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Home , Ethics of care, Feminist ethics

fate and fatalism

Widerker, David. “Fatalism.” Logique et analyse 119 In the late 1960s, however, as part of a general (1987): 229–34. resurgence of feminist activism, an unprecedented John Martin Fischer explosion of feminist ethical debate occurred, first among the general public, soon in academic dis- course. Actions and practices whose gendered dimen- sions hitherto had been either unnoticed or unchal- feminist lenged now became foci of public and philosophical Feminist approaches to ethics, often known collec- attention, as feminists subjected them to outspoken tively as , are distinguished by an ex- moral critique, developed sometimes dramatic strat- plicit commitment to correcting male biases they egies for opposing them, and proposed alternatives perceive in traditional ethics, biases that may be that nonfeminists often perceived as dangerously manifest in rationalizations of women’s subordina- radical. First grassroots and soon academic feminist tion, or in disregard for, or disparagement of, perspectives were articulated on topics such as women’s moral experience. Feminist ethics, by con- ABORTION, equality of opportunity, domestic labor, trast, begins from the convictions that the subordi- portrayals of women in the media, and a variety of nation of women is morally wrong and that the issues concerning sexuality, such as RAPE and com- moral experience of women is as worthy of respect pulsory heterosexuality. By the 1980s, feminists as that of men. On the practical level, then, the goals were expressing ethical concern about PORNOGRA- of feminist ethics are the following: first, to articu- PHY, reproductive technology, so-called surrogate late moral critiques of actions and practices that per- motherhood, militarism, the environment, and the petuate women’s subordination; second, to pre- situation of women in developing nations. scribe morally justifiable ways of resisting such Despite the long history of feminist ethical de- actions and practices; and, third, to envision morally bate, the term “feminist ethics” did not come into desirable alternatives that will promote women’s general use until the late 1970s or early 1980s. At emancipation. On the theoretical level, the goal of this time, a number of feminists began expressing feminist ethics is to develop philosophical accounts doubts about the possibility of fruitfully addressing of the nature of and of the central moral so-called women’s issues in terms of the conceptual concepts that treat women’s moral experience re- apparatus supplied by traditional ethical theory. For spectfully, though never uncritically. instance, some feminists alleged that a frame- Just as feminist ethics may be identified by its ex- work distorted discussions of abortion because it plicit commitment to challenging perceived male construed pregnancy and motherhood as adversarial bias in ethics, so approaches that do not express situations. Other feminists charged that certain as- such a commitment may be characterized as non- sumptions widely accepted by traditional ethical the- feminist. Nonfeminist approaches to ethics are not ory were incompatible with what was now beginning necessarily anti-feminist or male-biased; they may or to be claimed as a distinctively feminine moral ex- may not be so. perience or sensibility. SOCIAL CONTRACT theory, for instance, was criticized for postulating a conception of human individuals as beings who were free, equal, The Development of Contemporary independent, and mutually disinterested, a concep- Feminist Ethics tion that some feminists claimed reflected an expe- The history of Western philosophy includes a rience and perspective that were characteristically number of isolated but indisputable instances of masculine. Even IMPARTIALITY, usually taken as a moral opposition to women’s subordination. Note- defining feature of morality, became the object of worthy examples are ’s feminist criticism insofar as it was alleged to gener- (1759–1797) A Vindication of the Rights of ate prescriptions counter to many women’s moral (1792), ’s (1806–1873) The intuitions. Some feminists began to speculate that Subjection of Women (1869), Frederick ENGELS’ traditional ethics was more deeply male-biased and (1820–1895) The Origin of the Family, Private needed more fundamental rethinking than they had Property and the State (1884), and Simone DE BEAU- realized hitherto. VOIR’S (1908–1986) (1949). Such reflection was fueled by the much-publicized

528 feminist ethics work of developmental psychologist , ally masculine image of , discour- whose 1982 book, In a Different Voice: Psycholog- age preoccupation with issues defined culturally as ical Theory and Women’s Development, seemed to feminine, or in other ways covertly advance men’s demonstrate empirically that the MORAL DEVELOP- interests over women’s. Since is essentially MENT of women was significantly different from that a normative stance, and since its meaning is contin- of men. Claiming that females tend to fear separa- ually contested by feminists themselves, all feminists tion or abandonment while males, by contrast, tend are constantly engaged in ethical reflection; in this to perceive closeness as dangerous, Gilligan re- sense, feminist ethics is practiced both inside and ported that and women often construe MORAL outside the academy. Within the academy, its prac- DILEMMAS as conflicts of responsibilities rather than titioners are scholars located mainly in the disci- of RIGHTS and seek to resolve those dilemmas in plines of philosophy, religious studies, and jurispru- ways that will repair and strengthen webs of rela- dence; they represent a variety of philosophical tionship. Furthermore, Gilligan described females as traditions, secular and religious, Anglo-American less likely than males to make or justify moral deci- and continental European. In challenging perceived sions by the application of abstract MORAL RULES; male bias in those traditions, feminist scholars often instead, she claimed that girls and women were draw extensively on feminist work in other disci- more likely to act on their feelings of LOVE and com- plines, such as literature, history, and PSYCHOLOGY. passion for particular individuals. Gilligan con- Scholarly work in feminist ethics often is also re- cluded that whereas men typically adhere to a mo- sponsive to the ethical reflections of nonacademic rality of , whose primary values are FAIRNESS feminists as these occur, for instance, in much femi- and EQUALITY, women often adhere to a morality of nist fiction and poetry. In addition, a considerable CARE, whose primary values are inclusion and pro- body of nonfiction, written by nonacademics and di- tection from harm. For this reason, studies of moral rected towards a nonacademic audience, presents it- development based exclusively on a morality of jus- self as feminist ethics. Popular feminist books and tice do not provide an appropriate standard for mea- journals frequently engage in ethical consideration suring female moral development and may be said of moral or PUBLIC POLICY issues and sometimes also to be male-biased. offer more general discussions of supposedly “mas- Many feminists seized on Gilligan’s work as of- culine” and “feminine” systems. fering evidence for the existence of a characteristi- Much of the work in feminist ethics has been cally feminine approach to morality, an approach done by white Western women, but this is slowly assumed to provide the basis for a distinctively femi- changing. A few male are doing signifi- nist ethics. For some, indeed, feminist ethics became cant work in feminist ethics, and people of color are and remained synonymous with an . making increasing contributions, both within and Just how an ethics of care should be delineated, how- outside the discipline of philosophy, although they ever, was far from evident; nor was it clear whether sometimes hesitate to accept the label “feminist,” be- it should supplement or supplant an ethics of justice. cause of feminism’s racist history. Since the 1980s, many feminists have explored such questions, even though the empirical connection be- Feminist Criticisms of Western Ethics tween women and care has been challenged by some psychologists, who allege Gilligan’s samples to be Since most feminist ethics is done in a Western nonrepresentative, her methods of interpreting her context, it is Western ethics, particularly (though not data suspect, and her claims impossible to substan- exclusively) the European Enlightenment tradition, tiate, especially when the studies are controlled for that has been the most frequent target of feminist occupation and class. critique. The feminist challenges to this tradition may Regardless of empirical findings in MORAL PSY- be grouped conveniently under five main headings. CHOLOGY, debate continues over whether the fun- Lack of concern for women’s interests. Many of damental tenets of Western ethics are male biased in the major theorists, such as (384–322 some sense: if not in the sense that they express a B.C.E.) and ROUSSEAU (1712–1778), are accused of moral sensibility characteristic of men rather than having given insufficient consideration to women’s women, then perhaps in that they promote a cultur- INTERESTS, a lack of concern expressed theoretically

