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European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, IV - 1 | 2012, « Pragmatism and the Social Sciences: a Century of Influences and Interactions, Vol European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy IV - 1 | 2012 Pragmatism and the Social Sciences: A Century of Influences and Interactions, vol. 2 Roberto Frega and Filipe Careira Da Silva (dir.) Electronic version URL: http://journals.openedition.org/ejpap/758 DOI: 10.4000/ejpap.758 ISSN: 2036-4091 Publisher Associazione Pragma Electronic reference Roberto Frega and Filipe Careira Da Silva (dir.), European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, IV - 1 | 2012, « Pragmatism and the Social Sciences: A Century of Influences and Interactions, vol. 2 » [Online], Online since 23 July 2012, connection on 23 September 2020. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/ejpap/758 ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/ejpap.758 This text was automatically generated on 23 September 2020. Author retains copyright and grants the European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy right of first publication with the work simultaneously licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution- NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS Symposia. Pragmatism and the Social Sciences: A Century of Influences and Interactions, vol.2 Pragmatism and the Social Sciences A Century of Influences and Interactions, vol. 2 Roberto Frega and Filipe Carreira da Silva Section I. Classical Pragmatists and Contemporary Sociology Peirce and Iconology Habitus, Embodiment, and the Analogy between Philosophy and Architecture Tullio Viola Experiencing Practical Knowledge Emerging Convergences of Pragmatism and Sociological Practice Theory Tanja Bogusz The Social Scientist, the Public, and the Pragmatist Gaze Exploring the Critical Conditions of Sociological Inquiry Philippe Gonzalez and Laurence Kaufmann Section II. Law, Power, and the Prospects of a Pragmatist Social Theory Naturalistic Values and Progressive Politics A Missing Link Between Pragmatism and Social Theory Christoph Henning American Pragmatism and European Social Theory Holmes, Durkheim, Scheler, and the Sociology of Legal Knowledge Frederic R. Kellogg Does Pragmatism Have A Theory of Power? Joel Wolfe Pragmatism and International Relations A Story of Closure and Opening Molly Cochran Between Science and Fiction Pragmatism and Conservatism in History and Law Seth Vannatta Section III. Contemporary Appropriations Three Dimensions of the Sociality of Action Some Reflections based on the Cultural Psychology of Michael Tomasello and Sociological Pragmatism Frithjof Nungesser European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, IV - 1 | 2012 2 Pragmatism as a Communication-Theoretical Tradition An Assessment of Craig’s Proposal Mats Bergman Critical Pragmatist and the Reconnection of Science and Values in Educational Research Walter Feinberg A Symposium on R. Shusterman, Pragmatist Aesthetics 20 years later Pragmatist Aesthetics by Richard Shusterman A Bridge Between the Analytics and Continentals Paolo D’Angelo Enjoying the Doubtful On Transformative Suspensions in Pragmatist Aesthetics Heidi Salaverría Remarks On Richard Shusterman’s Pragmatist Aesthetics Krystyna Wilkoszewska Pragmatist Aesthetics, Twenty Years Later Understanding Interpretation, Interpreting Understanding Roberta Dreon Reviewing Pragmatist Aesthetics History, Critique, and Interpretation – After Twenty Years Richard Shusterman Essays Pragmatism, Ethics and Democracy YEP SEMINAR, May 4th 2011, Rome Maria Luisi Does Rorty’s Pragmatism Undermine Itself? James Tartaglia Book Review Mitchell ABOULAFIA, Transcendence. On self-determination and Cosmopolitanism Stanford University Press, Standford, 2010 Roberto Frega Henri BERGSON, Sur le pragmatisme de William James ed. by S. Madelrieux, Paris, PUF, 2011 Sarin Marchetti Alfred NORTH WITHEHEAD, Processo e Realidade. Ensaio de Cosmologia translation and introduction by Maria Teresa Teixeira, Lisboa, Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa, 2010 Elisabete M. de Sousa European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, IV - 1 | 2012 3 Symposia. Pragmatism and the Social Sciences: A Century of Influences and Interactions, vol.2 European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, IV - 1 | 2012 4 Pragmatism and the Social Sciences A Century of Influences and Interactions, vol. 2 Roberto Frega and Filipe Carreira da Silva 1 This issue continues the symposia on Pragmatism and the Social Sciences: A Century of Influences and Interactions that has appeared in the vol. 2, year 2011 of this journal. For a general introduction to the issue we refer readers to our Editor’s introduction to the volume 1. 2 This new issue, inspired by the same criteria used in the making of the first, is divided in three sections. 