Nasser 's

actions and policies were not in the same vein as Dulles '.

Any actions regarding Egypt had to be rationally secured so

as to remove the passion of moral viewpoints.

Having successfully gained forty million from America

wh ile ignoring the treaty of Baghdad , Nasser turned to the

problem of Egypt 's military record . He wanted to rebuild (26)

Egypt 's military forces and cause a Phoenix-like rebirth of Egypt 's image throughout the Middle East . To do this , weapons of modern capability in large quantities had to be 18 secured. He once again turned to the West .

The United States was the only acceptable country;

Nasser could not deal with the colonizing French, and the

British government ignored his attempts . Eventually Nasser would become entrapped by his own propaganda . Amer ica was the only ma jor Western country which had not been strongly criticized by Nasser . Therefore, he turned to the United

States to acquire the necessary amount of modern weapons needed to achieve Egypt 's dominance in the Middle East .

Egypt 's ability to pay on a cash basis was hindered by its weak economy , so the only other avenue was through a barter deal of Egyptian agricultural exports (of which cotton was the main product ) for the desired weapons .

Dulles did not accept the deal due to three ma]or reasons.

The first dealt with his moral viewpoint of the situation.

He stated that the United States would not start an arms race in the Middle East nor disrupt the peace achieved by the Tripartite Pact . Dulles viewed supplying Nasser with

we apons as a change in the balance of power , result ing in

one country overreaching its geographic influence by using

its military might, Egypt need not have fear of Israel if

the United Nations was allowed to control the area . Premier

Nasser could not understand Dulles ' moralistic position. (27)

For him , Egypt had to clean its image in the eyes of the Middle

East. The weapons would be used to halt any plans Israel might have of expanding her territory at Egypt 's expense.

In addition to this , the United Nations gav e Israel its

birth on Arab soil and therefore could not be trusted to 19 curtail Israel 's aggressiveness.

Dulles' second reason for not accepting the arms deal

wa s that , due to the creat ion of the Tripartite Pact and

the Baghdad Pact , any Middle East country need not fear an

outside aggres sor because the three maj or Western nations

had agreed to ensure the peace and prot ection of the area.

The Tripartite agreement , besides maintain ing the military

balance in the area, stipulated that the signatories would

oppose any attempt to change any existing armistice lines

by force. This clause allowed Western nations the power

of policing the area by being the only source of arms and

the only source of permission for any territorial changes.

Dulles viewed this as a satisfactory situation which negated

the need for any Middle East country to secure arms. He

also saw it as a calming message for the area 's fears of 20 Israel and Israel's fears of the Arab nat ions.

Since Egypt was not a member of the Western-created

Baghdad Pact , Nasser realized that Egypt would not be protected

by its clauses. He also realized that the Tripartite Pact

left out some serious clauses . This Pact came about as

Israel 's insistence with the United States to set up a (28) check on arms supplies to the area. The Treaty was advan tageous to Israel because it maintained the Israeli position of having superior arms in both quantity and quality.

Finally it did not disallow an Arab contra Ar ab state arms race. The outcome was the British creation of an Iraqi air force and an Egyptian air force. Great Britain did this to keep its inf luence in each of the two countries .

The results merely fueled the struggle for the leadership of a united Ar ab nationalist Middle East . Nasser naturally saw what wa s not covered by the Pact and that Israel had somehow circumvented it s arms checks . This was due to

Israel's raid into the Gaza strip in February of 1955.

Israel had successfully conducted a military raid using

superior , advanced weapons , which resulted in a number of casualt ies suffered by the Egyptian military . Israel had

shown the world that it acquired arms outside of the Tri partite restrictions . Nasser would not allow this imbalance 21 to go unchecked nor would he allow the humiliation to remain .

The third reason behind Dulles' refusal to supply weapons

wa s that , due to the Baghdad and Tripartite Pacts , the Middle

East need not fear for the safety of the area nor the weapons

balance from being disrupted by a non-Western nation . This

meant that the aggressively expansionist policies of Soviet

domination and influence would be blocked from the area.

The Western nations would know what was adequate to defend

one's territory and provide the larger , more necessary 22 burden of securing the curtailment of Soviet expansion. (29)

Nas ser did not view the Soviet Union with the same regard as Dulles nor the policy of Western control of the arms race in the area . Premier Nasser did not perceive the

Soviet Union as a direct threat to his country or the area .

He did not see the Soviet Union as being able to secure its

influence to the extent of dominating a Middle East country .

He viewed the Soviet Union as a supporter of Israel since

it wa s the second country to declare its recognition of the

state of Israel . The large Israeli lobby in America and

the Soviet recognition caused Pres ident Truman to recognize

Israel. Nasser believed the Tripartite Declaration to be

an outside creation placed on the shoulders of the Middle

East by the West . This view was because not one Arab country had signed the declaration , and also that Israel had asked

for it . Nasser was determined , regardless of the source , to 23 secure arms for Egypt .

The Soviet Union , even though it had not achieved a

lasting position in the Middle East until the Egyptian

Czechoslovakian arms deal of 1955, had desired the creation

of such an interest for over two centuries . Initial Russian

moves on the Middle East started in the early 1700's by the

Russian Tsar Peter the Great . Under Catherine the Great ,

in 1768, the Russian navy defeated the Turkish fleet and

gained status as a Black Sea power by the 17 74 Treaty of

Kutchuk Kaynardj i. By 1853, Tsar Nicholas I tried to (30) initiate the partition of the "sick man" of Asia -- the

Ottoman Empire. The 18 71 London Conference and the 1878

Berlin Congress, which Rus sia participated in, had specific points regarding the Ottoman Emp ire and the regulat ions con- cerning the Straits. The Ang lo-Russian agreement of 19 07 divided Persia into spheres of influence further moving the

Ru ssian imperialist goals of controlling the Middle East and 24 access to the Med it. erranean Sea closer to success.

The main opposition to the expansionistic drives of the Russ ian Tsar s was Great Britain. Britain , from 1588, successfully used its naval power and treaty relations in halting Russia 's drive for a year -round sea port in the

Middle East. This ability of Great Britain was severely strained by the advent of World War I, and as a result , concessions were made which gave the Russian Tsar , Nicho las

II , the possibility of realizing the Tsarist imperialistic goal of control in the Middle East and the Mediterranean 25 Sea.

Great Britain and France accepted the claims of Russia

for both shores of the Bosphorus , the Dardanelles , the annex- ation of Constantinople , and the Sea of Marmara in March

of 1915 for Russia 's military assistance. The success of

two centuries of Russian expansionistic goals wa s tossed

away two years later by the 19 17 Soviet seizure of power

from the Provisional Government after the Russian Revolu-

tion. The Soviet government under Lenin denied the territorial (31) claims of the Tsar's government , thereby turning away the

1915 gains. After the Treaty of Bres t-Litovsk in March ,

1918 , the Soviet government under Lenin was removed from any maJor power treaty negotiations at the end of World

War I. The reemergence of the Tsar ist obj ective of imperial expansion was reawakened by Stalin for the Soviet Union.

Stalin made four unsuccessful attempts for the Soviet

Union in trying to gain a foothold in the Mediterranean Sea and the Middle East . The first failure dealt with the secret negotiations between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union in

1940. In the short-lived agreement with Germany , Stalin declar ed that Soviet interests lay toward the Indian Ocean and naval freedom through the Straits. The implementation of Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of the Soviet 26 Union on June 22 , 1941 , ended Stalin's plan.

Stalin's second unsecces sful attempt centered around the partition of Palestine and the occupation of Iran. During

World War II, Great Britain made an agreement with the Soviets by which they would both militarily occupy Iran. This joint occup ation would hopefully insure that Germany could not gain the vital oil resources of Iran. Stalin wanted both the oil resources and a communist state to be creat ed in the

Middle East. The Soviet Union supported two political parties, the Kurdish Peoples Republic and the Azerbaijan government

led by Jofar Pishevari. The communist party of Iran , the

Tudeh , received aid from the Soviet Union to maintain them

selves in their struggle for control. The Iranian government (32) secured a United Nations resolution calling for the removal of Soviet troops; aided by United States pressure , Soviet troops were removed , two Iranian communist leaders were 2 7 executed , and the Tudeh communist party was outlawed.

Stalin 's third defeat at gaining territory and Soviet influence in the area concerned Turkey. Stalin sought the creation of mil itary bases in Turkey , the succession of cities at Kars and Ardahan , a base in the Dardanelles , and the former Italian Mediterranean Colony of Libya. Stalin realized that Great Britain could no longer maintain its pa st role of blocking Russo-Soviet expansion into the area.

What Stalin did not anticipate wa s the quick reaction of the United States under President Truman in filling the power vacuum. President Truman successfully countered the large Soviet military presence on the Turkish border by sending large quantitites of mil itary and economic aid to

Turkey. The security and integrity of Turkey was thus 28 maintaine. . d .

The fourth area of failure by Stalin conc erned Greece.

Stalin had indirect aid sent to Greece to aid the communist revolt. Soviet territory was allowed to become a safe haven for the communist forces in betwe en guerilla actions. Presi- dent Truman also sent aid to help the Greek government put the revolt down. This was the first successful application of the Truman Doctrine. Greece and Turkey were admitted into

NAT O in 1952 which further protected them from Soviet ag- 29 gressio. n. Soviet policy for expanding its influence , until the

19 55 arms deal with Egypt , was one of active aggression.

Thi s mil itant pol icy did not cause the Middle East to accept the communist ideology . In addition to this , the atheistic ba sis of communist ideology did not appeal to the passionate

Arab-Muslim nationalism which had rapidly deve loped . A new tactic wou ld have to be used to achieve the expansionist goals of the Soviet Union .

When Nasser turned to the communist bloc for military aid and weapons, it provided the Soviet Union with a wind fall. This was a new development which might give the Soviets another opportunity. Nasser 's action could lead to a circum vention of the Western containment policy, the creation of a Soviet influence among Arab nationalists , and the :possible reemergence of communist parties in the Middle East.

Nasser 's initial move in opening Egypt and the Middle

East to communist and neutral influence wa s at the Bandung

Conference in April of 1955. During the conference, Nasser talked with India 's Prime Minister , Jawahrlal Nehru , and

Ch inese Premier -Foreign Minister Chou En-Lai . Nasser re alized that , besides developing a new avenue for his plans , he could play East and West agains t each other to insure the best possible results. Chou En-Lai 's experience at securing arms from the Soviets without maintaining a puppet role influenced Nasser to look more seriously at the overtones C. 3 4) ma de by the Soviet ambassador to Egypt , Daniel Semenovich 30 Solod, in February of 1955.

After Dulles rejected Nasser 's attempts to buy Unit ed

States arms , Nasser made inquiries to Great Britain ex pecting to secure an arms arrangement after the li54 agree ment to evacuate the British Suez base , but no such arms deal resulted. This brought to light an important develop- me nt. Sir Anthony Eden, the British Prime Minister , wa s pro-Arab nationalism and not pro-Israel. He had in structed Anthony Nutting , his Under-Secretary of State for

Foreign Affairs , to stay on in Cairo , try to get on good terms with Nasser , and draw him out on the possibilities of future Anglo-Egyptian cooperation after he had concluded the 31 19 54 agreement.

Anthony Nutting points out in his book, No End of a

Le sson , that prior to General Glubb 's dismissal by King

Hu ssein of Jordan on March 1, 1956, Sir Anthony Eden wa s pr o-Arab and considered Nasser a great improvement over dealing with King Farouk. Eden defended Egypt 's refusal of allowing Israel ship s through the canal at the Berlin

Conference in January of 1954. Eden stated that under

Ar ticle Ten of the Constantinople Convention, the action was defendable on the grounds that it assured the defense of Egypt against Israeli arms imports. In his first Guild- ha ll speech , he stated that Israel 's borders must be de cided on , and that the displaced Palestinian Arabs must be (35) he lped . He even mentioned the use of economic sanctions ag ain st Israel by every Arab state as an avenue that cou ld 32 have been used .

Nasser's communist arms deal increased Eden's desire to build a stronger relationship with Egypt . He stated that

"on no account mu st we let the Russians into the Nile 33 Valley ." This statement summed up why he strongly defend ed , in a discussion after the arms deal, the joint

funding of the Aswan High Dam. Therefore , he willingly pledged Great Br itain to contribute with the United States

for the funding of Nasser 's Aswan High Dam . Chapter Three ( 3 6 )

Disruption of the East-West Balance of Power

After the Aswan arms deal , Dulles grew far more suspi cious , distrustful, and angry at Nasser . He saw the Bandung

Conference of neutral nation s and the resulting arms deal as a playing off of East and We st. He viewed Nasser as trying

to blackmail the United States into an economic race with the Soviet Union . Such competition coula result in Nasser

gaining better terms on aid and arms agreements in the future

unless the Soviets were shown to be bluffing . Dulles be

lieved that the Soviet Union could not make trade and aid

agreements on any better terms than those extended by Am

erica . This view , coupled with his anger at Nasser 's actions ,

influenced Dulles' later decision to withdraw the United 1 States' commitment on the Aswan Dam.

In U.S. and Soviet Policy in the Middle East 1945-56 ,

edited by John Donovan , the aid and economic track record of

Egypt from 1951 to mid-1956 is reviewed . On January 17 ,

1951, Egypt bought fifty thousand tons of wheat from the

Soviet Union . In 1952 , Egypt bought fifty thousand tons of

American wheat . Following this purchase , the Egyptians

obtained two hundred thousand tons of Soviet wheat for twenty

one thousand tons of cotton . Then , in February of 1952,

Egypt agreed to cooperate with the United States for more

aid . In April of 1955, Egypt traded cotton and cotton yarn

for nine million dollar s of Rumanian crude oil and kero

sene . At the Bandung Conference , Nasser initiated trade (37 ) agreements with Commu.nist C hina , This resulted in a total of twenty-nine million dollars in cotton for Chinese oil , iron , and machinery . Nasser then announced that the Soviets wer e negotiating Soviet reactor aid and training of Egyptian scientists with the Egyptian gov ernment . By 1956, it was e stimated that one hundred and sixty million dollars in

Soviet aid had been given to Nasser 's Egypt . These factors clear ly affected East-West attempt s to become the dominating

. 2 in. f luence in Egypt .