529 feminist ethics by their prescribing for women allegedly feminine culine,” insofar as they are culturally associated with such as obedience, silence, and faithfulness. men. Such associations may be empirical, norma- Some feminists charge that many contemporary eth- tive, or symbolic. For instance, Western ethics is al- ical discussions continue the tendency to regard leged to prioritize the supposedly masculine values women as instrumental to male-dominated INSTI- of independence, , intellect, will, wariness, TUTIONS, such as the FAMILY or the state; in debates hierarchy, domination, culture, transcendence, prod- on abortion, for instance, the pregnant woman may uct, asceticism, war, and death over the supposedly be portrayed as little more than a container or en- feminine values of interdependence, community, vironment for the fetus, while much discussion of connection, sharing, EMOTION, body, , absence reproductive technology has assumed that infertility of hierarchy, nature, immanence, process, joy, peace, is a problem only for heterosexual married women, and life. Claims like this are common in both pop- i.e., women defined in relationship to men. ular and academic feminist writings on ethics. Neglect of “women’s issues.” Issues of special Devaluation of women’s moral experience. Fi- concern to women are said to have been ignored by nally, some feminists also charge that prevailing modern moral philosophers, who have tended to Western conceptualizations of the nature of moral- portray the domestic realm as an arena outside the ity, moral problems, and MORAL REASONING are economy and beyond justice, private in the sense of masculine insofar as they too are associated with being beyond the scope of legitimate political regu- men, rather than women, in associations that again lation. Within the modern liberal tradition, the pub- lic domain is conceived as properly regulated by uni- may be empirical, symbolic, or normative. For in- versal of right whereas the private is a stance, feminists have accused modern moral theory domain in which varying may properly be pur- of being excessively preoccupied with rules, ob- sued. Even philosophers like Aristotle or HEGEL sessed with impartiality, and exclusively focussed on (1770–1831), who give some ethical importance to discrete deeds. In addition, feminists have charged the domestic realm, have tended to portray the home modern moral theory with taking the contract as the as an arena in which the most fully human excel- paradigmatic moral relation and construing moral lences cannot be realized. Feminist philosophers be- rationality so narrowly as to exclude emotions of as- gan early to criticize this conceptual bifurcation of sessment, sometimes called moral emotions. All social life. They pointed out that the home was pre- these characteristics have been asserted to be mas- cisely that realm to which women had been confined culine in some sense. A feminine (not feminist) ap- historically, and that it had become symbolically as- proach to ethics, by contrast, has been supposed to sociated with the feminine, despite the fact that avoid assuming that individuals ordinarily are free, heads of households were paradigmatically male. equal, and independent; to take more account of the They argued that the philosophical devaluation of specificities of particular contexts; and to be more the domestic realm made it impossible to raise ques- likely to resolve moral dilemmas by relying on em- tions about the justice of the domestic division of pathic feeling rather than by appealing to rules. labor, because it obscured the far-reaching social sig- Not all feminists endorse all of the above clusters nificance and creativity of women’s work in the of criticisms—and even where they agree with the home, and concealed, even legitimated, the domestic general statement, they may well disagree over its abuse of women and girls. applicability in the case of specific philosophers or Denial of women’s moral agency. Women’s debates. Despite differences of relative detail, femi- moral agency is said to have often been denied, not nists tend generally to agree on the first three clus- simply by excluding women from moral debate or ignoring their contributions, but through philosoph- ters of criticisms, whose correction seems not only ical claims to the effect that women lack moral rea- attainable in within the framework of En- son. Such claims were made originally by Aristotle, lightenment moral theory but even to be required by but they have been elaborated and refined by mod- that framework. However, they disagree sharply on ern theorists such as Rousseau, KANT (1724–1804), the last two clusters of criticisms, especially the fifth, Hegel, and Freud (1856–1939). which obviously contains clear parallels with a num- Depreciation of “feminine” values. Western ber of nonfeminist criticisms of Enlightenment ethics moral theory is said to embody values that are “mas- made by proponents of, for example, SITUATION