3 In the first section, titled “Classical Pragmatists and contemporary sociology” contains three papers, all dealing in different ways with the question of the legacy of pragmatism to contemporary social theory. All three papers tackle different strands of the appropriation of pragmatism in French social theory from Pierre Bourdieu to contemporary pragmatic sociology. 4 In the second section, titled “Law, Power, and the prospects of a pragmatist social theory,” the selected article deal with more specific issues in social and political theory, always in ways that focus on the distinct contribution of the pragmatist tradition to contemporary research. The papers address issues that are of concern for social theory in broad sense, as well as for more specific fields such as international relation theory, the theory of power, the theory of historiography. 5 In the last section, titled “Contemporary appropriations,” we have gathered articles that explore issues that extend beyond social theory to cover field such as the cognitive sciences, communication studies, and educational theory. 6 This volume closes the project. We hope that the articles published in both volumes will be of interest to philosophers as well as to scholars coming from other fields, and we hope in this way to have contributed to a broader understanding of pragmatism as a cultural enterprise that encompasses an increasing larger sphere of contemporary reflection. European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, IV - 1 | 2012 5 AUTHORS ROBERTO FREGA CNRS-IMM, Paris fregarob[at]gmail.com FILIPE CARREIRA DA SILVA University of Lisbon fcs23[at]cam.ac.uk European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, IV - 1 | 2012 6 Symposia. Pragmatism and the Social Sciences: A Century of Influences and Interactions, vol.2 Section I. Classical Pragmatists and Contemporary Sociology European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, IV - 1 | 2012 7 Peirce and Iconology Habitus, Embodiment, and the Analogy between Philosophy and Architecture Tullio Viola AUTHOR'S NOTE I received very generous comments on previous drafts of this article from Horst Bredekamp, Maria Luisa Catoni, Sascha Freyberg, Carlo Ginzburg, Lydia Goehr, Helmut Pape, Salvatore Settis. I thank them all. Laure Astourian and Julian Smith-Newman have much improved my English. Without the many conversations with the late John M. Krois this research would have never been born. I. Introduction: From Peirce to Sociology, via Panofsky 1 The starting point of this paper is a thus far barely remarked upon – and at first blush somewhat negligible – textual consonance: both the philosopher Charles S. Peirce and the art historian Erwin Panofsky have written about the classic analogy between Gothic architecture and Scholastic philosophy. 2 Panofsky, of course, dedicated one of his most famous and debated books – the 1951 Gothic Architecture and Scholasticism – to the topic; while Peirce addressed it almost in passing, first in his renowned review of Berkeley, and then, even less systematically, in a number of subsequent manuscripts and papers. This asymmetry notwithstanding, and also in spite of the fact that no direct connection among these texts is extant, I shall maintain in what follows that such a convergence does have a theoretical weight: one that may help us better to assess and historically locate the more general contact points between Peirce’s thinking and iconology. 3 Panofsky did in fact know of Peirce, whom he quoted in a number of passages dealing with the justification of iconological method. All these passages refer to one single phrase of the American thinker, one which at first seems peripheral but which actually European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, IV - 1 | 2012 8 (as we shall see) goes to the heart of his philosophy: “it is the belief men betray, and not that which they parade which has to be studied.”1 This brief sentence, which Panofksy took from his student Edgar Wind, will help reveal the broader story of an early, thus far neglected, yet at the same time momentous line of reception of Peirce’s philosophy. 4 Although my focus in the rest of this article will be on the art-historical tradition, however, it is important to add here that this line of reception did not stop with Panofsky. Albeit not altogether explicitly, it also played a crucial role in the genesis of Pierre Bourdieu’s sociology. 5 To clarify this, let me say in advance that I shall locate much of the common terrain between Peirce and Panofsky in the notions of habit and habitus: two distinguishable yet tightly interwoven concepts, which since their Greek origin have occupied a central position in Western philosophy. Originally the scholastic translation of Aristotle’s hexis and echein, the Latin term habitus has traditionally designated the philosophically stronger (and ontologically more committing) notion of the two: the
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