Nasser played a shell game with the Aswan Dam. He passed its financing from one side to the other . This teeter-totter process pitted East and West against each other , and the only apparent victor for Nasser would be

Egypt . He felt that he could secure the least amount of

interest rates, the most amount of capital backing , the necessary equipment and technicians , and thus keep the

eventual leaders' influence down to a negligib le amount .

In order to placate the strained situat ion which existed between his government and the Soviet Union, Nasser gradually reversed hi s anti-Soviet and communist policies . He toned down the anti-communist attacks of Voice of Cairo radio

broadcasts . The Soviet Union quickly realized this and re-

ciprocated by lessening its criticisms of his nationalistic

government . Egypt then signed economic trade agre ements

with the Soviets. Russia then sent Solod , Soviet Ambassador

to Egyp t , to seriously court Nasser . Common hatred of the ( 3 8)

Baghdad Pact was declared by both nations . Recognition of

Communist China wa s being negotiated , Egypt and Russia also agreed to an arms deal which further strengthened relations .

To top this off , the Soviet Union let it be known to Nasser and the world that it was willing to fund or participate in 3 the funding of the Aswan Dam proj ect .

Secretary Dulles was an astute statesman who had previously negotiated the Japanese Peace Treaty for the United

States after World War II. On his desk in the State Depart- ment , he kept a copy of Stalin's Problems of Leninism beside his family Bible , some copies of the Federalist Papers, and the Charter of the United Nations . He used his Bible for passages wh ich he cou ld integrate into his speeches . This would show the strength and soundness of American actions .

The Federalist Papers were for foreign dignitaries so they could learn the pr inciples that America stood for . The

Charter of the United Nations was there so that he could readily adap t United States foreign policy to upho ld and expound the policies and principles of the United Nations 4 for world order and peace .

Stalin 's Problems of Leninism was there for the purpose of knowing one's enemy . He realized that the Soviet Union 's peaceful cooperation and its Stalinistic views were not geared for advancement of the equality of all nations and men as equal but for the advancement of Soviet influence and subsequent domination of nations weak enough to fall to

Soviet plans . (39)

For Dulles, the Soviet Union and its communist ideology represented a maj or threat to wor ld peace , His policy of containment and massive retaliation was sidestepped by the

Soviet arms deal to Egypt . He considered this advancement as a harbinger of possible future moves. Therefore , the

Soviet Union mu st be countered . He felt that the United

States mu st make the Middle East secure from the Soviet

inf luence. The best possible way wa s to show that the

Soviet Union could not maintain its promises nor did it have friendly intent ions at heart .

British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden made it clear what his view of Dulles was prior to Dulles becoming the Secretary

of State . Early in 1952, Eden had personally visited Eisen

hower while he was at NAT O headquarters stating why he did

not want Dulle s to be appointed Secretary of State if Eisen

hower won the Presidential election in the fall . Eden

stated that he did not think that he wou ld be able to work

with Du lles. Thi s was due to his view of Dulles' track

record up to 1952. In 1951, during the Japanese Peace Treaty

t alks , the British Foreign Office was represented by Herbert

Morrison. During the se talks , the issue of recognition ot

the le gitimat e gov ernment of mainland China came up . Br itain

favored Mao's communist government and wa nted no pres sure

to be placed on Japan as to which government , the Nationalist

government of Chaing Kai -shek or Mao's, Japan would support .

At the time , Dulles clear ly agreed with the British. When

Dulles returned to America , he criticized the British for (40 ) recognizing the communist government and urged Japan to recognize Chaing Kai-shek . Morrison wa s discredited by

Dulles ' actions and the Br itish Foreign Office wa s most upset with Dulles ' apparent change of mind . Eden , from the very

start , did not trust Dulles nor did he pin Dulles down on a

c 1 ear cu t statement o f Amer ica. ' s intent . io . ns. 5

Dulles did not approve of Eden 's political views . He

con sidered Eden to resemble far too much the image of former

Secretary of Stat e Dean Acheson . Dulles had no love for either ,

and the resemblance did not he lp matters . Dulles disapproved

of Britain 's history of being the dominant world power prior

to World War I. He also disliked colonialism and imperialism

on which the Br itish Empire was built , and the way that the

Br itish had treated President Wilson was unforgivable to him .

An ar istocrat ic Eden became a rival in international diplo-

macy. Dulles could not share center stage with anyone .

Both were exceptional wor ld politicians whose successes will

always stand in high regard , but both being strong willed ,

they could not keep personal feelings out of their joint

activities . This mutual distrust and competitive dispo-

sition hurt the ability of the West to cooperate when the

Suez Canal wa s nationalized wh ich led dire ctly to expansion 6 of Soviet inf luence in the Middle East.

Premier Nasser , on March 1, 1956, replaced Dulles as

Eden's most distrusted and disliked indiv idual . On March

1, 1956, General Glubb and his senior British officers ,

who were the top officers of Jordan's army , were fired by (41)

7 King Hu ssein . Eden, on hear �ng this, did a comp lete about

face in his view of Nasser , He held Nasser as the cause of

this new setback to the image of Great Britain in the

Middle East. Eden considered Nasser 's guilt to be self

evident based on his inflammatory radio me ssages against

Britain and its influence to Jordan which Glubb 's dismissal

represented . Anthony Nutting , British Under-Secretary of

State for Foreign Affairs , stated that an enraged Eden

stated , "You love Nasser , but I say that he is our enemy , 8 and he shall be treated as such ," and "I want him destroyed ."

General Glubb , when he arrived in England , informed Nutting

that Hussein removed him due to the king's need to consolidate

his control in Jordan , and that Nasser had nothing to do

with it . Even after Glubb informed Eden , he still he ld

Nasser as the top enemy of Britain in the Middle East,

and he mu st be destroyed. When asked if it would be better

to maintain him in a more controlled position in order to

maintain order in Egypt , Eden replied , "But I don't want

an alternative , and I don't give a damn if there 's anarchy

and chaos in Egypt !" Nutting contended that from this point

on , Eden and the conservative imperial PM 's would not allow

reason to dictate Britain's policy, but the feelings of

revenge wou ld control the policy taken by Britain toward

Nasser and Egypt.

Prior to the dismissal of Glubb and the change of

Eden's view toward Nasser , the Prime Minister made a personal (42) visit to the White House , The purpose of this v i s it was to clearly define a united position towards the Midd le East and the Aswan project. Eden returned to Britain pleased that both countries were united on all top ics. President

Eisenhower agreed that British and American aid should joint ly fund the project , the project should go forward , and if

Na sser proved to be cooperative , Egypt should be helped by 9 the two power s in the future.

What then caused this joint agreement to fund the Aswan project to be cancelled? Eden 's change of heart , in reference to Nasser derived from Glubb 's dismissal and Nasser's Voice broadcasts. However , Great Britain was still committed to fund the proj ect unless the United States refused its commitment. America's cancellation of its commitment to fund the irrigation project stemmed from a personal and emotional decision on the part of Secretary of State Dulles. This

cancellation by Dulles was not based on the rational argu ments against the United States ' participation , wh ich were

not strong enough, nor was it reflective of Am erica 's national

interests.

The main thrust of opposition to America 's participation

rested in the United States Senate . The Senate Appropri

ations Committee and Democrat ic Senator Walter F. George

were the leading obj ectors. The Appropriations Committee

made a public press release stating that it had asked Secretary

of State Dulles not to spend any Mutual Security Funds on (43) the Aswan project without their consent . This position was taken due to growing tensions between Israel and Egypt which could make the economic situation critical , and Egypt 's growing relations with the Soviet Union added to their sti pulation . Senator George argued against the use of American funds in building the dam due to the amount of potential cotton producing land which would then be cultivated. He argued that this would cut into cotton sales of America on the wor ld market, and that it would not have any influence in maintaining peace between Israel and Egypt . These argu ments against using United States capital in the Aswan proj ect were based on the situation in the area , the source

of the funds , and the personal self-interests of southern cotton growers which Senator George represented . The

Appropriat ion s Committee 's argument and stipulation could have been easily ignored or rationally turned in favor of

the project 's fund ing . Dulles had , in 1955, formally an

nounced that money for the initial start of the proj ect would

be allocated from the "flexible Presidential fund for use 1 0 in the Near and �iddle East11 • This wou ld be from a one

hundred million dollar s 1957 fiscal year Presidential fund .

The estimated year ly contribution of United States funds

wa s placed at fifteen to twenty million dollars. The

permission of the Appropriations Committee was not necessary.

The Committee could have been persuaded using their own

argument . The dam would increase Egypt 's ability to have a

stronger world credit. Therefore Egypt , influenced by (44)

American participation , could purcha se American products and thus help America 's economy . The increase in Egypt 's standard

of living and emp loyment would improve the political climate

in Egypt. America 's funding of the darn would ease political

influence out of the irrigation project and prevent them from 11 receiving wor ld acclairn .

Senator George 's argument that cotton production result-

ing from the darn wou ld cut into the United States' world

market was a hasty generalization . First , the darn would not

be completed for an estimated fifteen years, nor would the

land be immediately productive . It wou ld be roughly twenty

year s before the effect of the dam' s irrigat ion would have

an impact on the wor ld market. Secondly , the population

growth rate of the world would generate an increase in the

demand and subsequent use of cotton and other textiles. The

advent and improvement of existing synthetic cloths would

naturally decrease cotton use . Senator George also represented

a self-interest group , southern�cotton - farrners, who would

• • 12 sacri"f ice. t h e nation I s b est interest f or persona1 gain. .

It was diplomatically necessary for the United States

to take an active role in the newly developing , expanding ,

and politically consciou s Middle East . Senator George con-

tradicted himself by stating that he would not place a stipu-

lat ion on the loan prevent ing the use of water for the en-

couragernent of commercial cotton production . This was con-

tradictory , since Senator George was against giving the aid (45 ) because it would undercut the cotton market of the American cotton growers. It was wor se to deny aid than to restrict its use , for it meant the future growth of Egypt and its 13 people.

Since argument s of i the opposition were not threatening to the granting of United States aid , then what caused Dulles to cancel America's commitment to fund the Aswan project?

Nasser's neutral game and the Soviet unreliability of its economic stability to provide the necessary funds influenced

Dulles ' decision . Dulles was rapidly becoming upset with

Nasser 's actions. It was one thing for Nasser to be antago nistic to France or Great Br itain , but it was a breach of the eleventh commandment of Dulles which was respect and

accept America as the best guiding influence . Nasser criti cized the United States once too often. Moreover , he failed to follow suit on his own prior agreement s. Nasser accepted millions in aid intend ing to accept the Baghdad Pact , but

instead took the aid and rej ected and aggressively attacked

the Pact . Nasser caused Dulles to separate from America 's

Western ally, Great Britain , and not sign the Pact , thereby

discrediting himself in the eye s of the British Prime Minister .

Premier Nasser accepted American offer s of aid wh ile stimu-

lating Soviet proposals . By associating with the neutral

camp , Nasser increased the ability of the Soviet Union to

block American proposals in the Unit ed Nations. Nasser

breached Dulles ' containment wall around the Soviet Union and

communist bloc by accepting the Czechoslovakian arms deal. (46)

This discredited the image of America with the Arab national ists which Dulles had been trying to cultivate . Finally ,

Nasser had recognized Peking 's government , further hinder ing American efforts at neutralizing the communist influ- 14 ence .

Dulles wanted to take Nasser down from his cleverly achieved position as king of the Arab nat ionalist mountain , to publicly rebut him, and to discredit him in the eyes

of the Arab masse s. If the infallible and all-delivering

Nasser wa s shown to be incapable of producing the object

of his greatest promises , the Arab world would realize that

Nasser was a weak and windy leader . Dulles wanted to teach

Nasser , who doublecro ssed him and rocked his carefully

piloted boat , a le sson that the neutral leaders of the

world could not forget . Nasser was to be shocked back into

line .

Dulles also wanted to discredit the Soviet Union once

and for all in the Middle East . He planned to do this by

showing that economic promises of the Soviet Union were

made on a weak and unsound economy . He believed that Soviet

economy was nearing a collapse due to its rapid military

bu ildup and restricted structure . The estimated one and

three-tenths billion dollar dam project would stretch the

ruble to the breaking point , causing a Soviet aid collapse.

This collapse would affe ct all communist and neutral countries

using Soviet capital . The growi ng tension in the Soviet

satellite countries in Europe was proof that the situation (47) was nearing a critical stage. When the Soviet Union could no longer keep its promises , America and the free economies of the West would appear as the only sound banker with which to do business. For had not the Marsha ll Plan shown what could be achieved using United States capital while the

Molotov Plan could only provide token funds. The shining example of industrial We stern Europe proved once and for 15 a 11 American . capab i. l"it ies. .

What Dulles failed to realize, given the economic situation which existed in the Soviet Union , was its ability to improve its economy , thereby generating the necessary revenue .

Dulles should have remembered the economic system of the

Soviet Union in 1953 under the Secret Police Chief Beria.

It may seem a bit odd to associate the two but not so odd after reviewing the magnitude of Beria's impact. One-third of all labor was done by prisoners under Beria 's orders.

This type of industrial slave labor maintained a controlled supply of cheap labor to help improve the economy by maintaining low wages . Such forced labor allowed a greater freedom of control over Soviet economic policy , thereby generat ing the neces sary funds for providing foreign aid.

The system dictated direct control over the amount of capital for government use. The President of the United States had

Congress , the press, and the voting public to wre stle the budget past. In the Soviet Union no such free press nor (48) balanced distribution of legislation and no repre sentation of popular opinion existed to hinder the generation of the one and three-tenths billion dollars in estimated develop ment funds. This meant that the Soviet Union wa s just as capable of financing the dam as the United States, the 16 World Bank , and Great Britain could in their joint project .