530 feminist ethics

ETHICS, ETHICS, COMMUNITARIANISM, and child care and abortion has significant consequences POSTMODERNISM. for the lives of men as well as women. On the other hand, since men and women typically are not what lawyers call “similarly situated” relative to each Common Misconstruals of Feminist Ethics other, it is difficult to think of any moral or public Feminist ethics has sometimes been construed, policy (“human”) issue in which women do not have both by some of its proponents and some of its crit- a special interest. For instance, such “human” issues ics, as a simple inversion of the criticisms listed as war, peace, and world hunger have special signif- above. In other words, it has sometimes been iden- icance for women because the world’s hungry are tified with one or more of the following: putting disproportionately women (and children), because women’s interests first; focusing exclusively on so- women are primarily those in need of the social ser- called women’s issues; accepting women (or femi- vices neglected to fund military spending, and be- nists) as moral experts or authorities; substituting cause women suffer disproportionately from war “female” (or feminine) for “male” (or masculine) and benefit relatively little from militarism and the values; or extrapolating directly from women’s moral weapons industries. For these reasons, it would be experience. These characterizations of feminist ethics a mistake to identify feminist ethics with attention are sufficiently pervasive that it is worth noting just to some explicitly gendered subset of ethical issues. why they cannot be correct. On the contrary, rather than being limited to a re- 1. Putting women’s interests first occasionally has stricted ethical domain, feminist ethics has enlarged been recommended as a way of achieving a “woman- the traditional concerns of ethics, both through centered” ethics that transcends the covert bias of a identifying previously unrecognized ethical issues supposed HUMANISM grounded in fact on male and by introducing fresh perspectives on issues al- NORMS. Whatever might be said for or against this ready acknowledged as having an ethical dimension. recommendation, it cannot be definitive of feminist 3. Feminist ethics certainly is being developed by ethics because the formula, as it stands, raises more feminists, most of whom are women, but this does questions than it answers. It fails to specify not only not imply, of course, that any woman, or even any which women’s interests should be preferred over feminist, should be regarded as a moral expert which men’s (or children’s) and in what circum- whose moral AUTHORITY is beyond question. Not stances, but also what should be done about con- only are there deep disagreements among women flicts of interest between women and even how in- and even among feminists such that it would be dif- terests should be identified at all. Most obviously, ficult to know whom to select as an expert, but many feminist ethics cannot be identified with “putting painful examples of failed insight or principle on the women’s interests first” simply because many femi- part of feminist leaders demonstrate only too clearly nists would refuse to accept and, indeed, be morally that no woman, or feminist, is morally infallible. outraged by what they would perceive as blatant 4. There are also serious difficulties with thinking PARTIALITY and . of feminist ethics as the substitution of female or 2. Feminist ethics certainly addresses issues of feminine for male or masculine values. These diffi- special concern to women that have been neglected culties include problems with establishing that any by modern moral theory, but it cannot be identified values are male or female in the sense of being gen- with an exclusive focus on such issues. This is partly erally held by men or women, when both women’s because nonfeminists as well as feminists have ad- and men’s values vary so much, both within cultures dressed these issues—and, indeed, are doing so in- as well as across them. Similar problems confront creasingly as feminism grows stronger and more ar- attempts to establish that certain values are mascu- ticulate. It is also because feminism rejects the line or feminine in the sense of being considered so- notion that moral issues can be divided cleanly into cially appropriate for individuals of one or those that are and those that are not of special con- the other. Again, norms of masculinity and feminin- cern to women. On the one hand, since men’s and ity vary not only between societies but even within women’s lives are inextricably intertwined, there are the same society along such axes as class and eth- no “women’s issues” that are not also men’s issues; nicity: some social groups, for instance, value physi- for instance, the availability or nonavailability of cal health, strength, or athletic prowess in women;

531 feminist ethics others value physical fragility, weakness, or incom- are situated similarly with some men in specific re- petence. Even if certain values could be identified in spects or contexts. In addition, not only does femi- some sense as male or female, masculine or femi- nist ethics need constant vigilance to detect subtle nine, the conclusive objection to identifying feminist as well as blatant manifestations of gender privilege, ethics with the elaboration of female or feminine val- it must also be sensitive to the ways in which gen- ues is that the feminine is not necessarily the femi- dered norms are different for different groups of nist. Indeed, since the feminine typically has been women—or in which the same norms, such as a cul- constructed in circumstances of male domination, it tural preference for slimness or blondness, affect dif- is likely to be quite opposed to the feminist. Personal ferent groups of women differently. Ultimately fem- charm, for example, may be valued not only in inism’s concern for all women means that feminist women but also by them; even if charm were, in ethics must address not only “local” issues of racism these senses, a feminine value, however, it would or homophobia or class privilege but also such seem at least as likely to undermine feminist goals global issues as environmental destruction, war, and as to promote them. access to world resources. 5. Similar problems apply to defining feminist 2. In order to develop guides to action that will ethics as the systematic extrapolation of women’s tend to subvert rather than reinforce the systematic moral experience, exclusive of men’s. While no ap- subordination of women, feminist approaches to proach to morality can be adequate if it ignores the ethics must understand individual actions in the moral experience of women, it is most unlikely that context of broader social practices, evaluating the women generally are similar enough to each other symbolic and cumulative implications of individual and different enough from men that a single distinc- ACTION as well as its immediately observable con- tively female or feminine approach to ethics can be sequences. They must be equipped to recognize co- identified. Attempts to establish such an identifica- vert as well as overt manifestations of domination, tion frequently commit the fallacy of generalizing subtle as well as blatant forms of control, and they about the experience of all or most women from the must develop sophisticated accounts of COERCION moral experience of some women; this seems to have and . Similarly, they must provide the con- been one flaw at least in Gilligan’s earlier work. ceptual resources for identifying and evaluating the Again, even if a distinctively feminine approach to varieties of resistance and struggle in which women, morality could be identified, perhaps in terms of particularly, have engaged. They must recognize the symbolic or normative connections with women often unnoticed ways in which women and other rather than empirical ones, there is no reason to sup- members of the underclass have refused cooperation pose that such an approach would be feminist. In- and opposed domination, while acknowledging the deed, given the feminist commitment to a critical inevitability of collusion and the impossibility of to- rethinking of cultural constructions of both mascu- tally clean hands. In short, feminist approaches to linity and , there is prima facie rea- ethics must be transitional and nonutopian, often son to suppose that it would not. extensions of, rather than alternatives to, feminist political theory, exercises in non- rather than ideal theory. Minimum Conditions of Adequacy for 3. Since most of most women’s lives have been Feminist Ethics excluded from that domain conceptualized as pub- Even though feminist ethics is far broader and lic, a third requirement for feminist approaches to more open than it appears in the foregoing miscon- ethics is that they should be salient to issues of so- struals, its goals are sufficiently specific, especially called private life, such as intimate relations, sexu- when taken in conjunction with its criticisms of tra- ality, and child rearing. Thus, they must articulate ditional ethics, as to generate certain minimum con- the moral dimensions of issues that may not hitherto ditions of adequacy for any approach to ethics that have been recognized as moral. In addition, we have purports to be feminist. seen that feminist approaches to ethics must provide 1. First of all, feminist ethics can never begin by appropriate guidance for dealing with national and assuming that women and men are similarly situ- international issues, strangers and foreigners. In de- ated—although it may discover that some women veloping the conceptual tools for undertaking these

