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Demetri Sevastopulo, “South China Sea Tensions Stem From „Nine From Stem Tensions ChinaSea “South Demetri Sevastopulo, and Sea China South ofthe analysis comparative Asia:a East disputes in territorial “Maritime AndyYee, ty novd n h dsue ih hn. oevr the Moreover, China. with dispute the in involved ctly The So The dispute maritime Sea China South The uth China Sea dispute can be of significance for two reasons. Firstly, it can can it Firstly, reasons. two for significance of be can dispute Sea China uth

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ime Disputes,” Council on Foreign Relations, accessed May 23, 2015, 2015, May23, accessed Relations, Foreign on Council Disputes,” ime in „assertive‟ or „provocative‟ ways whilst rhetorically insisting upon its its upon insisting rhetorically whilst ways „provocative‟ or „assertive‟ in

istration‟s Pivot to Asia,” The Foreign Policy Initiative, accessed June 1, 2015, 2015, 1, June accessed PolicyInitiative, Foreign The Asia,” to Pivot istration‟s - and

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cdmc oras Sm saeet are statements Some journals. academic iay sources rimary ize, realism and constructivism. It also also It constructivism. and realism ize,

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ways whilst whilst ways - CEU eTD Collection http://aacs.ccny.cuny.edu/2014conference/Papers/Klaus%20Raditio.pdf 2015, 25, April accessed Perspective,” 10 9 Report 8 1979). 7 Approaches 6 power. enhance to is security increase to way The is. state the secure Concern loss. other‟s the means zero a as system international the see They resources. scarce access to order in expansion is survive to way the and survival is concern fundamental i conflict that believe realists Offensive onlywar a occurgreat because between of powers. a also wars. to leads historically also and politics international in conflict of source classic a is state t in unequal be can they while equal are states all basis, legal a of terms in that believes He system. international to behave incertain ways. in important less international are that believe Neorealists Actors neorealism. system. the of structure the is focus analytical the central neorealism, In Waltz. Kenneth of thought the with associated primarily theories, politicallife.”domestic in that comparableto is that

Waltz, Waltz, Institutio Global and Powers “Rising Wright, Thomas and Ikenberry John G. Waltz, KennethN. in “Realism,” Sorensen, George and Jackson Robert

Klaus Heinrich Raditio, “China and the Tension in the South China Sea: A Defensive Realist Realist ADefensive Sea: China South in the the“China and Tension Raditio, KlausHeinrich 8

(2008): 4. (2008): shift in the balance of power. It can be implied that an international change will will change international an that implied be can It power. of balance the in shift and powers great of fall and rise a from comes system international in change Any Theory of International Politics International of Theory Neorealism has two variants which are offensive realism and defensive realism. defensive and realism offensive are which variants two has Neorealism the in security and survival are states of concerns main the Waltz, For , (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 59. 2010), Press, University Oxford (Oxford: ,

Theory of International Politics International of Theory erms of substantive or material bases. material or substantive of erms

, 97. , ing power, the more power a state possess, the more more the possess, state a power more the power, ing

s unavoidable because security is scarce. States‟ States‟ scarce. is security because unavoidable s

(New York: McGraw (NewYork: 6 Introduction to International Relations: International to Introduction

systems more or less determine actors actors determine less or more systems 9

Neorealism is one of Realism‟ssub of one is Neorealism .

- - sum game since one‟s gain one‟s since game sum 7 Hill; Reading: Addison Reading: Hill;

A rise of a new powerful new a of rise A ns,” ns,” The Century Foundation Foundation Century The 10

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Theories and and Theories - Wesley, Wesley, - CEU eTD Collection 15 14 http://ejt.sagepub.com/content/18/1/53.full.pdf%3Forigin%3Dpublication_detail Relations International of Journal 13 12 11 in the process, economically. atleast easy so longer no is it interdependence economic of levels high such given and order, world institutionalized more much in living are We order. world previous the from different I John dear.” most hold states says Mearsheimer things two the order, political domestic their of autonomy the and integrity territorial their of loss “the to lead can it and them likelyto less states make can hegemony for bid a make to that points Kirshner while world anarchic the in hegemony.” Mearsheimer‟s hegemons. as goal final their achieve to order in rivals their than power more gain to opportunities out seek always regional become to is want hegemons. states all what Mearsheimer, to According hegemon. regional a only become can state a Hence, hegemon. global a have to big too is world it guaranteeing survival theanarchicworld. in status hegemonic with hegemon a become to state a lead will power

Ikenberry et al., “Rising Powers and Global Institutions,”5. Global and Powers “Rising al., et Ikenberry realism,”. offensive of tragedy “The Kirshner, China,” ofrise the and realism Classical realism: offensive tragedyof “The JonathanKirshner, Mearsheimer, John 86. “Realism,” Sorensen, and Jackson

for a rising power to challenge an existing one without destroying its own interests interests own its destroying without one existing an challenge to power rising a for kenberry and Thomas Wright argue that the current international system is much much is system international current the that argue Wright Thomas and kenberry Joh 11 n Mearsheimer believes that states want to become a hegemon, however, the the however, hegemon, a become to want states that believes Mearsheimer n 13