Dulles, on July 19, 1956, refused to give Egypt the 17 neces sary loan for the funding of the dam. This was a refusal of the agreement between President Eisenhower and

Prime Minister Eden to continue with the loan to keep out any further advances of Soviet influence. Two unmentioned career State Department offic ials were present wh en Dulles informed Egyptian Ambassador Hussein and retold it to Herman

Finer , author of Dulles Over Suez. Hussein was sent to the

United States by Nasser on July 17 .to secure the loan in a formal agreement . This move was made after parts of the

Soviet terms were publicly released which Nasser hoped would generate better terms by the United States. Dulles wa s to have started out in a slow, deliberate , informative style reiterating the Senate Appropriations Committee and the cotton interests arguments against the loan . Hu ssein became agitated and worried . He interj ected , "Don't please say you are going to withdraw the offer , because (pointing to pocket) we have the Russian offer to finance the dam right here in my pocket ." Hussein was bluffing , for the Soviets had made no guaranteed offer . Dulles was said to have (49) immediately replied , "Well , as you have the money already , 18 you don't need any from us! My offer is withdrawn ."

After this statement , the meeting ended .

The French Ambassador , Couve de Murville , prior to the

July 19 meeting of Dulles and Hu ssein , had warned that if the joint financing plan for the dam was refused , Nasser would probably seize the canal. An ominous warning was not heeded . The British Ambassador , Sir Roger Makins , had prior

to the July 19 meeting , urged Dulles to seriously review all

poss ible choices before reaching a decision for the British

and World Bank loans rested on the United States' participa-

tion . Since the United States had little to lose in Egypt ,

Britain 's influenc e and possessions would be at stake not to

ment ion the success or failure of Soviet advancement into the

ar ea .

Dulles had rej ected the loan for the very same fears

mentioned by Hussein, the Russian statements. In doing so ,

Dulles had contradicted his earlier press statements. It

is true that he wa s gradually restructuring his press state

ment s to gain the most advantages over the Soviet propaganda

in the wor ld press . He had stated that the loan proj ect and

Aswan plans were not due to any Soviet actions . It was

sole ly a Western-Egyptian operation . The Soviet s countered,

saying they would like to participate unless the terms of

the West-Egypt plan directly prevented Soviet participation .

Dulles countered saying that any out side assistance would be (50) gladly acceptable if it was solely for enhqncing the situation in Egypt . He said that the Soviet Union could participate if it truly was not a "Trojan horse" to further Soviet influence and domination over the lives of free independent nations . The Soviet reaction was a public statement in

Egypt saying the Soviet Union could be counted on in true support for its Arab friend s and increased its aid proposal .

Dulles was not calmly brushing aside the Soviet statements and propaganda , but became extremely agitated by them .

He therefore rejected the We stern aid package in one quick

statement to publicly push the Soviet Union into a supposedly 19 untenabl e economic. positio. . n .

Nasser , who had become President in the 1955 elections , wa s negotiat ing with Soviet ambassadors. The rej ection of the aid package hit hard in Egypt . Popular feelings were

extremely enraged against the West . Nasser 's credibility

wa s at stake , and his leadership role in Ar ab nationalism

wa s threatened . He had to react in a way which overshadowed

the blow dealt by Dulles to his position and reassert his

role as the guiding force of Arab nationalism . The main

propaganda ploy of his ro le as leader of the Egypt revo lution ,

the Aswan Dam , was for the moment dashed apart on the

rocks of his neutralist, double dealing policy . If the

Egyptian and Arab ma sses saw that he had been outflanked

and left impotent to achieve their goals, he would be merely

an insignificant name in history . A major maneuver must be 20 made . (51)

The Soviet Union was caught in an awkward position wh ich

Dulles had achieved . However , their position wa s not as economically strained as Dulles predict ed . They denied the sum of the Soviet aid grant as reported in Western presses , but did state that if asked , the Soviet Union wou ld gladly accept any Egyptian requests and terms for development . By stating devel opment loans , they were stress- ing industrial control over the Aswan project . This was in the hope of encouraging a more united proletariat class in

Egypt but the Soviets would channel it to the dam project if so requested . This also meant that Nasser had not made any serious inquiries or transactions for Soviet loans for the

. 21 proJ ect .

President Nasser was indirectly shown by the Soviet statement to be playing on the West 's anticommunist sym- pathies in order to acquire more funds on better terms .

He immediately denied that any serious talks on the Aswan aid had ever occurred . Nasser hoped this would return the

Western proposal. Nasser was not a genius , but neither was he a fool. He realized that he had to act and act fast .

He had no intentions of becoming closely linked with the

Soviet Union, but his East versus West diplomacy left him little choice . On July 27, 1956, in Alexandr ia , Egypt , a dual bombshe ll for the West was dropped by Nasser . The first one wa s quietly delivered at the United States, and 22 the second one hit. loudly at France and Great B rit. ain. . (52)

The first one was a change in Nasser's policies towards the Soviet Union . Gama l Salem , Salah Salem, and Khalid

Mohieddin began to appear on the podium during Nasser 's speeches . The importance of these three individuals was their past standings and stated political beliefs . In the past they had been politically persona non grata, and one was in exile avoiding trial . Now they were all shar ing the public spotl ight with Nasser . What had made them so disfa vored in the past? It was because the two Salem brothers and

Mohieddin were top Egyptian communists and the communist party had long been suppressed in Egypt . They and their beliefs were now holding high positions in public office at Nasser's permission . This showed the world that communism , at least in the top ranks in Egypt , was now being given posit ions of high favor . The Soviet Union was given a great gift , for it showed Arab nationalists that Nasser now trusted communist advice. The Soviet Union now had an influence inside Egyptian politics. Dulles ' containment was now breached politically and socially in addition to its military and aid breach in the 23 1955 arms deal.

The second bombshell which hit hard and loud was the announcement by Nasser that the Suez Canal , its equipment , personnel, and company wo uld be nationalized into a com pletely Egyptian possession . He denounced the West 's sup posed attempt at dictating terms in the loan which would have virtually restored Western dominat ion of Egypt 's (52)

The first one was a change in Nasser 's policies towards the Soviet Union . Gama l Salem , Salah Salem, and Khalid

Mohieddin began to appear on the podium during Nasser's speeches . The importance of these three individuals was their past standings and stated political beliefs . In the pa st they had been politically persona non grata, and one wa s in exile avoiding trial . Now they were all shar ing the public spotl ight with Nasser . What had made them so disfa vored in the past? It was because the two Salem brother s and

showed Arab nationalists that Nasser now trusted communist

advice . The Soviet Union now had an influence inside Egyptian politics . Dulles ' containment was now breached politically

and socially in addition to its military and aid breach in the 23 1955 arms deal.

The second bombshell which hit hard and loud was the

announcement by Nasser that the Suez Canal , its equipment ,

personnel, and company would be nationalized into a com

pletely Egyptian possession . He denounced the West 's sup

posed attempt at dictating terms in the loan which would

have virtually restored Western dominat ion of Egypt 's ( 5 3)

economy . He denounced the colonial past of France and

Br itain , stating they had robbed Egypt of its canal, its

control , and the annual revenues of over one hundred million dollar s from the people of Egypt . He would restore Egyptian

owner ship and management . The revenue generated from the

canal would be used to finance Egypt 's Aswan High Dam,

giving Egypt freed om from economic dependency on Western

loans. This wa s for the people of Egypt . This move im- med iately restored the confidence of the Egyptian people in

Nasser . Nasser , in one smooth swoop , had achieved unprece-

dented popularity with the Arab nationalists and had tossed

Dulles' rebuke int o the faces of the French and Br itish gov-

ernments . The political shot by Dulle s had ricocheted and hit 24 his. a 11ies' .

On November 25, 1875, Great Britain had purchased one

hundred seventy-six thou sand , six hundred and two shares of

the Suez Canal Company in a very interesting financial ar -

rangement for four million pounds sterling from the Khedive

of Egypt . This made the government of Great Britain and the

private sector of France the principal owner s of the Suez

Canal Company. The Br itish government , as of 1956, owned

forty-four percent of the canal stock and seventy-eight

percent of the remaining fifty-six percent wa s owned by the

private sector in France. Besides the canal being a deoendable

avenue of Eur ope 's oil supply, it also generat ed a tidy profit

for their economies. Nasser 's actions not only restored his

position more securely , he also increased the fears of Great (54)

Br itain and France regarding their declining wor ld position , their pocketbooks , and the safety of their oil sup- 25 1.ies .

The Br itish immediately reacted . After the initial protest s, the government launched a two-edged response .

First , all Egyptian assets and canal company assets were frozen . This not only tied up the company's money wh ich

Nasser hoped to acquire , but also an estimated three hundred and eighty million dollar s of Egyptian investments including liqu id capital and physical capital such as war goods. The second aspect of the response was a military one . A commando unit , an infantry unit , units of Canberra jet bombers, and three carriers with accompanying craft were activated . The jet bomber squadrons were sent to Malta. Malta provided an air base within one thou sand miles of Cairo , Port Said , and Alexandria . It also was le ss than one thou sand miles to the British base at Cyprus which was less than two hundred and fifty miles from the above ment ioned Egyptian cities.

The three carr iers were sent into the Mediterranean Sea and therefore , on Egypt 's door step . These numbers of troops and ships would gradually be expanded to over forty-three thousand military personnel, twe lve thousand vehicle s, 26 three hundred aircraft , and one hundred warships.

The French , und er Socialist leader , Premier Guy Mollet ,

also quickly responded to Nasser 's move . On July 30, Mollet

publically protested the nationalization of the canal , and (55) by the second of August , instructed the French Mediterranean fleet from Toulon to take up positions which wou ld be in

. 27 c 1 ose cooperation. wit. h t h e B ritis. . h nava 1 units.

The two Western power s started to initiate plans for a joint military venture to remove Nas ser from power . The regaining of the canal wa s only a cover for their mutual plans for Egypt 's ruler . For reasons of logistic s and political obj ectives , the military operation developed and pro- ceeded slowly . The military operation held priority over any dip lomatic avenues followed by the two powers. The military preparedne ss of Great Britain was not adequate to allow for a rapid implementation of the joint military operat ion . In addition to this , Eden needed to politically justify a military course of acti rn. by outlining the political 28 obj ective. This obj ective would be the overthrow of Nasser .

Nasser represented the prime thorn in both powers' sides. To France , he was responsible for feeding the flames of the Algerian revolt , and stirr ing up trouble in Morocco and Tunisia . To Britain , he represented the cause of her rap id decline in the area. Seizure of the canal base , the canal comp any , the canal , the feeding of hostilities of the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA ) in

Cyprus, the verbal and terrorist attacks on the Baghdad

Pact countries' government s, and the supposed influence in

Glubb's dismissal would remove any effective Br itish presence and control. ( 56)

The French military preparations were not hindered by public opinion . The Socialist government , whose basic pr inciples discouraged warfare , had a strong public maj or ity favoring active military actions again st Nasser . The vari

ou s governments ' use of likening Nasser to Hitler and

Mussolini only fueled popular support . The major hindrances to the French government wa s manpower and military equipment .

Most of her strength was tied up in the fighting in Algeria.

Not enough ships , aircraft , and manpower could be collected to go it alone , so France had to wait for Great Britain to act .

France did not remain idle in the period from July 26 to

October 31. It started to cultivate a working relationship

between itself and Israel. France 's desire to get revenge on

Nasser for his gr ievous actions at her expense found fertile

ground in October of 1954. Israel wanted an ally who would pro

vide the necessary modern weapons with which it could maintain

superiority over its Arab neighbors . Israel's small popula

tion of slight ly over one million could not match that of her

hostile neighbors, wh ich combined meant over thirty million

enemies. Israel needed top qua lity equipment to offset this

gap until her population cou ld be large enough to adequately

defend itself with weapon s produced in Israel. Israel turned

to France who gladly sidestepped the Tripartite declaration

and supplied Israel with the desired weapons . Around June

of 1955, secret talks of a joint military action against Egypt

with the desire to remove Nasser had started . With the

French weapons , Israeli forces struck into Egyptian territory (57) in violation of the 1949 United Nations armistice agreement .

These we apons caused Nasser to seek arms , eventually succeed- ing with the Czechos lovakian government with Soviet assistance . France fed the fires of an arms race and helped open a breach in Dulles' containment wa ll. To France,

Nasser 1s seizure of the Suez Canal, the company , and its 29 personne 1 meant t h e 1 ong awa it. e d cause f or acti. on.

The dip lomat ic actions developed by Dulles in response to a British and French initiat ive for a united three power response to Nasser proved to become a possibly undesired solution; therefore a valid excuse for the invasion by France and Great Britain had to be developed and imp lemented . To most British subjects and especially members of Parliament ,

it was an unattractive thought of working with Israe l on any-

thing . However , even Eden changed his mind from his ear lier

strongly pro -Arab leanings to quietly ignore the Franco-Israeli

plans . By October 13, 1956, Eden knew of the Franco-Israeli

joint chief of staff operations and arms supplies. By remain-

ing silent , he wa s indirectly giving his country 's permission

to the plans . On October 25, 1956, Eden with Guy Mollet

and David Ben-Gur ion, Israel's Prime Minister , signed a

secret agreement for joint cooperation to achieve their

prime obj ective , the overthrow of Nasser and the destruction

of his government . Eventually it wa s agreed upon that an

Israeli raid into Egypt toward the canal would constitute

the excuse for the Franco-Brit ish invasion of Egypt . This (58) action allowed the two powers to act under the 1888 Treaty of Constantinop le and the 1954 Egyptian-Br itish agreement that in the event that the safety of the canal wa s threatened by an outside force , they could reoccupy the canal to protect it. f rom attac k . 3 0

The operation changed its name three times . Fir st it wa s called Operation Hamilcar when the only participants were Great Britain and France . The operation was changed, and so wa s the title , when it was realized that a different plan wa s needed due to three key factors. First , the size of the strike force had to be larger due to the Soviet we apons .