532 feminist ethics tasks, feminist ethics cannot assume that moral con- ethics can never be identified in terms of a specific cepts developed originally for application to the so- range of topics, methods, or orthodoxies. While called public realm, concepts such as impartiality or feminist ethics is distinguished by its explicit com- EXPLOITATION, are appropriate for use in the so- mitment to developing approaches to ethics that will called private; neither can it assume that concepts respect women’s moral experience and avoid ration- such as care, developed in intimate relationships, alizing women’s subordination, attempts to define it will necessarily be helpful in the larger world. In- more precisely or substantively than this are likely deed, the whole distinction between public and pri- to disregard the richness and variety of feminist vate life must be examined critically by feminist moral thinking and prematurely foreclose feminist ethics, with no prior assumptions as to whether the moral debates. distinction should be retained, redrawn, or rejected. 4. Finally, feminist ethics must take the moral ex- Current Concerns in Feminist Ethics perience of all women seriously, though not, of course, uncritically. Although what is feminist often Since the 1970s, feminists have made significant will turn out to be very different from what is fem- contributions to both practical and theoretical ethics. inine, a basic respect for women’s moral experience Because it is impossible to offer anything like a com- is necessary to acknowledging women’s capacities as prehensive survey of this work in the space avail- moral subjects and to countering traditional stereo- able, this article will end by sketching a few illustra- types of women as less than full moral agents, as tive examples of feminist work designed to counter childlike or close to nature. Furthermore, empirical male bias in ethics. Much of this work draws on the claims about differences in the moral sensibility of culturally feminine as a resource for reconceiving eth- women and men make it impossible to assume that ical norms or standards thought to be androcentric. any approach to ethics will be unanimously accepted Giving equal weight to women’s interests. Eigh- if it fails to consult the moral experience of women. teenth and nineteenth century feminist philosophers, Additionally, it seems plausible to suppose that such as Mary Wollstonecraft and John Stuart Mill, women’s distinctive social experience may make responded to the fact that Western ethics had often them especially perceptive regarding the implica- accorded less weight to women’s interests than to tions of domination, especially gender domination, men’s by demanding that women receive the same and especially well equipped to detect the male bias rights and privileges bestowed on men. They con- that feminists believe has pervaded so much of male- ceptualized sexual equality as formal equality; that authored Western moral theory. is, as identity of treatment for both men and women Most feminist, and perhaps even many nonfem- under gender-blind laws. Their twentieth-century inist, philosophers might well find the general state- successors sought to enshrine this understanding of ment of these conditions quite uncontroversial, but sexual equality in the U.S. Constitution via an Equal they will inevitably disagree sharply over when the Rights Amendment (passed by Congress in 1972, it conditions have been met. Not only may feminists was not ratified by the minimum number of states) disagree with nonfeminists, but they are likely even that would have made any sex specific law uncon- to differ with each other over, for instance, what are stitutional. women’s interests, what are manifestations of domi- Formal equality does not necessarily result in sub- nation and coercion, how resistance should be ex- stantive equality, however. Feminist work in practi- pressed, and which aspects of women’s moral expe- cal ethics is characterized by its use of gender as a rience are worth developing and in which directions. category of ethical analysis and its employment of this Those who practice feminist ethics thus may be category has revealed that many formally gender- seen both as united by a shared project and as di- blind policies and practices are not gender-neutral verging widely in their views as to how this project in their outcomes but instead have a disproportion- may be accomplished. Their divergences result from ately negative impact on women. Many illustrations a variety of philosophical differences, including dif- could be added to the examples of war, peace, and fering conceptions of feminism itself, which, as we world hunger, noted above; for instance, women, es- have seen, is a constantly contested concept. The pecially poor women, are among those hardest hit inevitability of such divergence means that feminist by seemingly gender-blind economic policies, such

