fate and fatalism Widerker, David. “Fatalism.” Logique et analyse 119 In the late 1960s, however, as part of a general (1987): 229–34. resurgence of feminist activism, an unprecedented John Martin Fischer explosion of feminist ethical debate occurred, first among the general public, soon in academic dis- course. Actions and practices whose gendered dimen- sions hitherto had been either unnoticed or unchal- feminist ethics lenged now became foci of public and philosophical Feminist approaches to ethics, often known collec- attention, as feminists subjected them to outspoken tively as feminist ethics, are distinguished by an ex- moral critique, developed sometimes dramatic strat- plicit commitment to correcting male biases they egies for opposing them, and proposed alternatives perceive in traditional ethics, biases that may be that nonfeminists often perceived as dangerously manifest in rationalizations of women’s subordina- radical. First grassroots and soon academic feminist tion, or in disregard for, or disparagement of, perspectives were articulated on topics such as women’s moral experience. Feminist ethics, by con- ABORTION, equality of opportunity, domestic labor, trast, begins from the convictions that the subordi- portrayals of women in the media, and a variety of nation of women is morally wrong and that the issues concerning sexuality, such as RAPE and com- moral experience of women is as worthy of respect pulsory heterosexuality. By the 1980s, feminists as that of men. On the practical level, then, the goals were expressing ethical concern about PORNOGRA- of feminist ethics are the following: first, to articu- PHY, reproductive technology, so-called surrogate late moral critiques of actions and practices that per- motherhood, militarism, the environment, and the petuate women’s subordination; second, to pre- situation of women in developing nations. scribe morally justifiable ways of resisting such Despite the long history of feminist ethical de- actions and practices; and, third, to envision morally bate, the term “feminist ethics” did not come into desirable alternatives that will promote women’s general use until the late 1970s or early 1980s. At emancipation. On the theoretical level, the goal of this time, a number of feminists began expressing feminist ethics is to develop philosophical accounts doubts about the possibility of fruitfully addressing of the nature of morality and of the central moral so-called women’s issues in terms of the conceptual concepts that treat women’s moral experience re- apparatus supplied by traditional ethical theory. For spectfully, though never uncritically. instance, some feminists alleged that a rights frame- Just as feminist ethics may be identified by its ex- work distorted discussions of abortion because it plicit commitment to challenging perceived male construed pregnancy and motherhood as adversarial bias in ethics, so approaches that do not express situations. Other feminists charged that certain as- such a commitment may be characterized as non- sumptions widely accepted by traditional ethical the- feminist. Nonfeminist approaches to ethics are not ory were incompatible with what was now beginning necessarily anti-feminist or male-biased; they may or to be claimed as a distinctively feminine moral ex- may not be so. perience or sensibility. SOCIAL CONTRACT theory, for instance, was criticized for postulating a conception of human individuals as beings who were free, equal, The Development of Contemporary independent, and mutually disinterested, a concep- Feminist Ethics tion that some feminists claimed reflected an expe- The history of Western philosophy includes a rience and perspective that were characteristically number of isolated but indisputable instances of masculine. Even IMPARTIALITY, usually taken as a moral opposition to women’s subordination. Note- defining feature of morality, became the object of worthy examples are Mary WOLLSTONECRAFT’s feminist criticism insofar as it was alleged to gener- (1759–1797) A Vindication of the Rights of Woman ate prescriptions counter to many women’s moral (1792), JOHN STUART MILL’s (1806–1873) The intuitions. Some feminists began to speculate that Subjection of Women (1869), Frederick ENGELS’ traditional ethics was more deeply male-biased and (1820–1895) The Origin of the Family, Private needed more fundamental rethinking than they had Property and the State (1884), and Simone DE BEAU- realized hitherto. VOIR’S (1908–1986) The Second Sex (1949). Such reflection was fueled by the much-publicized 528 feminist ethics work of developmental psychologist Carol Gilligan, ally masculine image of moral psychology, discour- whose 1982 book, In a Different Voice: Psycholog- age preoccupation with issues defined culturally as ical