More than two hundred modern aircraft , five hundred and thirty

Soviet built armored vehicles , five hundred artillery pieces, and large amounts of modern small arms made the Egyptian forces superior to those of Great Britain 's air and small weapons of wh ich its forces were comprised . Economic restrictions and neglect of British forces were beginning to be felt . A second cause was the need for a number of amphibiou s and tank tran s- port vessels to increase the punch of the operation . The third point was the need for a deep harbor capable of maintain ing the combined fleet . Cyprus, the closest ba se to Egypt , was not deep enough wh ich required Malta to be the main naval base , but

Malta wa s six sailing days from the target area . Operation

Hamilcar was scrapped for Operation Musketeer . Operation

Musketeer changed the main landing point from Alexandria to

Port Said . This would allow the joint force to cut the Egyptian forces in half along the canal leaving Israel to take care of (59) the Egyptian Sinai forces. The Franco-Brit ish force would not cut down the canal port cities and then push toward

Cairo . Eventually , it assumed the title of Musketeer incorporating the French plan of using Port Said as the key center

. 31 wit. h si. x d ays o f so f tening up b omb. ing rai. d s.

Eventually , the mi litary operation included over ninety thousand military personnel , one hundred and thirty warships , three hundred aircraft , and twe lve thousand vehicles . The

Israelis defeated the Egyptian Sinai defensive force (consist- ing of one hundred and fi fty tanks , one hundred and forty artillery pieces, sixty jet aircraft , and fort y thou sand troops) by using one hundred and eighty tanks , one hundred and fifty artillery pieces, one hundred and thirty aircraft , and forty- five thousand troops . The Israelis started the operation on October 29 when it commenced it s infiltration invasion into the Sinai . The French provided French built and French flown

Mystere IV 's prior to the announced invasion of France and

Britain to protect the canal. An ult imatum stipulating a demilitarized zone of ten miles on each side of the canal with a "police force" of the two powers would then occupy the zone separat ing Egyptian and Israeli forces. If Nasser accepted these terms , he would politically be cutting his own throat , and if he rejected it , wh ich he did , he would provide the two with the excuse to invade.

The invasion started for the British and French on

October 31 . Militarily, Israel had complete success of its (60) obj ectives: France and Britain only limi ted succe ss due to the forced United States cease fire . There were only thirty dead , one hundred and thirty wounded, and ten aircraft destroyed for the two powers . Israel had ten kille d and thirt y- two woullded . Egypt lost virtually all of it s air force and suffered extensive losses and casualties in men and equipment .

When the smoke cleared and the sands covered the debris ,

Egypt had become the diplomatic victor and Nasser the shining

1 ea d er o f A ra b nationa. l" ism . 3 2 (61)

Chapter Four

Negotiations Falter and War Cloud s Gather

Dulles ' denial of the irrigation proj ect set the wheels of Arab nationalism rolling which gave the necessary spark for military action s by the powers of Great Br itain , France , and Israel. Eisenhower ordered Dulles to halt the warlike plans of the United States' two European allies before a war could erupt and shatter world peace . If this was not reason enough to try to keep peace , 1956 wa s also a presidential election year for Eisenhower and hi s Secretary of State .

7he immediat e United States reaction to Nasser 's canal natio�alization proclamation wa s three br ief sentences which disap?roved of Nasser's actions and stated that other govern ment s affected would be contacted . The next ma jor statement criticized Nasser's speech as to the tone of language used when �eferring to the United States. This wa s also directly stated to Egyptian Ambassador Hussein by Acting Secretary of

State Herbert Hoover , Jr. because Secretary of State Dulles wa s away in South America making a show of American friendship and support . While Dulles was out of the United States,

Deputy Under-Secretary of State Robert Murphy was sent to

Londo� to sound out talks regarding the situation immediately following Nasser's actions , Dulle s arrived in London following

his return , and by August 2, a joint tripartite statement was

issued . This outlined a rough evaluation of the situation ,

points of concern regarding the re s ult s of Nasser 's actions ,

and the announcement of a conference incorporating initial (62)

signers of the 1888 Convention wit h the principle users of the canal . The list totaled twenty-four nations . The con

ference eventua lly entailed twenty-two nations with Greece refusing due to the Cyprus actions of Great Britain , and Egypt refusing becau se of the initial word ing of the tripartite

statement which contained the underlying motive of dictating

to Egypt regarding her own national actions. Egypt considered

the canal a national possession while the three powers considered 1 it an international possession .

Wt.ile military plans were being deve loped in Europe ,

President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles fashioned

diplomatic plans for a possible solut ion and made a public

address explaining America 's view of the situation. Dulles ,

in an August 3 press statement , after returning from the talks

in London between France and Great Britain , said , "We do not , 2 however , wa nt to meet violence with violence .11 Dulles either

viewed the qu ick military response of the two powers as being

standard acceptable replies or he ignored the tensions and

desires behind their responses. He further hinted at the

upcoming conference of the twenty-four nations as being a

rational way to divert "the danger of violence ." This would

leave violence as a possible course open and was not in keep

ing with the statement of not meeting violence with violence .

Dulles also states that Nasser 's seizure of the canal was for

the sole purpose of promoting "the grandeur of Egypt" and not

out of an economic necessity for obtaining the required funds (63) for the Aswan proj ect now that the United States had termi- nated its commitment in assisting its implementation . Dulles oversimplified the action in order to focus public opinion against Nasser . This was not conducive for developing mutual grounds for compromise. The legal status of the Suez Canal wa s not clear ly defined , because the Const antinople Conference of 1888 gave concessions to Egypt and to the major powers thus

. 3 creating. amb igu1. ty.

Also on the third of August , Eisenhower and Dulles pre- s0nted a joint television and rad io report . The President presented a brief introduction and a conc lusion . Secretary

Dulles provided the bulk of the public br iefing of the situation . Dulle s used excerpts from Nasser's speech in Egypt wh ich developed a general address of Egypt 's president to its people . In it , he used highly emotional statement s playing on Arab nationalism in explaining the nat ionalization of the canal . Dulles reiterated a few such as "to score one triumph after another" for Egypt 's "grandeur " against Western

"imperialism" . He stated that the personnel of the nat ional-

ized company had to continue to work or they would be eligible

for arrest . This point was aimed at keeping the one hundred

and eighty-seven pilots working as usua l in order to prevent

the French and British the right to intervene under the 1888

article of proper working order . One hundred and eight of the

pilots were French and British, and two were American . Dulles

made the statement , "To permit this to go unchallenged would (64) be to encourage a breakdown of the international fabric upon wh ich the securit y and the well-being of all people 4 depend ."

First of all, this stat ement wa s an indirect threat to the Egyptian government . It made no reference to the possibility of a compromise being reache d to satisfy the goals of

both affected sides . Secondly, it did not rule out violence

as an alternative but actually generated the impre ssion that

a course of military action wa s a viable avenue for solving

the situation . This indirectly encour aged the plans of France

and Great Br itain . Thirdly , there wa s no mention of upholding

the principles of the United Nat ions other than in conforming

one 's actions to the recognition of international law . The

United Nation s Charter and the Internat iona l Court of Justice

specifically disapproved of the use of violence or aggression

as a oeans of solving a problem . Al l members of the United

Nations are pledged to uphold peace and the principles of its

charter . Dulles had been avoiding the United Nations due to

Panama 's relationship to the Panama Cana l fearing that neutral

and Soviet bloc nations would exploit the issue , securing

Nasser's position , and raising questions which the United States 5 did not want asked in an open forum of world nations .

Dulle s did not foresee its failure because of the forces

and principles which were being represented . However , if

it did fail , the United States was not forma lly committed in

any specific course . What course of action the United States (6 5) would take between July 26 and October 31 now became cru cial . At no time was the United Stat es ' official policy made known to any of the key combatants by Dulles. Egypt never expected mil itary plans to crystallize. Eden did not clearly determine what the United States would do if France and Great Britain imp lement ed the ir plans . Eden viewed the movement of the United States Sixth Fleet as preparation to keep the Soviet Union out of the strike , and since no clear cut refusal of a military action was made by Dulles , the

United States would step aside and possibly let Operation

Mu sketeer reach its planned conclusion . France did not feel itself dependent on United States actions since Algeria kept any clear thought s by the French government from enter ing the situation . The purpose of Dulles ' ambiguous stance was to keep the United States from becoming entangled in the situation , calm election anxieties of the voters, and to 6 maintain friendly r elations with Arab countries .

The conclusion of the television and radio report by

President Eisenhower wa s very important . Eisenhower stated that Dulles appeared to have completed his latest task with respect to the principles which his post repvesented .

The principles behind his post , and for this specific time according to Eis enhower , were "to uphold the interests of the United States in the international field with due regard for fairness to every other nation and with the obj ec 7 tive of promoting peace in the world . 11 Eisenhower , in his (66) memoirs, further stated that he wa s flatly against the use of violence in solving the Suez crisis, and that he specifically wanted this made clear to Great Britain and France.

Eisenhower viewed diplomacy as the only viable avenue for achieving an equitable and acceptable compromise for all pr 1nc. 1p. 1 es invo. 1 ve d . 8

The Soviet Union did not remain idle during this period .

On July 31, Nikita Khrushchev, Communist Party Leader , made a stat ement supportive of Nasser ts actions which said that pressure politics were not productive or support ive of fur- thering peace . He added that such a course of recklessness and aggressive actions would only harm the int erests of the

We ster� powers in the Middle East . The gravity of the situation wa s reduced to the Sue z Canal Company 's stockholders as the only ones who were affected , and even this wa s after they had ma de a tidy profit exploiting the canal and Egypt .

One other stat ement made by him wa s that the Soviet Union

stood behind all countries wh o were working to "free them-

selve s from colonial enslavement . " By November 4 of 1956,

it wa s quite obvious that the Soviet Union was not going to

allow Hungary to obtain political freedom from the Soviet 9 brand of colonial enslavement .

It is important to note that from the start of Nasser's

nationalization of the Suez Canal, the Soviet Union made a

clear stand in support of Nasser . This not only increased

the influence of the Soviet Union in Egypt , but also (67) furthered Soviet acceptance among Arab nationalists from other countries. To promote this windfall the Soviet Union, through unofficial Soviet-c ontrolled journals, criticized

Israel's leaders for making menacing statements warning of war between Israel and Egypt . These statement s were due to the border depl oyment of the Soviet weapons , the increased fedayeen raids , and Nas ser 's continual Voice broadcast s call ing for Israe l 's destruction . The Soviet Union ignored these reaso�s in an attempt to save face with the Arabs because of its July 17 agreement to sell Israel forty percent of its 1957 oil needs . Whatever side looked to be ripe for Soviet influence received Soviet support . The Soviets played both sides of the

Middle East for all it wa s worth so as to accomplish the de 1 0 sired goal of creating a Middle East Soviet -controlled state.

An interesting development occurred in 1956 . The Soviet

Unio� created a new committee called The Soviet Committee of

Solidarity of the Countries of Asia and Africa . This committee's ma in purpose wa s to take advantage of radical

sent i�ent s and militant revolut ionary movements in the

countries which fell under its jurisdiction . It was to

exploit these movements or government s so the Soviets' in

fluence would become a crucial guiding force for their ac

tions . They realized that a tool for Soviet advancement lay

dormant in these groups. Once they were drawn into the

SovieL camp through financial, polit ical , and material aid,

they would become susceptible to Soviet domination . A tool ( 6 8)

of the Soviet Union which did not resemble the original was therefore created. Nasser opened the door of Arab national-

ism which was made up of varying degrees of mil itancy . Dulles'

rejection of the irrigation loan helped the Soviet Union to

become the new source of assis tance . The canal 's national-

izat ion and subsequent Soviet public support for the action

developed a new image of the Soviet Union as an Arab bene 11 factor .

Dulles' television and radio broadcast s did not go un-

noticed in Great Britain and France . They realized that

Dulles did not consider military actions as the primary

avenue . They did not consider that he was against the use 12 of violence if diplomatic channels were satisfactorily tried .

The t�o powers were determined to defend their interests , in-

fluence, and power in the area. They became adamant concern-

ing t:-i.e importance of the area, and that any interferences or

disturbances would not be at their cost , but rather cost ly

to those who tried it. Eden , in April of 1956, stated in

clear tone s his government's view of the Middle East . "The

uninterrupted supply of oil was literally vital to our economy

. I said I thought I must be absolutely blunt about the 14 oi. 1 , because we wou ld f ig. h t f or i. t . " Both countries were

calling Nasser either a Middle East Hitler or Mussolini who

had to be stopped . This was their area , and they would han-

dle the problem without interference if the dip lomatic chan-

nels failed . The two powers , wh en confront ed by the growing (69)

Soviet statements of support for Nasser, did not consider the threat of Soviet int ervention as a possibility because of the 14 United States Navy .

This hard line stance wa s helped by the knowledge that the United States Sixth Fleet had redeployed in accordance with secret contingency plans . These plans were designed to keep the Soviet Navy in check in the event that a confronta

tion between the two in the area might occur . The Sixth

F leet , operating in the Suez area, steamed eastward . The

Seventh Fleet shifted into the South China Sea, and its

amphibious components moved toward the Persian Gulf and the

Red Sea. It appeared that the fleets were closing the avenues

to Soviet Communist interference. Eden and Mollet did not

know the operational guidelines of the fleet corrunanders ,

and therefore assumed that its presence wa s to keep the 15 Sovie� Union physically out of the area and any involvement .

'l'ihat the two powers did not know wa s the operational

orders of the fleet corrunanders . J. C. Wylie, in his article ,

"The Sixth Fleet and American Diplomacy" , provides a short

summary of the general orders : "(l) to be alert and ready

in case the situation expanded into ·a maj or conflict; (2)

to protect and evacuate United States citizens from Egypt

and the other active countries of the Middle East ; and (3)

to avoid becoming involv ed locally , but to try and restrain 16 the actions of those already involved on both sides . 11

It me ant that the Navy would keep the Soviet Union out , but

the orders also meant that the Navy would try to prevent any (70) further military moves by France , Great Br itain , and Israel.

The United States did not maintain a neutral position and would become an arbitrator if forced to by the deve lopment of a military situation such as war . Eden, Mollet , Ben-Gur ion, and Nasser did not look very far ahead and hence saw only what they wanted to. The Soviet Union saw a very optimistic future for its own influence in the area . The United States, under Eisenhower , saw a critical situat ion which threat ened peace and allied stability . Dulles saw a critical military situation wh ich had to be forestalled indefinitely by diplo ma cy, so a compromise could have the necessary amount of time to be a fait accompli .