533 feminist ethics as structural adjustment measures; similarly, envi- normative individual who is taken as the standard ronmental degradation often has more serious con- against which others’ equality is measured. These sequences for women, especially for , than feminists argue that equal concern for women’s in- it does for men. Such systematically gendered out- terests requires reassessing major social institutions comes suggest that construing sexual equality in on the presumption that their users are likely to be purely formal terms may be inadequate for reaching women—including women who are not otherwise substantive sexual equality. Because norms of gen- privileged. The revised institutions would still be der situate women differently from men in most so- formally gender-blind but they would not be de- cial contexts across the world, substantive equality signed primarily for people who were able-bodied may require establishing policies and practices that and fully employed, people unlikely to be subjected are gender-sensitive or gender-responsive rather than to sexual assault or harassment, people without re- gender-blind. sponsibilities for the primary care of dependents Formulating policies and practices that respond such as children or elders. For instance, they might appropriately to gender differences is controversial offer workers paid leaves to enable them to care for and complicated. For instance, providing women family members or they might provide child care on with special legal protections such as pregnancy and the same basis as public schooling. If social policies maternity leaves may promote a public perception and practices were revised according to a principle that women are less reliable workers than men. At- of what Christine A. Littleton calls “equality of ac- tempts to protect women’s sexuality by restricting ceptance,” sex differences could become socially pornography or excluding women from employment “costless.” in male institutions such as prisons may have the Broadening the domain of ethics. In response to unintended consequence of perpetuating the cultural their recognition that mainstream, especially mod- myth that women are by nature the sexual prey of ern, Western ethics has defined the moral domain in men; by suggesting that and as- such a way as to exclude many issues of special con- sault are in some sense natural, this myth implicitly cern to women, contemporary feminists have sought legitimates these practices. Thus, gender-responsive to expand the ethical arena. In some cases, their interpretations of sexual equality may not only pro- questions have generated whole new bodies of re- voke an anti-feminist backlash, they may even un- search, such as feminist environmentalism and femi- dermine the prospects of long-term sexual equality nist . Issues that feminists have identified by stigmatizing women’s competences. In addition, as morally problematic include: abortion; sexuality, although gender-responsive conceptions of equality including compulsory heterosexuality, sexual harass- are intended to reflect sensitivity to differences in the ment, and rape; representations of masculinity and circumstances of men and women in general, they femininity, including those produced by the MASS are sometimes insensitive to differences in the social MEDIA and pornography; the domestic division of situations of different women. They may fail to no- labor; self-presentation, including body image and tice that broad social groups, like men and women, fashion; and the role of language in reinforcing as are characterized by internal differences that are sys- well as reflecting women’s subordination. Although tematic as well as individual, following the fault lines these issues received little attention from mainstream of other social divisions such as race and class. Thus, ethics until recent years, all have significant impli- these conceptions are sometimes responsive to gen- cations for women’s lives, to the extent that they dered differences in need that are characteristic of sometimes involve matters of life and death for only some men and women but not of all; often those women. As noted earlier, feminists resist character- taken as paradigms are men and women from more izing such issues as exclusively women’s issues; in- privileged classes; for instance, a feminist demand stead, by presenting them as hitherto neglected hu- that child care be provided for mothers in paid em- man issues, they broaden previous conceptions of ployment may be used to discredit other mothers’ normative human experience. claims to welfare support. Rethinking the moral subject. Feminists’ first re- Some contemporary feminists seek to avoid the sponse to Western philosophy’s disparagement of horns of the so-called equality/difference dilemma women’s moral subjectivity was to insist on women’s by questioning its underlying assumptions about the capacity for moral autonomy and rationality, soon,

534 feminist ethics however, they began to question prevailing under- and sexual capacities, and that it is expressed in standings of autonomy, rationality, and even subjec- women’s traditional assignments for biological re- tivity. With respect to autonomy, for instance, femi- production and bodily maintenance. They see West- nist concern about women’s collaborations with ern philosophy’s symbolic association of women with male dominance and consequent interest in the so- the body as not only reflecting but also rationalizing cial construction of gendered character structures and reinforcing these unjust social arrangements. provided insight into many ways in which choice can Attention to human embodiment has implica- be socialized and consent manipulated. Some femi- tions for moral psychology. The identity of embodied nists have faulted much modern moral philosophy moral subjects is constituted in part by specific so- for failing to recognize that autonomy cannot be as- cial relations, and these, in turn, are partially deter- sumed but instead is an achievement with complex mined by the social meanings attached to bodily material and social preconditions. characteristics such as parentage, age, or sex. Rec- Conceptions of moral subjectivity that privilege ognizing human embodiment explains why moral autonomy are especially characteristic of the Euro- subjects are often motivated more by considerations pean Enlightenment; they derive from the Cartesian of particular attachment than by abstract concern model of the self as disembodied, asocial, unified, for , more by care than by respect, and more by rational, and essentially similar to all other selves. In responsibility than by right. Some feminists have ar- developing alternatives to this conception, some gued that devaluing the body in comparison with the feminists have drawn on traditions such as MARX- mind has turned moral theorists’ attention away ISM, PSYCHOANALYSIS, communitarianism and post- from bodily related differences among individuals, modernism; others have been influenced by the such as age, sex, and ability, and encouraged them work of Carol Gilligan, who postulated that girls and to regard people as indistinguishable and inter- women were more likely than boys and men to con- changeable. They further contend that disparaging ceive themselves in relational terms. Viewing one- the body has encouraged ethical theory to ignore self as integrally related to others is said to promote many fundamental aspects of human life and to posit systematically different moral preoccupations from ideals unattainable by human beings. those that have characterized much mainstream Philosophical reflection that begins from the body Western ethics, particularly modern ethics; for in- tends to give prominence to aspects of human nature stance, such a view of the self encourages women to that are very different from those emphasized by construe moral dilemmas as conflicts of responsi- Cartesianism; for instance, it highlights temporality bilities rather than rights. Many feminist philoso- and situatedness rather than timelessness and non- phers argue that a relational conception of moral locatedness, growth and decay rather than change- subjectivity is not only more adequate empirically lessness, particularity rather than universality, soci- than an atomistic model but that it also generates ality rather than isolation. Reflection on these moral values and a conception of moral rationality features reveals that INEQUALITY, dependence and that are superior to those characteristic of the En- interdependence, specificity, social embeddedness, lightenment. For instance, it encourages women to and historical community must be recognized as per- seek resolutions to conflicts by means that promise manent features of human social life. They generate to repair and strengthen relationships, to practice ethical problems that cannot be adequately ad- positive caretaking rather than respectful noninter- dressed by developing highly idealized conceptions vention, and to prioritize the personal values of care, of equality, , autonomy, and impartiality or trust, attentiveness, and love for particular others that posit isolated individuals, ideal communities, or above impersonal principles of equality, respect, and some supposedly universal human condition. rights. The features of human subjectivity emphasized Feminist dissatisfaction with the Enlightenment by many feminist philosophers are precisely those conception of moral subjectivity springs partly from that Western culture associates with women and the an interest in the body, which many feminists regard feminine; they are features that tend to preoccupy as key to women’s subordination. Some argue that women in virtue of their social situation, they are this subordination is maintained by male control of culturally defined as appropriate to women, or they women’s bodies, especially women’s procreative are associated symbolically with women. However,