He is co is He

Mearsheimer‟s main argument is that to be a hegemon is a way to survive to way a is hegemon a be to that is argument main Mearsheimer‟s

ruet t dsigih between distinguish “to argument The Tragedy of Great Power Politics Power Great of Tragedy The

survive since states bidding for hegemony will face a coalition against coalition aface will hegemony for biddingstates sincesurvive nsidered an offensive realist whose assumption is that great powers great that is assumption whose realist offensive an nsidered

(2010): 7, accessed on April 20, 2015, 2015, 20, April on 7,accessed (2010): 12

Nevertheless, Jonathan Kirshner sees the main failure in failure main the sees Kirshner Jonathan Nevertheless,

(New York: W. W. Norton, 2001), 29. 2001), 29. Norton, W. W. (NewYork:

being a hegemon and and hegemon a .

bidding bidding European European

for G. CEU eTD Collection 16 a gives power excessive that perceives also but survival and security their for power power see not do realists to way a Defensive as maximization system. international the in positions their sustaining and security but power, not are states of goals the power, Regarding states. power state‟s aggressive an decrease would expansion that perceive also realists defensive Moreover, system. international current the in easy not is expansion Hence, norms. and laws international among manageable are other. self five these However, other. each to a complementary are assumptions aggressive be would states that dictate alone assumptions five these of none that concludes Mearsheimer versa. vice and states other ra are states is assumption last goal,according toMearsheimer, they ifgoals. statesother exist, donot pursue cannot The main the is It survival. is assumption fourth The anytime. at aggressive be to motivated t to regard with intention states‟ other about sure be cannot states that says one third the assumption, second the to Relating other. each harm to use can they which capability offensive some possess naturally powers system international the that is assumption first

Mearsheimer, Mearsheimer, - ep ad oe mxmzto wih eut i ofnie eair oad each towards behavior offensive in results which maximization power and help, 16

In contrast, defensive realists suggest that conflict is evitable because resources because evitable is conflict that suggest realists defensive contrast, In His assumptions‟; „bedrock five with realism offensive his builds Mearsheimer

The Tragedy of Great Power of Power Great Tragedy The

ahr hn nrae aacn bhvo b caiin f other of coalition by behavior balancing increase than rather

states. States are restrained by interdependent interests, interests, interdependent by restrained are States states. uvv. eesv raim eonzs ht tts ut seek must states that recognizes realism Defensive survive.

tional. They think about how their behavior would affect affect would behavior their how about think They tional. nd they lead to three general patterns of behavior: fear, fear, behavior: of patterns general three to lead they nd Politics 8 , 30 ,

heir offensive capabilities. States can be be can States capabilities. offensive heir - 32. 32. s eie yaacy eody great Secondly, anarchy. by defined is

CEU eTD Collection 20 Introduction 19 18 17 them which leads a to security dilemma. among suspicion and distrust creates also situation this and balancing for motives are u The power. its increasing of instead the power state‟s be aggressive the will decreases Balancing what intention. certain state‟s powerful not are they and survival and security their for concerned balancin with confronted defensive The actions andare offensive tools the distinguished hardly ones. from offensive. be to misinterpreted be could realism defensive However, revisionists.” were they if as behave states “makes which dilemma security a or factors domestic either maximizati security is realism defensive while maximization power is realism offensive nutshell, a in Put states. other by coalition balancing a stirs latter the while defeat to leads former goals.” their achieve survival andsecurity. logic not is it Waltz, For states. other from hostility provokes power excessive An result. counterproductive

Raditio, “China and the Tension in the South China Sea,”. China South in the Tension the “China and Raditio, in “Realism,” Colin Elman, Sea,”. China South in the Tension the “China and Raditio, 85. “Realism,” Sorensen, and Jackson n eesv raims esetv, f sae nrae is oe, t il be will it power, its increases state a if perspective, realism‟s defensive In from comes place first the in conflict of cause a that explain realists Defensive to order in power of amount‟ „appropriate an is need states “what words, other In , ed. MartinGriffiths, Ro (Oxon: ed. , on. 19

h scrt dlma s cr asmto o dfnie realism. defensive of assumption core a is dilemma security The 18 17 l o tuge o ecsie power excessive for struggle to al

To have limited or excessive power drives insecurity because the because insecurity drives power excessive or limited have To

International Relations Theory for the Twenty the for Theory Relations International ncertainty and fear in the aggressive state‟s military build military state‟s aggressive the in fear and ncertainty g rather than bandwagoning because other states are also also are states other because bandwagoning than rather g

utledge, 2007), 18. utledge,2007), 20

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CEU eTD Collection 23 22 relevant Relations 21 scenarpossible ones” defensive from distinguished be can postures offensive variables two the illustrates others.” of security the decrease or security its increase to tries state a which by means the of “many as dilemma security the describes Jervis react. to states surrounding th control to seek states So among interest of conflict a in also states.” but race, arms an of terms in only not happen but concern, security by driven security a that perceives state a When intention. potentially threatening.” defe as measures own its interprets each as others for insecurity rising to lead to intention, of regardless tend, needs security their after look to Idealism Political

Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the security dilemma,” thedilemma,” security under “Cooperation Jervis, Robert Sea,”. China South in the Tension the “China and Raditio, Relations?,” inInternational Relevant Still Dilemma Security “Isthe AdamWinkworth, - 22 in Misperception can come from uncertainty and fear about the other state‟s state‟s other the about fear and uncertainty from come can Misperception book his in dilemma security a defined Herz H. John

(2012), accessed April 28, 2015, 2015, 28, April accessed (2012),

- international According to Robert Jervis, states are concerned primarily about direct attack. direct about primarily concerned are states Jervis, Robert to According

security dilemma with the Four Worlds. His Four World is comprised of comprised is World Four His Worlds. Four the with dilemma security – ios.

wehr h ofne r h dfne a te datg, n whether and advantage, the has defense the or offense the “whether in 1951 as “a structural notion in which the self the which in notion structural “a as 1951 in

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eir border areas or create buffer zones. These actions provoke actions These zones. buffer create or areas border eir .

by power or greedy concerns. “The misperception could could misperception “The concerns. greedy or power by http://www.e 10

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World Politics Politics World seeker state‟s military build military state‟s seeker nsive and measures of others as as others of measures and nsive 30, no. 2 (1978): 169. 169. 2 no. (1978): 30, –

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Jervis, “Cooperation under the security dilemma,” 212. security underthe dilemma,” “Cooperation Jervis, 1 : Robert : Jervis's Four Worlds From figure 1, a security dilemma appears dilemma security a 1, figure From http://ocw.tufts.edu/Content/58/lecturenotes/726832/726843

nditures cannot definitely indicate which state is implementing implementing is state which indicate definitely cannot nditures

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CEU eTD Collection 79. 2 no. (2015): 94, 27 26 25 military increasing its with coincides spending. China by displayed behavior assertive and is talk that suggests Realists Sea. China South the regarding behaviors provocative‟ or „assertive and development‟ or rise „peaceful between oscillating policies contradictory implemented per Realists way. opposite the in China of rise the perceives pessimist the while region the in position country‟s the with secure more feel leaders Chinese the and rising is power its because tha believes optimist ownsupply.upon its “The objectivea build thrift.” „society isto of de to way a for looking is government Beijing ASEAN the Bijan, other Zheng and to According China claimants. between water disputed a becomes Sea China South rich hav they If time. theresource want. So they what maysupplying other stop states each other, conflict with the all them supply would states other that certain not are they because states other on depend to want not do definitely They interests. economic their maximize to want also realists world, interdependent economically and globalized this aggressor not. or an is it whether tell can confrontation a to responds state a way the defense, or offense

Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., “How to Deter China: The Case of Archipelagic Defense,” Defense,” ofArchipelagic Case The China: “How Deter to Jr., AndrewKrepinevich, F. Gr to Rise‟ „Peaceful “China‟s ZhengBijan, 212. security underthe dilemma,” “Cooperation Jervis, crease its dependence on energy countriescrease fromandresources todepend other dependence its imported Regarding the rise of China, there are two opposite views on this issue. The The issue. this on views opposite two are there China, of rise the Regarding In factors. material of importance the see realists offensive and defensive Both 27

cheap. Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., as a pessimist, notes that the provocative the that notes pessimist, a as Jr., Krepinevich, F. Andrew cheap. ceive the rise of China as threatening. The Chinese government has has government Chinese The threatening. as China of rise the ceive Mearsheimer, as an offensive realist, simply explains that China cannot rise cannot China that explains simply realist, offensive an as Mearsheimer, 25

Cia s oe iey o e oeae n b a tts u power quo status a be and moderate be to likely more is China t

eat - Power Status,” Status,” Power 12

Foreign Affairs Foreign 26

84, no. 5 5 18 no. (2005): 84,

Foreign Affairs Foreign - 24. e a a e

- CEU eTD Collection (2005). 31 or awareness 30 “human on 29 focuses constructivism 28 contrast, In etc. states, power among of balance and capabilities, economic forces, military as such power material generally.” more relations international on or behavior state on ideas and identity, culture, norms, including meaning,‟ world material „inter of importance the recognizes “Constructivism 1.2 foreign this see policies.explain below. Wewill howconstructivists in decision a make they when account into ideology and politics domestic take makers domestic like ideologyirrelevant.”and are politics things and realists‟ as „act “states model, Mearsheimer‟s in that states uniqu has state has policy foreign China‟s states. other from everydifferent are which characteristics particular And explanations. not are themselves in which analogies, historical Iain Alastair 1930s. the during did Japan the as Asia Southeast and of East the covering Doctrine, Monroe form own its create would China that suggests also He Hemisphere. Western compel to seek will China rising a likelihood, all in that, precedents historical comparable from derives Mearsheimer hegemony. regional achieve to order in state revisionist a become peaceful

Jeffrey S. Lantis, “Strategic Culture: From Clausewitz to Constructivism,” Constructivism,” to Clausewitz From Culture: “Strategic Lantis, JeffreyS. realism,”. offensive of tragedy “The Kirshner, Power?,” Quo Status Chinaa “Is IainJohnston, Alastair Rise,” Unpeaceful “China‟s Measheimer, John Social e characteristics which derive from its particular historical experiences. historical particular its from derive which characteristics e

osrciim s ifrn fo Raim hc fcss on focuses which Realism from different is Constructivism

ly. On the contrary, he believes that China would be more aggressive and and aggressive more be would China that believes he contrary, the On ly. the U.S. to „leave‟ Asia, as the U.S. barred the European powers from the the from powers European the barred U.S. the as Asia, „leave‟ to U.S. the Constructivism Johnston argues that what Mearsheimer predicts is the mere replication of of replication mere the is predicts Mearsheimer what that argues Johnston

