en Books published to date in the continuing series o .:: -m -I J> SOVIET ADVANCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST, George Lenczowski, 1971. 176 C pages, $4.00 ;; Explores and analyzes recent Soviet policies in the Middle East in terms of their historical background, ideological foundations and pragmatic application in the 2 political, economic and military sectors. n PRIVATE ENTERPRISE AND SOCIALISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST, Howard S. Ellis, m 1970. 123 pages, $3.00 en Summarizes recent economic developments in the Middle East. Discusses the 2- significance of Soviet economic relations with countries in the area and suggests new approaches for American economic assistance. -I :::I: TRADE PATTERNS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, Lee E. Preston in association with m Karim A. Nashashibi, 1970. 93 pages, $3.00 3: Analyzes trade flows within the Middle East and between that area and other areas of the world. Describes special trade relationships between individual -C Middle Eastern countries and certain others, such as Lebanon-France, U.S .S.R.­ C Egypt, and U.S.-Israel. r­ m THE DILEMMA OF ISRAEL, Harry B. Ellis, 1970. 107 pages, $3.00 m Traces the history of modern Israel. Analyzes Israel 's internal political, eco­ J> nomic, and social structure and its relationships with the Arabs, the United en Nations, and the United States. -I JERUSALEM: KEYSTONE OF AN ARAB-ISRAELI SETTLEMENT, Richard H. Pfaff, 1969. 54 pages, $2.00 Suggests and analyzes seven policy choices for the United States. Discusses the religious significance of Jerusalem to Christians, Jews, and Moslems, and points out the cultural gulf between the Arabs of the Old City and the Western­ r oriented Israelis of West Jerusalem. m Z DOCUMENTS ON THE MIDDLE EAST, edited by Ralph H. Magnus, 1969. 229 o pages, $3.00 No A collection of the key documents that explain the development of United States ~ policies in the Middle East. An invaluable reference, it includes official docu­ en ments as well as official explanations, speeches, and letters. A

UNITED STATES INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, edited by George Len­ czowski, 1968. 129 pages, $3.00

A unique examination of the political, economic, and cultural components of American interests in the Middle East, and a survey of alternative policies in u.s. INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST SERIES both the public and private sector. Contributors are George Lenczowski, Ralph Magnus, Carl Leiden, and Abdul A. Said; consultants were H. Paul Castleberry, Howard Ellis, Hamdy Loutfi, and Malcolm Kerr.

This series is the outgrowth of AEI's Middle East Research Project which is examining questions raised by the deterioration of the United States position in the Middle East. The project director is George Lenczowski, Middle East expert at the University of California, Berkeley.

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH 1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W., Washington, D. C. 20036

Job Name:2274816 Date:15-06-23 PDF Page:2274816pbc.p1.pdf Color: PANTONE 143 C PANTONE 653 C THE AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH, estab­ lished in 1943, is a publicly supported, nonpartisan research and educational organization. AEI studies and sponsors research on public policy issues of national and international significance. Its publications are made available to scholars, public officials, the press, the business community, and the public. The institute does not take positions on policy questions. Opinions expressed are those of the authors. Institute publications take three major forms: 1. Legislative and Special Analyses--balanced analyses of current legislative proposals· and special policy issues prepared with the help of specialists from the academic world and the fields of law and government. 2. Studies--in-depth studies of government programs and major national and international problems, written by independent scholars. 3. Rational Debates and Symposia-proceedings of debates, seminars, and conferences where eminent authorities with contrasting views discuss controversial issues.

ADVISORY BOARD Paul W. McCracken, Chairman, Edmund Ezra Day Ulliversity Professor of Business Administration, University of Michigan Karl Brandt, Professor of Economic Policy (Emeritus), Stanford University R. H. Coase, Professor of Economics, University of Chicago Milton Friedman, Paul S. Russell Distinguished Service Professor of Economics, University of Chicago Gottfried Haberler, Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research C. Lowell Harriss, Professor of Economics, Columbia University Loy W. Henderson, Professor of Foreign Relations, A merican University George Lenczowski, Professor of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley Felix Morley, Editor and Author Joseph T. Sneed, Dean, School of Law, Duke University George E. Taylor, Professor of Far Eastern History and Politics, Far Eastern & Russian Institute, University of Washington

OFFICERS Carl N. Jacobs, Chairman Henry T. Bodman, Vice Chairman H. C. Lumb, Vice Chairman Herman J. Schmidt, Vice Chairman William J. Baroody, President William G. McClintock, Treasurer

SENIOR STAFF Thomas F. Johnson, Director of Research Joseph G. Butts, Director of Legislative Analysis Sam S. Crutchfield, Assistant to the President for Administration Anne Brunsdale, Director of Publications Waldo H. Dubberstein, Director of International Studies Morton Blackwell, Director of Computer Operations Earl H. Voss, Assistant to the President for Special Operations

SOVIET ADVANCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST Presented by the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research as the seventh study within the framework of the Middle East Research Project, George Lenczowski, director. SOVIET ADVANCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

GEORGE LENCZOWSKI

American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research Washington, D.C. 20036 Distributed to the Trade by National Book Network, 15200 NBN Way, Blue Ridge Summit, PA 17214. To order call toll free 1-800-462-6420 or 1-717-794-3800. For all other inquiries please contact the AEI Press, 1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036 or call 1-800-862-5801.

George Lenczowski is professor of political science at the University of California, Berkeley.

Foreign Affairs Study 2, February 1972 Price $4.00 per copy

© 1971 by American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, D.C. Permission to quote from or to reproduce materials in this publication is granted when due acknowledgment is made. Library of Congress Catalog Card No. L.e. 78-186300 To Loy W. Henderson, a true statesman, in tribute to his wisdom and courage.

CONTENTS

PREFACE

INTRODUCTION 1

1. DOCTRINAL FOUNDATIONS ...... 5 Lenin's and Stalin's Contributions ...... 6 The Stalin-Zhdanov Doctrine: Rigid Bipolarity ...... 11 Doctrinal Evolution Since Khrushchev ...... 13 The Post-Khrushchev Era ...... 18 Conclusion ...... 21 II. IRAN: FROM SUBVERSION TO AID AND TRADE 23 Direct Soviet Threat to Iran's Independence: the Azerbaijan Crisis, 1945-47 ...... 24 Russia and the Oil Crisis, 1951-53 ...... 27 Moscow versus Consolidation of the Western-Iranian Alliance. . 30 Wooing Iran Toward Neutralism...... 31 III. TURKEY: TOWARD NORMALIZATION...... 37 World War I Aftermath: Negative Community of Interests. . . . 37 World War II: Soviet Designs and Turkish Fears...... 38 Explicit Statement of Soviet Aspirations ...... 40 The Pan-Turanian Question ...... 43 The Mid-1940s: Soviet Territorial Demands ...... 45 Building Ties with the West ...... 46 Moscow-Ankara: a New Phase in the 1960s ...... 49 The Cyprus Issue and Turkish-American Frictions ...... 50 Soviet Overtures and Advances ...... 51 IV. SOVIET ADVANCES IN THE ARAB WORLD ...... 55 Russia and Arab Nationalism...... 55 Focus on Arab Radical Regimes ...... 59 Arms Deliveries ...... 60 Cultural Offensive: Exchange Scholarships...... 61 Soviet-Oriented Cultural Events ...... 64 Soviet Information Media ...... 65 Issue of Fraternization ...... 67 Complicating Factors in Soviet-Arab Relations ...... 68 V. EGYPT: EXPANDING RELATIONS ...... " ...... 75 Moscow-Cairo: General Political Framework ...... 75 Convergence of Soviet and Egyptian Policies ...... 78 Soviet Gains from Egyptian-American Estrangement ...... 81 Egyptian Communists-An Uncertain Factor ...... 85 Soviet-Egyptian Economic Cooperation ...... 91 The High Aswan Dam ...... 93 Steel and Oil ...... 98 VI. SYRIA: AID AND IDEOLOGY ...... 101 The Post-Shishakli Period: Ties with Russia and Communist Advances ...... 102 The Period of Syro-Egyptian Union, 1958-61 ...... 106 Syria's Secessionist Regime, 1961-63 ...... 109 Baath Rule, 1963-66 ...... 111 The Left-Wing Baath Period, 1966-70 ...... 113 The Assad Regime: a Cautious Turn Toward Moderation .... 117 The Euphrates Dam ...... 120 VII. IRAQ: POTENCY OF THE COMMUNIST FACTOR ...... 125 The Prerevolutionary Era (prior to 1958) ...... 126 The Kassem Period (July 14, 1958-February 8, 1963) ..... 128 The First Baath Period (February-November 1963) ...... 136 The First Aref Period (November 1963-April 1966) ...... 137 The Second Aref Period (April 1966-July 1968) ...... 138 The Second Baath Period (July 1968-) ...... 139 Conclusion ...... 142 VIII. SOVIET ARMS AND MILITARY PRESENCE ...... 145 Arms Flow to Egypt ...... 145 Arms for Other Radical Regimes ...... 152 Soviet Naval Penetration ...... 154 IX. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION ...... 159 APPENDIX A: The Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, 1971 and the Soviet President's Visit to Cairo ...... , 165 APPENDIX B: A Note on the Tanker Fleets of the Communist Bloc, 1970 ...... 171 APPENDIX C: Merchant Marine Traffic in the Turkish Straits. .. 172 APPENDIX D: Soviet Warships Transiting the Turkish Straits, 1968 and 1970 ...... 172 LIST OF MAPS The Middle East ...... 4 Iran ...... 25 Turkey ...... 39 Egypt ...... 77 Syria ...... 103 Iraq ...... 127 The Mediterranean Sea ...... 147 INDEX ...... ,. 173 PREFACE

he aim of this study is to deseribe and analyze the substantial advances made Tby the Soviet Union in the Middle East in recent years, with special emphasis on developments following the Arab-Israeli war of 1967. Although Russia's interest in the Middle East has had a long history, her recent penetration of the area has been so broad and so intensive as to warrant a system­ atic inquiry into its nature and causes. Inasmuch as revolutionary theory and politi­ cal action have ofteH been closely interwoven in the execution of Soviet policies, the author has paid attention to both in the hope that some seemingly puzzling and contradictory Soviet actions would thereby be clarified and better understood by Western and non-Western readers. The present book is basically addressed to an educated layman-be he a legis­ lator, a government official, a membcr of the academic, professional or business community-whose political awareness and concern for national security and world peace may lead him to probe into the extent and meaning of Soviet advances in a highly strategic region for the West. It is hoped, however, that a specialist will also find material in this study worth his attention. Located at the junction of three continents, the Middle East is not only crossed by vital air and maritime routcs, but is also the source of oil which supplies about 70 percent of European and over 80 percent of Japanese petroleum requirements. It is an area abundant in conflicts, international and domestic, arising from many mutually irreconcilable social forces. Among the developing regions of the Third World, the Middle East stands out as one in which the struggle among the com­ peting ideologies and orientations has reached a high degree of intensity. It would thus appear th(lt a study of Soviet advances, the outcome of which might be a radi­ cal change of power relationships in the area, hardly needs further justification. In his research, the author has relied first and foremost on the primary sources. Articles in Communist periodicals, press reports contained in the Soviet, Western, and Arab newspapers, official government declarations, ideological pronounce­ ments, resolutions of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and international Communist conferences, statements of Middle Eastern political parties and leaders, national charters, official statistics and reports on Soviet-sponsored technical proj­ ects, as well as memoirs of lcading political pcrsonalities supplied the bulk of the sourcc material. Among the valuable reference sources could be cited Soviet Press Translations, The Middle East Journal, and the annual volumcs on armaments of the London-based Institute for Strategic Studies. Information from thc documentary sources was derived against the background of the author's personal knowledgc of the Middle East and of many of its political and intellectual leaders-a knowledge acquired from residence, research, and mul­ tiple annual visits to the area. Transliteration of Turkish, Iranian, and Arabic names has conformed to the generally accepted rules followed by major U.S. daily newspapers and non­ specialized periodicals. The aim was to maintain simplicity and, if possible, consistency. The author would like to acknowledge the dedicated services performed in the course of the preparation of this study by two of his research assistants at the University of California at Berkeley: Dr. Ralph H. Magnus, currently associated with The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, and Mr. John Amos, a member of the faculty of the Naval Postgraduate School at Monterey. Similarly, the author's wife rendered much appreciated assistance by reviewing the Soviet and East European press and periodicals in their original versions. Professor Yulug T. Kurat of the Middle East Technical University in Ankara read the chapter on Turkey and offered valuable comments. Mrs. Florence C. Myer typed the manu­ script with most laudable attention to detail. For all these services, the author wishes to express his sincere appreciation.

George Lenczowski INTRODUCTION

he year 1955 may be looked upon as a watershed in the history of Soviet rela­ Ttions with the Middle East. This was the year Moscow embarked on a policy of rapprochement with non-Communist governments of independent states in the area by offering them weapons, economic assistance and technical know-how. This new policy is best exemplified by the Soviet-Egyptian arms agreement of Septem­ ber, 1955. That year also marked an important switch toward a policy of accept­ ing and even encouraging neutralism in the Middle East, within the broader frame­ work of Soviet solidarity with developing and ex-colonial nations. Soviet support for the three basic principles of the Bandung Conference of Afro-Asian countries -non-alignment in the cold war, peaceful coexistence, and anti-imperialism-gave the Soviet Union a convenient set of symbols for enhancing her image with the peoples of the Third World. From that time on, the Soviet Union has made significant advances in almost every sector of the Middle East where her increased presence and influence could improve her international position. She stepped up the volume and intensity of her aid-and-trade with the area, sponsoring a number of major development projects; she poured growing quantities of military equipment into certain countries, while providing training and expert service; she greatly increased the size of her navy in the Mediterranean; she gave political support to Arab nationalism in its struggles with the remnants of Western colonialism and in its feud with Israel and Zionism; and in the cultural sphere, she enlarged the scope of those contacts that helped to condition her Middle East partners psychologically to be pro-Soviet. While these were all expressions of government-to-government relations, they were not without their impact on local Communist parties. Three basic factors enabled the Soviet Union to make these significant ad­ vances: (a) Circumstances in the Middle East itself were more favorable for Soviet penetration, notably, the emergence of a number of revolutionary-nationalist re­ gimes in the Arab world. These regimes had come to power with slogans calling for liberation from Western domination. Thus they were automatically critical of the West. Furthermore, Socialist trends in these regimes' economic and political development emphasized values and methods shared by their revolutionary elites and Soviet Communists. These values and methods were state-controlled indus­ trialization, state-imposed planning, hostility toward private ownership and free enterprise, single-party government, rejection of Western parliamentary models, and police-state coercion. (b) Western policies in the Middle East were uneven, inconsistent, hesitating, contradictory, and, in some cases, there was an almost perverse lack of logic. Only in the Northern Tier-from Turkey, through Iran, to Pakistan-was the Western record generally creditable. Here the West produced promising conditions (though not free of dilemmas) for political stabilization, military preparedness and eco­ nomic development. In the Arab area, by contrast, Western policies experienced grievous setbacks, many of which could be attributed, directly or indirectly, to the Western attitude toward Israel, a state founded by immigrant colonists in an ~ra when colonialism was universally condemned. (c) Soviet policies themselves were flexible and skillfully geared to maximize advantages derived from local circumstances and Western errors. After 1955, the Soviet Union did not have to force her way into the area; instead, she posed as a friend to exploit soft spots or gaps opened by local developments or Western poli­ cies. After the conclusion of the Baghdad Pact* Soviet relations with the Northern Tier--especially Iran and Turkey-were tense, while Soviet friendship with the Arab area steadily increased. Within a few years, however, this contrast began to be less pronounced, and there was a corresponding cooling in Western relations with Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan. Soviet policies in the Middle East-as elsewhere in the world-fused two ele­ ments: Soviet national interests and Communist ideological concepts. With respect to the first of these elements, there is, of course, a remarkable similarity between the policies of the Soviet state and Czarist traditions. Certain basic features of the old Russian state system and foreign policy persist: (a) an authoritarian, despoti­ cally inclined state exuding distrust and scorn toward the democratic and humani­ tarian values of the "decadent" West; (b) an imperial concept bestowing primacy on the Russian element in a multinational state with expansionist tendencies; (c) the drive for a dominant position in the Eurasian continent, with emphasis on pre­ venting the emergence of a strong central-European power or coalition; (d) a push toward warm water outlets, particularly the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean; (e) the search for a sphere of influence south of the Russian borders, especially in Iran and the Ottoman Empire (today Turkey and the Arab countries); and (f) justifying expansionism by embracing a myth or mission of broader, perhaps uni­ versal, appeal, such as promotion of Christian orthodoxy (Czarist Moscow as the Third Rome), pan-Slavism, and since 1917, Communist world revolution. As for the second element in Soviet policies-ideology-it is possible to debate whether it is an independent entity, using the power of the Soviet state, or whether the Soviet state has employed ideology as a useful psychological device. Either view may muster considerable evidence to sustain it. Occasionally contradictions between the ideological postulates and Soviet national interests crop up. It is open to question, however, whether such contradictions are of a long-range type or only transitional. In individual human lives, as well as in group behavior, there occurs sometimes the need to sacrifice one value to attain another that is deemed, in the long run, to be more important. This, however, is only a temporary contradiction which does not affect the long-range soundness either of pursuing both values or giving priority to one over the other. In the case of the Soviet Union, many ob-

*An alliance signed on February 24, 1955 by Turkey and Iraq and later joined by Iran. Pakistan and Great Britain. The United States became a non-signatory participant in the alliance's principal committees. After the withdrawal of Iraq in 1959, the alliance was renamed the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and its headquarters was moved from Baghdad to Ankara.

2 served contradictions are more apparent than real. Ultimately, a dynamic Soviet state interest to expand and dominate is complemented by Communist ideology and vice versa. The spiritual origins of the Soviet state can be traced to Marxist ideology. Soviet leadership, dedicated to the "scientific truths" of Marxist socialism, has tradition­ a11y tried to find guidance and justification for its actions in ideology. Communist ideology in its Soviet version represents a body of original Marxist doctrine, subse­ quently interpreted by the most authoritative practicing leaders of the Soviet state: Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev, and the post-Khrushchev group. These interpreters faced the age-old dilemma inherent in adaptation of an old and petrified document to current reality: Either the reality had to be molded to suit the dogma or the dogma had to be changed to fit the reality. Often both pro­ cesses were carried out simultaneously. Any change in the dogma was risky because it exposed the modifier to attack for heresy, or, in the Communist vocabulary, revisionism. Soviet and international Communist practice reserved the name "revisionist" for the doctrinal enemy or the defeated adversary, while the victorious leader became the true believer even if he himself had substantia1ly revised the doctrine. While the danger of being stigmatized with the revisionist label has always haunted any leader in the Communist movement, another risk, that of being called (or condemned as) a "dogmatist," was no less real. Although dogmatism is sup­ posed to denote excessive rigidity in adherence to dogma-in disregard of rea1ity -realistic criteria for either dogmatism or revisionism have never been estab­ lished. Thus came into being a vast area of uncertainty in which seman tical skills, an instinct for survival, capac!ty for dissimulation, ability to reserve a safe exit from exposed doctrinal positions, and sheer luck were ultimately to decide whether a given leader would entrench himself as a genuine disciple of Marxism-Leninism or be thrown into outer darkness as a heretic. Any comprehensive analysis of Soviet policies should not, therefore, rest on a mere reconstruction of observed behavior. To understand the mainsprings of such policies, it is necessary to take into account their doctrinal foundations and to fol­ low the evolution, if any, of ideology. It is to this task that we propose to turn in the first chapter of this study.

3 4 I. DOCTRINAL FOUNDATIONS

We Communists attach great importance to revolutionary theory and we are achieving all our successes precisely because we are always guided by Marxist­ Leninist teaching. The theory of Marxism-Leninism is our compass, our guiding star.

Nikita S. Khrushchev (To the Seventh Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party, June 3, 1958)

he Soviet Union's ideological posture toward the Middle East should be viewed Twithin the broader framework of Communist principles pertaining to colonial and semi-colonial areas-in current parlance, the developing countries. These prin­ ciples have been formulated and revised a number of times since the Soviet revolu­ tion. Main credit should be given to Lenin and Stalin for their basic contributions between 1913 and 1926 and to Nikita Khrushchev for his contributions during the decade between 1954 and 1964. To appreciate more fully the changes in original Communist dogma, a brief re­ statement of certain basic Marxist principles may be helpful. To Marx, history was unfolding in quite neatly-delineated periods, from a primitive, communal pre-class society to a slave-holding system, followed by feudalism in which power was based on ownership of land and on serf labor, then capitalism, and finally socialism, of which communism was to be the final and most desirable stage. The essence of the historical process was the class struggle between the dominant and the exploited classes. Control of the means of production provided the source of political power, while politics, nationalism, religion, ethics, law, and culture constituted but a su­ perstructure built upon the economic base. Change was inevitable as inventions al­ tered the mode of production, patterns of ownership and social relations in gen­ eral. But political change would occur through violent revolutions, which marked the boundaries betwecn each of the successive historical periods. Revolutionary change could not be avoided because the dominant class would never voluntarily abdicatc its power to a newly-emerging class. The state was viewed merely as an instrument of coercion in the hands of the dominant class. Thus, regardless of the formal designation, such as monarchy, republic, or democ­ racy, each state in reality represented a dictatorship of the economically, hence po­ litically, dominant class. Revolutions, violent changes from one to another form of state power, would occur when "objective conditions" permitted-that is when the oppressed classes

5 could not endure their condition any longer and when the exploiters were too weak to put up effective resistance. Living as he did in Europe in the nincteenth century, a period of capitalist­ sponsored industrialization, Marx paid special attention to capitalism and foresaw its eventual demise in favor of socialism. He regarded the urban proletariat, de­ fined as the industrial working class, as the most exploited and, therefore, most revolutionary class in the society. Its ranks were bound to be swelled by the petty bourgeoisie, such as artisans, who were expected to be pauperized as control of production passed to the bourgeoisie. Like the preceding historical periods, the capitalist epoch was to pass through stagcs of growth ending in the ripening and rotting of the system in its final phase. This deterioration was to be the result of multiplying "inner contradictions" and the exacerbation of the "class struggle." Eventually, capitalism would be overthrown by thc proletariat. In the first stage of the proletarian period, the leadership would establish a dictatorship according to the rule obtaining in preceding systems, that the state was but an instrument of coercion in the hands of the dominant class. This time, however, this exercise of political power would be only temporary. It would last only as long as it was nec­ essary to dispossess the former exploiters and to establish a classless society in which the means of production would belong to all, rather than to the exploiting few. Once this condition was achieved, there would be no more need for the coer­ cive functions of the state, hence no more need for the state. The state would thus "wither away" and the government of men would be replaced by the government of things, i.e., by the management of production, distribution, and services. In the socialist phase of this epoch, material goods would be distributed according to an individual's work; in its final, communist, phase, they would be allocated according to one's needs. While this outline of Marxist theory leaves much out (e.g., dialectical material­ ism, the theory of surplus value, concentration of capital, etc.), it should suffice for our purpose, which is to trace Marxism's subsequent evolution with regard to colonial and semi-colonial areas. The essentials relevant to our study are here: a monocausal view of social change, disregard of non-economic motivations in human behavior, concept of nationalism and religion as mere superstructure upon an economic foundation, historical determinism and the corresponding disregard of such factors as personality and accident, the role of the state, and the unfolding of the class struggle. 1 Lenin's and Stalin's Contributions The first major adaptations of Marxist theory were made by Lenin. In reality, his revisions were so radieal as to amount to virtual repudiation of parts of the original doctrine. What is euphemistically known as Lenin's "contribution" to Marxism, in the sectors relevant to the Middle East could be summed up as fol­ lows: (a) Elaboration of the concept of imperialism as the final stage of capitalism. Lenin conceived imperialism as a worldwide phenomenon and linked it with the -lFor a heJpful brief exposition of Marxist theory, see R. N. Carew Hunt, The Theory and Practice of Communism (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1950) and Hans Kelsen. The Political Theory of Bolshevism; A Critical A l1aiysis (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of Califor­ nia Press, 1955).

6 law of "uneven development of capitalism." Thus proletarian revolution did not have to occur necessarily in the most advanced capitalist country (as postulated by Marx); it could occur in the country which constituted "the weakest link" in the worldwide chain of capitalism, even if such a country had not yet fully developed its capitalistic system. This theory permitted Lenin to agitate for, and subsequently to justify, revolution in Russia, although Russia was barely entering upon the capi­ talist path of development. (b) Skipping of the capitalist phase. As early as ] 920, at the Second Congress of the Communist International, Lenin advanced a thcory that certain backward socicties could altogether skip the capitalist phase of their development and pass straight into the socialist phase. This was possible if such societies had an effective Communist organization which, in turn, was aided by a country of the victorious proletariat such as the Soviet Union. Should such a transition from feudalism to socialism occur, the socialist mode of production and distribution would be im­ posed from above by the political authority. Industrialization would produce an in­ dustrial working class which prcviously was lacking and which would provide the political base of the new regime. (c) Primacy of politics. In contrast to Marx, who considered political arrange­ ments as a frill of the superstructure dependent on, and conditioned by, the eco­ nomic structure, Lenin believed that a well-organized political movement could in­ fluence the economy, thus putting in doubt whether the economy could still be regarded as the main structure. The theory that skipping the capitalist phase through proper political manipulation was admissible eloquently exemplified Len­ in's belief in the primacy of politics. But even more important were his concepts regarding the role of the Communist party. The party was conceived as the direct­ ing force of the proletarian class which was to provide the "subjective" factor. When this "subjective" factor was mixed with the "objective" conditions, revolu­ tion would be made feasible. The party was to be guided by thorough knowledge of Marxist doctrine and was to be organized as a highly centralized and disciplined body of professional revolutionaries. Proper revolutionary strategy demanded that the proletariat should establish an alliance with the peasantry to defeat the bour­ geoisie. However, it was to be the proletariat alone which would exercise dictator­ ship upon the assumption of power; the proletariat would do it through the Com­ munist party. (d) Inevitability oj war. As an integral part of his theory of imperialism, Lenin advanced the theory that as the struggle between capitalistic monopolies for control of markets and resources sharpened, wars among the capitalist powers were inevitable. The proletariat in those countries had nothing to gain from the victory of one or another power, Lenin theorized; therefore, it should strive to eon­ vert an imperialist war into a civil war in the name of class struggle. Once the pro­ letariat established itself in authority following a successful revolution, its new so­ cialist state would be exposed to continuous hostility of the capitalist states. This was bound to result in a number of "terrible clashes." Thus, the second aspect of Lenin's theory of the inevitability of war. However, for practical reasons, for in­ stance to gain respite from the relentless pressure of more powerful enemy states, peaceful coexistence with the bourgeois countries should be accepted and might

7 take the form of peace treaties and other politico-legal arrangements. This concep­ tual dualism, combining the inevitability of war and the possibility of coexistence, has permitted subsequent Soviet leaders to interpret Lenin virtually at their will, choosing that part of his theory which at the moment best suited them. Lenin's concept of coexistence, however, was tactical. The concept of inevitable war was fundamental, because it derived from his basic view of the historical process. 2 (e) United front in colonies and semi-colonies. Lenin insisted, in principle, on ideological and organizational isolationism for the Communist movement, so as not to dilute its revolutionary effectiveness by mixture with other radical or liberal organizations. Yet he thought it advisable that Communists should establish tem­ porary alliances with the "bourgeois democracy" in colonies and semi-colonies. Such alliances should not preclude Communist support of the oppressed colonial peasantry against its feudal masters. The main purpose of these alliances was to wage a more effective struggle against the imperialist powers controlling the colo­ nies. Once the objective of eliminating foreign masters was achieved, it was incum­ bent upon the local Communists to revert to internal class struggle. Thus, as in the case of peaceful coexistence, the united front concept was frankly avowed to be of a tactical, hence a temporary, nature. By thus adding to or revising the original Marxist doctrine, Lenin not only adapted theory to the pragmatic considerations at a time when the Bolsheviks seized power in Russia, but he also provided guidance for action in Soviet rela­ tions with the outside world. By advancing his theory of skipping the capitalist phase he not only seriously deviated from Marx's iron laws of history, but also laid the foundation for Communist action in the dependent world of Afro-Asia. Lenin's views found a systematic expression in the Theses on the National and Colonial Question adopted at the Second Congress of the Communist International (Comintern) in 1920. At that time Lenin entrusted the practical application of these principles to Stalin who, as the first Soviet commissar for nationalities, emerged as an expert on the revolutionary transformation both of the Soviet­ controlled (or coveted) areas of Moslem Central Asia and the wider world of Afro-Asia beyond the physical reach of Soviet power. Stalin's interest in these matters actually antedated the Bolshevik revolution of 1917. Back in 1913 he wrote, on Lenin's advice, his study, Marxism and the Na­ tional and Colonial Question. This study was instructive not so much for the origi­ nality of the principles he expounded. These broadly reflected his Marxist upbring­ ing. The study'S main significance was in the tactical rules he advocated. Marx had considered nationalism as an element of superstructure in the historical phase of capitalist-bourgeois society; he had tended to focus his attention on internation­ alism of the proletariat, a class "without a country." Stalin, however, himself a Georgian in the Russian Empire, felt the need to deal with nationality in greater depth and detail. Without deviating from Marxist fundamentals, he stressed that nationality should be treated seriously rather than being disregarded as a tempo­ rary and undesirable phenomenon. In fact, he decided, it should be properly ma­ nipulated to foster the Communist objective of creating a culture "national in form

2 For a thorough treatment of the war problem. see T. A. Taracouzio, War and Peace in Soviet Diplomacy (New York: Macmillan Co., 1940).

8 but proletarian in content." Stalin also warned against reckless Communist "cav­ alry raids" on religion, particularly in the Moslem areas. He advised that Communist principles should be inculcated in the minds of certain backward groups through skillful interpretation of religious teachings. His other notable con­ tribution was to elaborate on the principle of national self-determination, initially propounded by Lenin. Lenin believed that the separation of various ethnic groups, unwillingly incorporated into Europe's multinational empires (Russian, Austrian, German), would weaken these imperial structures, thereby hastening the demise of capitalism. Stalin qualified this principle by making it relative rather than absolute. In certain circumstances, argued Stalin, secession of a national group would be a backward step and should be resisted. Some ten years later, he confirmed this idea by declaring that secession of any national group, such as Poland, Finland, or the Transcaucasian republics, from the Communist-controlled Soviet state should be regarded as clearly counterrevolutionary and hence inadmissible. 3 Having ascended to power in the mid-1920s, Stalin continued to show interest in the problems of colonial revolution. Under his aegis, the Sixth Congress of the Comintern (1928) adopted the Theses on the Revolutionary Movement in the Colonies and Semi-Colonies. "The toiling masses of the colonies struggling against imperialist slavery represent," said this document, "a most powerful auxiliary force of the Socialist world revolution." "The revolutionary emancipatory movements of the colonies and semi-colonies more and more rally around the banner of the So­ viet Union, convincing themselves by bitter experience that there is no salvation for them except through alliance with the revolutionary proletariat, and through the victory of the world proletarian revolution over world imperialism." 4 Having thus found a strong link between the liberation movement in colonial areas and the Communist movement in the metropolitan countries, the Theses: (a) reaffirmed "the objective possibility of a non-capitalist path of development for the backward colonies" and "the possibility of the 'growing over' of the bourgeois-democratic revolution in the leading colonies into the proletarian socialist revolution with the aid of the victorious proletarian dictatorship in the other coun­ tries"; (b) decreed that "the theoretical and practical advocacy of this path ... is the duty of all Communists"; (c) described "the development of the Communist parties in the colonies and semi-colonies, the removal of the excessively marked disproportion between the objective revolutionary situation and the weakness of the subjective factor ..." as "one of the most important and primary tasks of the Communist International"; (d) prescribed appropriate tactics for the Communist parties. The parties were instructed to keep their own organizations and identities distinct and to differentiate between the so-called "reformist bourgeoisie" and the equally bourgeois "national revolutionary movement." "It is necessary," said the Theses, "to reject the formation of any kind of bloc between the Communist party

:l J. Stalin's views on nationality and national self-determination are formulated in his Marxism and the National Questioll, Selected Writings and Speeches (New York: Interna­ tional Publishers, 1942). An earlier version, undated, Marxism and the National and Colonial Question, was published in the 1930s (Marxist Library, Works of Marxism-Leninism, Vol. XXXVIII). 'Intemational Prcss Correspondcnce, III (December 12, 1928), pp. 1659-76. This text has been reproduced as Appendix VII in George Lenczowski, Russia and The West in Iran, 1918-1948 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1949).

9 and the national-reformist opposition." By contrast, "a temporary co-operation is permissible, and in certain circumstances even a temporary union between the Communist party and the national revolutionary movement provided ... that its representatives do not put obstacles in the way of the Communists educating and organizing in a revolutionary sense the peasants and broad masses of the ex­ ploited." The foregoing instruction confirmed the Leninist tactic of the united front. This time the tactic was elaborated with greater attention to detail; it was, moreover, based on the assumption that an alliance with the anti-imperialist bourgeoisie in the colonies could be maintained while carrying on revolutionary activities against it, with the bourgeoisie's presumed acquiescence. This formulation of the united front, as sanctioned in 1928, was probably the most restrictive in the long history of this concept from 1920 to the present. The Seventh Congress of the Comintern (1935) brought an innovation to Com­ munist tactics in Europe by approving the concept of a popular front, i.e., coali­ tion of Communists, Socialists, and liberal-bourgeois parties to fight more effec­ tively the menace of fascism and nazism. Earlier Communists were inclined not to differentiate between bourgeois democracy and fascism, considering both as mere versions of capitalism, to be opposed with equal zeal. These new tactics did not make an appreciable difference in Moscow's policies toward the colonial areas, first because the colonial united front concept was already in existence, and, sec­ ondly, because the imperial governments of the principal colonial areas, held mostly by France, Britain, Belgium, and the Netherlands, posed no problem of dif­ ferentiation between fascism and democratic capitalism. Thus the Theses adopted by the preceding Sixth Congress were maintained in force with all their anti­ imperialist accent, although the colony-owning democracies of the West began to be regarded as a lesser evil than fascist Italy and nazi Germany. While the immediate security needs of the Soviet Union might have dictated a moratorium on the sub­ versive activities in the colonies belonging to Russia's potential allies in the forth­ coming contest with the Axis forces, no such moratorium was decreed. Instead, the Seventh Congress of the Comintern permitted the colonial Communist parties to enter into collaborative agreements even with the reformist bourgeoisie, thus lifting the restriction imposed by the Sixth Congress. Parallel to these theoretical formulations, Stalin was carrying out pragmatic poli­ cies dcsigned to make Russia into the most coercive totalitarian state in the histori­ cal experience of mankind. At the same time he asserted Moscow's unquestioned dominance over international communism. The Comintern was transformed from a voluntary association of independent Communist parties into a strictly centralized subordinate organ of Soviet state policy, to be used as an alternate channel of ac­ tion alongside official diplomacy, worldwide secret police and espionage apparatus, and front organizations. Leaders of foreign Communist parties, induding those in colonial areas, were being appointed, promoted and demoted on the orders of the Soviet government, which also arranged for their training, subsidization, and lengthy periods of residence in Moscow. All of this was symbolized by the decreasing fre­ quency of the Comintern congresses. When, during World War II, it was deemed advisable to reassure the West that the Soviet Union had no intention of exporting

10 her revolution, the Communist International was disbanded as a superfluous and potentially irritating body. There are reasons to believe that Moscow regarded this as a formal gesture which would not destroy its commanding position over the local Communist parties. Because of the Soviet Union's preoccupation with the war against Germany be­ tween 1941 and 1945, no further progress was registered in the theoretical formu­ lations on colonies and semi-colonies. In practice, international communism experi­ enced two simultaneous trends: upward, in terms of numerical growth, and downward, with regard to ideological purity and discipline. Numerical growth was attributable to wartime conditions: In certain countries, such as occupied France, Italy, occupied Greece and Yugoslavia, Communists played a substantial role in the resistance movement against German and Fascist rule once the Soviet-Nazi "honeymoon" (1939-1941) was over. This permitted the Communists to acquire the halo of nationalism and to swell their ranks with patriotic elements. But their gains in national respectability were partly offset by their own doctrinal and organi­ zational relaxation. As for the situation in colonies and semi-colonies (it being understood that countries such as Egypt, Iraq, and Syria were classified in this category by Soviet theorists), Communists also made certain numerical progress. Their gains could be ascribed to two main factors: the acquisition of prestige by the Soviet Union as an ally of the Western powers which successfully resisted the German onslaught, and the relaxation of anti-Communist vigilance by British and French authorities in those countries, in deference to Moscow's wartime cooperation. Moreover, the cus­ tomary tactic of the united front, by then almost 25 years old, blurred distinctions between "pure" Communists and various radical and fellow-traveling groups and individuals. Two other developments should be listed as influencing the worldwide position of Communist movements toward the end of World War II. One was the belief, however mistaken, held by some Communist groups that the dissolution of the Comintern decreed by Moscow in 1943 was a genuine step toward the granting of greater autonomy to local parties. War-induced obstacles to effective liaison be­ tween the Russian center and the outlying organizations were partly responsible for this misunderstanding. On the other hand, there was the growth in occupied coun­ tries of self-reliant Communist organizations, the most classical example of which was Tito's movement. The ability of these organizations to survive under adverse conditions without appreciable Soviet assistance gave them self-confidence and a somewhat independent outlook, potentially detrimental to Soviet supremacy over international communism.

The Stalin-Zhdanov Doctrine: Rigid Bipolarity To restore that supremacy and to assure that Communist parties resumed their time-tested role of reliable agencies supporting Soviet policies, at a time when the Soviet Union's expansion into Eastern Europe and threatened expansion into Tur­ key and Iran demanded marshaling of such support, Moscow decided to put an end to the uncertainties and ideological compromises of wartime Communist­ bourgeois coalitions. In September 1947, speaking at the opening session of the

11 Cominform (Communist Information Bureau), Andrei Zhdanov delivered a major policy pronouncement in which he reaffirmed the orthodox line, anticipating a world polarized between imperialism under American leadership and socialism under Moscow. An unbridgeable gulf separated these two camps and there was no possi­ bility of ideological compromise, he declared. "The cardinal purpose of the imperi­ alist camp," said Zhdanov, "is to strengthen imperialism, to hatch a new imperial­ ist war, to combat Socialism and democracy, and to support reactionary and anti-democratic pro-fascist regimes and movements anywhere. . . ." The main postwar instruments of American policy were, according to Zhdanov; the Truman Doctrine (1947) and thc Marshall Plan (1947). Both had clearly imperialist objectives, the Truman Doctrine through "creation of American bases in the East­ ern Mediterranean with the purpose of establishing American supremacy in that area," and the Marshall Plan by promoting "a scheme to create a bloc of states bound by obligations to the United States and to grant American credits to Euro­ pean countries as a recompense for the renunciation of economic, and then of po­ litical, independence." Under such a bipolar scheme there was no place for a third, uncommitted posi­ tion. Either a country belonged to the imperialist camp (as its active participant or dependent entity) or it opted for the anti-imperialist camp headed by the Soviet Union. In other words, genuine neutralism was conceptually inadmissible; as a pragmatic policy of some countries or groups it was condemned as dishonest and as disguising a client relationship to imperialism. 5 Reflecting this view in 1951, Syrian Communist leader Khaled Bakdash strongly attacked Arab Socialists for their advocacy of the "third force" or "neutrality" be­ tween the two camps. "This," said Bakdash, "in effect leads to a breaking up of the wave of hatred and growing struggle (a) against war and the aggressive schemes of the Anglo-American imperialists aiming toward the occupation of our country and (b) against the treason of the rulers." 6 This dichotomous view of the world also required a return to a more orthodox line on the class struggle. As Bakdash stated in his report to the Syro-Lebanese Communist party: Our job during the present stage is to muster the broad masses and especially the workers and peasants .... To bring this about, the prineipal orientation of our effort and activity must be toward isolating the nationalist bourgeoisie and putting an end to its influence among the people. For this bourgeoisie, no matter how much the names of its parties vary, uses its influence to deceive the people and turn it away from the revolutionary struggle; it works also for an understanding with imperialism .... We must work constantly also to unmask groups and parties claiming to be "socialist," such as the Arab Socialist Party, the Islamic Socialist Front, and Baath Party in Syria, and the Socialist Pro-

5 Andrei Zhdanov "The International Situation," eds. R. A. Goldwin and M. Zetterbaum, Readings in Russia:l Foreign Policy (Chicago: American Foundation for Political Educa­ tion, 2d ed., n.d.), Vol. III, p. 85f£. 6 Khaled Bakdash, "For the Successful Struggle for Peace, National Independence. and De­ mocracy We Must Resolutely Turn Toward the Workers and the Peasants," report delivered at the plenary session of the Central Command of the Communist Party of Syria and Leba­ non, January 1951. Middle East Journal, Vol. VII, No.2 (Spring 1953), p. 206ff.

12 gressive Party of lumblat, etc., in Lebanon ... for through their seductive propaganda they constitute a danger to the growing democratic national movement against war and imperialism, feudalism, and exploitation.' It would thus appear that, under the revival of strict orthodox orientation with its emphasis on the class struggle and distrust of the bourgeoisie little place was left for the concept of the united front. However, Bakdash did leave an opening to a possible collaboration with the bourgeoisie-with the reservation that it should be temporary, limited to a simultaneous attack against imperialism, and safeguard­ ing the distinctiveness of the Communist party. In proclaiming this guidance, Bak­ dash echoed more or less faithfully the Theses of the Sixth Congress of the Comin­ tern adopted 23 years earlier. Yet even during the last years of the Stalinist era, the concept of the united front was not only revived but also enlarged. This evolution was due perhaps more to international politics than to doctrinal formulations. In 1951-52 two Middle Eastern countries, Egypt and Iran, were caught up in significant nationalist upsurges against British influence. The Egyptian turmoil grew out of national frustration with the continued British military presence in the Suez Canal Zone and in the Sudan. In Iran, the bone of contention was oil. In both cases there emerged powerful nationalist groups attempting simultaneously to over­ throw the existing political structures and eliminate British influence. In both situa­ tions Communists tried to gain advantage from the sharpening conflicts by throw­ ing their support to, and trying to join, the nationalist coalitions. These coalitions were in reality no more than loose groupings of frustrated anti-Western elements, rather heterogeneous in composition and including even such religious groups as the Moslem Brotherhood in Egypt and Mulla Kashani's followers in Iran. So long as they were struggling and refusing to compromise with Britain they qualified for a label of "national revolutionaries" and were treated as tactical partners by the Communists.

Doctrinal Evolution Since Khrushchev With Khrushchev's advent to power in 1954, doctrinal formulations underwent further evolution, mostly in the tactical sense, but in some cases coming close to the revision of more fundamental principles. Khrushchev's contributions were contained in a number of statements he made at major Communist meetings, Soviet and internationaL Particularly important in this respect were the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1956, the 21st Congress in 1959, the meeting of 81 Communist par­ ties in Moscow in 1960, and the 22nd Congress of the CPSU in 1961. In addition, Khrushchev made'policy statements on his numerous visits abroad, when receiving foreign visitors and delegations in the Soviet Union, and in press interviews. On the basis of these pronouncements, Khrushchev's views could be summed up as follows: 1. Coexistence: Peaceful coexistence between countries with differing social sys­ tems is not only possible but desirable and must be regarded as one of the cardinal principles of Soviet foreign policy. To sustain this view, Khrushchev invoked Len-

7 Ibid.

13 in's authority on the subject. Inasmuch as Lenin had preached the inevitability of wars between the capitalist and the Communist states (while admitting periods of coexistence as a tactical device to gain respite for Communist Russia), Khrushchev gave the following explanation for the change in the doctrine: at the time when the Leninist concept was developed, "( I) imperialism was an all-embracing world sys­ tem and (2) the social and political forces which did not want war were weak, in­ sufficiently organized, and hence unable to compel the imperialists to renounce war." He claimed that "For that period, the above-mentioned thesis was absolutely correct. At the present time, however, the situation has changed radically. Now there is a world camp of socialism which has become a mighty force. In this camp the peace forces have not only the moral but also the material means to prevent aggression." 8 Coexistence thus being a new basic principle, it is to be understood with the fol­ lowing observations: (a) It is to be carried on through peaceful competition between the socialist and the eapitalist systems. "Our certainty of the victory of communism is based on the fact that the socialist mode of production possesses decisivc superiority over the capitalist mode of production.-We believe that all the working people on earth, once they have become convinced of the advantages communism brings, will sooner or later take the road of struggle for the construction of a socialist society." 9 (b) "Peaceful coexistence of states does not imply renunciation of the class struggle. . . . The coexistence of states with different social systems is a form of class struggle between socialism and capitalism. In conditions of peaceful coexist­ ence favorable opportunities are provided for the development of the class struggle in the capitalist countries and the national-liberation movement of the peoples in the colonial and dependent countries." 10 (c) "Peaceful coexistence of countries with different social systems does not mean conciliation of the socialist and bourgeois ideologies." 11 2. Third Force and Neutralism: In contrast to the StaIin-Zhdanov formula of absolute dichotomy between the world camps of capitalism and socialism, Khrush­ chcv admitted the independent position of a vast group of countries which be­ longed to neither camp. The earlier view was to consider them as "colonies and semi-colonies," thus denying the possibility of an independent status even to coun­ tries like Wafdist Egypt which enjoyed formal sovereignty; the new-Khrush­ chevian-formulation was to accept these states as truly independent, but underde­ veloped and struggling to eradicate the remnants of Western influence, while fighting the return of imperialism under various guises. Similarly, in contrast to the late Stalin era when neutralist trends were con­ demned as implicitly anti-Soviet and evil, Khrushchev acknowledged them as legiti-

8 "Report to the 20th Party Congress, February, 1956," The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. VIII, No.4 (1956). (Hereinafter referred to as "Report.") \l Ibid. lU Manifesto of 81 Communist and Workers' Parties, December 5, 1960. U,S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the In­ ternal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws. 87th Congress, 1st sess., January 26- February 2, 1961 (emphasis added); hereinafter referred to as "Manifesto of 81." 11 Ibid.

14 mate. "War is opposed," he said, "by a growing number of peace-loving countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America . . . the national liberation movement of the colonies and dependent countries, the world peace movement, and the neutral countries which want no share in the imperialist policy of war and advocate peace­ ful coexistence." 12 Later the draft program of the Soviet Communist party stated: "A vast peace zone has taken shape on earth. In addition to the Socialist countries, it includes a large group of non-Socialist countries that for various rea­ sons are not interested in starting a war. There is a growing number of countries that adhere to a policy of neutrality and strive to safeguard themselves against the hazards of participation in military blocs." 13 3. Nonrevolutionary Way to Socialism: The stress on peaceful competition was accompanied by the idea that, on the internal front in individual countries, it was not only possible but, in some cases, even preferable to achieve socialism by parliamentary and other nonviolent methods. As is often the case with Communist theorists, Khrushchev chose an appropriate quotation from Lenin to support his views. "V. I. Lenin wrote," he said, " 'All nations will arrive at socialism-this is inevitable-but not all will do so in exactly the same way.' " And he added on his own: "It is quite probable that the forms of transition to socialism will become more and more varied; moreover, achieving these forms need not be associated with civil war under all circumstances." 11 "The working class and its vanguard­ the Marxist-Leninist parties-prefer to achieve the transfer of power from the bourgeoisie to the proletariat by peaceful means, without civil war." 10 "In many capitalist countries," asserted Khrushchev, "the working class, uniting around itself the working peasantry, the intellectuals, and all patriotic forces ... has an oppor­ tunity to ... win a firm majority in parliament and to turn the parliament from an agency of bourgeois democracy into an instrument of genuinely popular will. The winning of a firm parliamentary majority based on the mass revolutionary move­ ment of the proletariat and of the working people would create conditions for the working class of many capitalist and formerly colonial countries to make funda­ mental social changes." 1/i Amplifying this view, he stated on a subsequent visit to Budapest: "There are people in the world who call themselves Marxists-Leninists and at the same time say there is no need to strive for a better life. According to them only one thing is important-revolution. What kind of Marxism is this?" " 4. Wars of National Liberation. Although winning independence and emancipa­ tion from imperialism are possible under present world conditions by peaceful means, "Communists have always recognized the progressive, revolutionary signifi­ cance of national-liberation wars," according to the 81 parties' manifesto of 1960." "The peoples of the colonial countries," said this statement, "win their in­ dependence both through armed struggle and by nonmilitary methods, depending

1:' Ibid. 1:\ "Draft Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union," presented at its 22nd Congress, October 1961. The New York Times, August 1, 1961. (Hereinafter referred to as "Draft Program.") 14 "Report," op. cit. 15 "Draft Program," op. cit. 16 "Report," op. cit. 17 The New York Times, April 2, 1964. 18 "Manifesto of 81," op. cit.

15 on the specific conditions in the country concerned .... The forces of world social­ ism contributed decisively to the struggle of the colonial and dependent peoples for liberation from imperialist oppression." 19 5. Modified Concept of the National Front. Communist doctrine applied the concept of the united front, that is, cooperation between Communists and non­ Communists to attain revolutionary objectives of liberation from imperialism (where it has not yet been completed) and socialist transformation, to colonial and semi-colonial situations long before the mid-1930s, when the popular front tactic was endorsed for the advanced Western societies. The rigid bipolarity line adopted by Stalin and articulated by Zhdanov in 1947, with its insistence that if "you are not one of us you are our enemy," not only repudiated neutrality in international rela­ tions but aJso put a brake on the united front concept. This united front was revived, however, under Khrushchev. In the 19605 it was generally referred to as the national front, although the older expressions of united front and popular front were occasionally used. If there was any differ­ ence between the national front of the post-Stalin era and its earIi~r versions, it was in an appreciable broadening of its scope. "When peoples fight for their na­ tional independence against the colonialists," declared Khrushchev, "all patriotic forces are merged in a single national front." 20 Nearly two years later, the "Manifesto of 81" reasserted the "alliance of the working class and the peasantry" as the most important force within a "broad na­ tional front" which it defined as "all elements of the nation prepared to fight for national independence, against imperialism." In a further refinement of this defini­ tion, the manifesto listed the components of the front as "the working class, peas­ antry, intellectuals and the petty and middle urban bourgeoisie," claiming that "there are favorable conditions for rallying these forees" and that "this unity is quite feasible." The manifesto conceded that such a coalition, with its progressive anti-imperialist and anti-feudal program, would "not eliminate the exploitation of man by man." However, "it would limit the power of monopolies, enhance the prestige and political weight of the working class in the country's affairs, help to isolate the most reactionary forces and facilitate the unification of all the progressive forces." 21 When reporting on the 81 parties' conference to Soviet party officials on January 6, 1961, Khrushchev gave an even broader formula. Referring to tactics in the "coloniaJ" areas, he urged Communists to seek "support from all persons at all levels of society so long as they opposed imperialism." 22 6. Concept of National Democracy. The "national democratic state" was de­ fined in 1960 at the Moscow Conference of 81 Communist and Workers' Parties as "a state which consistently upholds its political and economic independence and fights against the new form of colonialism and the penetration of imperialist capi-

19 Ibid. 20 Speech to the 21st Congress of the CPSU, January 17, 1959. Foreign Broadcast Informa­ tion Service, Daily Report, January 29, 1959. Emphasis mine. 21 "Manifesto of 81," op. cit. 23 Current Digest of the Soviet Press. Vol. III, No.4 (or 87th Cong., 1st seSS., Doc. No. 14, p. 5). For a thorough discussion of the national front, see A. Benningsen, "The 'Na­ tional Front' in Communist Strategy in the Middle East," in Walter Z. Laqueur, The Middle East in Transition (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958).

16 tal. ... The Communist parties," said the same document, "are working actively ... for the establishment of national democracies," and, similarly, "the socialist coun­ tries ... help and support these countries generously in achieving progress, creat­ ing a national industry, developing and consolidating the national economy and training the national personnel. ..." However, the national bourgeoisie (Le., the class governing such a state), though "objectively progressive," is "unstable" and "inclined to compromise with imperialism and feudalism." For this reason, support for the national democracies must be qualified. Communists support those actions of national governments leading to the consoli­ dation of the gains achieved and undermining the imperialists' positions. At the same time they firmly oppose anti-democratic, anti-popular acts and those measures of the ruling circles which endanger national inde­ pendence. Communists expose attempts by the reactionary section of the bourgeoisie to represent its selfish, narrow class interests as those of the entire nation; they expose the demagogic use by bourgeois politicians of social slogans for the same purpose ....23 Elaborating further on this theme, a statement of the Soviet Communist party in 1961 said that the young sovereign states do not belong either to the system of imperial­ ist states or to the system of socialist states. But the overwhelming majority of them have not yet broken free from world capitalist economy. . . . The CPSU considers fraternal alliance' with the peoples who have thrown off colonial and semi-colonial tyranny to be a cornerstone of its international policy. 24 Thus while the concept of national democracy was not entirely new, the way it was presented constituted an innovation. It accepted the hegemony of the national bourgeoisie in emancipated excolonial countries, with systems neither capitalist nor socialist, as a positive phenomenon in the overall Communist strategy.25 In evaluating Khrushchev's contributions to theory, it should be pointed out that he skillfully avoided any abrupt break with the past and invariably sought confir­ mation of his concepts in Lenin's (and occasionally Stalin's) pronouncements. 20 Thus, while emphasizing the concept of peaceful coexistence, he repeatedly in­ voked Lenin's authority on the subject. Even when his views seemed to be defi­ nitely opposed to classical Marxism-Leninism, as was his concept of the possibility

23 "Manifesto of 81," op. cit. 24 Draft Program of the epsu presented to its 22nd Congress in October 1961. Facts on File, August 24-30,1960 (also New York Times, August 1, 1961). 20 For further discussion of the concept, see B. Ponomarev, "The State of National Democ­ racy," Kommunist, No. 8 of 1961, as quoted by The Mizan Newsletter, Vol. III, No. 7 (July-August 1961). 2fi Defending his policy of peaceful way to socialism, Khrushchev said in a speech in East Berlin: "The supporters of the 'theory' of socialism triumphing through war also reject the possibility of using peaceful means for achieving the victory of socialism by asserting that this represents a retreat from Marxism. It should be brought to the notice of these supporters of the Stalin cult that it was Stalin himself who in conversation with British Communists after the last war developed the idea of using peaceful, parliamentary ways for achieving the vic­ tory of socialism. And this is written in the program of the Communist Party of Great Brit­ ain. The leaders of the British Communist Party know that this formulation was put forward by Stalin." (New York Times, January 17, 1963.)

17 of a nonviolent way to socialism, Khrushchev would go to great lengths to explain that (a) Lenin was perfectly right in stressing the need for revolution under the historical circumstances of his era, and (b) the revolutionary way to socialism was, under certain circumstances (i.e., "proper juxtaposition of the objective and subjective factors"), still a valid and proper method. Furthermore, by stressing that peaceful coexistence "implies intensification of the struggle of the working class, of all the Communist parties, for the triumph of Socialist ideas," Khrushchev left no doubt that coexistence as preached by him was primarily a matter of tac­ tics. He sought a Communist system rather than an immutable principle. Similarly, his references to the united front in the national liberation movement were not original, only a further elaboration of the older concept. In a broader sense, Khrushchev's main contribution was probably his greater flexibility in promoting the worldwide interests of the Soviet state and, implicitly, of communism. The rig­ idity of the Stalin era was, under Khrushchev's aegis, replaced by a more adapta­ ble approach. Infiltration and the use of non-Communist neutral governments to emancipate developing countries and to remove Western influence appeared to have a higher priority than outright calls for revolution.

The Post-Khrushchev Era Khrushchev's downfall did not entail any major changes in theoretical formula­ tions. In fact, his strategy and tactics in the Soviet Union's relations with the de­ veloping countries were maintained and, in some cases, expanded. Despite this basic continuity, there was some adjustment in Soviet theory on three issues: coex­ istence, revolutionary democracy, and national front. 1. Coexistence. Under Khrushchev's general formula of peaceful coexistence, significant differences of warmth could be observed in the relations between Mos­ cow and an assortment of developing nations. For instance, the Soviet Union's atti­ tude toward Turkey and Iran, both members of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), was no more than correct and, on occasion, carried accents of irritation and warnings against excessive reliance on the West. A series of Soviet-sponsored broadcasts from a clandestine anti-Iranian station, entitled "Behind the Walls of Saadabad," mercilessly attacked Iran's royal establishment for its alleged misdeeds and abuses. By contrast, Soviet relations with Nasser's Egypt and Kassem's Iraq were cordial and only occasionally marred by critical outbursts condemning the poor treatment of local Communists by these regimes. Toward the end of the Khrushchev era, the Soviet government began a period of determined conciliatory diplomacy toward Turkey and Iran, even though their internal political structures and their alliances with the West might have caused them to be viewed as adversaries rather than friends. This trend was further strengthened in the post-K,hrushchev period, resulting in the conclusion of a variety of aid-and-trade agreements with Turkey and Iran. The pattern thus set was ap­ plied later to other states in the Middle East, including Jordan and Kuwait, in spite of their monarchical systems and generally pro-Western policies. Although never fully articulated in theoretical terms, this was a marked enlargement of the concept of coexistence.

18 2. RevolutiolUlry Democracy. The post-Khrushchev era witnessed also an adap­ tation of the earlier concept of national democracy to that of revolutionary democ­ racy. The formula of national democracy had been conceived before the adoption of socialist programs by Egypt (U.A.R.), Iraq, and Syria in the 1960s, often by revolutionary methods. 27 Thus Soviet theorists were confronted with a somewhat paradoxical situation in which a national bourgeoisie (rather than the Communist­ led proletariat) was developing, under a one-party regime, a socialist society and economy in a number of Arab and other Afro-Asian countries. The question arose: Should those socialist programs be rejected as spurious, simply because they were authored by the "wrong" (from the Leninist point of view) class? Should they be denounced? Or should they be accepted as genuine, progressive, and revo­ lutionary? If they were accepted, what was to be the role of the Communist parties in such single-party socialist regimes? The problem was further complicated by of­ ficial, and sometimes actual, suppression of the Communist parties by the Arab governments. The answers were supplied in the last years of Khrushchev's rule through devel­ opment of the new concept of revolutionary democracy, which permitted differen­ tiation between such socialist regimes and other systems, ruled by the national bourgeoisie without adopting socialism. Both revolutionary democracy and the sin­ gle party, such as the Arab Socialist Union or the Syrian Baath, implementing a socialist program, were accepted as progressive elements. Soviet theorists also noted that the actual content of revolutionary practice in underdeveloped countries outpaced their ideological advance. Although there was a doctrinal lag between their national socialism and the Soviet "scientific socialism" (i.e., Marxism­ Leninism), socialist changes made by these regimes had to be considered as truly revolutionary.2" This being the case, it was conceded that local Communist parties were not a leading force in this socialist transformation. Yet because of its truly revolutionary and progressive nature, it deserved their active support. 3. The NatiolUll Front and Formal Self-effacement. Adoption of revolutionary democracy has had its effect on the theory and practice of the national front. This was because socialist transformations in revolutionary democracies were being carried out by military-nationalist regimes without Communist participation. Com­ munists thus were in danger of being left out when momentous radical changes were taking place in those countries. By joining with others in national fronts and conceding leadership to the non-Communist elements, Communists could, at least, avoid being bypassed and, at best, they could influence the process. This was a new development in the concept of the national front. Earlier Com-

27 The U.A.R. socialist program was launched by a series of nationalization decrees in July 1961, to be followed by the enactment of the National Charter in April 1962. In Syria a coup d'etat ushered the Baath Socialist Party into power in March 1963. Iraq introduced major socialist measures in July 1964, while proclaiming adherence to Cairo-patterned Arab socialism. e' For a thorough discussion of the new doctrine, see Mizan Newsletter, Vol. VI, Nos. 1-11 (1964), including a special November issue, No. 10, "The USSR and the Developing Coun­ tries." See also Jaan Pennar, "The Arabs, Marxism, and Moscow: a Historical Survey," The Middle East Journal, Vol. XXII, No.4 (Autumn, 1968). On ideological lag behind the revo­ lutionary practice, see also Khrushchev Remembers (Boston and Toronto: Little Brown and Co., 1970), pp. 443-45.