To this purpose , Dulles institut ed a twenty-four nation

convention on the Suez Canal . The nations asked to attend were : Egypt , Italy , Spain , the United Kingdom, France , the

Nether lands , Turkey , the Soviet Union , Australia , the Federal

Republic of Germany, Indonesia , Norway , Ceylon , Iran , Pakistan ,

Denmark , Greece , Japan , Sweden , Ethiopia, India , New Zealand ,

and the United States. Dulles realized that by narrowing the

situation to key points, removing political concerns, the

crisis could be deflated and a lasting compromise secured.

The purpose of the meeting wa s not to produce a binding

statement of a majority of a situation , but to produce a

specific set of guidelines and an understanding of the situ

ation. Egypt refused to attend because of the initial three

power stat ement regarding the canal . Nasser would not commit (71) hi s position as yet due to his view that the various canal users would not regard the situation as serious, and that

Franc e and Great Britain would not overreact . Greece refused to attend because of Great Br itain 's involvement in Cyprus .

Dulles realized that even without Egypt 's formal participation , the situation could be defined as to what the various

. 17 intere. sted nation. s thought a b out t h e cana l' s operation .

Dulles had three power bloc s to manipulate during the meeting . First and foremost wa s the Soviet Union . The

Soviet Union aimed at preventing any formal union agains+

Nasser 's position . The Soviet representative , Shepilov , triec to secure India's representative , Menon , as the president of the conference , thus hoping to secure support from the neutral bloc . The second bloc , the neutrals, represented by Menon , were trying to defend Nasser 's move from the position of national self-determinat ion out side of the two superpowers. The third bloc Dulles had to overcome wa s that of

Great Britain and France , who wanted to use the conference as a� avenue to chast ise Nasser and form a solid active front

against Egypt . Dulles realized that the Soviet Union wa s working for a political advancement of its influence by using

the canal 's nationalization as it s avenue . He also realized

that it wa s in India's self-interest to support the rights of

other neutral nations such as Egypt so as to further India 's

own independent development . Dulles clearly viewed revenge

as the underlying intentions behind Britain 's and France 's

actions . (72)

Dulle s masterfully negotiated the path of the conference and generated a reflective eva luation of the interest� of the majority of nations with a vital interest in the canal .

Shepilov tried to maneuver the conference into arriving at a united opinion with no concrete vote . Besides using it as a forum to expound Soviet rhetoric aimed at Arab and third world countries, the conference became a prime opportunity to disrupt any proposals which might be effective against

Egypt . Dulles sidestepped the formation of a specific agenda for the conference , and recomme nded that th is time be used for the presentation of their governments' viewpoints. Thus he avoided a stalling of the conference on procedural questions , and by the second me eting , began the critical discussion of

C' • • 18 the 0�ez situation .

Dulles, using quotations from Nasser 's nationalization

speec� of July 26 , 1956, touched on the fears of mo st of the sscond and third wor ld countries present at the confer-

ence . He further developed the legal standing of the canal

as an international waterway , serving one-sixth of all sea-·

born t:rade , as the maj or link of " interdependence" of all

nations. Dulles, using quotat ions from an official Soviet

government press statement of August 9 plus the Augu st 12

proposal by President Nasser , planted seeds for a possible

joint decision geared for a concrete solution , in order not

to generate merely an opinion . The Soviet stat ement praised the conference as a way to create a peaceful solution for

the Suez Canal that would be acceptable to all concerned . ( 7 3 )

Nasser 's statement recorrunended that a new international treaty should be created to settle the fears and complaint s of all involved regarding the Suez Canal . Dulles said that these statements clearly agreed with all concerned that a correction of the situation was necessary and that the con- 19 ference was an opportune method ,

Dulle s attempted to shift away from the Soviet proposal of a joint opinion to a united maj ority position on the solution cf the Suez problem . This would bring to bear on Nasser consicerable world opinion against him, and p�ssibly pressure him i�to a concrete , just, and mutually acceptable solut ion for t�e situation . The final result of the twenty-two power

Londo� Conference was an eight een nation proposal (represent -

ing n�nety-five percent of all canal tonnage ) based on

Dulles ' plan which recommended :

:peration of the canal would become the re sponsi jl lity of an international board set up by treaty and associated with the United Nations. Egypt would enjoy repres entation on such a board , but no one country would dominat e it . It would be so composed as to assure the best possible operation and to preclude favoritism or prejudice . The treaty would nake adequate provision for the payment of fair compensation to the Suez Canal Company

The treaty would entitle Egypt to an equitable return from the canal 's operation and to take into account Egyptian sovereignty over and all legitimate Egyptian right s in the canal . The Int ernational Court of Justice at The Hague would be empowered to appoint a corrunission of arbitration having jurisdiction over �01 dis putes arising from these last points .

All of these points, except an int ernationa l board for its (74) operation , were incorporated in the final ten-point declaration on April 24, 1957 by the Egypt ian government . Dulles ' . 21 proposa1 wa s tru 1 y representat ive. o f a f air. so1 ution .

The four nations which did not support Dulles' plan were India, Ceylon , Indonesia, and the Soviet Union. They supported the proposal by Menon of Ind ia calling for an international advisory group which , representing the various users, could assist in Egypt 's operat ion of the canal .

Egypt would , under international law, guarantee usage by a ll nGtions and continued operat ion of +he canal . Egypt would decide tolls and charges in order to competitively gener�te a profit . Any users who felt they were unjustly treated would take the matter before the World Court , and

. . 22 E gypt s h oul d abi•ct e b y it. s d ecision .

Cnder this proposal , Egypt wa s not bound by any clauses excep� open navigation and adequate development or maintenance . Egypt would be able to do as it pleas ed , plus India's proposal implied that any nation had the right to nationalize an in�ernal resource . Shepilov used his support of Menon to gain the favor of the neutral nations and to launch an attac� on the eighteen nation proposal as an attempt by the United States to restore a colonialist regime . He tried to portray the Soviet Union as a prot ector of the weak . One point of Menon 's proposal become incorporated

into �he Egyptian declaration of April 24 , 1957: i.e. , that

cooperation between the users and the Egyptian Canal Company (75) wou ld be encouraged to help improve confidence and the manage- 23 ment of the canal.

The London Conference lasted from August 16 to 23,

1956, On August 23, the eighteen nations voted for a five member committee to br ing the proposal and explain it to the Egypt ian government . This committee could not change any of the proposals , but it cou ld feel out the position with Nasser in the hope of contribut ing mutual under standing toward a compromise in the future . The cha irman of the committee was Au stralia's Prime Min ister Robert Menzies wh o wou ld be accompanied by the delegates from the United States,

Ethiopia , Sweden , and Iran . The United States representat ive was the United States Assistant Under -Secretary of State Loy

Henderson . Bes ides delivering the eighteen nation proposal ,

they also delivered full transcripts of the meetings, the

opposing views on internationalization , and the Indian 24 pr oposal.

Throughout the conference , the Soviet Union was out -

maneuvered by a Western dominated ma jority . On the final

day , Shepilov tr ied to get a draft passed which would have

publicly bound any Suez solution to peaceful mean s only ,

thereby ruling out force as a way to solve the situation.

This was prevented by Christian Pineau , the French Foreign

Minister , who cited Shepilov 's earlier position that

the Soviet Union had refused any final communique to be

passed . Shepilov was stopped by his own earlier safeguard . (7 6)

On Augu st 24, Shepilov made a public press stat ement in

London stat ing that the eighteen nation propo sal , based on the United States' proposal , was founded on "an unacceptab le

. 25 co1 onia . 1.ist positi. on. " He crit icized the five member commit tee mission calling it powerless and stat ing that the bourgeoisie classes who held the old canal company stock were behind the proposal. On August 23, Khrushchev said volunteers from the Soviet Union wou ld come to Egypt 's aid if the We st attacked to regain the canal . The unofficial Soviet controlled newspaper , Izvestja, considered the conference a failure and that Egypt would triumph over the powerplay of 26 the We st.

The five member committee met with Nasser from August 28 to Sep�ember 9. The meeting ended in failure . Menzies could not negotiate changes , and Nasser wa s utilizing Soviet influence to withhold any compromises . Nasser realized that

if he could stall the process of negotiation , he would

secure the canal by a fait accompli . Egypt also probed

the possibilit ie s of utili zing a United Nations Security

Council resolution . This resolution wa s aimed at Great

Britain and France in reference to their military operation

as acts of aggression wh ich wou ld be in violat ion of the

basic principle s of the charter , The only problem in this

cour se would be the veto powers of France and Great Britain

plus the possibility of having a resolution passed which

wou ld internat ionalize the canal . This would have wr ought

I • • 2 7 t h e opposi. te e ff ect on N asser s posit ion . (77)

The possibility of utilizing the United Nations wa s open to all sides involved in the conflict. The previously stated reasons as to why Egypt was he sitant to use the

United Nations were similar to Great Britain 's and France 's.

Great Britain and France were fearful of using the United

Nations for three reasons. The first was the fear of having the ir proposed resolution turned ag ainst them . This wou ld result in their actions being called aggressive , thereby forcing world opinion to side with Egypt . This would weaken Eden's position , and the imperialist group of the con servat ive party, allowing the Labor Party under Hugh Gaitske ll to gain power . The second reason was the veto power of the

Soviet Union . This would be brought to bear against their actions . The Soviet Union had a track record which was fa- vorab le to Egypt when it vetoed a resolution in 1954 which would OJen the canal to Israe li shipp ing which had been refused since 1951 . The third reason was that their res olution might be watered down , removing any repr imands on Egypt , and actually generating a compromise solution . This wou ld have undone their goal of destroying Nasser and regaining control 28 of the canal .

Dulles was he s itant to use the United Nations because

of one maj or factor , the Soviet Union . The Soviets cou ld veto any proposal in the Security Council which might create

a legitimate solution to a tense situation . This would in-

crease the Soviet influence with the Arab nationalists . In

addition to this, the Soviet veto could be used by France ( 7 8 ) and Great Br itain as an excuse to justify their use of force by stating that all other avenues have failed , Dulles also realized an ominous warning from the Soviet London Conference representative , Shepilov , and from the Kremlin itself .

This warning was in regard s to broadening the question of the canal 's nationalization to make all maj or canals and straits int ernational . This meant the Panama Canal would be br ought into the discussion , and possibly removed from

United States control by giving it an international status .

Dulles was not going to allow the Soviet Union to broaden 29 the question in order to strike at the United States.

With the failure of the London proposal , Du lles launched his next diplomatic plan for a peaceful solution of the

situation . Dulles proposed a Suez Canal User's Association

(SCUA ) wh ich Great Britain and France auickly agreed to support . SCUA wou ld represent all users wh o wish to join � It would be an internat ional body of users wh o would , in ef-

feet , lease the right of passage from Egypt. SCUA would

provide its own pilots, collect the tolls of SCUA members,

and give Egypt an appropriate share . It wou ld depend on the

cooperation of the Egyptian gov ernment , but .in effect ,

it removed total Egyptian control of the canal . The State

Department announced on September 12 that the United

States wou ld participate if SCUA was advanced by the eighteen

agreed nations of the London Conference and have its basis

in the 1888 Con stantinople Convention. Dulles also added

that if the eighteen nations did not join SCUA , it would be (79) based on a three party system . He further pointed out that if the cana l was blocked to SCUA ships , then the path ar ound the Cape of Africa would be used . The cana l would not be f orce d open b y gun b oat d ip. 1 omacy. 3 0

Dulles warned Eden that SCUA must not be used as an excuse for force again st Egypt . Dulles realized that Eden and

Mollet were hoping to tie the United States with them in a hard line policy against Egypt . If such were allowed , the chance that force would be used would greatly increase .

Since July 2 7, Dulles had been informed of Eden' s and Mollet 's joint view that Nasser had to be destroyed through a military operation . Dulles tried to prevent the use of force as the 1 avenue t o so 1 ve t h e si. tuatio. n . 3

Dulles wa s not alone in trying to halt the drive toward force . President Eisenhower communicated directly to Eden

America's position on the use of force to solve the situation .

1 Eisenhower , in his letter of July 3 to Eden, responded to a cable from Eden on July 2 7 plus the information delivered by Deputy Under-Secretary of State Robert Murphy from Eden and

Harold MacMillan Chancellor of the Exchequer . Eisenhower was shocked to hear that the main policy of Eden wa s to

"employ force without delay" and not to follow peaceful means. 3 2 Eisenhower advised against even the thought of military plans before all other avenues had been exhausted .

Throughout the rest of the Eisenhower--Eden communiques ,

Eisenhower clearly advised again st mil itary action . He (8 0) stated that the United States, even though it realized the value of the canal, would not fight for it in this situat ion and stated that any military action would result in a tremendou s shock to the West 's influence . He stated that this would result in a def inite Soviet advancement . To Eisen- hower , force was not justif ied ; it was not in character with the United Nations Charter and was not conducive to promoting 33 t h e in. f luence o f the West.

Eisenhower was shocked to read from Eden that Nasser 's action was he ld in the same light as Hitler 's. The additional statement that Eden would fight because not to " wou ld be an ignoble end to our long history if we accepted to perish 34 by degrees. " Eisenhower recognized that to use force would speed the end of Great Britain 's power . He considered Nasser's actions as a " reckle ss adventure" but not at all in the same light as Hitler 's actions up to 1940. He clear ly saw the danger of creating a larger image of Nasser than really existed .

He under stood that force wou ld unite the Arabs . If Britain used force , Nasser would be placed , by the We st , into the position of leadership over the Arab states. The result of this would dash all hopes of the West in preventing Soviet influ ence in the area. Eisenhower wa s shocked and maintained the position that force was not the corr ect path. The United States would not

. 35 con d one it s use .

SCUA wa s not what Eden and Mollet wanted after Dulle s removed its teeth. Eden, on the development of SCUA , started (81) actions in the United Nations, France and Great Britain sent a mes sage to Emilo Nunez-Portuando, Pres ident of the

United Nations Security Council, explaining the situat ion as they saw it . This was done to calm the Labor Party which demanded that the United Nations be used before any force.