However, in my perspective, the Chinese deciChinese the myHowever, perspective, in

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CEU eTD Collection 37 36 Studies Cambridge 35 34 33 32 neo as assumption theinternationalor ideasin creatingsystem. new norms place.” and time particular a at people certain by arranged been has which norms, of system a thought, of body a ideas, of set a is “It creations. or inventions human of one is system international w other In aspects. physical or material to related not is It ideas. by constituted well as theshared understandings between them.” inform that beliefs and ideas the on focus must relations international of study “the that claim they nutshell, a In material. not social, is relations international in upon focus should we that aspect significant most the that policy of makers.” decision the shaping in identities and “values as such the system of international side ideational the to attention close pay not does Realism dismisses. realism security. and survival are goals fundamental states‟ that is which neorealism, with ground common a shares politics. world in norms of role the especiallystructure, social affairs.” world in place its and consciousness

Jackson and Sorensen, “Social Constructivism,”, 160. Constructivism,”, “Social Sorensen, and Jackson 160. Constructivism,” “Social Sorensen, and Jackson Identity,” and Interdependence Power, Strategy: Regional and “China‟sRise LiuQianqian, 167. Constructivism,” “Social Sorensen, and Jackson Culture,”. “Strategic Lantis, Jackson and Sorensen, “Social Constructivism,” 160. Constructivism,” “Social Sorensen, and Jackson According to Anthony Giddens, structures can constrain states‟ action (the same same (the action states‟ constrain can structures Giddens, Anthony to According is system international the that believe theorists constructivist Consequently, 35

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M. Taylor Fravel, “China‟s Strategy in the South China Sea,” Sea,” China South the in Strategy “China‟sFravel, Taylor M.

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CEU eTD Collection 2015, 82 ChinaSea,” the East 81 80 through constructivist perspective. a seen as policy claiming territorial China‟s on chapter next the in more elaborate will Chin of issues to related also is defense coastal of change strategic The expand. to capacity country‟s their see and increase to power its expect leaders Chinese that is defense‟ „offshore to defense‟ „alongshore from change areas. coastal its in concentrated are capacities military far his from comes initiative Xiaoping‟s Deng from change This defense”. „offshore of concept strategic the proposed and defense‟ „alongshore of concept defense coastal traditional “the break leader of generation second the since Seas China contested waters. the in islands these control to is power naval regional and communication res natural of exploitation and access to rights the China,provessources, the therichness ofthedisputed U.S.or either sea. S China South the in gas natural and oil area. contested the in rights maritime acquire to determined very is Beijing why explain can This consumption.” gas natural and crude is dema That hydrocarbon gas. China's supply natural to of enough meters cubic trillion 20 and reserves oil in tons billion 30 to

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Rozman, “Chinese Strategic Thinking,” 312. Thinking,” Strategic “Chinese Rozman, Rise„To 10%.” Budget “ChinaMilitary 2015, May26, accessed BBC, Rise„To 10%,” Budget “ChinaMilitary International Stockholm Security,” International and Armaments,Disarmament 2009: Yearbook “SIPRI in Strategy,” Security Regional “China‟sEvolving Gill, Bates rces, inc - china aua rsuc aqiiin s n o te driving the of one is acquisition resource Natural , ed. David Shambaugh (London: University of California Press, 2005), 131. 2005), Press, of California University Shambaugh(London: David ed. , - 31706989 cent in 2001, 17.7 percent in 2002, and 9.6 percent in 2003.” in percent 9.6 and 2002, in percent 17.7 2001, in cent luding an aircraft carrier.”aircraft anluding ng, said that “China‟s military budget will rise by about 10% in 2015.” in 10% about by rise will budget military “China‟s that said ng, . ntry has increased its military expenditure with double with expenditure military its increased has ntry

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Bernard D. Cole, Cole, D. Bernard 296. Sea,” China South the in Strategy “China‟s Fravel, Hans

- 90 Dieter Evers, “Understanding the South China Sea: An explorative cultural analysis,” analysis,” cultural An explorative Sea: China South the “Understanding Evers, Dieter h ot CiaSai nt ny ia i eooi em, u as fr Chinese for also but terms, economic in vital only not is Sea China South The Hans

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tural resources, hydrocarbons and fish, in that area. China estimates thatestimates area.China that in fish, and hydrocarbonsresources, tural Former People‟s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) Commander, Admiral Admiral Commander, (PLAN) Navy Army Liberation People‟s Former 91

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not want to let other claimants have control over the contested contested the over control have claimants other let to want not

10, no. 1 (2014): 89. (2014): 1 no. 10, oil and natural gas “may be the driving force behind China‟s behind force driving the be “may gas natural and oil