19 munist theory had regarded the united front as a tactical device linking various groups in opposition to the colonial or semi-colonial regime. The new national front formula implied cooperation with the existing nationalist regime and, if pos­ sible, participation in the revolutionary process under its aegis.20 Success in this new tactic hinged on the tolerance and openness of the one-party nationalist re­ gimes. These were of two types. One could be described as an imperfect one-party system, under which, despite the official monopoly of a government-licensed organi­ zation, other political parties were permitted to operate semi-legally and semi­ openly. Syria, under the Baath party regime, and Iraq, during various periods after 1958, operated in this way. Under those conditions Communists found it possible to mount propaganda offensives favoring a national front. The other alternative had a much stricter one-party system, under which no other parties were tolerated. Egypt and Algeria were examples. These regimes relied exclusively on their own party organizations and shunned coalitions or alliances. Under such circumstances advocacy of a national front could only be regarded as an opposition activity, hence subject to suppression. Inasmuch as the Communist party wanted to avoid suppression, it had only the choice of remaining inactive or of permitting its mem­ bers to enter the government apparatus on an individual basis, in the hope that their services would be accepted. In either case, virtual self-effacement of the party was accepted in order to attain ultimate Communist goals at some future date. Self-effacement might even imply formal disbandment of the party organization. It was especially painful, and at variance with the basic concept of an active party serving as the vanguard of the proletariat, officially to embrace self-immolation. But it was conceivable, inasmuch as various doctrinal statements repeatedly stressed the need for flexibility and adaptation to local conditions.30 This was precisely the line adopted by the Egyptian Communist party on April 25, 1965. It announced its own dissolution in a communique published by the re­ gime's semi-official organ, Al-Ahram. The communique declared that the Arab So­ cialist Union (ASU), U.A.R.'s only licensed political organization, was capable of "shouldering the responsibility of carrying on the revolution in all national fields." Party members were instructed to join ASU's ranks. Ol What from one angle might have appeared as self-effacement, from another could be regarded as a technique of infiltration. This was perfectly compatible with the guidelines of the 81 parties' manifesto of 1960, which said that "Communists should extend their work in trade unions and cooperatives, among the peasantry, the youth, the women, in sports organizations, and the unorganized sections of the popUlation." 32

29 In conformance with this formula, a National Conference of the Iraqi Communist Party, December 1967, proposed "the formation of national-democractic fronts and coalition govern­ ments which would include the Communist Parties and all the progressive and patriotic forces." Peace, Freedom al1d Socialism, Vol. XI, No.4 (April 1968), p. 41. 30 In this vein the CPSU Draft Program of 1961 declared that "the diversity of national pe­ culiarities and traditions that have arisen in the course of history creates specific conditions for the revolutionary process and for the variety of forms and rates of the proletariat's advent to power." "Draft Program," op. cit. ~1 Facts 011 File, 1965, June 10-16, p. 221. 32 "Manifesto of 81," op. cit.

20 Conclusion To conclude our review of doctrinal foundations, Communist revolutionary theory for underdeveloped areas evolved significantly from the early Marxist­ Leninist formulations to the concepts of the 1970s. This evolution has been an adjustment to political developments in the Lenin-Stalin period and the post­ Stalin era. Communist political thought of the Lenin-Stalin period was influenced by three phenomena to which Soviet leaders and theorists were acutely sensitive: (a) the capitalist encirclement of the Soviet Union (b) the legacy of wars among the capitalist states, and (c) the existence of colonial empires controlled by the leading Western nations. The Leninist-Stalinist view was that wars were inevitable, that so­ cialist transformation could be achieved only by violent revolution, that there was no middle road between Western capitalism and Soviet socialism, and that inde­ pendence for underdeveloped countries was illusory even if they achieved formal sovereignty. Emphasis was on class struggle, doctrinal purity and organizational distinctiveness of Communist parties. Parties could cooperate temporarily with non-Communist groups, but eligibility of the bourgeoisie for membership in sueh united fronts was greatly restricted. At no time were the Communists to forget that their provisional bourgeois allies were to become objects of hostility, to be vi­ olently overthrown once emancipation from imperial control had taken place. The political environment changed appreeiably in the post-Stalin era. The chief characteristics of that era that are relevant to our study are: (a) emergence of the Soviet Union as one of thc two world superpowers; (b) establishment of the "so­ cialist camp" of satellite and other Communist states and, correspondingly, reces­ sion of the "capitalist encirclement" of the Soviet Union; (c) retreat and abolition of Western colonialism and emergence of independent nations; (d) adoption of non-Communist socialism in a number of independent Third World countries. Khrushchev was not slow in drawing conclusions from this change. Under his aegis Communist doctrine was adapted and modified to suit the new circumstances. This doctrinal evolution took place within the framework of basic Communist theory of state and society. There were repeated assertions of conformity, on Khrushchev's part, to the tenets of Marxism-Leninism. Khrushchev's and his suc­ cessor's main contributions to the theory were: to allow for peaceful coexistence between states with differing political systems and to deny the inevitability of war, either between the bourgeois states themselves or between the capitalist and the Communist camps; to admit the possibility of nonviolent transformation into so­ cialism, while stressing the continuity of the class struggle; to acknowledge the independence of sovereign ex-colonial countries; and to accept as a positive phe­ nomenon their 'neutrality, under the leadership of native nationalists of bourgeois stripe. While wars of national liberation were still hailed as an alternate and "sacred" way to achieve independence and were thus considered deserving of Soviet and general Communist support, peaceful emancipation from colonialism was acknowl­ edged as permissible, Khrushchev also redefined the role of Communist parties in such Third World nations: in those still struggling for independence, Communists were expected to join with other-including the bourgeois-groups in the broadest possible national fronts to fight imperialism. In those already emancipated-Le.,

21 the national democracies-Communists were to support the national governments in their efforts to preserve independence and promote economic development, but were enjoined to oppose the ruling groups' tendency to compromise with imperial­ ism and feudalism. Finally, in the new type of structures, the revolutionary de­ mocracies-i.e., those states which under a non-Communist rule were adopting so­ cialism-Communist parties were encouraged not only to cooperate but also to participate, on an individual or organized basis, in their governments so as to as­ sure active Communist presence in the process of socialist transformation. Ultimately, post-Stalin doctrinal formulations reduced the role of the native Communist parties as revolutionary agencies and enhanced the role of the Soviet state and its socialist allies in striving for Communist objectives in the Third World. The pattern of course varied according to local circumstances. Extension of Soviet influence through aid-and-trade or infiltration appeared to acquire higher priority than outright revolutionary action, but the latter was not repudiated as an ultimate weapon, to be used if warranted by local circumstances.

22 II. IRAN: FROM SUBVERSION TO AID AND TRADE

ince 1941, Soviet policies toward Iran have been subject to many fluctuations, S ranging from aggressive hostility to gestures of goodwill expressed in arms deliv­ eries and support for Iran's economic development. Traditionally, Iran has regarded the Soviet Union with distrust and fear caused by the persistence of Russia's southward expansionism which combined territorial aggrandizement, military aggressiveness, and political interference. Iran lost terri­ tory to Russia on three occasions in the nineteenth century, by the treaties of Gul­ istan (1813) and Turkomanchai (1828),' and by an agreement of 1881. Each of these instruments confirmed a Russian territorial advance at the expense of Iran and each followed military hostilities. In the economic sphere, Czarist Russia or her individual subjects secured banking, railroad, fisheries, and oil concessions as well as a preferential customs arrangement. By offering low-interest loans, Russia gained considerable influence over Iran's rulers of the Kajar dynasty. A Russian­ office red Iranian Cossack brigade served as a channel of penetration into the Ira­ nian military establishment. It was, in fact, this brigade, assisted by Russian troops, which was used in 1908-09 in an attempt to destroy Iran's newly pro­ claimed constitution and parliamentary system." In 1907, an Anglo-Russian agreement had divided Iran into the Russian and British spheres of influence with a neutral zone in between. The Russian sphere embraced not only the five Iranian provinces adjacent to Russia (Azerbaijan, Gllan, Mazanderan, Gargan, and Khorasan), but also large areas in the central part of Iran as far south as Isfahan and Yazd. It thus included most of Iran's urban centers in addition to its best farmlands in the north. During World War I, the Russian army, in disregard of Iran's neutrality, freely operated in the country's northwestern provinces. In spite of the denunciation of Czarist imperialist objectives by the freshly-established Soviet government in 1917-18,3 Red Army contingents invaded Iran's Caspian region in 1920. There, reinforced by political commissars, they gave a local rebel, Kuchik Khan, a helping hand in establishing his Soviet Republic of Gilan, which was the first experiment in Soviet-sponsored Communist rule in Asia. { The Gilan Republic collapsed by

1 Text of the Treaty of Gulistan may be found in J. C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy ill Ihe Near alld Middle East: A Documentary Record (Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand, 1956). Vol. I, pp. 84·86; and of the Treaty of Turkomanchai, ibid., pp. 96·102. " For an authoritative review of this earlier period of Russian-Iranian relations, see Rouhol· lah K. Ramazani, The Foreign PuliC}' of Iran, 1500·1941: A Developing Nation in World Affairs (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1966). 3 For relevant texts, see J. Bunyan and H. H. Fisher, The Bolshevik Rel'olution, 1917·1918: Documents and Materials (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1934), p. 468. 4 For an account of this episode, see George Lenczowski, Russia and the West ill ira II, 1918·1948: A Study ill Big-Power Rivalry (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1949), Chap. III, with a Supplement, 1954 (reprint edition by Greemz'ood Press, New York, 1968); and Sepehr Zabih, The Communist Movement in Iran (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1966), Chap. I.

23 1922 following the Red Army's retreat from the territory of Iran. Moscow de­ cided to abandon a small-scale revolutionary gain in Gilan to normalize her rela­ tions with Iran as a whole. This decision conformed to a broader policy which sought an end to the Soviet Union's diplomatic isolation in the immediate post­ reVOlutionary period. In pursuance of this policy, Moscow concluded, between January and March 1921, treaties of friendship with her three southern neighbors in Asia: Iran, Tur­ key, and Afghanistan. (The Soviet-Iranian Treaty of February 26, 1921, had an onerous clause in Article 6 which gave the Soviet Union "the right to advance her troops into the Persian interior" if a third party "should desire to use Persian terri­ tory as a base of operations against Russia.") :; It was not, however, genuine friendship that had generated these treaties. Soviet communism and the national­ ism of the three countries in question were too incompatible to warrant trust and warmth of feelings. At the most, the next 20 years could be described as a pe­ riod of armed truce. Soviet policy toward Iran during that period followed an am­ biguous line: While Leninist theorists tended to approve Reza Shah's regime as a revolutionary improvement over the previous feudal period and as a desirable na­ tionalist challenge to British imperialism," Soviet political agents in Iran were en­ gaging in subversive activities to undermine and weaken the regime. The truce was ended with the entry of Soviet troops into Iran in August 1941, following an Anglo-Soviet agreement to occupy Iran and thus assure safe passage of war supplies from the West to the Soviet Union. The Soviet invasion of Iran in 1941 opened a new and turbulent chapter in the history of Soviet-Iranian relations. Four phases in this chapter are distinguishable: ( 1) a direct Soviet threat to Iran's independence, 1945-47; (2) Soviet exploitation of the oil crisis, 1951-53; (3) a Soviet campaign against Iran's Western alliance, 1954-62; (4) wooing Iran toward neutralism, since 1965.

Direct Soviet Threat to Iran's Independence: the Azerhaijan Crisis, 1945-47 The presence of Soviet and British troops in Iran during World War II was reg­ ulated by the Tripartite Treaty of January 29, 1942.' This treaty brought Iran into alliance with Russia and Britain and provided for the evacuation of Soviet and British troops within six months after the end of the war. The British used their army to safeguard the passage of supplies and removed it by the stipulated dead­ line. The Russians, however, gave early evidence of assigning to their troops a broader task. This task was political and revolutionary. Soviet occupation in the northern zone sought to make certain basic changes in Iran's socio-economic struc­ ture: Repressive policies were applied to landowners and the upper bourgeoisie, some estates were seized, while local Communist elements (usually affiliated with the Tudeh party) were encouraged and protected. Similarly, the Soviet Embassy in Teheran energetically pursued political goals, publicizing the Soviet war effort and achievements in a variety of fields and promoting Communist influence in the

5 Text in Lenczowski, op. cit., pp. 317-18, and Hurewitz, op. cit., II, pp. 90·94. B For an analysis of Soviet revolutionary strategy with regard to Iran, see Lenczowski, op. cit., pp. 9-11,86-91, and 138-141; also Zabih, op. cit. 7 Text in Lenczowski, op. cit., pp. 319·22; and Hurewitz, op. cit., II, pp. 232-34.

24 I04JfII0 4F1''f' RVR($ilrlj'fA11a.. "!'tOT "-ECf ~ 'U L " Au TH OAlt,a.TI'I[ _

TURKEY U.S.S.R. .,,-. ._,-_ .\...... "'-., CASPIAN SEA (.J ,-. MeWd • f' '--. ~ ,,/' r- ' ~'./' () > AFGHANISTAN tv sovln BUilT STeeL Il'LANl U. \ ( ...... ,."'" ~ ' ,

$..qu.o, '"l NEUTRAL ZONE ..qt9..q~ ., .""._ ...... • Shi,-i z ~'\' -'- '_./ 'I.q 0,-.- - YE KHARK \. IRAN ...... \ PAKISTAN GoISplpe-flna -= OIl ,t tl Mr'V G" f l ~ l d ~ 0.1 pipeline L> Re fmed pcodueu • Tinker terminal Plpehne ~ . .-. a.' held o 50 100 150 200 M,Ift 1 ,. , -' o SO 1~ ,i.o ~K.aomelef' press, trade unions, and other organizations. Sponsorship of such potentially revo­ lutionary activities extended even to urban centers in the southern, British­ occupied zone, notably Isfahan and Abadan. The culmination of Soviet revolutionary effort occurred in December 1945 when, aided by the Red Army and Soviet political agents, local Communist insur­ gents under Jaafar Pishevari seized power in the Iranian province of Azerbaijan. In Tabriz, the Azerbaijan Democrats (as they called themselves) established a government among whose members were certain immigrants recently from the So­ viet Union, usually of Iranian or Turkish origin. Premier J aafar Pishevari, himself, and General Danishyan, commander of the rebel army, were both in this category.s Simultaneously, an independent Kurdish Republic was proclaimed under the leadership of Mohammed Ghazi in Mahabad in Western Azerbaijan. In contrast to the neighboring regime in Tabriz, the Kurdish entity was not Communist domi­ nated. It represented nationalist aspirations and had a tribal basis. However, it was also aided and abetted by Soviet agents in the region. Its army was given Soviet uniforms and benefited from Soviet military protection. In due time this army was reinforced by 2,000 Kurdish tribesmen headed by Mullah Mustafa Barzani, who brought them across the border from Iraq." Establishment of two ethnically based separatist regimes in the north constituted a clear danger to the integrity of the Iranian state. However, Iranian troop~ sent by the central government to restore its authority in the rebel-held areas were stopped 20 miles north of Teheran by the Soviet army. The official Soviet explan­ ation for this move was that, being responsible for the maintenance of law and order in the fJorthern areas, the Soviet government had to take appropriate meas­ ures to prevent bloodshed. The Iranian government resorted to two methods to protect its interests: It ap­ pealed to the United Nations and it opened direct negotiations with Moscow. The negotiations produced an agreement which suggested that the Soviet Union's objec­ tive was not to detach Azerbaijan from Iran, but rather to use it as a lever of pres­ sure on the Iranian government. It provided for Iran's recognition of continuing Soviet interest in Azerbaijan and stipulated that a separate agreement should be concluded between the central government and the Tabriz regime. At the same time, Premier Ghavam Saltaneh of Iran consented to the Soviet proposal to set up a Soviet-Iranian oil company to exploit Iran's northern oil resources. The Soviet share in the company was to be 51 percent as against 49 percent for Iran. In re­ turn, Soviet troops were to leave Iranian territory within three months.'° As a se­ quel to this agreement, Saltaneh reconstructed his cabinet by including in it three Communist ministers. It was clear that, as a quid pro quo for the promise of evacuation, the Soviet Union secured three significant gains: (a) a bilaterally-recognized legitimacy of the Communist regime in Azerbaijan, within the framework of the Iranian state; (b)

8 For an account of the Azerbaijan rebellion, see Lenczowski, op. cit., pp. 286-92; Zabih, op. cit., pp. 98-106; and Robert Rossow, "The Battle of Azerbaijan, 1946," Middle East Jour­ nal, Vol. IX (Winter 1956), subsequently referred to as MEJ. 9 Archie Roo~evelt, Jr., "The Kurdish Republic of Mahabad," MEJ, Vol. I, No. 3 (July 1947), and William Eagleton, Jr., The Kurdish Republic of 1946 (London: Oxford Uni­ versity Press, 1963). 10 For relevant documents, see Hurewitz, op. cit., II, pp. 261-64.

26 entry into the oil sector of Iranian economy; and (c) Communist participation in the central cabinet. It was, however, equally clear that Iran was coerced into sign­ ing this agreement by the presence of the Red Army on its soil. Consequently, as soon as the Red Army withdrew, the Iranian government ordcred its own troops to march into Azerbaijan. They encountered only weak resistance. Within a few days both the Tabriz Communist regime and the Kurdish Republic collapsed. Some Tabriz leaders managed to escape to the Soviet Union. Similarly, the Iraqi Kurdish chieftain, Mustafa Barzani, led his tribesmen through mountain trails into Soviet territory. There, he and his men remained until 1958-59, when they re­ turned to Iraq following the revolution that overthrew its monarchy. Iran at first feared possible return of the Red Army. When this did not mater­ ialize, Iran took another significant step to free itself from involvement with the Soviet Union: In the fall of 1947, the Iranian parliament rejected by nearly unani­ mous vote the Soviet-Iranian oil agreement. There is no doubt that in thus challenging Soviet expansionist policies Iran was encouragcd by the United States. Although Iran was not mentioned specifically in the Truman Doctrine of March 12, 1947, \ 1 the safeguarding of its sovereignty and territorial integrity was in accordance with a broader policy of containment which the doctrine formally articulated. In fact, the American ambassador in Iran during this dramatic period, George V. Allen, made repeated public statements that Iran had an unquestioned right to restore armed control over its own prov­ inces and to accept or reject any proposed oil agreements according to its best interests. This policy had the full backing of President Truman who, in his subse­ quent memoirs, reported that, in a message addressed to Stalin, he had threatened to move Al!lerican troops to Iran in case the Soviet Union persisted in its aggres­ sive policy toward the Iranian government.'" Thwarting of Soviet designs in Iran in 1946-47 of course aggravated Iranian­ Soviet relations. The Soviet press and radio repeatedly attacked the Iranian govern­ ment and supported dissident elements among the students, workers, journalists, and army officers in Iran. Much of this anti-government activity was conspira­ torial. An attempt on the life of the Shah in 1947 by an individual identified by Iranian police as Communist led the government to outlaw the Tudeh party; the latter hencefoith was obliged to operate in a clandestine fashion. The Teheran gov­ '!rnment followed up with a variety of measures to curb Communist aetivities, not the least of which was the extension of government control over organized trade unionism.

Russia and the Oil Crisis, 1951·53 By resisting Soviet designs on its independence and integrity in the immediate postwar era, Iran automatically ranged itself on the side of the West, toward which it looked for support and encouragement. However, the West was neither mono-

11 Text in Ralph H. Magnus, ed., Documents on tile Middle East (Washington: Ameri­ can Enterprise Institute, 1969), pp. 63ff. and in Hurewitz, op. cit., II. pp. 273-75: see also Dean Acheson, Present at tile Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1969), pp. 196ff. and 220ff. 12 Harry S. Truman, Memoirs (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1955), Vol. II, pp. 94-95; also "Truman Charges Inaction on Syria: Asks Vigorous Steps to Halt 'Communist Subversion' in Strategic Region," NANA dispatch, Tile New York Times, August 25, 1957,

27 lithic nor completely unselfish. The United States and Britain shared a concern for safeguarding Iranian security against Soviet pressures, but their interests in Iran were not identical. As a legacy of an earlier era. Britain held an oil concession, in the name of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), the controlling stock of which was owned by the British admiralty. The concession had been granted in 1901 at a time when the Iranian government, then ruled by the weak Kajar dynasty, was neither sophisticated nor patriotic enough to assure the best possible safeguards to its rights. Although the concession agreement was revised in 1932-as a result of cer­ tain forceful actions taken by Reza Shah-it still fell far short of satisfying Iranian expectations in the period following World War II. Iranian complaints centered on three issues: (a) AIOC was paying more in taxes to the British government for oil imported from Iran than in royalties to Iran; (b) the company's social policies were considered patronizing (personnel remained aloof from the Iranian environ­ ment, Iranian representation on medium and higher personnel levels was insuffi­ cient, housing and services for the labor force were inadequate); (c) the company was accused of exerting undue political influence and even of constituting a state­ within-a-state. These complaints had been voiced by successive Iranian governments since the end of World War II, but they were articulated with increasing strength in 1949- 50, not only in official quarters but also in various political and social strata. Seven members of parliament known as the national front were the standard bearers of this campaign. Its leader was Dr. Mohammed Mossadegh, a deputy who, in 1944, had been the author of a law drastically restricting the government's right to negotiate any new oil concessions. Under the influence of this small but vociferous group, the Iranian Majlis passed a law nationalizing Iran's oil resources in March 1951. The act led to a protracted political crisis which not only caused a rupture in Iranian-British relations, but also profoundly disrupted the country's in­ ternal structure.13 The Soviet Union, of course, benefited both politically and psychologically from this crisis. Iran's preoccupation with Britain's economic power helped Iranians for­ get Soviet imperialism in Azerbaijan. The Soviet Union also was able to pose as defender of underdeveloped countries against Western capitalist exploitation."

1~ For an account of the oil crisis, see Alan W. Ford, The Anglo-Iranian Oil Dispute oj 1951-1952: A Study of the Role of Law in the Relations of States (Berkeley; University of California Press, 1954), esp. pp. 126 and 140; George Lenczowski, The Middle East ill World Affairs (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 3rd ed., 1962), pp. 205ff.; L. P. Elwell-Sutton, Persian Oil: A Study in Power Politics (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1955); Benjamin Shwadran, The Middle East, Oil, and the Great Powers (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1955), Chap. V. 14 For typical Soviet press commentary during the oil crisis, see Y. Bochkaryov, "American Diplomacy and Iranian Oil," New Times (Moscow), No. 17 (April 23. 1952). Bochkaryov analyzes the oil dispute with reference to two articles in the Western press, one by Homer Bi­ gart, "How British Bungling Lost the Oil of Iran," in Look magazine, and the other by for­ mer Ambassador Henry Grady, "What Went Wrong in Iran," in the Saturday Evening Post. He declares that "What Grady actually wants is continuation of the old colonial policy which he himself has condemned as bankrupt, only with the difference that leadership is to pass from Britain to the U.S.A." In the same vein, see Bochkaryov's article "New Imperialist De­ signs on Iranian Oil," New Times, No. 37 (September 10, 1952): "There can be no question that nationalization of the oil industry is an inalienable right of the Iranian state and its own internal affair. ... The reaction of the Iranian people to the new U.S. and British plan is proof that the policy of plundering Asia and of interfering in the domestic affairs of Asian

28 Thus, in terms of international relations, Russia stood to gain by the diversion of Iranian attention and vigilance to a target other than herself. In addition, the cause of communism was advanced by the internal rift that the crisis produced in the Iranian society. While there was broad agreement on thc need to revise the oil concession, Iranians were far from unanimous as to the method of achieving it. Public attitudes oscillated between the maximal and minimal positions. The Shah, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, feared adverse effects of the oil crisis on the friendly course of Iranian-Western relations. But there were some groups which were not only indifferent to this consideration but actually expected to gain advantage from a deterioration of relations with the West. This was characteristic of a number of leaders within the national front, which by now had expanded into a loose but active grouping of the nationalist, leftist, and-more broadly-dissenting elements in Iran. The Tudeh party resurfaced after nearly four years of suppression. Al­ though it continued to be illegal, the party held rallies and was active on a variety of fronts. Under its aegis, certain front organizations sprang up. Typical of such groups was the "Association to Fight the Imperialist Oil Companies." The Tudeh not only swelled its own ranks by drawing in elements attracted by its anti-British slogans, but also penetrated other organizations which participated in the general nationalist crusade. By using the "united front" technique, the party succeeded in broadening its base. It emerged as a powerful factor in the crisis of mid-August 1953, when Premier Mossadegh challenged the Shah and induced him to flee the country briefly. Had the monarchy been overthrown, it was likely that the Tudeh, as the most disciplined group in the anti-royalist coalition, would have assumed the leading role in the revolution, even though the motivation of most of the other forces was primarily nationalist. Iran then might welI have become a Soviet satel­ lite. Last minute intervention by the military under the leadership of General Fa­ zlollah Zahedi-with strong U.S. encouragement-changed the course of events, however, permitting the restoration of the monarchy. The United States' attitude changed significantly during the oil crisis which lasted nearly three years. Washington's first response to the crisis was to maintain its neutrality, while trying to mediate, hopefully producing a solution consonant with Western concepts of legality. This neutral position produced resentment and suspicion both in Britain and among the Iranian nationalist radicals. As the inter­ nal situation in Iran began to deteriorate, American efforts focused on support of the threatened monarchy in the belief that its forcible removal would open the door to Soviet penetration. Thus, in American thinking, a close identity was estab­ lished between the Shah's regime and Iran's national security. Survival of Iran as an independent state was considered vital to American security, an extension in effect of the Truman Doctrine. By welcoming the return of the Shah to power and by promptly granting aid to the financially hard-pressed post-Mossadegh regime, the United States appeared in Iran to have replaced Britain as the principal active countries is meeting with an ever sterner rebuff on the part of the peoples concerned. The time is fast passing when the imperialists could dictate their will to other peoples." See also L. Surkova, "Iranian Oil and American 'Mediators:" Pravda, January 9, 1953; O. Orestov, "Who is Pushing Iranian Press onto the Path of Provocation," Pravda. October 10, 1953; and V. Danilov, "Mission of Hoover, Jr., in Iran," izvestia, November 4, 1953. (The latter three articles have been reproduced by The Current Digest of the Soviet Press.)

29 power opposing the Soviet Union's southward expansionism.1s As a virtual guar­ antor of Iran's security and working in concert with the Shah-Zahedi regime, Washington was in a position not only to sponsor negotiations leading to a fruitful conclusion of the oil crisis, but to pave the way for a substantial participation of American oil interests in the newly-formed international oil consortium.

Moscow versus Consolidation of the Western·Iranian Alliance The triumph of the American-backed monarchy in overcoming internal and ex­ ternal difficulties led to a new phase, that of consolidation of the alliance between Iran and the West. In 1955, the conclusion of the Baghdad Pact put a formal seal on this alliance."l Although not a signatory, the United States became heavily in­ volved in the Baghdad alliance-which subsequently became known as the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). Iraq's defection from the pact, following the revo­ lution in Baghdad in 1958, caused the Asian members-Iran, Turkey, and Paki­ stan-to ask Washington for a more formal commitment. In response, the United States concluded, in 1959, bilateral mutual security agreements with those three countries.17 This, in turn, accelerated and intensified the movement of better arms and equipment to the three nations' armies and brought about closer overall mili­ tary cooperation. Soviet response to this consolidation was hostility and abstructionism. Iran was Moscow's target. The Soviet Union tried (a) to dissuade Iran from joining (and later from participating in) the Baghdad Pact, (b) to obtain assurances that nei­ ther foreign bases nor foreign troops would be allowed on Iranian territory, and (c) to secure an exclusion of Western missiles from Iran. A well-synchronized policy of pressure was launched by Moscow to attain these objectives through three channels: subversion, propaganda, and diplomacy. The first-subversion-aimed at retrieving the losses to the Soviet ·and Communist po­ sition suffered in the anti-Mossadegh coup, which had restored the Shah to the throne. Soviet efforts centered on the Iranian army, where an espionage network was established. On the basis of subsequent information it embraced some six hundred officers including sixty of lieutenant-colonel and colonel rank. The size of this apparatus was alarmingly large (it would have been large even for the army of a major power) and the involvement of so many colonels, i.e., officers with regi­ mental or equivalent commands, presented a real threat to the Iranian state. Dis­ covery and smashing of this network in late 1954 by Savak-the Iranian security organization-under the direction of General Teymour Bakhtiar dealt a major blow to this formidable Soviet attempt at subversion. IS The Soviet Union also attacked the monarchy in Iran with propaganda. Clan­ destine radio stations broadcasting in Persian vied for primacy with Radio Moscow in attacking the Shah and his ministers as reactionary tools of American

15 For Presidenl Eisenhower's message of gratification at the successful conclusion of the oil crisis, see Magnus, op. cit., pp. 123-24. 16 Text in Magnus, op. cit., pp. 81fT. 17 lbid., pp. 83-85. 18 For a detailed account, see Isaac Don Levine, "The Anatomy of a Red Spy Ring," Life, November 21, 1955, pp. 172-91.

30 imperialismY A series of broadcasts entitled "Behind the Walls of Saadabad" tried to discredit the Shah and the royal family with tales of scandal and gossip. At the same time Soviet diplomats in Teheran worked hard to pry Iran away from the Baghdad Pact. The quid pro quo they offered was the renunciation by Moscow of articles 5 and 6 of the Iranian-Soviet Pact of 1921, which gave the Soviet Union the right to introduce troops into Iran if her territory were used by another power as a base of anti-Soviet operations.This diplomatic campaign was particu­ larly strong in 1958-59; it failed, however, to separate Iran from the Baghdad Pact or to prevent Iran from signing the security agreement with the United States. It was not until 1962-when Soviet hostility toward Iran diminished-that the Soviet Union succeeded, at least partly, in reducing Iran's commitment to military cooperation with the West. On September 15 of that year Moscow announced that it had obtained from Iran a pledge to exclude the establishment of Western rocket sites on its territory."O It was also during that period that a number of prominent Tudeh members managed to escape from Iranian detention and find their way to the Soviet Union and Soviet bloc countries. Observers of Iranian affairs tended to link this escape with the lessening of Iranian-Soviet tension. Willingness to accom­ modate the Soviet Union could partly be ascribed to Iran's disillusionment with American support during this period and, in particular, to the moves of the Ken­ nedy administration to improve relations with Egypt as exemplified by the recogni­ tion of the pro-Nasser regime in Yemen.

Wooing Iran Toward Neutralism By the mid-1960s, the Soviet Union was deeply concerned with Communist China and Soviet pressure on its southern neighbors decreased. The Soviet aid­ and-trade offensive broadened to include a widening circle of underdeveloped countries, regardless of their political orientation. For Iran, this meant that the So­ viet Union was prepared not only to forget the political reverses of the 1953-59 period, and thus to recognize the reality of the Shah's power, but also to offer Iran technical and economic assistance without attaching formal strings. Soviet moves toward a detente dovetailed with the weakening of Western ties with the Asian members of CENTO. The Cyprus crisis with Greece caused Turkey to express disappointment with the American position, which Ankara said was un-

19 The clandestine station National Voice of Iran, claiming to represent Iranian dissidents, specialized in attacks against the monarchy and its ties with the United States. For some typi­ cal comments, see broadcasts of July 14, 1959 ("Honor of the dynasty was violated as a re­ sult of the debauchery of the sons of the late Shah in a desire to gratify their passions and lusts .... The Shah ... is an enemy of Islam."); August 20, 1959 ("Army Officers call for Death of Shah": ... "We will not obey the orders of the coup d'etat regime headed by the Shah, the lackey of foreign colonialism .... Death to the Shah!"); September 1, 1959 (attack on the Shah's sister, Princess Ashraf Pahlavi, and her husband, Ahmad Shafiq); September 3, 1959 ("The Shah's One-Man Rule Ruination of Iran"); and September 4, 1959 ("U.S. Plans to Stockpile Atomic Weapons in Iran": "The Iranian people ... struggle to frustrate these sinister plans of the Shah, demand the abolition of foreign bases in Iran. The American ad­ visers must be kicked out of our army.") All the foregoing monitored by the Foreign Broad­ cast Information Service (PBIS), Washington, D.C., on the dates indicated. "0 Izvestia of September 15, 1962, made public the exchange of relevant notes between Iran's Foreign Minister Abbas Aram and Soviet Ambassador Nicolai M. Pegov. On the same day Tass quoted Aram as affirming that Iran would never become "an instrument of aggres­ sion against the territory of the Soviet Union." Quoted from Seymour Topping, "Iran Gives Soviet Pledge on Bases," The New York Times, September 16, 1962.

31 duly weighted in favor of Greece. Similarly, Pakistan resented American neutrality toward its conflict with India over Kashmir. Iran had no comparable case against the United States. However, the Shah's standing grievance had been American reluctance to grant his requests for more sophisticated weapons and, more broadly, lesser American responsiveness to Iran's development needs. On numerous occasions, the Shah criticized U.S. policy which, in his view, did not differentiate enough between allies and neutrals in extending economic aid."l Iran also wanted to cultivate her Asian partners in the Baghdad alliance, to whom she pledged her full support. This tripartite Asian soli­ darity was formally consolidated in the organization named Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD). Established in Istanbul on July 21, 1964, by Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan, the RCD provided for close eeonomic and technical ties among the signatories.22 Its de-emphasis of military cooperation and its exclu­ sively Asian character loosened politico-military ties between its members and the West. Launching of the RCD was accompanied by frequent Iranian broadsides, official and unofficial, at CENTO, whose usefulness and stress on defense were in­ creasingly questioned. Thus on both sides, Soviet and Iranian, a subtle transformation had taken place. A new era of ostensible good will was inaugurated. Earlier state visits of the Shah to Moscow had been tense because of Soviet hostility to Iranian participation in the Western alliance system. But the visit Iran's ruler paid to the Soviet Union in 1965 paved the way to more normal relations and to the conclusion of important aid-and-trade agreements."" On October 6, 1965, and January 13, 1966, agree­ ments were reached for Soviet assistance in the construction of: (a) a major me­ tallurgical complex in Isfahan, which would include a steel plant with an initial ca­ pacity of 600,000 tons, to be raised to 1,200,000 tons; (b) a machine tool plant in Arak with a capacity of 30,000 tons; (c) a $650 million gas pipeline with a maximum capacity of 15.6 billion cubic meters a year, to bring gas from Ahwaz in southwestern Iran to the Soviet Union (a rolling mill with a capacity of 360,000 tons, to produce pipe, was to be set up at Ahwaz with American participation); (d) silos and other facilities in the Iranian provinces; (e) hydroelectric installa­ tions and regulation of the Aras and Atrek rivers on the Soviet-Iranian border.24

21 Typical was an interview granted by the Shah to Harrison Salisbury (The New York Times November 5, 1961, pp. 1, 13); The Shah called on the United States to join in part­ nership with Iran to make it a showplace of the non-Communist world. "If we fail," said the Shah, "if we are not understood by our friends and do not get the aid we need-what a gain for communism. If we fail, the failure is not just in Iran. It is the springboard to the Middle East and Africa. I think the United States must decide how many vital and important places there are in the world. If the U.S. has, let us say, $3,000,000,000 to spend on foreign aid, and 101 countries to divide it in, you will not get results." 22 Text in Magnus, op. cit., pp. 137-38. 23 "Soviet-Iranian Relations Are Developing Auspiciously," Joint Communique Issued at the End of Visit by the Shah of Iran to the Soviet Union, July 3, 1965, Magnus, op. cit., pp. 124-26. 24 Summary of the agreement in Pravda, January 14, 1966, reproduced in the Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XVIII, No.2 (February 1966). Data on the Isfahan Steel Mill are also to be found in Keyhan International (Teheran), October 29 and November 9, 1969. Plans for a steel mill were prepared by the Soviet Steel Research Institute and approved by the Iranian Steel Corporation, a state-controlled body, in July 1967. They called for an initial capacity of 500,000 to 600,000 metric tons of pig iron per year. The project, to be called Ar­ yamehr Steel Mill, was inaugurated on October 26, 1967, to be completed by 1972. The mill, located in Isfahan, would receive iron ore from the Kerman-Bafq area, where the Chagart,

32 The gas pipeline was to be built by the Soviet Union in its northern sector and by Iran, with participation of Western firms, in its southern sector. Costs of these projects were to be repaid by deliveries of gas from Iran's southern oilfields to the Soviet Union. Conclusion of these basic agreements was, in due time, followed by the signing of various ancillary agreements to assure their implementation. Thus on February 19, 1967, the Soviet Union agreed to lend Iran $286 million for the steel mill, the machine tool factory and the gas pipeline. With the passage of time, new projects began supplementing the original ones. Soviet President Nicolai Podgorny's visit to Iran in April 1970 was the occasion for announcing a new agreement for Soviet aid in the development of the Caspian ports of Pahlavi and Nowshahr and the construction of a new port near Fahrabad. Moreover, the two parties discussed, for the first time, laying an oil pipeline (apart from the gas pipeline already under construction) which would carry Iranian crude to the U.S.S.R. either for transit or 2 for terminal purposes. [>

Saghand, and Barbara mines have an estimated 200 million tons of ore reserves. Coal was ex­ pected to come from the Kerman and Alborz regions. Isfahan itself was to provide other raw materials, such as dolomite, lime, quartz, etc. The Aryamehr steel mill was to cover 700 hectares; its site was 43 km southwest of Isfa­ han at Rizlanjan on the banks of Zayanderud. A dam under construction on Zayanderud was to provide the mill with 39,000 tons of water per hour. The mill was to begin its operations with a single blast furnace with a capacity of 1,033 cubic meters. Its planned daily output was 1,600 tons of pig iron. The coke plant was to con­ sist of a battery of 58 chambers with an annual production capacity of 444,000 tons of met­ allurgical coke derived from 770,000 of dry coal. The coke plant was to produce 5,600 tons of sulphate of ammonium, 4,700 tons of sulphuric acid, 20,000 tons of distills, and 4,500 tons of pure benzol. The steel mill was to consist of two 80-ton converters and three continuous cast rolling mills, giving an annual production of 550,000 tons in the initial stage. The rolling mill was to consist of two units, one of 650 mm and the other of 250 and 350 mm. It would produce bars and rods, plates, angles, channels and girders, profiles, rails, wires, bars, flats and rounds. The mill's power requirements were set at 60,000 kilowatts, from two generators of 12,000 kilowatts each and the balance from the nearby Shah Abbas the Great Dam, through the Re­ gional Electricity Authority. About 47,000 square meters of the steel mill area was to be devoted to various services. The volume of haulage was to be as follows: Iron Ore 840,000 tons a year Coal 740,000 tons a year Other raw materials 1,314,000 tons a year The total annual haulage to and from the mill of both raw materials and semi-processed products was estimated at about 5 million tons. According to :Mr. Sheibani, Managing Director of the Iran Steel Corporation, some 14,000 engineers, technicians and workers were employed at the site. Ultimately, the steel complex would require 7,000 skilled workers. A training program was under way: In 1969-70, 233 Ira­ nian apprentices were to be sent to the Soviet Union and 124 to India in the first wave, and 12 to U.S.S.R. and 114 to India in the second. The program for 1970-71 called for training 395 apprentices in the Soviet Union and 275 in India. A new modern township was being -built next to the mill for an expected popUlation of 200,000, in an area of 4 billion square meters, double that of Isfahan. (Source: Iran Almanac, Teheran, 1969, pp. 277·80.) 25 The Trans-Iranian Gas Pipeline, about 1,100 km long, is to link the southern oilfields of Iran with Soviet territory, with branch lines to Isfahan, Kashan, Qum, and Teheran. In the construction stage, it was to be divided into a southern sector (from the oilfields to Kuhe Namak southwest of Teheran near Saveh) and a northern sector (from Kuhe Namak to As­ tara on the Soviet border). The southern sector pipeline, 32-inch in diameter, was being con­ structed by Iran, the northern, 40-inch in diameter, by the Soviet Union. For the planning and engineering operation of the projects and for supervising the construction in the South, Iran concluded an agreement with a consulting engineering group, IMAC, which acted under the direct authority of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC). Actual construction work in the southern sector was to be managed by European firms.

33 In addition, Iran established closer economic relations with East European countries. These had a dual motivation: On the one hand, they fitted the overall scheme of building political bridges with the Soviet bloc and were thus psychologi­ cally complementary to the main Soviet-Iranian cooperation. On the other, they provided an answer to Iran's quest (strong in the mid-1960s) for oil markets out­ side regular consortium channels. Iran's agreements with the Soviet bloc countries were generally of the barter type, providing for Iranian deliveries of crude--out of the quota earmarked for Iran from the overall consortium production-in return for the satellites' industrial goods. One of the earliest and notable barter agree­ ments was the Iranian-Rumanian agreement of October 25, 1965, under which Iran agreed to supply Rumania with $100 million worth of crude oil over an ex­ tended period. The following year, on August 8, 1966, Rumania agreed to supply Iran $40 million worth of tractors, plows and agricultural machinery. She also un­ dertook to construct in Tabriz a tractor assembly plant, to be later converted into a full-fledged factory, with an initial capacity of 3,000 tractors in 1970-71, to be increased to 5,000 a year. 26 Czechoslovakia appeared as another major supplier for Iran among the East European countries. On February 2, 1967, a Czechoslo­ vak industrial mission to Iran agreed to establish a $100 million industrial complex to manufacture generators in cooperation with the Czech Skoda works. Deliveries of Iranian crude were to serve as payment.

Pipeline construction in the northern sector was to be undertaken by the Soviet Union under an agreement between Iran and the Soviet Oil Export Organization. This sector in­ cluded the branch line between Kuhe Namak and Teheran. However, the IMAC was made responsible for the telecommunication and automation system covering both sectors. Twenty one units of Soviet-made compressors were to be installed along the complete length of the pipeline. The pipeline's daily capacity was set at 600 million cubic feet of gas to the Soviet Union upon completion. This capacity was to be gradually boosted over a four-year period to about 1,050 million cubic feet. In addition, upon basic completion, the pipeline would supply 200 million cubic feet of natural gas to Teheran, Isfahan, Qum, and Kashan; this quantity was to be increased to 650 million cubic feet in nine years. The first stage required an investment of $400 million, of which $300 million was to be in foreign exchange and rubles to be secured from the Iranian Plan Organization, U.S. and Western banking and commercial credits, and the Soviet government. In 1967, Moscow had pledged a loan of 260 million rubles to finance various projects, including the steel plant. Of this amount, 70 million rubles ($77 million) was set aside for the gas pipeline. This credit was for a 12-year period at a 2.5 percent interest. According to the agreement of January 13, 1966, the supply of natural gas to the Soviet Union was to begin in 1970 and continue for 15 years until 1985. (These dates were subject to adjustment because the gas pipeline was not expected to begin operations until 1971.) In­ come derived by Iran from the natural gas was to be used to repay the 260 million ruble loan, plus interest, and meet the cost of machine tools received from the Soviet Union. Five years before the expiration of the agreement, i.e., in 1980, negotiations for the renewal of the agreement for a further period of ten years will be started. The cost of gas was fixed at $6.60 (6 rubles) per thousand cubic meters of gas, $4.40 stable price and $2.20 unstable price, i.e., subject to fluctuations dependent on changes in the declared average price of the Abadan fur­ nace oil. Assuming that some 6 billion cubic meters of gas would be supplied to the Soviet Union in the first year of operation, the income to Iran from these gas deliveries was expected to be about $41,000,000 and was expected to increase to $66,000,000 by 1974 or 1975. Cumulative income for Iran from gas sales to the U.S.S.R. during the 15 years of the agreement was ex­ pected to be $900,000,000. (Source: Iran Almanac, 1969, op. cit., pp. 347-50.) 26 The Tabriz tractor factory was expected to employ some 5,000 technical and clerical per­ sonnel and workers. A training center for 250 to 300 apprentices was to be established. Cost of the factory was estimated at $121,000,000 ($6 million for the first stage, $45 million for the second, and $70 million for the third, the latter to begin in 1974). (Source: Iran Alma­ nac, 1969, op. cit., p. 289.)

34 By January 1970, Iran had pledged to deliver crude oil to five East European countries in return for industrial goods and technical services, as follows: Rumania: 10 million tons over 5 years Bulgaria: 2.4 million tons, 1967-70 Hungary: 1 million tons, beginning in 1969 Czechoslovakia: up to 50 million tons Poland: possible barter arrangement for delivery through a pipeline envisaged from Bakar in Yugoslavia In January 1967 Iran had made another significant move by signing an agree­ ment with Moscow to purchase $110 million worth of Soviet military equipment. The Soviet Union was to supply relatively simple kinds of military hardware, like trucks, armored troop carriers, and anti-aircraft guns.2' The agreement did not make Iran dependent upon the Soviet Union for its defense. However, it was the first and only case that a country tied to a Western alliance system was acquiring defense equipment from a Communist state. Added to the earlier steel-plant pact with the Soviet Union the arms deal introduced a new psychological dimension into Iran's international position. This obviously could not yet be called neutralism because, in spite of its skeptical attitude, Iran maintained its membership in CENTO and kept its defense relationship with Washington through the mutual se­ curity pact of 1959. But clearly it did signify an Iranian modification in its pos­ ture, a partial disengagement. 28 From the Soviet point of view, this modified posture presented distinct advan~ tages. It legitimized the Soviet Union as a partner in Iranian development. It also gave her an opportunity to publicize herself as a builder of a spectacular and pres­ tigious project-the steel plant-that was to provide industrial infrastructure in a developing country. By accepting this partnership, Iran removed the self-imposed barrier against the presence of technicians from Communist countries on its terri­ tory. Iran's aid-and-trade agreements with the Soviet Union provided opportunities for Soviet representatives to establish direct contacts with the Iranian labor force, technocrats and the military. They also generated a political situation in which cer­ tain Soviet expectations and requests would have to be met on a day-to-day basis to avoid irritations likely to delay the completion of the various economic projects. While Soviet economic and technical assistance may not have been equivalent to Soviet political influence, the increase in Soviet presence provided the framework in which political influence could grow.

27 The agreement w~s signed early in January without any publicity, but the U.S. government was informed of it privately. The first public announcement was mad:e by Premier Amil' Abbas Hoveida in the Parliament on February 19. According to his statement, the So­ viet arms credit was to be repaid in eight installments at 2.5 percent interest. The first install­ ment was to be paid in manufactured goods, others in natural gas. See "Soviet Arms Deal with Iran Signed," The New York Times, February 8, 1967; "Iran Reaffirms Ties to CENTO after Word of Soviet Arms Deal," The New York Times, February 13, 1967; and "Iran Will Get Soviet Arms in $110 Million Accord," The New York Times, February 20, 1967. For a further discussion of this theme, see Rouhollah K. Ramazani, "Iran's Changing Foreign Policy: A Preliminary Discussion," ME}, Vol. XXIV, No.4 (Autumn 1970), and Se­ pehr Zabih, "Iran's International Posture," ME}, Vol. XXIV, No.3 (Summer 1970).

35 5

III. TURKEY: TOWARD NORMALIZATION

W orld War I Mtermath: Negative Community of Iuterests In the immediate period after World War I, both Turkey and the Soviet Union stood in opposition to the victorious entente powers. Both, in fact, were fighting for survival against the encroachments of British, French and other Allied troops upon their territories. Both had revolutionary governments whose right to exist was questioned by the West and to whom, at least initially, recognition was denied. Opposition to West European imperialism provided a common denominator in the policies of both states. At this time the Soviet Union even furnished military sup­ plies to Turkey. The newly proclaimed Republic of Armenia, whose territory straddled the Russo­ Turkish border area, was destroyed. It fell in 1920 under the successive blows of Turkish and Soviet armies, each acting on its own and for somewhat different purposes: the Turks to reestablish their pre-World War I eastern boundary, the Soviet Union to convert its part of Armenia into a Communist state to be incorpo­ rated into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. This negative community of objectives affected, to a limited degree, Soviet and Turkish attitudes toward the Turkish Straits in the early 1920s. Weak and inse­ cure, the new Soviet state sought to prevent free passage of Western warships through the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus into the Black Sea. By the same token, Turkey was interested in restricting freedom of passage of any warships-primarily Western-in her quest to regain full sovereign control over these strategic water­ ways. Also on this issue, Soviet and Turkish attitudes converged, though motiva­ tions were different. The resulting Lausanne Straits Convention of 1923 repre­ sented a compromise between the Western position, on the one hand, and the Turkish-Soviet, on the other.1 Although the Treaty of Lausanne, signed at the same time as the Straits Convention, provided a comprehensive peace settlement which, in principle, caused Turkey to become a satisfied status quo power, two territorial questions, those of Mosul and Alexandretta (Iskenderun), remained as an obstacle to full reconcilia­ tion between Turkey and the West." Of the two, the territory of Mosul was expressly stated in the peace treaty to be subject to further agreement between Turkey and Britain and, failing such an agreement, to adjudication by the League of Nations. Turkey was interested in retaining Mosul for three reasons: (a) a sizable Turkish minority lived in the city and surrounding area; (b) oil was presumed to exist in the district; (c) if left outside of Turkey, the Kurdish population could become a na­ tionalist center of attraction to the Kurds inside Turkish territory and thus threaten

1 For a comprehensive treatment of the Straits question, see James T. Shotwell and Francis Deak, Turkey at the Straits: A Short History (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1941). 2 Text of the treaty in Hurewitz, op. cit., II, pp. 119ff.

37 the cohesion of the Turkish Republic. Consequently, when in 1925 the Council of the League of Nations awarded Mosul to Iraq (then ruled by Britain under the man­ date provisions), the Turks felt aggrieved and frustrated. As a sequel to this disap­ pointment, Turkey hastened to conclude, on December 17, 1925, a new treaty with the Soviet Union.' In the formal sense, the treaty provided for non­ aggression and was renewable every ten years, unless one of the signatories gave notice of termination within six months prior to the date of renewal. In the political sense, it served as a symbol of Turkey's dissatisfaction with the West and as an implicit warning that her acquiescence to the totality of the Lausanne peace settle­ ment could not be taken for granted.

W orld War II: Soviet Designs and Turkish :Fears The common denominators in the Turkish and Soviet policies toward the West in the 1920s were not strong enough to assure Turkey's permanent pro-Soviet alignment. In the long run, policies of the two countries were bound to diverge. Although both regimes were revolutionary, Turkey's revolution was primarily na­ tionalist and as such antithetical to proletarian class concepts characteristic of the Soviet Union's official ideology. Moreover, the whole thrust of Kemalist reforms was to transform Turkey from an Asian into a European state. Therefore, the Turks looked toward Europe rather than toward the Soviet Union for a model to emulate. Last but not least, there were vital security considerations which were bound to bring Turkey and the West closer together. Beginning with the early 1930s, Turkey felt apprehensive about the German and Italian territorial ambi­ tions. This led her to seek the friendship and support of Britain and France, the two Western countries which had both a major stake in the security of the Eastern Mediterranean and a military presence there. This presence on the ground and at sea, as the Turks had learned since the Treaty of Lausanne, was not detrimental to their own security. On the contrary, it provided a much-needed element of stability in the region. 4 What began as a rapprochement between Turkey and the two Western powers ended as a formal alliance which, after a number of preliminary steps, was signed on October 17, 1939.5 Among these steps was the transfer by France of the San­ jak of Alexandretta from the mandate of Syria to Turkey. This transfer was to re­ move the last important obstacle in the path of reconciliation between Turkey and the West. Negotiations between Ankara, London, and Paris were conducted in the summer and early fall of 1939; thus they partly overlapped with the secret talks carried on simultaneously between Berlin and Moscow toward the conclusion of the Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 23, 1939. 6 That pact, of course, launched the Sep­ tember 1 German attack on Poland which opened the Second World War. The So­ viet action against Poland followed on September 17. On that same day, the Soviet

g Text in Hurewitz, op. cit., II, pp. 142ff. 4 For a useful discussion of this question, see Elizabeth Monroe, The Mediterranean in Pol­ itics (London: Oxford University Press, 1938), esp. Chap. V, "Next of Kin: Turkey." 5 Text in Hurewitz, op. cit., pp. 226ff. 6 Text in Raymond J. Sontag and James S. Beddie, ed .• Nazi-Soviet Relations, /939-/94]: Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Office (Washington: Department of State) Publication 3023. Reference to Turkey in connection with this pact is on p. 73: Subsequently referred to as Nazi-Soviet Relations. 38 BLA CI( SE~

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IIOUMOIoRV ",PRU(Ht"TION I,"*OT NEc:tISAIliU\.V AUtlol()llll'AnVl' government requested the Turkish government to send its foreign minister to Mos­ cow for conversations. By the time Minister Siikrii Saracoglu arrived in the Soviet capital, on September 26, the situation in Europe had radically changed. Before August 23, Turkey could carryon negotiations for an alliance with the Western powers with the conviction that, as a protective measure against the warlike designs of the Axis, such action would be compatible with the security of the Soviet Union and would not produce a strain in Soviet-Turkish relations. Revelation of the Soviet­ Nazi agreement and the two nations' subsequent cooperation in the conquest and sUbjugation of Poland put the Turkish-Western alliance in a new light. As an ally of Germany, the Soviet Union was obligated, in fulfillment of her part of the bar­ gain, to resist any Turkish initiatives which might result in the encirclement of Germany from the side of the Balkans and the Black Sea. Consequently, Saracoglu was presented in Moscow with two Soviet demands: (a) to close the Straits to for­ eign warships; (b) to conclude with the Soviet Union a mutual assistance pact. The Turkish government promptly rejected the first demand. As for the second, it refused to make a move without consulting its newly acquired Western partners, Britain and France, with whom negotiations toward an alliance were far advanced. In mid-October Saracoglu left Moscow without acceding to either of the Soviet de­ mands. The Turkish government thus avoided being neutralized and ensnared in the Nazi-Soviet power bloc, but it learned, to its great discomfort, the degree to which the Soviet Union was willing to do Berlin's bidding at Turkey's expense,1 This awareness of the Soviet factor had its effect on the subsequent treaty of al­ liance signed on October 19 with Britain and France. Turkey insisted on and se­ cured two conditions: the first, that her duties as an ally would not become opera­ tive unless the war spread to the Eastern Mediterranean; the second, contained in the protocol No.2, that in performing her obligations she would not be compelled to enter into armed conflict with the U .S.S.R.' The latter condition was deemed by the Turks to be a vital safeguard for their security, should the Nazi-Soviet alliance lead to Soviet confrontation with the West.

Explicit Statement of Soviet Aspirations The Soviet Union's failure to secure Turkey's compliance with her demands in direct bilateral negotiations did not result in the abandonment of Soviet policy objectives. It was only the method that underwent a temporary change. In the ne­ gotiations conducted between Moscow and Berlin in the fall of 1940, Foreign Commissar Molotov reopened the question of Soviet interest in Turkey. These ne­ gotiations resulted, between November 13 and 26, in the agreement between Ger­ many and the Soviet Union-to be also submitted to Italy and Japan-in which

7 For an enlightening discussion of this period in Soviet-Turkish relations, see David I. Dal­ lin, Soviet Russia's Foreign Policy, 1939-1942 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1942), esp. Chap. IV, Section 7, "Turkey," pp. 105-11; and Rene Massigli, La Turquie devant fa Guerre: Mission ii Ankara, 1939-1940 (Paris: Pion, 1964). 8 Hurewitz, op. cit., II, p. 228.

40 the Soviet government went on record with the following demands regarding Tur­ key (directly or indirectly):

From the Secret Protocol No. I: "The Soviet Union declares that its territorial aspirations center south of the national territory of the Soviet Union in the direction of the Indian Ocean."

From the Secret Protocol No.2: (1) "Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union agree in the view that it is in their common interest to detach Turkey from her existing international commitments and progressively to win her over to political collaboration with themselves. They declare that they will pursue this aim in close consultation, in accordance with a common line of action which is still to be determined. (2) "Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union declare their agreement to conclude, at a given time, a joint agreement with Turkey, wherein the Three Powers would recognize the extent of Turkey's possessions. (3) "Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union will work in common toward the replacement of the Montreux Straits Convention now in force by another convention. By this convention the Soviet Union would be granted the right of unrestricted passage of its navy through the Straits atany time, whereas all other Powers except the other Black Sea countries, but including Germany and Italy, would in principle renounce the right of passage through the Straits for their naval vessels. The passage of commercial vessels through the Straits would, of course, have to remain free in principle."

Fl'om the telegram of the German ambassador to the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to the German Foreign Office: Moscow, November 26 "For the Reich Minister in person. Molotov asked me to call on him this evening and in the presence of Dekanosov stated the following: The Soviet Government has studied the contents of the statements of the Reich Foreign Minister in the concluding conversation on November 13 and takes the following stand: The Soviet Government is prepared to accept the draft of the Four Power Pact which the Reich Foreign Minister outlined in the conversa­ tion of November 13, regarding political collaboration and reciprocal economic support subject to the following conditions: (1) [pertaining to Finland] (2) Provided that within the next few months the security of the Soviet Union in the Straits is assured by the conclusion of a mutual assistance pact between the Soviet Union and Bulgaria, which geo­ graphically is situated inside the security zone of the Black Sea bound-

41 aries of the Soviet Union, and by the establishment of a base for land and naval forces of the U.S.S.R. within range of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles by means of a long-term lease. (3) Provided that the area south of Batum and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf is recognized as the center of the aspirations of the Soviet Union. (4) [pertaining to Japan's rights in Sakhalin] In accordance with the foregoing, the draft of the protocol concerning the delimitation of the spheres of influence as outlined by the Reich Foreign Minister would have to be amended so as to stipulate the focal point of the aspirations of the Soviet Union south of Batum and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf. Likewise, the draft of the protocol or agreement between Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union with respect to Turkey should be amended so as to guarantee a base for light naval and land forces of the U.S.S.R. on the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles by means of a long-term lease, including-in case Turkey declares herself willing to join the Four Power Pact-a guarantee of the independence and of the territory of Turkey by the three countries named. This protocol should provide that in case Turkey refuses to join the Four Powers, Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union agree to work out and carry through the required military and diplomatic measures, and a separate agreement to this effect should be concluded." 9 Soviet hopes to pressure Turkey into territorial and strategic concessions with Germany's support were soon dashed by the outbreak of the war between Ger­ many and the Soviet Union in June 1941. Fighting for survival against the rapid German offensive, the Soviet Union not only had to put aside her plans for control of the Straits, but was obliged to revise her policy toward Turkey in general. In­ stead of trying to "detach Turkey from her existing international commitments" (i.e., from her alliance with Britain and the already defeated France), the Soviet Union developed an active interest in strengthening Turkey's ties with the West as a safeguard against any possible Turkish alignment with Germany. Of all members of the anti-Axis alliance, the Soviet Union became the one which was most anx­ ious to see Turkey involved in the war against Germany. Turkey's non-belligerency -within the framework of the formal alliance with Britain-was viewed in Moscow with increasin~ impatience. Although activation of the Turkish-Western alliance might result in a German attack on Turkey as well as in the advance of German armies toward the Soviet Caucasus through Turkish territory, these risks could be outweighed by the advantage of having the German war effort spread to another theater, which could be expected to reduce the military pressure on the Soviet front. While this appeared to be the Soviet Union's primary motivation in 1941-42, in the subsequent period, especially after the battle of Stalingrad which marked the beginning of the Soviet counteroffensive, Soviet interest in pushing Turkey into the war acquired a new dimension. Turkey's declaration of war against the Axis would

9 Nazi-Soviet Relations, op. cit., pp. 257ff.; also Hurewitz, op. cit., II, pp. 228-30.

42 have compelled her to offer unrestricted strategic and logistic cooperation to the Allies. Under such circumstances the Soviet Union, as a member of the Allied camp, would have claimed the right to enter Turkish territory in pursuance of the war with Germany. The Turks were not unaware of Soviet designs in Eastern Eu­ rope and of the Soviet technique of organizing in Moscow Communist groups ready to take over the administration of "liberated" territories. Of particular signif­ icance in this respect was the Soviet sponsorship of the so-called "Union of Polish Patriots" in Moscow, which in 1943-44 not only defied the Polish government-in­ exile in London but also, with Soviet support, began organizing a puppet Polish army about to enter Poland side by side with the Red Army on the heels of the re­ treating Germans. The prospect of being first invaded and devastated by Ger­ many and then liberated by Soviet forces was so unpalatable to the Turkish leader­ ship that it preferred to risk the Soviet Union's displeasure rather than open the gates to a chain of almost certain calamities.