535 feminist ethics to point to these features of human subjectivity is but also by the working classes, especially, in most not to imply that the paradigm moral subject should of the West, by people of colour. This analysis of the be a woman rather than a man, or even culturally social genesis of care thinking fits well with Law- feminine rather than culturally masculine. Instead, rence Blum’s argument that justice ethics expresses it is to suggest that previous conceptions of human a juridical-administrative perspective that is indeed subjectivity have often provided understandings and masculine but reflects the concerns specifically of ideals of both women and men that are partial and men from the professional and administrative classes. distorted. Together, these arguments suggest that both the Revaluing the feminine. Feminists have fre- ethics of justice and the ethics of care express moral quently responded to Western philosophy’s dispar- perspectives that are not only gendered but simulta- agement of what it has constructed as feminine by neously characteristic of different races and classes. insisting that the feminine should be revalued. We Feminist philosophers are divided about the po- have observed already that feminist ethics cannot be tential of care ethics. One concern is that it may be identified with feminine ethics but we have also seen insufficiently sensitive to the characteristically fem- that ways of thinking that are culturally feminine inine moral failing of self-sacrifice; another is that may point toward less biased and more adequate ap- its emphasis on meeting the immediately perceived proaches to ethics. Some feminists regard the ethics needs of particular individuals may lead agents to of care as a case in point. show unfair partiality to those closest to them. There The first articulations of the ethics of care repre- also exist concerns about whether care’s character- sented it as an expression of women’s characteristic istic focus on the details of small-scale situations can experience of nurturing or mothering particular oth- address problems that are rooted in social struc- ers, but later studies had difficulty confirming a clear tures; such a focus may encourage what are some- empirical link between women and caring. When times called band aid or social work approaches to subjects were matched for education and occupa- moral problems rather than attempts to address tion, women often achieved almost identical scores them through institutional changes. For these and with men on justice-oriented tests of moral devel- other reasons, some feminists doubt that care ethics opment, leaving women who worked in the home as provides resources capable of adequately critiquing the main representatives of the care perspective; male dominance in both public and private life. moreover, some men as well as women were found Despite these problems, many philosophers are to employ care thinking. Recent advocates of an continuing to draw on care’s “feminine” insights and ethics of care acknowledge not only that some values to develop alternative and more feminist ap- women think in terms of justice and some men in proaches to democratic theory, to social and eco- terms of care, but also that most people of each sex nomic policy, and to international relations. Rather are able to adopt either perspective. Nevertheless, than dismissing the claims of justice, such ap- they still view care as feminine on the grounds that proaches typically seek to reinterpret them within a it emerges from forms of socialization and practice framework of care. Their goal is to reconceptualize that, in contemporary Western society, are culturally social and even global institutions so that they will feminine; these include nursing, maintaining a home, enable and reinforce caring relations among people. raising children, and tending to the elderly. Caring Building on women’s moral experience. The is also feminine in the symbolic or normative sense ethics of care is often represented as an approach to of expressing cultural expectations that women be ethics that is based on women’s moral experience; more empathic, altruistic, nurturant, and sensitive however, it has been presented here as an ethical than men. revaluation of the culturally feminine. To illustrate Some feminists have associated the ethics of care ethical initiatives that are based on women’s moral not only with gender but also with race and class. experience, let us consider instead some recent femi- Joan Tronto links the moral perspective of care with nist reinterpretations of HUMAN RIGHTS. the work of cleaning up after body functions, tasks The concept of rights was central to the emer- that in Western history have been relegated primar- gence of Western feminism but, because rights are ily to women but not to all women or to women central in most modern versions of the so-called jus- exclusively; caring work is done not only by women tice tradition, some contemporary feminists have