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Zhang Kunsheng, “Remarks by Assistant Foreign Minister Zhang Kunsheng at the ARF Seminar on Sea on Seminar ARF theat ZhangKunsheng Minister Foreign Assistant by“Remarks ZhangKunsheng, Strategy,” OneRoad‟ Belt, „One “China‟s Minnick, Strategy,” Road‟ One Belt, „One “China‟s Minnick, Wendell 296. Sea,” China South the in Strategy “China‟s Fravel, Lelyveld Michael eadn scrt ise, hitpe Samn a ainl ees University Defense National a Sharman, Christopher issues, security Regarding http://www.rfa.org/english/commentaries/energy_watch/oil 93

In terms of security, Taylor Fravel notes that notes Fravel Taylor security, of terms In http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/2015/04/11/taiwan 95 , “Mideast Oil Drives China Disputes,” China Disputes,” Oil Drives “Mideast ,

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Wong, “China Expands Naval Power to Waters U.S. Dominates,”. U.S. Waters Powerto Naval “ChinaExpands Wong, Dominates,” U.S. Waters to NavalPower “ChinaExpands Wong, Edward - defense to include crucial maritime and economic in economic and maritime crucial include to defense ey eety o My 6 21, h Biig oenet eesd strategy a released government Beijing the 2015, 26, May on recently, Very build naval China‟s of purpose the that insist leaders military Chinese A hns dpt cmadr f h Es Sa le, er dia Zhang admiral Rear Fleet, Sea East the of commander deputy Chinese A .

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self and - CEU eTD Collection 277 2008): Press, University Princeton Oxford: and (Princeton 103 102 101 aed0 military 2015, May31, accessed 2015, May26, 100 th to claims “China‟s recognized Vietnam North because Vietnam South defeated Vietnam North when islands the capture to waited China But escalation. of strategy a adopt to prone never was China Vietnam, Viet South from Paracels the of part Western the in located Group Crescent the occupied China forces, naval Vietnam‟s area. disputed the in features capture o exploiting started Vietnam sea. contested the in reefs and islands more occupied claimants ASEAN the 1970s, the from resources seabed potential and islands offshore of importance increased the since Sea People‟s the of establishment China South the in disputes maritime the towards strategy delaying a question. answeringthis for tools past the Hence, this. China South the reveal in incidents can conflict a to responds state that way the However, realist. offensive an or defensive a is state a whether answer can expenditure military counterattack.”unless attacked, but will attack not “will China that saying interests, and rights maritime Chinese threaten which offense.” and defense

M. Taylo M. 177. Asia,” East disputes in territorial “Maritime Yee, Says,”. Paper Seas‟, „Open Focus on to “ChineseNavy Grow,” Interests‟ Reach as„National Global Expand Courseto Sets Military “Chinese Denyer, Simon - 264ffcbbcdb4_story.html - sets According to Robert Jer Robert to According r Fravel, Strong borders, Secure nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China‟s territorial disputes China‟sterritorial Conflict in and Cooperation nation: Secure StrongFravel, borders, r - course - to - expand 100

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Fravel, 298. Sea,” China South the in Strategy “China‟s Fravel, In 1994, China seized the Mischief Reef in the Spratlys which was claimed by the by claimed was which Spratlys the in Reef Mischief the seized China 1994, In claim China‟s decreased which events of series a was there 1980s, During Strong borders, Secur borders, Strong

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CEU eTD Collection 2015, May12, accessed 111 110 109 108 2015, May12, 107 106 a during disputes the in ball hard play or interfere not would U.S. the that confident was government Beijing The force. with occupation claimants‟ other to responded government Chinese the why reasons the Nixon Richard Beijing visited President when the 1972 Secondly, in U.S. strategy. the delaying and China its between rapprochement in factor main the were capabilities military conteste of occupation claimants‟ other to respond to order in water disputed the in claims its strengthen to wants country strength. claim tha addresses Fravel Firstly, insights. some 1990s. the through declined these then untilPhilippines the present time. Beijing The with incident Reef Mischief water. the since delaying of disputed strategy a to switched government the toward policy Chinese in change new a provoked and leaders Chinese surprised incident the from condemnation united a with reaction Sea. China South the in strategy China‟s in change a to led and juncture company‟s the protect would necessary.” “it if force by activities that 1993 in interview an Denver. gave of also Corporation government Energy Crestone the to rights drilling oil

Asad Latif, “Sino Latif, Asad 298 Sea,” China South the in Strategy “China‟s Fravel, Fravel, 177. Asia,” East disputes in territorial “Maritime Yee, site,” oil Vietnam warshipsto “Chinasends Shenon, Philip Fravel, In a nutshell, there were more serious armed conflicts in the 1970s and 1980s and 1980s and 1970s the in conflicts armed serious more were there nutshell, a In Strong borders, Secure nation Secure borders, Strong nation Secure borders, Strong http://www.nytimes.com/1994/07/21/world/china 111

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107 time of improving diplomatic relationship. Thirdly, how Thirdly,how relationship. diplomatic improving of time - d features. d ,277 ,297.