The Pan-Turanian Question Turkey's unwillingness to accept Soviet and Western demands was matched by her resistance to German pressures and overtures. In trying to win over Turkey, Germany attempted to attract the Turks by a special incentive: support for Pan­ Turanism. The Pan-Turanian ideology proclaims the unity of all Turkic-speaking peoples; these include not only Turks of Turkey proper but also related ethnic groups in the Persian and Soviet Azerbaijan, in Crimea, in the Tatar areas of the Volga-Ural region, as well as the Turkoman, Uzbek, Kazakh, and Kirghiz groups in Soviet Central Asia, together with some scattered and more distantly related Mongol­ Turkic populations in Siberia. Altogether, it is estimated that the Turkic-speaking groups in the Soviet Union are over 30 million strong. Before and during World War I, Pan-Turanism (or Pan-Turkism) enjoyed considerable popularity in the Ottoman Empire. It was propagated particularly in Russia by those Turko-Tatar intellectuals who found the Russifying policy of the Czarist government oppressive and threatening the survival of Turkic culture and identity.'° To avoid reprisals, these intellectuals were sometimes compelled to leave Russia and settle in Turkey where they preaciled liberation of Turkic minorities from Russian bondage and union of all Turkic-speaking peoples. From the Russian point of view, Pan-Turanism was deemed subversive and de­ structive in that it threatened separation of the compactly settled Turkic territories on the southern periphery of the Russian empire along the Black Sea coasts, in Transcaucasia and Transcaspia.ll It was partly for this reason that the founder of modern Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Atatiirk, rejected Pan-Turanism as a guiding ide­ ology for his generation. In a realistic appreciation of Turkey's strength and poten­ tial, he opposed both the Ottoman imperialism and the Pan-Turanian program as

10 For a background treatment, see M. A Czaplicka, The Turks oj Central Asia (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1918). 110n Pan-Turkism, see Charles Warren Hostler, Turkism and the Soviets: the Turks oj the World and Their Political Objectives (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1957); Serge A. Zen­ kovsky, Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960); and Firuz Kazemzadeh, The Struggle jar Transcaucasia, 1917-1921 (New York: Phil­ osophical Library; Oxford: George Ronald, 1951).

43 likely to involve Turkey proper in a dangerous contest with the newly created So­ viet state, whose good will or at least neutrality he badly needed in the formative years of his Republic. Despite his fervor as a nationalist, he defined Turkish na­ tionalism as limited to AnatoIia, i.e., the territory of the modern Turkish state. 12 While he did not succeed in stamping out Pan-Turanism, he definitely discouraged its organizational manifestations. With the advance of the German armies into the Turkic-speaking and Moslem areas of the Soviet Union, such as the Crimea and the North Caucasus, an oppor­ tunity arose to revive the Pan-Turanian idea. Long chafing under Russian rule, the Crimean Tatars and the Kalmyk, Karachai-Balkar and Chechen-Ingush peoples of the Caucasus greeted the invading Germans as liberators, while certain groups and individuals among them offered the Nazi Reich their collaboration. Two alterna­ tives became open to the German government: one was to disregard the special ethnic character of the occupied areas and to apply to them direct and harsh Ger­ man administration as was done elsewhere in the Soviet Union under Nazi occu­ pation; the other was to exploit politically their separate identity, encourage local autonomy, and entrust their leaders with administrative responsibilities under the general supervision of German authorities. Should this second alternative be pur­ sued, it was possible to link recognition of local autonomy with the Pan-Turanian idea and thus cause Turkey to cooperate with Germany in the process of liberation and unification of the Turkic peoples of the Soviet empire. Although the Germans initially employed some local Turkic-speaking individuals in their administration, the German government did not develop a consistent policy in this respect. In fact, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs pursued a different policy from that espoused by the Ministry of Eastern Territories (Ostministerium) and the military authorities. Higher ranking career diplomats, aware of the potential of Pan-Turanism and the effect it might have on Turkey's wartime alignments, fa­ vored a tolerant policy of occupation geared to recognition of local autonomy and cooperation with Turkey in a joint venture. By contrast, Nazi careerists from the Ostministerium, eager to secure the governorships of occupied districts, were hos­ tile to the idea of sharing power with either the local people or the Turks from Turkey. For some time, the diplomatic line was pursued by the German ambassador in Ankara, Franz von Papen. In his conversations with the Turkish prime minister in 1942 he sought permission to recruit Turkish citizens for administrative duties in the Crimea and other occupied territories, while alluding to the possible liberation of the "Turko-Mongol" peoples from the yoke of Soviet communism. The premier answered that while, as a Turk, he ardently desired to see his fellow Turks liber­ ated from Russian rule, as chief of the Turkish government he could not commit himself to a policy which might result in annihilation of the Turko-Mongol minori­ ties by the Soviet UnionY Discouraged by Turkish refusal, Germany's Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop soon afterward instructed von Papen to put an end to

12 For Kemal Atatiirk's views on a proper national policy, see George Lenczowski, ed., The Political Awakening in the Middle East (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970), pp.85-87. 13 La Politique Allemande, 1941-1943: Documents Secrets du Ministere des AfJaires Etran­ geres d'Aliemagne (Paris: Paul Dupont 1947), pp. 89ff.

44 these negotiationsY Henceforth, the Nazi-militaristic school of thought gained an upper hand in the formulation of German policy toward the conquered areas and no serious attempt was made to promote local autonomy. Turkey's reluctance to adopt-through Pan-Turanism-a hostile policy toward the Soviet Union was not limited to her rejection of the German proposals. The Turkish government turned also against the revived Pan-Turanian movement at home. In May 1944 it issued a formal ban on the Pan-Turanian "Gray Wolf So­ ciety." Accusing its leaders of a plot, it placed them under arrest and, subse­ quently, on trial. A number of jail sentences followed. If these measures were cal­ culated to assuage Soviet irritation at Turkey's refusal to be drawn into the war, however, they failed in their objective.'5

The Mid-1940s: Soviet Territorial Demands Beginning in 1943, the tone of Soviet propaganda grew increasingly critical of Turkish behavior.'6 This hostile attitude did not lessen even with the Turkish de­ cision to open the Straits to the flow of Allied supplies to Russia in January 1945. On March 21 Moscow formally repudiated the Soviet-Turkish Non-Aggression Treaty of 1925. Results of this open break were not slow to follow. By the time of the Potsdam Conference (August 1945), the Soviet Union came forth with the fol­ lowing demands for which she sought both Turkish compliance and Anglo­ American concurrence: (a) cession by Turkey of the eastern border districts of Kars and Ardahan; (b) establishment of a Soviet military base in the Bosphorus; (c) a revision of the Montreux Straits Convention in favor of the Soviet Union; (d) a revision of the Thracian boundary in favor of Communist-dominated BulgariaY When Stalin outlined the Soviet Union's interest in military control of the Straits to President Truman and Prime Minister Churchill at Potsdam, their response was negative. However, the two Western powers differentiated between outright Soviet control of the Bosphorus and the change in international regulation of the Straits

14 Ibid. For further details on Germany's policy, see Edige Kirimal, Der Nationale Kampf der Krimturken (Emsdetten, Westf.: Verlag Echte, 1952), pp. 306ff.; and Peter Kleist, Zwischen Hitler und Stalin (Bonn: Athenaum Verlag, 1950), pp. 129-229. 10 The trial ended on March 29, 1945. Most defendants received sentences of two to ten years' hard labor. However, an outburst of Soviet attacks, coupled with territorial demands on Turkey in the summer of 1945, made it evident that Russia's hostility toward Ankara could not be removed by repressive measures applied to the Pan-Turanians. Consequently, when the matter was reviewed under the appeal procedure in October 1945, the Military Court of Cas­ sation reversed the sentences and many of the defendants, including Colonel Alparslan Turkes, the key figure in the subsequent coup d'detat of 1960, were reinstated in their pre­ vious professional positions. (Based partly on Hostler, op. cit., p. 185, and partly on personal communication to the author of Professor Yulug Kurat of the Middle East Technical Univer­ sity in Ankara.) 16 For typical Soviet articles critical of Turkey's policy of neutrality, see N. Vasilyev, "Komu na Polzu Neutralitet Turtsii (For Whose Benefit Turkey's Neutrality)", Voyna i Ra­ bochy Klass (The War and the Working Class), No.7 (Sept. 1, 1943), and by the same au­ thor, "Yeshcho Raz 0 Neutralitetie Turtsii (Once Again About Turkey's Neutrality)," ibid., No. 10 (October 15, 1943). 17 Regarding Soviet demands, see Necmeddin Sadak, 'Turkey Faces the Soviets," Foreign Affairs, April 1949, pp. 458-59'; Harry N. Howard, "Germany, the Soviet Union and Turkey during World War II," (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State Bulletin, July 18, 1948); Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. VI: Triumph and Tragedy (Bos­ ton: Houghton-Mifflin, 1953), p. 635; and, with more detail, Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Vol. I, 1945: Year of Decisions (New York: The New American Library, 1955), pp. 413- 416,424-426.

45 as stipulated by the Montreux Convention. On the latter, they were willing to ne­ gotiate with the Soviet Union so that her legitimate security needs could be taken into account. A series of diplomatic exchanges followed between Ankara, Moscow, London, and Washington. The United States made proposals on November 2, 1945 that went a long way to meet the Soviet Union's security requirements. According to them, the Soviet Union would enjoy preferential treatment in the Straits. Her ships, naval and merchant, would be permitted to enter the Mediterranean without any restrictions as to numbers, tonnage and time. By contrast, save for an agreed tonnage in time of peace, warships of the non-Black Sea powers would be denied access to the Black Sea at all times, except with the specific consent of the Black Sea powers or except when acting under the authority of the United Nations. In their generous treatment of the Soviet Union, the U.S proposals resembled the pro­ visions of the secret Turkish-Russian Treaty of Unkiar Iskelessi of 1833 which had given Czarist Russia a dominant position in the Straits and which, at that time, provoked strong protests in the security-conscious West European capitals.ls In spite of these far-reaching concessions on the part of the West, the Soviet Union rejected the American proposals because they did not contain a provision for the joint Soviet-Turkish defense of the Straits. Subsequent negotiations proved inconclusive. Slowly awakening to the realities of Soviet expansionism in Eastern Europe and the Middle East, the American government was not ready to concede to Moscow physical control of the Turkish Straits. On their part, the Turks-who quickly sensed this stiffening of American attitudes-were not slow to convey the idea that, in their opinion, there was no compelling reason to modify or scrap the Montreux Convention which, not unfairly, took heed of both Soviet and Turkish security requirements. At the same time, Turkey voiced her absolute opposition to any Soviet proposals that would reduce either her sovereignty (such as the demand for a base in the Bosphorus) or territory. The Soviet response was angry and intimidating. Soviet media mounted a power­ ful propaganda campaign against Turkey. She was depicted as an unfriendly and un­ cooperative country whose behavior during World War 11 was treacherous and hostile to the Allies. '9 Soviet troops concentrated on Turkish borders as the prop­ aganda campaign broadened.

Building Ties with the West

There was mounting concern in the United States, but no action was taken until, on February 21, 1947, the British government-hitherto tacitly regarded as guarantor of Turkish independence and integrity-informed the United States of its inability to extend any further assistance to Turkey and Greeee. (Greece, which

Text of the treaty of Unkiar Iskelessi, together with British protest against it in Hure­ witz, op. cit., I, pp. 105-06. For a Turkish view of the Straits problem at the end of World War II, see Ahmed Stikrti Esmer, "The Straits: Crux of World Politics," Foreign Affairs, January 1947. For text of US. proposals of November 2, 1945, see The Problem ot the Turkish Straits (Washington: U.S. Department of State, 1947), Publication 2752, Near Eastern Service 5. 19 Text of Soviet note to the United States complaining about Turkey's wartime behavior in Hurewitz, op. cit., II, pp. 268-70. For a critical Soviet press comment, see S. Belinkov, 'Turkey in World War II," New Times, No. 11 (21) (November 1, 1945). 46 also had relied on British military and financial assistancc, was in turmoil due to the stepped-up activity of Soviet-supported Communist guerrillas.) On March 12, President Truman formally inaugurated the new American policy of containment of Soviet expansionism by pledging economic and military advisory assistance to Turkey and Greece. 20 Turkey was to receive $100 million out of the total of $400 million, but this relatively modest amount was only the beginning of a mas­ sive flow of aid for both economic and military purposes. The total of this aid reached, by 1971, an imposing figure of over $4 billion. Continuous American aid enabled Turkey not only to meet its budgetary deficits and engage in ambitious de­ velopment programs, but also to modernize and maintain a military establishment which, with its 1,000,000 men under arms, emerged as one of the largest among those of the medium-sized powers. Once the American protective shield was extended to Turkey, it was logical to provide her the benefits of the Marshall Plan for European recovery, which was inaugurated in 1947. Receiving this aid, Turkey was increasingly qualifying as a European state. By 1950 she and Greece were admitted as associate members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), to be recognized as full-fledged partners on October 17, 1951.21 Following this confirmation of her status as an ally of the West, Turkey began to pay increasing attention to her immediate neighborhood in the Middle East. She fully shared the Anglo-American view that the free world's defenses against Soviet expansionism would be incomplete without tying the Middle East into the overall complex of Western defense schemes. With American concurrence, Premier Men­ deres of Turkey and Premier Nuri as-Said of Iraq became, in 1955, the architects of the Baghdad Pact which came to include Iran, Pakistan, and Britain as members as well as the United States as a fully-cooperating though not signatory power.22 The deficiency, from Turkey's view, in not having the United States formally obli­ gated to defend Turkey in case of an agression was removed when, on March 5, 1959, the two countries concluded a mutual security agreement. 23 Turkey's growing association with the West of course affected her relations with the Soviet Union and other Communist bloc countries. First, Turkey's vigorous participation in the Korean War in 1950-52, as a member of the United Nations coalition, was a clearly anti-Communist action. The Turkish brigade distinguished itself for its dedication and valor, and gained unstinted praise from American com­ manders in the field. This in turn strengthened Turkey's moral status among West­ ern nations and facilitated her full admission into NATO. Secondly, perceiving that, assured of American support, Turkey was unbending in her refusal to accept Soviet demands formulated in 1945, the Moscow government made a conciliatory gesture by formally notifying Ankara on May 30, 1953 that it was withdrawing any claims to Turkish territory previously formulated. Thus it appeared that the American policy of containment, which was both firm and clear, was paying a div­ idend. Moscow accepted the U.S.-sponsored Turkish status quo.

20 Text in Magnus, op. cit., pp. 63-70. Revealing details of how the American decision was reached are in Acheson, op. cit., pp. 2l7ff. "' Text in Magnus, op. cit., Pi? 70-75. 22 Text in Magnus, op. cit., pp. 81ft See also p. 30 above. 23 Ibid., pp. 83ff. See also p. 30 above. 47 From then on, Turkey could be considered an integral part of the Western secu­ rity zone around the southern periphery of the Soviet Union. But her role in that zone did not remain entirely free of controversy. The main point of irritation for the Soviet Union was the United States' use of Turkish territory for the establishment of missile sites. This matter came to the fore during the Cuban missile crisis. Toward the end of October 1962, Chairman Khrushchev addressed three notes to the United States regarding missiles in Cuba. The first, dated October 26, offered to remove the missiles under U.N. supervision in exchange for the American guarantee not to invade Cuba. The second, of Octo~ ber 27, proposed the withdrawal of rockets from Cuba in exchange for the Ameri­ can removal of rockets from Turkey. The third, of the 28th, announced that work on the Cuban bases had been ordered stopped and that dismantling had begun. The second note said, inter alia:

You have stationed devastating rocket weapons, which you call offen­ sive, in Turkey, literally right next to us. How then does recognition of our equal military possibilities tally with such unequal relations between our great states? ... We agree to remove those weapons from Cuba [author's note: medium and intermediate range missiles and jet bombers] which you regard as offensive weapons. We agree to do this and to state this commitment in the United Nations. Your representative will make a statement to the effect that the United States, on its part, bearing in mind the anxiety and concern of the Soviet state, will evacuate its analogous weapons from Turkey. Let us reach an understanding on what time you and we need to put this into effect. President Kennedy accepted the Soviet offer to remove the missiles from Cuba and, in return, on October 27 gave "assurances against an invasion of Cuba" by the United States. He ignored Khrushchev's reference to Turkey and spoke instead in general terms of "the effect ... [that] such a settlement [would have] on eas­ ing world tensions" by enabling both parties "to work toward a more general ar­ rangement regarding 'other armaments' as proposed in your second letter which you made public." 24 Despite this implicit rejection of the Soviet proposal, the American missiles were removed from Turkey sometime in 1963. Affected by this removal were 18 bases along the Black Sea with Jupiter intermediate range rockets (1500 miles), already considered obsolescent. At the time the removal was made, the bases may not yet have been fully operational. In addition to serving as missile sites, the bases included radar and eommunications installations. Under the origi­ nal agreement the United States had control over nuclear warheads while the Turks maintained and operated the bases. According to the military commentator Hanson Baldwin, the removal of these bases was likely to weaken the defenses of the Middle East and the Eastern Medi­ terranean and make them vulnerable to Soviet penetration. Turkey's position as the key to military logistics in the area could not be replaced by Lebanon, whose airport at B.eirut was too small to handle large amounts of material. However, the loss of these bases could be made up by submarine-based Polaris missiles and by

24 Texts of Khrushchev's and Kennedy's messages in U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin, November 12, 1962, pp. 741-46.

48 intercontinental rockets. As for the nearest intermediate range missile sites next to Turkey, thirty of them were to be found in Italy.25

Moscow-Ankara: a New Phase in the 1960s The decade of the 1960s was complicated with domestic and foreign policy is­ sues for Turkey. It opened May 27, 1960, with a military coup which put an end to the ten-year-Iong rule of the Democratic party.26 The military applied firm pu­ nitive measures toward the Democratic leaders, most of whom were accused of abuse of power. They were given varying sentences, ranging from death for ex­ Premier Mcnderes and some of his ministers to imprisonment for deputies in the National Assembly. The ruling military group suffered a split in mid-November 1960 when a group of 14 officers headed by Colonel Alparslan Turkes was removed from the Com­ mittee of National Unity (CNU), the supreme governing body of the revolution. There is no evidence that this incident had any direct connection with the shaping of Turkey's foreign policy. Indirectly, however, it might have been related in two ways: (a) Colonel Turkes, an ambitious man inclined to greater radicalism than the majority on the CNU, was in favor of the military's retaining power indefinitely rather than relinquishing it after a transitional period; (b) he was understood to be critical of Turkey's depending too heavily on the West. Because the preceding Democratic government of Turkey was dedicated in principle and practice to the maintenance of the closest possible links with the United States, it might be as­ sumed that removal of the Democrats would open, at least theoretically, the pos­ sibility of a reorientation in Turkish foreign policy. Soviet experience with the military regimes of neighboring Arab countries was not discouraging; consequently it was not illogical for the Soviet Union to favor retention of power by the Turkish officers. On June 16, 1962, General Cemal GUrsel, president of the republic, dis­ closed that the U.S.S.R. had urged Turkey's military leaders to remain in power after the May 27, 1960 coup. The suggestion, he stated, was accompanied by an offer of $500 million in economic aidY Under the circumstances, had Colonel Turkes succeeded in seizing power, a shift in Turkey's foreign alignments might have followed. Removal of Turkes and his associates permitted the majority of the CNU to carry out the policy originally intended, Le., to rule during a transitional period only, pending the restoration of a civilian constitutional system. With almost unprecedented restraint, the military ruling group relinquished power to a renovated constitutional authority in the fall of 1961. Although the power transfer was genuine, the army retained an influential background role in Turkey's political process. Its influence was achieved in two ways: (a) the presi­ dency of the republic, in Turkey an office much more than nominal, was invariably entrusted to a general of the highest rank, and (b) political parties and leaders, in or out of power, quickly learned it was unwise to ignore the views of the army and,

25 The New York Times, October 28,1962. ~6 For an account of the coup, see Walter F. Weiker, The Turkish Revolution, 1960-1961: Aspects oj Military Politics (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1963); on its effects on Soviet-Turkish relations, pp. 159ff. 21 The New Y (Irk Times, June 17, 1962.

49 particularly, to engage in such practices as those that had brought about the Dem­ ocrats' downfall in 1960.

The Cyprus Issue and Turkish-American Frictions Between 1960 and 1970, Turkey's political history may be divided into three periods: (1) military rule (May 1960-0ctober 1961); (2) uneasy Republican as­ cendancy, combined with coalition cabinets (November 1961-0ctober 1965); (3) rule by the Justice party, an heir to the outlawed Democratic party (from October 1965 onward). Throughout these three periods Turkey remained faithful to her basic pro-Western orientation: she continued to be a member of NATO and CENTO, and she kept her territory available for military installations-including the presence of al­ lied military personnel--required by her treaty obligations. At the same time, how­ ever, and especially since 1963-64, Turkish foreign policy was emancipated from the virtually exclusive relationship with the West and moved toward greater inde­ pendence, especially in foreign economic relations. There was a cooling-off of Turkish-American relations and a rapprochement with the Soviet Union and other Communist-ruled countries.28 Perhaps one major immediate cause of this shift was American neutrality on the emotion-ridden Cyprus issue of the mid-1960s. Because the very survival of the Turkish minority in Cyprus was thought by Turkey to be threatened, Turkish pub­ lic opinion viewed America's neutrality as appeasement of Greeks, both in Cyprus and in Greece proper. The official Turkish attitude differed little from the popular one. During the height of the Cyprus crisis in 1964, Turkey's air force bombed Greek Cypriot forces beleaguering certain Turkish Cypriot villages. Moreover, Premier lsmet InBnli contemplated dispatching a military force to Cyprus to safe­ guard the security of the Turkish minority on the island. His declared intention, however, met with a rebuff from President Lyndon Johnson. According to subse­ quent disclosures, Mr. Johnson warned that, should Turkey suffer a Soviet attack as a result of her armed intervention in Cyprus, she could not expect support from NATO.29 These American counsels of restraint stemmed primarily from Washing­ ton's genuine concern over a possible outbreak of war between Turkey and Greece, a war which would wreck NATO's eastern flank. But they could also be traced to Soviet warnings to Turkey. In the first, on August 9, 1964, Pre­ mier Khrushchev called upon Premier InBnli to "stop military operations against the Republic of Cyprus"; in the second, a week later, he cautioned Turkey that she could not drop bombs on Cyprus "wi~h impunity." 30 In the dispute over Cyprus, the Soviet government chose the side of the Greek Cypriots as against Turkish interests and allowed some of its arms, earlier deliv­ ered to Egypt, to be transferred to the Greek Cypriot government of Archbishop Makarios. On September 30, 1964, the Soviet Union signed an agreement pledging military and economic aid to Cyprus.

28 For an analysis, see A. H. Ulman and R. H. Dekmejian, "Changing Patterns in Turkish Foreign Policy," Orb is, Fall 1967. 29 Text of President Johnson's letter of June 5, 1964, to Prime Minister Inonti in Magnus, op. cit., pp. 127ff. 30 MEl, Vol. XVIII, No.4 (Autumn 1964), pp. 459 and 461.

50 Some in Turkey thought their country was both threatened with Soviet encircle­ ment and abandoned by its Western friends. Most Turks felt genuinely aggrieved: they believed that the Treaty of Guarantee on Cyprus of 1960 entitled them, as one of the guarantor states, to intervene if the constitution of Cyprus was violated to the detriment of the Turkish minority. They also felt that their policies toward Cyprus should have been treated separately from their relations with the Soviet Union. Attempts to link the two problems-by both the Soviet Union and the United Stat(.;s-made them resentful toward Washington;l1 and, simultaneously, more conciliatory toward Moscow. Frictions began developing in American-Turkish relations in 1964. Turkey fol­ lowed to some extent Iran's example in playing down the importance of CENTO and, on July 21, 1964, joined with Iran and Pakistan in forming the RCD organi­ zation. 32 In 1966, Secretary of State Dean Rusk was met by hostile demonstrations upon his arrival in Turkey to attend a CENTO meeting. Various difficulties devel­ oped sporadically over the presence of American military personnel in Turkey, as well as over the activities of certain Peace Corps members who were aecused of spying and asked to leave. Visits of the units of the U.S. Sixth Fleet in Turkish ports, previously enjoying a warm welcome, gave rise to anti-American demonstra­ tions and there were occasional attacks on sailors. American activity in Vietnam provided another opportunity for outbursts of hostility toward the United States. And, as if to erase the memory of a recent Turkish involvement in an "Asian war," the 800-man contingent of Turkish troops in South Korea was withdrawn in May 1966. The arrival in 1968 of newly appointed American Ambassador Rob­ ert Komer, fresh from duty in Vietnam, served as an excuse for violent student outbursts on two separate occasions, during one of which the ambassador's official car was burned. Flights by American aircraft over Turkish territory at the time of the Lebanese crisis of 1958 were recalled, and there was unofficial speCUlation that Turkey would be reluctant to grant the United States such a privilege again, should a similar contingency arise in any current crisis in the Middle East.

Soviet Overtures and Advances While Turkish-American relations were worsening, Soviet-Turkish relations were steadily improving. The beginning of this improvement process could perhaps be

31 Prime Minister Inonli'~ reply to President Johnson, dated June 13, 1964, contains the fol­ lowing significant passages: "Mr. President, Your message, both in wording and content has been disappointing for an ally like Turkey who has always been giving the most serious atten­ tion to its relations of alliance with the United States and has brought to the fore substantial divergences of opinion in Vl:lrious fundamental matters pertaining to these relations .... The part of your message expressing doubts as to the obligation of the NATO allies to protect Turkey in case she becomes directly involved with the USSR as a result of an action initiated in Cyprus, gives me the impression that there are as between us wide divergences of views as to the nature and basic principles of the North Atlantic Alliance. I must confess that this has been to us the source of great sorrow and grave concern. . . . Our understanding is that the North Atlantic Treaty imposes upon all member states the obligation to come forthwith to the a,sistance of any member victim of an aggression. The only point left to the discretion of member states is the nature and the scale of this assistance. If NATO members should start discussing tbe right and wrong of the situation of their fellow-member victim of a Soviet ag­ gression, whether this aggression was provoked or not and if the decision on whether they have an obligation to assist the member should be made to depend on the issue of such a dis­ cussion, the very foundations of the Alliance would be shaken and it would lose its meaning. . . ." Full text in Magnus, op. cit., pp. 130-36. 32 See p. 32 above.

51 traced to the visit of the Turkish parliamentary delegation to the Soviet Union in February 1963, barely a month after the removal of American intermediate-range rockets from Turkish territory. There followed an 18-month period of no visits, perhaps reflecting Soviet-Turkish aggravation caused by the Cyprus dispute. Turkey's disappointment with the American attitude, following President In6nii's exchanges with President Johnson during his visit to Washington in June 1964, spurred a "revisionist" mood in Ankara. Turkish deputies asked publicly whether their country should continue its membership in NATO. In October 1964, the Turkish Foreign Minister Feridun C. Erkin visited Moscow to discuss Cyprus and economic exchanges with the Soviet Union. It was the first such visit that a Turk­ ish statesman had paid to the Soviet Union in 25 years. The visit appeared to be mutually satisfactory: the Soviet Union accepted the Turkish view on independ­ ence for Cyprus, as against enosis with Greece, and on the need to protect the Turkish minority on the island. In return, Turkey expressed interest in closer eco­ nomic and technical cooperation with the Soviet Union. Other high-level visits fol­ lowed: a Soviet "parliamentary" delegation led by Nicolai Podgorny to Turkey (January 1965), Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko to Ankara (May 1965), Turkish Prime Minister Suat Hayri Orgiiplii to the Soviet Union (August 1965), Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin to Turkey (December 1966), Turkish Prime Minister Suleiman Demirel to Moscow (September 1967), and Turkish Foreign Minister Ihsan Sabri Caglayangil to the Soviet Union (July 1968). These visits produced a marked detente in the Soviet-Turkish relations. On Feb­ ruary 26, 1965, Premier Urgiiplii declared that Turkey would cooperate with her NATO partners, but would emphasize an individual foreign policy, particularly in developing better relations with the Soviet Union. On October 10, 1967, his suc­ cessor, Premier Demirel, commented on his return from Moscow that the visit had eliminated "the last traces of hostility" in Soviet-Turkish relations.33 The improvement in political relations was accompanied by a steady growth in economic exchanges. Agreements between the two countries projected an increase of trade from $30 million in 1965 to $75 million in 1968. In December 1964, the Soviet Union undertook to establish in Turkey a plant to produce 50,000 prefabri­ cated homes. The visit of a 24-man Soviet delegation resulted, on November 12, 1965, in Soviet agreement to provide $200 million in assistance to construct a 100,000 ton aluminum plant at Konya, an iron and steel plant, a refinery, a sul­ phuric acid plant, a glass factory, a vodka distillery, and a fibre-board plant. This was followed, on November 24, by a Turkish-Soviet agreement to erect a dam on the borderland Arpa\East Germany, and other Soviet bloc countries began paying visits to Ankara in 1964. Frequently they were headed by prime ministers or other cabinet­ level dignitaries of the countries in question. Invariably, the visits resulted in the signing of trade-and-aid agreements. In September 1968-to give an example­ Rumania pledged her cooperation in the exploration for oil and minerals in Tur-

33 MEl, Vol XXII, No.1 (Winter 1968).

52 key, thus entering a field hitherto reserved for cooperative ventures with the West. Although it was a standard policy of most of the countries in the Afro-Asian area to distinguish between domestic communism and their government-to­ government relations with the Soviet Union, implementation of this policy varied from country to country. Official rapprochement with Moscow tended often to be interpreted by local Communists as a sign of greater tolerance toward their activities. It was sometimes embarrassing for a government to put curbs on communism with equal vigor as in the past, when relations with the Soviet Union had been either strained or nonexistent. In Turkey, some resurgence of Communist activities could be noted in the late 1960s. Turkey, staunchly nationalistic and historically distrust­ ful of Russia, had developed a degree of immunity against communism. However, certain manifestations of Communist upsurge were considered important enough by a number of parliamentary deputies to warn, in April 1967, of the danger of leftist advances in Turkey. Some two years earlier, in January 1965, a similar distrust and fear had led a group of deputies to protest the anticipated speech of Soviet President Podgorny to the Turkish National Assembly.~4 By 1970, Turkey's campuses and streets had become the scene for demonstra­ tions by militant groups which bore some resemblance to the American "new left." The Turkish militants had tight organizations, frequently staged protests, and were prone to resort to violence. Their demonstrations were directed as much against the Justice party government of Premier Suleiman Demirel as against the United States. Although observers tended to play down their numbers as compared with the total of uninvolved students, the militants were successful in certain cases in rallying and putting in motion large crowds, on one occasion estimated at 10,000 and including professors of law and political science. The mining department of the Istanbul Technical Institute was described by its former dean as "an ammuni­ tion depot" for the militants. The intermittent political agitation cost its students 100 days of class work in 1969-70. It is a matter for speculation how sponta­ neous these activities were and where the ultimate loyalties of the young revolu­ tionaries lay. Some light was shed on this aspect in late spring 1970 elections at the Middle East Technical University in Ankara. A Maoist Communist faction won 1,882 votes compared to 1,390 cast for a moderate socialist group and only 92 for a new middle-of-the-road group. However, 3,000 students, half of those enrolled, abstained from voting."" Regardless of whether a link could be established between these events and Soviet or Chinese policy, radicalization of the schools and defiance of authority embarrassed the government and weakened the fabric of the Turkish state. Disorders and kidnappings in early 1971 led the Turkish generals to issue an ultimatum on March 12, 1971, which resulted in the resignation of the Demirel government. Nihat Erim, a respected member of the Republican party, was ap­ pointed premie~ with the approval of the generals and quickly imposed martial law and began a campaign against terrorists and subversion. In July 1971 the Turkish

34 Podgorny did address the Grand National Assembly at a joint session of its two houses. This exception to existing rules was-rightly--considered by the Soviet delegation as "a sign of special attention." From a report by Pravda, February 7, 1965, as reproduced by The Cur­ rent Digest of the Soviet Press, March 3, 1965. 35 The New York Times, June 15, 1970.

53 Labor party was disbanded and tight control over domestic critics was exercised by the government. While there continues to be some criticism of the government, the determined posture of the present regime discourages anti-government activity. Transformation of Turkish-Soviet relations from hostility and distrust to nor­ malcy and cooperation was due primarily to the abandonment by the Soviet Union of the strong-arm tactics and pressures which characterized Soviet policies in the 1940s and the 1950s. At the same time there was a growing conviction in Turkey that the problems of China and Eastern Europe claimed priority in the Soviet thinking over expansionism at Turkey's and Iran's expense. There was also a sub­ tle but noticeable change in the attitudes of the Turkish population at large. The generation of students who burned the American ambassador's car or attacked sailors of the Sixth Fleet had not experienced the anxieties of the postwar period when Turkey was subjected to Soviet territorial demands and threats to her sover­ eignty. At that time it was Turkey which, on her own initiative, had asked for American guarantees and assistance and it was Turkey which received American and NATO aid with appreciation. True enough, anti-American feelings of the stu­ dents in the 1960s were not necessarily representative of the broad spectrum of Turkish opinion. The Turkish government and the freely-elected National Assem­ bly neither repudiated nor had the intention of repudiating Turkey'S ties with the West, such as NATO, CENTO, or the Turkish-American mutual security pact of 1959. No responsible Turkish statesman could disregard the eommon Turkish- Soviet boundary, their relations in the recent past, or the profound differences be­ tween their political systems. Nor could he remain oblivious to the fact that, in 1967 alone, 6,192 Soviet merchant vessels of 26,631,409 tons (out of a total of 17,398 ships carrying 59,512,793 tons, or 44.8 percent of all merchant-marine traffic) had passed through the Straits. In that same year, some 240 Soviet war­ ships transited the Straits, as the Soviet Union increased its naval presence in the Mediterranean:'6 In strategic terms, these Soviet activities and the growth of So­ viet influence in Syria, Iraq and other Arab countries, could be viewed as an envel­ oping movement which, potentially if not actually, presented a danger to Turkey's security.

36 Harry N. Howard, "Turkey: A Contemporary Survey," Current History, March 1969.

54 IV. SOVIET ADVANCES IN THE ARAB WORLD

n the decade following World War II, the Northern Tier (including Greece, Tur­ I key, and Iran) provided one of the principal foci for the cold war. Soviet threats, demands, and interventions were countered by a newly developed Ameri­ can policy of containment, enunciated in the Truman Doctrine and in a number of ancillary policy statements and aid actions. By and large, the policy of containment proved successful in the region to which it was addressed: Greece avoided a Com­ munist takeover, Turkey maintained her territorial integrity, while Iran arranged for the Soviet Union to withdraw from its northern provinces and restored law and order after Soviet attempts at subversion during the Mossadegh era. Russia and Arab Nationalism Soviet failure to penetrate the Northern Tier could be ascribed primarily to the obvious contradiction between the policies of the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and those of Greece, Turkey, and Iran on the other. Any Soviet initiative toward these countries during the Stalinist era was regarded by them as a threat to their political independence and territorial integrity, to be resisted by strengthening their internal and international position. This logic could not be applied with equal ease and simplicity to the area of Soviet-Arab relations. In a broad sense, the Arab region of the Middle East and North Mrica was an ex-colonial area which was undergoing, however unevenly, the process of modernization and liberation from Western control and influence. In this process Arab aspirations often exceeded the pace at which the European West was relinquishing its governing responsibilities. Furthermore, while imperial control was shrinking, Western interests, economic and strategic, were not. A new dimension was added when the traditional British, French, and Italian domi­ nance in the Arab world began to give way to an increased American presence. The United States was not pursuing conventional imperial goals, territory or one-sided economic advantages. Rather, the United States had begun to assume its new role in the postwar period as the leader and principal guardian of the free world's security. In practice, the free world could be defined as all those areas of the globe which were not under Soviet-Communist domination, regardless of the type of govern­ ment in existence in individual countries. Within this broad definition, the free world comprised two areas: (a) The West European community of nations (with its Mediterranean exten­ sion) which, in partnership with the United States, constituted the active hard core of the free world. This area, commonly referred to as the North Atlantic commu­ nity, was the main repository of the values and practices of Western Christianity. Its political freedoms, adherence to the rule of law, and its collective standard of liv~

55 ing were examples for the world. It could boast of the greatest labor efficiency, the densest accumulation of skills, and the most spectacular scientific achievements, based on a broad base of educated and politically conscious citizenry. (b) The outer region, composed of a great variety of nations whose common denominator was underdevelopment in virtually every sphere of human endeavor. This region, which included Christian Latin America, the predominantly Islamic Middle East and North Africa, the Sub-Saharan Black Africa, and most of non­ Communist Asia, had varying degrees of consciousness of belonging to the free world, ranging from a close identification among the ruling elites and middle classes in Latin America, through an ambivalent attitude of the intelligentsia in many Afro-Asian countries, to an ignorance, apathy or outright hostility of the poverty-stricken urban or rural masses throughout the outer region. The Arab world belonged par excellence to the second category. Its intelligent­ sia and ruling elites were divided in their thinking and allegiance: some desiring identification and closer ties with the West; others, with colonial memories still fresh in their minds, resentful, suspicious, and prone to see neo-imperialism in vir­ tually every manifestation of Western presence, be it economic (however mutually profitable), cultural, or military. The nature of Western military presence had changed considerably since the colonial days. In earlier times West European mili­ tary installations in the Arab area insured Western political domination, but in the post-colonial period they had a broader strategic significance, primarily and some­ times exclusively directed against the Soviet expansionist threat. This was clearly the purpose of American bases in Saudi Arabia and Libya, which were integral to the strategies of NATO, CENTO, and SEATO. There were thus three conceptual sectors in which the Soviet Union could ex­ ploit to her own benefit the resentments and suspicions of substantial segments of the Arab intelligentsia: (a) the Arab struggle for "liberation" from real or imagi­ nary remnants of Western dominance; (b) the Arab effort to develop their under­ developed countries; (c) the desire to modernize their socio-political structures by replacing traditional authoritarianism with social mobIlity and more contemporary forms of political participation. The combination of these three aspirations consti­ tuted the essence of nationalism in the Third World. Ever since the revolution in 1917, the Soviet Union had tried to identify herself with this type of nationalism and to project the image of a disinterested friend of oppressed peoples in colonies and semi-colonies. After 1955 especially, these efforts were intensified in the Arab world. The five years, 1955-59, were replete with significant international and re­ gional developments, of which the following are particularly relevant: (a) growth of neutralism in the Arab world within the framework of Afro-Asia (Bandung Conference, 1955); (b) extension of American policy of containment (Baghdad Pact, 1955; Eisen­ hower Doctrine, 1957); (c) establishment of closer ties between Arab nationalist centers and the Soviet Union (Soviet-Egyptian arms deal, 1955; Soviet-Syrian aid agreement, 1957; So­ viet Aswan Dam commitment, 1958); (d) challenge to Western supremacy in the Arab world (nationalization of Suez Canal, 1956); (e) crisis in Arab-Israeli relations (the Suez war, 1956); 56 (f) surge of radicalism in the Arab world (Communist and Socialist advances in Syria, 1957; revolution in Iraq, 1958; civil war in Lebanon, 1958); (g) intensified drive for Arab unity (formation of United Arab Republic, and federation with Yemen, 1958); and (h) American intervention in favor of moderate Arab status quo (support for Jordan, 1957-58; landing of troops in Lebanon, 1958). The main trend in these developments was the gradual estrangement between the leading centers of Arab nationalism (Cairo, Damascus, Baghdad) and the United States. Differences centered primarily on issues of neutralism, Israel, and revolutionary radicalism. During the Dulles-Eisenhower era, the trend in Washing­ ton was to regard neutralism as immoral and to stress the difference, especially in the terms of U.S. economic and arms aid, between neutrals and allies. As for Israel, American displeasure (backed by suspension of aid) over Israeli invasion of Egypt in 1956 was decisive in compelling the Israelis to withdraw from the conquered territories. However, this signal service to Arab nationalism was overshadowed by more spectacular (though less effective) Soviet threats toward Israel and by the American insistence on freedom of navigation in the controversial Straits of Tiran. The United States' initial credit for defending Egypt's territorial integrity was dissipated by these two factors. With regard to Arab-American differences over revolutionary radicalism, it was not radical reform per se that caused Washington's negative attitude. In fact, the United States recognized the need for reform and, as its early friendly attitude to­ ward Nasser's regime indicated, was willing to cooperate with a revolutionary gov­ ernment that strove to improve local social and economic conditions. Thus the United States not only offered its good offices but also put some pressure on Brit­ ain to encourage a settlement with Egypt on the evacuation of the Suez base. Diffi­ culties between Washington and the revolutionary Arab regimes could generally be traced to the following causes: first, if a newly emerged dictatorship adopted anti-American attitudes in contrast to the posture of the government it replaced; second, if such a regime allowed significant Communist penetration; and third, if the new regime followed an aggressive policy toward its neighbors. Any or all of these policies might have been inspired by Pan-Arab or revolutionary ideologies or by both. Serious strains developed, successively, between the United States on the one hand, and Egypt, Iraq, and Syria on the other. When, in 1955, Nasser shifted his attention from domestic reform to a militant Pan-Arab policy which threatened the existing political structures in other Arab countries, tension between Cairo and Washington became inevitable. The United States also disapproved when revolu­ tionary Iraq threatened the independence of Kuwait and when radically-oriented Syria aided and abetted attempts at the overthrow of the Jordanian monarchy. In contrast to the United States, the Soviet Union was in a position to turn to her advantage the three principal trends in contemporary Arab nationalism (neu­ tralism, anti-Zionism, radicalism) which stood in the way of harmonious American relations with the Arabs. Although initially (during the Stalinist era), neutralism was not approved by Moscow, it was not only accepted in the Khrushchev period and after but it was even encouraged as a policy which had an anti-Western and

57 pro-Soviet potentiaL 1 In fact, Soviet propaganda tended to hail neutralism as a mark of national emancipation of Arab countries. On the issue of Zionism, Soviet policy seemed pragmatic and purposeful despite certain outward inconsistencies. While Moscow's basic doctrinal stand on Zionism was negative (a "petty bourgeois nationalist movement"), 2 the Soviet Union not only assisted in the creation of Israel by opting for the partition of Palestine in 1947, but also helped the initial Zionist war effort by supplying arms, directly or through its satellites, to the newly formed Jewish state. 3 Furthermore, the Soviet Union hastened to extend diplomatic recognition to Israel after its proclamation of independence. (She carne second in this "race" only because of the impressive speed with which President Truman acted.) These Soviet moves could hardly be described as pro-Arab; in fact, angry Syrian students reacted to them by storming the Soviet Embassy in Damascus. However, it soon became evident to Moscow that the creation of Israel provided a built-in wedge, almost automatically guaranteeing a degree of tension in Arab­ American relations. It was, therefore, not illogical for the Soviet government to take full advantage of these circumstances by adopting an active policy of support for Arab nationalism in its opposition to Israel and Zionism.4 It is within this general framework that the Soviet Union launched in the Arab world in the mid-1950s a broad offensive in the political, economic, and cultural sectors. The objective was to establish close and friendly relations, to discredit and

1 See p. 14 above. 2 The editor's "explanatory note" No.2 in J. Stalin's Marxism and the National and Colo­ nial QUestion (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 2nd ed. of 1936, reprinted 1947) gives the fol­ lowing definition: "Ziollism-a reactionary and nationalist political movement which recruited its followers from among the Jewish petty and middle bourgeoisie, intellectuals, business em­ ployees, artisans and the more backward sections of the Jewish workers. Its aim is to organize a Jewish bourgeois state in Palestine and it endeavors to isolate the Jewish working-class masses from the general struggle of the proletariat." (p. 289) The note in question refers to the following sentences in Stalin's text: "And the rising tide of militant nationalism above ... evoked an answering tide of nationalism below, which at times took the form of crude chau­ vinism. The spread of Zionism among the Jews, the increase of chauvinism in Poland and of Pan-Islam ism among the Tatars, the spread of nationalism among the Armenians, Georgians and Ukrainians, the general tendency of the ordinary man to anti-Semitism-all these are generally known facts." (pp. 3-4). 3 "While the hard currency for these arms transactions was provided largely by the dollar contributions of United States Jewry, one of the most fruitful sources of supply was the state-owned armament factories of Czechoslovakia, where the Communists had seized power in the previous February." Quoted from George Kirk, The Middle East, 1945-1950 (London: Oxford University Press, 1954, p. 277). Israeli purchasing agent in Czechoslovakia was Ben Gurion's emissary, Ehud Avriel, aided by two Haganah emissaries, Pino Ginsburg and Urie! Doron. They found "the Czechs unex­ pectedly co-operative and friendly" but apparently reluctant to commit themselves until Soviet clearance was obtained. Ultimately. after long discussions between the Zionist representative in New York. Moshe Shertok (Moshe Sharett, future foreign minister of Israel), and the Soviet U.N. delegate, Andrei Gromyko, the Russians gave their approval in January 1948 and "the Czechs finally agreed to sell arms." See Jon and David Kimche, A Clash of Destinies: The Arab-Jewish War and the Founding of the State of Israel (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960, pp. 75-76). 4 "Contemporary Zionism is an ideology, a widespread system of organizations and political practice of the big Jewish bourgeoisie that has become intertwined with the monopolistic cir­ cles of the U.S.A. and other imperialist powers. Zionism consists basically of rabid chauvin­ ism and malicious anti-communism. Ignoring the genuine interests of the Israeli people, the Zionists have placed even the state of Israel at the service of imperialism." (Editorial, Pravda, March 3, 1970. Quoted by The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XXII, No.9, March 31, 1970, pp. 12-13.)

58 displace Western presence, and to promote maximum dependence on the Soviet Union among the recipients of Soviet aid. The Soviet Union scrupulously avoided resorting to violence, threats, and intimi­ dation even when irritations and difficulties developed. The basic attitude was osten­ sible benevolence and friendship. Business with the Arab states was conducted on a government-to-government basis, even when a given Arab regime had strained re­ lations with the local Communists. The Soviet Union avoided any direct and overt assistance to local Communist parties and withheld public protest when Commu­ nist movements were outlawed, as they were in virtually all the Arab countries. A few exceptions to this rule did occur in Soviet relations with Egypt and Iraq, but they did not upset the basic pattern of mutual accommodation.

Focus on Arab Radical Regimes Facing an Arab world divided into the radical and moderate camps, the Soviet Union's attention tended to focus on the radical regimes. Consequently, she devel­ oped her closest relations with Egypt (U.A.R.), Syria, Iraq, Algeria, and the two Yemen republics. However, she did not entirely neglect other Arab states; and at one time or another she entered into transactions with, or made friendly overtures to, the more conservative Arab governments such as Kuwait, Jordan, Morocco, and even Saudi Arabia (the country which thus far had refused to enter into dip­ lomatic relations with the Soviet Union). Soviet rapprochement with Arab revolutionary regimes could not be ascribed to their pro-Communist policies. The Arab revolutionaries were generally hostile and distrustful toward communism. Rapprochement was due rather to the combi­ nation of their anti-colonial ethos, their neutralism, and their preference for a state-directed economy under the banner of Arab socialism. 5 The economies of the Soviet Union and the Arab radical states were not always complementary. The pattern varied from country to country: Egypt's cotton could be absorbed in the Soviet and satellite markets; but Iraq's oil had a logical outlet in Western Europe and Japan. Furthermore, Arab states were in greater need of high quality Western industrial products than the comparable but lower-grade Soviet goods. Conse­ quently, it was not trade advantage which determined Soviet relations with these states, but rather subjective factors based on policy aims and psychology. Soviet assistance to the radical Arab regimes was generally geared to satisfy the psychological needs of their ruling elites. If their development plans called for major infrastructural projects, Moscow was ready to come forward with corrc-

5 "The Soviet Union's increasing aid potential opens up new perspectives to developing na­ tions, perspectives of genuine economic independence and complete freedom from the rapa­ cious practices of the capitalist world economy. The newly independent nations, including sev­ eral Arab natipns, are orienting their foreign trade on the socialist world market, which can supply them with needed producer goods .... Underlying that process is the fact that the ex­ istence of the socialist system is altering the very pattern of economic relations. The old pat­ tern, based on subordination and exploitation, is being broken.... Farseeing Arab leaders, ir­ respective of the social systems they favour, know that the very existence of the Soviet Union is an inestimable factor in their countries' economic progress .... Arab friendship with the U.S.S.R. rests on a firm foundation-hatred of imperialism, exploitation, colonial rapine and violence, and an unbending will to promote peace and bar the way to the forces that would unleash a nuclear war. The Soviet Union and the Arab countries are a part of the Peace Zone, which stands opposed to the aggressive forces of imperialism." From "The Soviet Union and the Arab World," New Times, No. 20 (May 19, 1964).

59 sponding offers of aid, like the High Aswan Dam, the Helwan steel plant in Egypt, and the Euphrates Dam in Syria. If, at a given moment, Arab emphasis was placed on extractive or consumers' industries, Russia and her East European allies responded favorably to such quests as well. A Czech Bata shoe factory for Iraq, a Czech refinery (at Homs) for Syria, a harbor (at Hodeida) for Yemen, a Polish sulphur mining project for Iraq testified to the versatility of Soviet bloc policies in this respect. Generally, Soviet preference was for aid in schemes which were spec­ tacular and which possessed a high public relations potential.

Arms Deliveries Deliveries of arms played a major role in this psychological offensive. It is a moot question as to what the true defense needs of the recipient states were. There is no doubt that the main recipients of Soviet arms, Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, faced a continuous possibility of violent confrontation with Israel and that an actual war occurred twice-in 1956 and 1967-and this justified arms transactions, to a de­ gree. Furthermore, the refusal of the United States, in June 1956, to respond to Cairo's request for arms-a request made after the Israeli raid on the Egyptian Gaza headquarters---compelled Egypt to look for alternate sources of arms sup­ plies. In addition, heavy arming of Israel by pre-Gaullist France and, subsequently, by the United States, tended to create such a technological imbalance, to the detri­ ment of the Arabs, that it would have been remarkable if they had not sought equalization. There is no doubt that one purpose of Soviet arms deliveries was to satisfy the prestige and internal security needs of the Arab regimes. There was hardly an issue on which the radical regimes could muster a more enthusiastic response of the masses than to present them with evidence of a heightened defense potential. The moderate "bourgeois" strata might privately object to squandering the national wealth on military hardware which was unproductive and which-as proved in practice---did not materially increase the recipients' capacity to cope with Israel's power. But the "bourgeois" were on the defensive, and each new confrontation with Israel, whether a full-fledged war or a lesser hostility, eroded their position further. Apart from the masses, each recipient government had to consider its rul­ ing establishment-or its coercive apparatus-which were likely to be strengthened by the acquisition of new weapons. This was particularly true of the armies and the air forces whose career officers were especially keen on the new military "toys" that could be put into their hands. Officers in non-radical states had the same attitude toward modern weapons and equipment. The kings of Saudi Arabia and Jordan (and the Shah of Iran in the non-Arab area of the Middle East) were also solicit­ ous of their officers' desires in this respect. The moderate nations were being sup­ plied by the United States and, to a lesser extent, by Britain. These two Western governments heeded not only the prestige and internal security needs of their re­ spective Arab and Iranian partners, but their genuine defense needs as well. How­ ever, should the recipient country be likely to confront Israel-as was the case of J ordan-Western, especially American, arms supplies were limited and restrained, so as not to threaten Israel's military preponderance. The Soviet Union did not seem bound by self-imposed restraints to the same de­ gree. However, she obviously was selective in the kinds of weapons she was willing

60 to place in her partners' hands, presumably for four reasons: (a) She did not want to generate reckless over-confidence in the Arab regimes which could lead them toward hasty and ill-planned offensives against Israel and thus invite a pos­ sible new defeat; such offensives might complicate the Soviet Union's position and force her to choose between intervention to rescue her partners, on the one hand, and inaction which would risk Arab disenchantment, on the other. (b) From the record of her past policy and her occasional pronouncements, the Soviet Union did not appear to favor the destruction of Israel.e (c) It was unlikely that she would want to risk war with the United States at the time and place of Egypt's and Is­ rael's choosing. (d) She was anxious to safeguard the secrets of her more sophisti­ cated weapons by reducing the chances of their capture by the Israelis. For all these reasons the Soviet Union supplied Arab nations with a mixture of simple and sometimes obsolescent weapons and arms of a more sophisticated but essentially defensive character. 7 Cultural Offensive: Exchange Scholarships Soviet aid-and-arms policies were accompanied by a broad cultural offensive, with the special meaning that the word "cultural" has in the Communist political vocabulary. According to classical Marxism, culture is but a segment of the super­ structure of society above the economic substructure. Leninist and Stalinist prac­ tice (by and large continued, with somewhat decreased harshness, in the post­ Stalin era) has been to treat and use cultural manifestations, such as writing, paint­ ing, science, language, music and folk arts, as devices to assure political conformity at home and pro-Soviet attitudes abroad. Art for art's sake, search for truth in sci­ ence or social sciences, genuine open-minded dialogues with foreign scholars, and exposure of Soviet students to the trends and values of the outside world have al­ ways been frowned upon by Soviet authorities. Hence, in concluding cultural ex­ change agreements and in its actual conduct of cultural relations, the Soviet gov­ ernment was primarily interested in the effect that such cooperation with foreign countries might have upon the position and interests of the Soviet state and its ide­ ological purity. Scholarships for Arab students in the Soviet Union and East Europe figured most prominently among the methods of cultural penetration. Such scholarships

6 "One may ask, why is the Soviet Union so resolutely opposed to Israel'! However, the So­ viet Union is not against Israel, but against the aggressive policy pursued by the ruling circles of that State. "In the course of its fifty-year history, the Soviet Union has treated all peoples-large or small-with respect. Every people enjoys the right to establish an independent national State of its own. This is one of the fundamental principles of the policy of the Soviet Union. "It is on this very basis that we formulated our attitude toward Israel as a State when we voted in 1947 for the United Nations decision to create two independent States, a Jewish one and an Arab one, in the territory of the former British colony of Palestine. Guided by this position of principle, the Soviet Union later established diplomatic relations with IsraeL" From a speech by Pr~mier Alexei N. Kosygin, Official Records, United Nations, General As­ sembly, Fifth Emergency Special Session, 1526th Plenary Meeting, Monday, June 19, 1967, 10:30 A.M., New York (A/PV 1526). A similar statement was contained in a broadcast from Moscow Radio, Peace and Progress (Yiddish to Israel, 15.00 GMT, June 11, 1970): "The Soviet Union has never suggested and does not support now the liquidation of the state of Israel. Israeli citizens remember. well enough that the Soviet Union voted in the United Nations in favor of the creation of a Jewish state on the territory of Palestine. The Soviet Union's viewpoint has never changed. The Soviet Union opposes only aggression and the ad­ venturist policy of the rulers of today's Israel." From FBIS, Daily Report, No. 116, June 16, 1970. 1 For a more detailed review of the arms problem, see Chapter VIII below.

