China Fragile Superpower This page intentionally left blank China Fragile Superpower Susan L. Shirk 2007 Oxford University Press, Inc., publishes works that further Oxford University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education. Oxford New York Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto With offices in Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore South Korea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam Copyright © 2007 by Susan L. Shirk Published by Oxford University Press, Inc. 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016 www.oup.com Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of Oxford University Press. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Shirk, Susan L. China: fragile superpower / by Susan L. Shirk. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-19-530609-5 1. Nationalism—China. 2. China—Politics and government—2002– I. Title. JC311.S525 2007 320.951—dc22 2006027998 1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2 Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper For Sam, Lucy, and David Popkin This page intentionally left blank Contents Acknowledgments ix 1 Strong Abroad but Fragile at Home 1 2 China’s Economic Miracle 13 3 Domestic Threats 35 4 The Echo Chamber of Nationalism: Media and the Internet 79 5 The Responsible Power 105 6 Japan: “When the Chinese People Get Angry, the Result Is Always Big Trouble” 140 7 Taiwan: “A Question of Regime Survival” 181 8 The United States: “External Troubles Can Become Internal Troubles” 212 9 China’s Weakness, America’s Danger 255 Appendix: Chinese and Japanese Periodicals 271 Notes 273 Index 311 This page intentionally left blank Acknowledgments began writing this book as a fellow at the Center for Advanced Stud- ies in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, California, during the 2004– I05 academic year. I am grateful to the Center staff (especially Kathleen Much), the other fellows, and Don Lamm for encouraging my interest in writing for a broader audience beyond academia. This aspiration became reality thanks to my research assistant, Yu Zheng, my agent, Jill Marsal, of the Djikstra Agency, and my editors at Oxford University Press—Peter Ginna, who edited the manuscript, Tim Bartlett, Dedi Felman, Tim Bent, and the copyeditor, Paula Cooper. The intellectual stimulation and per- sonal support provided by colleagues and staff at the Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, University of California, San Diego (especially Peter Cowhey, Stephan Haggard, and Barry Naughton), the University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Coopera- tion, and the U.S. government greatly contributed to the book. I also wish to thank Jeffrey Bader, Tai Ming Cheung, Thomas Christensen, and An- drew Walder for their helpful comments on the manuscript, and to Alastair Iain Johnston for sharing his unpublished research with me. My husband, Sam Popkin, and my children, Lucy Popkin and David Popkin (the new- est China hand in the family), provided loving encouragement and good advice every step of the way. Finally, I am deeply grateful to the many Chinese government offi- cials, military officers, scholars, think-tank experts, journalists, and stu- dents I interviewed for informing me and my readers about China’s domestic situation and foreign policy. This page intentionally left blank China Fragile Superpower This page intentionally left blank 1 Strong Abroad but Fragile at Home S THE DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE responsible for Ameri- can relations with China in the Clinton administration, I con- A stantly worried about the risk of war between the two nuclear powers. A war between China and the United States is terrifying to con- template. China’s Asian neighbors would be on the front line and people all over the world would feel the shockwaves. When I left the government and resumed my job as a university profes- sor, these worries continued to haunt me. I can still imagine receiving the dreaded phone call from the State Department Operations Center: “The Pentagon just informed us that a Chinese SU-27 jet fighter and a Taiwanese F-16 jet fighter have collided in the Taiwan Strait.” My heart sinks. I have heard that the military aircraft patrolling the nar- row body of water between the island of Taiwan and the Chinese Mainland fly dangerously close to one another, despite U.S. warnings to the two sides. “What about the pilots?” I ask. “Have they bailed out? Been rescued?” “We don’t know yet,” says the Op Center voice. “Has either side made a public statement? Or communicated with us? Have we seen any military moves from either side?” “No information yet, ma’am. But CNN is just reporting it now.” I dash to my car and speed back to the State Department, using the moments of calm before entering the storm of the crisis to make a plan. What should our government do to prevent the accident from triggering a war between China and Taiwan—and very likely drawing in the United States? I play through the various scenarios, and they all have one common thread. If CNN is broadcasting the news of the crash, it is sure to be picked up and spread by the Internet in China before the Communist Party censors 2 china: fragile superpower can block it out. And once the news is public, China’s leaders will feel compelled by the pressure of public opinion to react forcefully. A forceful reaction is not beyond the pale. Flashpoints for military clashes between China and the United States have multiplied in recent years. And although most Americans have forgotten, China and the United States came to the brink of war in 1996. The Chinese launched massive military exercises and shot missiles into the waters outside Taiwan’s ports to demonstrate their fury at our allowing Taiwan’s president to visit the United States for the first time since we derecognized Taiwan and estab- lished diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China in 1979. Envisioning the scenario as it unfolds, when I reach my office in the State Department, I learn that President Hu Jintao has already appeared on China Central Television: “My fellow countrymen, earlier today a Taiwan air force plane flew across the midline of the Taiwan Strait, veering into a People’s Liberation Army air force jet and causing it to crash into the sea, killing its brave pilot. This fla- grant and barbarous act was a deliberate provocation by the Taiwan authori- ties to provoke antagonism across the Taiwan Strait and undermine the status quo. The Mainland and Taiwan belong to one and the same China.” Following the pattern of previous crises, the Chinese leaders have imme- diately framed the situation as an intentional attack on China and boxed themselves into a corner. Now how will they prove their determination to defend the national honor against this “deliberate provocation”? Taiwan is an issue that arouses intense nationalist emotions in China. The Japanese colonized the island from 1895 to 1945 when China was too weak to resist, during a period that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) school textbooks describe as China’s “century of humiliation.” Ever since 1949, when the Chinese civil war ended with a Communist victory and the defeated Guomindang retreated to Taiwan, Chinese schoolchildren have been taught that the century of humiliation would finally end only when Taiwan was reunified with the Mainland. It is widely believed in China and abroad that if the Communist re- gime allows Taiwan to declare formal independence without putting up a fight, the outraged public will bring down the regime. China’s military and political leaders know full well that the United States, while not le- gally bound to intervene, has committed morally and politically to help Taiwan defend itself. They also realize that China’s booming economy would be the first casualty in any military conflict with Taiwan and the United States. Nevertheless, they would use force to avoid domestic hu- miliation if they believed their political survival depended on it. Strong Abroad but Fragile at Home 3 After consulting with the secretary of state, I call the National Security Council staff. We agree that the president should immediately telephone China’s president to urge him not to mobilize the military or to make any public threats against Taiwan. Forget about using the Foreign Ministry channel. We have to get straight to China’s top leader, who will be feeling the heat domestically as well as internationally. And only our president can reach their president. For our part, we will intercede with the Taiwan gov- ernment and ask it not to mobilize its military forces and to return the Mainland crew promptly. It is too late. American intelligence reports that China has mobilized not only its regular military forces but also its internal security forces. Angry Chinese students are swarming into Beijing’s Tiananmen Square and the central squares of other Chinese cities, shouting, “Down with the Taiwan separatists!” Some in the crowds carry hastily made signs saying, “Down with the America-loving Chinese Communist Party toadies!” and “When will China finally stand up?” This scene is hypothetical, but it is not a fantasy. Crises like this have happened in the past and could happen in the future. Taiwan is just a hair short of being a formal ally of the United States.