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CEU eTD Collection 112 weakerover likelyprevail is China to Innegotiations, bilateral ones. multilateral to settlement of way a as negotiations bilateral prefers China So Taiwan. and China South claimants ASEAN the other to compared state powerful most the is China Concerning dispute, territorial claimants. ASEAN other and China among Sea China South the in developments in power asymmetric Yee of role important the Andy emphasizes power. superior it giving disunity, their of advantage takes Beijing them. lead points two These Sea. China South the over China with dispute maritime the has country ASEAN every not Moreover, China. from benefited unequal have countries ASEAN ten all However, countries. ASEAN to opportunities and benefits afact.‟are just is and countries that small countries other and country big a is „China that Forum Regional Asian the at 2010 July and big countries, all „China sees that stated Xi Jinping In 2010, November realist acheap perspective. from is talk power, or size of regardless equal are states all that equality, sovereign of idea the unityits whileincreasingregion power decrease can inthe China‟s bargain power. its that know should ASEAN side. U.S. the into ASEAN pushes aggressiveness its scenario, can it assertive how learns China ASEAN. and China both for learnt lesson good a offers incident Reef Mischief 1995 The accommodation. or aggressiveness China‟s of level the affect can is ASEAN united

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Sea CEU eTD Collection 79. 2 no. (2015): 94, 114 disputes Japan May31, because manufacturing computer and phone 113 cell for vital is which Japan to rare supplying stopped temporarily China 2010, September In Sea. China C South the in policies conflictual boats.” fishing Vietnamese with clashing zone, economic exclusive Vietnam‟s intorig oil an moved China later, months Two Islands. Spratlythe on outposts guard coast Chinese 2014, March implemented “In has Seas. China East and government South the in states claimant Chinese other towards policies conflictual The power. superior its exercises country strategic and economic and interests inthe region, accordinglyboth places.way and inthe power same exercises in power rising its over concerned is Beijing that suggest pol China‟s Seas. China East and South the both towards strategyand policy claiming territorial same the implemented neighbors.” its with relations China‟s impacting security, and representof intersection history, an significant geopolitically are Seas China East and China South the “Both areas. buffer maritime its are seas disputed two the perspective, Chinese the From Sea. China East t to only limited not are security and power terms alsomilitarily. but economic in only not country, ASEAN individual any than power bargaining more has

Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., “How to Deter China: The Case of Archipelagic Defense,” Defense,” ofArchipelagic Case The China: “How Deter to Jr., AndrewKrepinevich, F. ChinaSea,” East and ChinaSea South in the Disputes “China‟sTerritorial Zhao, Shelly - 2011, accessed May 15, 2015, May15, accessed 2011, in har a taken has Beijing its over concerns its and policy claiming territorial government‟s Beijing The - the - south

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CEU eTD Collection 117 2013. 7, June California, Springs, U.S. The Remarks, Meeting,” Bilateral ChinaBefore of Republic foreign ASEAN 116 the in stated 115 Clinton Hillary State of Secretary US 2010, July In Atlantic. Pacific the in stationed are submarines the former College, navala National andtold professor American at currently officer War the also is and power major a as itself regards States.” United the and China of countries large two the for space enough has Ocean Pacific vast “the that stated Jinping Xi President Chinese Pacific the in power naval U.S. with overlaps chain‟ island „second Chinese The chain‟. island „first called so is claimed currently has China where area maritime The Pacific. the to Philippines goes which strategy naval chain‟ island „second the SeasChina government form Beijing the„first what chain‟. the calls island towa policies same the implemented has government Chinese the claimant, ASEAN individual an to comparing China to power comply.” to refused that aircraft against C East the of areas other and Islands Senkaku disputed the over regulations, traffic air own its to subject zone,‟ identification defense „air an declared unilaterally “China 2013, November in Furthermore, vessels. fishing a of captain Chinese a detained

Wong, “China Expands Naval Power to Waters U Waters Powerto Naval “ChinaExpands Wong, Obama, Ji Xi Barack 79. Defense,” Archipelagic Caseof China: The “How Deter to Jr., Krepinevich, e Yr Times York New pr rmte„a e dfne taey h hns gvrmn as follows also government Chinese the strategy, defense‟ sea „far the from Apart 117

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Mark Landler, “Offering to Aid Talks, U.S. Challenges China on Disputed Islands,” Islands,” Disputed on China Challenges U.S. Talks, Aid to “Offering Landler, Mark 166 Asia,” East disputes in territorial “Maritime Yee, In December 2014 at the ARF Seminar on Sea Lines of Communications Communications of Lines Sea on Seminar ARF the at 2014 December In the handle to willingness its expresses government Chinese The Nevertheless, 119 h U i as cnrbtn t icesd eso i te ot Cia e by Sea China South the in tension increased to contributing also is US The ons.”