61 were offered by the hundreds to Iraq, Syria and the United Arab Republic. Both undergraduate and graduate students were invited, regardless of their previous knowledge of Russian or East European languages. Main emphasis was on engi­ neering and sciences. Stipends and amenities (lodging, transportation, free theater tickets, etc.) offered to Arab students were generally more attractive than those granted to native students of the Communist host countries. The first year, espe­ cially for an undergraduate student in the Soviet Union, would be spent on an in­ tensive course in the Russian language to be followed by four or more years of specialized study. Next to the Soviet Union, Bulgaria figured prominently as a host country for Arab students, but POlaqd, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia also had a substantial share in this scholarly exchange activity.8 Soviet and satellite offers of scholarships were accepted by many Arab students from the radical states for three reasons: (a) Professional skills acquired in the Soviet Union and East Europe were regarded as of higher quality than those in most of the Arab universities, especially in the scientific and engineering fields. (b) Such scholarships opened opportunities for travel which otherwise were not easily available, either because of the low economic status of the candidates or be­ cause of the restrictions imposed on travel by the radical Arab regimes. (c) There was a tangible advantage in having one's tuition and expenses fully paid by a for­ eign government. In spite of these attractions, most applicants tended to give higher preference to scholarships in the United States and Western Europe, assuming that such were available. An informal survey in Iraq in the early 1960s revealed that (a) most candidates desiring to study abroad were applying for scholarships in the West; (b) these students embraced a wide ideological spectrum which included Commu­ nists; (c) relatively few Marxist -oriented students mentioned the Soviet Union as their first preference; (d) a good deal of personal and political favoritism was practiced by officials in the Iraqi Ministry of Education in awarding scholarships; (e) if, at a given moment, officials of Communist persuasion were in key posi-

S Details are as follows:

Arab Students Studying in Communist Countries 1965166 1966/67 1967/68 Academic Technical Academic Technical Academic Technical Algeria 315 65 315 65 410 115 Iraq 1,205 50 1,200 100 1,035 70 Jordan 70 70 65 Lebanon 360 290 435 Morocco 85 130 65 85 80 Sudan 665 1,070 1,265 Syria 405 400 285e 25 Tunisia 70 45 85 115 165 235 UAR. 280 445 370 415 345" 260 Yemen 550 105 365 240 325e 165e Approximate Pattern Distribution ot Arab Students in 1967/68 U.S.S.R. Eastern Europe Academic 70% 30% Technical 50% 50% Note: e = estimate. Source: U.S. Department of State. Research Memorandum (Unclassified), Educational and Cultural Changes Between Communist and Non Communist Countries: RSB-I0, January 25, 1967, RSB-40, May 1967, and RSB-65, May 31, 1968. 62 tions, they were inclined to favor their fellow Communists by granting them the most coveted scholarships, Le., those in the West; (f) as a result, scholarships for study in the Soviet Union and other Communist states went overwhelmingly to non-Communists. The question arises whether the sustained presence of so many young Arabs (several thousand cumulatively in the decade of the 1960s) in the Soviet bloc area has had any appreciable impact on their political orientation and whether they have been subjected to systematic indoctrination. To begin with the second part of the question, it appears that Soviet authorities occasionally attempted indoctrination in the form of the courses or lectures on the history of the Soviet state or history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, offered in addition to the regular professional curriculum. But the practice has not been uniform and, in certain cases, Arab students protested against such offerings on the grounds they were irrelevant to the main course of study and only a dis­ guised vehicle for possible indoctrination. A group of Iraqi engineering students in Odessa, for instance, lodged a protest with their military attache in Moscow and succeeded in having the course promptly withdrawn. It appears that systematic indoctrination was not being imposed by Soviet au­ thorities against the will of students and that those subjected to it constituted a mi­ nority with a pre-conceived Communist bias who desired to perfect their knowl­ edge of Marxism-Leninism. More detailed information about these "volunteers" is not available and it is not certain whether the governments of their home countries have accurate data on the numbers and identity of such individuals. Assuming, however, that a few percent of the total number of Arab students in the Soviet bloc area have been receiving a thorough training in the theory, strategy and tac­ tics of revolution, it does not automatically follow that, upon their return, they could be counted upon as effective agents of the revolutionary movement. This is so because Communist parties, as mentioned earlier, have been outlawed in most Arab countries and their revolutionary appeal has had to compete with nationalist revolutions in the states with radical governments. However, such indoctrinated in­ dividuals probably could and did exert a certain amount of influence in fostering and strengthening the pro-Soviet orientation of the "neutralist" Arab dictatorships. Insofar as the non-Communist majority of scholarship holders was concerned, we may more properly speak of the general impact of their studies and residence in the Communist area than of the indoctrination per se. Sample observations, based on conversations with those who have returned, and some of whom subse­ quently continued their studies in the West on a more advanced level, indicate the following: (a) Arab students tended to develop respect for Soviet and East Euro­ pean technology and science; (b) they acknowledged that, under central planning, the Soviet Union, a previously underdeveloped country, could boast of considera­ ble achievements in various sectors of her national life; (c) despite these findings, they still believed that in many respects Western science and technology were su­ perior to the Soviet Union's; (d) those who have had experience in both thc So­ viet Union and the satellite countries were of the opinion that life in the satellites was more pleasant and that their standard of living was higher than that in the So­ viet Union; (e) they were convinced that, to some extent in the Soviet Union but especially in the East European countries, the masses, both urban and rural, had a

63 better life than the destitute masses in their home countries (the fact that Polish workers and peasants wear shoes, boots, and neat clothing, and that no one begs in the streets of Warsaw, as contrasted with the barefooted and ragged appearance of the sari/a dwellers in Baghdad or the city populace in Cairo, was mentioned as one indicator of the difference in the standard of living); (f) they were aware that their position as foreign scholarship holders was a privileged one as compared with the bare minimum granted by the Communist authorities to their own students; (g) they were also aware of the pervasive sense of totalitarian coercion in their host countries and realized that for any students, local or foreign, to engage in un­ authorized political activities would be senseless and fraught with danger. To the extent that such impressions were representative of the majority, it ap­ pears that Arab scholarship holders in the Soviet bloc area retained a good deal of critical capacity and common sense in evaluating the Communist scene. There was no evidence that, in contrast to many foreign students in the United States, any Arab individuals or groups have decided to live and make careers in the Soviet Union after the conclusion of their studies. In other words, the Soviet experience seems to confirm, up to a point, the Western experience, namely that studies and residence abroad do not guarantee automatic enthusiasm for the host country; that positive response, if any, must be based on factors other than the mere process of learning and the more or less nostalgic memories of school days. Possibly, how­ ever, by having sizable numbers of their technical intelligentsia trained in the So­ viet bloc area, the radical Arab regimes were gradually creating a degree of tech­ nological dependence on the Soviet Union and East European countries. Postdoctoral tours for study and research in the Soviet bloc area were offered Arab scholars, professors, and officials. It is doubtful, however, that any significant political conversions occurred among these mature and relatively established indi­ viduals. Perhaps there were possibilities for influencing such visitors through spe­ cial favors, like free medical treatment, or blackmail, if they were framed, away from home, in compromising situations. But there was no evidence of effects on policy in any country. Soviet-Oriented Cultural Events In contrast to the influx of Arab students into the bloc area, there was no mas­ sive or even small-scale influx of Soviet or satellite students into the Arab coun­ tries. An occasional advanced scholar, in linguistics, literature or archaeology, would appear in the Arab states, more often from some satellite country with a Western tradition of learning than from the Soviet Union. However, Soviet cultural "export" of a showy or propagandistic type has been substantial: art shows, exhi­ bitions, folk dances, lectures, visits of Soviet cosmonauts, photographic displays, circuses, trade-fair exhibits, and awards of Stalin (or Lenin) peace prizes for Arab individuals who loaned their talents to the Soviet-sponsored "peace appeals." 9

9 For more on the Soviet-sponsored congress in Vienna, organized in December 1952 by the World Peace Council and endorsed by such front organizations as the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), the World Federation of Democratic Youth. the International Union of Students, and the International Federation of Resistance Fighters and Victims of Nazism, see "The Peace Congress of the Peoples," New Times, No. 32 (August 6, 1952). On the award by the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. of the peace prize to Sheikh Mo­ hammed al-Ashmar of Syria, see p. 106 below, and to Egypt's Khaled Muhieddin, see p. 75, D. 1, below. 64 In the twilight zone between cultural and technical assistance ranged the services of Soviet and satellite experts in such fields as city planning and architecture. Pol­ ish professors of architecture advised city and university planners in Baghdad in the 1960s. Soviet-Arab friendship societies, with names suited to a particular coun­ try were organized. 10 They would meet as occasion dictated to provide semi­ official auspices for some ceremony, reception, or lecture. Soviet embassies in Arab capitals tried to introduce into the official calendar of their host countries com­ memorative celebrations of such events as the November revolution of 1917. So­ viet public relations offices were especially active during the fiftieth anniversary of the Soviet revolution in 1967 and the hundredth anniversary of Lenin's birth in 1970. Congratulatory telegrams on occasions like these would be sent to Moscow by the heads of friendly Arab states while local officialdom and cultural elite would flock to huge receptions organized by Soviet embassies. In a special gesture of goodwill, Syria issued a large commemorative 60-piastre postage stamp bear­ ing the effigy of Lenin against a red background with captions in Arabic and Eng­ lish: "looth Anniversary V. I. Lenin Birth." Characteristically, the stamp did not have a corresponding Russian-language caption. It either did not occur to the Syrian engraver and authorities to provide a foreign caption other than English-an international lingua franca--or it was deemed useless to provide the Russian because the Russian script was not known in Syria. This was the paradox in the Arab East in the 1960s and 1970s: while closer political links were being forged between the revolutionary Arab states and the Soviet Union, culturally the Arab states were still a part of the broader Medi­ terranean area, with many affinities to the Western world. Similarly, the Arabs' popular preference has been for American as against Soviet films. Thus one cannot avoid the impression of certain artificiality in the attempts to build bridges between Soviet and Arab cultures. Soviet Information Media One of the handicaps of the Soviet position in the Arab world before 1955-a date which proved a turning point in Soviet-Arab relations-has been the almost exclusive reliance of local newspapers on Western news agencies for their foreign news. In 1955, local papers began making increasing use of the official Soviet news agency TASS' dispatches. Space devoted to TASS dispatches began to equal and sometimes exceeded that for Western media. TASS was used most widely in Iraq and Syria. In addition, the press bureaus of the Soviet embassies in the area were busy-and increasingly successful-placing in the local newspapers feature articles on Soviet life, achievements, and artsY Various satellite diplomatic mis­ sions took up the same practice. By contrast, few Soviet Russian-language newspa­ pers were to be found on the newsstands in Arab capitals. Official Arab censorship policies in radical states restricted foreign publications. In any case, the local market for such papers was infinitesimally small because few could read Russian and Soviet newspapers were gray and dull.

10 A somewhat dated but still basic discussion of Soviet techniques through this medium may be found in Louis Nemzer, "The Soviet Friendship Societies," The Public Opinion Quar­ terly, Vol. XIII, No.2 (Summer 1949), pp. 265ff. 11 For typical handouts, see "Lessons from Space Medicine," by Victor Malkin and "An­ other Soviet First: Space Station Aloft," The Baghdad Observer, April 22, 1971, p. 6.

65 Daily Soviet newspapers-Izvestia and Pravda could be taken an representative in this respect-have never carried much material about the Middle East. Such news as they printed was frequently official and perfunctory, for example announc­ ing a visit of an Arab delegation in Moscow or a trip to the Middle East by Soviet dignitaries. Occasionally, a Soviet correspondent would make a tour of some Arab country or region and write a report which would be a mixture of bland travelogue and observations about some industrial or irrigation project in an Arab country.12 From time to time, a political commentary on Arab problems by a Moscow-based staff writer would appear.13 But articles of this kind were more likely to be found in the specialized periodical publications such as Novoye Vremia (New Times) or International Affairs published in Russian and several foreign languages. Such arti­ cles invariably emphasized Soviet goodwill toward the aspirations of the Arab peoples, anti-colonialism, American "imperialism," Soviet support for national self-determination and development, criticism of Israeli aggressiveness, advocacy of the national front in which Communists and other "progressive" forces should co­ operate/4 and an occasional cautious praise for the reforms carried out by the governments of the radical Arab states. In a category apart in the Soviet cultural offensive-bordering on actual politi­ cal penetration-were the visits arranged between the delegations of the ruling Arab political parties (or officially licensed political organizations) and the Com­ munist Party of the Soviet Union, ostensibly to engage in an ideological dialogue. Such visits were organized for the delegations of the Syrian and Iraqi Baath parties and Egypt's Arab Socialist Union to Moscow in the late 1960s. In the 1950s the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Conference was organized with headquarters in Cairo. In its formative years, it attracted considerable publicity. Participant countries were represented by permanent national committees. In the mid- and late 1960s the conference became less active and conspicuous, however, partIy because of Egyptian authorities' distrust and partly because of tensions that developed between Soviet and Chinese officials. Radio Moscow and other Soviet stations did not differ in their general news and editorial policies from the newspapers and periodicals. However, propaganda by air allowed a somewhat greater flexibility. A number of clandestine radio stations, usually identified with some dissenting cause, such as Kurdish nationalism or Iraqi communism, broadcast to the Middle East from the Soviet Union or Eastern Eu­ rope. Operating with Soviet encouragement, these stations supplemented official Soviet propaganda.'5 If there was an occasional discrepancy, it was presumably intentional.

12 See "Unforgettable Days in Cairo," New Times, No. 20 (May 19, 1964). 13 For example: Y. Primakov, "Iraq Faces Important Decisions," Pravda, January 29, 1970, as reproduced in The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XXII, No.4 (February 24, 1970). 14 See, "Roots of Soviet·Arab Friendship," New Times, No. 22 (June 3, 1964); V. Laptev, "U.S.-Israel: Dangerous Alliance," New Times, No. 40 (October 7, 1970); Emile Touma (Member of the Politburo, Central Committee, c.P. of Israel), "Zionism's Big Lie," New Times, No. 51 (December 23, 1970); L. Berenshtein and M. Fridel, "Who Pipes the Tune for Zionism," IZl'estia, December 14, 1969. 15 Most notable of these stations were the Voice of the Iraqi People broadcasting in Arabic and Kurdish and the National Voice of Iran broadcasting in Persian. Here are a few exam­ ples of broadcasts:

66 Issue of Fraternization This was the broad spectrum of methods and techniques used by the Soviet Union to pursue her policy objectives in the Arab world. Skilled personnel were used in technical, military, communications, cultural, and diplomatic fields. The Soviet foreign service had developed a cadre of Arabic-speaking officers who made their careers specializing in affairs of the Middle East. Not infrequently these men hailed from the Islamic ethnic groups of the Soviet Union, as their somewhat Rus­ sified names indicated. 16 Although there were some Jews in the Soviet foreign service, Moscow avoided appointing them to posts in Arab countries. Similar care was exercised in the selection of personnel for various technical assignments. While exact data on the subject are lacking, Arab officials claimed that a good number of Soviet experts spoke Arabic, thus comparing favorably with their counterparts in such Western missions as were still in existence. While knowledge of Arabic was undoubtedly useful to Soviet officials and tech­ nicians, it was not generally applied as a vehicle for social fraternization. In this respect, Soviet practice differed markedly from the Western. Westerners tried to maintain social relations with Arab officials, businessmen, and intelligentsia and to receive them in their homes. The Russians clustered in their own communities, talked to the Arabs when on duty or shopping, but avoided individual invitations, and almost never entertained at home. In some radical Arab countries, of course, few Western officials and experts remained. Some Arab authorities frowned on their citizens' association with foreigners. Soviet reluctance or outright refusal to associate with their Arab hosts was partly due to fear strongly implanted by their own totalitarian system, and partly due to the modesty of their quarters, compared to those of the Westerners. Even where large colonies of Soviet citizens were to be found in the more desirable sec­ tions of Arab capitals (such as the Zamalek district in Cairo), Soviet citizens tended to live in small or medium-sized apartments of average cleanliness and state of repair, which could not compare with the elegance of Western fiats or villas. In the few cases where Soviet citizens established social contact, the associations were

Voice of the Iraqi People (in Kurdish), 1418 GMT, October 21, 1963: "You, the heroes of beloved Kurdistan: the Voice of the Iraqi People is the voice of your valiant struggle ...• It is aimed to clean the homeland from the filth of the unholy Baathist clique, to create a free and democratic Iraq, and to establish the right of autonomy for Kurdistan. . . . Aref, the lackey of imperialists, tries to belittle the valiant Kurdish leader, Mulla Mustafa Barzani. ..." National Voice of Iran (in Persian), 1720 GMT, October 21, 1963: "The Political Bureau of the Democratic Party of Kurdistan recently delivered a statement.... The statement sharply condemn~, the colonialist policy and national oppression pursued by the Baathist authorities in Iraq.... Voice of the Iraqi People (in Arabic), 1810 GMT, October 14, 1965: Statement of the Iraqi Communist Party: "The fingers of the British imperialists and the oil companies played a suc­ cessful part in the formation of the cabinet which Arif Abdur Razzaq headed and which in­ cluded elements from the Nuri as-Said-Jamali school. ... The Al-Bazzaz cabinet was born emaciated and shaky. While lacking representatives of national forces, it includes a mixture of opportunists, small-timers, tools and suspicious elements ...." National Voice of Iran (in Persian), 1730 GMT, September 19, 1963: "The Baathists in Iraq have established a fascist regime. . . . The Kurdish revolutionary armed forces will undoubtedly triumph.... " (All the foregoing from FBIS, Daily Reports, October 22, 1963; October 24, 1963; October 15, 1965; September 20, 1963.) 16 Such as: Sarvar Azimov, Soviet Ambassador to Lebanon in 1971; Mohieddinov, Deputy Chairman of the Soviet Committee for Foreign Cultural Relations in 1967; Nureddin Mohied­ dinov, Soviet Ambassador to Syria in 1969-70; Mirza Rakhmatov, Soviet Ambassador to Yemen in 1969-70.

67 strained. A number of subjects were taboo, and artificial gaiety tended to be mixed with awkward silences. East Europeans, for instance architects, professors, or ar­ chaeologists with experience in the West, mixed much more freely with the Arabs than their Soviet counterparts, but the fear of being watched and denounced for excessive fraternization also acted as a brake on their social contacts. With this small degree of informal social contact, there was no appreciable pros­ pect that the Arabs would be indoctrinated in communism. Nor was there any rea­ son to expect that Arab populations among whom the Soviet experts lived would become acquainted or enchanted with the Soviet "way of life." Soviet expertise in various fields of technical endeavor might evoke respect among Arab bureaucrats and technocrats, depending on their degree of sophistication and their exposure to Western techniques. Socialists might draw inspiration from the Soviet example as a country which overcame its backwardness and achieved an industrial status. But this was not equivalent to absorbing Marxism-Leninism as a political doctrine. The presence of large numbers of Soviet citizens among the poverty-stricken Arab masses and among poorly-paid local officials could have been counter-productive, as the presence of larger and more privileged foreign colonies in underdeveloped countries sometimes is. One obvious advantage to the Soviet government however, was the intelligence­ gathering potential of so many Russians in intimate contact with various technical and military activities of the host country.

Complicating Factors in Soviet-Arab Relations While the deterioration in American-Arab relations, mostly due to the United States' support for Israel, was the main reason for the convergence of Soviet and Arab policies, this convergence could not be equated with full identity of views and objectives. For the Soviet Union, seeking to extend her power and transform the world into a Communist society, support of the Arab nationalist cause was only a tactical device within the broader strategy of alliance with the Third World against the WestY Regimes like those of Nasser, the Iraqi military, and the Syr­ ian Baath were accepted by Moscow with varying degrees of approval or reserva­ tions. Arab nationalism, even of the Socialist variety, was basically self-centered, not cosmopolitan. According to its standards, the happiness of the nation was an end in itself. In spite of certain Marxist influences upon the Baathist ideology, Arab so­ cialism as a broad movement avoided emphasis on the class struggle, preferring in­ stead to stress social solidarity. It not only accepted religion as a valid expression of man's spirituality but, in some cases, endeavored to enterpret Islam as an essen-

11 For a frank statement by Khrushchev on this subject in 1961, see Watt, Documents on International Affairs, 1961 (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 598-99. Khrushchev declared: "We want communism. You say you want Arab nationalism and also socialism. We have different views on many issues. But this should not be a barrier between you and us. History will be our judge. We are communists and you are not connected with this word. But history will teach you. We are not the ones to teach you. Life itself will teach you. If our people live better than you under the communist banner, then can you declare yourselves averse to communism? The people will tell you to get out. ... You may think that I want to transform you from Arab nationalists into communists. Naturally I do not propose to do this now but I feel that some of those present here will be communists in the future, because life imposes itself upon man ...." (from a speech to a U.A.R. parliamentary delegation in Mos­ cow),

68 tiaIly socialist message. Arab socialism took pride in stressing its humanitarian val­ ues and, for this reason, rejected the Soviet concept of ruthless industrialization which might demand the sacrifice of one or two generations for the sake of future ones.1B Thus the convergence of Arab and Soviet policies was only temporary, and the ultimate objectives of the two parties were not identical. In addition to this basic ideological difference, the Soviet Union had to choose sides on a number of issues. Foremost among them were: (a) the problem of Arab unity; (b) the position of Communists in the Arab states; (c) the Kurdish problem; and (d) the role of Palestinian guerrillas in the Arab-Israeli conflict. A.rab Unity Soviet attitudes toward Arab unity were ambivalent. While in general terms Moscow always proclaimed its support for Arab national aspirations, its stand at the time of the Syro-Egyptian union between 1958 and 1961 oscillated between negative and critical. If unity were to mean consolidation of Arab power on a more self-sustaining basis to the exclusion of Communists from participation in the political process in a wider area than before the union, the Soviet Union ob­ viously could not accept it without strong misgivings. 19 Even if, undcr certain cir­ cumstances, a revolutionary leader like Nasser was regarded by Moscow as an in­ termediary in spreading Soviet influence in the area, it did not necessarily follow that his emergence as an undisputed ruler of a larger and stronger Arab common­ wealth would be desirable. There is no logical reason to believe that the old impe­ rial adage divide et impera, used so effectively in the heyday of Britain's glory, should not apply to Soviet policies as well. Connected with the problem of unity was that of the Soviet stance toward the division of the Arab world into radical and moderate camps. Close identification

18 For a lucid statement, see Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal, "Communism and Ourselves: Seven Differences between Communism and Arab Socialism," in Kemal H. Karpat, ed., Politi­ cal and Social Thought in the Contemporary Middle East (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), pp. 156-61. See also "UAR and USSR: The Dialogue on Socialism," Mizan, Vol. 10, No.1, January­ February, 1968. 19 See R. Petrov, "Arab Unity: Lessons and Prospects," New Times, No. 18 (May 1, 1971). Speaking in Aswan on May 16, 1964, Khrushchev derided the call for Arab unity in the following words: "Listening to some speakers here, I heard: We're Arabs ... we're Arabs ... Arabs unite, and so forth. If one takes that position, then we Russians, one might say. have no business here among you Arabs; we ought to pick ourselves up and go home. For we are not Arabs. Our teacher and leader Lenin also calls for unity, but not on a national basis, no, on a class, labor basis. Are there Arab capitalists? Are there Arab landlords? ... Well, are these Arab capitalists and landlords brothers of the Arab workers and peasants who work for them and whom they exploit? No! An Arab worker, an Arab peasant is closer to me than the Russian capitalist and the Russian landlord was. "The Soviet Union did not corne to the aid of the Arabs as such but to the aid of the peo­ ple of Egypt in their fight against imperialism and colonialism .... Speakers here were right when they said that the Soviet Union provides aid without any political strings. But I'll say frankly that it gives us more pleasure to extend aid to countries which take the way of build­ ing socialism .... In short, the slogan 'Arabs, Unite' evidently needs to be qualified some­ what. Arab 'workers, Arab peasants, Arab intellectuals-all working people should unite in the struggle for freedom and independence, for a better life, for their rights, against the exploit­ ers. In the context of such unity, there will be room for a Russian too and for representatives of other nations ...." From New Times, No. 22 (June 3, 1964), p. 4. When Syria seceded from the United Arab Republic in September 1961, Pravda hastened to publish a statement of the Syrian Communist Party in which Syria's defection was hailed as "a historic victory won by the Syrian people in cooperation with the army" over the U.A.R. government, under which "thousands of patriots were thrown into prison" and "law-abiding citizens were killed in torture-chambers." Mizan Newsletter, Vol. III, No.9 (October 1961),

69 with the radical camp did not preclude, as we have mentioned earlier, Soviet inter­ est in establishing closer relations with other Arab regimes. According to King Hussein of Jordan, the Soviet Union offered him arms in 1968-an offer which he declined. Should the circumstances change and the offer be accepted, it would sig­ nify the extension of Soviet aid to a regime which was the target of Syrian hostility for a long time. Such a move might produce strain in Soviet-Syrian relations. On the other hand, it also might induce the Russians to play the role of peacemaker between two antagonistic Arab regimes.

The Communist Parties The position of Communist parties in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq will be reviewed in greater detail in the chapters to follow. Suffice it to say here that the implicit ac­ ceptance by the Soviet Union of the ban on Communist organizations in the Arab states could not be equated with real Soviet indifference to their fate. Restrictive and sometimes punitive measures applied toward the Communists by the radical regimes, especially those of the United Arab Republic and Iraq, occasionally elic­ ited words of condemnation from official Soviet quarters, from Soviet information media, and from clandestine radio stations serving as mouthpieces for the outlawed movements. Most notable were two angry verbal exchanges between Soviet Pre­ mier Nikita Khrushchev and President Nasser in 1959 and 1961.2Q Iraq figured on repeated occasions as the target of attacks by the clandestine stations and Moscow-sponsored publications on account of its treatment of Com­ munists, virtually under every regime since the revolution of 1958.21 And even Syria, perhaps the most accommodating to communism of the three states, was not spared occasional criticism. 22 Arab-Soviet relations were exposed to major strain when, on July 19, 1971, a coalition of Communists and pro-Soviet army officers made an attempt to seize power in the Sudan. At first, the rebels appeared victorious: Having placed under arrest Sudan's head of state, General Jaafar Numeiri, they broadcast the formation of a new government. Many units in the army, however, remained loyal to Nu­ meiri and soon regained initiative in the fighting that ensued. Moreover, two other developments helped the counter-coup forces: On the one hand, Egypt's President Sadat arranged for an airlift of some 2,000 Sudanese troops from positions on the Suez front to Khartoum to assist the pro-Numeiri loy­ alists. (Paradoxically, they were flown in Soviet-supplied Antonov transports.) On the other, on orders of Libya's president, Colonel Qadhafi, a British airliner carry­ ing two Sudanese rebel leaders, Colonel Babakr al-Nur, chairman-elect of the pro­ Communist junta, and Major Farouk Hamadallah, from London to Khartoum was forced to land in Libya. The Libyans removed the two from the plane and handed them over to Numeiri who, in the meantime, succeeded in defeating the pro-Communist rebels. Both captives were promptly executed for their role in the

20 See p. 87, Chap. V, note 13. 21 See Ali Muhammed, "The Terror in Iraq Continues," Peace, Freedom and Socialism, Vol. VII, No.2 (February 1964); Samir Ahmad, "Stop the Terror Against Political Prison­ ers," Peace, Freedom and Socialism, Vol. XI, No.7 (July 1968). 22 Ahmad Chagouri, "Baathist Crimes in Syria," World Marxist Review (WMR), Vol. VII, No.5 (May 1964); also, "Reign of Terror in the United Arab Republic," WMR, Vol. IV, No.1 (January 1, 1961).

70 rebellion, along with some dozen other leading coup figures, among them Abdul Khalek Mahgoub, head of Sudan's Communist party, and Shafiq Ahmed Sheikh, secretary-general of the Sudanese Federation of Trade Unions and a Lenin Peace Prize winner. Back in power, General Numeiri declared a full-scale war on the Communists. In his first address to the country he called on all Sudanese to hunt down the Communists. Mass arrests among the party members and sympathizers followed. The Soviet Union reacted to these events with obvious annoyance bordering on anger. At stake was not only the fate of some 1,000 Soviet experts employed in the Sudan, but also the future of Soviet economic aid and arms deliveries, as well as the totality of political relations between the two countries. In subsequent weeks Numeiri softened his anti-Soviet posture which likewise resulted in a lessening of Soviet response. It thus appears that both sides were willing to drop their earlier hostile postures. The Sudanese crisis-widely debated throughout the Arab world-seemed to demonstrate that: (a) having to choose between the Soviet friendship and the na­ tionalist orientation when the two appeared to clash over the issue of domestic communism, Arab leaders inclined to assert their nationalism; (b) Pan-Arab soli­ darity, even at the risk of offending Moscow, was not an empty slogan, as Sadat's and Qadhafi's prompt aid to Numeiri indicated. As for the Soviet Union, it was clear that since the mid-1950s she was giving greater weight to good relations with the constituted Arab governments than to the welfare of outlawed fellow Communists. Yet she was not in a position to abdicate her protective role entirely. As the leading revolutionary state she had to maintain a certain "respectable" posture, to avoid denunciation by the disenchanted disci­ ples or the loss of their allegiance to the more dynamic system of Communist China. The Kurdish Problem The struggle for Kurdish autonomy against a succession of governments in Iraq similarly placed the Soviet Union in a dilemma. Mullah Mustafa Barzani, leader of the rebellious Kurdish tribes, had spent 13 years in the Soviet Union (1946- 59) and looked upon Moscow as a power friendly to Kurdish national aspira­ tions. The Soviet Union had demonstrated her support for Kurdish national rights by assisting the short-lived Kurdish Republic of Mahabad in 1945-46. Subse­ quently, the Soviet media and the Soviet-sponsored clandestine stations regularly upheld the Kurds' right to national autonomy. Moreover, the principal political or­ ganization headed by Barzani, the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), had a left wing whose members stood close to communism. For all these reasons, the protracted Kurdish rebellion (1961-69) in Iraq had a disturbing potential in Moscow's relations with Baghdad. 23 The agreement reached with the Kurds by Iraq's Premier Abdur Rahman al-Bazzaz in June 1966 opened vistas for a settlement. However, soon afterward Bazzaz was summarily dismissed, and implementation of the agreement was to all practical purposes sus-

"Concern was expressed over the unresolved Kurdish problem by M. Bochkaryov, "New Orientation in Iraq," New Times. No. 37 (September 16, 1964), and by Y. Primakov writing in Pravda, January 29, 1970, See note 13, above.

71 pended. Subsequent Arab defeat in the war with Israel in 1967 compelled Iraq to concentrate on the Israeli front and to reduce points of friction on other fronts. The result was the conclusion, on March 11, 1970, of a new agreement with the Kurds in which many of their demands were granted. The agreement was signed at a time of increasing Soviet arms aid to the radical Arab states, including Iraq. While no documentary evidence to prove the point is available, there was specula­ tion that Soviet persuasion helped arrange the agreement. Soviet media greeted the agreement with satisfaction, inasmuch as it removed a truly complicating factor in the Soviet Union's relations with the friendly regime in Baghdad.24 The Palestine Guerrillas The fedayeen have been another potentially disturbing factor in Soviet-Arab re­ lations. The Soviet Union agreed with the United Arab Republic and Jordan in supporting the United Nations resolution of November 22, 1967, which called for a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict on the basis-inter alia--of the implicit recognition by the neighboring Arab states of the right of Israel to exist. This approach was rejected by the Palestine guerrillas, whose main organization, Falah, called for the abolition of the state of Israel as an entity based on race and religion and its replacement by a democratic state in which Moslem, Jewish, and Christian populations would enjoy equal rights of citizenship. Initially, Moscow was opposed to guerrilla warfare as inconsistent with the U.N. resolution. For this reason also the Moscow-affiliated Arab Communist parties did not participate in the guerrilla activity. 25 By 1969-70, however, the guerrilla movement grew so much in numbers and emerged as such a major social force in Jordan and Lebanon that it became increasingly difficult for Moscow to persist in its initial negative attitude. A change in Soviet policy took two forms: first, a dele­ gation of Arab resistance forces under the Fatah leader, Yasser Arafat, was re­ ceived in Moscow in February 1970 (at the invitation of the Soviet Committee

24 Thus, Nina Nikolayeva, "Iraq: Arabs and Kurds," New Times, No. 12 (March 24, 1970); and V. Kudryavtsev in Izvestia, May 26, 1970. 25 Soviet opposition to the fedayeen was based on the view that they were "adventurous" and "extremist" and that, by their action, they might provoke Israel and endanger the posi­ tion of the Arab "progressive regimes" which have been the mainstays of Soviet influence in the area. Echoing this view, the Jordanian Communist Party made public its "emergency pro­ gram" which (a) gave top priority to the maintenance of a national front in Jordan; (b) sup­ ported the U.N. resolution of November 22, 1967; (c) condemned "the radical leftists who are launching a campaign with the aim of overthrowing the present regime"; (d) denounced "the adventurous trend represented by the commandos" as having a "negative effect" on the functioning of the national front; (e) proclaimed "complete understanding between us and the Israeli comrades" in the Israeli Communist Party; (0 rejected the "unrealistic political objec­ tives" of the commandos; (g) stated that "conditions are not yet ripe in Jordan or in any Arab country, inside or outside the occupied territory, for commando action"; and (h) warned that the Arab "progressive" countries-Egypt and Syria-"realize the serious conse­ quences of provoking the enemy" and, therefore, "oppose commando operations in the cease­ fire areas." The Arab World Weekly, May 24, 1969. In a similar move, the Lebanese Communist Party denounced "leftist trends" among the fe­ dayeen for being "in conflict with the progressive regimes. These trends call for the armed struggle as the only solution to solve the Palestine problem even if this led to the downfall of the progressive regimes." From an official party statement at the world conference of Com­ munist parties held in Moscow June 5 to June 18, 1969, in which eight Arab Communist par­ ties participated. TASS release as quoted by The Arab World Weekly (Beirut). June 28 1969, pp. 15-19. For a direct expression of Soviet hostility toward the fedayeen, see Pravda, June 5, 1969.

72 for Afro-Asian Solidarity); 26 second, at a meeting held on March 3, 1970, the Communist parties of Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan formed their own guerrilla organization, called the Arab Partisan Forces (Al-Ansar), and sought affiliation with the coordinating bodies of the Palestine resistance movement. 27 While these steps have not produced any visible irritation in Soviet relations with the official Arab governments, they posed the question of how consistent Soviet support would be for a settlement based on the United Nations resolution. 28 It would be unwise to disregard all these actual or potential sources of friction. However, so long as the Soviet Union persisted in identifying herself with Arab national aspirations, especially in opposing Israel's territorial expansion, these com­ plicating factors were bound to be overshadowed by the more fundamental­ though, in historical perspective, temporary--convergence of interests.

26 On Arafat's visit, see "P.LO. Delegation's Visit to the Soviet Union," Izvestia, February 21, 1970, as quoted in The Current Digest at the Soviet Press, Vol. XXII, No.8 (March 24, 1970). Also Pravda of the same date. 27 For a justification of Al-Ansar organization and the "danger of isolating the Arab revolu­ tionary struggle from the Soviet Union," see Nicolas Chaoui, "Leninism and Problems of the Revolutionary Movement in the Arab Countries," Peace, Freedom and Socialism, Vol. XIII, No.5 (May 1970). 25 The rebellion staged in September 1970 against the government of Jordan by the feda­ yeen and their subsequent defeat at the hands of King Hussein's army caused Soviet media to renew their criticisms of the guerrillas. The editorial "Danger Course" in New Times, No. 38 (September 23, 1970), declared: "In these circumstances such extremist actions of some Pale­ stinian organizations as the hijacking of international airliners bring grist to the mill of the Israeli hawks .... Inter-Arab armed clashes in Jordan likewise tend to heighten tensions and weaken the Arab front at a time when Israel's sabotage of a settlement and persistence in annexationist ambitions make Arab unity more necessary than ever." Similarly, R. Petrov in "Problems of the Arab World," New Times, No. 44 (November 2. 1970), said that "The Jordanian crisis has stimulated the development of new trends in the Palestinian resistance movement. The extremist approach of certain Palestinian organizations is being critically reappraised."

73

v. EGYPT: EXPANDING RELATIONS

n this and the following two chapters we will review the evolution of relations I between the Soviet Union and the three Arab countries-Egypt, Syria, and Iraq-1n which Soviet influence has been most notable. Egypt (U.A.R.), the larg­ est and most populous state which has traditionally aspired to and largely prac­ ticed the role of leadership in the Arab world, blazed the trail in developing Soviet­ Arab relations. Egypt's example was emulated by other revolutionary regimes. Moreover, the pattern of its relations with the Soviet Union provided one of the most important empirical elements in the evolution of Soviet theory about the Third World. Post-World War II Soviet ideas on neutralism, peaceful coexistence, and revolutionary democracy evolved to a considerable extent from Soviet-Egyptian relations. These relations will be reviewed under three major heading!;: (a) general political framework, (b) position of the Egyptian Communists, and (c) economic cooperation.

Moscow·Cairo: General Political Framework In principle, from the Communist point of view, the Egyptian revolution of 1952 was a step forward because it eliminated a royalist regime which was politi­ cally retrograde and tied to the West. Moreover, there was a possibility of estab­ lishing a link between the Communist movement and the Free Officers. In fact, two early associates of Nasser, Major Khaled Muhieddin and Yusef Sadiq, could be identified as Communists or sympathizers. 1 Nasser himself, in a speech some years later in Damascus, admitted that he had been approached in the early stages of his movement by Communists who tried to win him over to their creed. 2 The new regime's emphasis on social justice, on agrarian and other reforms, and its anti-imperialist and neutralist stance gained praise from a leading Egyptian Marxist, Dr. Rashed el-Barawy. "The people," said Barawy, "supported the revo­ lution because it felt that it expressed all its grievances and hopes." "The aims of

1 In due time, Khaled Muhieddin, initially a member of the Revolutionary Command Council, assumed the leadership of the Peace Partisans' Council, a Soviet front organization, in Egypt. In this capacity he received a Lenin Peace Prize awarded by the Soviet authorities on the occasion of the centenary celebrations of Lenin's birth in April 1970. Another Arab recipient of the prize on this occasion was AI-Shafiq Ahmed aI-Sheikh, member of the Pol it bureau of the Sudanese Communist Party. For further information on the Soviet-sponsored peace prizes, see p. 64 above and p. 106 below. 2 "Before the Egyptian revolution, the Communists tried to induce certain members of the revolutionary junta to join them. I was one. The Communists tried every means to convince me to take up their creed, but I refused, brethren, for one simple reason: namely, I could not possibly believe in atheism and subservience .... I had some Communist acquaintances who tried to exploit our acquaintance to make me adopt communism. They believed that by so doing they would score a great victory. However, I believed in Arab nationalism ...." From Nasser's speech in Damascus, March 15, 1959. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), Daily Report, March 16, 1959. 75 the Army and the people were identical," he asserted, "and thus it was sufficiently clear that when the Army carried out its great movement it was really achieving the people's will. The logic of things supports such an assertion because the Army is composed of those recruited from the masses of the people while the leaders of the revolution belonged mostly to such popular elements, and by the very nature of their descent and upbringing were opposed to the previous regime." Barawy fur­ ther justified the army's role by pointing out that "formerly, demonstrations, riots and barricades were the principal aspects of any revolution .... Nowadays, such antiquated methods have become ineffective and it has become necessary for the success of the revolution that it should be undertaken by regular armed forces." The army, in turn, he claimed, was expressing the will of the new rising middle class ("most revolutionary") and the working class; the latter "supported all ele­ ments that had for objectives the combatting of imperialism, feudalism, absolutism, and monopolistic capitalism;" hence "there arose a community of interests between it and the new revolutionary middle class." 3 As for the Soviet reaction to the coup of July 23, 1952, it was initially one of distrust. Soviet commentators suspected that the coup was engineered with Ameri­ can connivance and tended to view the friendly relations established between the American Embassy and the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) as proof of secret ties between Washington and Cairo.! Soviet misgivings persisted through 1953 and 1954 even though the Egyptian Communists derived some benefits from RCC's decision to release from detention a number of political prisoners pre­ viously jailed by the royalist authorities. The Soviet Union's reserve toward the Egyptian revolution could further be traced to two factors: first, General Mohammed Naguib-then in formal position of leadership--appeared too conciliatory toward the West 5 and too favorable to the influx of foreign capital into Egypt, while at the same time putting curbs on Communist-sponsored labor unrest; second, in the ensuing struggle for power in the Revolutionary Command Council, Colonel Nasser linked Naguib to the Mos­ lem Brotherhood and the Communists and, accordingly, applied repressive meas­ ures to both groups. This, however, proved to be merely a passing cloud. Within less than a year, by 1955, relations between the Soviet Union and Egypt began taking a turn for the better. With the passage of time, in spite of occasional difficulties, they developed into a multifaceted partnership in the political, economic, and military fields.

3 Rashed el-Barawy, The Military Coup in Egypt: An Analytic Study (Cairo: The Renais­ sance Bookshop, 1952), pp. 12, 47, 49, 80, 92. 4 Thus Y. Zvyagin, "Behind Events in Iran and Egypt," New Times, No. 31 (July 30, 1952). In the same vein, B. Bekhterev, "Latest Imperialist Moves in the Middle East," New Times, No. 35 (August 27, 1952): 'The final outcome of the present events in Egypt is hard to foretell at this juncture. But the world has remarked with one accord on the active share which American diplomatic agents took in the coup d'etat of July 23 and the elimination of King Farouk." For a possible corroboration of these suspicions, see Miles Copeland, The Game of Nations: The Amorality of Power Politics (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969), pp. 47ff. However, the authenticity of Copeland's revelations (by their very nature, un­ documented) has been seriously questioned. 5 In an article, "The Anglo-Egyptian Agreement" (of July 1954), Y. Bochkaryov emphati­ cally criticized the clause providing for a return of British troops to Egypt in the event of an attack on Turkey, claiming that it ties Egypt and the entire Arab world to the North Atlantic alliance. New Times, No. 33 (August 14, 1954).

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77 Convergence of Soviet and Egyptian Policies This steady strengthening of ties between Moscow and Cairo could be ascribed to the convergence of Soviet and Egyptian policies on seven issues: 1. Egypt's Neutralism. Nasser emerged as the undisputed leader of Egypt at a time when another newcomer, Nikita Khrushchev, abandoned the rigid Stalinist line that the world was divided into two irreconcilable camps--capitalist and Com­ munist. Instead, Khrushchev accepted the division of the world into three camps: capitalist, Communist, and the "peace zone" (the Third World of less developed ex-colonial nations) which had good reasons for refusing to be drawn into a Big Power conflict. This dovetailed with Nasser's insistence on neutralism, to which he gave forceful expression by attending and playing a prominent role at the Bandung Conference of April 1955.6 In that same year, the conclusion of the Baghdad Pact-a Western-sponsored regional alliance of which one Arab country, Iraq, became a member-provided an opportunity for the Egyptian and Soviet policies to converge. Nasser strongly opposed the Baghdad alliance because it was a "foreign" pact, because it was likely to draw the Arab countries into collaboration with Western "imperialism" and thus expose the area to hazards of a major war, and because it implied both the strengthening of the rival regime of Iraq and the betrayal of Arab solidarity, as stipulated by the Arab League Charter.' As for the Soviet Union, its opposition to the Baghdad Pact was less complex: the pact sought greater coordination of mili­ tary and economic efforts by four neighboring Asian countries, supported by Brit­ ain and the United States, to assure their security against possible Soviet expan­ sion. Regardless of motivation, attacks on the pact by the Soviet Union and Egypt were of similar intensity. 2. Armaments. Egypt's search for arms in 1955 was a second issue which brought Cairo and Moscow together. The Israeli army raided the Egyptian head­ quarters in the Gaza Strip on February 28, 1955, in retaliation for sporadic guer­ rilla incursions from the Egyptian-controlled territory. The raid brought home to Nasser the inadequacy of Egyptian armaments and led him to dispatch a mission to Washington to negotiate purchase of weapons. Egyptian requests were modest; moreover, the very fact that Nasser sought arms in Washington bore testimony to the reservoir of goodwill toward America which existed in Egypt and the Arab world in general. The U.S. government, however, failed to make any meaningful gesture toward meeting Egypt's plea for arms. This negative attitude (first revealed during Ali Sabry'S mission to Washington in the fall of 1952) was largely due to official sensitivity to pro-Zionist sentiments, and prior to Suez settlement, to British objections. The mission's stay in the United States proved to be a humiliating ex­ perience. After many delays, the Egyptians were obliged, in June, to leave empty­ handed. Washington thus missed an excellent opportunity to exert a moderating influence

6 For an account of the conference proceedings, see George McTurnan Kahin, The Asian­ African Conference, Bandung, Indonesia, April 1955 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1956). 7 For a comprehensive analysis, see Fayez A. Sayegh, "Neutralism in the United Arab Re­ public," in F. A. Sayegh, ed., The Dynamics of Neutralism in the Arab World: A Symposium (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1964). 78 on Arab-Israeli relations, apparently believing that Nasser would accept his fate with resignation. The opposite was true: meeting a rebuke on the Potomac, the Egyptian leader turned promptly to Moscow. Following a midsummer negotiation with the Soviet ambassador in Cairo, a formal purchase of arms from Czechoslo­ vakia was announced on September 27, 1955. The arms agreement was interpreted -rather accurately-as the Soviet Union's "leap" over the barrier erected in the Northern Tier by the Baghdad Pact and by other acts of American containment policy. Nasser strengthened his position at home and in the Arab world as a hero who dared defy the West, and the Soviet Union was cast as a friend who re­ sponded to the Arab search for dignity and strength. 8 3. Anti-colonialism. The arms deal helped to transform Nasser almost over­ night from a local Egyptian leader into a Pan-Arab leader. His reputation was en­ hanced throughout the Afro-Asian world. He became a recognized figure in the Third World's struggle for liberation. There was hardly a crisis in the global fight for emancipation from colonialism in which Egypt did not become involved. First and foremost was the case of the fellow Arab country of Algeria, in the throes of its war of liberation against the French. Within its means, the Egyptian regime did its best to aid the Algerian revolutionaries-morally, financially, and militarily. Similarly, Egypt extended assistance to Lumumba's government of the Congo and allowed its territory to be used by Soviet aircraft in carrying missions and supplies into black Africa. Nationalist movements in Somalia and Angola were likewise as­ sisted. And a friendly relationship was established with Fidel Castro's Cuba, on the platform of a joint struggle against the exploitations of capitalism and imperialism. The high point of this policy was the nationalization of the Suez Canal in July 1956. It was Nasser's second major act of defying the West, a move full of risks, which brought in its wake a triple invasion of Egypt by Israel, Britain, and France, and nearly ended in calamity. In all these struggles of liberation, Soviet and Egyptian policies converged, both as a matter of general principle and in the handling of individual crises. Western imperialism, whether real or imaginary, advancing or retreating, was invariably the common target of hostility. In the case of Suez, Moscow lost no opportunity to ex­ ploit it psychologically to its own advantage: Khrushchev sent stern notes to Israel, Britain, and France, threatened to use "terrible weapons" and "volunteers" to compel withdrawal of the invaders, and promptly moved to replenish Egypt's arse­ nal after the losses suffered in the brief war with Israel. 4. Socialist Economic Development. From its inception, Egypt's revolution­ ary regime assumed major responsibility for economic development under state auspices. While "Arab socialism" was, in its early stages, no more than a word within the slogan of a "democratic, cooperative, socialist society," it crystallized into a definite program by 1961-62. The U.A.R. National Charter of April 1962 called for a scientifically planned economic development in which the public sector

8 This and other aspects of Egypt's foreign policy are discussed in Charles D. Cremeans, The Arabs and the World: Nasser's Arab Nationalist Policy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963); John C. Campbell, Defense of the Middle East: Problems of American Policy (New York: Harper, 1958; 2nd ed., Praeger, 1960); John S. Badeau, The American Approach to the Arab World (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), and Faiz S. Abu-Jaber, "The Origins of Soviet-Arab Co-operation," Mizan, VoL Xl, No.4, July-August 1969.

79 would be dominant. 9 Thus conceived, Arab socialism differed in several respects from Soviet communism. However, reliance on state planning, management, and ownership of the most significant segments of the economy provided a common de­ nominator between the two statist systems. Egypt thus supplied an excellent empirical example of the "non-capitalist path of development" which received recognition in the evolving Soviet political theory. Within this broad agreement on principles, construction of the High Aswan Dam figured as a project in which Soviet-Egyptian cooperation could be applied in prac­ tice. The economic significance and symbolic value of this darn could hardly be exaggerated. Initially, the dam was to be constructed with Western aid. Like the earlier refusal to se11 arms, the withdrawal of the American offer to build the Aswan Dam was seemingly based on the assumption that no alternatives were available to Egypt. Such an alternative did, however, come forth-with a two-year delay-in the form of the Soviet offer. Thus again the Soviet and Egyptian policies converged on an issue which was bound to have a major impact on Egypt and the entire Afro-Asian community of nations. 5. Struggle Against Arab Feudalism and Conservatism. By the late 1950s Nasser emerged not only as a principal neutralist and leader of the anti-colonial liberation movement. He also appeared as a standard-bearer in the struggle against "feudalism and reaction" in the Arab world as a whole. Anti-conservative dissident elements flocked toward him in Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Yemen, Aden, Inner Oman, and the Persian Gulf. In Syria in 1956-57, he exerted a major influence through a coalition of his sympathizers with the Baath Socialists and Communists. In the October 1956 elections in Jordan, the victorious "popular front" coalition headed by Suleiman Nabulsi had a strong pro-Nasser orientation and in April of the following year an alliance of the Nasserites and other dissent­ ing elements (including Communists) almost succeeded in toppling Hussein's mon­ archy in the attempted coup at Zerqa. In the Lebanese civil war of 1958, the rebels challenging pro-Western President Chamoun's authority drew their inspiration and assistance from Cairo and Egyptian­ controlled Damascus. The coalition comprising the first revolutionary government in Iraq had a strong pro-Nasser ingredient until it was eliminated by dictator Kassem. Saudi Arabian dissidents-Prince Talal and his associates-likewise looked to Cairo for guidance, support, and shelter in their days of exile. Egypt es­ tablished a similar relationship with dissenting elements of Oman, Libya, Aden, and, in due time, of Yemen. While details in each situation varied, the dominant theme was Nasser's war on "the palaces of reaction" which were depicted as cen­ ters of treason against Arabism. The same conservative elements have traditionally been targets of hostile Soviet propaganda. 6. Arab Unity. Nasser's role as a revolutionary liberator was supplemented by his striving for Arab unity. Soviet support for Arab nationalist aspirations could not exclude Arab unity without appearing incomplete and insincere, even though both the Soviet Union and Arab Communists had strong reservations about certain

9 Text in United Arab Republic, The Charter (Cairo: Information Department, n.d.). For a Soviet analysis of the Egyptian brand of socialism, see "UAR and USSR: The Dialogue on Socialism," Mizan, Vol. X, No.1 (January-February, 1968).

80 aspects of unity the Arabs sought. Cairo and Moscow both opposed Islamic unity, which was strongly advocated by the monarchies of Saudi Arabia and Iran. In the later 1960s, when the revolutionary Arab states took an interest in uniting, the So­ viet government not only accepted the new trend, but actually took a public stand advocating an alliance among Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Algeria. 7. Israel's Occupation of Arab Territory. The Arab-Israeli war of June 1967 brought Israel into occupation of Arab territories about three times its size at the expense of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. The Soviet Union fully endorsed the Arab view that Israel's invasion represented an act of unprovoked aggression and that Israel had no right to occupy the conquered territories. In the wake of the war, Soviet President Nicolai Podgorny hastened to visit Cairo, Damascus, and Baghdad to reiterate Soviet support for the Arab national cause. Subsequently, the Soviet Union voted for the United Nations resolution of November 22, 1967, which, in its first point, called for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied territo­ ries. In the ensuing four-power talks among the Soviet Union, the United States, Britain, and France, Moscow invariably was the closest supporter of the Arab point of view. Similarly, in the simultaneous Soviet-American negotiations, the Soviet government strongly endorsed the Arab position and also acted as virtual inter­ mediary between Washington and Cairo. In addition to the diplomatic support, the Soviet Union gave Egypt military aid, first, to replace the arms and equipment lost by the Egyptians in Sinai during the June war, secondly, to improve Egypt's defenses, particularly against Israeli air at­ tacks during the intermittent warfare along the Suez Canal in 1969 and 1970. The nature of this military aid will be discussed in greater detail in another chapter of this study. Suffice it to say here that of all the acts of Soviet strategy to link the Soviet Union with Egyptian and Arab interests, the arms aid was the most effec­ tive, because it was tangible and directly related to the vital issues of Arab inde­ pendence and territorial integrity.

Soviet Gains from Egyptian-American Estrangement While the convergence of Soviet and Egyptian policies on all these issues was a matter of record, there was no real necessity that this should be so. The Soviet­ Egyptian alignment was more a function of the American-Egyptian estrangement than a result of Egypt's deep-seated preference. In fact, on a number of issues it would have been more natural for Egypt to cooperate with the West. Egypt's neu­ tralism need not have been an obstacle to a correct relationship with Washington: Arab reluctance to join in Western-sponsored security schemes had been recog­ nized as a practical reality by Secretary Dulles as early as the spring of 1953, i.e., before the Soviet Union discarded Zhdanov's view of a world divided into only two antagonistic camps. The Soviet-Egyptian arms deal of 1955 could have been avoided, had the administration agreed to sell a modest amount of defensive arms which Cairo had requested. In the long run, there also was no incompatibility be­ tween Nasser's championship of the cause of national liberation in Afro-Asia and American policies. Since World War II, the United States repeatedly supported the quest for independence of Asian and African countries as in the cases of Syria and Lebanon, Indonesia, Libya, Algeria, and a number of African colonies. The

81 United States also gave aid and technical assistance to underdeveloped countries, directly and through the United Nations, at a time when the Soviet Union, re­ covering from her own war ravages, was not yet able to assist other states or was opposed to the internationally-administered programs. Thus it would have been more logical for the United States, with its greater cap­ ital resources and technical advantages, to help in the construction of the Aswan Dam than for the less advanced Soviet Union. Nor was it inevitable that the Soviet Union should monopolize the role of promoter of progress in poverty-ridden lands. The United States had an honorable record of favoring and assisting in a variety of reform measures and planning--especially in the sector of agrarian reforms-in a number of countries of the Middle East, including Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia. While the principles and practices of Arab socialism did not al­ ways accord with American preference for free enterprise, the American attitude was flexible enough to allow accommodation, as attested by the participation of two American concerns-Standard of Indiana and Phillips-in development of Egyptian oil resources. Major difficulty in American-Egyptian relations was likely to arise on the issue of Arab unity. But if this were so, it was due not to the prin­ ciple of unity itself-{)n which the United States could be described as neutral­ but to the method by which Nasser sought to achieve that objective. Egyptian­ sponsored subversion and armed intervention, practiced or attempted in Lebanon, Jordan, and Yemen, were disapproved in Washington. The United States adopted such countermeasures as landing troops in Lebanon, extending aid to Jordan, and mediating the Yemen conflict. To keep matters in proper perspective, it should be pointed out that Cairo's Pan-Arab militancy was occurring after Egypt became es­ tranged from the United States on a number of other issues, i.e., at a time when Washington had little capacity to exert a moderating influence on Egypt's revolu­ tionary regime. The most important-but essentially potential-issue likely to complicate American-Egyptian relations was, during the 20 years from 1947 to 1967, the degree of United States support to Zionism and Israel. Modern Arab nationalism was acquiring increasingly a Pan-Arab dimension. Consequently, no Arab country could remain indifferent to the fate of the Palestinian Arabs, especially a country in close geographical proximity to Palestine. Egypt was in such proximity and pos­ sessed many historical links with the Holy Land. Moreover, assumption of Pan­ Arab leadership by Nasser made it impossible for him to evade responsibility for the destiny of Palestine. His attitudes and actions in this respect led many observ­ ers to say that he had become "a prisoner of his own words." While there was much truth in this observation, it should be pointed out that in his role of a Pan­ Arab leader Nasser found it difficult if not impossible to avoid using the words and slogans of Arab liberation and solidarity. His Pan-Arab policy would have re­ mained largely meaningless if he had not constantly reiterated his concern for the fate of Palestine and its dispossessed Arab inhabitants. Yet, even with this basic attitude of concern and solidarity, Egypt's policy to­ ward Israel contained certain elements of restraint. The first of these was the ac­ ceptance of the armistice agreement signed at Rhodes on February 24, 1949, and the subsequent participation in the Egyptian-Israeli Mixed Armistice Commission,

82 which constituted a de facto acknowledgment of the reality of Israel's existence without granting it diplomatic recognition. The second was the acceptance, in the wake of the Sinai war of 1956, of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) on Egyptian territory while Israel, a state which had waged a preventive war, refused admission of UNEF on its side of the border. Instead of making a major international issue out of this unequal ar­ rangement, Egypt was willing to accommodate to it, with the result that, among all the borders of Israel, the Egyptian-Israeli armistice line was the most peaceful dur­ ing the subsequent decade. In the long run, this inequality was bound to embarrass President Nasser. When more militant Arabs, particularly those in Syria, began criticizing him for seeking a shelter behind the protective shield of UNEF and thus shirking his Arab duty to assist the oppressed Palestinian brethren, he felt he had no alternative but to avail himself of his latent legal right to demand UNEF's re­ moval from Egypt's territory. His action led to a second preventive war waged by Israel, that of June 5-10, 1967. During the two decades between the partition of Palestine and the Arab­ Israeli war of 1967, American-Egyptian relations had never deteriorated to the point of diplomatic rupture. American economic assistance was being extended to and accepted by Egypt, and Nasser's militant Pan-Arab policy-with its attendant threats to the political structures of Jordan, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia--caused greater tensions between Egypt and the United States than the mutual enmity be­ tween Cairo and Tel-Aviv. In the wake of the Suez war of 1956, the United States was actually the prime mover in safeguarding Egyptian sovereignty and territorial integrity against the invasion and occupatIon by Israel, Britain, and France. Al­ though President Eisenhower-together with Secretary Dulles the main architect of this pro-Egyptian policy-received only belated and grudging Arab acknowledg­ ment for his stand, it was clear that the United States had scored a major point in Egypt's favor. This mixed but not consistently unfriendly record of American-Egyptian rela­ tions seems to justify the view that, until the June war of 1967, American support for Zionism and Israel could be regarded as the potential rather than the actual major cause of complications in American-Egyptian relations. What made it actual after 1967 was the growing conviction in Cairo-shared by other Arab centers­ that (a) Washington had reversed the earlier Eisenhower policy of vigorous op­ position to Israel's preventive wars against its Arab neighbors; (b) the United States accepted Israel's concept of security through enlarged boundaries; (c) the United States was determined to help Israel maintain its military superiority by supplying sophisticated air and land weapons. The latter point rankled most. Official American references to the need to pre­ serve Israeli technological superiority in arms or to safeguard the balance of power between the Jewish state of less than 3 million and the Arab world nearly thirty times larger wounded Arab self-esteem. This position appeared to condemn the Arabs to a perpetual status of inferiority. This was viewed as essentially a racist position, unacceptable in the late 20th century community of nations. By espousing what seemed to Arab public opinion to be a clearly discriminatory attitude in favor of the Israeli colons in the midst of the Arab heartland, and by thus counte-

83 nancing Israeli expansionism-however justified in purely strategic terms-the United States was converting the latent into the actual: alienation from the Arab world in general and from Egypt, as the standard-bearer of Arab nationalism, in particular. Following the June war of 1967, the Arab-Israeli conflict overshadowed all other previously mentioned issues in American-Egyptian relations and reinforced other points of friction. The Soviet Union was presented a unique opportunity to press her advantages in every sector where she already had secured a foothold and to reassert-however fraudulently-her basic theoretical position that, in its ad­ vanced stages, capitalism assumed the form of imperialism bent on subjugation of the less developed nations of the Third World. Soviet-Egyptian relations reached a high mark when, on May 27, 1971, Soviet President Podgorny and Egypt's President Anwar al-Sadat signed a IS-year treaty of friendship and cooperation in Cairo. Composed of 12 articles, the treaty: (a) pledged close cooperation in the political, economic, scientific, technological, cultural, and other fields; (b) acknowledged the common bond of socialism be­ tween the contracting parties; (c) provided for regular consultation on all issues that bear on their interests and prompt coordination of stands to eliminate threats to peace; (d) pledged "on the basis of the existing agreements" cooperation in the military field; and (e) enjoined the parties to abstain from joining pacts or blocs inimical to either of them.10 By signing this treaty, President Sadat departed from the long-established official policy of nonalignment, while giving the Soviet Union a formal basis for a voice in Egypt's foreign policy through the provision of obligatory consultation. However, when viewed in the context of Egypt's international position at the time of signing, the treaty appeared to give procedural rather than substantive gains to the Soviet Union. Prior to the conclusion of the treaty, Egypt passed through a period of signifi­ cant domestic and international developments. On May 2, 1971, President Sadat relieved Ali Sabry, an original member of the RCC and an ex-premier, from his post of vice-president. Sabry was known for his pro-Soviet orientation and, more recently, for his opposition to the projected federation of Egypt, Libya, and Syria for which Sadat had worked hard since his assumption of the presidency in Sep­ tember 1970. Above all, however, Sabry was Sadat's rival in the unpublicized but real struggle for Nasser's succession. By removing him, Sadat not only eliminated a dangerous competitor and a man trusted by Moscow, but also gave himself a free hand for his impending talks with U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers. Two days later, on May 4, Rogers arrived in Cairo to explore the possibility of arrang­ ing a peaceful settlement in the Arab-Israeli conflict. It was the first visit paid to Cairo by an American secretary of state since John Foster Dulles' visit in 1953. Although the two-day-Iong conversations proved inconclusive in a formal sense, a somewhat warmer rapport was established between Washington and Cairo. Apart from reopening the communications between the two countries on the highest level, the visit opened a vista for a possible solution of the Arab-Israeli deadlock in which the United States could emerge as principal peacemaker.

10 Text in Appendix A.

84 Within a week after Rogers' departure, on May 13, Sadat placed under arrest six cabinet ministers and three leaders of the Arab Socialist Union-Egypt's only licensed political organization-in a move to foil a conspiracy against him. All those arrested had supported Ali Sabry and favored a stronger Socialist course for Egypt. Moscow could not but view with alarm these developments. By "purging" Sabry and his associates and by receiving Secretary Rogers, President Sadat appeared to be veering away from the Soviet orbit. Within a week after the purge, a high-level Soviet delegation headed by President Podgorny arrived in Cairo. The signing of the treaty of May 27 was the outcome. In concluding the treaty, Sadat implicitly reasserted his-and Nasser's-basic position that internal politics of Egypt and its external relations were two different entities and that by removing from the scene a man-Sabry-who stood closer to Moscow than other members of Egypt's ruling group, he was not necessarily hostile to the Soviet Union. To his younger army officers Sadat could point out that, by virtue of the treaty, the Soviets were now formally bound for a definite period to provide Egypt with the necessary weapons and to train the Egyptians in their use. To his would-be critics, he also could explain that the treaty explicitly mentioned mutual respect for each other's sovereignty as well as noninterference in internal affairs. On the other hand, the West could find some comfort in that the treaty did not establish a mili­ tary alliance. No article spoke of a definite Soviet pledge to come to the aid of the U.A.R. in case of an aggression. The clause giving Moscow the greatest opportunity for maneuver and influence was that establishing a mutual obligation for consultation. The consultation clause, incidentally, was included also in the pacts previously signed by Moscow with Fin­ land, Canada, and West Germany and, subsequent to the Soviet-Egyptian treaty, with India. If liberally interpreted, the obligation to consult could give the Soviet Union a basis for continuous interference in Cairo. But, under less propitious cir­ cumstances, consultation could also be interpreted restrictively so as to negate its importance. An inkling into the tenuous value of such clauses was given by Mohammed Hassanein Haikal, editor of the semi-official Al-Ahram who--with reference to the Sudanese-Soviet crisis over the treatment of local Communists-warned that Egypt might not be able to retain its mediatory role between Moscow and Khartoum if the "war of words" between the two countries continued to escalate. He added that the recently signed Soviet-Egyptian treaty "had no value" except insofar as it maintained a common denominator to achieve the overriding objective of regaining the Israeli-occupied Arab landsY In conclusion, the essence of the existing Soviet­ Egyptian relationship was not appreciably modified by the treaty. This relation­ ship was, as before, bound to be shaped by a variety of political and economic considerations, of which the relations between Cairo and Washington remained a paramount factor. Egyptian Communists-An Uncertain Factor While Soviet-Egyptian relations grew warmer, the role played by the Egyptian Communists was peripheral or virtually nonexistent.