Preliminary moves then began in that direction .

Nasser also announced that another conference should be called to negotiate a settlement wh ich wou ld include such ar eas as the tolls, freedom of navigation , revision of the 1888 treaty, and future canal development . The pressure of the user nations , the Ar ab oil countries, plus the economic sanctions brought some indication of a compromise by Nasser .

The British government stated that Nasser's statement had no basis for future negotiation . Since he had refu sed the five member committee , wh ose proposals were considered as the basic policy points of the Western nations, no new grounds 36 cou ld be developed .

The Soviet Union qu ickly and loudly responded . On

September 15 , the Soviet government attacked SCUA as being a plan of aggression towards Egypt . In a long Moscow radio broadcast , a hint at nuclear usage was suggested with the contention that any disturban ce of the peace in the Middle

East would be viewed as a direct threat to the Soviet Union's national security. The Nasser -Suez conference proposal wa s

supported , the United Nations' partic ipation called for , and

Eisenhower was attacked for not criticizing the hostile (82) military moves of his We stern allies. Nasser , on the same day, replied that if any SCUA vessel tried to push its way

through the canal , Egypt would defend itself . It would be viewed as aggre ssion and counter -measures would be initiated .

Egypt wou ld unite with the Arab people and show their com- 37 bined strength to the West .

The eighteen nation union of the London Conference

rapidly deteriorated . SCUA began to be widely and publicly

criticized , and a call for United Nations action emerged .

More nations started to call for the acceptance of Nasser's

proposed conference on the canal. India took the lead and

inst igated talks in Cairo . Ind ia also hoped to find fertile

ground for specific points of negotiation . Moves were then

initiated to generate a joint United States-India mediation

between the We st and Egypt . Egypt , Iraq, and Saudi Arabia

issued a joint statement of Arab solidarity on the canal, the

need for Arab union again st ho stile moves of Israel, and

the need for a conference to negot iate a solution on the

canal dispute. The Soviet Union then joined the bandwagon 38 calli. ng f or a U n1. ted N at1o. ns so1 ut1on · .

The President of the United Nations Security Council ,

Nunez-Portuando of Cuba , and Secretary General Dag Hammer-

skj old from Norway , soon were inundated with letters from

each side , From September 12 to 23 , Great Britain , Egypt ,

France , the Soviet Union , Syria , and Lebanon all sent notes

condemn ing the other side , calling each other aggressors ,

and warned that if no negot iation cont inued , force may be (83) applied , Finally, on September 231 France and Great Britain asked that a Unit ed Nations Secur ity Council be called to convene on the actions begun by Egypt . Egypt replied in similar fashion pointing to the increased troop concen trations in Cyprus by Great Britain and France . Egypt accused the two power s of United Nations Charter vio lations ba sed on the military moves. The council agreed to hold a 39 debate on the various claims wh ich started on October s.

The United States, Great Br itain , and France , prior to the October 5 debate , worked on securing a joint policy which wo uld contain a resolution making international control a ba sis for any United Nat ions solution . Solidarity developed only between France and Great Britain . Dulles ' cloudy actions in regards to SCUA and his anticolonial statements drew the two tog ether and away from securing a strong rela tionship with the United States. The proposed resolution by France and Great Britain did not take a hard line posit ion .

This allowed Dulles to state that the United States supported 40 the reso lution . (84)

Chapter Five

A Forced Peace Restored

United Nations debates took two forms ; the first being open and closed Security Council debates and the second being private discussions between French Foreign Minister

Christian Pineau , British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd ,

Egyptian Foreign Minister Fawzi, and United Nations Secretary

General Hammerskj old . British and French proposals consisted of four points wh ich were debated in the Security

Council . The action was moderate and incorporated a similar stand as that of an earlier mentioned resolution by India . It called for an international board to check on canal operat ion , decide on any charge of toll violations, and rule on any prejudices regarding vesse ls using the canal.

The board would also maintain funds for improvement . This resolution had an oDerat ional clause utilizing the eighteen nation proposal . Since Egypt was not a member of the

Security Council, it wa s allowed to be represented . This representation wa s without a vote on any resolution before 1 the Council.

The debate contained many viewp oints. Shepilov , who repre sented the Soviet Union , recommended that an enlarged conference of all countries concerned be called . In addition to this, a specific board of the Soviet Union , Egypt ,

France, Great Britain , India , and the United States be created to negotiate a settlement for the canal. Also , he stated (85) that United States oil interests were behind a scheme to replace French and British interests in the area to control oil . He stated that the reactionary We st was trying to 2 dominate Egypt.

Dulle s responded by rej ecting Shepi lov 's stat ement s.

He attacked the Soviet proposal, pointing out that such a board wou ld be clearly dead locked due to the widely separate viewpoints. Dulle s further stated that French and

Br itish resolutions would receive American support . Dulle s wa s successful in keeping politics out of the issue . This would then focu s attention on the specific problems , legal 3 and operational , around the Suez Canal .

The debate wh ich started on October 5 ended in an eleven to zero vote in favor of the rough draft of the resolution on October 13 . The Soviet Union, with Yugoslavia 's support , vetoed the clauses of the resolution which were operational, thereby keeping the res olution a paper document .

This wa s to prevent the use of the eighteen nation proposal from being implemented as the operational clause and also to increase its standing in the eyes of Arab nationalists . The

Soviet Union , by showing support to Egypt , obviously furthered 4 it. s own int. erests .

The United Nations Security Council debate and subsequent vote was only part of the activities in the United Nations .

As was stated earlier , the second part was the closed dis- cu ssions between the three powers with the Secretary General.

These informal closed discussions were far more significant C.8 6 ) to an understanding of motives behind the French and Br itish move to use the United Nations. Privat e discussions continued to make progress up to the council vote . Fawzi, Egypt 's representative , came to the discussions with the purpose of 5 working out ground s for an acceptable solution.

Egypt no longer shouted anti-imperialist phrases or ignored proposals . Fawzi wa s allowed to work for a solution .

This altered policy came about because of Arab pres sures from oil producing states on Nasser . They applied this pressure due to the loss of the rich oil royaltie s caused by Nasser' s nationalization . This wa s formidable pres sure for it meant a possible break in Arab solidar ity behind Nasser 's actions which would we aken his control . Secondly, economic sanctions of the We st were depleting Egypt 's capital and credit which foreshadowed internal economic trouble . If this economic situation continued, Egyptians might lose faith in Nasser and remove him from power . Fawzi, therefore , was in a posi 6 tion conducive to negotiation .

The discussions made considerable headway . Maj or contri- butors were Lloyd and Fawzi. Pineau maintained a position of

indifference to the discussions because of his government 's

negotiat ion s with Israel, By October 12, the three representa-

tives, under Hammerskj old1s watchfu l eyes , agreed on six points.

These were recognition of Egyptian sovereignty, freedom from

politics for the canal, freedom of transit , joint agreement of

tolls between users and Egypt , funds for devel opment , and dis-

putes to be solved by arbitration . Nutting pointed out in his (87) book , No End of a Lesson , th�t Lloyd personally considered that discussions had secured every desired guarantee which the Br itish 7 government sought from Egypt in regards to the canal.

These six points were presented before the Security

Council on October 13 . The Unit ed Nations opened new dis cussions on the points with a negative response by Shepilov who still sought his six nation negotiation forum . The

Soviet Union , after the eleven to zero vote , vetoed the operat ional clauses which were based on the earlier eighteen nation proposal . The six basic princ iples were supported by Egypt but not the operational clauses. Franc e and Great

Britain wanted them to be imp lemented through the international 8 board . This now became the crucial factor .

Egypt responded by proposing three points wh ich had to be

incorporated . Cooperation between Egypt 's company and the

canal users in safeguarding Egyptian sovereignty wa s one of the

points , a result of India 's representative Menon who persuaded

Nasser to consider a users ' club instead of the SCUA type of

user representation . The second point called for mutually fair

tolls and charges. The third point called for the allocation

from canal profits of a reasonable percentage for canal develop

ment . This was in direct opposition to the Soviet actions . It

marked the acceptance of user participation and announced common 9 grounds for a settlement to be based on .

Private discussions were once again initiated. Pineau

had , on October 12, publicly denounced the private discussions (88) as a failure due to the lack of a basis for negotiation !

Fawzi ignored this attempt to halt the discussions since he was now in a position to sign a bind ing document securing a settlement of the situation on all points of contention . This settlement had to include Egypt 's sovereignty and recognition of its operation of the canal. A meeting was set for October

29 in Geneva . Pineau wa s somewhat relieved after the Soviet veto and Egyptian disapproval of the operat ional factors , be cause it meant a possible deadlock, thereby making Mallet 's plans with Israel viable . The Unit ed Nations Secretary General, at Dulles ' urgning , shifted from an observer to a participant .

He initiated communication between himself and Fawzi. In this communication , Hammerskjold outlined points of the negotiations where a mutually acceptable agreement could be reached . This 10 exchange of letter s started on October 24.

Nutting contends, through personal conver sations with

Eden , that British motives for including the eighteen nation proposa l in the resolution on October 13, came from distrust for Dulles, and that the solution would recognize Egypt 's sovereignty regarding the canal . Dulles had supported the position that a users' club be imp lemented instead of the eighteen nation proposal for the operat ion of the canal.

Eden distrusted Dulles and hated Nasser so much that he ordered Lloyd to include the eighteen power point instead of the users ' club. The eighteen power proposal, even though it recognized Egyptian sovereignty, did not place the canal in ( 8 9 ) the hands of an Egyptian company , As wa s mentioned earlier , the Unit ed States position appeared to be ambiguou s. Dulles made statements wh ich appear�d to infer that force wa s not out

of the question . Dulle s also stated that force would be the

last resort . The Eden--Eisenhower correspondence downplayed

any use of force . Eden , therefore , did not trust Dulles ' change

from the eighteen nation proposal , wh ich was a moderately hard

stance , to a we ak stance of the users ' club . Eden then ordered

Lloyd to reinsert the eighteen nation proposal , for the opera-

tional aspects of the canal 's solution , wh ich had been previously 11 stated as unacceptable to Egypt .

On the next day, October 14 , Eden was secretly br iefed ,

along with Nutting , by the French Minister of Labor and Acting

Secretary , M. Albert Gazier , and French Deputy Chief of Staff

for the Air Force , General Maurice Challe . In this secret

meeting , the French persuaded Eden to call off the Iraqi troop

movement into Jordan , to disregard the Tripartite Pact , and

to start plans for a joint Israeli-French-British invasion of

Egypt . Eden immediately recalled Lloyd from New York , who was

scheduled to begin talks with Hammerskjold on securing a

peaceful solution . Eden , in halting the Iraqi troop movement ,

failed to enforce the Baghdad Pact . Jordan had called on

Br itish assistance in response to the maj or reprisal raids com-

mitted by Israel on Jordan territory . In opting to go with

the French plan , Eden sacrificed the various Arab allies of

Great Britain to gain his revenge on Nasser. Lloyd 's successful 12 talks would, of course , be another casualty . (90)

The French plan called for an Israeli invasion followed by a French-British paratrooper and sea borne invasion . The

Israelis would br ing the fighting close enough to the canal for it to be threatened . Then , a joint communication wou ld call for the canal zone to be evacuated with a subsequent

French and British occupation to save it from harm . They would then occupy both key entrance ports thu s returning the

entire canal to their direct control, end the Israeli block- 13 ade , and cause Nasser's downfall.

Eden had persuaded Lloyd to look at the Hammerskj old

discussions as a failure for Br itish and French interests.

Lloyd was so convinced that he considered Fawzi's negot iations

as a success for Egypt over the West . Eden's halting of the

Iraqi troop s cau sed rumor s to circulate prior to the Oct ober

23 Jordan elections. The result was the virtual removal of

the pro-Western government and its replacement by a pro-Nasser-

ite government . On October 25, Jordan entered into a joint

Jordan-Syr ian-Egyptian mi litary command with overall control

in the hands of an Egyptian Commander in Chief. On that

same day , Eden's cabinet gave final approval to the joint

plan , and Israel' s leader , Dav id Ben-Gurion agreed completely

to the French plan . The day of the Israeli inva sion wa s set

for October 29. On that day of agreement , Nutt ing resigned

his position from Eden's government and left in silent pro- 14 test .

The advance made in the private Hammerskjold discussions

were blocked on October 17 by a joint Anglo-French communication . (91)

It stated that the six points were acceptable , but they mu st also have an acceptance of the eighteen nation pr oposal for international control of the canal's operation. Nasser , of course , denied that any solution would incorporat e an Egyptian loss of control. Consultat ions or joint operations were acceptable . Menon used his influenc e on Nasser to have him re- state that co-control of the canal in its oper at ion was ac - ceptable . Britain and France rejected this on October 23 after having also rej ected Hammerskj old's attempt to start the negotiation discussions ear lier on October 19. A blackout

started on information to be given to the United States.

Eisenhower no longer received any information on the specific plans of his Western allie s due to his strong stance against their plans of using force . In a televised press conference on October 24, Eisenhower said that Egypt wa s in its legal 15 rig. h ts to nationa. 1°ize t h e cana 1 .

When war broke out , Eis enhower pressed for a United Na-

tions settlement . The United States publicly stated that it s

posit ion wou ld be to uphold the Tripartite Pact and assist

the victim, wh ich was Egypt . The American resolution , wh ich

was introduced into an emergency session of the Unit ed Nations

Security Council on October 30, was vetoed by the French and

Br itish. Great Britain had stained her unblemished record of

not using her veto privileges . The veto was considered neces-

sary in order to defend Britain 's breach of the United Nations

Charter and to strengthen its cour se of forceful action instead (92) of peacefu l negot iation . The Soviet delegate immediately introduced a similar resolution which met the same fate as 16 the United States' .

The United States' resolution called for an immediate cease fire , withdrawal to armistice lines, that all members refrain from using force , and that no military aid be given to either side . Eisenhower , in a press conference on Octo- ber 31, blasted the Israeli invasion , the British-French ultimatum of October 30, and the British and French veto of 17 the United States' proposal in the United Nations .