536 feminist ethics dismissed them as reflections of a moral perspective in the currently burgeoning global feminist move- that is characteristically masculine. These feminists ment, which is united by the slogan, “Women’s regard rights as expressing an inherently adversarial rights are human rights.” This movement calls not morality that disparages the more basic and impor- simply for enforcing women’s human rights but for tant human values of interdependence, cooperation, radically rethinking how human rights have been and trust. Some contend that appeals to rights may conceived. Many feminist proposals for reinterpret- rationalize male POWER over women; for example, ing rights begin by recognizing that violations of the right to freedom of expression may justify mi- women’s rights are more often carried out by non- sogynist pornography. Others observe that legal state than by state actors—often by male family equality of rights may obscure inequalities of power members—and that they occur in the private as well to exercise them, noting that the procedures asso- as the public sphere. This recognition requires ex- ciated with claiming and redressing rights are often panding the definition of state sanctioned repression degrading, intimidating, and humiliating for women, to include acceptance of family forms in which especially in trials for rape and sexual harassment. brides are sold and in which fathers and husbands Still other feminists argue that focusing on rights exert strict control over women’s sexuality, dress, ignores the ways in which women may be compelled speech, and movement; it also requires redefining by their social situations to exercise their rights in a SLAVERY to include forced domestic labour and manner that is harmful to them, for instance, by prostitution. Because some violations of human “choosing” prostitution or cosmetic surgery. In short, rights take gender-specific forms, the definition of some feminists charge that rights talk may often be war crimes must be expanded to include systematic not only unhelpful to women but even rationalize rape and sexual TORTURE. Similarly, the definition of their inequality. GENOCIDE must be expanded to include female IN- It is certainly true that appeals to rights have had FANTICIDE; the systematic withholding of food, medi- only limited success in promoting women’s equality. cal care, and education from girls; and the battery, The United Nations identifies three categories or starvation, mutilation, and even murder of adult “generations” of rights, including civil, political, eco- women. Feminists have also noted that women’s nomic, social, and cultural rights and, in each of rights are often indivisible from each other; for in- these categories, abuses to women are often still ne- stance, many violations of women’s civic and politi- glected or excused. Either women are seen as iden- cal rights are made possible by women’s economic tical to men, so that substantive equality is equated vulnerability. Fully protecting women’s human rights with formal equality, ignoring salient differences be- requires changing not only laws but also ECONOMIC tween the social situations of men and women; or SYSTEMS and cultural practices. women are seen as “other,” inherently different from In the above examples, women’s gender-specific men, so that abuses of their rights have been rep- experiences have served as a resource for identifying resented as “normal,” “natural,” or “inevitable.” covert male biases lurking in existing definitions of Despite continuing systematic abuse and subor- human rights and as a model for revising those def- dination of women, some feminists still believe that initions. However, to imagine the normative bearer the rights tradition constitutes a valuable resource of rights as a woman rather than a man is not to for women’s liberation. For instance, rights may be replace male with female bias. Because women are interpreted to take account of morally salient differ- vastly overrepresented among the poor and illiterate ences among rights holders and they may be as- of the world and among those most vulnerable to signed to groups as well as individuals. They may oppressive systems of power, this image instead ex- include “positive” as well as “negative” rights, which poses the false humanism of older conceptions of are “ENTITLEMENTS“ rather than and carry human rights; it also points toward new understand- claims not only to noninterference but also to cor- ings of rights that are more inclusive and fully relative on the part of others. Such rights may human. be thought of as embodying the supposedly feminine The global movement for women’s human rights values of interdependence, social co-operation, and provides a final illustration of the trajectory followed care. by much feminist ethics; beginning by criticizing the Faith in the concept of rights is certainly evident exclusion of women and DISCRIMINATION against

537 feminist ethics them, it moves to challenging the covert male bias ———. The Unnatural Lottery: Character and Moral of existing ethical frameworks, and finally draws on Luck. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1996. the culturally feminine to propose more ethically ad- ———, ed. Feminist Ethics. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1991. equate norms and standards. ———. Feminist Ethics and Politics. Lawrence: Univer- See also: ABORTION; AGENCY AND DISABILITY; sity Press of Kansas, 1999. AUTONOMY OF MORAL AGENTS; BIOETHICS; CARE; Clements, Grace. Care, Autonomy and Justice. Boulder, CHILDREN AND ETHICAL THEORY; COERCION; COM- CO: Westview, 1996. MUNITARIANISM; CONSENT; CULTURAL STUDIES; DE de Beauvoir, Simone. The Second Sex. New York: Bantam 1964 [1949]. BEAUVOIR; DISCRIMINATION; DUTY AND OBLIGA- Diquinzio, Patrice, and , eds. Feminist TION; EMOTION;ENGELS; ENTITLEMENTS; ENVIRON- Ethics and Social Policy. Bloomington and Indianap- MENTAL ETHICS; EQUALITY; EXPLOITATION; FAMILY; olis: Indiana University Press, 1997. FIDELITY; FRIENDSHIP; GAY ETHICS; HOMOSEXUAL- Friedman, Marilyn. What Are Friends For? Feminist Per- ITY; HUMAN RIGHTS; INEQUALITY; LESBIAN ETHICS; spectives on Personal Relationships and Moral Theory. LIBERTY; LITERATURE AND ETHICS; MASS MEDIA; Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993. JOHN STUART MILL; MORAL ATTENTION; MORAL DE- Gilligan, Carol. In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory VELOPMENT; MORAL IMAGINATION; MORAL PSY- and Women’s Development. Cambridge: Harvard Uni- versity Press, 1982. CHOLOGY; MULTICULTURALISM; NARRATIVE ETHICS; Griffiths, Morwenna. and the Self: The Web of ; OPPRESSION; PARTIALITY; PATER- Identity. New York and London: Routledge, 1995. NALISM; PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS; PORNOGRAPHY; Held, Virginia. Feminist Morality: Transforming Culture, POSTMODERNISM; PSYCHOANALYSIS; PUBLIC AND PRI- Society, and Politics. Chicago: University of Chicago VATE MORALITY; PUBLIC HEALTH POLICY; PUBLIC Press, 1993. POLICY; RACISM AND RELATED ISSUES; REPRODUC- ———, ed. Justice and Care: Essential Readings in Femi- TIVE TECHNOLOGIES; RESPONSIBILITY; RIGHT HOLD- nist Ethics. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995. ERS; SELF AND SOCIAL SELF; SELF-OWNERSHIP; SEX- Hoagland, Sarah Lucia. Lesbian Ethics: Toward New UAL ABUSE AND HARASSMENT; SEXUALITY AND Value. Palo Alto, CA: Institute of Lesbian Studies, ;STAE¨ L;THOMSON; WELFARE RIGHTS 1988. AND SOCIAL POLICY;WOLLSTONECRAFT; WOMEN Jaggar, Alison M. “Caring as a Feminist Practice of Moral Reason.” In Justice and Care: Essential Readings in MORAL PHILOSOPHERS; WORK. Feminist Ethics, edited by . Boulder: Westview, 1995. Bibliography Kabeer, Naila. Reversed Realities: Gender Hierarchies in Development Thought. New York: Verso, 1995. Addelson, Kathryn Pyne. Moral Passsages: Toward a Col- Kittay, Eva Feder. Love’s Labor: Essays on Women, Equal- lectivist Moral Theory. New York: Routledge, 1994. ity, and Dependency. London and New York: Rout- Baier, Annette C. Moral Prejudices: Essays on Ethics. ledge, 1999. Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, Kittay, Eva Feder, and Diana T. Meyers, eds. Women and 1994. Moral Theory. Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, Bar On, Bat-Ami, and Ann Ferguson, eds. Daring to be 1987. Good: Essays in Feminist Ethico-Politics. London and Littleton, Christine A., “Reconstructing Sexual Equality.” New York: Routledge, 1998. California Law Review 75:4 (1987): 1279. Benhabib, Seyla. Situating the Self: Gender, Community Meyers, Diana Tietjens. Self, Society and Personal Choice. and Postmodernism in . New New York: Columbia University Press, 1989. York: Routledge, 1992. ———, ed. Feminists Rethink the Self. Boulder, CO: Blum, Lawrence A. “Kant’s and Hegel’s Moral Rational- Westview, 1997. ism: A Feminist Perspective.” Canadian Journal of Phi- Mies, Maria, and Vandana Shiva. . London: losophy 12:2 (1982): 287–302. Zed Press, 1993. Bowden, Peta. Caring: Gender-Sensitive Ethics. London Mill, John Stuart, and . Essays on Sex and New York: Routledge, 1997. Equality. Edited, and with an introductory essay, by Calhoun, Cheshire. “Justice, Care, Gender Bias.” Journal Alice Rossi. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, of Philosophy 85:9 (1988). 1970 [1832, 1851, 1869]. Card, Claudia. Lesbian Choices. New York: Columbia Moser, Carolyn. Gender, Planning and Development. Lon- University Press, 1995. don: Routledge, 1993.