11 Al-Ahram, August 6, 1971.

85 The Egyptian Communist movement was, since its inception in 1920, torn by inner strife which resulted in the emergence of a number of competing factions, es­ pecially during and after World War II. Among the factions were Iskra, the MELN (Mouvement Egyptien de Liberation Nationale), Tahrir al-Shaab (Peo­ ple's Liberation), Al-Talia (The Vanguard), the Marxist League, Citadelle, and Al-Fagr al-Gadid (The New Dawn). Even after Iskra and MELN, the two big­ gest groups, had merged with Al-Talia into a larger organization called MDLN (Mouvement Democratique de Liberation Nationale) in 1947, several smaller groups remained apart and in opposition to the main body. Differences among these various factions covered a wide range of issues, such as the advisability of united front tactics, the stand on Zionism, and the Egyptianization of the memhership. These Communist groups had large non-Egyptian minority elements, and Jews sometimes shared in the leadership, among them men like Joseph Rosenthal in the early twenties, and Henry Curiel and Hillel Schwarz (leaders of MELN and Iskra, respectively) in the 1940s.12 Factionalism, the foreign character of many members, and lack of a firm mass base either among the city proletariat or the peasants rendered the Communist movement as a whole rather weak in comparison with such native political group­ ings as the Wafd party and the Moslem Brethren. Furthermore, communism was outlawed by the royalist government in Egypt and on several occasions-one of them the Palestine war of 1948-hundreds of Communists were placed under detention. Membership in the Communist groups increased during the two last and rather chaotic years of the monarchy, while at the same time the number of separate groups decreased. By the time of the revolution of July 1952, two groups were in existence, the MDLN and the Egyptian Communist Party. Initially, the MDLN supported the Free Officers' revolution while other Communist groups, again beginning to proliferate, opposed it. After an early period of tolerance, by the end of 1952, General Naguib's regime began applying restrictive measures against the Commu­ nists, regardless of group affiliation. This suppression, paradoxically, did not affect the activities of certain front organizations, such as the peace movement, which was permitted to recruit members in the academic and intellectual circles, publish appeals, and send delegations to the Moscow-sponsored international congresses of the Peace Partisans. After the ouster of General Naguib, President Nasser not only continued but even intensified the anti-Communist stance of his predecessor. Strict repressive policies were inaugurated at the end of 1954. The conclusion of the Soviet-Egyptian arms deal in 1955 and the gradual rap­ prochement between Cairo and Moscow were government-level actions entirely separate from the Communist movement in Egypt. From the very outset, President Nasser insisted on differentiating between his regime's foreign policy and his treat­ ment of local Communists. He gave a forceful expression to it when, on the eve of Soviet Foreign Minister Shepilov's visit to Cairo in June of 1956, Egyptian author­ ities put on trial 69 Communists. On two occasions-mentioned in the preceding chapter-tension arose between Moscow and Cairo over the position of Arab

12 For a more detailed treatment of factionalism and transformations in the Egyptian Com­ munist movement, see Walter Z. Laqueur, Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1956).

86 Communists but, significantly, it was the Iraqi and possibly Syrian Communists that were the object of mutual irritation rather than the Egyptian ones,13 The So­ viet leadership seemed to be reconciled to difficult times for local Communists for the foreseeable future. In spite of the advent of the Khrushchevian era, Stalin's view that the local Communist struggle should be subordinated to broader consid­ erations of Soviet world strategy has remained valid: "The struggle the Emir of Afghanistan is waging for the independence of Afghanistan," said Stalin in 1924, is objectively a revolutionary struggle, despite the monarchist views of the Emir and his associates, for it weakens, disintegrates and under­ mines imperialism .... For the same reasons, the struggle the Egyptian merchants and bourgeois intellectuals are waging for the independence of Egypt is objectively a revolutionary struggle, despite the bourgeois origin and bourgeois title of the leaders of the Egyptian national move­ ment, despite the fact that they are opposed to socialism. . . . Lenin was right in saying that the national movement of the oppressed coun­ tries should be appraised not from the point of view of formal democracy but from the point of view of the actual results obtained, as shown by the general balance sheet of the struggle against imperialism ....14

13 In 1959 and 1961, see p. 70 above and p. 108 below. During his stay in Damascus in March 1959 (corresponding to the Shawaf rebellion in Iraq, March 9-12, which was crushed by General Kassem with the aid of the Communist party), Nasser delivered a number of speeches strongly attacking Communists in the Arab World. The following are excerpts from these speeches: March 11: "We consider these Communists as agents-agents of the foreigner. The Commu­ nist party here in Syria was never inspired from Syria nor did it work for Syria. It followed outside instruction from foreign Communist parties .... Communist terrorism which today prevails against Arab nationalism and Arab nationalists in Baghdad and the demonstrations which they plan against Arab nationalism, the UAR, and its leaders will only increase our determination to pursue our mission ...." March 13: "The Communists are agents. . . . When their boss returned to your town [reference to an attempt to return to Syria by Khaled Bakdash from his self-imposed exile in the Soviet Union] in the belief that the fruits were almost ripe, they were taken aback by the consciousness of the Arab people here. The Arab people rose to defend their nationalism and their religion and faith as well. They rose to repudiate atheism and red communism .... So they [Communists] turned their attention to Iraq. Iraq's rulers flung the doors of Baghdad open to them in order that they might operate against your RepUblic. They dream to be able to establish a Communist Red Crescent which communism will start knitting together from Baghdad .... The question, brethren, was not a matter of a dispute over ideology, principles, or mission, but was a case of black and red rancor beamed at you and your Republic . . . because this Republic has preserved its independence, was able to keep away from zones of influence, and has remained the master of its own will. The Communist plan, which in the past failed to dominate Syria, found in the Iraqi revolution compensation for its failure in Syria.... "We will not allow the formation of a Communist party in Egypt because we are confident that the Communist party in Egypt did not work of its own free will and did not work in the interests of the homeland but worked on outside orders and served the interests of the for­ eigner. Ever since 1953 the Communist party in Egypt used to receive orders from the Com­ munist party in Italy ...." March 15: "The Communists, brethren, tried to exploit the Egyptian revolution in order that they, a small faction, might dominate the majority ... and establish a dictatorship founded on blood in the name of fake democracy.... Today in Iraq, brethren, the Communists are trying to liquidate all-honorable and nationalist elements." March 22: "Khrushchev, the Soviet Premier, spoke some days ago and commented on our anger for our freedom, country, nationality, and Arabism. He commented with simplicity and said: 'Abdul Nasser is a young man who is enthusiastic and rash' (cheers). Brethren, I like to say today that Abdul Nasser is not alone in being rash and enthusiastic, but all the Arab peo­ ple are enthusiastic and rash.... What we want is an independent nationalism; but were the Communist party able to dominate us, it would destroy the nationalist elements and establish a bloody, terrorist dictatorship." Quoted from Foreign Broadcast Informalion Service, Daily Report, No. 48, of March 11, No. 51 of March 16, and No. 56 of March 23,1959. 14 Joseph Stalin, Marxism and the National Question, op. cit., pp. 186-87.

87 The position of the Egyptian Communist movement deteriorated further with the launching of the only licensed political organization in the United Arab Repub­ lic, the Arab Socialist Union, in 1963. The party had three alternatives: (a) to oppose the regime as an essentially bourgeois-military Fascist type of government which used empty Socialist slogans to mask its anti-class struggle stance and which engaged in repression against any type of opposition; (b) to cooperate with the re­ gime within the framework of a national front, Le., of a coalition of "progressive" forces, while retaining its identity as a Communist organization; (c) to cease any activity as an identifiable organized group and offer the services of its individual members to the regime. The first of these alternatives would have been virtually suicidal, because the party could count neither on the permissiveness of the au­ thorities nor on support from the Soviet Embassy. Moreover, to oppose a regime which was riding a high crest of its nationalist and revolutionary popularity was politically and psychologically a losing proposition. The second alternative--coop­ eration via a national front-presupposed either the existence of such a front or at least the willingness of the regime to consider its formation. For a variety of rea­ sons such a willingness, albeit with reservations, existed in Syria and Iraq. But the Egyptian regime gave no sign whatsoever of being interested in diluting its own monolithic structure. In other words, the gain to be derived from organized Com­ munist support for the regime would be, in the eyes of Nasser, greatly oversha­ dowed by the loss in allowing a pluralistic political structure to emerge and thus to negate the regime's fundamental opposition to the multiparty system. What remained under the circumstances was the third alternative-that of self­ liquidation-and this was precisely what the Egyptian Communist Party did. On April 25, 1965, the party pronounced its dissolution and enjoined its approxi­ mately 1,000 members to cooperate with the government as individuals, by joining the ranks of the regime's single organization, the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) .15 This was a gamble predicated on the assumption that Communists would be ac­ cepted into the bosom of the ASU, permitted to engage in work, and possibly given some official or semi-official government assignments (in the administration, state enterprises, propaganda apparatus, or the state-controlled press organs). Such an assumption proved fairly correct: rather than keeping the ex-party members in "outer darkness," the regime absorbed them without much fanfare. In doing so, the regime, on its part, also acted on the assumption that: (a) whether reformed or not, the Communists would now offer their energies to achieve the national goals of the Egyptian revolution; (b) the danger of Communist infiltration was negligible because of the tight and ubiquitous security system prevailing in the U.A.R. These assumptions cannot be easily proved. Tangible evidence cannot be obtained quickly and conclusively. The individual Communists' impact will depend as much on the skill and intellectual power of the Communists as on the similar qualities of their non-Communist colleagues in the ASU and various agencies. Whether the party was dissolved as a result of its own autonomous decision, on instructions from Moscow, or through some combined process is not known. Con­ sidering the marginal effect of the party on the Egyptian system, self-liquidation

15 The announcement was made in a communique published in Al-Ahram on April 25, 1965. 88 was probably the best solution from the Soviet point of view, because it removed an overt cause of potential irritations while opening a door-however slightly-to a possible boring from within. That infiltration was a practical possibility was at­ tested by developments in Egypt's press. The regime accepted individual Commu­ nist participation in the media, justifying its stand by the slogan "Socialist culture is not possible without socialist thinkers." 16 A veteran Marxist officer, Khaled Muhieddin (who had been a member of the first RCC in 1952), was put in charge of ASU's press division and appointed director of Al-Akhbar and Akhbar al­ Yaum, both ASU-controlled papers. Other Communists were either given new as­ signments in the communications media or maintained in their jobs if they already held them. Communist representation was more substantial in the U.A.R.'s press and information sector than in other sectors. Absorption of the ex-party members by the ASU was not invariably smooth. The emergence, by midsummer of 1965, of a pro-Peking group, the Arab Com­ munist Party under Mustafa Agha, created complications. In July, 11 Maoists were arrested. They were subsequently released and presumably allowed to resume their jobs. Factionalization of the Egyptian Communist movement, previously re­ ferred to, thus appeared to continue even despite the dissolution of the Egyptian Communist party; moreover, it acquired a new dimension in the emergence of the pro-Chinese faction. A second repressive measure was reported in October 1966, when between 30 and 50 persons accused of Communist affiliation were placed under arrest. Among those arrested were some well-known figures of Egyptian journalism such as editors Ahmed Hamrush of Rose al-Yussef, Mahmud al-Alem of Al-Akhbar and Akhbaral-Yaum, and Mohammed Bahaeddin of Al-Musawar. This "purge" had apparently started after an article appeared in the Cairo newspa­ per Al-Talia (Vanguard), edited by Marxist-inclined Loutfi el-Kholy. The article was critical of Egypt's National Charter of 1962. Most if not all arrested individu­ als were eventually released and the three editors were permitted to resume their work. As for the old-timer Khaled Muhieddin, he was in due time promoted to membership in the central committee of the reorganized ASU. He was also given the task of representing Egypt in the Soviet-dominated World Council on Peace, where he scrved on its presidential council in his capacity as secretary general of its affiliate, the U.A.R. National Peace CounciL In this position, Muhieddin orga­ nized the Second International Conference in Support of Arab Peoples, which met in Cairo, January 25-28, 1969. The Arab-Israeli June War of 1967 partly reopened, albcit indirectly, the issue of communism in Egypt. Egypt's defeat posed the problem of the soundness of its social and political system. Critical commentary on this subject came from three sources: the Soviet Union, the Arab Communist movement, and the Egyptian rul­ ing elite itself. Soviet criticisms focused on the class structure of the Egyptian army; according to them, there was an excessive gap between the soldiers and the officers, due to the latter's bourgeois origins. The implication of this was that there should be a purge, and renewal and restructuring of the army to give it a more pop-

16See "Egyptian Communists and Their Role," The Arab World Weekly (AWW), January 25, 1969; also The Arab World, September 24, 1968; AWW, October 19, 1968 and May 3, 1969.

89 ulist character.17 As for Arab Communists, the Lebanese Communist press organ, Al-Akhbar (Beirut), published after the June war. a series of articles highly critical of Egypt's ASU, calling for the formation of a united front of all the pro­ gressive forces in the United Arab Republic.18 This looked like a possible bid to recreate the Egyptian Communist Party to assume the role of at least an officially recognized junior partner in the would-be ruling coalition. There was no sequel to this suggestion, partly perhaps because the regime itself took steps toward re­ form. On March 30, 1968, President Nasser called for changes in the ASU to make it more powerful and responsive to the people's wishes. Implementation of socialist principles, creation of a vanguard party within the ASU, and elimination of reac­ tionary and bourgeois-minded groups from the state apparatus figured as the main points of the program. In April and May, the ASU underwent a purge of its high and medium levels and a thorough reorganization. The main thrust of this reform was to implement more strictly the original idea differentiating ASU membership between the active (vanguard) and the general, and to strengthen the active com­ ponent. Such a reform was to have taken place in 1965-66 but was delayed and inter­ rupted by the war of 1967. When, back in 1965, the vanguard group was to be es­ tablished within the ASU, Soviet commentators endorsed the idea. "That ...," said G. Mirsky in the Moscow New Times, "is the beginning of a process the ur­ gent need for which is widely realized: the process of creating within the Arab So­ cialist Union a vanguard party, the political core of the Union .... The way is thus being paved for the transformation of the once backward and largely passive masses into conscious builders of the new society." 19 Similarly, another Soviet writer spoke approvingly of the statements made by the editor and ASU official Loutfi el-Kholy "that the vanguard organization thus being formed will be the 'ide­ ological backbone' of the Union. It will be composed of 'socialist elements' and will be 'in the nature of a socialist party with its own constitution and program.' "20 Soviet comments were equally favorable to the reorganization of the ASU in 1968.21 One may ask whether these Russian theorists and commentators were not un­ duly optimistic. While the notion of a vanguard party is a time-honored concept of Leninism, in principle it refers to the Communist party only. Honoring other than

17 See Igor Belyayev and Evgeny Primakov, "The Situation in the Arab World," New Times, No. 39 (September 27, 1967), and G. Mirsky, "Arab East: Moment of Truth," New Times, No. 46-47 (November 12-20, 1967). For an analytical summary of Soviet views in this respect, see also The Mizan Newsletter, Vol. IX, No.4 (July-August 1967). 18 Al-Akhbar (Beirut), October 15, 1967; excerpts and extensive summary in The Arab World, October 18, 1967. 19 "United Arab Republic: New Stage," New Times, No. 48 (December 1, 1965). 20 Y. Bochkaryov, "BattIe for Progress," New Times, No. 19 (May 9, 1966). 21 "Developments in recent months have injected yet another element-the enhanced role for the working class and peasantry in social and political life, exercised through the Arab Socialist Vnion (ASU), recently reorganized to unite the national forces." Its new constitution forms it as "a vanguard organization of the entire people in the fight for social progress.... " After March 30, 1968 reforms, "the Union has made democratic centralism its guiding princi­ ple ...." From "United Arab Republic: Development Problems," Peace, Freedom and Social­ ism, Vol. XII, No.5 (May 1969). For a similarly positive view of ASU reforms see TASS International Service, FBIS, Daily Report, April 26, 1968; and Mizan, Vol. X, No.3 (May­ June 1968),p.1l8.

90 a Communist organization with this title implied a belief that such a body could be used as an effective vehicle for Communist activity. Soviet commentators' optimism for the Egyptian vanguard organization could have been based on a conviction that its skilled ideologists and organizers could manipulate the broader membership of the ASU, primarily through communications media and, secondly, through per­ sonal influence. Inasmuch as Communists were well represented in the press and other media-all ASU controlled-they might serve the Communist cause effec­ tively. In this sense, the role of Egyptian Communist writers and editors resembled the influence Marxist-inclined professors exerted upon their students in universities anywhere in the world: steeped in selective documentation, skilled in debate, and always conscious of their ultimate goals, such individuals often succeeded in de­ stroying inner defenses of their captive audiences, shaking the existing system of values, and neutralizing if not eliminating their listeners' initial distrust toward communism in theory and practice. In part, Soviet optimism regarding ASU reform could possibly be attributed to the conviction that the shock of defeat in the June war was profound enough to cause Egypt's masses to turn toward more radical solutions for prevailing social ills. Such a view was well articulated in a series of three articles in Pravda by Ser­ gei Baruzdin who, on the basis of his direct contact with Egyptian workers, sol­ diers, and officials, claimed that the masses burned with determination not evident before 1967 to achieve changes and improvement in the social, economic, and mili­ tary sectors. In spite of this, Egypt was still divided into two antagonistic groups, the popular and the bourgeois, between whom an acute class struggle was in proc­ ess. According to Baruzdin, many elements in the country's bureaucracy were out of step with the objectives of Egyptian revolution. However, Egypt's new army had changed because now it could avail itself of Soviet experience in political and morale training. 22 To conclude: between 1952 and 1967 Egypt's Communist movement had not played a major role in the formulation of the country's foreign and domestic poli­ cies. This was largely due to Nasser's determination to distinguish between govern­ ment relations with Moscow, on the one hand, and domestic communism, on the other. His treatment of Communists was generally restrictive and sometimes re­ pressive. However, he tended to be lenient toward Communist intellectuals to whom he entrusted, rather puzzlingly, important positions in his state-controlled press and information machinery. While it would be difficult to ascribe this policy to his po­ litical nalvete--especially in view of the strong verbal attacks he directed at them as foreign agents 23_it is not unlikely that, ultimately, he hoped to utilize their talents for his and not their type of revolution. Similarly, one may speculate whether the ex-party members have not entered the ASU and its vanguard for an­ alogous reasons-to achieve revolutionary objectives via the psychological condi­ tioning of the masses according to their own credo. Soviet-Egyptian Economic Cooperation Soviet-Egyptian economic cooperation closely reflected the political rapproche­ ment between the two countries. It was expressed in the growth of trade and in

22 "4,000 Kilometers Around Egypt," Pravda, May 21, 26, and 30, 1970. 23 See p. 87 above, n. 13.

91 techno-economic assistance to Egypt's development, involving not only the Soviet Union but other Communist countries as well. By including the entire Communist world, one gets a more accurate picture of the degree to which Egypt's economic destinies have become linked with a political camp hostile to the West. The year 1955-when the Soviet-Egyptian arms deal was concluded-marked the beginning of closer economic relations. By 1958-the year of the apogee of Nas­ ser's Pan-Arab drive--U.A.R. exports to the Soviet Union reached $82.1 million, to Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe $103.8 million, to Yugoslavia $13.6 million, and Communist China $34.9 million. These exports to the Communist states rep­ resented nearly 50 percent of U .A.R.'s total exports of $470 million. In that same year U.A.R. imports from the Soviet Union amounted to $83.6 million, a figure virtually equivalent to the value of exports. If we add to it imports from Eastern Europe worth $98.3 million, from Yugoslavia $23.9 million, and from Communist China $25.1 million, we obtain a cumulative amount representing nearly 35 per­ cent of U.A.R.'s total imports of $605.4 million. In the following years Egypt's trade with the Communist states rose steadily. By 1966 U.A.R. exports to the Soviet Union rose to $142.6 million (i.e., by nearly 58 percent), to Eastern Europe to $146.8 million, and to Yugoslavia to $20.3 million. They kept at about equal level with Communist China, amounting to $32.5 million. Cumulatively, those exports represented 56 percent of U.A.R.'s total exports of $605.4 million. In the same year the U.A.R. imported from the Soviet Union goods worth $93.7 million, from Eastern Europe $186.3 (almost doubling the figure for 1958), from Yugoslavia $27.3 million and from Commu­ nist China $17 million. Jointly, this represented 33 percent of the total U.A.R. imports of $1,070 million. The slight decrease of the Communist states' share in the U.A.R.'s imports (from 35 to 33 percent) could be ascribed to the substantial increase of imports from other (mostly Western) sources between 1958 and 1966: thus imports from the United States quadrupled in value (from $50.7 million to $212.4 million) and those from Western Europe, United Kingdom, and Japan rose from $257.9 million to $381.2 million. There was. growing imbalance in the U.A.R.'s trade with Eastern Europe (nearly $40 million trade deficit in 1966), while trade with the Soviet Union in that year showed a surplus of $49 million. Assuming a degree of overall coordina­ tion of the Soviet bloc's foreign economic policies, it would thus appear that the East European sateJ1ite states carried a considerable burden in supplying the U.AR. industrial goods (some of which were badly needed by their own semi­ developed economies), while obtaining relatively little in return. The surplus in their trade position with the U.A.R. constituted a dubious benefit from their point of view, inasmuch as these transactions rarely involved hard currency payments by Egypt. By contrast, the Soviet Union was obtaining from the U.A.R. considerable quantities of goods-mostly cotton-in exchange for a mixture of merchandise, much of which was arms and military equipment, i.e., nonproductive and rapidly becoming obsolescent. Whereas Soviet trade with the Middle East as a whole was almost balanced both in 1958 and in 1966, Eastern Europe could "boast" sub-

92 stantial surpluses in both years, the surplus for 1966 reaching $213.9 million, East European exports to the Middle East exceeding imports by about two to one.24 Long-term external aid, in the form of grants and loans, provided another eco­ nomic link between the U.A.R. and the Communist bloc. Although Egypt bought substantial amounts of surplus wheat and other foodstuffs from the United States with its own nonconvertible currency, aid from the Communist states-mostly the Soviet Union-exceeded that from the United States by about 50 percent, as shown in the following table: 25

LONG-TERM EXTERNAL AID TO EGYPT, 1945-65 Source Millions of U.S. Dollars

U.S. economic aid, 1945-64 $ 943.1 World Bank and LD.A., as of June 30, 1965 45.2 Communist bloc aid (incl. Communist China), 1954-65 1,441 Kuwait, as of June 30, 1965 209.4

Soviet economic and technical assistance was intended to help Egypt in its devel­ opment programs. It also embraced technical training in both the Soviet Union and the U.A.R. These training programs followed two patterns: some were of a gen­ eral nature, while the others were related to specific Soviet-sponsored projects. As many as 24 technical institutes were in existence in Egypt in 1964, the largest of which, located at Aswan, was training 1,000 students per year. In 1965 approxi­ mately 7,500 students in the U.A.R. underwent Soviet-supported technical train­ ing. At the same time, 365 Egyptian students were studying in the Soviet Union. Of these, 150 were classified as academic and 215 as technicaL The total number of Egyptian students in the U.S.S.R. rose to 530 by February 1968. In July of that year, the U.A.R. and the Soviet Union signed another agreement providing for con­ tinuation of the technical training programs.26 Although Soviet assistance extended to a number of fields and projects, three deserve special mention because of their economic and psychological importance. These are the High Aswan Dam, the Helwan steel plant, and the development of u.A.R.'s oil resources.

The High Aswan Dam Thc High Aswan Dam was constructed with Soviet aid during the ten-year pe­ riod between 1960 and 1970. It was not only the biggest engineering project on the continent of Africa in modern times but also a subject of dramatic political maneuverings. Conceived early by Egypt's Revolutionary Command Council as its major project, this undertaking attracted the initial attention of the United States, Great Britain, and the World Bank. On December 16, 1955, Secretary Dulles made a firm offer of $70 million to finance the construction of the cofferdam. In

24 Based on Lee E. Preston in association with Karim A. Nashashibi, Trade Patterns in the Middle East (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1970). 25 Ibid., p. 62. 20 U.S. Department of State, Educational and Cultural Exchanges, op. cit., see note 8, p. 62 above.

93 addition, the World Bank expressed willingness to extend a 40-year loan of $200 million at 5 percent interest. Furthermore, supplementary financing was expected to be obtained from the United States ($130 million) and Great Britain ($70 mil­ lion). These Western offers were made at a time of gradual worsening in relations between Egypt and the West. Back on September 27, 1955, Egypt and Czecho­ slovakia had announced conclusion of their arms deal, whereby much of Egypt's cotton crop was bartered for Soviet weapons. It was followed by rumors that the Soviet Union was prepared to finance the dam in case American aid was not forth­ coming. In the winter of 1955-56, President Nasser did not respond to Western offers and appeared to delay his decision, thereby creating a suspicion that he was ex­ pecting a better offer from Moscow. To Washington's dismay, on May 15, 1956, Egypt accorded Communist China diplomatic recognition while concluding with her a barter agreement pledging 45,000 tons of cotton for Chinese steel. A month later, Soviet Foreign Minister Dmitri Shepilov visited Cairo to emphasize Soviet­ Egyptian friendship. At the same time Egypt campaigned intensely against the U.S.­ sponsored Baghdad Pact. American cotton producers grew increasingly concerned over the competition of Egyptian cotton exports on the world markets. Further­ more, Nasser raised objections to the conditions of the proposed World Bank loan for the Aswan Dam, which required international supervision of the Egyptian econ­ omy to prevent inflation during the period of construction. On June 20, 1956, Nasser addressed a series of counterproposals to the bank's president, Eugene Black, aiming at the removal of these restrictions. To President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles, the counterproposals appeared to indicate that Nasser was not in­ terested in the West's offer. In spite of Shepilov's visit to Cairo and the occasional hints by Nasser that the Soviet Union stood ready to finance the dam, no firm Soviet offer had been made by mid-July 1956. At this point Nasser decided to seek Western assistance once more. But on July 19, 1956, Secretary Dulles informed the Egyptian ambassador to Washington, Ahmed Hussein, that the United States was withdrawing its offer. Egypt was soon afterward notified by Britain and the World Bank of withdrawal of their offers, as well. The consequences of these decisions were mom en tous: the na tionaliza tion of the Suez Canal, the resulting Suez crisis, invasion of Egypt by Israel, Britain, and France, and a settlement under the United Nations auspices, followed by the proclamation of the Eisenhower Doctrine. Throughout these turbulent months no major overt moves were made in the Soviet-Egyptian negotiations regarding the dam; in fact, they appeared to be sus­ pended. As late as October 1958, President Nasser inquired from World Bank President Black, then on a visit to Cairo, whether the United States and Britain, on whose decision the offer of the bank was contingent, had changed their minds. On hearing a negative reply, Nasser made his final decision to conclude the agree­ ment with the Soviet Union. On October 23, 1958, the Soviet Union agreed to finance the construction of one section of the dam. Premier Khrushchev pledged an initial loan of up to $100 million (the actual loan amounted to $80 million), thus making the first major

94 move in the Soviet policy of economic penetration of the Middle East. From then on, Egypt's economic dependence on the Soviet bloc, in both arms and aid­ and-trade, steadily increased. Financing. Soviet financial aid in construction of the dam was extended through three loans: (a) £E 34.8 million ($80 million) for 12 years at 2.5 percent with repayment to begin in 1964, announced on December 27, 1958; (b) £E 78.4 million ($180 million), with the same terms and interest, with re­ payment to begin in 1970, announced on July 27, 1960; and (c) £E 113 million ($259 million), terms, interest and repayment date unpub­ licized, announced on May 23, 1964. The total of these loans amounted to $559 million. However, it is possible that some of these funds might have been earmarked for projects other than the Aswan Dam. Cost. In addition to the Soviet loans, an equal amount of financing was pro­ vided by Egypt in local currency. Estimates of the total cost varied, depending on the source and on the definition of the development projects included. In 1964, the U.A.R Ministry of Information published a pamphlet entitled Aswan High Dam, which gave the following breakdown of the costs: (a) Dam itself: £E 85.5 million ($197 million) (b) Compensation for Nubia and Wadi Haifa: £E 20 million ($46 million) (c) Power station: £E 57.5 million ($132 million) (d) Power lines and transformers: £E 50 million ($115 million) Total: £E 213 million ($490 million) However, the 1965 edition of the same publication almost doubled the estimate of the preceding year, giving the following figures: (a) Dam itself, lines, power station and indemnities: £E 245 million (b) Irrigation projects, roads, public utilities, housing: £E 170 million Total: £E 415 million ($955 million) The 1965 estimate contains associated projects not included the year before. In round figures, the dam's total cost was about $1 billion."7 Size and capacity. The earth and rock fill required to build the dam amounted to about 42 million cubic meters or 17 times the bulk of the great pyramid of Cheops. The dam is 111 meters (366 feet) high and 3,600 meters (about 2.5 miles) long. Its breadth (thickness) is 980 meters at the base and 30 to 40 meters at the top. Its water storage capacity is 157,000 million cubic meters, the 13th largest in the world, according to the United States Department of Interior. Of this water volume, some 75 percent is to be located in Egypt and some 25 percent in the Sudan. Water stored by the dam has created a huge reservoir, Lake Nasser, some 500 kilometers (350 miles) long. Its average width is 10 kilometers (at one point it reaches 20 kilometers). Its depth is 90 meters. The Sudanese border town of Wadi HaIfa was inundated as the reservoir was formed, requiring resettlement of nearly

27 A figure of an estimated $1.3 billion was advanced by The New York Times, October 24, 1958, in a dispatch with a Washington dateline.

95 60,000 Sudanese to Kashm al-Gibra, a district southeast of Khartoum. Flooding of Egyptian territory necessitated moving thousands of inhabitants to 33 villages around Kom Ombo. A number of ancient Egyptian monuments located on the banks and islands of the Nile, including the temple of Philae, were also submerged. The colossi of the Abu Simbel temple were moved to cliffs overlooking their original location after an international campaign raised some $30 million to pay for the project. Egypt's cultivable area is slightly in excess of 6 million feddans (approx. 6.2 million acres). The irrigation potential of the dam's stored water is estimated at up to 2 million feddans in Lower Egypt, which, with local schemes closer to Aswan, may add about 30 percent to Egypt's cultivable area. It may expand threefold the Sudan's agricultural capacity. The dam will also assure flood controL In fact, in 1965, when the dam reached its 68 percent completion level, it already helped avert a major flood whieh might have caused damage estimated at £E 200 mil­ lion. On the other hand, the added volume of water enabled the farmers to in­ crease the acreage allocated to rice cultivation from the usual 500,000 to 1,000,000 acres. The dam is also expected to make a revolutionary contribution to the power supply in Egypt. By the end of ] 966, four giant power turbines were in operation. In subsequent years, eight others were installed. Each of the twelve had a capacity of 175,000 kilowatts by 1970. Two high-tension lines were put up between Aswan and Cairo. The power thus generated is expected to supply both industry (10,000 million kilowatt hours per year, according to the allocations for 1970) and the consumer, i.e., road electrification and domestic uses. Cost of this power is esti­ mated at half the London price. Labor and construction schedule. According to official Egyptian data, the dam construction employed, at one time or another, between 950 and 1,800 Soviet en­ gineers, technicians, and skilled workers. In addition, it required the services of 34,000 Egyptians prior to the diversion of the Nile in May 1964 and 26,000 after­ ward. Of these, 200 were engineers. Construction of the dam was carried out in three stages. They were to be fol­ lowed by the fourth, final stage focusing on the installation of the dam-related power system in the country. First stage, January 9, 1960-May 1964-completion of the lower portion of the dam, diversion of the Nile. Second stage, May 1964-67--dam built to three-fourths of final height; filling of reservoir to begin. Third stage, 1967-69--completion of the dam; construction of the power station (started January 9, 1963) and high tension lines, and Final stage, 1970-72-remaining generators to be completely installed by July 1970; total power grid to be completed by 1972.28

28 The foregoing section was based on: United Arab Republic, Ministry of Information, Aswan High Dam, editions of 1964 and 1965; Tom Little, Modern Egypt (London: Ernest Benn, 1967); Hugh Thomas, Suez (New York: Harper & Row, 1966); Keesing's Contempo­ rary Archives, 1957-58, pp. 16470ff.; 1963-64, pp. 20129ff.; and numerous dispatches in The New York Times.

96 Completion of the first stage was celebrated in May 1964, in the presence of President Nasser, Soviet Premier Khrushchev, President Abdul Salam Aref of Iraq, President Ahmed Ben Bella of Algeria, President Abdullah Sallal of Yemen, and high-ranking officials from a number of Arab and non-Arab countries. Khrushchev arrived on his yacht with an entourage of 100, including Foreign Minister Gro­ myko and Deputy Defense Minister Marshal Grechko. During his 17-day stay in Egypt (May 8-25) he delivered at least seven major speeches, the theme of which was peaceful coexistence and Soviet support for liberation movements. He pre­ sented Nasser with the Order of Lenin and that of the Hero of the Soviet Union, hailed him as the great leader of the liberation movement, praised Arab socialism for its achievements in the U.A.R., and acknowledged that the U.A.R. was follow­ ing "the path of socialism."29 He also took the opportunity to hold talks with Iraq's President Aref in Cairo, thus beginning an era of steady Soviet-Iraqi rap­ prochement. The second major celebration was held on July 21, 1970, on the eve of the eighteenth anniversary of the Egyptian revolution, to inaugurate the dam. Work on it was completed around July 1, when'the last 25 Soviet experts left for home. In a ceremony from which Westerners were excluded, Egyptian, Soviet and other officials of states deemed friendly to the U.A.R. watched as the twelfth and last power-generating turbine of the dam was turned on. The third and final dedication ceremony took place on January 15, 1971. Hosted by U.A.R.'s new president, Anwar al-Sadat, it was attended by Soviet President Nicolai Podgorny who took this opportunity to renew his government's pledge to assist in building a power network for the High Dam's power plant. At the end of Podgorny's state visit on January 19, a joint communique announced that the two countries had "reached agreement on all urgent questions pertaining to the current international situation." Official rejoicing over the inauguration of the dam did not prevent some criti­ cisms, nor could it conceal certain difficulties. It was reported that much water would be lost through seepage under the floor of the basin and that the Soviet en­ gineering studies had not adequately dealt with the porosity of the rocks around the dam. Another problem, experienced during the first years of the operation, was that the dam would stop silt originating in the upper Nile from being deposited in the Delta and thus reduce the fertility of the land. Egyptian authorities acknowl­ edged that loss of silt was undesirable, but said it was limited and could be com­ pensated for by increased use of fertilizers. Anyway, said the officials, a hundred years from now Egypt may not need the dam once nuclear energy assures swift and economic means of desalting sea water. Gains in standard of living expected to be assured by the dam were offset by Egypt's alarming population growth rate, estimated at 2.7 percent per year. But the purpose of the dam was not only to in­ crease the cultivable area but also to industrialize the country. Officials expected an increase in the gross national product of £E 175 million a year, of which about £E 48 miIIion was to be ascribed to the increase of electric power.30

29 The New York Times, May 15, 1964; see also Khrushchev Remembers (Boston, To­ ronto: Little, Brown & Co., 1970), pp. 443ff. :10 "Egypt's Aswan High Dam is Completed," A WW, July 4, 1970. See also "The Eternal Nile: A Blessing and a Curse," The New York Times, January 16, 1971.

97 Even if the technical and economic criticisms were valid, the economic signifi­ cance of the dam could hardly be denied or ignored. Its sheer size placed it among the major engineering feats of the 20th century. In every respect it was a monu­ mental achievement and an outstanding symbol of Soviet-Arab cooperation.

Steel and Oil Steel. Ownership and operation of a steel plant has been the standard objective of most underdeveloped countries. The prestige value of such an undertaking and its symbolism in the country's struggle for emancipation and modernization have tended to override more sober calculations of its economic feasibility or desirabil­ ity. As a regime dedicated to nationalist revolution, Egypt's government was, from its very beginning, committed to having an iron and steel industry of its own. Ini­ tial steps were made with the assistance of German technicians. In June 1954, the Egyptian Iron and Steel Company was set up as a mixed enterprise, with shares to be held by the government, the private sector, and the German firm DEMAG, the latter to undertake construction of the plant and supply of the technicians. The ini­ tial objective was modest, to assure production of 235,000 tons of iron and steel per year by 1958, as against Egypt's annual consumption of 310,000 tons in 1954 and the expected 400,000 tons by 1960.31 The project, located at Helwan near Cairo, encountered financial difficulties stemming from overoptimistic planning and lack of adequate coordination of var­ ious government agencies. Initial estimates of cost were £ E 17 million. But by the time the plant was officially opened in July 1958, it had already absorbed some £E 25 million, and further expenditures of over £E 3 miliion were expected."" In March 1962, a protocol signed with the Soviet Union called for expansion of the steel producing complex. Government releases at that time referred to three mills at Helwan, but gave no details on financing or technical aspects. A subse­ quent official publication said that the plant, expanded in 1964-65, had a ca­ pacity of 2 million tons of steel, 2 million tons of iron, 462,000 tons of rolled iron, 345,000 tons of hammered products, and 119,000 tons of steel products. It employed 7,000 workers and its cost was given as £ E 30 million. This figure was somewhat puzzling, because the original estimate of cost, with German participa­ tion, had been close to that amount. Possibly the figure referred only to the cost of the Soviet-assisted expansion, but it was equally possible that its cost was pur­ posely omitted. Apart from the basic iron and steel plant, the Helwan complex housed five other ancillary industries: the EI-Nasr compar.ies for pipes and metal smelting, the EI-Nasr foundry, the EI-Nasr company for auto production, and the General Egyptian Company for Railroad. Except for the latter which began operations in 1958, the four others were launched between 1962 and 1964, i.e., at the time when the steel plant was being expanded. No details have been published on the

31 The Egyptian Economic and Political Review (Cairo). October 1954, pp. 32-33 and September 1954. pp. 22ff. 32 Keith Wheelock, Nasser's New Egypt: A Critical Analysis (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960), pp. 161-62. 33 DAR Information Department, "Heavy Industries, 1963-64," Guide Book for the UAR (Cairo, 1965).

98 degree of Soviet technical participation in these ventures beyond the announcement that Soviet experts were employed in them. Oil. For a long time Egypt was ranged among the oil-poor countries, its produc­ tion of crude being marginal and not sufficient even to satisfy its own domestic needs. But, beginning with the mid-1960s, this picture began to change, especially with the discoveries made by Phillips Petroleum Co. and Pan American Oil Co. (a subsidiary of Standard of Indiana) in the EI-Morgan field in the Gulf of Suez and in El-Alamein in the Western Desert. These discoveries not only con­ firmed the existence of sizable deposits of crude in locations where drilling was made but also opened attractive vistas for exploration in the broader expanses of Egyptian territory. In the late 1960s, especially in the aftermath of the Arab­ Israeli war of 1967, the Soviet Union intensified its search for oil in the Persian Gulf­ Mediterranean area. In the U .A.R. three contracts were signed in late 1967, to (a) carry out survey work in the Siwa Oasis, close to the Libyan border, (b) sup­ ply equipment, (c) provide service personnel, all as part of an agreement in 1966 pledging 544 million in Soviet credits.31 These contracts were followed by a more comprehensive agreement signed be­ tween the two countries on May 8, 1969, providing for joint participation in oil exploration and development. A Soviet loan to the General Petroleum Company [Authority] of the U.A.R. was to be repaid over 12 years at 2.5 percent interest, regardless of whether oil was discovered. All oil found was to be the property of the U .A.R. The agreement provided for two stages of exploration and develop­ ment. In the first stage of five years, ten Soviet drilling crews and six rigs were to drill 40 wells. The Soviet work force was to number 700 technicians. In the sec­ ond, development stage, further Soviet credits would be required. 35 The U.A.R.-Soviet trade protocol for 1970 called for exchange of oil products. The Soviet Union was to supply the U.A.R. with $61.3 million worth of crude, 54.1 million of oil products, 30,000 tons of urea, and 500,000 tons of coal; and was to buy, in return, from the U.A.R. 2 million tons of Morgan crude and 45,000 tons of naphtha. The seeming paradox of the Soviet Union simultaneously buying and selling crude to the U .A.R. could be explained by the logistics of the situation after the June war of 1967: with its Suez Canal zone refineries destroyed by Israeli bombings, the U.A.R. had to rely on its Mex refinery near Alexandria, to which Soviet crude could easily be delivered by sea. On the other hand, the So­ viet Union could use the Gulf of Suez (Morgan) crude to supply Asian, especially Japanese, markets."n Cooperation in the oil sector extended to other Communist states as well. The Egyptian-Yugoslav barter agreement concluded in September 1968 provided for the purchase by the U.A.R. of five rigs for exploration in the Siwa Oasis, Giza, and Ras Gharib in exchange for oil. Similarly, a Rumanian-U.A.R. trade protocol of March 1970 called for increased cooperation in the areas of oil exploration and development.

34 Middle East Economic Survey (MEES) (Beirut), Vol. XI, No. 49 (October 4, 1968). 35 MEES, op. cit., Vol. XII, No. 28 (May 9, 1969). 36 MEES, op. cit., Vol. XIII, No. 12, January 16, 1970. 37 MEES, op. cit., Vol. XI, No. 49 (October 4, 1968).

99 To conclude: Soviet-Egyptian economic cooperation was inteJ;lsified as the un­ derlying political rapprochement developed. Volume of the exchanges increased as did the versatility of technical assistance. The most recent expansion was in oil ex­ ploration and production. The Soviet Union began to make serious strides forward in exploitation of Egyptian oil. As these political and economic ties grew, the U.A.R. became increasingly de­ pendent on Soviet arms supplies. From the Egyptian point of view these supplies appeared to be a logical and natural concomitant of the general growth of friendly relations between the two governments. From the Soviet viewpoint the arming of Egypt was but part of a broader strategic design in the Middle East and the Medi­ terranean, with diplomacy, propaganda, aid-and-trade, and military power all im­ portant components. We will return to these military aspects of the Soviet policy in a further chapter of this study.

100 VI. SYRIA: AID AND IDEOLOGY

SOviet penetration of Syria may be traced back to 1955, the year of major devel- opments in the Middle East and of significant political evolution in Syria itself. At that time the basic pattern of Soviet-Syrian relations was established: close interdependence between Syria's foreign policy and her domestic politics. Any in­ ternational or Pan-Arab event was bound to find quick echo in Syria's internal po­ litical process. And-vice-versa-domestic changes were invariably reflected in Syria's foreign policy postures and actions. Syria's internal politics had been noted for their instability since 1949, the beginning of a long series of coups d'etat, 11 of which resulted in the overthrow of governments and about an equal number of which did not. In this maze of violence and counterviolence, it is possible never­ theless to discern basic trends. Upon achievement of full independence in 1945, Syria possessed a constitutional parliamentary system in which a variety of parties vied for power and influence. These parties could be called conventional, having no profound ideological differences, and often were grouped around ambitious political leaders. The defeat of the Arab armies in the first war with Israel in 1948 had a pro­ found impact on Syria's politics. Disenchantment with the mismanagement of the war by the civilian politicians led to the first army coup in 1949. For the next five years Syria was ruled by military dictators, among whom Colonel Adib Shishakli held power the longest. With his overthrow early in 1954, democratic processes were restored. While the old political parties reappeared and, in the formal sense, hcld sway, their influence was eroded by the growth of new groups whosc only common denominator was that they stressed ideology and challenged the legiti­ macy of the Syrian political system. Except for this common negativism, the new groups varied widely. By the mid-1950s, four major orientations had crystallized: (a) Pan-Arab­ Socialist; (b) Greater Syrian; (c) Islamic, and (d) Communist. All four were op­ posed, and at times repressed, by the conventional parties, whose primary loyalty was to Syria as a national state within her existing boundaries. Conventional party leaders, in competition for power, occasionally made tactical alliances with one or another of the four ideological groups. These yielded immediate advantage to the leaders, but eventually led to the strengthening of the ideological groups whose collaboration was sought. Thus, ultimately, the four groups advanced in member­ ship and influence, and Syria's domestic political process polarized. The Greater Syrian (Syrian Social Nationalist Party) and the Islamic (Moslem Brotherhood)

101 groups were, in different ways, conservative, while the Pan-Arab and the Commu­ nist groups were radicaP

The Post-Shishakli Period: Ties with Russia amI Communist Advances Radicals asserted themselves with increasing intensity during the post-Shishakli period (1954-1957). This was a time of momentous developments in international and Arab politics: the emergence of Nasser, the Baghdad Pact, the Bandung Con­ ference, the turn to neutralism by Cairo, the Soviet-Egyptian arms deal, the Suez crisis, the proclamation of the Eisenhower Doctrine, and the Turkish-Syrian crisis. Militant nationalism, preached and practiced by Nasser's Egypt, was gaining ground throughout the Arab area. Pan-Arabism evoked an eager response in Syria. Its growing emphasis on socialism and anti-imperialism attracted increasing num­ bers of the Syrian intelligentsia, especially students, but also cadets and graduates of the Homs Military Academy, younger groups which felt alienated both from the existing system in Syria and from Western influence. Main beneficiaries of this climate were the Baath party and the Communists. Both recruited their members from the same strata of the population, i.e., from those hostile to the establishment and looking for radical change. While the mood of the potential recruits for both parties was often identical, their choice of movement to join was often made by accident of friendship and kinship, degree of personal economic frustration, exposure to propaganda literature, persuasion by a profes­ sional party worker, or ethnic and tribal ties. The Baath party, after its merger with the Socialist party in 1954, was headed by a triumvirate of Michel Aflaq, Salaheddin aI-Bitar, and Akram Hourani. Of these, Aflaq and Bitar, the original founders of the Baath, were most intent on their aims of Arab unity and socialism. Before launching the Baath movement, Aflaq had broken away from the Communist party, to which he belonged while a student in Paris in the 1930s. He not only differentiated between Baathist and Communist objectives, but also-at least by 1957-resisted Communist influence in Syria. The same clarity about purpose, albeit in another direction, characterized the secretary general of the Communist party in Syria, a Damascus-born Kurd, Khaled Bakdash. A strict adherent of Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy, he was unflinch­ ingly loyal to the Soviet Union and faithfully followed Moscow's party line. In spite of the Baath and Communist differences on objectives-the Baath was nationalist and Cairo-oriented, while the Communist party was internationalist and Moscow-oriented-the two parties formed tactical alliances, especially in 1955-57, whenever they faced a strong, hostile front of the conventional political parties or of the right-wing ideological groups, such as the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) and the Moslem Brethren. Their cooperation produced two results: a blurring of boundaries between the two parties in the minds of some of their less­ indoctrinated adherents and sympathizers, and occasional support by the Baath of a Communist candidate for a high government or military post. In the late summer

1 For a more detailed treatment of the period under review, see Gordon H. Torrey. Syrian Politics and the Military, 1945-1958 (Ohio State University Press, 1964) and Patrick Seale, The Struggle for Syria: A Study of Post-War Arab Politics, 1945-1958 (London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1965).

102 TURKEY .-..,. ./ .- ._ ...... ( .-.'t ._.-./' ,--' ,._._._.---././ ~ .r-':>

IRAQ .,~ ~ o ~ - ~ w : ~ '" 'PC PIPElIN£ •~ / ./ ./' / ' SYRIA /,' /,' .. O,lh.ld 011 plpehne ,/./(' Rt'llled productl ptpehnt " 0" re',nerv ,/ \ • Tanker term,.,.t ./' '\ vi Dam /' . 15 50 l!1o~~ / ' \ I " , /' . 2ft 50 7&'I~'t'n

JORDAN \ touftOAillY '1IE"..5t ",rATIO" 'SNOr NEaJlA"lt't o\UTHOflHAT1VE of 1957, for example, a Communist army officer, General Afif Bizri, was ap­ pointed chief of staff with the backing of both parties. In the elections held in 1954, the Baath had won 17 parliament seats and the Communists only one-that held by Bakdash. But these figures did not fully re­ flect the strengths of the two parties; in fact, the Communist party's influence was considerably stronger than its nominal representation in the parliament. When in 1957 a number of by-elections were held, Baath candidates succeeded only be­ cause of the strong support given them by the Communists. Communist party cooperation with the Nasser-oriented Baath, identification with Pan-Arab objectives, submergence in the national community and de-emphasis of the class struggle were striking elements in the new Soviet doctrinal line toward the Third World, enunciated by Khrushchev at the 20th Congress of thc Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956. The new line, it will be recalled,2 (a) recog­ nized the existence of a third group of neutral nations (as opposed to the earlier Zhdanov doctrine of a strict Communist-non-Communist world dichotomy), (b) acknowledged the genuine independence of such Third World nations, (c) admit­ ted that the national bourgeoisie could have progressive economic policies, (d) called for creation of a national front to be composed of the Communists and allY group standing for independence and against imperialism, and (e) accepted the thesis that the overthrow of the bourgeoisie need not be accomplished by violent means, but could be effected by peaceful, including electoral, methods. This was the concept of so-called "national democracy" in the Third World countries, the still bourgeois-:-dominated but independent political systems which because of their neu­ tralism and anti-imperialism deserved support of the local Communist parties. Communist tactics and slogans were expected to overlap with the nationalist thrust of other political groups. Communist parties were enjoined to avoid isolation by deemphasizing class warfare and the ultimate dictatorship of the proletariat. Fur­ thermore, while lending support to nationalist groups, the Communists were not to alarm them by insisting on participation in the governments. Against this background of mixed Pan-Arab nationalism, Socialist revolutionism, and dissimulation of real Communist objectives, Syria entered her phase of close relations with the Soviet Union and the Communist bloc. Syrian nationalists and radicals sought to emulate Egypt in its defiance of the West and its assertion of national sovereignty. The first act of this emulation was the conclusion, in January 1956, of the Soviet-Syrian arms agreement. In the semi-conspiratorial style of Syrian politics (despite the existence of constitution, parliament, and multiparty system), the agreement was not made public." The first unofficial revelation of the deal in Syria came on September 5, when one of the SSNP leaders asserted that Syria's presi­ dent, Shukri al-Quwatli, had been forced to accept Soviet arms under leftist pres­ sure while simultaneously agreeing to give Communist and Socialist officers key military posts .. Further details of the arms purchase were apparently discussed in

2 See p. 13 above. 3 It was reported by Al-Ahram (Cairo) on February 19, 1956, as an agreement between Syria and Czechoslovakia. Thus the pattern followed here bore resemblance to the earlier arms deal with Egypt. (See p. 77 above.) 4 MEl, Vol. XI, No.1 (Winter 1957), p. 88.

104 the course of Ouwatli's visit to Moscow in early November, at the time of the Is­ raeli Sinai campaign. During that visit, public Soviet pledges to help preserve Syrian independence were followed by Ouwatli's statement that Syria had enough arms and that his Soviet trip was "more than successful." In a move parallel to its policy toward Egypt, the United States informed Syria on November 28 of its concern over the reported Soviet arms shipment. In re­ sponse, Foreign Minister Salaheddin aI-Bitar, a Baath leader, denied any arms shipments were coming from the U.S.S.R. and followed it up by sponsoring a tour of Syria for foreign correspondents, who admitted having found no evidence of Soviet arms. This mystifying hide-and-seek game was finally put to an end on December 10, 1956, by the chief of intelligence, Colonel Abdul Hamid Sarraj, who an­ nounced that Syria did indeed buy arms from the Soviet Union because "the West" imposed impossible conditions when approached on this matter. From that time on, the successive Syrian governments ceased denying the existence of Soviet arms deliveries. The timing, amounts, and kinds of weapons were, however, never officially revealed. As usual, supplies of arms led to cooperation in the training of Syrian personnel by Soviet and satellite experts, in both Syria and the countries of the Soviet bloc. They also led to occasional goodwill visits of Soviet naval units to Syrian ports. The first, by a cruiser and a destroyer, occurred in October 1957 in Lattakia. The Soviet-Syrian arms transactions had to be judged in the context of the gen­ eral political rapprochement between the two countries, which began before the Suez crisis and intensified during its aftermath. In June 1956 after his trip to Egypt, Soviet Foreign .Minister Dimitri Shepilov stopped off in Damascus, launch­ ing an exchange of visits by leaders of Syria and the Soviet Union. Ouwatli's trip to Moscow was an important part of this exchange. While an uneasy coalition of conservatives and radicals controlled Syria's gov­ ernment in 1956-57, it was the radicals, particularly the Baathists (supported by Communists), who set the general tone of foreign policy by stressing the popular themes of Pan-Arabism, defiance of the West, and friendship with the anti-Zionist oriented Soviet Union and East European countries. Even certain conservative oligarchs tended, for tactical reasons, to identify themselves with this trend. Syria's defense minister, millionaire Khaled al-Azm, on August 6, 1957, secured a much publicized Soviet pledge of extensive economic and military aid. On his way back from Moscow, Azm stopped in Prague, where he obtained additional assurances of economic assistance. Syrian-Czechoslovak co­ operation actually had begun earlier, in March 1957, when Czechoslovakia was given a contract to build a refinery in Horns. This award was beyond doubt politi­ cally motivated, having been granted in spite of the more attractive offers from Western firms. Following Azm's return, it was revealed that the Soviet Union had promised Syria a loan of $140 million. On October 29 the two governments signed a more specific economic agreement, calling for 19 development projects at a total cost of $579 million. This agreement was reached during a crisis in Turkish-Syrian relations, when both Syria and the Soviet Union loudly accused Turkey of concen­ trating troops on Syrian borders and threatening to intervene in Syria. Khrush­ chev's statements on October 7 and 9, 1957, warned the Turks against troop

105 movements, and these warnings were repeated in a note sent, to Ankara on No­ vember 25 by Soviet Premier Bulganin. While the facts regarding the Turkish mili­ tary movements with anti-Syrian implications have not been fully established, this controversy was fully exploited by the Soviet Union. It dovetailed neatly with the announcements of broadening Soviet-Syrian cooperation. Cultural and general psychological effects of Soviet-Syrian cooperation were not neglected. In March of 1956 Moscow announced the award of the Stalin Peace Prize to a Syrian religious leader, Sheikh Muhammad al-Ashmar, for his activity in favor of peace, This was one event in a worldwide campaign by the Soviet­ sponsored peace partisans organization, a Communist front which originated the so­ called Stockholm Peace AppeaI.S In the same month, the first issue of the French-language paper Syrie, organ of the Communist party, appeared in Damas­ cus. On August 20 a Syrian-Soviet cultural agreement was signed and in September a Soviet parliamentary delegation arrived in Syria's capital. Later that month a Syrian cultural delegation went to Moscow. These visits set the pattern for frequent exchanges between Syria and the Soviet bloc countries. In the summer of 1957 these exchanges reached the point of saturation: in the course of some three to four months, about 30 Soviet bloc missions-cultural, artistic, economic, and technical-visited Damascus. Moscow tried her utmost to maximize, to her own benefit, the estrangement of Arab nationalism from the West. The Soviet Union used two tactics: support of radical forces inside Syria, and intensive diplomatic and arms-and-aid activity.

The Period of Syro-Egyptian Union~ 1958-61 Union between Egypt and Syria, proclaimed in February 1958, was brought about largely on the initiative of the Syrian Baath party. While the party had preached Arab unity as one of its basic principles for a long time, its decision to press for the union was due to its fear of being overwhelmed by the Communists or ousted by the conservatives. The Communist danger appeared to the Baath leaders as a matter of immediate concern after substantial advances were made by the Communist party in Syria in 1956-57. With the appointment of the Communist, General Afif Bizri, as chief of staff in August of 1957, there was a possibility that Syria's military establishment might become a tool facilitating a Communist takeover. The conservatives shared the Baath party's late awakening to the Communist menace. But the conservative reaction to that menace could take one of two alternate roads: an attempt at a coup which, if successful, might remove from power all the radical elements, in­ cluding the Baath itself, or a tactical cooperation with the Baath, directed against the common Communist enemy. Obviously, the Baath preferred the latter altern a-

5 Sheikh al-Ashmar was extolled by Soviet media as an "ardent champion of peace" and identified as chairman of the Syrian Peace Committee and member of the World Peace Coun­ cil. The peace prize carried with it 100,000 rubles cash award, a diploma, and a gold medal embossed with Stalin's portrait. See New Times, No.1 (January 1, 1956). The prize was pre­ sented to al-Ashmar at a ceremony in the Soviet ElT'bassy in Damascus several weeks after Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin at the 20th Congress of the CPSU held in Moscow in February 1956. Apparently Soviet bureaucrats charged with the administration of the prize program had not yet received specific instructions to change the name of the prize. Later, its official designation was changed to the Lenin Peace Prize.

106 tive and, in the closing months of 1957, did its utmost to secure conservative co­ operation for a solution which appeared most practical under the circumstances: union with Egypt in the name of Arab nationalism, which meant securing Nasser's protection against a possible Communist takeover. This design was crowned with success. Although he was not quite ready for im­ mediate union, Nasser accepted the Syrian proposals under two conditions: (a) that all Syrian political parties be dissolved, and (b) that the unification of Syria and Egypt result in a unitary, rather than federal state. The thrust of these condi­ tions was to bring about an equalization of the political system in Syria and Egypt and to assure a centralized authority. In practice, it meant that Syria, by dismantling her multiparty system, would conform to Egypt's political structure. As could be expected, Syria's Communist response to these ideas was negative. On January 28, 1958, on the eve of the unification, Khaled Bakdash declared his opposition to the dissolution of the Communist party and, on the same day, he left in protest for Moscow, accompanied by other party leaders. Until that moment it had been possible for the Communists to support-largely for tactical reasons­ the slogans of Arab unity. Now, however, a choice had to be made between Arab unity plus suppression of the party, on the one hand, and Arab division plus free­ dom for the party on the other. The latter of course was chosen, and the pretense of combining Communist and Pan-Arab objectives had to be abandoned. It should be pointed out, however, that the Communist party was not the only loser in the union thus formed. The dissolution of all political parties affected not only the Communists but also the old "conventional" parties as well as the Baath. Moreover, it soon transpired that the union was not exactly equal, due to the pre­ ponderant size and power of Egypt and Nas'ser's centralized authority. Within a few months, political restlessness became evident in Syria. Not the least ingredient of this restlessness was the Baath party's disenchantment with its diminishing role in the United Arab Republic. Under the circumstances, the Communist party, though formally dissolved, felt that it could advance certain ideas likely to evoke a general positive response while at the same time assuring direct benefits to itself. Khaled Bakdash described these ideas in an article published in 1959: In the autumn of 1958, a few months after unification, when Syria experienced economic and political difficulties, the Communist party ad­ vanced a political platform which could be a sound basis for developing the United Arab Republic. The platform proposed the setting up of separate governments for the Syrian and Egyptian areas (side by side with the central government of the United Arab Republic which would concern itself with defense, foreign policy, and other questions of common interest); the establish­ ment of economic relations between Syria and Egypt on a basis which would further the economic, primarily the industrial, development of both areas; free elections; safeguards for freedom of speech, the press, assembly, political parties, trade unions and peasant organizations; an extensive agrarian reform which would guarantee land and implements to the landless peasants. 6

6 Khaled Bakdash, ''Two Trends in the Arab National Movement," The World Marxist Review, Vol. II, No. 11 (November 1949).