The ultimatum to Egypt wa s shown to be a sham due to its clause that both combat ants remove themselves from ten mile s on either side of the canal. By October 30, Israeli forces were slightly less than one hundred miles from the canal.

This meant that the canal was not at all endangered . It wou ld have given Israel the who le Sinai area and would have nearly divided Egypt in half . The use of French flown French planes to help protect the Israeli invasion was proof of collusion , for it wa s before any ult imatum wa s made . Eisenhower realized the terrible wrong that was committed by his allies and brought the power of American economic and political might to bear 18 agains. t t h em.

Eisenhower refused to loan Great Britain any emergency

fund s to bail it out becau se of a run on the pound . Rapid de-

pletion of Br itain 's sterling reserves shocked Eden out of his reckless and dangerou s plans. Eisenhower brought to bear the (93) strength of American political might and utilized the United

Nations General Assembly. An American proposed cease fire 19 was delivered to the French and Br itish governments.

Eden realized that he could not maintain his actions without American support and with American opposition . He informed the French that Great Britain would accept the cease fire terms and allow the specially created United Nations

Emergency Force (U.N.E .F.) of three small power nations to take over occupation . The French could not go it alone be cause the British contr ibution was too great to be without , and the chain of command over the joint force was a Br itish structure . The French were sullenly forced to accept America's 20 Unit ed Nations' terms .

Nasser's Egypt maintained its ownership of the canal.

Nasser remained in power . Eden's government was virtually crippled . The French emp ire started to rapidly decay. More over the United States had taken a surprising position against its t wo major allies, while the Soviet Union had now breached the containment policy in the Middle East. (94)

Chapter Six

Conclusion

When the canal was restored to working order , a drastic ally different turn of events awaited both the East and the

West in the Middle East. The bipolar wor ld balance was again changed . Previously dominant powers were in rapid decline , and the Middle East was undergoing a rapid transition .

The overall outcome for Israel was extreme ly gratifying .

The Egyptian-Czechoslovakian weapons and planes were destroyed .

Fedayeen bases in the Sinai were destroyed . Israel acqu ired all the new weapons it needed . Israel opened the Gulf of

Aqaba by using a United Nations resolution and the United

Nations Emergence Force . The resolution made the gulf open to Israe li vessels and the U.N.E.F. placed troops in the area of Aqaba to enforce the resolution . In addition to this,

Israel had its Sinai and Gaza border problems cared for by the

U.N.E.F. troops until 1967 . Israel cou ld relax and continue to build its strength in the area.

Nasser and Egypt acquired a unique success. Even though

its armed forces were devastated, and its territory invaded

in the "battle" , Egypt won the "war" . The canal became

solely controlled by an Egyptian company . All revenues would

be given to Egypt . Int ernational participation wa s limited

to a cooperative board . Great Britain , Israel, and France

were branded as aggressors, providing Egypt world justifica

tion of it s peacefu l intent ions. Egypt gained the supposedly (95) unlimited assistance of the Soviet Union in economic aid , in United Nat ions actions, and in military aid . Nasser emerged an Arab hero , further hurting the pro-We stern Middle East governments. Nasser 's Aswan Darn was no longer an airy pro paganda ploy but a concrete project for the near future .

France was left in a much wor se position . Bitter at having victory for its Algerian , Nasser , and Middle Eastern problems snatched from its grasp by the American cease fire order , her empire would rapidly be broken apart . Her traiter ou s dealings in arres ting the Algerian F.L.N. repre sentatives under a French truce backfired . France had hoped that once

Nasser was destroyed , the Algerian rebels, either under the aforementioned arrest or those still fight ing , would lose heart and accept French dictated terms . Instead , Algeria's revolt gained fuel and would eventually result in France 's departure from Algeria . France 's ho ld on Tunisia and Morocco would also, as a result , be lost . France was branded as an

aggressor in the United Nations, further damaging its world

" prestige". Guy Mallet 's government would , as a result , lose

its popular support , and France would again return to politi

cal turmoil at home .

Great Britain 's situation in the advent of hostilities

wa s the worst of all . Not only had Britain 's influence been

devastated in Egypt , it also lost its military , economic , and

political influence in Jordan . Jordan 's pro-British govern

ment wa s reduced to a minority as a result of Britain 's (96) actions in Egypt. Nasser's Jordan followers gained the maj ority position in its government , pushing King Hussein away from the West . The Baghdad Pact became viewed by its

Middle Eastern memebers with suspicion . Br itish oil supplies, which Eden was so gravely concerned about , were temporarily stopped . Nasser kept the canal blocked wh ile the Syrians slowed the pipeline repairs, creating the maj or oil shortage feared by Eden . This showed the Arabs what cou ld be accompli shed by using oil as a dip lomat ic lever . This further justified

Nasser 's three part Arab plan . Great Br itain 's economy almost collap sed due to the run on its sterling reserves, using up we ll over a billion in government holding s. Disaster was narrowly averted in both cases by American oil and emergency loans . Great Br itain lost her unblemished United Nations record of not using it s veto power by twice abusing it for selfish motives. This proved to be a result of trying to further it s aggre ssive actions in violation of the United

Nations Charter . In addition to this , Eden 's government lost it s standing in Parliament , resulting in a complete restruc turing of the Con servative Party and Eden's res ignation and

subsequent nervou s breakdown .

The Soviet Union made tremendou s gains far above and beyond Nasser's. The achievement of a two-century-old previou sly denied objective was accomplished . The Soviet

Union rapidly increased its influence in the Middle East .

It gained a successful breach of We stern containment policy (97) by a nonaggressive accepted method . The Soviet Union gained political standing in Egypt , Syria , and Jordan . Communist

China achieved recognition . Soviet aid wa s considered more acceptable than West European aid . The eventual acclaim for the Aswan High Dam increased Soviet prestige in Ar ab eyes.

Most importantly of all, the Suez invasion by France and Great

Britain allowed the Soviet Union to direct world opinion away from its violent subjugation of Hungary . The West was divided, its NATO forces drained , and its active response to the Hungar ian situation impossible , thus securing for the Soviets freedom of action in Hungary .

The turmoil over Suez deeply affected the United States.

America 's containment of communism in the Middle East was circumvented. Its interests, private and public , were jeopard

ized by it s alli es ' actions. The United States was not con

sulted at all by its two major allies wh ile they were planning

a ma jor military operation . This resulted in a serious divi

sion between France and the United States with only a temporary

chill between Great Britain and the United States. Eisenhower 's

prized United Nations wa s almost destroyed, only to be barely

saved by his and Hammerskj old's stalwart actions . The United

Nations proved almost bankrupt due to its inability to respond

in Hungary . French and Br itish actions , if allowed to go un

checked through a United Nat ions resolution , would have re

sulted in its (the United Nations ) being discredited in the

eyes of the third world and the wor ld in general. Eisenhower ,

at the near expense of the United States ' ma jor allies, saved (98) the United Nat ions from destruction . Dulles' State Department met with har sh Congressional and public criticisms for not averting the invasion . The treacherous actions of our Euro- pean allie s and the subsequent containmen t breach added to Dulles' health problems ; he had begun to show critical cancer infection .

Eisenhower , on July S, 1957 , pledged America to defend and sup port the Middle East by itself thr ough the creation of the

E isenhower Doctrine . The United States had to reevaluate its p osition in the Middle East , attempt to repair the damages committed by its allies, and repair their economies. America 's position was threatened , and it s Eurouean allies were clearly on the decline . The West was disj ointed and the United Nations weakened . The We st failed to act in concert in the Middle East .

The principles of Western democracy and freedom were severely tainted in the eyes of the Arab world while the Soviet image rapidly improved . Arab nationalism and fading colonial prestige had ignited a powd er keg in the Middle East .

The Soviet victory , after having been achieved , slowly began to decline . At the May 1964 opening ceremony of the Aswan Dam' s first stage , Khruschev showed his growing displeasure with the policies of Nasser's government . The release of Egyptian Com munist prisoners by Nasser calmed the situation . In October of

1964 Khruschev was removed from power and Nasser distrusted his replacement . Nasser slowly began to realize that Soviet aid was

structured to make Egypt dependent upon the Sovie t bloc for finished goods. The Soviet Union halted the industrial develop ment of Egypt and by 1967 the Egyptian mili tary structure was (99) dominated by Soviet advisors provided by Soviet President

Podgorny . As a result Nas ser reopened diplomatic relations with the We st , i.e. , Great Britain on November 19, 1967 and by accept ing the American plan for a cease fire in 1969.

After Nasser's death in September of 1970, Anwar Sadat became Egypt 's new leader . In a speech given on July 23, 1972

Sadat announced the repatriation of all Soviet personnel (six thousand ) and all Sovie t bases would revert to Egyptian con trol. Sadat had retrieved Egypt 's independence and reopened

Egypt 's relation s with the West after sixteen year s of Soviet influence . (100)

ENDN OTES

Chapter 1

1 J. Garry Clifford , Kenneth J. Hagan , Thomas G. Paterson, American Foreign Policy: A History (Massachusetts: D.C. Heath & Co. , 1977), p. 264.

2 John Pimlott, ed ., The Middle East Conflicts , 1945 to Present (London : Orbis Pub. , 1983) , p. 114 .

3 John Pimlott , ed. , British Military Operat ions 1945 to Pres ent (London : Hamlyn , 1984) , p. 68.

4 Joel H. Winer , Great Britain: Foreign Policy And The of Empire 1689-1971 Vol. 4 (New York : McGraw Hill Book Co. , 1972), p. 2924.

5 Pimlott , ed. , The Midd le East Conflict s, 1945 to Present , p. 21 .

6 Alden H. Voth, Moscow Abandons Israel For The Arabs (Maryland : University of America , 1980) , p. 217 .

7 Herman Finer , Dulles Over Suez (Chicago: Quadrangle Books , 1964) , p. 39. See also U.S. Superintendent of Docu ments, " Agreement Relating To Development Assistance" United States Department of State Bulletin Vol. 31 Nov . 29 (Washing ton , D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office , 1954), p. 838.

8 Anthony Nutting , Nasser (New York: E.P. Dutton & Co ., 1972) , p. 75.

9 F in. er , Dulles Over Suez, p. 27.

10 Herbert Tint , French Foreign Policy Since The Second World War (New York : St . Martin's Press , 1972) , p. 194 .

11 voth, Mos cow Abandons Israel For The Ar abs , p. 157.

12 Tint , French Foreign Policy Since The Second World War , p. 190. See al so Guy de Carmoy , The Foreign Policies of France , 1944-1968 trans . Elaine P. Halperin (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press , 1980), p. 155. (101)

Chapter 1

13 william G. Andrews , French Politics and Algeria (New York: Appleton-Century-Croft s, 1962) , pp . 2,5.

14 John Donovan , ed ., U.S. & Soviet Policy In The Middle East 1945-56 (New York : Facts on File Inc. , 1972), p. 147 .

15 w ei . ner , G reat B rit. ain . : Foreign Policy And The Span Of Empire 1689-1971, p. 3146 .

16 F iner. , Dulles Over Suez, p. 16.

17 Hugh Thomas , Suez (New York : Harper & Row , 1967), p. 11.

18 u. s. Superintendent of Documents, "The Goal of Our Foreign Policy" by Dulles, United States Department of State Bulletin 3l:Dec. 13, p. 892.

19 Gama l Abdul Nasser , Egypt 's Liberation (Wash ington , D.C.: Public Affair s Press, 1955), p. 113 .

20 Ibid., p. 106, 107 .

21 Robert R. Bowie , Suez 1956 (London : Oxford University Pre ss, 1974) , p. 5. (10 2)

Chapter 2

1 John Donovan , ed ., U.S. & Soviet Policy In The Middle East 1945-56 (New York : Facts on File Inc., 1972) , p. 175.

2 J. Garry Clifford , Kenneth J. Hagan , Thomas G. Pater son, American Foreign Policy: A History (Massachusetts : D.C. Heath & Co ., 1977), pp . 455, 500.

3 Patricia Ann O'Connor , ed . , The Middle East: U.S. Policy, Israel, Oil And The Arabs 4th ed . (Washington , D.C.: Congressional Quarterly , 1979), p. 65.

4 Donoavan , ed ., U.S. & Soviet Policy In The Middle East 1945-56, p. 175 .

5 u.s. Superintendent of Document s, "Tran script of Secretary Dulles' News Conference" United States Department of State Bulletin Vol . 33 Oct . 17 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office , 1955), p. 604 . See also Herman Finer , Dulle s Over Sue z (Chicago : Quadrangle Books , 1964) , p. 2 7.

6 David Ben-Gurion, Israel: A Personal History (New York : Funk & Wagnalls, 1971) , p. 449 .

7 Donovan , ed ., U.S. & Soviet Policy In The Middle East 1945-56, p. 202.

8 c1ifford , Hagan , Paterson , American Foreign Policy: A History , p. 485. See also Finer , Dulles Over Suez, p. 72.

9 Ibid. , p. 15.

10 Joel H. Wiener , Great Britain: Foreign Policy And _� The Span of Empire 1689-1 �9=7=1-=-v �o�r=-. ---=-4��(�N�e-w�==Yo-r�k-:��M�c�G-r_aw Hill Book Co. , 1972), p. 3105.

11 U.S. Department of Documents, Address by Secretary of State Dulle s in United States Department of State Bulletin Vol . 28 June 16, p. 605.

12 Ibid. , 607. (103)

Chapter 2

13 Robert R. Bowie , Suez 1956 (London : Oxford Univer sity Press, 1974) , p. 5.

14 Anthony Nutting , Nass::.£ (New York : E.P. Dutton & Co ., 1972), p. 131.

15 Donovan , ed. , U.S. & Soviet Policy In The Middle East 1945-56, p. 154.

16 Anthony Nutting , No End Of A Le s son (London : Con stable and Co ., 1967), p. 34.

17 F iner. , Dulles Over Suez, p. 17 .

18 O'Connor , ed ., The Middle East : U.S. Policy, Israel, Oil And The Arabs 4th ed ., p. 37 . See also Nutting , Nasser , p. 137.