538 Fe´nelon, Franc¸ois

Narayan, Uma. Dislocating Cultures: Identities, Traditions Fe´nelon, Franc¸ois (1651–1715) and Third World Feminism. New York: Routledge, 1997. Franc¸ois de Salignac de la Mothe Fe´nelon was born Nelson, Hilde Lindemann. Feminism and Families. Lon- into a noble but impoverished family in Perigord. He don and New York: Routledge, 1997. was ordained in 1675; named director of the New Nicholson, Linda J. Feminism/Postmodernism. New York: Catholics (former Protestants) in 1678; appointed Routledge, 1990. tutor of Louis, Duc de Bourgogne (1682–1712, the Noddings, Nel. Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics grandson of Louis XIV) in 1689; elected to the and Moral Education. Berkeley: University of Califor- Acade´mie Franc¸aise in 1693; and made Archbishop nia Press, 1984. of Cambrai in 1697. At the center of major contro- Nussbaum, Martha, and Jonathan Glover, eds. Women, Culture and Development. Oxford: Clarendon Press, versies of the period, he rejected the Jansenist inter- 1995. pretation of AUGUSTINE (354–430) and opposed Okin, Susan Moller. Women in Western Political Thought. Bossuet (1627–1704) in the Quietist debate, a de- Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979. bate precipitated by his refusing to condemn Mme. ———. Justice, Gender and the Family. New York: Basic Guyon (1648–1717) as a heretical mystic. He set Books, 1989. out his position in Explication des maximes des Peters, Julie, and Andrea Wolper, eds. Women’s Rights, saints sur la vie inte´rieure (1697), in which he ar- Human Rights: International Feminist Perspectives. gues that saintly love of God is pure, radically dis- New York: Routledge, 1995. interested LOVE. Although his opposition to Bossuet Phelan, Shane. Identity Politics: and was costly in the short term—he was banished from the Limits of Community. Philadelphia: Temple Uni- versity Press, 1989. the court in 1697 and his book was condemned by ———. Getting Specific: Postmodern Lesbian Politics. Pope Innocent XII in 1699—his views on pure love, Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota , predestination and grace soon thereafter Press, 1994. found favor both in Rome and in France. He carried Plumwood, Val. Feminism and the Mastery of Nature. out pastoral functions as Archbishop in his war- London: Routledge, 1993. ravaged diocese until his death. Robinson, Fiona. Caring and International Relations. Fe´nelon’s work in philosophy was apologetic, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1999. though he believed that the path to the best apolo- Ruddick, Sara. Maternal Thinking: Towards a Politics of getics was that of reason and true philosophy. He Peace. New York: Beacon Press, 1989. admired the ancient philosophers—especially Sen, Gita, and Caren Grown. Development, Crises and Alternative Visions: Third World Women’s Perspec- (c. 430–347 B.C.E.)—and sought a synthesis of Au- tives. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1987. gustine and DESCARTES (1596–1650). In his earliest Sherwin, Susan. No Longer Patient: Feminist Ethics and work, he maintains that MALEBRANCHE’s (1638– Health Care. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1715) metaphysics, contrary to good theology and 1992. sound reason, restricts the possible to the necessary Spelman, Elizabeth V. Inessential Woman: Problems of and deprives God of free choice. On the contrary, he Exclusion in Feminist Thought. Boston: Beacon Press, argues, owing to God’s infinite perfection and power, 1989. God is free to create or not to create any possible Tronto, Joan C. Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument world entirely at his pleasure and does not, accord- for an Ethic of Care. New York: Routledge, 1993. ingly, choose a world because it is good, but makes Walker, Margaret. Moral Understandings: A Feminist Study in Ethics. New York: Routledge, 1998. the world good by choosing it. Wendell, Susan. The Rejected Body: Feminist Philosoph- And similarly by gratuitous choice does God ical Reflections on Disability. New York: Routledge, make the chosen few good and worthy of salvation. 1996. To the objection that this is at once unfair to those Wing, Adrien Katherine, ed. Critical Race Feminism: A who are not chosen and contrary to the scripture Reader. New York: New York University Press, 1997. that says that God wills that all be saved, Fe´nelon Young, Iris Marion. Intersecting Voices: Dilemmas of replies as follows: First, it is evident that we have Gender, , and Policy. Princeton: free will, the power to do or not to do A, even when Princeton University Press, 1997. A appears to us to be what we ought to do. Second— Alison M. Jaggar this is what it means to say that God wills that all

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