107 Nasser, of course, was not receptive to these proposals and, inevitably, tension developed between him and the Communists in Syria. In December 1958, Egyptian­ directed security forces made a number of arrests among Syrian Communists. On December 23 Nasser angrily accused Syrian Communists of being enemies of the D.A.R. and of Arab nationalism and appointed a three-man reform committee to deal with the Communist problem. Three days later, he was followed by Syria's security chief, Colonel Sarraj, who called the Communists "mouthpieces of enemies of Arab nationalism." The Communist press organ, Al-Nur, was closed on govern­ ment orders; and on December 28 Bakdash secretly left Syria for the Soviet Union and the countries of the Soviet bloc, in a self-imposed exile that was to last a num­ ber of years. Nasser's anti-Communist measures in Syria evoked an irritated response from Khrushchev who, on January 27, 1959, warned the U.A.R. not to persecute Com­ munists, "the most steadfast supporters of the Arabs against imperialism." This statement touched off a series of angry public exchanges between the two leaders. On March 14, on a visit to Damascus, Nasser declared in a major speech: "Where there is a Communist party, it operates under the word 'democracy' and when it succeeds, it works for the red dictatorship." Two days later, Premier Khrushchev responded in a speech in Moscow that Nasser's anti-Communist policy was "doomed to failure." Khrushchev warned against trying to force a union of Iraq and the U.A.R. On the same day, Nasser accused Khrushchev of "distorting facts," asserting that "we do not interfere in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union or support a faction of it against another faction." On March 19, Khrush­ chev in a press interview in Moscow called Nasser "a rather hot-headed young man" who "took upon himself more than his stature permitted" in attacking com­ munism in the Middle East. This again drew a response from Nasser who, on March 20, in a speech in Damascus, denounced Khrushchev for "interference in our affairs" and promised to "crush" the Communists in the U.A.R. as "agents" of a foreign power. He amplified his declarations upon his return to Cairo on March 30 by declaring that an elected parliament in the Soviet Union was "dismissed in 1917, and now they are governed by the Communist party where no one has the chance to speak except the Communists." 7 The verbal duel was concluded by an exchange of notes between Khrushchev and Nasser on April 20 and May 14. On May 18 Nasser revealed that Khrush­ chev had given him "rcnewed assurances" of noninterference in Arab affairs. Rec­ onciliation between the two leaders was apparently effected on Nasser's terms. Not only did the U .A.R. authorities, both in Egypt and in Syria, not relax their domes­ tic anti-Communist measures, but they actually intensified them, dismissing Communists from the armed forces and applying other curbs. This campaign was dramatized by the flight of Syria's General Afif Bizri to Iraq on June 1. Iraq at that time was undergoing a strong upsurge in Communist influence under Premier Kassem's protection. This explains why, at a mid-March conference of 42 Commu­ nist parties in Warsaw, the exiled Khaled Bakdash not only attacked Nasser but also praised Iraq as "the unconquered bastion of the Arab nationalist movement."

7 Summary in MEl, Vol. XIII, No.3 (Summer 1959). For fuller quotations from Nasser's speeches, see p. 87, n. 13, above.

108 On September 27, 1959, in Peking at the tenth anniversary celebration of Com­ munist China, Bakdash again attacked the U.A.R. Cairo protested to Peking and temporarily recalled its diplomatic representative. Furthermore, according to Syrian press reports, Bakdash was to be tried in absentia on charges of "high treason and intriguing against the U.A.R. and Syrian-Egyptian unity." The official anti­ Communist campaign seemed to have reached its final stage toward the end of 1959 when it was reported that the security organs had "smashed" a number of youth cells representing the last Communist organization in Syria. 8 It was characteristic of Soviet policy in the Khrushchev era that, despite the irri­ tations caused by the anti-Communist domestic policies of the U.A.R., Moscow did not relent in its efforts to secure a techno-economic foothold in both Egypt and Syria. In fact, throughout 1960, the year following imposition of drastic curbs on Syrian communism, the Soviet Union stepped up its aid-and-trade policy to­ ward Syria, particularly in mineral and petroleum exploration. On February 16, 1960, TASS announced that Soviet teams had begun exploratory activity for oil in Syria. In the spring of that year comprehensive negotiations with a Soviet eco­ nomic mission in Damascus reviewed all projects covered by the 1957 Soviet­ Syrian agreement. In mid-September, the chairman of Syria's Executive Council, Dr. Nureddin Kahhalah, announced a new Soviet pledge of several loans totaling 275 million rubles to finance the previously agreed projects.

Syria's Secessionist Regime, 1961·63 Syria abruptly withdrew from its union with Egypt in September 1961. This was followed by a period of political turmoil. Parliamentary democracy was for­ mally restored, but the struggle for power intensified, and competing factions often used nondemocratic methods. Authorities then in power represented a coalition, but it was dominated by the Syria-first conservatives of the pre-union era. The coalition conducted a rather hesitant domestic policy, ostensibly dedicated to the revival of a full-fledged multiparty system, but actually fearful of releasing various nonconformist centrifugal forces. The government obviously was reluctant to begin licensing political parties. Thus the Syrian Communist Party-one of those groups which re-emerged from obscurity after the removal of Egyptian-imposed controls-found itself in a twi­ light zone between legality and illegality. As a political party, it hoped to reassert its presence in Syria's political life on a par with other parties. But lack of formal permission to resume its activities kept it somewhat in check. Indicative of this ambiguous situation was the position of the party's leader, Khaled Bakdash. In November 1961, less than two months after the secession from Egypt, Bakdash made an attempt to return to Syria, but he was forbidden to land in Damascus by the newly established government. In May of 1962, in response to a query, the then Premier Bashir Azmeh declared that the ban on Bakdash was still in force. The Soviet Union officially recognized Syria's secession from the United Arab

8 For an adverse Soviet reaction to these measures, see Pravda, October 24, 1959. Basing its article on reports from L'Unita, organ of the Italian C.P., the Soviet paper stated: "Following the so-called 'tria! of the 64,' the 'trial of 48' is now in progress there. The persons on trial are a small part of the 15,000 democrats and Communists who were arrested in January and March of 1959 and thrown into the torture chambers where prisoners are cruelly tortured." (Quoted by The Current Digest af the Soviet Press, Vol. XI, No. 43, November 25, 1959).

109 Republic on October 7, 1961, and in November appointed an ambassador to Da­ mascus. Moscow thus risked Cairo's displeasure and a possible adverse reaction from broader Pan-Arab circles. But the risk was worth taking because it was hardly conccivable that Nasser would be willing, as a possible reprisal, to stop the flow of Soviet aid-and-trade toward Egypt. Furthermore, it was important from the Soviet point of view not to lose its foothold in Syria. Separation of Syria opened a renewed opportunity to deal with the Syrian government without Cairo's interfer­ ence and to expand such gains as had been secured or confirmed during the pre­ vious, more difficult, period of the union. For all these reasons, Soviet diplomacy in Damascus resumed an active role de­ spite the conservative leanings of Syria's resurrected national leadership. The Syrians were willing to respond positively to renewed Soviet advances for two rea­ sons: (a) they welcomed assistance, almost regardless of origin, which was likely to strengthen Syria's position against a possible attempt at forcible reunification with Egypt; (b) by dealing with the Soviet Union they demonstrated to their left­ leaning and Pan-Arab opposition that Syria's separation from Egypt did not entail dependence on the Western "imperialist" camp. By mid-1962, Soviet-Syrian con­ tacts were not only resumed but were being expanded. In July, the Soviet Union agreed to build three agricultural research facilities for Syria. In August, a new Soviet-Syrian cultural agreement was signed to replace the earlier pact of 1957. In September, a Syrian military delegation, headed by the chief of staff, General Namik Kamal, paid a three-week visit to Moscow to review and renegotiate Soviet arms assistance to Syria. And in mid-October, Syria's Foreign Minister Asad Mu­ hasin announced that the Soviet Union might finance the Euphrates Dam project, which until then had been the subject of negotiations with West Germany. It was characteristic of Syria's political process that, repeatedly, major moves to­ ward closer Syrian-Soviet economic collaboration were made by Syria's conserva­ tive leaders, who were motivated not by ideological but by internal tactical consid­ erations. Since mid-September 1962, secessionist Syria's premier was that same landowning man of wealth, Khaled al-Azm, who had been the architect of the first major aid agreements with the Soviet Union in 1957. Under the circumstances it was not surprising when, early in December, Azm announced that Communist China had offered "huge financial and economic aid" to Syria. By accepting Chinese aid, Syria's government not only stressed its neutrality in the ideological dispute then developing between Moscow and Peking, but also implied its freedom of action vis-a.-vis the U.S.S.R., despite large amounts of Soviet assistance being sent to Syria. As if further to emphasize the purely economic nature of relations with the two major Communist states, a Syrian delegation headed by Subhi Kahhalah, minister of communications, traveled, early in 1963, to both Moscow and Peking on one continuous trip. Most of the delegation's time-some two weeks-was spent in China. Despite the publicity given the offer of Chinese aid, however, it did not amount to much in practice. Peking provided only a $16 million credit which re­ mained largely unutilized because, according to a Chinese diplomatic defector in 1966, "what the Syrians wanted we could not supply." 9

9 Miao Chen-pal, former Chinese aide in Syria, in an interview with Wall Street Journal, September 19, 1966.

110 Baath Rule, 1963.66 The coup that brought the Baath party to power on March 8, 1963, posed a new set of problems for both the Syrian Communists and the Soviet government. The Communist party feared the advent of the Baath, knowing it to be hostile to Communist influence. The Baath was better organized, and more intolerant of dis­ sent than its predecessor secessionist regime, even though the latter was under a conservative leadership. These fears were confirmed when, on March 13, barely five days after the coup, Damascus radio warned that the government would "crush" Communists and other enemies of the revolution without mercy. Further­ more, the Pan-Arab oriented Baath was expected to reopen the question of unity with Egypt, thus reviving the specter of strict Egyptian-directed curbs on commu­ nism. Restoration of Syro-Egyptian unity proved to be, however, only an illusory dan­ ger to the Communists. Persistent mutual distrust between the Baath and Nasser (dating back to 1958-59) rendered all efforts in that direction fruitless. One of the most important attempts was made in April 1963, at tripartite unity negotiations conducted in Cairo by Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, the latter also under a Baath gov­ ernment since February 8, 1963. Notwithstanding the signing of a formal federa­ tive agreement, the Syrian and Egyptian governments viewed each othcr with sus­ picion, well substantiated by Nasserite attempts to overthrow the Syrian Baath regime twice within a few months after its advent to power. Under the circum­ stances, the mediation effort by the Iraqi Baath in August proved to be of no avail and the projected federation remained in limboY' Thus Syria remained both independent and Socialist. Simultaneously, Egypt en­ larged the public sector of its economy following the initial series of nationalization decrees of July 1961. With the enactment of nationalization measures in Iraq (July 1964) and Syria (January-May 1965), the three leading revolutionary countries in the Arab East clearly entered the phase of "Arab socialism." Soviet reaction to this trend was to adopt ideology to the new reality. The new line was to proclaim the doctrine of "revolutionary democracy." First expounded by Khrushchev in a foreign press interview in December 1963, the new doctrine was a logical extension of the previous doctrine of "national democracy." Its main features, it will be recalled,l1 were: (a) positive acknowledgment of the "non­ capitalist path of development" followed by certain Third World countries, with an attendant proffer of Soviet assistance, and (b) encouragement of local Communist parties to assist in this development process by participating in the governments or ruling parties, either through united fronts or as individuals, if official party partici­ pation was impossible or inadvisable. Thus, in effect, Syria'S Communist party was enjoined to reconcile itself with the Baath-dominated regime, to support its socialist policies, and to establish, if possible, a collaborative relationship on an organized or individual basis. As we know from the preceding chapter, the Egyptian Communist Party faced a similar

10 Mutual distrust between the Baath and Nasser has been clearly revealed in subsequently published documents on the tripartite negotiations in Cairo. See "Minutes of the Tripartite Union," Arab Political Documents, 1963, op. cit., pp. 75ff. 11 See p. 19 above. 111 situation and, given a disproportion between its own strength and Nasser's regime, it chose dissolution and support of "Arab socialism" through individual participa­ tion. But what was acceptable to the local Communists (and to Moscow) in the Egyptian context was only partly acceptable to the local Communist leadership in Syria. The Syrian Communist Party was willing to go along with Moscow's in­ junction to respond positively to the non-capitalist path of development launched by the Baath party.12 A leading party member, Ahmad Chagouri, made this clear in a statem0nt published in February 1965, right after the first wave of Syrian na­ tionalizations.13 Similarly, the party accepted the idea of participation in a united front. H But the party's chief leader, Bakdash, strongly objected to two proposi­ tions implied in the new Soviet doctrine: (a) glorification of the oppressive Baath-military dictatorship as "socialism" and (b) dissolution of the party and replacement of its group identity with individual Communist participation in the ruling establishment. He gave forceful expression to these reservations in Decem­ ber 1965: The Soviet Union and other socialist countries pursue a policy of alli­ ance with these [Third World nations] against imperialism and for peace and help them to achieve economic independence. But this does not mean that the Communist parties and the democratic forces generally must under all circumstances support the governments and renounce the fight for democratic freedoms, for the workers' and the peasants' demands, and against the negative aspects and deficiencies of their foreign policies. The Seventh Congress [of the Communist International], while putting forward the united front tactic, called for safeguarding the integrity of the Communist parties, preserving their independence, and strengthening their ranks. This is not to say that we Communists do not recognize the role of the other revolutionary forces advocating socialism. On the con­ trary, we call for the unity of all these forces in order to combat the intrigues of imperialism and the reactionaries at home. But this unity cannot be based on the disbandment of the Communist parties or in their being dissolved into other parties.'5 On the government level, collaboration between the Soviet Union and Syria con­ tinued, but did not assume spectacular proportions. In June 1964, the Soviet Union signed a contract for the construction of 43 oil storage tanks in Damascus, Lattakia, Horns, and Aleppo, and in February 1965 the two governments con­ cluded an agreement for Soviet delivery of machines and equipment for a steel rail factory and a railroad assembly plant. No progress was registered regarding the Euphrates Dam project, except for a statement made in November by the Syrian minister of information that the U.S.S.R. would enjoy priority if it wished to assist

12 Since the nationalization decrees of December 1964-January 1965, Soviet commentators have praised Syria's regime as following the "non-capitalist road to development." See N. Smetanin, "A Step in the Direction of Progress," Prm'da, January 10, 1965, and V. Alexeyev, "Lllportant Step of Nationalization," Izvestia, January to, 1965. 13 "Syrian Communist Party Supports Nationalization," World Marxist Review, Vol. VIII, No.2 (February 1965). 14 Ahmad Chagouri, "Syria: For Unity of the Left," World Marxist Review. Vol. VIII, No.7 (July 1965). 15 Khaled Bakdash, "The National Liberation Movement and the Communists," World Marxist Review, VoL VIII, No. 12 (December 1965).

112 in the project. In fact, Syrian-Soviet relations appeared to have reached a slow­ down stage, in which routine functions were maintained but no significant new de­ velopments were planned. Syria did enter into closer relations with another Communist country, East Ger­ many. In 1965 East Germany provided Syria with an expert to reorganize the Finance Ministry "so that it may conform to the present phase of socialist evolu­ tion." A protocol for trade and technology exchange, an agreement providing for a $25 million East German loan for development projects, and another protocol pledging East German expert advice on reorganization of various Syrian ministries were steps in this steadily developing relationship, symbolized by elevation of East German representation in Damascus to the rank of consulate-general.

The Left-Wing Baath Period, 1966·70 The coup of February 23, 1966, which brought to power the left-wing group centered in the Regional (Syrian) Command of the Baath under the leadership of General Salah Jadid,16 opened a new chapter in Syrian-Soviet relations, with re­ percussions affecting the Syrian Communist Party. On the internal political level, the new era was marked by the re-emergence of the Communist party from obscurity into a virtually open and semi-legal existence. It participated in the government and opened a dialogue with the Baath, prelimiw nary to formation of a united front. There were two reasons for this more tolerant attitude toward communism: (a) there was a greater ideological affinity between the leftwwing Baath and the Communists than when the right-wing (or moderate) Baath leadership of Aflaq and Bitar was in power; (b) the Soviet Union influ­ enced some of these decisions. Soviet influence could be explained as follows: the left-wing Baath, preaching as it did "scientific socialism," was anxious to secure Soviet aid in the building of the Euphrates Dam, a spectacular project which was likely to enhance the regime's prestige at home and abroad. For this reason, both the Soviet Union and Syria were receptive to an early round of negotiations on a wide spectrum of economic and technical subjects. Such negotiations did begin within three weeks after the February 26 coup. A large Soviet delegation arrived in Damascus. Among them were several oil experts. According to one source, the Soviet negotiators put three conditions on their proffered assistance in the construction of the dam: (a) that the exiled Communist leader, Bakdash, be allowed to return to Syria; (b) that a

16 According to its constitution, the Baath party possessed at its apex the National (Pan· Arab) Command, emanating from the National Congress, and Regional Commands emanat­ ing from Regional Congresses, the latter corresponding to countries ("regions") such as Syria, Iraq, Jordan, etc. Before the coup of 1966, Baath policies in Syria were strongly influenced by the National (Pan-Arab) Command which, in turn, followed a more moderate orientation, while rallying around the party founders, Salaheddin ai-Bitar and Michel Aflaq (although Afiaq exerted only a remote influence, being absent from Syria for long periods of time). The more radical elements-such as General Salah ladid, Dr. Nureddin Atassi, Dr. Yusuf Zuayyen, and Dr. Ibrahim Makhous (the latter two veterans of the Algerian war of independence)­ clustered in and around the Regional Syrian Command. It is they who seized power in Febru­ ary 1966 by resorting to violence against their more moderate comrades.

113 Communist be appointed to a cabinet post; and (c) that the regime permit the Communist newspaper, Sawt al-Shaab, to be published in DamascusY Authentic documentation that these conditions were indeed put by the Soviet Union is not available. However, the fact remains that all three measures were taken by the new Syrian regime, thus providing a thaw in the Syrian-Soviet rela­ tions. On April 13, four weeks after the arrival of the Soviet delegation, Khaled Bakdash was permitted to return to Syria. A Communist party member, Sami Ati­ yah, was appointed minister of communications and a Communist sympathizer (or possibly a member), Ahmad Murad, was givcn the portfolio of national econ­ omy. And the Sawt al-Shaab received permission to be published. Bakdash cautiously approved these changes in Syria. In a number of oral and written statements, he accepted cooperation with the Baath and conceded that the "progressive military" constituted one of the "basic revolutionary forces" in the Arab world. He also acknowledged that the Baath military regime was pursuing the path of non-capitalist development, and that it was absorbing many ideas of "scientific socialism." At the same time, however, he warned that unity of revolu­ tionary forces "did not require one to forsake one ideology [i.e., Communist] and adopt another [i.e., Baathist]". He refused to accept a secondary role for the Communists in the revolutionary process. He insisted on the "vanguard of the pro­ letariat" remaining in the lead. And he expressed regret that the regime was coop­ erating with individual Communists and not with the party as such. He further de­ plored the lack of "democratic freedoms" in Syria which deprived the Communists of freedom of action. He reminded his readers of the old but always valid principle, formulated by Lenin in 1920, that the Communist parties "must enter into temporary alliance with bourgeois democracy in the colonies and backward countries, but should not merge with it and should under all circumstances uphold the independence of the proletarian movement even if it is in its most embryonic form." 18 In spite of all the compliments paid the Baath and the military as "progressive" and "revolutionary," they were still considered by Bakdash to be a bourgeois grouping with which genuine merger was rejected. This, however, did not prevent him from advocating that the Baath regime should strive for even closer relations with the Soviet Union or other countries of the "socialist" camp to achieve eco­ nomic independence from the West.'!! Whereas Bakdash's wish for a relaxation of curbs on the party activity was only partly met, his advocacy of closer relations with the Soviet Union was largely satis­ fied. During the period of left-wing Baath ascendancy, these relations expanded significantly not only in the economic sector but in the political sphere as well. Construction of the Euphrates Dam, exploration and development of the oil re­ sources, infrastruetural projects such as steel-processing facilities enhanced Syrian-

"Milorad M. Drachkovitch, ed., Yearbook of International Communist Affairs, 1966 (Stanford, Calif,; Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, 1967), pp, 285-90. Simi­ lar conditions (with the addition of the purge of the Syrian military intelligence and dismissal of Generals Fahd al·Shaer and Hamed Obeid) mentioned by AI-Nadwah (Mecca), June 28, 1966. IS Quotations in this paragraph are from statements by Rakdash in Akhbar at-Yaum (Cairo), November 12, 1966, and from his article "Problems of the National-Liberation Movement in Syria," World Marxist Review, VoL XI, No.6 (June 1968). 19 World Marxist Review, op. cit.

114 Soviet economic relations. Syrian Premier Dr. Yusuf Zuayyen and a delegation of 28 experts visited Moscow in April 1966 to pave the way for a series of agree­ ments covering these projects. Other highlights of this economic cooperation in­ cluded a £ 1 million agreement on the first stage of the Euphrates Dam on Decem­ ber 18, 1966; an agreement on Soviet aid for Syrian oil-gathering facilities in Suwaidiyeh, Karachuk, and Rumailan on November 1, 1967; and a further pledge of Soviet assistance, given on August 13, 1969, to develop the Jezira province oil fields and establish oil research laboratories. Simultaneously, technical assistance and credits were sought and obtained from the more industrialized Soviet bloc countries: in November 1966, Poland undertook to construct a steel-rolling mill in Rama; in December of that year Czechoslovakia pledged assistance in extending the capacity of the oil refinery in Horns, which had been built by a Czechoslovak state firm. In April 1967, the Syrians accepted a Communist Chinese offer to es­ tablish a £ 1.3 million fine-yarn factory. The left-wing Baath rule led also to a closer political relationship with the So­ viet Union. 20 This could be partly attributed to the ideological affinity between the two governments, but even more so to the deterioration of Syria's relations with the West. The aggravated situation between Israel and the Arabs, culminating as it did in the June 1967 war, constituted the central ingredient in Syria's further cs­ trangement from the West. In her policy of friendly overtures to the Arabs, the Soviet Union revived her verbal support for the principle of Arab unity, a support which, as we know, suf­ fered an eclipse during the period of the Syro-Egyptian union, 1958-61. This time, Soviet support was geared to the new concepts of unity propagated in the Arab world, namely that unity should be preceded by internal-presumably revolution­ ary--changes in the Arab states. The internal reforms were to assure a socio­ political uniformity in the political systems about to be united. Echoing this trend, Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin urged, in a speech to the U.A.R. National Assembly on May 17, 1966, a united front of four "progressive" Arab states: the U.A.R., Syria, Algeria, and Iraq. The Soviet Union's past record in this respect gave cause to doubt whether her leaders desired full Arab unity. In all probability, a coordi­ nation of efforts which Kosygin called "united front" was the optimum desired by the Russians. Full unity, by contrast, would conceivably revive the disadvantages suffered by both the Soviet Union and the local Communists at the time of the Syro-Egyptian union. Elaborating on this theme a few months later, Syria's Khaled Bakdash said states about to unite should first achieve similar social and economic status. He cautioned, however, that unity should be based on the federative princi­ ple, with "no interference on the part of one member in the internal affairs of another." 21

eo Positive Soviet attitude toward the Syrian left-wing Baath was expressed in V. Sinelnikov, "Downfall of Right-Wing Baathists in Syria. Progressive Principles in Syrian Government Pol­ icy," Pravda, February 8, 1965. Similarly, I. Belyayev, Pravda, May 16, 1965, and Yeo Primakov, Pravda, October 24, 1965. See also "Results of the Plenary Session of the Syrian C.P. Central Committee" Pravda. July 21, 1965 (the latter article reproduced in The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XVII, No. 29 [August 11, 1965]). For a comprehensive review of Syria's political evolution from the Communist point of view, see Tom Foley, "Syria and the Middle East," Political Affairs (Theoretical Journal of the Communist Party, USA), Vol. XLVII, No. 12 (December 1968), pp. 47-56. 21 Aklzbar al-Yaum, op. cit.

115 Friendlier relations on the government level led, in due course, to an interesting innovation: establishment of direct contacts between the two ruling parties of Syria and the Soviet Union. In January 1967 a high-level Baath party delegation, led by General Salah Jadid, journeyed to the Soviet Union as a guest of the So­ viet Communist party. The visit coincided with a crisis in the relations between Syria and the Western-owned Iraq Petroleum Company whose pipeline, traversing Syria's territory, was temporarily shut down by the Syrian government. Upon their return from the Soviet Union the Baath delegates declared they had received "sup­ port for Syria's struggle against petroleum monopolies." 22 A few months later, the Arab-Israeli war and its aftermath provided an even firmer platform for the growth of the Syrian-Soviet friendship. In the first place, Soviet and Syrian roles in the developments leading to an outbreak of the war were closely interwoven. Syria's propaganda offensive which criticized Nasser for hiding behind the U.N. Emergency Force (UNEF)-a force stationed on the Egyptian side of the U.A.R.-Israeli border-may have influenced Nasser's decision to remove the UNEF from the U.A.R. territory. On the other hand, the Soviet Union contributed to the conflict by informing Nasser of an alleged impending Is­ raeli attack on Syria. The war, in which Israel invaded and captured the Golan Heights of Syria after the ceasefire was decreed by the U.N. Security Council, gave renewed opportunity for the Soviet Union to side emphatically with Syria. The period preceding and fol­ lowing the war abounded in high-level visits between the Syrian and Soviet leaders. On May 29, on the eve of the war, Syria's president, Dr. Nureddin Atassi, paid a visit to Moscow. Between July 1 and 3, Soviet President Nicolai Podgorny visited Damascus, accompanied by the first deputy minister of defense, General Soko­ lov, and in August and again in October Syria's defense minister, General Hafez Assad, made trips to Moscow to confer with the Soviet defense minister, Marshal Grechko. The obvious purpose of these visits was to negotiate re-equipment of the Syrian army with Soviet weapons after the losses sustained in the June war. Within

ZZ MEl, Vol. XXI, No.2 (Spring 1967). p. 250. In July of 1969 a similar journey was un­ dertaken to Moscow by a Syrian Baath party mission. The official communique stressed the primacy of the party-to-party contact in the following words: "A government and party dele­ gation from the Syrian Arab Republic, headed by Dr. Nureddin Atassi, Secretary General of the Arab Baath Socialist Party, head of state and Prime Minister, began an official visit to the Soviet Union in the period between July 3 and 11 at the invitation of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist party, the Supreme Soviet, and the Soviet government .... The Syr­ ian side informed the Soviet leaders about the activity of the Arab Baath Socialist Party and the Syrian government in the field of realizing the socialist transformation and Arab unity ... . "During the discussions, Soviet Communist party leaders informed Dr. Nureddin Atassi ... . about the results and resolutions of the conference of world Communist parties held in Moscow recently. The two sides consider that this conference will play an important role in the struggle against imperialism and colonialism and in consolidating world peace." TASS Ar­ abic Service, quoted by AWW, July 19, 1969. The Baath party delegation's visits to Moscow at the invitation of the Communist party of the Soviet Union-in due course followed by similar visits by the ruling parties' missions from other Arab radical countries-reflected a new tactical line which was formally confirmed by Leonid Brezhnev at the 24th CPSU Congress on March 30, 1971. Said Brezhnev: "Com­ rades, in the struggle against imperialism an ever greater role is being played by the revolu­ tionary-democratic parties, many of which have proclaimed socialism as their programme goal. The CPSU has been actively developing its ties with them. We are sure that cooperation between such parties and the Communist parties, including those in their own countries, fully meets the interests of the anti-imperialist movement, the strengthening of national independ­ ence and the course of social progress." New Times, No. 15, April 14, 1971, p. 31.

116 a few months, this objective was attained: not only were the losses replaced and upgraded, but the supplies exceeded the prewar armaments level. Massive economic, technical, and arms aid given Syria by the Soviet Union and other countries of the Soviet bloc left Syria heavily dependent on the Soviet Union. Syria's dependence was probably more pronounced than that of the U.A.R., which maintained a few outlets to the West, and of Iraq with its Western-managed oil wealth. Syria, moreover, accentuated her alienation from the West by refusing to accept pro forma the peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict as envisaged by the U.N. resolution of November 22, 1967. She also continued to preach revo­ lutionary war of national liberation, aiming at the recovery of the whole territory of Palestine-and hence the destruction of Israel-not recovery merely of the areas occupied by Israel during the June war. Her intransigent policy led her to support, more than any other Arab state, the Palestinian guerrilla organizations. One of these-al-Saiqa-was directly sponsored by the Syrian Baath authorities and oper­ ated under the supervision of General Salah Jadid and, eventually, Dr. Yusuf Zu­ ayyen, after he was divested of the premiership in the spring of 1969. Syria's militant attitude deviated somewhat from Soviet policy on the Arab-Israeli conflict. The differences could be narrowed down to three principal points: (a) in contrast to the Soviet Union which had voted for the November 1967 Security Council resolution, Syria rejected it; (b) while Syria actively assisted the feday­ een, the Soviet Union gave them only limited and indirect support, at times mixed with criticism; (c) the Soviet Union's general objective of obtaining a U.N.­ sponsored settlement, avoiding excessive entanglement which might lead to a new war, and opening the Suez Canal, did not square with Syria's maximalist stance. To the extent that Syria's policies maintained tension in the area and cultivated an anti-American spirit in the Arab nationalist circles, they were welcomed by the Soviet Union. But an excessive belligerency which might result in reopening major hostilities with Israel was not deemed to be in the Soviet Union's interest. The So­ viet Union, in fact, sent a message of moderation, which was conveyed indirectly through Czechoslovakia, warning Syria, Iraq, and the U.A.R. in April 1969 against attempts to revive the war. ~3 The warning was understood to be accompanied by reduction of arms shipments, presumably by Czechoslovakia. Soviet influence in Syria reached a zenith in 1968. In that year, the Euphrates Dam project was inaugurated, a regular sea cargo service between Syria and the Soviet Union began, and, on the occasion of Marshal Grechko's talks with the Syr­ ians in Damascus in March, a squadron of Soviet bombers paid a week-long good­ will visit to Syria.

The Assad Regime: a Cautious Turn Toward Moderation However, in that same year the Baath leadership's growing dependence on the Soviet Union began to encounter some opposition within Syria's ruling establish­ ment. The main critic was General Hafez Assad, minister of defense and com­ mander of the Air Force. He was reported to have criticized the neglect of military preparedness by the civilian leadership of the Baath party, its undue preoccupation with economic development at a time when Syria was threatened by Israel, and its

23 "Three Arab Countries Warned," The New York Times, April 22, 1969.

117 exaggerated support of the fedayeen at the expense of the regular army. The ensu­ ing struggle between Assad, representing the military wing in the Baath, and the party's civilian or "ideological" group, resulted in Assad's ascent to power, exe­ cuted in two stages. In March 1969 at a regional (Syrian) Baath congress, Assad secured partial approval of his views and removal from key positions in the gov­ ernment of his rivals, including Premier Zuayyen. In November 1970 he seized power, placed his opponents, among them President Atassi and General Salah J adid, under arrest, and assumed the position of premier in addition to his pre­ vious functions. 24 Assad's seizure of power must be equated neither with an anti-Soviet turn of Syria's policy nor with the repudiation of the Baath as a ruling party in Syria. He clearly identified himself with the party and, instead of destroying it, reconstituted it under a new Provisional Regional (Syrian) Command. But, in contrast to the left-wing ideological orientation of his deposed rivals, Assad had a reputation of being pragmatic in both domestic and foreign issues. One example of his independ­ ent thinking was his decision to send his close associate, the chief of staff, Gen­ eral Mustafa Tlas, to Communist China in May 1969 to secure arms which he felt were being supplied in inadequate quantities by the Soviet Union. The visit re­ sulted in a reported Chinese pledge in July to deliver to Syria between $10 million and $15 million worth of armaments. Because of his pragmatic inclination, Assad was reported to favor a more open policy toward the West, in the hope of obtain­ ing military or economic aid from whatever quarter it might be available. His pri­ mary objective was to strengthen Syria vis-a.-vis Israel. In contrast to his predeces­ sors who openly disagreed with the U.A.R. on certain policies, Assad moved early to assert his solidarity with Cairo and to obtain Syria's admission to the newly proclaimed federative agreement between the U.A.R., Libya, and the Sudan.25 In­ asmuch as all these states depend in varying but substantial degrees on Soviet as­ sistance, military, technical or economic, closer relations with them could obviously not be interpreted as an anti-Soviet turn of Syrian policy. But rapproche­ ment with those three states put an end to Syria's isolation which had forced greater dependence on Soviet goodwill. There were indications of serious Soviet concern over General Tlas' visit to China in 1969, but the Soviet Union remained officially uncommitted and some­ what inscrutable after the overt seizure of power by General Assad. Perhaps the most accurate indication of its attitude came indirectly, through a statement issued by the Syrian Communist Party in December 1970. Initially, the party had reacted with hostility to Assad's takeover, afraid that he might launch an anti-Communist drive. Assad, however, relieved the party's anxiety by appointing two Communists to his cabinet, ~

21 On March 12, 1971, General Assad was elected President of the RepUblic, and on April 3 he reconstituted the cabinet, naming General Abdur Rahman Khlaifawi premier. 2" The road toward the federation was marked by the following diplomatic acts: (1) Tripoli declaration of December 27, 1969, by President Gamal Abdul Nasser of the UAR, Gen. Jaafar Numeiri of Sudan, and. Col. Muammar al-Qadhafi of Libya, establishing a tripartite alliance and a revolutionary Arab front; (2) Cairo agreement of November 8, 1970, among the UAR, Libya, and Sudan, pledging to "stablish a federation; (3) Syria's adherence to the Cairo agreement, November 27, 1970; (4) Benghazi proclamation of the Federation of Arab Repub­ lics, April 17, 1971, issued by the UAR, Libya, and Syria (Sudan abstaining temporarily). 26 Yusuf Faisal, Minister of State, and Omar Sibai, Minister of Communications.

118 a broad political basis. This move was probably made for tactical reasons. Assad had to protect himself against the immediate main danger of a possible counter­ coup by his deposed adversaries in the Baath. To quarrel with the Communists at that time would have been impractical. This being the case, the Communist party felt that it was preferable to accept Assad's proffer of cooperation at its face value rather than to probe his sincerity. The Syrian Communist Party's statement reflected this attitude. "The party," it said, "stands by the principles of February 23, [1966, when the left-wing Baath overthrew the right-wing Baath] and cooperates with all progressive nationalist forces in a progressive front." The party's alliance "with the Baathist left was and still is the proper alignment," the statement went on. It paid Assad a compliment by saying that "the declaration announced by the Provisional Regional Command as its working platform is an excellent program and all progressive national forces should rally round it so that it may be carried out." And it concluded with refer­ ence to its role in Assad's cabinet: The Communist party, when it takes part in a government, never does it with the idea that this participation is an end in itself. It rather looks at this participation as a form of struggle which it must undertake in defense of the national rights and progressive achievements of the people and in an endeavor to bring about the participation of the masses of the workers and peasants, tradesmen, revolutionary intellectuals, students, soldiers and their party and popular organizations in the direction of the affairs of the country, to achieve popular democracy and to create pop­ ular and official institutions. The Syrian Communist Party at the meeting of its Central Com­ mittee has decided to participate with two ministers in the Syrian govern­ ment which was formed after the recent crisis in the Baath Party. In taking this position, the Communist party is not under any delusion concerning the existence of clements having rightist or suspicious ideas or tendencies .... That, however, does not prevent it from taking part in the cabinet. We must, on the basis of the declaration of the Provisional Regional Command and on the basis of the progressive national forces included in the cabinet, cooperate with it. The Syrian Communist Party . . . will work so that the four-power federation of the U.AR., Libya, Sudan, and Syria may march down the road to success and be transformed into reality as an active means for bringing together the material and spiritual energies and capabilities of these countries in their struggle against imperialism, Zionism, and reaction." 27 Soviet influence in Syria has been aided by three factors: (a) Syria'S alienation from the West, largely attributable to the persistence of the Arab-Israeli conflict; (b) Syria's quest for rapid economic development and Soviet willingness to invest in major projects; and (c) the ideological affinity, on a broad platform of radical­ ism, between the Baath party and the Soviet Union. While the third of these fac­ tors may have diminished in importance after General Assad's coup in 1970, the other two factors continued their strong role at the beginning of the 1970s. The most important development project in Syria, involving Soviet assistance, was the Euphrates Dam.

27 Text in Al-Nida (Beirut), December II, 1970. Despite the party's officially positive view, Soviet media had some serious reservations about Assad, even before he openly seized power. Thus Trud, July 18, 1970, as reproduced by Mizan, Supplement A, No.4, July-August 1970.

119 The Euphrates Dam In order of magnitude, the Euphrates Dam is the second Soviet prestige project in the Middle East, next to the Aswan Dam. It is expected nearly to double Syria's area of irrigated land and hydro-electric power. Its significance is not merely eco­ nomic but also, and perhaps primarily, political. The Euphrates Dam agreement of 1966 marked the resumption of large-scale Soviet penetration of Syria and was synchronized with the advent to power of the left-wing Baath and the revival of the Communist party. Moreover, the entire Syr­ ian development effort was reoriented around the dam project, which became the focus of Syria's second development plan, 1965-70. For Soviet policy, investment in the dam was a new strategy inaugurated by Khrushchev of providing support for Third World regimes which (a) adopted a pro-Soviet type of neutralism, (b) launched radical domestic reforms within the broader framework of "revolutionary democracy", and (c) rejected communism but refrained from, or toned down, persecution of the Communist parties while, in some cases, accepting their cooper­ ation on an individual or group basis.

Negotiations

The idea of erecting a dam on the Euphrates and increasing the fertility of Je­ zira province in northeast Syria originated during the days of the French mandate. As early as 1927, mandate authorities presented a plan to build a dam near the village of Yusuf Pasha on the Turkish border. Promptly after achieving independ­ ence, Syria commissioned a British firm, Sir Alexander Gibb & Co., to layout the project. Gibb's plan, presented in 1949, called for a dam of the same size and lo­ cation as proposed in the French plan. The objective was to irrigate 100,000 hec­ tares in the valley of Euphrates; an additional 120,000 hectares would be watered by pumping. The Gibb proposal centered on technical aspects, leaving out the question of financing the project. The matter was revived on August 6, 1957 when Syria concluded its first major aid agreement with the Soviet Union. Construction of the Euphrates Dam was one of 19 proposed development projects. A 12-volume Soviet plan for building the dam was presented iri 1960, at the time of the Syro-Egyptian union, when major decisions were being made in Cairo. At that time, Nasser's policy was to seek cooperation with West Germany, a country which offered superior technology and attractive credit terms. Conse­ quently, the Soviet report was laid aside and instead, on July 5, 1961, a U.A.R.­ West German credit agreement was signed in Bonn. It provided for a total outlay of DM 1 billion ($250 million), of which a loan of DM 500 million ($125 mil­ lion) was earmarked for the Euphrates Dam in Syria. The breakup of the U.A.R. in September caused Bonn to suspend the loan on the grounds that Syria by herself was not able to guarantee its repayment. Under pressure from Syria, which hinted that Bonn's refusal might affect adversely the German Concordia oil concession, West Germany agreed to revive her initial pledge, though with some modification. On January 14, 1963, a Bonn-Syrian agreement was reached. Its terms were: (a) a loan of DM 350 million ($87.5 million) for 20 years at 3.75 percent interest, to be repaid in hard currency; (b) prior agreement with Iraq and Turkey over allocation

120 of water; (c) a Syrian promise not to recognize East Germany; (d) Syria's finance minister to keep the West German Bank for Reconstruction informed about the condition of the Syrian treasury; (e) only partial satisfaction of Syria's demand for construction of power facilities connected with the dam, due to Syria's limited capacity to utilize them. Within a few weeks, the Baath coup of March 8,1963, brought down the "se­ ce!Ssionist" government. The new regime, headed by General Amin al-Hafez, de­ manded revisions in the agreement. A modified accord was reached in October 1964. Two months later, however, Syria nationalized all oil and mineral resources, and the Concordia was deprived of its oil concession. German interest in pursuing the dam project of course waned. Rupture of diplomatic relations between West Germany and Syria came in May 1965, following Bonn's recognition of Israel. That put an effective end to the German role in the Euphrates project. During the intermittent negotiations with Germany, leftist Syrian elements had urged repudiation of German assistance and return to the original Soviet proposal of 1957. Among those who favored this line were the dissident Baath leader, Akram Hourani, the retired General Afif Bizri, and Miss Najah al-Saati, at that time member of the National Revolutionary Counci1. The latter two were identified as Communists. Their advocacy coincided with the general aggravation in Bonn­ Damascus relations. The moderate Baath government of Salaheddin ai-Bitar, in­ stalled in December of 1965, reopened the matter of possible Soviet aid for the dam by sending a mission to Moscow in late January 1966. The mission returned without securing any Soviet commitment. Soviet reluctance to cooperate was un­ derstood to be based on two considerations: (a) unwillingness to deal with the Bitar-AfIaq group of the Baath party which, due to its record of opposition to com­ munism, was distrusted (this group, moreover, had just ousted from power Salah Jadid's left-wing faction of the Baath, a faction which had been praised by Soviet media); (b) desire to improve the position of the Syrian Communist Party through appropriate pressure on the Damascus government. Premier Bitar hoped to over­ come Soviet reluctance by scheduling a personal visit to Moscow for March. But on February 23, 1966, he was overthrown by the Jadid-Zuayyen-Atassi left-wing faction. Thus returned to power by a coup, the Jadid government promptly reopened ne­ gotiations with the Soviet Union. These were conducted in two installments: in March in Damascus, and in April in Moscow. The Soviet Union made her com­ mitment of aid conditional on relaxation of restrictions against the Syrian Commu­ nist Party (allowing the return of Khaled Bakdash, rescinding the ban on a party daily paper, and admission of Communists into the "national front" cabinet).28

The Agreement Premier Yussuf Zuayyen headed the Syrian delegation which signed the Eu­ phrates Dam protocol with the Soviet government on April 22, 1966. The protocol called for Soviet cooperation in the form of (a) assistance in research, planning, and building of the first stage; (b) supplies of equipment and construction mate­ rials; (c) financing: the U.S.S.R. to loan Syria 120 million rubles ($132 million)

28 See p. 113 above.

121 at 2.5 percent interest, repayable over 12 years in installments to begin within one year after the completion of the first stage. The first stage called for the building of the dam and the power plant. Further stages were to include construction of various ancillary projects, such as the power station in Aleppo, a cement factory near the dam site, a steel factory at Hama, a canal and irrigation network, and railroad lines. Soviet financing was to provide for more than half of the expenditures, covering foreign exchange requirements, of the first stage. The balance was to be supplied by Syria in local currency. The Second Five-Year Plan was adjusted to accommo­ date the dam project and on August 9, 1966, it was announced that out of £S (Syrian pounds) 4,955 million total development budget, £S 655 million would be assigned to the dam. The total cost of the dam project was estimated at $910 mil­ lion, of which the first stage was to cost $260 million. The Dutch NEDECO firm, under contract to the Syrian Euphrates Dam Authority, estimated the total costs of the dam at £S 3.3 billion.29 The following table presents comparative data on the Euphrates Dam and the High Aswan Dam.

Euphrates A swan

Height (meters) 325 a III Volume of soil displaced (cubic meters) 14 million 16 million Volume of soil needed to divert river (cubic meters) 40 million 39 million Capacity (cubic meters) 30 billion 157 billion Area to be irrigated (hectares) 850,000 h 700,000 Power output (kw hours per year) 300,000 (first stage) 2,100,000 800,000-1,000,000 on completion of power network Number of Soviet technicians 320 950-1,800 • The German plan called for a dam 310 meters high for fear of creating alluvial deposits in Turkey and in consideration of geological conditions unfavorable for a higher dam. o According to the Soviet plan, the irrigable area is to be composed of 100,000 hectares already irrigated and 750,000 hectares of new, hitherto unirrigated, land. This total of 850,000 hectares comprises four regions: (a) Euphrates valley: 100,000 old and 100,000 new hectares; (b) Northeast of Euphrates, including Balikh valley: 200,000 hectares (water to be pumped 40-55 meters up from reservoir); (c) Ressafe basin south of Tabka: 150,000 hectares (water to be pumped up 20 meters); (d) Lower Euphrates Region: Deir ez-Zor to Abu Kamal, including Khabour River junction: 300,000 hectares (need for a diversion dam at Halabiye-Zalabiye). Source: Data compiled from Dahbar, op. cit.; The Arab World (Beirut), March 15-21, 1968; The Middle East and North Africa, 1967-68 (London: Europa Publications, Ltd.); and Kees­ ing's Contemporary Archives, 1961-62, p. 18234 and 1963-64, p. 19290.

29 Dr. Amin Dahbar, "Le Barrage de l'Euphrate a l'ordre du Jour," May 7, 1966, Joint Publications Res. Service, International Developments, Vol. V, No.2 (July 1966-June 1967). The estimated costs of the dam were broken down as follows: dam (£S 580 million), power plant (£5 535 million), irrigation network (£S 1,113 million), other projects (£8 2,416 million), and interest (£S 837 million),

122 Once the agreement was reached and political conditions were fulfilled by the Syrian side, work on the Euphrates project proceeded rapidly. In mid-May 1966, a Higher Committee for the Euphrates Dam Project was established by Syrian cabi­ net decree. A week later the first group of Soviet engineers arrived. According to an official announcement they were to use the equipment originally used on the Aswan Dam. By early December Soviet experts presented to Premier Zuayyen the final blueprint for the dam. This, in turn, led to the signing on December 18, 1966, of an executive agreement ratifying the April protocol. In 1967 hundreds of tons of equipment were brought in Soviet ships to Lattakia and in December of that year a supplementary agreement put the number of required Soviet techni­ cians at 320. Finally, on March 7, 1968, work on the dam project was formally inaugurated by President Nureddin Atassi and Premier Zuayyen. The first stage was expected to be completed in six years, by 1973. The Syrian government clearly looked upon the Euphrates Dam as a major symbol of its transformation into a socialist country. State-controlled media con­ centrated on publicizing the project during the few weeks following the conclusion of the initial April protocol. They tried to convey the impression that the entire fu­ ture of Syria depended on the construction of the dam. "We are determined," said Premier Zuayyen, "to build the dam, over our skulls if need be." And he added: "The Euphrates Dam forms the basis 6f our socialist economic system." 30 The regime thus left no doubt that it was determined to derive maximum political ad­ vantage from this spectacular undertaking. Soviet advances in Syria which began with economic and arms agreements in 1956-57 have, over a period of more than a decade, shown remarkable progress even though they encountered obstacles and suffered temporary setbacks. By 1970, Syria's dependence on the Soviet Union, economic, technical, and military was pronounced. During the Khrushchev and post-Khrushchev era the Soviet Union strove to establish closer relations with all Arab governments regardless of their political complexion. But Moscow of course favored regimes with a radical­ revolutionary stamp and, in the case of Syria, Soviet leaders even differentiated between the left and the moderate wings of the ruling Baath in extending their economic and technical assistance. Syria's leftward orientation was added insurance although by no means a guarantee, that Soviet efforts would not ultimately be turned to the benefit of hostile groups and that the Syrian Communist Party, unlike its Egyptian counterpart, would not suffer dissolution but could participate actively in the much-hoped-for radical transformation of the Syrian polity.

30 The Arab World (Beirut), May 21, 1966.

123

VII. IRAQ: POTENCY OF THE COMMUNIST FACTOR

receding chapters should have made it clear that a review of Soviet relations Pwith any Middle Eastern country must not be limited to official transactions but should also encompass the activities of local Communist parties. The importance of local Communist parties has varied from country to country. In the Northern Tier, the Communist movement has been prominent in Iran but negligible in Turkey. Among the three Arab countries specifically reviewed in this study, the record has been mixed. Local communism has been overshadowed by government-to-government dealings in the case of Egypt. By contrast, the Commu­ nist party factor has played a more significant role in shaping Syrian-Soviet and Iraqi-Soviet relations. Of the latter two, Iraq's local Communist party probably would claim primacy. Syria's experience with native communism has been noteworthy-on account of both the veteran leadership provided by Khaled Bakdash and the assumption, at one time, of the highest military post in the country by a self-avowed Communist, General Afif Bizri. But in Iraq the potency of the Communist factor appears to have been even greater. Unlike Syria's Communist Party, Iraq's made more than one attempt to seize power on a national or provincial scale; furthermore, in cer­ tain periods of Iraq's recent history its Communist movement constituted the best organized political foree, capable of strong direct action. Had the Communists suc­ ceeded in capturing power in Iraq, the whole pattern of Iraqi-Soviet relations would have been vitally affected. In fact, in contrast to Egypt, local communism has tended to eclipse government-level relations between the Soviet Union and Iraq. Like Syria and Egypt, Iraq has tasted the appeal of Pan-Arabism. This appeal has influenced Iraq's domestic process and its foreign relations. Syria and Egypt are much more homogenous in their social composition. Iraq is divided into three main segments-the Sunni Arabs, Shias, and Kurds-and between them there are significant tensions based on clashing religious or ethnic loyalties. The generally underprivileged but independent-minded Kurdish minority has had links with the Kurds in Iran and Turkey, thus adding an international dimension to the tense do­ mestic scene. A study of Soviet-Iraqi relations may be divided into two periods corresponding to the main divisions of Iraq's modern history, prerevolutionary (prior to 1958) and revolutionary (after 1958). The main focus of this study will be on the post-1958 era, in which there have been five periods: (a) the Kassem period (1958-63); (b) the first Baath period (referred to as Baath I, 9 months of 1963); (c) the Abdul Salam Aref period (Aref I, 1963-66); (d) the Abdur Rahman Aref period (Aref II, 1966-68); (e) the second Baath period (Baath II, beginning 1968).

125 The Prerevolutionary Era (prior to 1958) Iraq's transition from mandated to independent status in the 1930s did not change its basic political complexion. Its socio-political system and its political ori­ entation remained conservative, pro-British, and anti-Communist. Local conditions encouraged various protest movements, but these tended to rally around national-liberation slogans rather than follow class-struggle appeals. True enough, Iraq eventually developed its own revolutionary tradition. This was evident in such outbursts against the existing establishment and British dominance as the Bakr Sidqi coup of 1936, the Rashid Ali revolt of 1941, the Portsmouth Treaty protest of 1948, the riots of 1952, and the revolutionary effervescence fol­ lowing the Suez crisis of 1956. But in no case was the dominant role played by Communists. In the background of the Sidqi coup stood the Ahali group, later to become the National Democratic Party of broadly socialist and democratic lean­ ings. The Rashid Ali movement was spearheaded by Istiqlal nationalists, essentially conservative but opposed to British dominance. Behind the riots after World War II stood a variety of groups of which the Communists were one, but not neces­ sarily leading or decisive. 1 The dominant figure of the pre-1958 era was General Nuri as-Said, an Iraq­ firster, a conservative authoritarian, and a champion of alliance with the West. In and out of office for a period of two decades, he not only suppressed communism at home but also avoided any close relationship with the Soviet Union. 2 Nuri's feelings toward the Soviet Union and communism were fully reciprocated by Moscow, which found no difficulty in identifying the Iraqi regime as a "feudal monarchy" and a pliable tool of Western imperialism. Consequently, any rebellious movement in Iraq was invariably attracting Soviet attention as a potentially posi­ tive phenomenon from the Communist point of view. Thus Moscow regarded the Bakr Sidqi coup of 1936 with cautious favor because of the "national front" coali­ tion (giving an entree to the Communists) which initially supported it. Similarly, the Soviet Union was one of the first countries to recognize the coup-engendered Rashid Ali government in the spring of 1941 because it was anti-British. This was done despite the fact that the new Iraqi leadership rested in bourgeois-nationalist hands and looked to Nazi Germany for assistance. The honeymoon did not last long. Following Germany's attack on the Soviet Union in June of that year, Mos­ cow became Britain's ally, and it lost no time in branding Rashid Ali as a "Fascist hireling." 3 Iran overshadowed Iraq in the Soviet Union's wartime scale of priorities. Iran was the main supply route to the Soviet Union and an area of actual Soviet mili­ tary occupation. Still Iraq was not altogether absent from Soviet strategic thinking. Back on November 26, 1940, in his exchange of notes with German Ambassador Schulenburg, Soviet Foreign Commissar Molotov had stated that "the area south

10n Iraqi political parties under the monarchy, see George L. Harris, ed., Iraq: Its People, Its Society, Its Culture (New Haven: HRAF Press, 1958), pp. 92fl. "For a political biography of Nuri, see Waldemar 1. Gallman, Iraq under General Nuri: My Recollections of Nuri ai-Said, 1954-1958 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1964), and Lord Birdwood, Nuri as-Said: A Study in Arab Leadership (London: Cassell, 1959). 3 On Soviet attitudes toward the Rashid Ali rebellion, see Majid Khadduri, Independent Iraq: A Study in Iraqi Politics from 1932 to 1958 (London: Oxford University Press, 2nd ed., 1960), pp. 228-29, and Walter Z. Laqueur, Tile Soviet Union and the Middle East (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1959), p. 124.

126 IRAN

"",,/' / ' " .....- ./. ....,'\ N -.J ,,// \

4 See p. 40 above. c. On the Kurdish revolutionary movement in 1945, see William Eagleton, The Kurdish Re­ public of 1946 (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), and Archie Roosevelt, Jr., "The Kurdish Republic of Mahabad," Middle East Journal, Vol. I, No.3 (July 1947). On the post-World War II Kurdish nationalist movement, see Lettie M. Wenner, "Arab-Kurdish Rivalries in Iraq," MEJ, Vol. 17, Nos. I and 2 (Winter-Spring 1963). 6 Gallman, op. cit., p. 80.

128 Communist states including Communist China, East European countries, North Korea, North Vietnam, and Cuba. It abstained from formally recognizing East Germany but in May 1962 the two countries agreed to establish consulates-general. Iraq's relations with the Communist world were friendly but Baghdad aspired to an independent stance. By 1959 it had also entered into formal relationship with Albania and Yugoslavia. Diplomatic relations soon led to numerous aid-and-trade agreements, cultural pacts, and, in the case of the Soviet Union, arms deliveries. A Soviet-Iraqi economic and technical assistance agreement was signed on March 16, 1959. It called for Soviet credits of 550,000,000 rubles to assist in 43 industrial and development projects. In April 1960, on the occasion of Anastas

Mikoyan's 7 visit to Baghdad, Soviet aid was increased by 180,000,000 rubles. A formal agreement to this effect was signed on May 25, 1960. Various sub­ agreements later were signed with the Soviet Techno-Export and other organizations. Four important sub-agreements had been concluded in 1959, ranging from aid in agrarian reform through technical training to oil exploration and railway projects. The example set by the Soviet Union and Iraq was emulated by other Commu­ nist states, depending on their capacities. Iraq did not necessarily choose the more industrialized countries, such as Czechoslovakia and Poland, for its preferred partners. Trade and payments agreements were signed also with really underdevel­ oped Communist states, such as North Vietnam and North Korea (July 1959). A series of cultural agreements was signed in 1959-60 with Bulgaria, Czecho­ slovakia and East Germany. In 1962 Iraq concluded a cultural pact with the So­ viet Union providing scholarships for Iraqis to study in the Soviet Union. By 1967 Iraqi students in Soviet bloc countries exceeded 1,200. This number grew in subsequent years. Formal agreements were supplemented by exchanges of visiting professional and political groups. Such visits had been inaugurated in October 1958 when a delegation of Iraqi lawyers and another of Iraqi Peace Partisans trav­ eled to the Soviet Union. Parallel to these economic and cultural exchanges came arms deliveries from the Soviet Union to Iraq. The beginning date of these deliveries is shrouded in secrecy. No formal agreement has ever been announced. It is certain, nonetheless, that Iraq began receiving arms from Moscow rather early after the revolution. By Feb­ ruary 1959, the press reported that Iraq had obtained between 100 and 150 tanks from the Soviet Union. By June of that year Iraq was said to have received $100,000,000 worth," and the pace of deliveries increased thereafter. On Septem­ ber 1, 1961, a formal announcement spoke of a visit to Moscow by the com­ mander of the Iraqi Air Force at the head of a ten-man delegation. Iraq thus began to follow the example of Egypt in expanding its economic, technical, cul­ tural and military ties with the Soviet Union and other Communist countries. Inside Iraq there was a revival and rapid expansion of the Iraqi Communist Party. Despite the strong repressive measures in the Nuri era, the party reconsti-

7 Soviet Minister of Foreign Trade, one of the highest-ranking members of the Politbureau, often employed on major "trouble-shooting" missions, including that to Cuba in connection with the missiles crisis of 1962. 8 MEl, Vol. XIII, No.2 (Spring 1959), p. 182, and Vol. XIII, No.4 (Autumn 1959), p. 430.

129 tuted itself with impressive speed. Many of its members were released from prisons in September 1958 in the general amnesty, and the party profited from the prevail­ ing revolutionary effervescence. 9 It took full advantage of the emotion-charged at­ titude of Kassem's government, which was denouncing the prerevolutionary past as unmitigated evil and invariably referring to the overthrown Hashemite mon­ archy as "the exterminated regime." A group steeled in adversity and used to clan­ destine operations, the party soon established its superiority in organization over a number of competitive movements, each of which was trying to fill the political vacuum left after years of Nuri's repression. Kassem's ruling junta had no base of power beyond the army and its own secu­ rity apparatus. Big city lumpen-proletariat, the so-called sarifa dwellers, responded favorably to the revolution and on a number of occasions reacted with enthusiastic spontaneity to the visits of the "sole and faithful leader," Abdul Karim Kassem, in the slum areas of Baghdad. But this support was volatile, transient and unreliable. The destitute masses could be regarded as no more than "cannon fodder." What was needed was an organized force capable of harnessing and directing this mass potential. Kassem had neither the political organization nor the plan to fill the po­ litical vacuum. His initial strategy was to invite the prerevolutionary opposition parties to par­ ticipate in the first coalition cabinet he formed after the July coup. The parties were the Istiqlal, the National Democrats, and the Baath, each of which was repre­ sented, de facto if not formally, by recognizable leaders.tO As for the Communist party, Kassem adopted a somewhat different approach: instead of inviting any ac­ knowledged members of the party's official leadership, assuming it was possible to identify them at that time, he offered the portfolio of National Economy, which in­ cluded oil affairs, to Ibrahim Kubbah, a Marxist professor. Kubbah was generally regarded as a Communist or pronounced leftist, but not considered a member of the party leadership. His presence in the cabinet was viewed as recognition by Kassem of the legitimacy of the Communist trend in the Iraqi political spectrum. We have no evidence of how exactly the organized party leadership reacted to this appointment. 11 From the very outset the party operated both openly and through front organi­ zations. The largest and most capable of street action among the front organiza­ tions was the Peace Partisans, headed by a veteran Communist leader, Aziz Sharif. Other, more select front groups were the Soviet-Iraqi and the Czechoslovak­ Iraqi friendship societies. The Iraqi Women's League also was captured by the party in its early stages. The revolution also brought into the open a group which had previously operated in secret, the Iraqi Committee for the Afro-Asian

9 On Communist ascendancy during the Kassem period, see Majid Khadduri, Republican Iraq: A Study 0/ Iraqi Politics Since the Revolution ot 1958 (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 117ff., and Uriel Dann, Iraq under Qassem: A Political History, 1958-1963 (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969, and London: Pall Mall Press, 1969), Part Two: "The Communist Challenge," pp. 93-234. 10 On political party. representation in the first revolutionary cabinet, see The Iraqi Revolu­ tion: One Year ot Progress and Achievement (Baghdad: 14th July Celebrations Committee, 1959), p. 97. 11 The party, however, considered him a persona grata and its chief press organ, Ittihad ash-Shaab, willingly printed his .views and ideas. See "Kubbah Calls for Guided Democracy," Ittihad ash-ShlUlb, February 23, 1960, and Iraqi Review, Vol. I, No. 26 (March 9, 1960).