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Andy Yee, “Maritime territorial disputes in East Asia: a comparative analysis of the South China Sea China South ofthe analysis comparative Asia:a East disputes in territorial “Maritime AndyYee, Chinese The “HistoricalFiction,”. Malik, Malik, The Chinese Communist PartyThesuited to Chinese nationalist Communist hascard (CCP) its the when played have occurred.” have e China already controlled the Paracels and the country does not want to anger anger to want not does country the and Paracels the controlled already China e Nationalism has always been used as an instrument of the CCP, as mentioned mentioned as CCP, the of instrument an as used been always has Nationalism

“Historical Fiction,”. “HistoricalFiction,”. - most border of China is Hainan Island. “In this version of history, any territory territory any history, of version this “In Island. Hainan is China of border most Communist Party (CCP) has ruled the country since 1949. However, its power does not does However,its power since1949. the country has ruled (CCP) Party Communist

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Swaran Singh, “Xi‟s Provocative Foreign Policy Fruitful,” Fruitful,” Policy Foreign “Xi‟sProvocative SwaranSingh, Xi Under Policy Foreign New “China‟s ZhangJian, „Provocations‟,” Against AsiaNations Southeast Warns Li “ChinesePremier AndrewBrowne, 299. Thinking,” Strategic “Chinese Rozman, - rfl rl i frin oiy n wrd oiis Te hns frin policy foreign Chinese The politics. world and policy foreign in role profile urnal From Li Keqiang‟s speech, some speech, Keqiang‟s Li From , April 10, 2014, accessed May 25, 2015, 2015, May25, accessed 2014, April 10, , http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2014 gn policy under Xi Jinping becomes more „assertive‟ or „provocative‟ and „provocative‟ or „assertive‟ more becomes Jinping Xi under policy gn 172

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may argue that Xi Jinping‟s foreign policy is is policy foreign Jinping‟s Xi that argue may 54

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China’s Daily China’s 169

an UN member in 1971, China did China 1971, in member UN an

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hn Ja prevs that perceives Jian Zhang , March 19, 2014, accessed accessed 2014, 19, March , Swaran Singh also shares also Singh Swaran In Chinaplayed thepast, .

Global Global The Wall The CEU eTD Collection humiliation http://www.ch Li 175 (2005). 10 174 Un Thammasat 173 in role significant a plays also culture Strategic policy. foreign their and beliefs strategic out. points Blair David beliefs, strategic 19 the in foreigners by occupation policy behavior.” security national shaping in conditions domestic of role “the emphasizes culture strategic decision policy foreign of part central a is culture Strategic culture. strategic by partly influenced undoubtedly are Sea China South jo the in actions pursue country‟s the disputes, and policy aside claiming territorial Chinese set The development‟. ours, is „sovereignty statement, classic Deng‟s in China‟s stressed is these of All cooperation. anddevelopment joint and advantage) preferenceand to accommodates (which settlement peaceful offered region, the in stability an peace maintain to attempted sovereignty, Deng its protected since firmly has nutshell, China a Xiaoping, In Sea. China South the towards policy China‟s from notice started shaping norm internationalnormsandbecomes a China onward, 2000 from then follower, rule or norm a became and norms international learning started China 2000, to 1971 from community, international with engage not beral World Order,” Order,” World beral

David Blair, “The Clash of Historical Memory: The „Century of Humiliation‟ vs. the „Post vs.the Humiliation‟ of „Century Memory: The ClashofHistorical “The Blair, David Constructivism,” to Clausewitz From Culture: “Strategic Lantis, JeffreyS. from China of Foreign Policy lecture, Class Policy,” “Chinese Foreign Chinwanno, Chulacheeb h hsoia eprecs f h ps hmlain uh s h territorial the as such humiliation past the of experiences historical The can we which policy foreign their of continuity the retain leaders Chinese The -

vs inacenter.net/2014/china_currents/12 - iversity, Bangkok, August 28, 2012. 2012. 28, August Bangkok, iversity, the - post 174 China Research Center Research China -

wwii -

liberal

- world - order/ th

12, no. 2 (2013), access May 19, 2015, 2015, May access (2013), 19, 2 no. 12, n ery 20 early and 175 .

- making processes. Jeffrey S. L S. Jeffrey processes. making

2/the 55 This means that history can influence states‟ influence can history that means This

- clash - th of

- c historical entury has shaped core Chinese Chinese core shaped has entury creator. - memory 173 Strategic Insights Strategic

- the - that states antis century - WW II II WW

IV, issue IV, - of - int int d CEU eTD Collection core interests. submission, Malaysian and Vietnamese prior the to respond „ni the of submission The „History‟. of interpretation by shaped is identity national China‟s unity. national and legitimacy regime of aims own its for Kingdom Middle a of notion the pushing by The Conference. Francisco San 1951 the to refers China contemporarily, or dynasty Qing the since China of part a is The goal. final its Chinese strategic achieve to order in dispute the handled has government the Chinese how explains it culture, strategic and policy foreign to relates hypothesis second the words, other „Middle In interests. the core specific a of as sovereignty Chinese idea of nature the the shaped has Kingdom‟ how and feeling, nationalist narratives, historical around are them of both that complementary conclude I this. to related behaviors its and Sea China the South in policy claiming territorial its to contributed has culture strategic its or identity strategic culture? 3.3 own strategic culture. Strategic culture ofamilitary is reflective states‟ identity. decision policy states Conclusion China‟s claim is based on historical narratives suggesting that the contested area area contested the that suggesting narratives historical on based is claim China‟s cons the Regarding

Wa hs nlecd hn’ cnetd ae plc, dniy or identity policy, water contested China’s influenced has What : n spot n aohr I a usel te is hptei i based is hypothesis first the nutshell, a In another. one support and fae h sail cp o wee ejn‟ svriny claim. sovereignty Beijing‟s where of scope spatial the frame y culture is influenced fromculture uniquepast its experiences.