Theory and Women’s Development, seemed to feminine, or in other ways covertly advance men’s demonstrate empirically that the MORAL DEVELOP- interests over women’s. Since feminism is essentially MENT of women was significantly different from that a normative stance, and since its meaning is contin- of men. Claiming that females tend to fear separa- ually contested by feminists themselves, all feminists tion or abandonment while males, by contrast, tend are constantly engaged in ethical reflection; in this to perceive closeness as dangerous, Gilligan re- sense, feminist ethics is practiced both inside and ported that girls and women often construe MORAL outside the academy. Within the academy, its prac- DILEMMAS as conflicts of responsibilities rather than titioners are scholars located mainly in the disci- of RIGHTS and seek to resolve those dilemmas in plines of philosophy, religious studies, and jurispru- ways that will repair and strengthen webs of rela- dence; they represent a variety of philosophical tionship. Furthermore, Gilligan described females as traditions, secular and religious, Anglo-American less likely than males to make or justify moral deci- and continental European. In challenging perceived sions by the application of abstract MORAL RULES; male bias in those traditions, feminist scholars often instead, she claimed that girls and women were draw extensively on feminist work in other disci- more likely to act on their feelings of LOVE and com- plines, such as literature, history, and PSYCHOLOGY. passion for particular individuals. Gilligan con- Scholarly work in feminist ethics often is also re- cluded that whereas men typically adhere to a mo- sponsive to the ethical reflections of nonacademic rality of justice, whose primary values are FAIRNESS feminists as these occur, for instance, in much femi- and EQUALITY, women often adhere to a morality of nist fiction and poetry. In addition, a considerable CARE, whose primary values are inclusion and pro- body of nonfiction, written by nonacademics and di- tection from harm. For this reason, studies of moral rected towards a nonacademic audience, presents it- development based exclusively on a morality of jus- self as feminist ethics. Popular feminist books and tice do not provide an appropriate standard for mea- journals frequently engage in ethical consideration suring female moral development and may be said of moral or PUBLIC POLICY issues and sometimes also to be male-biased. offer more general discussions of supposedly “mas- Many feminists seized on Gilligan’s work as of- culine” and “feminine” value systems. fering evidence for the existence of a characteristi- Much of the work in feminist ethics has been cally feminine approach to morality, an approach done by white Western women, but this is slowly assumed to provide the basis for a distinctively femi- changing. A few male philosophers are doing signifi- nist ethics. For some, indeed, feminist ethics became cant work in feminist ethics, and people of color are and remained synonymous with an ethics of care. making increasing contributions, both within and Just how an ethics of care should be delineated, how- outside the discipline of philosophy, although they ever, was far from evident; nor was it clear whether sometimes hesitate to accept the label “feminist,” be- it should supplement or supplant an ethics of justice. cause of feminism’s racist history. Since the 1980s, many feminists have explored such questions, even though the empirical connection be- Feminist Criticisms of Western Ethics tween women and care has been challenged by some psychologists, who allege Gilligan’s samples to be Since most feminist ethics is done in a Western nonrepresentative, her methods of interpreting her context, it is Western ethics, particularly (though not data suspect, and her claims impossible to substan- exclusively) the European Enlightenment tradition, tiate, especially when the studies are controlled for that has been the most frequent target of feminist occupation and class. critique. The feminist challenges to this tradition may Regardless of empirical findings in MORAL PSY- be grouped conveniently under five main headings. CHOLOGY, debate continues over whether the fun- Lack of concern for women’s interests. Many of damental tenets of Western ethics are male biased in the major theorists, such as ARISTOTLE (384–322 some sense: if not in the sense that they express a B.C.E.) and ROUSSEAU (1712–1778), are accused of moral sensibility characteristic of men rather than having given insufficient consideration to women’s women, then perhaps in that they promote a cultur- INTERESTS, a lack of concern expressed theoretically 529 feminist ethics by their prescribing for women allegedly feminine culine,” insofar as