130 Solidarity Conference. The Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference had its headquarters in Cairo. Although headed by a Socialist member of the National Democratic Party, it maintained liaison with the Communists. Labor unions and professional associations were the usual party targets for infiltration. Yielding to the party's in­ fluence, the Iraqi Labor Federation joined the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) in Prague on December 18, 1959. The party also tried hard to capture the leadership of the newly formed peasant federations, students' unions, associa­ tions of journalists and men of letters, and the Iraqi Bar Association. Since Kas­ sem had outlawed the regular democratic process, elections in these unions and as­ sociations served as an indicator of the strength of various political parties. Although not uniformly successful in all such elections, the Communist party grew in influence in the second half of 1958, and particularly in 1959. In some cases the party was able to transform these groups into front organizations. A typical ex­ ample was the 85,000-strong Iraqi Democratic Youths, whose first conference, on June II, 1959, was opened by Kassem. Delegates from many countries attended. The Communist delegate from Czechoslovakia, liri Pelikan, played a leading role. A similar, Communist-dominated, international congress of students, representing 75 countries, took place in Baghdad in October 1960. The party was particularly interested in the Popular Resistance Movement, a semi-official armed militia which acted as a watchdog of the revolution. The popu­ lar resistance squads were heterogeneous in their composition, embracing as they did idealistic students, some restless dropouts from schools, party militants, and or­ dinary thugs from the slum areas, whose main interest was in plunder. Because the militia carried arms given it by the revolutionary government and performed self­ appointed police tasks-mostly searches of vehicles and homes, often accompanied by arrests of individuals denounced as enemies of the revolution-it opened attrac­ tive opportunities to the party for direct actionY Side by side with this interest in voluntary associations, the party focused on the government itself and on the military establishment. The degree of penetration into the army and the air force was very hard to judge. A few years later, after the overthrow of Kassem, subsequent regimes tried and sentenced a number of officers for seditious Communist activities. There is no doubt that at least some of these men were affiliated with the party. But it is difficult to speak of their Communist ties with precision because of the imperfections and political influence in Iraq's system of justice. As for the civilian branch of the government, the party concentrated on depart­ ments that played a key role in the exercise of political power, in the formulation of policies, and in influencing public opinion. Thus it made inroads into the secret police, passport and visa administration, the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Education, and the Directorate of Broadcasting. It also secured a few important positions in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but, by and large, Iraq's foreign service remained relatively intact, as a preserve for career diplomats whose professional­ ism had helped them to ward off Communist attempts to purge or demoralize them.

12 On various "voluntary" associations emerging during Kassem's regime, see The Iraqi Rev­ olutioll, op. cit., pp. 96ff.

131 In fact, the foreign ministry's resistance to attempts at Communist takeover (and later the Baathist takeover) was typical of the resistance in all those govern~ ment departments which had a better-educated professional cadre of civil servants. Their skills were needed by any government. Although many officials were dis­ missed by revolutionary governments, Iraq's bureaucracy by and large survived and thus maintained its prerevolutionary "bourgeois" ethos. For this reason it was repeatedly attacked in Communist-influenced newspapers which angrily spoke of "the pockets of reaction" or of the "remnants of the exterminated regime" in the administration. A government creation which did much to enhance the Communist position in the country was the military "People's Court," set up soon after the coup to try the leaders of the old regime and, more broadly, any enemy of the revolution. Its president was Kassem's relative, Colonel Fadhil Abbas Mahdawi, variously de­ scribed as party member or sympathizer, who apparently preferred the Maoist ver­ sion of communism. "The court," said an official publication of Kassem's govern­ ment, "is more than a court, it is a political school and a political seminar, in which many a fine poem and an expressive speech were delivered by members of the public. The people," added the publication, "began to exercise the authority of judgment, side by side with the military judges of the court, of those who had played with its destiny for over a century."]3 In actual fact, the modus operandi of the court, whose proceedings were broadcast and televised, violated all the ele­ mentary rules of legal practice. There was no serious attempt to preserve, even outwardly, the impartiality of judges. The court was both an instrument of revenge against the leaders of the defunct regime and a tool of revolutionary propaganda. It was thus well adapted to the general Communist design of "smashing" the bour­ geois holdovers in the Iraqi society, without regard to legal niceties. 14 The year 1959 represented the high tide of Communist influence in Iraq. The party owed its successes probably as much to the help it received from Kassem as to its own skills and perseverance. Lacking a political organization of his own, Kassem soon discovered that the political arena was filled with two antagonistic forces, the pro-Nasser elements and the Communists. Initially in an informal alli­ ance with the former, Kassem developed a feud with them within a few weeks after the July coup over the issue of merger with Egypt. The pro-Nasser forces, composed of the Baathists, Arab Nationalists, and other non-affiliated elements, fa­ vored early moves toward Arab unity, the impetus for which had been given by the Syro-Egyptian union of February 1958. The chief spokesman was Kassem's second-in-command, Colonel Abdul Salam Aref, who, having returned from a meeting with Nasser in Damascus within a few days after the revolution, began pressing Kassem for an early decision on unifica­ tion. Kassem resisted the idea, deprived Aref of his positions as deputy commander­ in-chief and deputy premier, and, to remove him from the Iraqi scene, ap­ pointed him ambassador to Bonn. Within a short time Aref returned to Baghdad without permission and tried to enlist support in the army for his ideas. This led to

13 On People's Court, see ibid., p. 99. 1. On the need to "smash" or "shatter" the bourgeois state machinery as a prerequisite to the effective establishment of Communist power, see V. I. Lenin, The Paris Commune (New York: International Publishers, 1934), pp. 26ff.

132 his arrest, trial and sentencing to death (later commuted) in the winter of 1958- 59. By that time Kassem's faith in the loyalty of revolutionary forces was badly shaken. From December 1958 on, his vigilance and reprisals against the Baathists and the Nasserites equalled if not exceeded in intensity his repression of old­ regime figures. In thus parting ways with his erstwhile collaborators, Kassem needed allies and the only organized group capable of lending him effective help was the Commu­ nist party. Street clashes and other confrontations between the Communists and the Baathists or N asserites became an almost daily occurrence in 1959. Baathist and other professors were physically threatened and abused by Communist stu­ dents at the university, Communists disrupted various union meetings, and, gener­ ally, resorted to direct action on an increasing scale. In March of 1959, the Communist offensive reached a high point in the wide­ spread purge of officials known for or suspected of anti-Communist attitudes. A prominent party member, Selim Fakhri, then served as director of Iraqi Broad­ casting. He set a general tone of anti-Western, anti-old regime, and anti-Nasser vindictiveness and vituperation. In the same month, the Peace Partisans, encouraged by the benevolent and co­ operating attitude of the authorities, converged by the thousands in government­ provided trains and trucks upon Mosul to hold a rally. Their aggressive behavior in this northern, basically conservative city sparked a mutiny, under the leadership of Colonel Abdul Wahab al-Shawaf. Shawafs rebellion was engineered by an Egyptian-backed local military conspiracy against Kassem but its immediate cause was the Peace Partisans' rally. Lacking air cover, the rebels were soon crushed by troops loyal to Kassem, assisted by some Kurds and the Popular Resistance Forces. In terms of bestial behavior of man against man, the following days were probably the darkest in Iraq's modern history. Self-appointed "people's judges," either Communist party members or sympathizers, sitting under open skies, meted out summary justice to political enemies, a broad term applying as much to active political opponents as to bourgeois families which were not involved but were per­ secuted merely because of their class affiliation. Private homes were invaded, the accused were dragged before the court, sentenced, and executed, often by hanging at nearby lampposts in front of excited multitudes. A number of victims died of torture before reaching the court. When placed against the background of intense Communist activity in all sectors of Iraqi life in that period, both the Peace Parti­ sans' rally and the subsequent exercise of "popular justice" appear to have been a deliberate bid to seize power in a major urban center, thus blazing the trail for similar developments in other parts of Iraq.'" A similar bid for power was made in Kirkuk in mid-July of the same year, on the first anniversary of the revolution. This time army units joined the party in an apparent pro-Communist mutiny-in contrast to Shawaf's mutiny in Mosul. Again there were cases of torture, dragging of victims tied to speeding trucks, and mutila­ tion, but the spectacle of people's courts was not repeated. This time Kassem's loyal troops had to intervene against the Communists to protect the city from vio­ lence.

1;; On the abortive Mosul rebellion, see Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp. 104ft and Dann, op. cit., pp. 16411.

133 Between the events in Mosul and Kirkuk, the party launched a vigorous drive for two cabinet seats, indicating that Ibrahim Kubbah's presence in the government was not considered sufficient. The intensity of this drive, coupled with the general purge of anti-Communist officials and the freshly concluded bloodbath of Mosul, led Allen Dulles, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, to declare on April 28 before a U.S. Senate committee that the situation in Iraq was "the most dan­ gerous in the world today" and to state that the Communists in Iraq were close to a complete takeover. 16 Shaken by the Shawaf rebellion, which, next to Aref's conspiracy, he regarded as more evidence of Nasser's tentacles reaching out to Iraq, Kassem yielded to Communist demands. On July 13, the eve of the first anniversary of the revolu­ tion, he appointed Madame Dr. Naziha Dulaimi, a prominent party member, as minister of municipalities. In a simultaneous reshuffie he gave the portfolio of N a­ tional Guidance to Dr. Faisal al-Samir and that of Works and Reconstruction to Awni Yusuf. Both stood close to the party. Counting Kubbah, who in the mean­ time was transferred from National Economy to Agrarian Reform, the far left had assumed control of four ministries. While the party was aiming at the ultimate seizure of power, it realized that it needed allies. On June 29 it revived the national front by banding together with Kamel Chaderchi's National Democrats and the Kurdish Democratic Party.17 By mid-July 1959, the party stood at the apogee of its power. Its main political adver­ saries had been defeated, the masses of the poor were following its lead, and there was substantial Communist representation in the government from the cabinet downwards. Yet, in resorting to violence in Kirkuk the party overreached itself. Many Iraqis were inclined to look at the Mosul and Kirkuk massacres as typical of Communist behavior. Armed vigilante groups began forming in certain residential areas of Baghdad to protect homes and families against physical attacks by the Commu­ nists. More decisive, however, was the fact that Kassem himself became alarmed. Speaking on July 29, barely two weeks after the Kirkuk episode, the "sole leader" accused the Communists of having plotted uprisings in all major cities of Iraq on July 14.1~ From that time on Kassem ceased to support the Communists as a counterweight to the Baathists and the Nasserites. Instead of playing the two forces against each other, he adopted a policy of repression toward both. Repression against the Communists, however, was slower and less obvious, for two reasons: First, the Communists were already so well entrenched in many gov­ ernmental and non-official organizations that it was difficult to remove them or curb their influence; second, on account of his growing dependence on Soviet arms

16 The New York Times, April 29, 1959. 11 In 1956, following the Suez crisis, a national front was formed of four parties: Commu­ nist, National Democratic, Istiqlal, and Baath. All but the Communist party were represented in Kassem's first cabinet while the presence of Ibrahim Kubbah as Minister of National Econ­ omy was regarded as a substitute for an official Communist party spokesman. On December 23, 1958, the United Kurdish Democratic Party joined the front. After the Shawaf mutiny in, March 1959, the front collapsed because of the defection of Istiqlal and Baath parties which were in sympathy with Shawaf's objectives. On the Communist party's view of the front, see "Statement on C. C. Session," Iraqi Review (Baghdad), Vol. I, No. 10 (August 6, 1959 ). 18MEJ, Vol. XIII, No.4 (Autumn 1959).

134 and economic aid, Kassem was reluctant to make an abrupt break with the party. Indicative of this caution was Kassem's semantical device of referring to the Com­ munists as "forces of anarchy" in his public utterances. The party itself felt the need to review its policies at the enlarged session of its central committee held in Baghdad in mid-July 1959. "Our Party," said the cen­ tral committee's official statement, "has committed some mistakes as a result of the dizziness of victory and vanity as an outcome of the great successes." "The revolutionary zeal of the Iraqi people is a positive feature," said the statement. It confessed, however, that "the drawing up of our daily tactics ... led the policy of our party to be influenced by the spontaneous movement and to take a wrong stand on the excesses of the masses." The excesses were described as "dragging of bodies, torturing detainees, looting and trespassing." "This does not mean," contin­ ued the statement, "that we never opposed such excesses .... In general, however, we did not make sufficient effort in this respect." Having admitted this, the state­ ment tried partly to exonerate the party from guilt by declaring: "Our party, which has never participated in the responsibility of government, has less chance of preventing the acts of torture which were inflicted upon detainees, in circum­ stances of mutiny and plotting against the Republic. . . . The principles of the party do not approve wrong inhumane acts. That is why we relied, even in the hardest times of tyranny, on guided re,volutionary mass struggle and rejected the method of individual assassination, terror and torture of individuals and other such acts." 19 What the party-led extermination squads did not finish in Mosul was completed during the following September by Mahdawi's People's Court. The court sen­ tenced to death thirteen officers who had backed Colonel Shawaf in the Mosul Mutiny. The executions were promptly carried out, whereupon Ittihad ash-Shaab, the party's chief press organ, hailed them as "prudent and necessary." 20 The party's self-criticism did not save it from Kassem's suspicion and growing hostility. He was now determined not only to restrict the party's influence but also to exploit and encourage dissensions and splits within the party itself. The first such split occurred in mid-December 1959. It was precisely the time (December 14) that Kassem chose to sign a cultural exchange agreement with Britain, which only a year before had been a foremost target of his fulminations. A few weeks later, on Iraqi Army Day, January 6, 1960, Kassem announced the restoration of political life in the country and invited political parties to apply for licenses. Rather promptly after this announcement he licensed a dissident leftist group under Daud Sayegh, which styled itself "Iraqi Communist Party" and published a separate newspaper, Al-Mabdaa. At the same time he refused to license the genu­ ine Communist party, which was obliged to adopt the name Ittihad ash-Shaab (People's Unity) after the title of its press organ. The Ittihad ash-Shaab was headed by Zaki Khairi, who lost no time in denouncing Sayegh's group as artificial and fraudulent. At the same time he deplored Kassem's partiality,21 Despite its

19 "Report of Enlarged Session of C. C., Iraqi Communist Party," Iraqi Review, Vol. I, No. 10 (August 6, 1959) and Special Number, Vol. I, No. 13 (September 6, 1959). 20 MEl, Vol. XIV, No.1 (Winter 1960). 21 For a step-by-step development of this dispute between the party and Kassem's govern­ ment, see Iraqi Review, Vol. I, No. 22 (January 18, 1960); No. 25 (February 24, 1960); No. 26 (March 9,1960); and No. 27 (March 23,1960).

135 unofficial status, the genuine party felt confident and strong enough in the spring to mount a major signature-collecting drive to secure release of the "Mosul pa­ triots," i.e., the militants charged with atrocities who had been arrested on Kas­ sem's orders. In July the lttihad ash-Shaab boasted of having collected 145,000 signatures.22 By the fall of 1960, Kassem's policy toward the Communists began acquiring definitely repressive features. On October 1 he had Abdul Qader Ismail al-Bustani, a veteran party leader and editor of lttihad ash-Shaab, arrested and sentenced to three months in prison. But, with his characteristic penchant for surprises, he or­ dered Ismail's release the next day. Between March and May of 1961, he closed all offices of the Peace Partisans. However, he allowed the genuine party to playa major role in the festivities of May Day. As if to compensate for his generosity, he ordered many arrests among the Communists soon afterward, thus bringing upon himself strong criticism from the Moscow newspaper Trud (May 16, 1961). This gradual rupture with Iraqi Communists did not have an immediate effect on Iraqi-Soviet relations. Apparently both governments were interested in cultivat­ ing good mutual relations and not allowing the treatment of the Iraqi Communists to stand in the way. Soon after the appearance of the critical article in Trud, it was announced that a Soviet-built radio station was to be opened in Baghdad and that the Soviet Union would sell Iraq 25 diesel locomotives. In July Poland and Iraq concluded a civil aviation agreement, thus preserving the continuity of Iraq's relations with the Soviet bloc. Not even the outbreak of a Kurdish uprising in mid-September 1961 caused any significant deterioration in official Soviet-Iraqi relations, although the party favored Kurdish autonomy within the Iraqi state and maintained links with the Kurdish Democratic Party."' Interestingly enough, however, Cairo's criticisms of the role of Communists in Iraq, particularly in repressing pro-Nasserite nationalist forces in 1959, had brought about angry exchanges between Nasser and Khrushchev on two occasions in March 1959 and May 1961.24 The First Baath Period (February-November 1963) In spite of the break between Kassem and the party, Iraqi Communists consid­ ered him a lesser evil than some other forces in the country. Consequently, when on February 8, 1963 the Baath, supported by the Army, staged a coup, Commu­ nists and their allies in the Popular Resistance Forces were the ones to make the last stand in defense of Kassem. Previous persecution of the Baath in the heyday of Communist influence in 1958-59 made it certain that with the Baath advent to

n Iraqi Review, Vol. II, NO.3 (July 12, 1960). n For the party's position in this respect, see "The National Charter of the Iraqi Commu­ nist Party," Iraqi Review, Vol. I, No. 22 (January 18. 1960), pp. 5-6, and "The National Rights of the Kurdish People in the Programme of the rep," Iraqi Review, Vol. I, No. 24 (February 1960), p. 11. "The Iraqi Communist Party," says the latter editorial, "emphasizes once again the natural rights of the Kurdish people . . . their rights in managing their administrative and cultural affairs and in developing their literature and language and in reviving the history of their glorious nation. . . . Our party . . . denounced with the same firmness all the chauvinist tendencies and the separatist calls which prepossess some of the Kurdish chauvinists. Our party takes into consideration the dangers which such narrow calls and tendencies would create on the status of our republic and the gains of our revolution." 24 See p. 87 above.

136 power a policy of anti-Communist repression would set in. This was precisely what happened. In many ways, the Baath emulated the tactics of the previous regime. It created a paramilitary organization, the National Guards, recruited mostly from the younger echelons of the Baath, but kept its doors open to the usual reeruits from the slum sections of Baghdad. The guards then became an instrument of anti-Communist terror. On the official level the policy toward Communists was also vindictive. There was an extensive purge of Communists from government jobs and to some extent from the Army. There were arrests following a discovery of a plot in an army tank regiment. Within two weeks after the coup the Baathist authorities arrested Husain al-Radawi, secretary general of the Communist party; Aziz Sharif, secretary general of the Peace Partisans; and Abdul Qader Ismail al­ Bustani. Before long, the instigators and perpetrators of atrocities in Mosul and Kirkuk were placed on trial, sentenced and, in a number of cases, executed. Simultane­ ously, Baathist authorities b~gan closing Communist party offices and seizing their libraries. The Communists responded by attempting, on July 3, 1963, a coup in Rashid military camp near Baghdad. It did not succeed and its principal military figures paid for their failure with their lives. The Baathist anti-Communist course was so intensive and open that Moscow apparently found it difficult, in contrast to the last phase of Kassem's regime, to pretend that it did not exist. Relations between Iraq and the Soviet Union took a downward turn. On February 15 Pravda wrote of a "wave of terror in Iraq." The Iraqi Embassy was attacked by angry demonstrators in Moscow; complaining groups of Iraqi students began returning to Iraq from the Soviet Union and, in mid-summer, Soviet economic aid was reduced to a trickle. Arms deliveries were virtually suspended. Lack of spare parts to keep Soviet-made tanks in good condition and shortages of ammunition for Soviet-made guns caused a slow-down in military operations against the Kurds in a war which the Baath inherited from Kassem and which it tried to prosecute with an even greater vigor. On June ] 7, the Moscow Red Star accused the Baathists of genocide against the Kurds. And on July 22, the Iraqi government expelled six East German and Bulgarian diplomats for activities in­ compatible with diplomatic immunity. It was hinted unofficially that they had tried to give a helping hand in the abortive July 3 coup in Camp Rashid.

The First Aref Period (November 1963-April 1966) The forcible removal of the Baath by General Abdul Salam Aref, in a coup exe­ cuted on November 18, 1963, did not change the anti-Communist posture of the Iraqi government. True enough, the party initially approved of his takeover be­ cause, from its angle, anything appeared better than the Baath-sponsored persecu­ tion. Similarly, the party gave its initial approval to Aref's idea of creating an Iraqi version of the Arab Socialist Union (ASU), the latter to be patterned on its Egyp­ tian model. In Egypt, it will be recalled, the Communist party eventually pronounced its own dissolution and advised its members to join the ASU, to which they were admitted. 23 However, despite his pro-Egyptian proclivities, Aref was

25 See p. 88 above.

137 not inclined to follow Nasser's example in this respect. Communists were barred from joining the Iraqi ASU which, anyway, encountered many difficulties in its formative stages and ultimately proved to be a total failure. By the same token, the government continued rounding up Communists of higher and lower ranks alike, and placing them on trial. The country felt a general revulsion against the misdeeds of the Kassem era, which were often attributed to the Communists. Indicative of this mood was the sentencing to death, in absentia, by a court in Baghdad of Madame Naziha Dulaimi, Communist minister of mu­ nicipalities under Kassem, in April 1964. On May 3 of that year Aref enacted a constitution which described Iraq as an "Arab, Islamic, independent and sovereign republic." 26 Aref himself quoted copiously from the Koran in his public 2 speeches. Time and again he stressed the incompatibility of Islam and Marxism. ; All of this did not augur well for the party's future. Yet, with all these disappointments, Aref's anti-Communist course was not as vindictive as that of his Baathist predecessors. Moreover, his nationalization de­ crees of July 1964 placed his regime on a Socialist platform similar to Egypt's and, from the Soviet point of view, signified that Iraq had entered upon a "path of non-capitalist development." Virtually from the beginning of his term, the Soviet

Union gave evidence of greater warmth toward his regime. e8 Soviet experts were busy building for him an atomic reactor for peaceful uses, which was eventually completed in 1968. In May 1964, Aref met Khrushchev in Egypt while attending the inauguration of the first stage of the Aswan Dam. The meeting led to a public ideological con­ frontation between the two leaders. Disagreeing with the tenor of Aref's speech in which the Iraqi President emphasized Arab interests and unity, and encouraged by Ben Bella and Nasser to reply, Khrushchev promptly took the floor to rebut Aref for his disregard of deep class divisions in Arab society. Whatever tension this epi­ sode might have caused was soon to be dispelled by conviviality at a dinner for Khrushchev which Aref hosted a week later in the Iraqi Embassy in Cairo. In his memoirs, Khrushchev tried to differentiate between Nasser's "scientific socialism," which he found closer to Marxism-Leninism, and Aref's "Arab socialism," appar­ ently unaware that "Arab socialism" became Egypt's official creed also. He found the latter less desirable but placed it into the anti-colonial complex, in the initial phase of the evolution of Arab political thought, which was to end in the ripening of class consciousness. e9

The Second Aref Period (April 1966-July 1968) There was no major change in the basically anti-Communist course set by Abdul Salam Aref when, upon his death in a helicopter accident, his brother Abdur Rahman Aref succeeded to the presidency. However, with most of the

eo Text in Arab Political Documents, 1964 (Beirut: Political Studies and Public Administra­ tion Department of the American University of Beirut), Document No. 61, pp. 147ff. "; Ibid., pp. 495ff: 28 See Y. Bochkaryov, "New Orientation in Iraq," New Times, No. 37 (September 16, 1964). The author tends to contrast Aref's regime with that of the Baath, which had "set out to ... wipe out Communists, progressive nationalists, forward-looking intellectuals and in fact all real patriots ...." 29 Khrushchev Remembers (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1970), pp. 443-45. See also note 19, Chap. IV of this study, p. 69 above.

138 major trials completed and a number of Communist leaders in exile, relations be­ tween the government and the party lacked the sensationalism of earlier years. The Aref II period could perhaps best be described not as a period of persecu­ tion of communism but rather as an era of gradual turning toward greater conserv­ atism and moderation in both the political and the economic sectors. It was personified by the first civilian premier since the revolution, Professor Abdur Rah­ man al-Bazzaz, whose terms of office straddled the presidencies of the Aref broth­ ers and whose orientation was toward parliamentary democracy, rule of law, and encouragement of the private sector. His signal achievement was the conclusion, on June 30, 1966, of the 12-point agreement with the Kurds, which put an end to their rebellion. Bazzaz was staunchly anti-Communist and so was Aref II who, for example, on July 13, spoke against "imported ideologies." an Aref II was about as ineffective in creating a civilian political organization as his late brother. His at­ tempts to launch or revive the Arab Socialist Union were largely fruitless. The party viewed these attempts negatively and advocated instead the "democratization of political life" through the creation of a broader national front. The general am­ nesty decreed in May 1966 did not extend to the Communists and in that same year Abdul Qader Ismail al-Bustani and Selim Fakhri, ex-director general of broadcasting, were arrested and tried. Ismail received a sentence of six years of hard labor. In April 1967, a government announcement spoke of the discovery of a Communist plot. In the same month the Communists won the elections in the Baghdad students union, following it up with a victory of a Communist-sponsored slate in the Iraqi Bar Association in February 1968. As under Aref I, these domestic tensions with the Communists did not prevent the Soviet Union from maintaining friendly relations with the Iraqi government. It was during this period that progress was made in the Soviet-Iraqi negotiations for construction of the Euphrates Dam on Iraqi territory. A major factor, however, in expanding Soviet-Traqi relations was the Arab­ Israeli war of June 1967. It caused the intensification of Soviet contacts with all the countries of the Arab revolutionary camp, and Iraq proved no exception to the general trend. On July 3 of that year Soviet President Podgorny paid a visit to Aref in Baghdad, inaugurating an era of fast-multiplying Soviet-Iraqi contacts. While the principal focus this time was on replenishing the depleted Iraqi supply of Soviet bloc weapons and other military equipment, economic and technical ex­ changes also were increased. It was estimated that during the ten years of revolu­ tion Iraq obtained from the Soviet Union 200 jets, more than 500 tanks, varieties of small arms and guns, and some minor warships.3] The Second Baath Period (July 1968-) The overthrow of Aref II by the Baath-military alliance on July 17, 1968, and the subsequent emergence, via a supplementary coup thirteen days later, of the Baath as the sole ruling group in Iraq, did not modify the basic trend toward friendship in Soviet-Iraqi relations. To be sure, the Baath attitude toward domestic

30 The Baghdad News, July 14, 1966. 31 Sources: Annual volumes of the Institute for Strategic Studies (London), The Military Balance, and Geoffrey Kemp, "Strategy and Arms Levels, 1945-1967," in J. C. Hurewitz. ed., Soviet-American Rivalry in the Middle East (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), p. 24.

139 Communists was still negative and there were still many party members in prison. But there was a major difference between 1963, the first period of Baath rule, and 1968: the Arab-Israeli war of June 1967 had intervened. This set into motion two parallel trends, greater radicalization in the domestic sector of several Arab states, and closer links with the Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc. 32 Arab governments, especially those humiliated in the war, felt an overpowering urge to seek Soviet friendship as compensation for defeat and as their response to what they considered to be American partiality toward Israel. Although the Iraqi Baath had had a spotty record in its relations with the Soviet Union, it did not allow past difficulties to mar the felicity of these relations in the post-June period. Ready acceptance of Soviet arms delivered to fill the June war losses, especially aircraft, tended to create a degree of dependence upon Moscow, thus reducing the Baath government's freedom of action. This, in turn, had its reflection on Baath­ Communist relations at home. These relations, though not yet friendly, evolved from repression toward a dialogue, the purpose of which was to explore establishing a national front of progressive forces. In view of the common Israeli-imperialist threat, the Communists could participate in that front, giving political direction to the country. This dialogue, however, encountered difficulties of both procedural and substan­ tive nature. The procedural complicatiQn was a new split in the Communist party, which occurred as early as the fall of 1967 and which rent the party into the so­ called central committee, headed by the veteran leaders Zaki Khairi and Amir Abdullah, and the central leadership, headed by Aziz al-Haj, popularly known as the Iraqi Che Guevara. The Aziz al-Haj faction, smaller numerically, took the "hard line" on domestic and international issues. It opposed cooperation with the Baath in any national front, reminding the party of the Baathist "bloodbath" in 1963. It also opposed the Soviet line on the Arab-Israeli conflict by rejecting the United Nations November 1967 resolution. On this issue it took the side of the Palestinian guerrillas, or fedayeen, whose aim was not mere recovery of the territo­ ries lost in the June war but the destruction of the state of Israel as a whole. This inner division in the Communist movement complicated the dialogue for the Baath. On the other hand, it stood to gain from the dissensions in a competi­ tive party. In practical terms, however, the Baath could not ignore the fact that the majority of Communist membership followed the central committee (i.e., Zaki Khairi and Amir Abdullah), which was anxious to create a national front and, if possible, to participate in the cabinet. In fact, the central committee entered, in the spring of 1969, into an alliance with a group known as the Arab Socialist Movement, a faction headed by ex-Baathist Fuad Rikabi, in a move designed to lay foundations for a national front. The Baath response to these initiatives was somewhat ambiguous. It preferred, of course, to keep the Communists quiet and relatively contented instead of deal­ ing with new conspiracies and turmoil. Its own political base was narrow and it tried to bolster its fortunes by staging spectacular spy trials accompanied by tele­ vised confessions of 'the defendants. 33

,~2 For a cautious Soviet reaction to the Baath II regime, see G. Mirskiy, "Some Thoughts on the New Regime in Iraq," N,ew Times, Vol. X, No.5 (September 1968), pp. 194-98. aa The spy trials were conducted in January and between June and August 1969.

140 Neutralization of Communists by accepting them as junior partners in a would­ be national front looked attractive. But the Communist party was not prepared to accept a meaningless and strictly subordinate role. Furthermore, there were sub­ stantive differences over domestic and foreign policies. In October 1969, Sidam Hussein Takriti, secretary general of the Iraqi Baath, summed up these differ­ ences as follows: ( 1) The basic CommunIst position on the subject of "Zionist existence in the land of Palestine" differs from the Baath position and "needs a radical amend­ ment" (he was referring to the attitude of the pro-Moscow central committee which accepted the U.N. resolution and thereby accepted Israel as a state). (2) The basic Communist position on Barzani's Kurdish movement was also unacceptable. This was because the Communist party's branch in northern Iraq "is fighting on the side of Barzani on the grounds that such a movement is allegedly aimed at national liberation." It was illogical, said Takriti, for the Baath and the Communists to be partners on one front in Baghdad while one Communist faction was fighting against the Baathist central government in northern Iraq. (3) There were differences between the two parties on indoctrination "at the lowest popular levels." Takriti claimed that the Baath regime had met as many Communist demands as was possible. It was not possible, he added, to meet the Communists' demand to have their daily paper reopened before the national front was set Up.3' The same distrust emerged in Sidam Hussein's comments in March 1971 on pos­ sible cooperation with the Communists in a national front. This dialogue has been going on for two years now .... The conditions we made did not go beyond seeking guarantees to the real content of the envisaged front. As to the other side [i.e., Communist], the intentions there do not seem to have taken a settled shape. . . . A front lacking in precise formulas will inevitably reflect itself adversely on the national movement and bring much harm to the revolution itself. This is because either of the two things will happen: other quarters outside the Baath party will join the front for tactical reasons of their own by which they will seek to attain to strategic positions where it would be easy for them to come down with a sudden blow on the revolution; or we, the Baath party, will, after a while, find ourselves compelled to oust such quarters from the positions they had acquired within the front. Obviously, we accept neither of these two courses. We are much concerned in keeping the revolution within the framework of its contents and avoid any final parting of the way with other national quarters-which is precisely what an inexact formula of the front will bring. 35 He concluded his remarks with some severe advice: Let me give a piece of honest and sincere advice to the Communist party in the name of the Baath party: as long as they continue to use devious methods in their relations wth us, we shall remain far away from

34 Sidam Hussein Takriti in a press interview, Al-Sayyad (Beirut), October 9, 1969. ,,;; In an interview with Al-Dastur (Beirut), as reproduced in The Baghdad Observer, March 16, 1971. Notable in this text is the systematic omission of the word "Communist" and its re­ placement by the expression "other national quarters."

141 them and continue to consider them as strangers. And the opposite is correct. Let them not use foreign formulas in order to pressure us. Let them know that we are treating them as Iraqi Communists and there is no other criterion on the basis of which we can treat them. 36 The sour tone in these exchanges can be attributed to the Communists' tendency to embarrass the Baathist regime whenever they could do it with relative impunity. Such an opportunity had presented itself in July 1970 on the occasion of the Eighth Congress, held by the Kurdish Democratic Party in Qalala, Arbil province. The Eighth Congress followed an earlier settlement, reached on March 11, between the Kurds and the government. The Iraqi Communist Party was represented by a guest delegation whose leader, Karim Ahmed, strongly attacked the regime's domestic policies. His statements were not well received by the authorities in Baghdad and the Communist party was rewarded with a variety of repressive measures as a re­ sult. In spite of these discordant notes, the Baath-Communist relations during Baath II period did not reach the acute stage of mutual warfare characteristic of the Baath I period. Less turbulence undoubtedly helped in shaping post-June Iraqi­ Soviet relations, which grew more cordial. Thereupon relations with the entire Soviet bloc improved. Thus on May 1, 1969, Iraq became the first Arab country to grant formal recognition to East Germany and to exchange ambassadors. That same spring. a major deal with Poland provided for technical assistance in exploiting rich Iraqi sulphur deposits, in spite of the more attractive offer presented by an American firm. As for direct Soviet-Iraqi relations, Iraq's controlled press obsequiously ap­ proved of the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia in August 1968. This attitude contributed to the atmosphere of mutual goodwill which, in turn, generated fur­ ther technical and economic agreements. A major move in this respect was the agreement of June 21, 1969, pledging Soviet assistance in developing the proven reserves of the North Rumaila oilfield in southern Iraq. This was the first signifi­ cant entry of the Soviet Union into the production of petroleum in the Middle East, a hitherto exclusively Western preserve. While these various agreements were being negotiated, Soviet naval squadrons paid two goodwill visits to the Iraqi har­ bors of Umm Qasr and Basra, in February and June 1969.

Conclusion Iraqi-Soviet relations have developed in a checkered pattern since the restora­ tion of diplomatic relations at the time of the Iraqi revolution of 1958. Periods of cordiality-during spans of officially-proclaimed Traqi neutralism to which all revo­ lutionary governments adhered-alternated with periods of coolness, particularly noticeable during the first rule of the Baath. Although this coolness was directly attributable to the treatment of Iraqi Communists by the Baath then in power, the Soviet Vnion did not allow this factor to influence unduly its relations with Iraq on a long-range basis. Consequently, the Soviet Vnion seemed to seize eagerly on the

ow Same interview as reproduced by the Arab World Weekly (Beirut), March 27, 1971. This passage, however, was omitted in the version published by The Baghdad Observer, i.e., for Iraqi home consumption.

142 slightest sign of relaxation in domestic treatment of Iraqi Communists to renew and reinvigorate their dealings with Baghdad on the government level. Iraq's turn toward socialism, beginning with 1964, has helped Soviet leaders jus­ tify their policy toward Iraq. They could argue that Iraq was pursuing a noncapi­ talist path of development, thus fitting into a broader framework of Soviet policy toward the underdeveloped countries. The primary consideration of this policy was to remove the Western presence, while hoping that the internal radicalization proc­ ess would eventually provide for collaboration of the native governments with local Communist parties through national fronts. This, in the more distant future, might ideally lead to a Communist takeover. In the immediate future, however, the design seemed to avoid alarming unduly the native nationalist governments by any tactless sponsorship of local Communist am­ bitions. Communist parties had to practice patience and subordinate themselves to longer-range Soviet plans. The alienation of Arabs from the United States as a re­ sult of the Arab-Israeli war played squarely into the hands of the Soviet Union in Iraq. It permitted Moscow to identify with Arab nationalist aspirations by painting America as a sinister and malevolent power bent on arming and supporting Israel in its aggressive and expansionist policies. In Iraq there was a high degree of re­ ceptivity for this message, and Soviet fortunes in that country seemed to be on the rise in the early 1970s.

143

VIII. SOVIET ARMS AND MILITARY PRESENCE

Political rapprochement and economic assistance were accompanied by massive infusions of Soviet and Soviet bloc arms into the Arab countries. Arming se­ lected Arab states had its psychological, political. and strategic aspects. Psychologically, the Soviet Union stood to gain much in prestige, by becoming the chief provider of the necessary elements of strength to the arms-starved and underequipped Arab world. Politieally, arms aid was manipulated to extend Soviet influence, to assure greater pliability of certain governments. The strategic results were three: (a) by becoming better armed, the Arabs could challenge Israel's mili­ tary superiority; (b) by arming certain Arab regimes, the Soviet Union was im­ plicitly giving them her protection against possible Western intervention; and (c) the increased Soviet military presence in the Middle East affected the global bal­ ance of power between East and West. The flow of Soviet arms interacted with international and domestic events in the area. In some cases the Soviet-Arab arms deals generated further political develop­ ments; and some of the political developments led toward the arms deals. The major opening move was the Egyptian-Soviet arms agreement of 1955. Overnight it changed the Soviet role in the Arab world, from distant bystander, to active participant in the politics and diplomacy of the area. The second phase of Soviet arms flow came in the post-Suez period: Egypt was rearmed after its losses in the war of 1956 and Syria made her first major arms deal with the Soviet Union in 1956. The third phase was inaugurated by the Iraqi revolution of 1958. Iraq, Algeria, and Yemen emerged as new revolutionary centers which promptly accepted Soviet arms. By the mid-1960s, five radical states 1 which shared slogans of Pan-Arabism and socialism had become steady recipients of Soviet bloc armaments. Arming of these Arab regimes-particularly the U.A.R.-was indirectly responsible for the outbreak of the June War of 1967. It created overconfidence and unrealistic atti­ tudes in Cairo which led to the May 1967 prewar crisis. The fourth phase in the flow of Soviet bloc armaments to the Middle East cov­ ers the post-June 1967 war era. Its two distinguishing features have been: (a) rearming of the U.A.R., Syria, and Iraq to compensate for losses sustained during the war; (b) arming of the new radical regimes which issued from the turmoil of the postwar period, namely those of the Sudan, Libya, and South Yemen. Arms Flow to Egypt Since 1955, Egypt and the Soviet Union have been concluding arms agreements roughly every two years. The first agreement, announced on September 27, 1955, was officially concluded between Egypt and Czechoslovakia, the latter serving

1 U.A.R., Syria, Iraq, Algeria, and Yemen.

145 largely as a formal substitute for the Soviet Union and only partly as supplier of her own arms. Later, this disguise was abandoned altogether, and the Soviet Union concluded its arms deals directly, occasionally supplemented with East European arms. The 1955 agreement provided for four broad categories of arms: aircraft, tanks, other land weapons including artillery, and warships. Under its terms, 200 combat aircraft were pledged, of which 150 MIG-15 jet fighters and 40 Ilyushin (IL-18) light bombers were delivered prior to the Suez War. This was accompanied by 100 T-34 tanks and a substantial number of BTR-152 armored personnel carriers. The artillery quota comprised SU-IOO self-propelled assault guns and 120 mm. mortars. Other land equipment included MAZ trucks, Goriunov heavy machine guns, and a substantial quantity of Czech-made rifles, submachine guns and other lesser weapons. In the naval sector the agreement called for delivery of six subma­ rines. The total value of the military hardware pledged in this first deal was esti­ mated at $250 million. In the course of the Suez War of 1956 much of this equipment was lost: 10 IL-28s were destroyed while the remaining 30 were evacuated to Saudi Arabia and Luxor. Twelve of the MIG-15 planes were shot down, while 100 were destroyed on the ground. Of the 38 remaining, some were given or sent to Algeria and the Yemen Republicans. By 1957, however, they were withdrawn from com­ bat service and eventually dismantled for spare parts. The weakness of the MIG-IS was its lack of an ejection seat. Much of the other war material delivered before the 1956 war was geared to service in the cold, wood-covered plains and swamps of the Soviet Union, unsuitable for the climate and terrain of Egypt. Conversely, the Egyptian armed forces did not have ade­ quate capacity to absorb all the weapons and equipment. Intensive training pro­ grams for the Egyptians in handling Soviet bloc weapons occupied much of the 1957-59 period. Training for armor, artillery, engineering, and motorized infantry was conducted in the U.S.S.R.; for the air force and signals, in Czechoslovakia; and for the navy, in Poland. The principal hardware components of the 1957 Soviet-Egyptian arms agree­ ment, valued at $150 million, were 200 MIG-I7 jet fighter bombers (with ejection seats) to replace the destroyed or cannibalized MIG-IS jets. Substantial numbers of cannon and other conventional weapons werc added, including the Czechoslovak­ made Katiusha-type rocket launchers. The deal also called for additions to the Egyptian navy. In due course, W-class submarines, the Skory-type destroyers, and the Chaika minesweepers were delivered. Equipment indoctrination centers were set up in Egypt with the aid of Soviet and Czechoslovak instructors: at Bilbeis for the air force, in Zagazig for armor, and in Zifta for artillery. Under the next agreement in 1959, military hardware valued at an estimated $120 million was delivered. Some 120 MIG-19 all-weather jets were supplied. More rigorous pilot training was instituted. Only Bilbeis air school graduates with 12 months' experience in MIG-17s and 18 months' intensive training on the more modern craft were entitled to fly the more sophisticated MIG-19s. During this pe­ riod, a submarine base was built in Abukir, east of Alexandria, and five new air­ strips were constructed in Sinai and on the Red Sea coasts near the Gulf of Suez.

146 ITHE MEDITERRANEAN BASIN I I

...... -...)"""

EGYPT

"1~;IIIt!II •

l(Nr'lo.- e

$VUAH The agreement of 1961 brought a significant innovation. For the first time, East German military technicians made their appearance in Egypt. They began to play an increasingly important role in the training and guidance of the Egyptian naval personnel, especially in submarine warfare. Simultaneously, Egypt's army under­ went a thorough revamping: the old British-model brigade organization was re­ placed by the Soviet-patterned divisional and regimental system. Sufficient Soviet land-warfare weapons were supplied to equip six Egyptian infantry and armored divisions. The total value of arms thus delivered was estimated at $170 million. Reorganization of the U.A.R. armed forces called for additional Soviet bloc in­ structors and advisers, of which 900 were Soviet, 200 Czechoslovak, and some 200 East Germans, the latter replacing Poles who had been instructors in naval warfare. The next agreement, of June 1963, provided for $220 million worth of arms at official cut-rate Soviet prices, but their real value might have been $500 million. It was the biggest of the pre-June war Soviet-Egyptian deals. Deliveries paralleled Egypt's growing involvement in the Yemen war from 1962 to 1967. The Soviet Union agreed to equip two Egyptian armored divisions with tanks of T-54B type, replacing the older Josef Stalin (lS-3) and T-34 tanks, most of which were turned over to the National Guard and armored regiments of infantry divisions. Some were presented to Algeria and the Yemen Republieans. Part of the newly supplied equipment for the air force reflected the needs of the Yemen war for big transport planes and bombers. Thus 24 big Antonov transports, worth $3 million each, were provided for service on the Cairo-Luxor-Yemen route, with Soviet pilots and Egyptian co-pilots. Other aircraft going to Egypt were 64 TU-16 medium bomb­ ers, valued at $1 million to $3 million each, 100 IL-28 light bombers, 24 IL-l b medium-range paratroop carriers, at $2 million each, 40-plus MI-2 helicopters, and-for the first time-MIG-21 supersonic jet interceptors. By the fall of 1964, 50 of these MIG-21 s were in U.A.R.'s possession. There were also further deliver­ ies of MIG-17s and MIG-19s. It was at that time that the first SA-2 ground-to-air missiles began to appear. It is possible that a separate agreement, preceding the major June 1963 deal, had been eoncluded for these. SA-2 missiles were reported to be in Egypt as early as April 1963. By the fall of 1964 about ten batteries of the ground-to-air missiles had already been installed. Western sources are uncertain whether they were SA-Is or SA-2s. Both were designed to destroy the high-flying aircraft. In the naval sector, the 1963 agreement provided for delivery of 36 guided mis­ sile gunboats of the Komar (2 missiles) and Gsa (4 missiles) type; 2 heavy de­ stroyers of the TaWil type, and 2 W-class submarines, bringing Egypt's subma­ rinc fleet to 12 vessels. It appears that, eventually, it was not the TaWil but the Skory class destroyers which were delivered. Lesser vessels included minesweepers and landing craft for infantry and tanks. The last major military air agreement between the Soviet Union and the U.A.R. prior to June 1967 was concluded in Moscow in August 1965. Estimates of the value of arms plcdged varied eonsiderably; it is likely that it reached or exceeded $310 million. It further increased the U.A.R. arms inventory for air, land, and naval warfare, without introducing major innovations in the type of arms delivered.

148 However, the large amounts of military hardware and the complexity of certain weapons necessitated sending more Soviet military technicians to Egypt. The Sov­ iet Union's military investment was deemed also important enough to warrant a visit to Cairo by the Soviet defense minister, Marshal Grechko, in December 1965. Before the June war of 1967, the total value of Soviet arms supplies sent to Egypt since 1955 was estimated at about $1.5 billion. Although the cumulative total of combat aircraft delivered to Egypt up to June 1967 was at least 600 and possibly neared the figure of 800, the combat-ready air fleet of the U.A.R. on the eve of the June war was much smaller than that. There had been the normal attrition, losses during the Suez war of 1956, withdrawals of older types of aircraft from service, transfers and gifts to friendly Arab regimes, and losses incurred in the Yemen civil war. U.A.R. airpower, apart from trans­ ports, helicopters and trainers, comprised about 430 combat aircraft at the begin­ ning of June 1967: 163 MIG-2I supersonic interceptor jets 40 MIG-19 100 plus MIG-I7 55 SU-7 fighter-bombers 30 TU-16 medium bombers 43 IL-28 light bombers On the eve of the June 1967 war, the U.A.R. also possessed at least 900 tanks. In addition, its navy was composed of 67 war vessels: 4 Skory class destroyers 15 submarines 12 submarine chasers 36 guided-missile boats of Komar and Osa types In the short June war much of this arsenal was lost, particularly aircraft and tanks. According to Israeli and independent sources, of the 430-odd combat air­ craft nearly 300 were destroyed on the ground and in the air. Adding losses of transports, helicopters and other non-combat planes, the total aircraft destroyed

2 Calculated on the basis of composite data from a variety of sources, including U.S. Depart­ ment of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Communist Governments and Developing Nations: Aid and Trade in 1967, August 14, 1968; Leo Heiman. "Moscow's Export Arsenal: The Soviet Bloc and the Middle East Arms Race," East Europe, Vol. XIII, No.5, (May 1964); F. D. Holzman, "Soviet Aid and Trade Policies," in J. C. Hurewitz, cd., SOl'iet­ American Rivalry in the Middle East (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), p. 111; and Wynfred Joshua and Stephen P. Gibert, Arms for rhe Third World: Soviet Milirary Aid Diplomacy (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1969), p. 23. These combined sources allow us to draw the following table of the estimated value of Soviet arms supplied to Egypt (U.A.R.) during the period 1955-67 prior to the June 1967 war: Year Millions Dollars T955 1957 150 1959 120 1961 170 1963 500 1965 310 Total 1,500

149 amounted to about 355.° Losses in tanks were equally staggering: Of 900 in serv­ ice before June 5, 1967, about 600 were destroyed or captured. The U.A.R. navy was the only service which avoided heavy losses. Israeli naval forces were small and played only a minor role in Israel's military establishment. They succeeded in destroying one gunboat of the Gsa type and engaged several Egyptian submarines with unknown results. But the bulk of the U.A.R. navy was untouched. Moscow moved quickly to replace Egypt's war losses. Within ten days after the end of the war, Soviet President Nicolai Podgorny visited Cairo, and Soviet arms shipments to the U.A.R. were immediately resumed. In fact, on June 23, while Podgorny was still in Cairo, the U.S.S.R. was reported to have begun a shipment of 200 war planes. By June 30, over 130 new combat planes had been delivered. The flow of arms continued steadily. Within a year of the first postwar shipments, the U.A.R. had almost regained its prewar numerical strength in combat aircraft. By July 1968, Egypt's air force contained 400 fighting planes, only 30 less than in the pre-June 1967 period. The most substantial replacement of losses, however, was made in the old-fashioned MIG-15/17 types, of which at least 105 were de­ livered, and MIG-19s, of which at least 70 were delivered. Replenishments in the most modern jets, the MIG-21s, were slower. By July 1970 an estimated 150 MIG-21s were flying for Egypt, only 10 less than in early June 1967. For two years, 1968 and 1969, the total number of combat aircraft hovered around 400. This was not a static situation, of course, because planes were being lost in skirmishes over the Suez Canal and in normal attrition. These losses were regularly covered by the Soviet Union. According to a British source, the U.A.R. air force in July 1970 numbered 463 combat aircraft, including all prewar categories except for MIG-19s. Absence of the MIG-19 is somewhat puzzling, especially when their number in July 1968 was estimated by the same source to have been 80.' The following table gives a com­ parison of the combat aircraft strength on the eve of the 1967 war and in 1970:

COMBAT AIRPLANES IN THE U.A.R.

June 5,1967 July 1970 MIG-21 163 MIG-21 150 MIG-19 40 MIG-19 ? MIG-17 100 MIG-15/17 165 SU-7 55 5U-7 105 TU-16 30 TU-16 15 IL-28 43 IL-28 28 Total 431 Total 463

3 Sources: Randolph S. Churchill and Winston S. Churchill, The Six Day War (London: Heinemann, 1967); and Nadav Safran, From War fo War: The Arab-Israeli COllfrontation, 1948-1967 (New York: Pegasus, 1969). 4 The Military Balance, 1970-1971 (London: The Institute for Strategic Studies, 1970) and ibid. for 1968-69. 5 Source: The Military Balance, 1970·1971, op. cit., and the sources mentioned in notes 2 and 3 above.

150 By summer 1970, the Soviet Union had responded to Nasser's request and had assigned several squadrons of Soviet fighter planes, the MIG-21J, to Egypt. These units, entirely Soviet manned and Soviet controlled, were to help protect Egypt from Israeli air attacks. Egypt's defenses were strengthened significantly by the introduction of substan­ tial numbers of SA-2 and SA-3 surface-to-air missiles. The missiles of the SA-2 type, first brought in in 1963 to defend against high-flying aircraft, were installed at more than 100 sites by the end of 1970. There was a heavy concentration on the Suez Canal front. SA-2s alone were insufficient, however, to assure Egypt's defense during the intermittent warfare along the Suez Canal front line in the early part of 1970. At that time, there were continuous violations of the cease-fire by both the U.A.R. and Israel. Israeli aircraft, many of American Phantom type, conducted deep-penetration raids into Egypt, and Israeli bombing of Egyptian artillery and other installations on the west bank of the Canal was often effective. To bolster Egypt's defenses, a new SA-3 type missile, designed to destroy low­ flying aircraft, was introduced into Egypt in the summer of 1970 at the same time the Soviet-manned fighters were assigned. The American-sponsored cease-fire went into effect on August 7, 1970, at a time when installation of these SA-3 missiles was under way immediately west of the canal, and when some of the SA-2 missiles were being moved closer to the eanaL Israeli protests notwithstanding, the Soviet-Egyptian teams proceeded with their installation activities even at the risk of disrupting peace negotiations which were to be resumed under U.N. auspices. By the ena of 1970 it was estimated that some 50 SA-3 sites had been established, many along the canal. The build-up of the U.A.R .. defenses proceeded through the winter of 1970-71, with an average of two shiploads of Soviet arms per month ar­ riving in Egyptian harbors. Soviet deliveries of combat aircraft and missiles took a dramatic tum upward after March 7, 1971, when the Egyptian-Israeli cease-fire expired. The decision not to extend it was taken by the U.A.R.'s new president, Anwar Sadat, after Israel refused to accept peace proposals advanced in mid-February by the U.N. mediator, Ambassador Gunnar Jarring of Sweden. Sadat's announcement was preceded by a secret trip to Moscow, February 28 to March 2, to seek Soviet sup­ port for his decision and increased Soviet assistance in anticipation of a possible re­ newal of warfare with Israel. As a result, Soviet arms deliveries were accelerated. The Soviet Union mounted a huge airlift, using the giant Antonov-22 transports. The Antonov-22 is believed capable of transporting two disassembled fighter planes. Simultaneously, the arms shipments by sea were also increased. These were said to include large numbers of anti-aircraft missiles, radar equipment, Sukhoi-7 fighter-bombers, more MIG-21 interceptors, and some advanced fighters of SU-l1 Flagon A type and MIG-23 Foxbat type. 6 The latter is credited by experts with performance capability superior to the American-made F-4 Phantom jets supplied to Israel. The MIG-23s were flown by Soviet pilots only. The Foxbats were believed to fly at three times the speed of sound at altitudes between 70,000 and 80,000 feet. The American F-4 Phantom flies at 2.3 times the speed of sound. Soviet replacement of equipment for the Egyptian ground forces has also been

6 Code names for Soviet aircraft and missiles are of NATO designation.

151 substantial. Since June 1967, the U.A.R. received over 900 tanks, over 200 per­ sonnel carriers, and several hundred guns, including up to 200 203-mm howitzers, the latter presumed to be capable of inflicting significant damage on the Israeli Bar-Lev Line east of the Suez Canal. The U.A.R. arsenal was further strengthened by mid-1970 with delivery of about 50 Soviet ground-to-ground missiles, some of the Frog-3 type, with a 50-mile range and the rest of the short-range Samlet type. Stocks of these ground-to-ground missiles are believed to have been increased since mid-1970. To man these various advanced weapons systems an estimated 15,000 Soviet military personnel were brought in. Of this number, some 3,000 to 4,000 were as­ signed as instructors and advisers to Egyptian units. The majority were employed as crews at SA-3 missile sites or served on the mixed Soviet-Egyptian teams oper­ ating the SA-2s. Part of the Soviet contingent was security troops to protect the missile sites' crews and equipment. Probably some 200 Soviet pilots were assigned to the fighter units of MIG-2Us and to handling the advanced jet fighters (MIG- 23 or SU-ll). This massive rearming aimed at creating a better defense of the u.A.R., after the vulnerabiI:ty of the Suez Canal line and the interior of Egypt had become evi­ dent during Israeli air and commando raids in 1970. The aim was to protect (a) the Suez Canal line, (b) the Aswan Dam with its power plant and other points in Upper Egypt, and (c) Cairo and the urban and industrial centers of the Delta. Yet, while defense appeared to be the primary objective, the heavy concentration of Soviet-made artillery on the Suez Canal line, together with the installation of ground-to-ground missiles, provided a certain potential for crossing the Suez Canal and possibly retaking Sinai after saturation shelling of the Israeli Bar-Lev Line. Some Soviet airpower was also at hand to help cover the operation, at least to challenge Israel's previously unchallenged air superiority.' An attempt to retake the Sinai would have been doomed to failure in the spring of 1970, when the Israeli air force held mastery of the skies over the Suez Canal and the 50-km-deep zone west of it. By the spring of 1971, there were numerous Soviet missile sites in that zone, in addition to increased U.A.R. artillery and air­ craft strength. Any Israeli move to reassert superiority could be attempted only at high cost and there would be no assurance of success. By mid-1971, Egyptian artillery had the potential of hitting-and possibly breaking-the Bar-Lev Line with a degree of immunity not possessed a year earlier.

Arms for Other Radical Regimes While the Soviet Union exerted her major effort to arm and rearm Egypt, she did not neglect other states of the Arab radical camp. Syria and Iraq, both in­ volved in the June war of 1967, should be distinguished, however, from Sudan, Libya, Algeria, Republican Yemen, and South Yemen, all more remote from the Arab-Israeli front line. Like Egypt, Syria suffered heavy losses in her air force during the June war. She lost 32 MIG-21s, almost her entire fleet, 23 MIG-15/17s, 2 IL-28s and 3 MI-4

7 Data based on a variety of sources, including-inter alia-press reports: The New York Times, October 27 and November 27, 1970; January 6 and February 6, 1971; San Francisco Chronicle, March 30 and April 3, 1971.

152 helicopters, a total of 60 aircraft, about two-thirds of her air force. 8 After June 1967, substantial Soviet deliveries permitted Syria not only to replace her losses but virtually to triple her air force strength. In three years, Syria received from the Soviet Union 70 to 80 MIG-21 s, 50 to 60 MIG-I7 fighter-bombers, at least 20 SU-7 fighter-bombers, over 40 jet trainers, and about 10 helicopters. Simultane­ ously, there was a build-up for ground force equipment. From 1967 through 1970, Syria received 250 to 300 Soviet-made tanks, over 400 field guns and rockets, over 100 personnel carriers and an estimated 40 SA-2 surface-to-air missiles. Iraq also suffered losses in the 1une war, though on a lesser scale, and the So­ viet Union came to her rescue as well. Air losses included 9 MIG-21s, 5 Hunters,

1 TU-16 medium bomber, and 2 transports, a total of 17 aircraft. D Iraq's prewar air strength was restored by Soviet deliveries in the last months of 1967 and early in 1968. By mid-1969 Iraq reached a substantially higher level of air power, and this has been maintained. By mid-March 1971 the Soviet Union had supplied Iraq with 50 MIG-2Is (making a fleet of 60), 50 to 60 SU-7 all-weather fighter­ bombers, over 10 jet trainers, and over 10 helicopters. Soviet-delivered ground equipment included 100 to 150 tanks, bringing the number of Soviet-made tanks in Iraq to about 600, 300-plus personnel carriers, and 500 field guns and rockets. Of the five remaining radical Arab countries, Algeria had the longest history of military assistance from the Soviet Union. Her I70-strong combat air force was entirely equipped by the Soviet Union, about 140 aircraft of various MIG catego­ ries, and an estimated 30 IL-28 light bombers. Algeria also received SA-2 ground-to-air missiles. Her small coastal navy was equipped primarily with Soviet assistance. Her army, especially in the armored sector (some 300 tanks) and artil­ lery, was dominated by Soviet equipment. In May 1969 a revolutionary officers' group carne to power in Sudan and promptly aligned itself with Cairo in its Arab and foreign policies. One of the manifestations of this orientation was a rapprochement with the Soviet Union, and the gradual replacement of Sudan's predominantly British military equipment with Soviet arms. As a result, Sudan's armed forces had a mixed assortment of weap­ ons, but the Soviet ingredient grew steadily. By mid-I970, half the small Sudanese air force was of Soviet origin (16 MIG-21 s). Some three months later, early in September 1969, young officers in Libya fol­ lowed Sudan's example, and overthrew the constitutional monarchy there. One of the first acts of the new regime was to ask for the prompt evacuation by the United States of Wheelus Air Base, which had been leased from the prerevolu­ tionary government of King [dris. The United States turned over the base to the Libyans in 1970. Like the new government of Sudan, the Libyan Revolutionary Command Council established a close relationship with Cairo. Libya's leader, Colonel Qadhafi, became the foremost proponent of revolutionary Pan-Arab policy, to free the Arabs from Western influence, liberate Arab lands seized by Israel, and fully mobilize the Arab defense potential. While hostile to local Arab Commu­ nists, as his Sudanese counterpart General 1 aafar Numeiri was, Qadhafi was not averse to establishing relations with the Soviet Union and accepting Soviet arms.