19 F in. er , Dulles Over Suez, p. 24.

20 O'Connor , ed ., The Middle East : U.S. Policy, Israel , Oil And The Ar abs 4th ed ., p. 65.

21 Ibid. , p. 46 . See also Nutting , Nasser , p. 137 .

22 0 1 Connor , ed ., The Middle East : U.S. Policy, Israel , Oil And The Ar abs 4th ed ., p. 36.

23 Ibid .

24 Aaron S. Klieman , Soviet Russia And The Middle East (Baltimore : John Hopkins Press, 1970), p. 28. See also Michael Confino , Shimon Shamir , eds. , "Soviet Penetration Into The Middle East In Historical Per spective" by Ben-Cion Pinchuk in The U.S.S.R. And The Middle East (Jerusalem : Israel University Press, 1973), p. 63 .

25 Klie" man , Soviet Russia And The Middle East , p. 33 .

26 Ibid ., p. 34.

27 Barbara Jelavich , St . Petersburg and Moscow: Tsarist and Soviet Foreign Policy , 1814-1974 (Bloomington : Indiana University Fr e ss, 1974), p. 374. (104)

Chapter 2

28 U.S. Defense Department , Report On Middle East , Suez Crisis (Washington , D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office , 1957) , p. 5.

29 Dereck Urwin , Western Europe Since 1945 (London : Longman , 1981) , p. 107 .

30 Alden H. Voth , Moscow Abandons Israel For The Arabs (Maryland : University of America, 1980), p. 196 . See also Nutting , Nasser , p. 137 . Du lles was the United States Re presentative on the Reparations Commission at the Treaty of Versailles . He was asked by Pres ident Wilson to continue negot iations wh ile Wilson returned home to battle Congress for membership in the League of Nations. Dulles was with his uncle , Robert Lansing , Wilson's Secretary of State . Dulles viewed the treatment of Wilson 's democratic principles for a fair peace , which were shattered by the revengefu l and unworthy French and British , as unforgivable . This latter information is from Town send Hoopes , The Devil And John Foster Dulles (Boston : Little , Brown , and Co ., 1973), p. 32.

31 N utting. , N o E n d Of A L esson, p. 21 .

32 Ibid. , p. 22.

33 Ibid. , p. 23 . (105 )

Chapter 3

1 Alden H. Voth, Moscow Abandons Israel For The Arabs (Maryland: Univers ity of America , 1980) , p. 146 .

2 John Donovan , ed. , U.S. & Soviet Policy In The Middle East 1945-56 (New York : Facts on File Inc., 1972), p. 152 .

3 Aryeh Yodfat , Arab Politics In The Soviet Mirror (Jerusalem : Israel Univer sity Press , 1973), p. 45.

4 Herman Finer , Dulle s Over Sue z (Chicago: Quadrangle Books , 1964), p. 2.

5 Ibid., p. 85.

6 Ibid. , p. 83. The Bangdung Conference of April 18 , 1955 was a meeting of African and Asian countries representing over half of the wor ld 's population . The Conference consisted of third world and neutral nations . Twenty-nine of the countr ies present signed a declaration against the evil of colonialism and called for its complete removal from the wor ld . This latter information is from Townsend Hoopes , The Devil And John Foster Dulles (Boston: Little, Brown , and Co ., 1973), pp . 282, 315.

7 Anthony Nutting , No End Of A Lesson (London : Constable and Co ., 1967), p. 17.

8 Ibid. , p. 34.

9 Ibid. , p. 27.

10 u.s. Superintendent of Document s, Executive Order #10575 in United States Department of State Bulletin Vol. 31 Dec . 18 (Washington , D.C. : U.S. Government""" Printing Office , 1954), p. 914.

11 Hugh Thomas , Suez (New York : Harper & Row, 1967) , p. 24. See also Donovan , e�U.S. & Soviet Policy In The Middle East 1945-56, p. 155.

12 u.s. Superintendent of Documents, "Some Pending Problems in U.S. Foreign Economic Policy" by Samuel C. Waugh in United States Department of State Bulletin Vol. 32 May 20, p. 877 .

13 Donovan , ed ., U.S. & Soviet Policy In The Middle East 1945-56, p. 155. (106)

Chapter 3

14 Anthony Nutting , Nasser (New York : E.P. Dutton & Co . , 197 2 ) , p . 13 8 .

15 u.s. Superint endent of Documents, "Recent Achievement of U.S. Foreign Policy" by Dulles in United States Department of State Bulletin Vol. 32 June 20, 1955, p. 993. See also Dereck W. Urwin , Western Europe Since 1945 (London : Longman , 1981), p. 108.

16 John Gunther , Inside Russia Today (New York: Harper & Brothers , 19 5 8) , p. 2 3 5.

17 Donovan , ed . , U.S. & Soviet Policy In The Middle East 1945-56 , p. 156.

18 F iner. , Dulle s Over Suez, p. 48 .

19 u.s. Superintendent of Documents, "Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference" in United States Depart ment of State Bulletin Vol. 34 Jan . 2, 1956, p. 11 . See also Donovan , ed ., U.S. & Soviet Policy In The Middle East 1945-56, p. 154. U.S. Superintendent of Documents, "Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference" , p. 8. Donovan , ed ., U.S. & Soviet Policy In The Middle East 1945-56, p. 156 .

20 voth, Mos cow Abandons Israel For The Ar abs , p. 227 .

21 N utti. ng , N asser , p. 142.

22 voth, Mos cow Abandons Israel For The Arabs, p. 222.

23 Michael Adams , Suez And After (Boston : Beacon Press, 195 8) , p. 2.

24 U.S. Department of State , President ial Decree on the Nationalization of the Suez Canal Company , July 26 in The Suez Canal Problem : July 26-Sept . 22 , 1956 (Washington , D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1956) , p. 31-32.

25 Joel H. Wiener , Great Britain: Foreign Policy And The Span of Empire 1689-1971 Vol . 4 (New York : McGraw Hill Book Co. , 19 7 2) , p. 2 7 5 2 . (107)

Chapter 3

26 Donovan , ed ., U.S. & Soviet Policy In The Middle East 1945-56, p. 218 . See also John Pimlott , ed ., British Military Operat ions 1945-1984 (London : Hamlyn , 1984) , p. 78.

27 Donovan , ed ., U.S. & Soviet Policy In The Middle East 1945-56 , p. 218 .

28 Robert R. Bowie, Suez 1956 (London : Oxford Univer sity Press, 1974) , p. 19.

29 Finer , Dulles Over Suez, p. 286. See also Voth, Mo scow Abandons Israel For The Arabs , p. 192 . Dav id Ben-Gurion, Israel: A Per sonal History (New York : Funk & Wagnalls, 1971) , p. 368.

30 Nutting , No End Of A Lesson, p. 88.

31 Pimlott , ed ., British Military Operations 1945-1984, p. 73. See also Ibid. , p. 76.

32 John Pimlott , ed., The Middle East Conflicts, 1945 to Present (London : Orbis Pub. , 1983), p. 37 .

33 u.s. Department of State , Statement in the British House of Commons by Prime Minister Eden, October 30, 1956 in United States Policy in the Middle East : Sept . 1956- June 1957 (New York : Greenwood Press, 1968), p. 139. (108)

Chapter 4

1 U.S. Department of State , Department of State Press Statement , Ju ly 27 in The Suez Canal Problem: July 26- Sept . 22, 1956 (Washington , D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office , 1956), p. 32. See also U.S. Department of State, Department of State Announcement that the United States Would Participate in Three-Power London Talks , July 28 in The Suez Canal Problem : July 26-Sept . 22, 1956, p. 33 .

2 U.S. Department of State , Three Power London Talks : Tripartite Statement , August 2 in The Suez Canal Problem : July 26-Sept . 22, 1956, p. 34 . See also U.S. Department of State , Statement by Secretary Dulle s Upon Return From London, August 3 in The Suez Canal Problem: July 26-Sept . 22, 1956, p. 37 .

3 Robert R. B owie , Suez 1956 (London: Oxford University Press, 1974) , pp . 23 , 27, 101, 106 .

4 u . s. Department of State , Radio Television Report by President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles, August 3 in The Suez Canal Problem: July 26-Sept . 22, 1956, p. 40.

6 Ibid. , p. 41.

7 Ibid. , p. 42 .

8 Herman Finer , Dulles Over Suez (Chicago : Quadrangle Books , 1964) , p. 78.

9 John Donovan , ed ., U.S. & Soviet Policy In The Middle East 1945-56 (New York : Facts on File Inc., 1972), p. 218 .

lO ibid .

11 J. C. Hurewitz, ed ., Soviet-American Rivalry in the Middle East (New York : Frederick A. Praeger , 1969) , p. 167 .

12 Hugh Thomas, Suez (New York : Harper & Row, 1967), p. 54 .

13 Anthony Nutting , No End Of A Le sson (London : Constable and Co ., 1967), p. 39. (109)

Chapter 4

14 Thomas , Suez, p. 52.

15 Hurewitz, ed ., Soviet-American Rivalry in the Middle East , p. 55.

16 Ibid .

17 Donovan , ed ., U.S. & Soviet Policy In The Middle East 1945-56, p. 222. See also U.S. Department of State , Statement by President Nasser Rejecting Invitat ion to the London Con ference, August 12 in The Suez Canal Problem : July 26-Sept. 22, 1956, p. 50 .

18 U.S. Department of State , Statement by Mr . Shepilov (Soviet Union ) in The Suez Canal Problem: July 26-Sept . 22, 1956 , p. 61.

19 Ibid .

20 Don ovan , ed ., U.S. & Soviet Policy In The Middle East 1945-56, p. 228 .

21 U.S. Department of State, Letter to the United Nations Secretary-General From The Egyptian Foreign Minister , April 24 , 1957 in Unit ed States Policy in the Middle East : Sept . 1956-June 1957 (New York : Greenwood Press, 1968) , p. 387 .

22 u.s. Department of State , Indian Proposal , August 20 in The Suez Canal Problem : July 26-Sept . 22, 1956, p. 288. See also Donovan , ed ., U.S. & Soviet Policy In The Middle East 1945-56, p. 230.

23 8 owie. , Suez 1956, p. 137.

24 u.s. Department of State , A Message From Prime Minister Menzies to President Nasser , August 24 in The Suez Cana l Problem : July 26-Sept . 22, 1956 , p. 303 .

25 Donovan , ed ., U.S. & Soviet Policy In The Middle East 1945-56, p. 230.

26 Ibid . (110)

Chapter 4

27 u.s. Department of State , Letter From President Nasser To Prime Minister Menzies, September 9 in The Suez Canal Prob lem : July 26-Sept . 22, 1956, pp . 317-322.

28 John G. Stoessinger , The United Nat ions & The Super- l2_0Wers 3rd ed . (New York: Random House , 1973), p. 6. 29 Donovan , ed ., U.S. & Soviet Policy In The Middle East 1945-56, p. 225.

30 U.S. Department of State , News Conference Statements by Secretary Dulles , Sep�ber 13 in The Seuz Canal Problem : July 26-Sept. 22, 1956, p. 335. 31 B owie. , Suez 1956 , pp . 21 , 22.

32 Thomas , Suez, p. 50.

33 B owie. , Suez 1956, pp . 121, 122.

34 Ibid ., p. 126.

35 Ibid. , pp . 126-128.

36 Donovan , ed ., U.S. & Soviet Policy In The Middle East 1945-56 , p. 236.

3 7 Ibid. . , p. 2 33. S ee also Anthony Nutting. , N asser (New York : E.P. Dutton & Co ., 1972) , p. 159, & Ibid. , p. 234.

38 Donovan , ed ., U.S. & Soviet Policy In The Middle East 1945-56, p. 335.

39 Ibid. , p. 236 .

40 u.s. Department of State , Statement in the Unit ed Nations Security Counc il by Secretary of State Dulles, October 9, 1956 in Unit ed States Policy in the Middle East: September 1956-June 1957, p. 116 . Clll )

Chapter 5

1 John Donovan , ed ., U.S. & Soviet Policy In The Middle East 1945-56 (New York : Facts on File Inc. , 1972), pp . 244, 246 .

2 Ibid., p. 246.

3 . . U.S. Department of State , Stat eme nt in. the United Nations Security Council by Secretari of State Dulles, October 9, 1956 in Unit ed States Policy in the Middle East: September 1956-June 1957 (New York : Greenwood Press, 1968), p. 115.

4 Donovan , ed ., U.S. & Soviet Policy In The Middle East 1945-56, p. 248 .

5 Robert R. Bowie , Suez 1956 (London : Oxford Univer sity Press, 1974) , pp . 48 , 49.

6 Anthony Nutting , Nasser (New York : E.P. Dutton &

Co . , 197 2 ) , pp . 159 , 16 O •

7 Bowie , Suez 1956, p. 49 . See also Anthony Nutting , No End Of A Les son (London : Constable and Co ., 1967) , p. 96.

8 Donovan , ed ., U.S. & Soviet Policy In The Middle East 1945-56, p. 248 .

9 B owie. , Suez 1956, p. 48 .

10 Donovan , ed ., U.S. & Soviet Policy In The Midd le East 1945-56 , pp . 147 , 148 .

ll N utting. , N o E n d Of A L esson, pp . 78 , 79 .

12 Ibid ., p. 96 .

13 John Pimlott , ed ., British Military Operations 1945- 1984 (London : Hamlyn , 1984) , pp . 76, 77 .

14 Nutting , No End Of A Lesson , p. 98. (112)

Chapter 5

15 Dwight D. Eisenhower , Public Papers Of The President Of The United States 1956 (Washington , D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office , 1958), p. 1017 .

16 Donovan , ed ., U.S.:.,,. & Soviet Policy In The Middle East 1945-56, p. 255.

17 u.s. Department of State , Radio and Television Address by President Eisenhower , October 31, 1956 in United States Policy in the Middle East : September 1956-June 1957, pp . 149 , 150.

18 John Pimlott , ed ., The Middle East Conflicts, 1945 to Pres ent (London : Orbis Pub., 1983), p. 39

19 B owie. , Suez 1956, p. 75.

20 Pimlott , ed., British Military Operations 1945-1984, p. 8 2. (113)

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