- ne aig concerning making - ah ie mp s mas o opy ih nentoa law international with comply to means a is map line‟ dash tructivist view, this chapter proves that either China‟s national China‟s either that proves chapter this view, tructivist CCP has used historical narratives to stir nationalist feeling feeling nationalist stir to narratives historical used has CCP

security. China is like other states. It has its its has It states. other like is China security. 56

and publicly announce its its announce publicly and

The The , CEU eTD Collection Sea China andSouth explain useof its force past incidents. inthe ter China‟s of understanding proper a offer to another one strengthen and complement constructivism, and realism theories, IRs both how present to tool its is culture strategic to order in counterattack, notattack. moves further claimants‟ other to respond to force uses Beijing dispute, Br Confician paradigms; culture strategic two its from derives force using and peace keeping between mixture The threats. interests‟ core its to firmly dev joint initiate settlement, peaceful for open to is which Xiaoping Deng during ones the from change not do behaviors and rhetoric China‟s Both issue. the towards strategies its ne something iefly, China uses force when the country feels weak or inferior. In the context of the of context the In inferior. or weak feels country the when force uses China iefly, elopment and cooperation, maintain peace and stability in the region but respond respond but region the in stability and peace maintain cooperation, and elopment u simply, Put not is Sea China South the in behaviors claiming active recent China‟s However, w or surprising if we look to the track record of Chinese foreign policy and and policy foreign Chinese of record track the to look we if surprising or w history

nom wee hn das h ln o line the draws China where informs a ffect such claims. In the conclusion of this thesis, I will will I thesis, this of conclusion the In claims. such ffect 57

ritorial claiming policy in the in policy claiming ritorial - eca ad Parabellum. and Mencian

is lis while claims its f CEU eTD Collection Chinese of area‟ „indisputable an in occur developments the because „legitimate‟ or contr „assertiveness‟ In U.S. the as and neighbors labeled its by „provocation‟ is islands contested the in development construction threats. any to response firm a and sovereignty upon insisting peace maintain to efforts cooperation, and development the towards policy continuing China‟s of understanding proper a provides culture strategic impulse, t make nationalist economics and security, power, as such factors material the from Apart claim. sovereignty China‟s of boundaries exact Kingdom‟ „Middle the of notion the and impulse, nationalist canas be defensive both interpretedand offensive. which delaying, of strategy continuing its also and chain‟ island „second and protection‟ suc policies ambiguous certain of because state offensive becomean to it for likelihood a is there However, time. present not willingness and development joint for opportunities open and stability. and peace maintaining upon insisting rhetorically whilst ways ambiguous in behaved entire the almost cover to Sea China South the towards Conclusion dispute, characterized by openness to a peaceful resolution underpinned by joint joint by underpinned resolution peaceful a to openness by characterized dispute, C policy claiming territorial its framed has China why answer to seeks thesis This

omplying with the assumptions of constructivism, historic constructivism, of assumptions the with omplying From

a to realist view, I concludeI view, realist attack except in self in except attack a „fsoe defense‟ „offshore as h - defense ,

by ob by 58

, serving how it responded to to responded it how serving that China is still a defensive state at the at state defensive a still is China that

cooperation, and and cooperation, s, ejn prevs t ato as action its perceives Beijing ast, ,

South China Sea, and why it has it why and Sea, China South and stability in the region the in stability and which is moving to „open seas seas „open to moving is which ,

have shaped the scope and and scope the shaped have he area a core interest. Its interest. core a area he However al narratives, a strong strong a narratives, al how it it how , China‟s recent China‟s , past incidents past expresses its its expresses while CEU eTD Collection far. pea „rise side, U.S. the From should country that claimantsother maintain should claimant every Firstly, region. the in stability and peace maintain and tensions find to difficult military cooperation. and relations diplomatic their increasing by responded have Vietnam and Philippines and distrust sow The U.S. the and neighbors amongstits suspicion could which capacities military developed has China as dilemma, security regional a to lead also could Sea China South the in situation current The not. or t by abides truly China whether of evidence good be can dispute the manages country the how and U.S. the with side to ASEAN push to want not its credibility rights and maritime its andjurisdictio increase to means a are constructions these speaking, Legally territory. sovereign

The nature of the dispute is complex and reflects various aspects various reflects and complex is dispute the of nature The does China implications. further provide also can dispute Sea China South The cefully‟

the

status quo status also be transparent be also

, whilst , a

solut it w it America

ill ion. Nevertheless, there are some actions which can decrease decrease can which actions some are there Nevertheless, ion. guaranteeing security to its allies in allies its to security guaranteeing in order to decrease tensions. Secondly, China should reassure should China Secondly, tensions. decrease to order in

not start any attack or make any further further anymake anyattackorstart not

can help to reduce tensions by open by tensions reduce to help can

in terms of of terms 59

its military expenditure and development. and expenditure military its n bypresence. showinga physical

U.S. and Chinese neighbors such as the the as such neighbors Chinese and U.S. he doctrine of the „peaceful rise‟ rise‟ „peaceful the of doctrine he the case China China case ing aggressive moves. T moves. aggressive

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