8 Churchill, op. cit., p. 87. Y Ibid.

153 In July 1970 some Soviet tanks and other armor were delivered to Libya, to be conspicuously displayed at the military parade marking the first anniversary of the revolution on September 1. There were no reports of aircraft deliveries up to mid-1971. The pace of aircraft deliveries, should they be undertaken, probably would not be fast because of the limited absorptive capacity of the Libyan air force whose total strength was about 400 men with 7 combat aircraft.10 Rapid expansion of air power in Libya was unlikely, mainly because of the general retar­ dation of the country and the dearth of mechanical skills among the largely rural and pastoral population. In an apparent move not to become tied to the Soviet Union, Qadhafi signed an agreement to purchase over a hundred Mirage fighters from France. By summer of 1971 France had delivered a few planes. Information on Soviet military aid to Yemen and South Yemen has heen frag­ mentary, partly because of the civil war in Yemen in the 1960s and the strife marking the transition of South Yemen from colonial status to independence in 1968-69, and partly because of the severance of normal relations with the West by both of these revolutionary states. During the civil war Soviet-made combat air­ craft appeared in Yemen, but these were primarily U.A.R.-owned and operated. Some were loaned to the Yemeni air force. With the settlement of the Yemeni civil war at the Arab summit conference in Khartoum on September 1, 1967, u'AR. forces, including the air contingents, were withdrawn from Yemen. This opened the way for more direct Soviet relations with Sana. However, the reconciliation of Yemen with Saudi Arabia in the spring of 1970, followed by the deterioration of relations between Yemen and South Yemen in the same year, caused the Yemen government to adopt more moderate domestic and foreign policies and to seek the reopening of communications with the West. The Yemeni government showed no sign it wished to commit itself to an exclusive cooperation with the Communist bloc-in the field of armaments or otherwise. The Soviet Union also avoided placing excessive reliance on that govern­ ment. By contrast, the Marxist-oriented regime of South Yemen, which in 1970 adopted the radical-sounding name of People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, appeared to be more receptive to Soviet military assistance. This was due in part to the regime's militant radicalism and in part to the competition for influence be­ tween Moscow and Peking, a phenomenon not absent in Yemen proper, but ap­ parently more acute in South Yemen.

Soviet Naval Penetration In 1967, the Soviet Union began a formidable build-up of its naval force in the Mediterranean. In 1970-71, the size of the Soviet fleet there oscillated between 35 in the winter months and over 60 in the warmer seasons. The American Sixth Fleet, in the same waters, had normally counted 40 plus ships and, before 1967, had regarded the Mediterranean as "an American lake." The Sixth Fleet repre­ sented about 5 percent of the total of 800 active U.S. navy ships, while the Soviet Mediterranean Fleet, which averaged 55 ships, represented some 4 percent of the 1,400 Soviet combatant ships and craft. Between 10 and 15 submarines mostly of

10 Data on the 1970 status of the armed strength of Algeria, Sudan, and Libya based partly on The Military Balance, op. cit. See also "Soviet Tanks Delivered to Libya," Times-Post Service, Washington, San Francisco Chronicle, July 23, 1970.

154 diesel type, but with a few nuclear-powered among them, represented a substantial segment in the Soviet Mediterranean Fleet. Surface warships normally included one of the two existing guided missile helicopter carriers, Moskva and Leningrad, de­ signed for anti-submarine warfare. Other vessels in the fleet were a Kynda class guided missile cruiser, three guided missile cruisers of the Kresta class, some eight to ten destroyers of the Kotlin, Kasin and Krupny class, landing craft, Riga and Mirka type escorts, minesweepers and auxiliary ships. The Soviet fleet lacked air­ craft carriers, altogether absent from the Soviet navy. By contrast, the U.S. Sixth Fleet has invariably included two aircraft carriers (in 1970 Franklin D. Roosevelt and Forrestal, later replaced by John F. Kennedy and Independence), with an average total complement of 400 aircraft. Sometimes referred to as "reusable missiles," aircraft aboard the carriers included the A-6A Intruders, A-7 A Corsairs, and F-4 Phantoms. They were an element of strength which gave the numerically smaller American fleet a presumed edge over the Soviet fleet, largely because the aircraft had a longer range than that of missiles aboard the Soviet surface vessels and submarines. 11 To make up for the absence of fleet-connected aircraft, the Soviet Union used a surveillance squadron of TU-16 bombers (Badgers) with the markings of the U.A.R. but flown by Soviet pilots. These land-based aircraft regularly "buzzed" U.S. warships and airplanes, often at a perilously close range. American aircraft eventually reciprocated, but no incidents have been reported by either side. Of the various types of Soviet warships in the Mediterranean, the submarines represented probably the most substantial threat to American and allied NATO navies. With a heavy maritime traffic in the Mediterranean-some 2,000 ships a day, of which some 250 were Soviet merchantmen-sonar detection of submarines became complicated, especially in summer months when a thermal layer on the surface of the sea added to the difficulty of swift detection. Continuous surveillance of Soviet submarines became one of the most important tasks for the Sixth Fleet. Organizationally, the Mediterranean fleet (or squadron) is part of the larger Soviet Black Sea Fleet (the other divisions being the Baltic, Arctic, Pacific, and Caspian fleets) and its ships normally traverse the Turkish Straits. The Montreux Convention on the Turkish Straits of July 20, 1936 expired in November 1956 but continued to be honored by the world's maritime powers. Submarines were re­ quired to surface when transiting the Straits, which made count of their numbers easier for Turkish and NATO authorities Even if they were to try to pass the Straits submerged, of course, Soviet submarines could hardly avoid detection by the Turkish authorities' sophisticated instruments. Partly for this reason, some So­ viet submarines were detached from the Baltic Fleet for Mediterranean service. They entered the inland sea via the Strait of Gibraltar, where the surfacing obliga-

11 Data in thi ... and the following sectiOljs based on a variety of sources including Soviet Sea Power (Washington: The Center for strategic and International Studies. Georgetown Uni­ versity, Special Report Series No. 10, June 1969); Drew Middleton. "U.S. 6th Fleet Concerned Over Soviet Navy in the Mediterranean!' The New York Times. May 13, 1970; a'"!d Middleton. "Tn Mediterranean, a Delicate Balance," The New York Times. December 24. 1970; Cmdr. Robert W. Herrick, Soviet Naval Strategy: Fifty Years of TIll?ory and Practice (Annap­ opJis. Md.: U.s. Naval Institute, 1968); Jane's FiRhtillR Shivs, 1969·]970 (London: Haymar­ ket Publishing Group, 1970); Strategic Survey, 1968 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1968).

155 tion did not apply. This, however, was the exception in the pattern of Soviet naval movements, which were regularly directed to and from the Black Sea. On the aver­ age, some 250 to 300 Soviet warships transited the Straits annually between 1967 and 1970. The substantially augmented Soviet naval and merchant marine presence in the Mediterranean enhanced the importance of the Turkish Straits to the Soviet Union and to the NATO powers alike. The novelty of the present situation is that despite their increased international role, as compared with the 1945-67 period, the Straits are no more subject to a binding set of international rules. Under the terms of the Montreux Convention, the Black Sea powers could send their warships through the straits without tonnage limitation. The only limit was on the number and tonnage of ships transiting the straits at any given moment. This provision applied so long as Turkey was not at war or under the threat of war. Tonnage lim­ itations applied only to the non-Black Sea powers, whose maximum aggregate strength in the Black Sea was not to exceed 30,000 tons, to be increased to 45,000 tons, according to an "escalator clause," if the Soviet navy were to augment its ini­ tial strength by 10,000 tons (Article 18). These rules were to apply for the duration of the convention, i.e., 20 years. However, the convention also proclaimed the general "principle of freedom of transit and navigation by sea in the Straits" (Arti­ cle 1) which was to continue "without limit of time" (Article 28).12 Considering the affirmation of this general principle, the expiry of the conven­ tion in 1956 did not basicaIly change the position of the Soviet Union, whose free­ dom of egress to the Aegean Sea was practiealIy unlimited under the terms of the convention. By contrast, the expiration of the convention enabled the non-Black Sea powers to enter the Black Sea without tonnage restrictions. The United States had never been a signatory of the convention and as such had not been formally bound by its provisions. In spite of this, the U.S. navy visits to the Black Sea were rare and restricted in tonnage to well below the maximum level envisioned by the convention. In June and December 1968, two destroyers of the Sixth Fleet en­ tered the Black Sea. These visits elicited Soviet complaints that the United States was violating the terms of the Montreux Convention.1a In purely legal terms, however, Soviet accusations did not appear to be justified. Paradoxically again, this was the year when the Soviet Union, in May 1968, sent, for the first time, her three warships to the Persian Gulf on a goodwill tour which included a visit to the Iraqi port of Umm QasrY Although technologically and in terms of fire power the Sixth Fleet was believed to be superior to the more numerous Soviet fleet, the latter had three advantages: (a) most of its ships were of recent vintage, i.e., less than 20 years old, in contrast to the majority of American ships; (b) it was near to its home base in the Black

12 Text of the Montreux Convention in Magnus, op. cit., pp. 42-53. For a discussion of the Soviet position, see James T. Shotwell and Francis Deak, Turkey at the Straits: A Short His­ tory (New York: Macmillan, 1941), and W. C. Hucul, "Soviet Russia and the Turkish Straits: An Historical Sketch," World Affairs Quarterly, Vol. XXVII, No.3 (October 1956). 13 Strategic Survey, 1968 (London: The Institute for Strategic Studies, 1969), p. 28. 14 For a discussion of possible Soviet penetration of the Persian Gulf, see The Gulf: impli­ cations of British Withdrawal (Washington: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, Special Report Series. No.8, 1969).

156 Sea; (c) it had access to facilities in the radical Arab states along most of the eastern and southern shores of the Mediterranean. The Sixth Fleet had no major bases in the Mediterranean. It was supplied, serv­ iced, and fueled on a "floating" basis by auxiliary ships. It had ports of call where American ships stopped for leaves, such as Naples, Barcelona, Piraeus, Malta, and Gibraltar (the French ports were removed from this list upon suspension of France's active military role in NATO in 1966). By contrast, the Soviet fleet had access to the docking and bunkering facilities of the ports of Lattakia in Syria; Alexandria, Port Said, and Mersa Matruh in the U.A.R.; and Algiers, Bone, and Mers el-Kebir in Algeria. Large sections in the harbor of Alexandria were restricted areas and reserved for the Soviet navy's exclusive use. Development of port facilities in Mersa Matruh was geared largely to Soviet needs. Mersa Matruh, moreover, became a Soviet air base in 1967. In a purely legal sense, these facilities available to Soviet armed forces were not formally granted bases. The Russians avoided concluding formal leasehold agree­ ments. These might have had a connotation of imperialism and might have ex­ posed the Soviet Union to dangerous comparisons with Western powers which only recently had used bases in Arab countries. In addition to these facilities on Arab shores, the Soviet fleet used anchorages in international waters in the Gulf of Hammamet off the eastern coast of Tunisia; the Gulf of Sirte off the coast of Libya; in the Sicilian Channel between Sicily and Tunisia; in the seas off the Greek islands of Kythera and Antikythera south of Pe­ loponesus, off the island of Karpathos between Crete and Rhodes; and-for sub­ marines-off the Spanish Alboran Island. The Alboran Island anchorage, 135 miles east of Gibraltar and in equidistance of about 40 miles from both the Mo­ roccan and the Spanish coasts, is particularly well placed for Soviet submarines to watch movements of NATO ships between the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. Impressive increase in the numbers and frequency of visits of the Soviet navy in the Mediterranean became a matter of serious concern to Washington and the al­ lied governments. At a meeting of the NATO ministerial council in Brussels in May 1971, U.S. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird stated that Soviet naval activ­ ity in the Mediterranean had expanded from 650 ship days-the operational pres­ ence of one ship for one day-in 1964 to 20,000 in 1970.'0 The balance between the Soviet Mediterranean Fleet and the U.S. Sixth Fleet in 1971 thus appeared to be precarious. Of course, the Sixth Fleet was backed by contingents of the Italian, Greek, Turkish, and to some extent British navies, under NATO command. Furthermore, with the exception of the French sector, the west­ ern and northern coasts of the Mediterranean were accessible to NATO navies. But growing numbers of air bases in the radical Arab states along the Mediterra­ nean coastline-to which Soviet aircraft had access-tended to strengthen the So­ viet naval position. And, to some extent, this counteracted the power of American aircraft carriers. The recently evacuated Wheelus Air Base, off Tripoli in Libya, was of great potential importance. Situated on the coast and facing the mid-section

10 For an expression of official American concern over the strategic balance in the Mediter­ ranean, see "Laird Pleads for NATO Buildup in Mediterranean," Associated Press, Brussels, in San Francisco Chronicle, May 29, 1971.

157 of the Mediterranean, where it begins to narrow between Sicily and Tunisia, the Wheelus Base could shift the balance of power in the Mediterranean if its facilities were to become available to the Soviet air force. Nationalism asserted by Libya's Revolutionary Command Council, together with fresh memories of massive foreign presence-American and British-on Libya's territory, inhibited Libya's military rulers from offering this important facility for Soviet control. The Sovict attempt to match the strength of the V.S. Sixth Fleet, the "buzzing" of American ships, and the deployment of Soviet forces in the ports of access and anchorages, together with certain pronouncements of Soviet officials, indicated three objectives of their naval policy in the area: (a) to gain prestige by showing the flag; (b) to neutralize the power of the Sixth Fleet; and (c) to assist in politi­ cal penetration of the Middle East and Africa. The first two objectives were can­ didly acknowledged by Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, commander in chief of the So­ viet navy, in an article written on Soviet Navy Day in July 1970: "The pride of our navy," said Gorshkov, "is atomic submarines fitted with missiles of various purposes which can be launched from under water." And he added: "Ships of the Soviet Navy are systematically present in all oceans, including the areas of the presence of the navies of NATO. Such a situation is undoubtedly not to the liking of imperialist hawks." 16 As for the third objective-to serve as a tool of forward Soviet policy, particu­ larly in the Arab world of the Middle East and North Africa-the Soviet Mediter­ ranean Fleet beyond doubt influenced the struggle between East and West in those areas. In the 1950s and up to 1967, much of the planning and execution of Amer­ ican foreign policy in the Middle East and North Africa was based on an assumption that the West had complete freedom of military and naval action throughout the Mediterranean. Such major moves as the demonstrations of the Sixth Fleet along the coasts of the eastern Mediterranean at the time of the Jor­ danian crisis in April 1957, the landing of American troops in Lebanon in July 1958 (an operation during which Turkish facilities were used for stopovers and re­ fueling of military aircraft), the appearance of the V.S. Air Force in Saudi Arabia in 1963 in connection with the Yemen conflict, were carried out in the secure knowledge that no major military challenge need be expected from the Soviet Union. That immunity either did not exist in 1971 or it had been gravely impaired. In the early 1960s, a hypothetical American intervention to save a friendly govern­ ment from overthrow by a revolutionary conspiracy required merely a politieal de­ cision whether such a move would be politically justified and profitable, along with a purely technical military capacity to transport troops to the scen:; of crisis. Later, a similar contingency-as exemplified by the 1969 revolution in Libya-required in addition the weighing of a possible Soviet intervention on the side of the revolu­ tion. The mere presence of the Soviet navy in the Meditcrranean, aided by the Egypt-based Soviet aircraft, constituted, in fact, a passive form of Soviet interven­ tion. The effeet was to provide a protective shield for a variety of anti-Western movements and regimes, with an attendant growth of dependence of Arab govern­ ments on Soviet power and goodwill.

16 "Homeland's Ocean Guard," Pravda, July 26, 1970.

158 IX. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

eginning in 1955, the Soviet Union has pursued its centuries-old policy of pen­ Betration of the Middle East with increasing vigor, both in the Northern Tier and in the Arab region. This penetration activity was intensified after the Arab­ Israeli war of 1967. In the Northern Tier, the Soviet attitude toward Turkey and Iran mellowed from aggressive and threatening behavior to almost friendly promotion of normal political relations. Diplomatic detente was accompanied by offers, often accepted and implemented, of technical and economic assistance in development of spectac­ ular projects, such as the steel plant in Isfahan and the regulation of Iranian-Soviet border rivers. Certain major projects linked Soviet and Iranian economies, espe­ cially the pipeline conveying gas from southern Iran to the Soviet Union. A degree of economic aid, though on a lesser scale, has also accompanied the normalization of Soviet-Turkish relations. At the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union held in April 1971, Secretary General Leonid Brezhnev stated that relations between the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and Iran and Af­ ghanistan, on the other, had been developing "in a satisfactory manner" and that

Soviet relations with Pakistan and Turkey were "normal." 1 Government officials and the peoples in the Northern Tier took the Brezhnev speech as an indication that the Soviet Union would continue its policies of restraint and coexistence. These Soviet actions and pronouncements weakened psychologically Western ties with the Northern Tier, like CENTO and the bilateral security agreements be­ tween the United States and the three Northern Tier countries of Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan. The new trend was to substitute for them purely local agreements, such as the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD), which excluded Western powers from membership and emphasized nonmilitary objectives. The Northern Tier regimes' de-emphasis of their defense ties with the West encouraged, in turn, a variety of radical and anti-Western groups and movements, particularly among the younger generation whose personal memories did not reach back to the days of Soviet aggressiveness in the 1940s. These groups emerged from obscurity in the early 19708 to press anti-establishment and anti-Western campaigns, particularly in Turkey but also, to some extent, in Iran. In the Arab world, Soviet policy followed three broad lines: close political alignment with radical Arab regimes; arming those regimes and massively rearming them after their defeat in the June 1967 war; and economic assistance. Nonmili­ tary aid has generally been synchronized with Arab development plans which, as a rule, emphasized industrialization over agriculture. This emphasis harmonized with the Soviet view of what was proper and desirable in the Arab development pro-

1 Full text in New Times, No, 15, April 14, 1971. Reference to Turkey, Iran, and Afghani­ stan on p. 33.

159 cess, especially when it followed a "noncapitalist path." Since much of their in­ dustrial activity was channeled into the public sectors of the economies, the Arab countries pursued a noncapitalist path. By contrast, Arab agriculture, despite var­ ious land reform laws, was not collectivized, and it offered little incentive for the Soviet Union to help it succeed. Soviet assistance in the Arab development process was extended in three broad categories: (a) general industrialization (Helwan steel plant in Egypt and a vari­ ety of other industries in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq); (b) harnessing of major rivers and electrification (the Aswan Dam in Egypt and the Euphrates Dam in Syria); and (c) aid in oil exploration and development (North Rumaila oil field in Iraq, Syrian oil fields and ancillary facilities in Jezira, Czechoslovak-built refinery in Horns and exploration in the Siwa oasis in Egypt). 2 In a category apart-affecting both the Arab world and the Northern Tier-was thc major Soviet military and naval presence in the Middle East-Mediterranean area, especially after 1967. This presence took two forms: (a) military advisers, instructors, missile crews, and pilots, primarily in Egypt but also in Syria, Iraq, Al­ geria, and certain other Arab countries; (b) the Soviet navy, which maintained a standing force of 35 to over 60 ships in the Mediterranean, developed a presence in the Indian Ocean, and paid occasional visits to the coasts of southern Arabia, the Red Sea, and the Persian Gulf. These Soviet policies and actions operated in three major contexts: 1. Differences between the Northern Tier and the Arab World. In the Northcrn Tier (Turkey-Iran) the Soviet Union encountered a tradition of suspicion, based on centuries of hostility and bitter experiences with Czarist and Communist imperi­ alism. To any patriotic Turk or Iranian the survival of their countries depended on their defenses against Soviet encroachments and domination. This explained the Turkish and Iranian alliances with the West and the unwillingness of their govern­ ments to sever those ties. The Soviet Union sought to weaken these links and, to some extent, this objective was achieved. The Northern Tier area is no longer used for Western missile emplacements. But so long as Iran and Turkey had govern­ ments whose policies were based on national rather than class interest as conceived by Marxism, there were limits on the effectiveness of Soviet attempts at penetra­ tion. On its part, Moscow was probably realistic enough to recognize these strong feelings of nationalism. By contrast, Soviet approaches to the Arab world have been facilitated by the Arabs' remoteness from the Soviet Union. There was lesser fear of takeover by So­ viet forces. The Arabs had experienced only the Western, not the Soviet, variety of imperialism. Revolutionary ferment in the Arab area after World War II, as con­ trasted to the much greater stability of the Northern Tier during that period, pro­ duced a climate receptive to Soviet diplomacy. And the Arab-Israeli conflict helped Moscow recruit Arab client states. Furthermore, although Western imperial

2 Gradual Soviet involvement in the Middle Eastern oil picture has elicited growing concern of Western observers. See D.L.M., "Soviet Interest in Middle East Oi\." Mizan, Vol. 10, No. 3, May-June, 1968; Lincoln Landis, "Soviet Interest in Middle East Oil," The New Middle East, December 1968; and Robert E. Hunter, "The Soviet Dilemma in the Middle East, Part II: Oil and the Persian Gulf," Adelphi Papers, No. 60, October 1969. For a Soviet statement, see Boris Rachkov, "The Russian Stake in the Middle East: A noted Soviet oil expert answers the recent Western criticisms of the Kremlin's policy," The New Middle East, May 1969.

160 rule in the Middle East had receded, there remained a Western presence of non­ imperial type, with its investments, commercial operations, and. Western cultural assets. These easily became targets of hostility-for both nationalists and Commu­ nists. All this allowed the Soviet Union to project an image of a have-not, disinter­ ested country. The Soviet Union tried to appear in the eyes of the Third World as a country opposed to colonialism (regardless of record in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Eastern Europe), as a society taking an impressive leap forward through a planned economy under noncapitalist state guidance, and as a system condemn­ ing racial discrimination (notwithstanding the privileged position of the Russians in the Soviet multinational state). She turned to her advantage some of the similari­ ties between her own underdeveloped status and the retarded condition of Third World countries. Despite the differences between Arab socialism and Marxism­ Leninism, the Soviet Union was able to emphasize common approaches to the solution of socio-economic problems. These advantages enabled the Soviet Union to sound credible when supporting Arab nationalism against its three standard targets, Zionism, imperialism, and reac­ tion; and to find receptivity when proffering aid and arms. In extending assistance, the Soviet Union always stressed-and Arab recipients dutifully echoed-that as­ sistance was granted "with no strings attached," presumably in contrast to Western aid which in most cases was said to serve ulterior political motives. As if to prove her sincerity in this respect, the Soviet Union dealt directly with Arab governments and made little or no effort to protect Arab Communist parties. If any advantages accrued to local Communists because of Soviet dealings with the official Arab re­ gimes, these were usually the result of subtle inducements rather than of threats or physical pressure. This was in sharp contrast to standard Soviet behavior in East­ ern Europe. The Soviet Union first established, and then enlarged its military, and partic­ ularly its naval presence in the Middle East, without protests from local govern­ ments and without suffering the usual accusations about imperialist designs. 2. Obstacles in the Execution of Soviet Policy. The first and most serious obsta­ cle to Soviet political expansion in the area was the sovereign quality of Middle Eastern, including Arab, governments. In contrast to Eastern Europe, where the governments often were creatures of the Kremlin and where, at the most, attempts at emancipation from satellite status occasionally occurred, even the most radical Arab governments were, politically, masters of their own destiny, free to make sovereign decisions, however unwise or unprofitable. The Soviet Union might have made recipients of her arms and aid dependent on her to a considerable degree, but she did not advance to the point that presidents, premiers and key cabinet members in these countries could be safely relied upon to act as her agents. Secondly, communism was generally rejected by the regimes which cultivated Soviet friendship. Communist parties were either suppressed or barely tolerated. In the Arab revolutionary states, Communist parties were subject to repression and harrassments in Egypt, Sudan, Iraq, and Libya; treated with suspicion in other countries; and, at the most, reached a modus vivendi (including participation in the cabinet) with the regime in Syria. In fact, despite all the protestations of

161 Soviet-Arab friendship, the existence of Communist parties, regarded as Soviet agencies, introduced an element of tension into Soviet-Arab relations, even given official Soviet restraint. The third obstacle in Soviet-Arab relations was posed by the generally acknowl­ edged superiority of Western technology and organization. Had the West been more responsive to Arab aspirations and free from entanglements which soured its political relations with the Arabs, the Arab governments would normally have cho­ sen to purchase Western goods and acquire Western technology. Even under the conditions of tension with the West, certain Arab regimes persisted in hiring West­ ern technical skills. Egypt, for instance, entrusted development of some of its oil resources to two American companies in the 1960s. The fourth obstacle was the basically pro-Western cultural orientation of the Middle Eastern intelligentsia. Students preferred to seek knowledge in the West rather than in the East. To the author's awareness, no Arab cabinet minister up to 1971 obtained his degree in the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe; by contrast, even in the most radically inclined regimes, a number of ministers held American or West European Ph.D. degrees. Similar preferences could be observed in Arab con­ sumers' tastes for Western goods, fashions, motion pictures, and vacation places, Le., thc good things of life which were obtainable within the general context of a superior and free civilization. By the same token, political refugees, i.e., losers in the variety of revolutions and coups-even those who proved their radicalism-did not choose the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe as their place of exile. They prc­ ferred to settle in England, France, West Germany, Spain, Switzerland, or Brazil. Exiled Communists were the only exception to this rule, but even in this category the West sometimes was chosen in preference to the Soviet Union. 3. The Central Issue of Arab-Israeli Conflict. The June war of 1967 and the suhsequent occupation of Arab lands by Israel had a negative effect on the West's position and influence, while accelerating the pace of Soviet advanccs in the area. By stirring up the Arab masses and intelligentsia alike, the war quickened the trend toward radicalism in the Arab world. This radicalism was displayed in four ways: (a) there were new revolutions against moderate or conservative regimes (Sudan and Libya in 1969, Sudan again briefly in July 1971); (b) further radical measures-mostly of the repressive political type-were initiated in certain states in which revolutions had occurred earlier (hangings and repression in Iraq in 1969-70); (c) unity schemes were promoted among the radical states (the federa­ tion of Egypt, Libya, and Syria was formalized in August-September 1971 with the Sudan to join later); and (d) revolutionary foreign policies were adopted which strengthened ties of friendship with the Soviet Union. Thus the two main themes, defeat of the moderates at home and alienation from the West, tended to go hand in hand and to reinforce each other. Alienation from the West-with the United States a special target due to its arming and support of Israel-was expressed in many ways: rupture of diplomatic relations with Wash­ ington by six Arab countries, reduction in economic interchange, expulsions of Western residents in the afea, closing and sequestration of American schools, uni­ versities and libraries, temporary oil embargoes, suspension of overflight rights, boycotts of Western shipping, trade, and banking, total or partial nationalization of

162 certain enterprises, and threats of drastic action against the oil companies. It was this alienation that the Soviet Union exploited to its own advantage by trying to substitute itself for the diminishing Western presence in the area. Soviet advances in the Middle East were not only a matter of Soviet decisions and bilateral Soviet-Arab relations; they were in reality a product of a triangular complex in which Western postures and policies played a vital role. The Arab rela­ tionship with the United States has sometimes been described as "unrequited love." The Arab modernization process began with admiration, emulation of, and prefer­ ence for the West. The Franco-British imperial presence in the area in the interwar period and Western support for the state of Israel since 1948 marred this friendly relationship. But while Franco-British imperialism receded or vanished altogether, the controversy over Israel remained as the focal point of Western-Arab disagree­ ments. This controversy, in turn, changed its character since 1967: Arab emphasis on the inadmissibility of the existence of Israel gave way to a new emphasis on the need to stop Israel's territorial expansion, with an implicit and at times explicit willingness in important Arab centers (Egypt, Jordan) to accept Israel as a reality. The success of Soviet advances in the Middle East could thus be attributed pri­ marily to the receptivity of Arab radical regimes to Soviet offers of arms and aid, a receptivity resulting from the dual process of alienation from the West and do­ mestic radicalization. The issue for the West was how to make these countries less receptive to Soviet advances. The logical reply would appear to be that the West should demonstrate, by word and by deed, that it is not hostile to the basic Arab aspirations of independence, territorial integrity, and deVelopment, and that it does not endorse schemes and policies aiming at territorial expansionism and demo­ graphic changes at the expense of the Arab peoples. During the six-month period from September 1970 to February 1971, an inter­ esting and, from the Western point of view, hopeful trend made its appearance in the Arab world: a partial reversal of radicalism in three Arab countries bordering on Israel. In Jordan, King Hussein asserted his authority over guerrilla militants, thus strengthening the position of Arab moderates. In Syria, General Hafez Assad removed from power the extremist left-wing of the Baath party and launched a policy of domestic and foreign moderation. And in Egypt, President Anwar al­ Sadat expressed his willingness to sign a peace agreement which would acknowl­ edge Israel's right to a secure existence within recognized boundaries, provided Is­ rael withdrew from the occupied Arab territories according to the United Nations resolution of November 1967. An ebb of radicalism and the reorientation of Arab policies that would follow could have serious repercussions for both Soviet and Western positions iJ;l the area. But moderation and rationalism were tender flowers in 1971-especially in the Middle East. They needed careful cultivation. That there was promise in those trends and danger if they were to be reversed appeared evident also to the United States government. On March 16, 1971 Secretary of State William P. Rogers said: "The climate has never been better for a settlement in the Middle East, and if we don't make a settlement now, we are going to plant seeds that will lead to fu-

163 ture war." 3 Yet the months that followed, despite Department of State efforts, brought no visible progress in promoting approaches to peace and by the close of the summer of 1971 the impasse remained as great and disturbing as ever.

3 The New York Times, March 17,1971.

164 APPENDIX

APPENDIX A

Text of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation Signed by the Soviet Union and Egypt Following, as transmitted in English by Tass, the Soviet press agency, is the text of the Soviet-Egyptian treaty of friendship signed in Cairo: The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Arab Republic, Being firmly convinced that the further development of friendship and all­ around cooperation between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Arab Republic meets the interests of the peoples of both states and helps strengthen world peace, Being inspired by the ideals of struggle against imperialism and colonialism, and for the freedom, independence and social progress of the peoples, Being determined to wage persistently the struggle for stronger international peace and security in accordance with the invariable course of their peaceable for­ eign policy, Reaffirming their allegiance to the aims and principles of the United Nations Charter, Being driven by a desire to consolidate and strengthen the traditional relations of sincere friendship between the two states and peoples through concluding a treaty of friendship and cooperation and thus creating a basis for their further de­ velopment, Agreed on the following:

Article 1 The high contracting parties solemnly declare that unbreakable friendship will always exist between the two countries and their peoples. They will continue to de­ velop and strengthen the existing relations of friendship and all-around cooperation between them in the political, economic, scientific, technological, cultural and other fields on the basis of the principles of respect for the sovereignty, territorial integ­ rity, noninterference in the internal affairs of each other, equality and mutual bene­ fit.

Article 2 The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a socialist state and the United Arab Republic, which has set itself the aim of reconstructing society along socialist lines, will cooperate closely and in all fields in ensuring conditions for preserving and further developing the social and economic gains of their peoples.

165 Article 3 Being guided by a desire to contribute in every way toward maintaining interna­ tional peace and the security of the peoples, the Union of Soviet Socialist Repub­ lics and the United Arab Republic will continue with all determination to make ef­ forts toward achieving and ensuring a lasting and fair peace in the Middle East in accordance with the aims and principles of the United Nations Charter. In pursuing a peace-loving foreign policy, the high contracting parties will come out for peace, relaxation of international tension, achievement of general and com­ plete disarmament and prohibition of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction. Article 4 Being guided by the ideals of freedom and equality of all the peoples, the high contracting parties condemn imperialism and colonialism in all their forms and manifestations. They will continue to come out against imperialism, for the full and final elimination of colonialism in pursuance of the U.N. declaration on the granting of independence to all colonial countries and peoples, and wage unswerv­ ingly the struggle against racialism and apartheid. Article 5 The high contracting parties will continue to expand and deepen all-around co­ operation and exchange of experience in the economic and scientific-technological fields-industry, agriculture, water conservancy, irrigation, development of natural resources, development of power engineering, the training of national personnel and other fields of economy. The two sides will expand trade and sea shipping between the two states on the basis of the principles of mutual benefit and most-favored nation treatment. Article 6 The high contracting parties will further promote cooperation between them in the fields of science, arts, literature, education, health services, the press, radio, television, cinema, tourism, physical culture and other fields. The two sides will promote wider cooperation and direct connections between political and public organizations of working people, enterprises, cultural and sci­ entific institutions for the purpose of a deeper mutual acquaintance with the life, work and achievements of the peoples of the two countries. Article 7 Being deeply interested in ensuring peace and the security of the peoples, and attaching great importance to concerted ness of their actions in the international area in the struggle for peace, the high contracting parties will, for this purpose, regularly consult each other at different levels on all important questions affecting the interests of both states. In the event of development of situations creating, in the opinion of both sides, a danger to peace or violation of peace, they will contact each other without delay in order to concert their positions with a view to removing the threat that has arisen or reestablishing peace.

166 Article 8 In the interests of strengthening the defense capacity of the United Arab Repub­ lie, the high contracting parties will continue to develop cooperation in the military field on the basis of appropriate agreements between them. Such cooperation will provide specifically for assistance in the training of the U.A.R. military personnel, in mastering the armaments and equipment supplied to the United Arab Republic with a view to strengthening its capacity to eliminate the consequences of aggres­ sion as well as increasing its ability to stand up to aggression in general.

Article 9 Proceeding from the aims and principles of this treaty, each of the high con­ tracting parties states that it will not enter into alliances and will not take part in any groupings of states, in actions or measures directed against the other high contracting party.

Article 10 Each of the high contracting parties declares that its commitments under the ex­ isting international treaties are not in contradiction with the provisions of this treaty and it undertakes not to enter into any international agreements incompati­ ble with it.

Article II The present treaty will be operative within 15 years since the day it enters into force. If neither of the high contracting parties declares a year before the expiry of this term its desire to terminate the treaty, it will remain in force for the next five years and so henceforth until one of the high contracting parties makes a year before the expiry of the current five-year period a written warning on its intention to termi­ nate it.

Article 12 The present treaty is subject to ratification and shall come into force on the day of exchange of ratification instruments, which will take place in Moscow in the nearest future. The present treaty is done in two eopies, each in Russian and Arabic, with both texts being equally authentic. Done in the city of Cairo on May 27, 1971, which corresponds to 3 Rabia as Sani, 1391, Hejira.

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. N. PODGORNY. For the United Arab Republic. ANWAR SADAT.

167 Soviet President Podgorny's Visit to Cairo, 1971: Text of Joint Communique

In response to the invitation of U.A.R. President and ASU Chairman Anwar as-Sadat, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet Presidium Nikolai Podgorny paid a friendly and unofficial visit to the U.A.R. 25-28 May 1971. Discussions and meetings were held between the Soviet President and President Anwar as-Sadat during President Podgorny's visit. Negotiations were also held between the two sides. They were attended on the Soviet side by: CPSU Central Committee Secretary B.N. Ponomarev, CPSU Central Committee member and Soviet Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko, CPSU Central Committee member and Soviet Deputy Defense Minister Army General I. G. Pavlovsky, Soviet Ambassador to the U.A.R. V. M. Vinogradov, and chief of the Middle East Section at the Soviet Foreign Ministry M. D. Sytenko. The discussions were attended on the Arab side by: Vice President Husayn ash-Shafi'i; Premier Mahmud Fawzi; People's Assembly Speaker Hafiz Badawi; Deputy Premier and Minister of Industry, Petroleum, and Mineral Wealth Dr. Aziz Sidqi; Deputy Premier and Information Minister Dr. Muhammad Abd al­ Qadir Hatim; Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister Mahmud Riyad; Minister of State for Presidential Affairs Muhammad Ahmad; Minister of State for People's Assembly Affairs Muhammad Abd as-Salam az-Zayyat; War Minister Gen. Mu­ hammad Sadiq; and U.A.R. Ambassador to Moscow Murad Ghalib. During the discussions, which took place in an atmosphere of friendship and mutual understanding characteristic of the existing' relations between the two coun­ tries, views were exchanged on a number of questions regarding the development of the relations between the Soviet Union and the U .A.R. and also on continuing questions relating to the current international situation and the present situation in the Middle East. President Podgorny acquainted the Egyptian side with the 24th CPSU Con­ gress [words indistinct] in carrying out the congress resolutions. President Anwar as-Sadat explained the Egyptian people's efforts to eliminate the consequences of the Israeli aggression and realize the aims of economic and social progress in the country. The Soviet side expressed great appreciation of the U.A.R. leaders' and people's determination to continue the progressive and anti-imperialist line that the de­ parted President Jamal Abd an-Nasir had followed and charted in the national ac­ tion charter and the 30 March declaration and their determination to continue to follow the line leading to social progress and socialist transformation of society. The discussions concentrated especially on the grave situation in the Middle East resulting from Israel's imperialist aggression against the U.A.R. and other Arab states.

Source: Cairo MENA in 1904 GMT 27 May 1971, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 28 May 1971.

168 The two sides affirmed that the policy of Israel, which depends on U.S. support, is the policy of an aggressor who seeks to usurp Arab territories he occupied fol­ lowing the 1967 aggression. The two sides also emphasized that by its rejection of all the proposals for set­ tling the Middle East problem and its refusal to withdraw its forces from the terri­ tories occupied in 1967, Israel has confirmed its expansionist policy and emphasized that its continued disregard of the principles of the UN Charter and international law and insistence on its expansionist policy constitute a serious threat to international peace and world security. The two sides agreed that the U.AR.'s constructive policy of seeking a settlement to the Middle East problem by political methods creates suitable conditions for es­ tablishing a just and durable peace in this area and that this U.AR. policy receives the support of all peace-loving states and the world public. The two sides reaffirmed that a just, durable, and firm peace in the Middle East cannot be established except on the basis of Israel's withdrawal from all the terri­ tories occupied in 1967 and implementation of all the provisions of Security Coun­ cil Resolution 242 issued on 22 Nove,mber 1967. The Soviet side affirmed that the Soviet Union will continue in the future to ex­ tend its comprehensive aid and support to the U.AR. and other Arab states in their just struggle against the Israeli aggression, for the liberation of all Arab territories occupied by Israel, and for a just settlement to the Middle East crisis. President Anwar as-Sadat expressed profound gratitude to the Soviet Union for its aid and support to the U.AR. in its struggle against the Isracli aggression. He also praised the 24th CPSU Congress statement regarding a just and stable peace in the Middle East. During the negotiations the two sides expressed full satisfaction at the growth in the relations of friendship and fruitful cooperation in various fields between the Soviet Union and the U.AR. in the political, economic, military, and other fields. These relations are founded on the bases of common aims in the struggle against imperialism and for social progress. Both sides expressed their common desire to mobilize all capacities for the con­ tinued development of these relations. Questions of developing the relations between the CPSU and the U.AR. Arab Socialist Union were discussed at the meetings. Agreement was reached on practical and specific measures for implementation of the 1971 party contacts programs. On the basis of their firm belief that continuous development of friendship and comprehensive cooperation between the Soviet Union and the U.AR. conforms with the interests of both states and serves the cause of strengthening world peace, and in their desire to consolidate and strengthen the traditional relations of friendship between the two states and peoples, the two sides decided to conclude a treaty of friendship and cooperation between the U.S.S.R. and the U.A.R. The treaty was signed in Cairo on 27 May 1971. U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet Presid­ ium Chairman Nikolai Podgorny signed for the Soviet Union, and President Anwar as-Sadat signed for the U.AR. This treaty is considered a historic document in the relations of the two countries, as its aim is to support the just, liberative, national struggle of the U.A.R. people to build a better future.

169 The two sides expressed determination to eliminate the consequences of thc Is­ raeli aggression as soon as possible and to restore a just peace in the Middle East based on respect for the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. The two sides expressed confidence that the forthcoming visit of U.A.R. President Anwar as-Sadat to the Soviet Union at the invitation of the Communist Party Cen­ tral Committee, the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet Presidium, and the Soviet Govern­ ment, will be a new contribution to the development of the fraternal relations between the two countries.

170 APPENDIX B

A Note on the Tanker Fleets of the Communist Bloc, 1970

Deadweight T2 No. of Tons (16,000 tons) Tankers thousands) ... equiv~I~!lts

Soviet Union . . ~ ...... ~ . .. . . 192 4,449 291

East Germany . . ~ . ~ ...... 12 374 34

Bulgaria • • .. '" • • • • • .. • * • • .. • ~ • .. 13 237 15

Rumania ...... ~ ...... 4 110 7

Poland ~ .. • .. • • ...... • • • • .. .. ;0 • • • 6 110 7 Communist China ...... 13 218 13

~.

Totals ...... ~ 240 5,498 367

Most of the Communist bloc tankers are in the 18,000 to 36,000 ton range; a few are within the 45,000 to 50,000 ton range. Under construction in 1970-71 there were three tankers of 60,000 tons and two of 100,000 tons. One tanker of 150,000 tons was in the "drawing board" stage. A greater part of the Soviet tanker fleet serviced the Black Sea region; about one-quarter operated from the Baltic ports. Exports of the Soviet and bloc crude and products to the free world amounted in 1970-71 to slightly over 1 million barrels per day (bid), of which 75 percent was shipped by tankers and the rest over land and by river. Soviet and bloc tankers have also transportcd oil between the countries of the free world. These movements (whieh included Cuba) havc amounted to 100,000 bid. Shipments of oil (mostly crude) from the free world to the bloc countries have been at the rate of 150,000 bid, of whieh about one-half was carried in So­ viet and bloc tankers.

171 APPENDIX C Merchant Marine Traffic in the Tnrkish Straits, Selective List for 1970 Calls in Transit Total Country Harbors Voyages Total Tonnage Communist Bloc:

USSR •••• * •••• 376 6,695 7,071 29,337,803

Bulgaria • + • • ~ • • 431 879 1,310 2,885,933 Rumania 99 564 663 2,244,410

Poland . . . . . ~ . . 21 78 99 530,892

Hungary ~ ...... 60 46 106 70,488 East Germany ... 38 112 150 1,059,502 Albania ...... 11 33 44 89,342 Free World: United States ... 111 12 123 605,367

Panama •••• +. <> 84 425 509 987,305

Liberia ~ . . . . . 59 375 434 2,143,756 Oreat Britain ... 74 55 129 494,486 France ...... 15 101 116 1,024,616 West Germany .. 181 169 350 727,051 Greece ...... 443 2,728 3,171 7,171,092 Italy ...... 211 970 1,181 5,697,020 Norway ...... 34 215 249 1,426,791

Source: Republique Turque. Ministerc des Affaires Etrangcres. Rapport AllfllleI Jur Ie MotH'ement des Nat'ires a Tralers ley Detroits T",,'s, 1970, 34emc AII1,,'e (Ankara January 1971),

APPENDIX 0

Soviet War Ships Transiting the Turkish Straits, 1968 and 1970

---"'--.~.--~,--.. ~----- Number of Passages 1968 1970 January 6 15 February 17 9 March 16 42 April 29 16 May 12 28 June 19 24 July 18 22 August 17 20 September 23 23 October 34 ]9 November ]6 31 December 23 23 Total 230 272

.-.-.--,~ Source: Rapport Annue1.op. cit,. 1969 and 1971 172 INDEX

Abdullah, Amir, 140 Comintern, 9, 10, 11, 112 Afghanistan, 24, 87, 159 Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 13, 17 Aflaq. Michel, 102 Cuba, 48, 129 Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Conference, 66, Curiel, Henry, 86 72, 131 Cyprus, 31, SOlI. Agha. I'IIustafa, 89 Czarist Russia, 2, 23 Ahmed, Karim, 142 C..zechoslovakia, 34, 35, 60, 62, llS, 117, 129, Albania, 129 131, 142, 145ff. Alem, Mahmud al-, 89 Algeria, 59, 115, 145, 146, 152, 157 Demirel, Suleiman, 52 Allen, George V., 27 Dulaimi, Dr. Naziha, 134, 138 Arab Socialist Union, 19, 20, 66, 88, 90, 137, 139 Dulles, A lien, 134 Arafat, Yasser, 72 Dulles, John F., 57, 81, 83 Aref, General Adbul Salam, 97, 132, 137ff. Aref, General Abdur Rahman, 138ft East Germany, 52, 62, 113, 129, 137, 148 Armenia, 37 Egypt (~ee also Nasser, Aswan Darn, Sadat), Ashmar, Muhammad al-, 106 Assad, General Hafez, 116, ll7ff., 121, 163 acceptance of UNEF, 83 Arab socialism, 80 Aswan Dam, 56, 60, 80, 93ff., 122. 152, 160 arms deal of 1955, 56, 78, 81 Atassi, Dr. Nureddin, 116, 121, 123 Atatiirk, Mustafa Kemal, 43 arms flow, 145ff. Communist movement, 85ff. Azerhaijan, 23, 24f1. Communist party dissolved, 88 Azm. Khaled al-, 105, no oil development, 99 Azmeh, Bashir, 109 pact with Russia of 1971, 84, 165II. removal of Sabry, 84 Baath Party, 12, 19, 20, 66, 68, 80, 102ff., lllff., Soviet reaction to coup of 1952, 76 132, 139fT. Eisenhower, Dwight D. (and Eisenhower Doc- Baghdad Pact (see also Central Treaty Organi­ trine), 83, 94, 102, 128 zation), 2, 30, 31, 47, 56, 78, 94, 102, 128 Erkin, Feridun. 52 Bakdash, Khaled, 12, 102, 107, 108, 109, 113, Erim, Nihat, 53 114, 115, 121, 125 Euphrates Dam (in Syria), 60, 112, 114, 120ff., Bakhtiar, General Teymour, 30 160; (in Iraq), 139 Bakr Sidqi, 126 Baldwin, Hanson, 48 Bandung Conference, I, 56, 102 Fakhri, Sclim, 133, 139 Bar-Lev Line, 152 Fascism, 10, II Barawy, Rashed el-, 75, 76 Fatah, 72 Barzani, Mustafa, 26, 27, 71, 128, 141 Fedayeen, 72, 117 Bazzaz, Abdur Rahman, 71, 139 France, 40, 79, 81 Ben Bella, Ahmed, 97 Bitar, Salaheddin, 102, 105 Gallman, Waldemar, 128 Bizri, Alif, 104, 106, 108, 121, 125 Germany Black, Eugene, 94 Euphrates Dam, 120ff. Bulganin, Premier, 106 Nazi-Soviet pact, 38 Bulgaria, 35, 52, 62, 129, 137 Rahid Ali coup, 126 Ghazi, Mohammed, 26 Caglayangil, Ihsan Sabri, 52 Gilan, Soviet Republic of, 23, 24 Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), 18, 30, Gorshkov, Admiral Sergei, 158 31, 32, 35, 51, 52, 56, 159 Great Britain, 40, 79, 81 Chaderchi, Kamel, 134 Grechko, Marshal, 97, 116, 117, 149 Chagouri, Ahmad, 112 Greece, 31, 46, 47, 55, 157 Chamoun, Camille, 80 Gromyko, Andrei, 52, 168 China, Communist, 31, 54, 66, 89, 92, 93, 94, Giirsel, General Cemal, 49 109, no, 115, 118, 128, 154 Coexistence, 13, 14, 18 Haikal, Mohammed H., 85 Cominform, 12 Haj, Aziz al-, 140

173 Hamadallah, Major Farouk, 70 critical of Arab nationalism, 138 Hamrush, Ahmed, 89 warnings to Turkey, 105 Hourani, Akram, 102, 121 Kirkuk, 133-134 Hussein, King, 70, 163 Komer, Robert, 51 Kosygin, Alexei, 52, ll5 Ideology, Soviet, role of, 2, 3 Kubbah, Ibrahim, 130, 134 Idris, King, 153 Kuchik Khan, 23 Indian Ocean, 41, 160 Kurdish Democratic Party, 134, 135, 142 Inonii, lsmet, 50fl'. Kurds (Kurdistan), 26, 37, 66, 69, 71·72, 125, Iran, 13, 18, 2311'. 128, 136, 137, 141 and CENTO, 30 and rocket sites, 31 Laird, Melvin, 157 Azerbaijan rehellion, 25·27 Lausanne, Treaty of, 37, 38 gas pipeline, 321'1. l.ebanon, 12, 13, 57, 80, 158 Kurdish rebellion, 26 l.enin (l.eninism), 6, 7, 8, 14, IS, 17, 18,21, 65, oil crisis, 28ft 114 Soviet arms deal, 35 Lenin (and Stalin) peace prizes, 64, 75n., l06n. Soviet· Iranian treaty of 1921, 24, 31 l.iberation, national, wars of, 15, 21 steel plant, 32ff. l.ibya, 70, 80, 84, 145, 152, 153, 154, 158, 161 Iraq (see also Aref, Baath, Kurds) Ard's clash with Khrushchev, 138 :\1ahdawi, Colonel Fadhil Abbas, 132, 135 Aref's Islamic proclivities, 138 Mahgoub, Khalek, 71 Baath--Communist party dialogue, 141-142 Marshall Plan, 12, 47 Communist factions, 140 Marxism,S, 6, 15, 17,21,61,68, 138,161 Communist pary influence under Kassem, Menderes, Adnan, 49, 128 129fl'. Molotov V., 40, 126 Communist party persecuted by Baath, Montreaux Convention, 41, 45, 46, 155, 156 136-137 ~10rocco, 59 Communist party self-criticism, 135 Moslem Brotherhood, 76, 101 dissident Communists, 135·136 ~lossadegh, Mohammed, 28, 29 Kassem and Russia, 128ff. Mosul, 37, 133, 137 MOBul and Kirkuk crises, 133 Muhasin, Asad, llO People's Court, 132 Muhieddin, Major Khaled, 75, 89 Podgorny in Baghdad, 139 Ismail al·Bustani, Abdul Qader, 136, 137, 139 Nabulsi, Suleiman. 80 Israel, 56 Naguib. General Mohammed, 76 Communist arms purchased, 58 Nasser, Gamal Abdul, 57,69,70,78,79, 80ff. destruction not favored by Moscow, 61 dehate with Khrushchev over communism, impact of June war on the West, 162 87n., 108 impact of war on Iraq, 140 union with Syria, 107 recognized by Soviet Union, 58 National democracy, 16, 17,22, 104 rejeets Jarring's peace proposals, 151 National front (see also united front), 16, 19, Soviet stand toward U.N. resolution, 72 88, 104, 119, 121, 126, 141, 143 lttihad ash·Shaab, 135·136 National Guards, 137 N.A.T.O. (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), Jadid, General Salah, 113, 116, 117, 121 47, 56, 157, 158 Jarring, Dr. Gunnar, 151 ~eutralism, 14, 15,31, 57, 78, 102, 104, 120 Jordan, 59, 60, 70 Numeiri, General Jaafar, 70, 71, 153 Johnson, Lyndon, 50ff. Nur, Colonel Babakr al., 70 Nuri as·Said, 47, 128 Kahhalah, Dr. Nureddin, 109 Kahhalah, Subhi, 110 Oil, Soviet (bloc) interest in, 26, 27, 34, 35, 52, Kamal, General Namik, 110 99, 105, 116, 160 Kars and Ardahan, 45 Horns refinery, 105, ll5, 160 Kassem, General Abdul Karim, 80, 128ff. Iranian gas pipeline, 32ft Kennedy, John F., ·18 Jezira province, 115, 160 Khairi, Zaki, 135, 140 North Rumaila field, 142, 160 Kholy, l.outfi el·, 89, 90 Siwa oasis, 160 Khrushchev, Nikita, 5, 13ff., 48, 50, 57, 120, 123 storage tanks in Syria, 112 and Aswan Dam, 94 and Suez crisis, 79 Pakistan, 159 attacks on Nasser, 70, 108, 136 Palestine, 72; see fedayeen

174 Pan-Turanism, 43fT. arms for Egypt, 78, 81, 14Sff. and anti-Soviet liberation movements in arms for Iraq, 129, 139 Crimea, Caucasus, 44 arms for Syria, llO Papen, Franz von, 44 Azerbaijan intervention, 24ft Pavlovsky, General L G., 168 Baath Party, attitude toward, 102, lIlff. Peace Partisans, 86, 89, 106, 129, 130, 133, 136 Cyprus policy, 50ff. Pelikan, ]iri, 131 Czarist traditions, 2 Persian Gulf, 41, 42, 156, 160 fedayeen, stand on, 72·73 Pishevari, Jaafar, 26 Gilan intervention, 23·24 Podgorny, Nicolai, 53, 81, 84, 85, 116, 139, 150, Iraqi revolution, stand on, 128ff. 167ft June 1967 war, 81 Poland, 35, 38, 40, 43, 62 Kars and Ardahan, 4S aviation pact with Iraq, 136 Khrushchev era, 13 city planning in Baghdad, 65 missiles in Egypt, 148, 151H. naval training for Egypt, 146 missiles in Iran, stand on. 31 steel-rolling mill in Hama, 115 missiles in Turkey, stand on, 48 sulphur project in Iraq, 60, 142 Molotov·Ribbentrop accord, 1940, 4Off. Popular Resistance Forces, 131, 133, 136 naval bases, 157 neutralism, acceptance of, 57·58, 78 Qadhafi, Colonel Muammar, 70, 153, 154 pact with Egypt, 1971, 84·85, 165H. Quwatli, Shukri, 104, 105 pilots in Egypt, 151 scholarships for Arabs, 61H. Radawi, Husain al-, 137 Sixth Comintern Congress, 9 Rashid Ali al-Gaitani, 126 steel and gas in Iran, 32ff. RCD (Regional Cooperation for Development), straits question, 4Iff., 45 32, 159 Suez crisis, 79 Revolutionary democracy, 19, 22, 111, 120 U.N. 1967 resolution, 81, 117 Rhodes armistice, 82 Stalin (Stalinism), 8, 9ff., 27 Ribbentrop, von, 44 Students, Arab Rikabi, Fuad, 140 in Soviet bloc, 62, 63, 93 Rogers, William, 84, 85, 163 preference for West, 162 Rumania, 34, 35, 52, 99 Sudan, 70, 71,96, 145, 152, 153, 161 Rusk, Dean, 51 Suez Canal and crisis, 56, 152 Syria (see also Baath, Egypt), aid pact, 1957, 105 Saadabad, 18, 31 arms deal, 1956. 104-105 Sa ada bad Pact, 128 Baath rule, IlIff. Saati, Miss Najah, 121 Communist-Baath cooperation, 102ff. Sabry, Ali, 78, 85 conditions of Soviet aid, 1%6, 113-114 Sadat, Anwar al-, 70, 84, 85, 151, 163, 167ff. Sadiq, Yusef, 75 Communist party statement on Assad, 119 Sallal, Abdullah, 97 Communist party vs. union with Egypt, 107 Saltaneh, Ghavam, 26 Euphrates Dam, 114H., 120ft Samir, Dr. Faisal al., 134 Hafez Assad and China, 118 Saracoglu, Siikrii, 40 Kosygin on progressive front, lIS SarraL Abdul Hamid, 105, 108 Nasser attacks Communist party, 108 Saudi Arabia, 80, 146, 154, 158 Soviet.Syrian role in June war, 116 Sayegh, Daud, 135 stand on U.N. resolution. 117 Schulenburg, Ambassador, 41, 126 Syrian Social Nationalist Party, 101, 102 Scientific socialism, 19, 114, 138 Sharif, Aziz, 130, 137 Takriti, Hussein Sidam, 141 Shawaf, Colonel Abdul Wahab, 133, 135 TIas, General Mustafa, 118 Shepilov, Dimitri, 86, 94, 105 Truman Doctrine, 12.27,29,47,55 Shishakli, Adib, 101 Turkes, Alparslan, 49 Sixth Fleet, U.S., 51, 154ff. Tudeh Party, 2·4, 27, 29 Socialism, Arab, 68, 79, 82, Ill, 138 Turkey, 24, 31, 36ft Sokolov, General, ll6 and German·Soviet cooperation, 40ft South Yemen, 145, 152, 154 Cuban missile crisis, 48 Soviet navy, 54, 142, 154ff., 160, 172 Cyprus crisis. 50ff. Soviet Union (see also Khrushchev, Kosygin, Mosul question, 37, 38 Podgorny) , Soviet territorial demands, 45f£. Arab socialism, stand on, 80 Turkish Straits, 37, 45, 54, 155, 156. 173 Arab unity, stand on, 69, 80, 109-110, Il5 Umm Qasr, 156

175 United Arab Republic (U.A.R.l, see Egypt support for Iran's integrity, 27 United front concept (tactic), 8, II, 13, 16, 20, support for Zionism, 58, 78, 82 29, 90, 112, 114 Truman Doctrine, 27, 47 U.N. Emergency Force, 83 Turkish Straits, 46 United States (see also Dulles, John F., Eisen· U.S. Navy to Black Sea, 156 hower, Johnson, Kennedy, Rogers, Truman), Wheelus Base, 157 alienation from Arabs, 81·84, 162-163 withdraws Aswan Dam offer, 80, 93·94 Arab reprisals for June war, 162 Orgliplli, Suat Hayri, 52 arms for Israel, 83 arms for moderates, 60 Vanguard concept, 90·91, II4 Baghdad Pact and CENTO, 30, 47, 56, 159 bases in Arab states, 56 Wheelus Air Base, 153, 157, 158 Cuba-Turkey crisis, 48 Cyprus crisis, 50fI. Yemen, 57, 59 early support for Nasser, 76 arms for, 152, 154 economic aid to Egypt, 93 civil war in. 148 Eisenhower Doctrine, 56 receives airplanes, 14-6 intervention in Lebanon, 57·82 Soviet harbor for Hodeida, 60 Northern Tier alliances, 30, 47, 160 Yugoslavia, 92. 129 refuses Egypt's arms quest, 78 Yusuf, Awni, 134 Rogers in Cairo, 84·85 Sixth Fleet strength, 154, 156 Zahedi, General Fazlollah, 29 strains with radical regimes, 57, 162 Zhdanov, 11, 12, 14, 81 Suez crisis, stand on, 57, 83 Zionism, 58, 161 mpport for Hussein in 19.57, 82 Zuayyen, Dr. YU8uf, 115, 117, 118, 121, 123

176

SELECTED AEI PUBLICATIONS, 1971

RATIONAL DEBATES CAN REGULATORY AGENCIES PROTECT THE CONSUMER? George J. Stigler and Manuel F. Cohen ($5.75) THE ROLE OF CONGRESS IN FOREIGN POLICY, John C. Stennis and J. William Fulbright ($5.75) A JUST PEACE IN THE MIDEAST: HOW CAN IT BE ACHIEVED? I. L. Kenen, Elmer Berger, Allen Pollack, and Christopher Mayhew ($5.75) THE PRESIDENCY AND THE PRESS CONFERENCE, Edward P. Morgan, Clark Mollenhoff, Max Ways, Peter Lisagor, Herbert G. Klein ($5.75) ANALYSES AND STUDIES A STRATEGY FOR U.S. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS POLICY, Gottfried Haberler and Thomas D. Willett CAMPAIGN FINANCES: TWO VIEWS OF THE POLITICAL AND CONSTI­ TUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS, Howard R. Penniman and Ralph K. Winter, Jr. ($3.00) INCOMES POLICIES ABROAD, Eric Schiff CASE FOR MODERATION IN THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY OF 1971, William Fellner ECONOMICS OF HEALTH AND PUBLIC POLICY, Rita Ricardo Campbell ($3.00) SOVIET MILITARY TRENDS: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. SECURITY, Wil- liam R. Kinter and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. ($3.00) BRAZIL'S TROTTING PEG, Juergen B. Donges NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE: AN ANALYSIS, Mark V. Pauly RECENT MONETARY POLICY AND THE INFLATION, Phillip Cagan FEDERAL BUDGET TRENDS, 1962-72 INCOMES POLICIES AND INFLATION, Gottfried HabeIer ($3.00) WAGE-PRICE CONTROLS IN WORLD WAR II, UNITED STATES AND GERMANY, Edited by Colin D. Campbell ($3.00) COMMUNIST CHINA AND THE WORLD BALANCE OF POWER, Yuan-Ii Wu ($3.00) SIGNIFICANT DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT, 1970-71 TERM, Paul C. Bartholomew DAVIS-BACON ACT, John P. Gould ($3.00) ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM, Edited by Valerie Earle ($3.00) U.S. INCOMES POLICY, ITS RATIONALE AND DEVELOPMENT, Thomas Gale Moore WAGES, WAGE POLICY AND INFLATION, 1962-71, Marten Estey AIMING FOR A SUSTAINABLE SECOND BEST DURING THE RECOVERY FROM THE 1970 RECESSION, William Fellner BEAR AT THE GATE: CHINESE POLICYMAKING UNDER SOVIET PRES­ SURE, Harold C. Hinton (AEI-Hoover Policy Study I) ($3.00) AMERICAN POLICY FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, 1969-1971, Robert J. Pranger ($3.00)

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